CRITICAL TRANSITIONS

From 1969 we’ll carry out crop production in common with the LPG Type III … What do you want from us now, we produce well. We have a high production; we have what we need and we’re doing fine …¹

(LPG Type I members in Burgtonna, Kreis Bad Langensalza make clear their lack of enthusiasm for developing advanced cooperation in crop production in February 1968.)

The solutions to the issue of cooperation are more difficult or rather more grave than was the formation of the LPGs.²

(Comments made by leading agricultural functionaries in discussion in Kreis Mühlhausen in October 1968.)

Much had been achieved during the 1960s in transforming agriculture in the GDR and changing the context in which agricultural policy was implemented. More LPG chairmen were technically trained and politically loyal. SED party secretaries and SED party organisations were becoming increasingly influential. An ever-increasing proportion of LPG members were achieving qualifications in socialist agricultural methods, learning specialist trades and, at more advanced levels, learning the techniques of socialist agricultural management and economics. Moreover, with the continuing absorption of Type I LPGs into Type III LPGs and the development of collective livestock herds, greater centralisation of farm management increased the uniformity and consistency with which the SED leadership was able to communicate its authority over the front line of production. Arguably by the end of the 1960s there had been some internalisation of the norms of socialist, collectivised and industrialised agriculture among the agricultural workforce alongside a stabilisation and routinisation of the structures of agricultural administration. These processes of transformation had, however, by no means been consistent or comprehensive in their scope and rested on fragile foundations.

There remained in 1968 a considerable gulf between the theoretical degree of agriculture’s development in the GDR and the actual extent to which individual LPGs were prepared to evolve. As had been too often demonstrated, there were limits to the speed with which reforms
could be imposed on reluctant collective farmers without damaging production and alienating a proportion of the population which was only just beginning, literally and metaphorically, to come to terms with the SED regime’s latest great intervention in their working lives. There were also limits to the ability of the economy as a whole to provide the investment needed to sustain the speed of this transformation. Finally, there were limits to the certainty of LPG functionaries as to which path of development was likely to be the most effective means of reaching the ultimate goal of a cost-efficient mechanised, concentrated and industrial-scale agriculture.

In 1968 and 1969 some LPGs were indeed marching forward – but not all were following the same path. Many LPGs, particularly Type I LPGs, were standing resolutely still, while the vast majority were being jostled and cajoled into more or less reluctant steps towards an uncertain future.

**Forced Evolution**

Since the late 1950s a considerable amount had been achieved in transforming the living conditions and working practices of villagers and farmers. It remained the case, however, that the zeal of district party functionaries for transforming the fundamental organisation of agriculture in the country did not correspond to the willingness or the ability of a large proportion of LPG managers, let alone the members at large, to accept change at such a rapid rate. At the same time agriculture, owing to its reliance more than ever on machinery, fuel and electricity, was becoming increasingly subject to growing inefficiencies in the rest of the economy. Bottlenecks in the supply of essential products from industry to agriculture were beginning in 1968 to have an impact on the efficiency of farming in Bezirk Erfurt.

The circumstances were thus by no means auspicious for any attempts to introduce a new pattern of agricultural organisation. The year 1968, however, saw the SED leadership call for far-reaching change in the status of the LPG as it was within the GDR’s economic system. In particular, the VII Party Congress of the SED in 1967 and the X German Farmers’ Congress in 1968 set a new agenda for the development of collective farming in the GDR, advocating the deepening of cooperative relations between LPGs, above all in crop production, and no less significantly the development of new structures regulating the LPGs’ supply of produce for public consumption. Attempts to force a rapid evolution of agricultural organisation, however, served only to demon-
strate how fragile the structures for communicating the authority of the SED leadership in rural society could be.

Speaking in March 1968 at the SED Bezirksparteiaktivtagung, the Secretary for Agriculture in the SED Bezirksleitung had stressed the need for ideological persuasion of LPG members before steps were taken in the formation of advanced cooperative relations between LPGs. As a farmer from an LPG Type I in Kreis Sömmerda was reported to have said with regard to suggestions of permanent cooperation in crop production: ‘It would be very easy … to make the whole thing law with a resolution. That would however be a breach of inner collective democracy and would erase the fact that “all power comes from the people”.’ As it was, the people – in this case collective farmers, particularly in the Type I LPGs – remained deeply sceptical of any measure which appeared to change their status. The development of permanent cooperation in crop production between two or more LPGs appeared to entail far-reaching changes to rights of ownership of land and also to the independent status of individual collective farms. It appeared, moreover, to sever the traditional connection between livestock and crop farming, which was something which farmers and agricultural functionaries in the state administration alike found hard to countenance.

Ulbricht’s comments at the X German Farmers’ Congress in 1968 were crucial inspiration for action to be taken by the KLRs to put renewed pressure on LPG chairmen to commit their farms to the rapid development of permanent cooperation in crop production. He appeared to announce that the structure of farming had to be – and would be – transformed in order to take advantage of the latest scientific and technological developments, which would in turn transform ‘the social organisation of production’. More clearly than ever before, it was articulated that traditional ideas of maintaining mixed crop and livestock farms – whatever the size – had no place in the future of agriculture in the GDR. In Ulbricht’s own words: ‘relatively ever more independent large production units for crop production and for the different branches of livestock production will gradually develop’. Cooperation was confirmed as no mere temporary solution but the essential link in the chain of future agricultural development.

At the same time, a radical change to the status of agriculture within the economy was announced. The solution to the problem of integrating agriculture into a more flexible demand-orientated planned economic system was sought in the formation of a new administrative body designed to regulate agriculture in conjunction with the food industry. At the X German Farmers’ Congress in July 1968 it was proposed therefore that the agricultural councils (Landwirtschaftsräte) were expanded to in-
clude representatives of the food industries (Räte für Landwirtschaft und Nahrungsgüterwirtschaft or RLNs). As a unified administration in the districts and the Bezirke the RLNs would, it was hoped, be able to oversee the coordinated development of agricultural organisation in line with the demands of the various food industries for industrial-scale, specialised production of certain agricultural products.

In order to coordinate and fund the construction of the necessary facilities for this development, so-called cooperative unions (Kooperationverbände or KOVs) were formed to coordinate farms with the food processing and distribution industries. With the growth of so-called vertical cooperation between LPGs and the food industry, reflected in administrative terms by the formation of the KOVs, the long-term goal of transforming agriculture into a controllable and therefore somewhat more predictable branch of the wider economy appeared in theory to be rapidly approaching.

The actual prospects for implementing this vision of modern agriculture and responsive economic planning any time soon were rather slim. Attempts to introduce material incentive and closer economic regulation through strict cost analysis and socialist competition into the LPGs during the 1960s had been intended not only to stimulate production but also to enable the regulation of different strands of agricultural production more efficiently. Under the New Economic System, rather than being defined by economic planners in the state administration, agricultural development – i.e. the specialisation and concentration of production – was ultimately to be orchestrated directly according to the priorities set by those industries which relied on agricultural produce to function. Agricultural production was thus to be flexibly controlled according to contracts established between the food processing industries – the so-called final producers who were best placed to gauge demand for particular produce – and the LPGs. The efficiency of vertical relations relied, however, on LPG chairmen implementing a system of contractual relations regulating the relationship between the various strands of crop and livestock production in accordance with sozialistische Betriebswirtschaft in agriculture. By 1968 very few chairmen had been moved to go so far. By 1969 approximately 60 per cent of LPGs in the Bezirk still had not implemented in full the system of sozialistische Betriebswirtschaft and LPG members had yet to be convinced of the value of vertical cooperation.

The lack of trust in the system of vertical cooperation was unsurprising given the problematic relationship LPGs often had with the food industries. Assessing the situation in 1968 in the experimental KOVs already established in Bezirk Erfurt, the agricultural department of
the SED Bezirksleitung concluded that the majority of final producers had proved unable to take effective responsibility for the whole chain of cooperation and were found to have resorted to ‘outdated working styles’, relying too heavily on bureaucratic methods to force LPGs to comply with their demands. In 1969 it became clear that representatives from final producers still not only did not necessarily have the requisite technical knowledge to make reasonable demands on farmers but also simply did not know enough about their suppliers to influence their development appropriately.

If there were obstacles to LPGs’ inclusion in vertical cooperation, the prospects for horizontal cooperation between collective farms to enable specialisation of crop production were also slim. Pressure on KOGs in Kreis Sömmerda to develop specialised crop production in advance of most of the rest of the Bezirk demonstrated the lack of convinced support for the policy among collective farmers or indeed among many LPG brigadiers, board members and even LPG chairmen.

In a number of KOGs in Kreis Sömmerda, the organisation of permanent cooperative crop production had been attempted during May and June 1968. This had proved less than successful, however. LPGs commonly chose not to share their machinery with one another. Few had specialised their crop production or changed their crop rotation or field structure in order to mass-produce, even where they had been given access to the latest machine systems. Despite the arrival of new technology in the form of the E512 combine harvester, the size of fields in even advanced cooperative communities (KOG) such as those based around Weissensee and Mannstedt, Kreis Sömmerda, where the average was below fifteen hectares, still did not allow for the most effective deployment of machinery.

Even in the most advanced KOGs the integrated deployment of machinery had barely been put into practice. Tractor drivers in Schellenburg expressed no desire to take their tractors to work around Sömmerda; LPG members in Tunzenhausen reportedly warned each other against allowing Sömmerda to ‘put one over on them’. In the LPG Straussfurt the prospect of specialisation as part of cooperation raised the question of what the rest of the workforce would do. In LPG Grossbrembach there was opposition to cooperation on the grounds that they were doing ‘quite well already and saw no reason to give others a boost’. The farmers of successful LPGs were rarely happy to cooperate with their underachieving neighbours. How, the crop production brigadier in Kleinneuhausen wondered in 1968, could he convince his fellow farmers of the benefits of cooperative relations as long as Beichlingen and other LPGs within the KOG continued to have such bad yields? There
was little desire among either collective farmers or their functionaries to sacrifice their success for the sake of their neighbours.\textsuperscript{14}

Persuading the rank-and-file members of the collective farms of the value to them of a joint crop production unit within their KOG was no small matter. The practical implementation of cooperation required fundamental changes not only to working practices but the whole manner in which farmers perceived their status and identity. As the chairman of the LPG Vehra, Kreis Sömmerda put it:

The step to a common crop production [between LPGs in a KOG] and the development of various cooperative relations is comparable to the step from being a private farmer to being a collective farmer. But back then there was a clear statute which indicated to each person what his rights and obligations were and everyone knew exactly, from their neighbours’ experience too, how things proceed and what awaited them. With the common crop production there is still a great deal unclear and we can’t give concrete answers to the questions members pose.\textsuperscript{15}

Collective farmers were not on the whole willing to agree to the principle of the matter while their pay and conditions in the new system remained uncertain. ‘How will pay be measured out fairly – will it be set at the level of the highest paying LPG? Will all the best functionaries work in crop production? How are all the requirements of the plan to be met if we specialise our crop production?’\textsuperscript{16} Even top- and mid-level cadres were reluctant to advocate something without any clear idea how it would affect their future. What status, they wondered, would they have within the new leadership structure in the joint crop production and the LPG? More seriously still, what if any status would the LPG have? If cooperative livestock units were set up alongside the cooperative crop production unit, would the individual LPG cease to exist altogether?\textsuperscript{17}

Despite the fact that such questions remained unresolved, the RLN (K) and the SED Kreisleitung in Kreis Sömmerda in particular, but also in neighbouring districts such as Kreis Bad Langensalza and Weimar,\textsuperscript{18} pressed cooperative councils to develop specialised cooperative crop production during the coming year. In accordance with the apparent instructions given at the X German Farmers’ Congress and the VII SED Party Congress, LPG chairmen who were anxious to be at the forefront of agricultural development set about arranging crop production in their KOGs independently of the individual LPGs. By February 1969, on paper there had been some success. The RLN (K) claimed to have finally ended any tendencies in the district towards the creation of Groß LPGs out of the full merger of the constituent collective farms in KOGs. It was clear, however, that mid-level cadres – technical advisers and

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heads of the work brigades – in the LPGs remained doubtful of the sense of separating crop production from the LPGs. There were also serious disagreements among leading cadres in a number of cooperative councils which had the potential to scupper harmonious cooperation.¹⁹

The development of the scale of crop production had gone a long way since the early 1960s. The pressure for even more rapid progress in the latter half of 1968 and 1969 via cooperative crop production, however, came increasingly at the expense of suitable preparation and persuasion of collective farmers. Much of the apparent progress which zealous LPG chairmen and RLN functionaries claimed to have made in organising cooperative crop production had been achieved so rapidly that there were real concerns that in practice it might have an adverse effect on production. Given growing problems in the economy at large as well as unrest in Czechoslovakia, there was arguably good reason to be wary of any measures that might unnecessarily undermine food production within the country.

Whether all this entered into his calculations or not, during the 10th Plenary Session (or Plenum) of the SED Central Committee in April 1969, Walter Ulbricht himself made some damning criticisms of the progress of agricultural transformation which his comments in 1968 had apparently sparked.²⁰ The response to Ulbricht’s intervention from the GDR’s collective farmers revealed a degree of confusion and deception alongside suppressed resentment and conflict throughout LPGs in the Bezirk which thoroughly surprised agricultural functionaries at all levels in the regime hierarchy. Enormous change had been achieved in the past decade; however, the limits and the possibilities of the social transformation of the countryside could now be seen in a truer light. The extent to which agricultural administration at the grass roots was formed by and beholden to the interests and attitudes of collective farmers rather than the malleable object of socialist modernising policy was once again demonstrated.

The Crisis Precipitated

Ulbricht’s intervention was necessary because certain aspects of the party line had, he claimed, been misinterpreted. Crop production was not to become independent of the LPGs, but, as he had said at the X German Farmers’ Congress, ‘relatively’ independent. The food industries were to have a coordinating and directing role over agriculture through the use of mutual contractual relations – not through their dominance of the councils of cooperative unions (KOV). There were thus two lines
to his criticism of the situation in agriculture: first, the organisation of the cooperative unions had given too much power to administrators in the food industry and undermined the independent status of the LPGs; secondly, a minority of LPGs in advanced states of cooperation had gone too far, too quickly, in the development of independent crop production. Change at such a rate was not suitable for all LPGs and thus these LPGs were no longer to receive publicity as models of the correct path of development.

Central to his comments was the notion of inviolability of the LPG as an economic unit, in which the principles of collective democracy were to be meticulously implemented. If a separate crop production was to exist, it was to be a sub-department of the KOG and its leaders subordinate to the chairmen of the LPGs. Moreover, Ulbricht argued that the development of cooperative relations in crop production must and could only occur gradually in consultation with LPG members.21

At a meeting of the RLN of the GDR in May 1969 to evaluate the 10th Plenum, Ulbricht’s arguments against the independence of the crop production units were reiterated.22 In the ensuing discussion it became clear how widespread divergent conceptions of the imminent development of agricultural organisation had become. At the meeting the influential chairman of the LPG Dahlen described how teachers at a technical college found the essence of the 10th Plenum difficult to grasp, given what they themselves had been told would be the next stage in the GDR’s agricultural development. It had been drummed into them thus far, one teacher told him, that in the future, ‘of the LPG only the telephone and the desk would be left’; in other words, the establishment of independent cooperative units by the KOG was indeed, as far as they understood the situation, the first step on the road to abandoning the idea of collective property altogether.23

There was certainly a tendency in much of the theoretical literature to predict ‘the dissolution of the class of the collective farmers’ in the near future. Soon farmers would have effectively the same status in society and rights of ownership as a factory worker. In particular, a dominant role for food industries in controlling agricultural production and the transfer of farmland from collective (genossenschaftlich) to cooperative (kooperativ) use seemed to point towards a change in the status of those working in agriculture and the rendering of the LPGs increasingly obsolete. This attitude was not wholly surprising given the continual and deliberate erosion of the proprietary ties between individual farmers and the land they farmed inherent in the reform of LPGs during the 1960s.

Gerhard Grüneberg, speaking to the national RLN, nevertheless now made clear that too much theorising had gone on, particularly as re-
gards the guiding role of the food industries in conjunction with agriculture. ‘There are mountains of books, and one is amazed, when one feels obliged to busy oneself with the matter, by all that has been written about agriculture and the food industry.’ His message to the delegates at the conference was that it was not practical for agriculture in general and the LPGs in particular to have their independence compromised. Farmers and not simply administrators were still essential to the effective management of a sector of the economy which remained in many respects subject to uncontrollable (unpredictable and thus unplannable!) natural conditions and would not submit simply to the plans of a bureaucrat, however efficient he might be.24

Criticism of recent developments in some LPGs sent shock waves running through the state and party administration concerned with agriculture. To some extent Ulbricht (and in his wake Grüneberg) had in fact done little more than publicly rein in those zealous functionaries who sought to realise the long-term goals of transformation in agriculture ahead of schedule. The essential course of agricultural development was more or less the same as before. Cooperative relations were still to be at the heart of a gradual move towards greater specialisation. The Groß LPG had not been overtly approved as a more effective means of reaching industrial-scale production. The persuasion of LPG members and their subsequent ratification of new measures in accordance with the demands of ‘collective democracy’ now, as before, was required (at least rhetorically) before progress could be made. Yet it soon became clear that the administration of agriculture from top to bottom was in fact highly sensitive to any suggestion that the steps taken thus far had been in any way mistaken.

In the course of 1968 and 1969 terms such as ‘rump LPG’ had begun to be used to describe what was left of some LPGs in the Bezirk once all-but-independent joint crop production units had been set up in a few of the KOGs. While the use of this pejorative phrase clearly expressed what was going wrong with the hasty development of cooperative crop production, there had equally clearly been some confidence among LPG functionaries that pursuing the administrative separation of crop production from the LPGs had been officially sanctioned. In some KOGs in Kreis Sömmerda there were reports that LPGs and joint crop production units had separated so much that headed letter paper had been designed and company name signs put up advertising their new status as either a ‘Cooperative crop production enterprise’ or a ‘Livestock production enterprise’. In such cases, where Ulbricht’s comments had some clear and direct relevance, i.e. in those few LPGs where intentions to proceed rapidly with developing separate specialised crop and live-
stock production had already begun to be put into practice, the Kreisleitungen were quick to respond. In the KOG Bachra, Kreis Sömmerda, the development of cooperation in crop production had proceeded so far that the joint crop production was on the verge of proclaiming its independence from its constituent LPGs. The SED Kreisleitung intervened to ensure that the head of the crop production was subordinate to an LPG chairman and responsible to the cooperative council. The chairman of the cooperative council thus could not at the same time be the head of the crop production unit. Furthermore, the joint crop production was to be renamed to identify its subordinate position to the LPGs. It was now to be known as a Cooperative Crop Production Unit, *(Kooperative Abteilung Pflanzenproduktion* or KAP), emphasising its dependence on the LPGs for its legal status.

Responding directly to the technical criticisms made by Ulbricht was one thing. Dealing with the confusion and rumour which abounded among farmers, LPG functionaries and the state apparatus in the districts was quite another. The variety of responses to Ulbricht’s comments in the LPGs and the district party and state administration revealed the complex balance in the relationship between collective farmers, their leading functionaries and the state and party hierarchy. The impossibility of agricultural transformation without some degree of consent from collective farmers themselves, and the often ambiguous role played by LPG functionaries in communicating state authority while protecting personal and local interests, was once again demonstrated.

**Crisis and Confusion in Agricultural Administration**

Such were the tensions which had developed in recent years within LPGs, within KOGs and between LPGs and the district authorities that Ulbricht’s comments were seized upon as an excuse for attacking all that seemed to be wrong with the status quo in agriculture. What appeared to give farmers and LPG functionaries alike the grounds for their attacks was the emphasis placed upon the independence of the LPG and the importance of consultation as part of collective democracy. Anger and resentment over the lack of consultation with LPG members on policies such as cooperation or the introduction of socialist business economics had reached boiling point. There were thus various strands to the complaints unleashed at the grass roots by the 10th ZK Plenum, not all of which bore an immediate relation to the actual subject of Ulbricht’s own criticisms.
A meeting of the SED Kreisleitung Sömmerda in July 1969 to discuss Ulbricht’s concluding remarks heard a report on the reaction of farmers in the district. It was claimed hopefully that the majority of the collective farm members understood correctly that the 10th Plenum did not mean a correction of agricultural policy but rather a continuation of the resolutions of the VII SED Party Congress, with the caveat that this process must not be mismanaged through impatience. In the first days and weeks after the 10th Plenum, however, mid-level LPG cadres were marked out as being particularly problematic, spreading the opinion that ‘thanks to the 10th Plenum they could all now take their time and that cooperation would be scaled back’.

More seriously, Ulbricht’s remarks were being interpreted as a licence for collective farms to assert their individual independence from outside interference, be it from other LPGs or the state apparatus. One chairman of an LPG was reported to have collected all the newspaper articles he could find on the subject of collective democracy. His intention appears to have been to use them as proof that he could not legitimately implement change without the agreement of his members.26 Members of the LPG Lützensömmern in Kreis Bad Langensalza were among the first in Bezirk Erfurt to take the opportunity to voice their frustration and reclaim some independence. The KOR and the RLN (K), they complained, had too often taken decisions affecting the LPG members without any prior discussion of the matter and they had thus been forced to accept what amounted to faits accomplis.27 Reports compiled by the DBD in Bezirk Erfurt during May 1969 on the mood in the countryside highlighted the sense among LPG members that recently they had been bullied into things or not listened to sufficiently by functionaries at various levels of agricultural administration, from the LPG board, the KOR, up into the district state administration, and this situation would now have to be rectified. In Kreis Erfurt-Land in particular, DBD members complained about the damage done to the independence of their LPGs because of the pressure put upon them by the RLN (K).28

Such complaints could be more or less justified in the context of the 10th Plenum. However, doubts over the validity of previous agricultural policy also began to be expressed. LPG members made the point that they had the right to be properly consulted and prepared for cooperation and the separation of crop and livestock production. They also, however, began to suggest that they had a right actively to determine their own path of development. If cooperative relations could only be developed against the will of collective farmers then, the question was
raised, was it not correct that no such relations exist until farmers were convinced of their value?

In Kreis Arnstadt as well as Kreis Bad Langensalza, collective farmers who in the past had been particularly obstinate in their resistance to cooperation began to draw this conclusion. Where few or no extensive cooperative relations had developed between LPGs, they considered themselves right all along not to have participated in cooperation. Doubts even began to be raised as to whether KOGs could continue to exist at all, if the majority of LPGs opposed them.29

Faced with the apparent vindication of collective farmers’ hostility to cooperation after the 10th Plenum, LPG functionaries and the staff of the RLN (K) appeared for a time to be at a loss as to how to respond. The chairman of the LPG Kalteneber in Heiligenstadt reportedly expressed his confusion and disillusionment: ‘The question which concerns me is whether agricultural policy has changed since the 10th Plenum? There are currently many discussions: cooperation is going to be broken up, or cooperation will lead to the liquidation of the class of the collective farmer. I’m not against new things, but it’s not so easy for us up here as it is for those farmers down in the plains.’30 In Kreis Heiligenstadt, Mühlhausen and Erfurt-Land, staff of the district councils appeared to be uncertain what was going on in the LPG assemblies.31 DBD sources noted too that the LPGs were no longer receiving guidance from staff from the SED Kreisleitung or the RLN (K), who themselves no doubt were unclear what the correct path ought to be. In Steinrode, Kreis Worbis some DBD members pointed out that representatives of the district authorities used to participate in every meeting of the cooperative council, but had not turned up once since the 10th Plenum.32

Even where the RLN (K)s did attempt to continue to advise the LPGs, however, it was soon clear that concrete decisions about the future of individual KOGs were not possible. Following the 10th Plenum, the RLN (K) in Kreis Sömmerda initially continued to press ahead, encouraging the development of joint crop production in the KOG Kölleda. The economics advisory service attached to the RLN (K) had worked out plans and practices for a joint cooperative crop production in the KOG Kölleda which appeared to be in tune with the 10th Plenum line, as they ‘in no way limited the role of the LPGs and foresaw the payment of farmers via the individual collective farms’. There remained, however, a major obstacle to the establishment of a joint cooperative crop production in the KOG: namely the ‘current ideological attitude of members’. This the RLN (K) admitted would have to be discussed shortly in ‘comprehensive consultation’ in the LPGs.33 The following month, in a discussion at the district RLN in Kreis Sömmerda, it was reported that
the fixed attitude of LPG members in a number of collective farms was that cooperation in crop production should be broken up and the LPGs allowed to be independent again. Among these was the LPG ‘Neuer Weg’ (‘New Path’) Kölleda. In a letter sent by the chairman and party secretary to the chairman of their KOG, they explained the decision of the LPG’s board to withdraw from cooperative crop production. The letter concluded with the chairman and party secretary expressing their regret at this decision having been reached. They pointed out, however, that even they could not get around the words ‘the farmers decide’.34

By mid-August, the RLN (K) could not help but notice that some KOGs were likely to be hard put to continue even with minor forms of cooperation between LPGs during the harvest. The KOG Mannstedt, it found, was more or less falling apart. In the neighbouring LPGs in Buttsstädt, Olbersleben and Essleben, the opinion was widespread, among LPG cadres as well as ordinary farmers, that joint crop production would be broken up and the LPGs allowed to become independent again. It was thus unsurprising that in the KOG Buttsstädt even the use of machinery in combination between LPG Essleben and LPG Buttsstädt had fallen apart and each LPG had begun to employ its own machinery for its own purposes. All in all, in the words of the SED Kreisleitung, the level of cooperation in this part of the district had ‘just about reached zero’.35 At the August meetings of the SED party organisations in the LPGs in Sömmerda district, the backlash against cooperation continued. In Werningshausen, among other places, the opinion was widespread among LPG members that the deployment of harvesters in cooperation put their LPG at a disadvantage.36

Looking back on 1969, a report on the development of cooperation by the SED Bezirksleitung admitted that ‘immediately after the 10th Plenum people no longer worked conscientiously towards realising and fixing cooperative relations’. Among leading cadres in the LPGs as well as in the state apparatus there was insecurity and a ‘wait and see’ attitude to the further development of cooperation. In sixty-nine out of 150 cooperative communities in the Bezirk a joint unit for crop production had in theory been established. However, given the confusion and conflicts surrounding cooperative production, these KAPs were often not particularly efficient and their inefficiency had only been exacerbated by the poor weather during 1969. Justified dissatisfaction with the whole notion of the KAP among LPG members developed as a result, along with the revived tendency among leading cadres to advocate the Groß LPG as a better alternative.37

Now that the need for large-scale production was widely accepted, it seemed to many farmers that the best alternative to cooperation, which
seemed to solve the conflicts between LPGs and confusion over ownership and distribution of profits and costs between crop and livestock production, was once again the Groß LPG.

The lack of an influential body of advocates of SED agricultural policy promoting the continuation of cooperation in either the KOGs or in individual LPGs clearly increased the chances that alternative ideas would gain widespread support among the general membership. In January and February 1970 a number of reports came in to the SED Bezirksleitung of party organisations whose members claimed to be unable to exert any influence on the boards of the LPGs. In many LPGs, party comrades complained that they were not being sufficiently informed. SED members in Bad Tennstedt remarked: ‘Whenever the discussion is about decisive questions, we don’t get asked, but rather find out about the decisions made by the board only in the pub later on.’ In Oßmanstedt SED members similarly complained: ‘Basically we don’t get asked at all, if for example some thing needs to be built, that’s the board’s decision alone.’

Where the SED was weak, this was often put down to the existence of a strong alternative party group. DBD members occupying the key functionary positions in particular appeared in a number of cases to be blamed for the failure of SED organisations to have sufficient influence over the direction of individual LPGs’ development. Naturally there were many cases in which DBD cadres and party groups in general worked well with SED party members and sought actively to implement current SED policy. The support for the Groß LPG and hostility towards cooperation shown by some DBD members however, raised suspicion in the SED Kreisleitungen. As a consequence, where cooperative relations had ground to a halt, DBD members in leading positions in the LPGs were suspected, whether fairly or not, of deliberately undermining cooperation while speaking publicly in its favour.

In a meeting with the first secretary of the SED Kreisleitung, Weimar in August 1970, the chairman of the LPG Kromsdorf, himself a member of the DBD, sought to outline some of the basic problems with the development of cooperation since the 10th Plenum in his area. In his analysis, the mood in the collective farms had worsened because ‘the 10th Plenum has not gone out of the minds of the members yet’. At the same time the new organisational structure of the crop production was not conducive to efficient farming. It was proving difficult, for example, for LPG chairmen to have to apply for access to machinery and manpower to a functionary – the head of the crop production unit – who was technically not his superior. The dropping value of the work unit and a cut in the funds available for bonuses had also added to the gen-
eral dissatisfaction with the new arrangements. The SED Kreisleitung, however, chose to see the problem as essentially one of ideological discipline. Their report concluded: ‘it certainly does not overstate the case to make the assertion that cooperative relations above all are hindered by such cadres as do not belong to the SED’.41

Whether this assessment was entirely fair or not, in the aftermath of the 10th Plenum, it became clear that the SED regime had failed to close the ideological deficit in the LPGs. The long-term goals of socialist agricultural policy continued to be regarded with suspicion by collective farmers and for the time being the apparatus through which agricultural policy was to be communicated and implemented in the LPGs appeared at best unsure of itself and at worst to have broken down. Amid a worsening economic crisis, the district state authorities appeared unable to give sufficient guidance or practical advice to the LPGs on how they ought to organise themselves. At the same time, LPG chairmen found it impossible to agree with each other on how to proceed with cooperation. Under these circumstances, the possibilities for a coherent programme of future development to be agreed between LPG cadres, LPG members and the district agricultural councils was in most cases remote.

Administrative Gridlock

After the upheavals resulting from the 10th Plenum, how LPGs of various types, in their various stages of development towards merger and cooperation, could or should proceed to develop their production facilities remained obscure to LPG members and their functionaries. The RLN (K)s, too, appeared to be reticent in dictating a coherent direction to the LPGs given the reassertion of collective democracy and consultation of collective farmers which Ulbricht’s comments had provoked. Whether or not cooperation between LPGs, leading to the ultimate separation of crop production from livestock production, ought to be actively pursued for the time being was once again cast into doubt. By the same token, LPG chairmen were not sure whether they ought rather to pursue merger with their neighbours or indeed whether they should seek to remain independent and build up their production facilities individually.42

Dealing with these dilemmas was made far more complicated by the atmosphere of uncertainty and fear of financial catastrophe among collective farmers, which resulted from sudden shortages in the supply of essential equipment to LPGs in 1969 and 1970. DBD functionaries in
Kreis Sömmerda and Kreis Worbis found they could give little satisfactory explanation to collective farmers who could not understand why the supply of essential spare parts for machinery was so much worse than in previous years.43

A lower than average yield from the 1969 harvest added to the sense of crisis in some parts of the Bezirk. The whole business of malfunctioning cooperation and specialisation was blamed for aggravating the situation by affecting both the quality and variety of crops produced. Shortages of feed crops in particular strengthened criticism of cooperation in crop production, especially where collective farmers thought that their LPG was receiving less than their fair share, or at least less than was required to sustain their livestock. In some LPGs the downturn in productivity had a serious and immediate effect on working conditions. Just how difficult things had become in some LPGs is evidenced by a noticeable rise in the number of LPG members seeking to withdraw from the collective farms in disillusionment over the poverty in which they worked.44

In the course of the harvest in 1969, it had become clear that in those advanced KOGs where separate cooperative crop production had in fact been established, there was often unresolved and disruptive rivalry between the cadres of the LPGs and those of the crop production unit.45 By the end of 1969, the cooperative councils of numerous KOGs had simply stopped meeting – existing rather ‘only on paper’.46 During 1970 hostility to cooperative crop production appeared to grow rather than diminish among collective farmers. Members of LPGs harked back to the time prior to the formation of the cooperative crop production, commenting: ‘now there is a lot of waste, there is frustration and irritation, instead of progressing, things are going backwards’.47 By the end of the year LPG chairmen in a number of KOGs were considering whether or not to abandon cooperative relations altogether.48 Even where cooperative communities were seemingly up and running, investigation by the RLN (K)s into the extent of cooperative relations revealed the superficiality with which they functioned.49

By January 1971, the SED Bezirksleitung estimated that approximately fifty-two of the KOGs in the Bezirk had a cooperative crop production section.50 This accounted, however, for less than half the LPGs. For the majority there was still considerable opposition to cooperation. A number of SED Kreisleitungen were still reporting a lack of clarity over the ‘meaning in principle and objective necessity of cooperative relations’ among LPG members and functionaries. In Kreis Sömmerda LPGs were still considering withdrawing from cooperative communities.51 In the KOG Tannroda, Kreis Weimar, the LPG chairmen them-
selves were thought to be preventing the development of cooperative crop production by simply not taking the steps in practice which they had publicly agreed upon in the cooperative council. The SED Kreisleitung regarded this state of affairs as the result of unwillingness rather than incapability. Allegedly, the discussions of the cooperative council were also notorious among some members of the LPGs for failing to correspond to reality, earning their meetings the nickname ‘the fairytale hour’.52

Reports on the mood among collective farmers paint a rather desperate picture, with stagnation in development, problems with production and an apparent inability by either the RLN (K) or the cooperative councils to take action to improve the situation in the individual farms.53 As a result of the conflicts which cooperation in crop production seemed to cause, there was certainly no consensus in the Bezirk that the separate specialisation of crop and livestock production was indeed the correct way to develop agriculture. During 1971 there were a number of discussions with farmers in the LPGs where cooperative crop production units had been recently established. The same complaints came up repeatedly in nearly all the LPGs in the district where such discussions were held: that the new relationship between crop and livestock was having a negative effect on the quantity and quality of the feed on offer. As a result, both ordinary members and leading cadres of the LPGs began openly to suggest that the ‘tearing asunder’ of crop and livestock production was mistaken.54 Even though LPG cadres were known to have been removed from their posts for actively advocating the Groß LPG as an alternative to the separation of crop and livestock production, there remained considerable uncertainty as to whether such views would not soon be considered acceptable. Until the outcome of the SED’s VIII Party Congress was known, LPG chairmen were known to be hesitant to pursue cooperation.55

Conclusion

The last two years of the decade demonstrated more dramatically than ever before the limits of the state apparatus’s ability to drive forward transformation and the lack of strong SED influence over farmers. The shifting parameters within which agricultural development had taken place were necessarily shaped by technological advancement and the transformative ideals of socialist ideology. However, they were also clearly shaped by the need for compromise with the personal interests of collective farmers themselves, as they were managed (and misman-
aged) by the functionaries of the LPGs and the agricultural administration at the grass roots. With the future still uncertain, the failure to deal with the lack of consensus of interests between the SED leadership and LPG members and their functionaries exposed the fragility of what up to then had seemed increasingly stable structures of authority in the districts.

Out of the conflict and confusion arising after the 10th Plenum and the more general economic uncertainty caused by the failure of economic reforms, paradoxically a new relationship began to take shape between the SED leadership and the agricultural workforce. As ever greater restrictions were placed on private production, increasingly well-trained and specialised collective farmers began to accept the necessity of specialising agricultural production and actively supported the development of new and stable structures of agricultural administration at the grass roots. The promise of an end to austerity and a secure future under a more rigorous system of economic planning began too to enable both new and older generations of collective farmers to accept a reconfiguration of the agricultural system.

Notes

1. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt IV/B/2/7-268 SED Bezirksleitung, Abt. Landwirtschaft, Bericht über die LPG in Burgtonna, 29.2.1968, pp. 123–4. The report describes how a members’ assembly was held in secret in order that a resolution could be passed against cooperation without interference from the village mayor or the chairman of the LPG Type III.


3. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt IV/B/2/2-022 Protokoll der Bezirksparteiaktivtagung zu den Fragen und Aufgaben der sozialen Landwirtschaft am 7.3.1968, Referat Genosse Lüdecke, p. 3.


5. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A/1/7/57 ZK der SED Abt. Landwirtschaft, Seminarplan für das Seminar mit den Führungskadern aus der LuN am 13.11.1968 in Liebenwalde.

6. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt IV/A/2/3-179 RdB Erfurt, Bericht über den Stand der Konzeption und
Erprobung einiger Grundsatzfragen zur weiteren Anwendung und Ver-

7. SAPMO BArch DY30/IV A 2/2.023/220 Büro Gerhard Grüneberg, Proto-


9. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt IV/B/2/7-248/1 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Landwirtschaft, Entwurf – Analyse über die Weiterführung des Experimentes des ÖSS, 30.4.1968, p. 3.


14. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Kreisleitung der SED Sömmerda IV/B/4.10/190 SED Kreisleitung Abt. Landwirtschaft, Zu mündli-
chen Berichten vor dem Sekretariat der Bezirksleitung, 7.5.1968, p. 1.


18. The KOG Berlstedt, Kreis Weimar was among the most advanced in the GDR in developing specialised production through cooperation. As an experimental model for the most efficient means of establishing agriculture on an industrial scale it had an exceptional status within the Bezirk, which enabled it to develop organisationally far in advance of other KOGs.


21. The cooperation based around Berlstedt, Kreis Weimar had for many years been a model of advanced socialist agricultural policy. However, in the con-
text of the 10th Plenum in 1969, Walter Ulbricht made it clear that Berlstedt
was no longer an example which should be followed. Although not wholly
critical of the developments made by the LPGs in the KOG Berlstedt, the
overall direction was no longer to be publicised, particularly as regards
specialisation. SAPMO BArch DY30/IV 2/1/395 Tagungen des ZK der SED –
22. SAPMO BArch DY30/IV A 2/2.2023/169 Büro Gerhard Grüneberg, RLN der
23. SAPMO BArch DY30/IV A 2/2.2023/169 Büro Gerhard Grüneberg, RLN der
DDR – 6. Tagung am 16.5.1969, Beitrag des Genossen Döhler, Vorsitzender
der LPG Dahlen.
24. SAPMO BArch DY30/IV A 2/2.2023/169 Büro Gerhard Grüneberg RLN der
25. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Kreisleitung der SED Söm-
merda IV/B/4.10/200 SED Kreisleitung, Abt. Landwirtschaft, Probleme der
26. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Kreisleitung der SED IV/
B/4.10/190 SED Kreisleitung Sömmerda, Abt. Landwirtschaft, Kreislei-
27. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Er-
furt IV/B/2/5-183 SED Bezirksleitung, Abt. Parteiorgane, Kurzinformation,
Stimmen von Genossenschaftsbäuerinnen und -bauern zum Schlusswort
des Genossen Walter Ulbricht auf der 10. Tagung des ZK zum Problem der
28. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Er-
furt IV/B/2/5-410 DBD Bezirksverband, Bericht an den 1. Sekretär der Be-
29. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Er-
furt IV/B/2/5-183 SED Bezirksleitung, Abt. Parteiorgane, Kurzinformation,
Stimmen von Genossenschaftsbäuerinnen und -bauern zum Schlusswort
des Genossen Walter Ulbricht auf der 10. Tagung des ZK zum Problem der
30. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Er-
furt IV/B/2/5-183 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Parteiorgane, Kurzinformation
31. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Er-
furt IV/B/2/5-183 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Parteiorgane, Kurzinformation
32. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Er-
furt IV/B/2/5-410 DBD Bezirksverband, Auswertung der Berichte der Kreis-
verbände über Meinungen unserer Mitglieder zum 10. Plenum des ZK der
33. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Kreisleitung der SED Söm-
merda IV/B/4.10/200 RLN Sömmerda, Produktionsleitung an die SED
Kreisleitung, über KOG Kölleda, 17.7.1969, p. 139.
34. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Kreisleitung der SED IV/
B/4.10/200 Vorsitzender und Parteisekretär der LPG ‘Neuer Weg’ Kölleda
44. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Kreisleitung der SED Söm-
46. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt IV/B/2/5-410 DBD Bezirksverband, Zu einigen Entwicklungsproblemen der sozialistischen Landwirtschaft im Bezirk Erfurt, 12.11.1969, pp. 197–208.
49. ThHStAW RöB L14600 RLN (B), Probleme bei Durchsetzung der sozialistischen Demokratie und Durchführung des Wettbewerbes in den LPG und KOG im Bezirk Erfurt im 1970 (undated).
52. ‘Fairytale hour’ here translates the German ‘Märchenstunde’: ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt IV/B/2/7-268 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Landwirtschaft, Information über Aussprachen in der KOG Tannroda, Kreis Weimar, 8.3.1971.