RESISTANCE, COMPROMISE AND ‘COOPERATION’

Cooperation means making sure other LPGs have a higher value of work unit; bringing advantages for some but disadvantages for others; and it means that we’d have to give up what we’ve achieved to help those who have been left behind.1

(Machine Brigade Leader, Wundersleben, Kreis Sömmerda, 1966)

By the mid-1960s, the LPGs were no longer a new or controversial phenomenon. The context in which farming took place in the GDR continued nevertheless to shift, as the SED leadership continued to pursue a radical transformation of the conditions of agricultural production. Levels of recruitment to the SED and levels of more and less advanced degrees of qualification among farmers continued to increase, as the size of the agricultural workforce declined. The economic pressures on members of Type I LPGs to establish collective livestock holdings or agree to merge with Type III LPGs ensured the extent of private farming was being continually scaled back. Moreover, new technology was beginning to raise yields, and in turn improve working conditions and incomes for the agricultural workforce. Nevertheless, growing uncertainty as to their future in a reformed system of socialist agriculture among both LPG farmers and functionaries continued to limit the pace and the extent to which the agricultural councils were in a position to drive the implementation of SED agricultural policy. With no guarantee of financial security there were few LPG members willing to compromise what stability they had thus far achieved.

The Early Development of Cooperation

Parallel to the debate over the implementation of the NÖS in the LPGs was the issue of establishing the conditions for more cost-intensive mechanised production. By the mid-1960s, after a series of mergers, most LPGs had reached a stable position financially and, responding to the policies of the NÖS, had raised significant levels of accumulated
capital. This, alongside considerable improvements in the numbers and capacity of tractors, harvesters and other machinery available in the GDR, made mechanised crop production on a larger scale and the beginnings of large-scale intensive livestock production possible. However, it was still not clear what was the most effective means by which collective farmers would be brought to combine their resources.

Solutions to these problems presented themselves in two forms: the development of cooperative relations between two or more LPGs; or the merger of collective farms together to form a so-called Groß LPG combining crop and livestock production on a larger scale under a single leadership. There were strong tendencies among some LPG managers to seek to develop the scale of production under their personal control. In most cases, however, the KLRs were reluctant to endorse mergers between LPGs across more than one village during the early 1960s, for fear this would limit further possibilities for a more effective rationalisation of resources in later years. Moreover, the development of cooperative relations did not preclude but rather provided the basis for possible mergers in the future.

Cooperation between LPGs could occur in a number of different forms and had begun to be developed on a small scale since the early 1960s. LPGs had already started to combine their efforts on construction projects, cooperate on building up stocks of animals between the collectives and form joint land improvement cooperatives. As the 1960s developed, LPGs were encouraged to expand their participation in local cooperative projects – particularly with regard to the use of land and machinery – as increased yields would enable the GDR to become less dependent on importing feed for livestock. To achieve greater yields LPGs had to be encouraged to combine their resources to increase the fertility of the soil and to move on to ever more effective use of the large machinery now available. While few farmers objected in principle to cooperation where there was mutual benefit, there was considerable suspicion of what cooperation might lead to and of how the finances of their LPG would be affected.

Assessing developments in March 1965, the BLR estimated that approximately 15 per cent of the LPGs in the Bezirk were involved in some form of cooperation. The degree of openness to the idea of establishing cooperative relations between LPGs among collective farmers and the leading functionaries of the LPGs varied across the Bezirk. Kreis Erfurt-Land and Kreis Weimar had the most cooperating collective farms. In contrast, in Kreis Nordhausen and Kreis Mühlhausen very few LPGs had entered into any form of cooperative relationship. Part of the reason for this difference, even at this early stage in the development of coopera-
tion, was the different solutions which cooperative relations offered the LPGs in different parts of the country. In the uplands of the Bezirk where the LPGs were small, mainly of Type I and arable land not very easily farmed on a large scale, cooperation was immediately worthwhile, above all for building larger, more efficient livestock sheds, silage and storage facilities. This required LPG members to be willing to invest considerable sums in construction projects which would bind them together with their neighbours for years to come as well as committing them, if they belonged to an LPG Type I, to scale back their private livestock.\(^4\)

Cooperative relations represented a degree of commitment to the long-term transformation of the conditions of ownership for members of Type I LPGs which they considered neither practicable nor desirable. At the SED Bezirksparteiaktivtagung in December 1964 it was reported that among a number of farmers, particularly in the smaller LPGs, cooperative relations with their neighbours were rejected outright. Members of the LPG Type I in Görmär, Kreis Mühlhausen allegedly believed: ‘cooperative relations have the purpose of enabling large LPGs to swallow small collective farms and enrich themselves at their expense’.\(^5\) In Kreis Nordhausen members of small LPGs under 100 hectares also doubted the value of cooperation, raising questions such as: ‘Aren’t we giving up our independence with the creation of cooperative relations? Won’t we be done over by stronger LPGs?’\(^6\)

In contrast, in the flatlands in the heart of the Bezirk where large-scale arable plantations were possible, cooperative institutions were set up mainly to deal with auxiliary processes from crop production such as feed preparation and the transport and drying of crops. Not only was participation in such forms of cooperation not necessarily an overwhelming commitment which entailed compromising the independence of a significant facet of (private) production, it was also of clear and immediate benefit to the LPGs involved.\(^7\) An analysis of the extent of cooperation in Kreis Erfurt-Land in 1965 noted that all of the LPGs in the district belonged to one of seventeen so-called Cooperative Communities (*Kooperationsgemeinschaften* or KOGs) of two or more cooperating LPGs.\(^8\)

From the SED’s point of view cooperation was an ideal solution to many of the problems undermining agriculture’s development since collectivisation. The imbalance in the economic and social development of individual LPGs could begin to be evened out once neighbouring collective farms began to share the burdens of improving production facilities. The influence of politically loyal collective farmers and technically capable cadres was given the opportunity to spread beyond the confines of a single LPG. At the same time, the possibilities increased for
establishing industrial-scale specialised production above all in joint arable farming between LPGs. Cooperation provided, too, a halfway house to ease the transition for small Type I LPGs on their way to a merger with a larger neighbour. The process of working together brought with it necessarily both greater familiarity and steps towards greater conformity in the financial organisation of the LPGs, potentially making for a smoother merger.

However, these arguments in favour of cooperative relations also provided the basis for much of the opposition from collective farmers, who remained resistant to interference in the internal workings of their collective farm. Cooperation threatened to subordinate LPG members’ interests to outside influence, transform their way of life and working practices and potentially rob them of their independence altogether. The progress of cooperation between LPGs depended heavily, therefore, on the collective farmers’ perception of their status and future within agriculture in the GDR.

Farming practices had changed since 1960. Investment in construction and machinery for agriculture had brought with it new routines and new expectations for all those involved in the LPGs. In five years of full collectivisation, approximately one in five members of the agricultural workforce had left the profession, while the number of tractors available to the LPGs had doubled and the number of combine harvesters had tripled. The total number of LPGs had been reduced through mergers and a number of Type I LPGs had begun to develop collective livestock holdings. The process of transforming agriculture from small-scale, unspecialised and unconcentrated production methods, over which little direct control could be exerted, into an industrial-scale, specialised and concentrated system of production responsive to state demand and more easily subordinated to administrative control had begun with collectivisation. Establishing cooperative relations between LPGs promised to move this process forward. The long-term consequences of developing cooperative relations between LPGs represented, however, a far more dramatic transformation of rural existence in the GDR even than collectivisation.

Grounds for Continuing Hostility to Cooperation

As a result of the expansion and specialisation of production which went hand in hand with cooperation between neighbouring LPGs, collective farmers expected not only changes to their daily work routine and the location of the workplace but also a change in their status as
farmers – at the very least a dilution of their rights as theoretical landowners. Both rank-and-file collective farmers and LPG chairmen who had remained suspicious of the impact on them – on their status as farmers and stakeholders in the LPG – of a rapid transformation of agricultural production, thus remained keen to limit the speed with which such measures were implemented. Their reticence was exacerbated by a desire to consolidate and a growing sense of identification and possession of the LPG among its members that rejected the prospect of their LPG losing independent control over its wealth, land and machinery. In 1960 the individual farmer had protested against any incursion on his private ownership of his land or animals or his independence; now, collective farmers acted as one to protect the resources and independence of their LPG.

The First Secretary of the SED Bezirksleitung was at pains to make it clear to leading party members working in agriculture that the precondition for an LPG’s participation in cooperation and subsequent merger ought to be mutual consent. Appearing to respond to complaints that Type III LPGs had, with state and party agreement, in fact exploited neighbouring Type Is, he cautioned agricultural functionaries attending the SED Bezirksparteiaktivtagung in December 1965: ‘You can’t do things, and I say it quite openly, in such a way that the Type III LPGs pillage the Type Is.’

Throughout the Bezirk, LPG Type I members and their chairmen nevertheless remained wary of establishing cooperative relations which threatened to lead to exploitation of their resources and ultimately loss of their independence. In some cases their fears were justified. The BLR clearly intended that the district agricultural councils should concentrate their efforts on establishing cooperative relations between neighbouring Type I LPGs and Type III LPGs where the latter were in clear need of the resources of the former. During 1965 and 1966 the KLRs thus sought to increase the pressure on the smallest LPGs to develop cooperative relations with their neighbours in order to maximise the scale on which production could be undertaken.

The desire to consolidate what had already been achieved hardened rejection of cooperation even where KLR functionaries argued that independent production was no longer reasonable given the machinery now available. Those LPGs which had begun to achieve a level of profitability were unwilling to jeopardise either this success or their independence, calling upon the authorities of party and state to leave them be for a while. Members of all LPG types argued that they would rather buy their own machinery with their own money and use it independently even if they weren’t able to maximise its effect. LPG chairmen,
charged with brokering effective relations with one another, clearly were convinced that their LPGs had much more to lose than others in the long term as a result of cooperation.

In this context it is unsurprising that attempts at the joint deployment of machinery belonging to more than one LPG during the harvest in 1965 were often marred by mutual suspicion. So-called integrated deployments (Komplexeinsätze) of machinery from a number of different LPGs at the same time demanded a clear plan for the order of work and a clear division of authority. Such matters, however, had rarely been finally and definitely agreed upon in August 1965 since LPG chairmen were reluctant to commit themselves to measures which might disadvantage their LPG. The few attempts at the integrated deployment of machinery by groups of LPGs during the harvest in 1965 tended thus to break down. LPG functionaries, it was reported, tended to see to their own concerns before helping their partners in the cooperation.13

Attempts to arrange more informal cooperation in the use of machinery between some LPGs in the course of the harvest also tended to break down rather quickly amid confusion and mutual suspicion. Given the importance of exploiting good weather conditions and the potential danger to any crop left too long in the field, the leading functionaries of the individual LPGs were understandably concerned not to lose out to their neighbours in the timely use of machinery. Quite apart from the loss of income, appearing to be hoodwinked by one’s neighbours was a sign of weakness which few LPG cadres did not resent, and which few LPG members did not scorn in their leaders.

Without functioning cooperative councils (Kooperationsräte or KORs) to coordinate the resources in men and machines of the constituent LPGs of the cooperative communities, and no formal agreements on how the harvest was to proceed, LPG leaders soon insisted on taking back their own machinery and equipment to harvest independently.14 Even in the more advanced districts such as Kreis Erfurt-Land, harvest machine systems were deployed independently by individual LPGs. There were even instances of large Type III LPGs refusing ‘socialist aid’ to their neighbouring collective farms despite the fact that their machinery was not in use at the time.15 LPG Type III farmers resented having to adopt struggling Type I LPGs which appeared to be paying the price now for the (‘selfish’) refusal to develop their production facilities in the past. Certainly there was no desire to put one’s own LPG in financial jeopardy for the sake of another. On occasion chairmen of Type III LPGs were known to refuse proposals from the KLR that they cooperate with farmers from the LPG Type I, at the very least unless they could demonstrate the ability to achieve parity in their yields.16
In 1965 there was some evidence of successful cooperation between several LPGs based around the small town of Trebra, Kreis Sondershausen. The SED Kreisleitung reported that there had been sufficient prior discussion among leading local cadres – party secretaries as well as LPG chairmen – to enable machinery to be shared between the LPGs. The Kreisleitung’s Secretary for Agriculture made clear above all that the key to success had been sufficient preparation of farmers beforehand. In his words: ‘LPG farmers prefer not to slip into a finished corset.’\(^{17}\) It was clear, however, that at this stage LPG farmers of all types along with their leading cadres on the whole were not convinced that they were not going to be stitched up – be it in a corset of either their own making or someone else’s.\(^ {18}\)

In 1965 Type I LPGs still outnumbered Type III LPGs in the Bezirk. Of 651 Type I LPGs 122 were less than 100 hectares in size and a further 350 less than 300 hectares in size.\(^ {19}\) Cooperation was thus put forward as the key to rationalising production while maintaining the rights of the individual farmer, just as collectivisation had been. However, just as they had with collectivisation, many farmers regarded this as yet another restriction on their independence. In contrast to the spring of 1960, however, establishing cooperation by force was not a practicable option. Rather the transmission of SED agricultural policy relied heavily on the willingness and ability of LPG functionaries to explain it and persuade LPG members of its value to them as well as to society at large. It became clear, however, that LPG functionaries remained more often than not unconvinced of the benefits of further change to the structure of agriculture and the establishment of cooperation either to themselves, the LPG members or society in general.

The attainment of a reasonable level of profitability in the LPG, which enabled LPG members to receive satisfactory incomes, had brought a degree of social harmony and stability to collective farms not seen since before the collectivisation campaign. There was thus an understandable desire on the part of the cadres and ordinary members not to rock the boat with further change. This attitude was critically dismissed in the rhetoric of party sources as ‘the theory of mediocrity’, which derided resistance to further change on such grounds as merely signs of incompetence or cowardice among LPG cadres and ideological backwardness among their members.\(^ {20}\)

After the failure of cooperation during the harvest in 1965, the Bezirkssleitung certainly regarded LPG cadres as a weak link in the chain of policy implementation in agriculture, from the development of cooperation through to the use of material incentive and economic levers as part of the New Economic System:
A whole range of leading cadres in the collectives, chairmen as well as crop and livestock brigadiers are not getting to grips with the current problems of society’s development. This is the result of their level of qualification, even though many of them are themselves state qualified farmers or master farmers … In most cases the functionaries appear to be the progressive party in the collective. But already in the boards of the collective farms these leading cadres often do not find sufficient support in order to realise the tasks in the collectives individually …

Worse still, many LPG cadres clearly had no desire to continue in a position where they were under constant pressure to push through policies which the majority of their fellow farmers rejected. The report continued:

In all the districts in which new elections are being held there are problems with filling posts as chairmen and board members. They refuse to be candidates using in part paper-thin arguments. They claim not to understand the integrated deployment of machinery and cite among other things internal difficulties in the collectives, health reasons, age, unreasonable state demands for grain delivery, poor support from the board, differences within the LPGs. The real causes lie however not in these arguments but are rather to be found in the fact that these chairmen shy away from confrontations with LPG members over the implementation of the decisions of the party and the government.  

Given the degree to which LPGs of all types, but particularly Type I, were failing to take the steps to develop with the speed the SED leadership desired, doubts were raised as to the competence or indeed the political reliability of the leading cadres of LPGs. It had already been made clear that LPG chairmen who proved flagrantly to be unable or unwilling to establish a functioning collective farm were liable to be labelled opponents of progress and removed from their posts. However, immediate wholesale changes to those running LPGs which were not rapidly implementing SED policies were neither possible nor worthwhile. Not only was there a lack of suitably qualified, suitably skilled and suitably reliable replacements, but transforming agriculture while retaining some stability in collective farms and winning LPG members’ support for the transformation was recognised to be necessarily a gradual process.

In the face of ongoing hostility to cooperation from LPG members and LPG functionaries, administrative attempts were made to move the situation forward in the Bezirk. To ensure members of smaller LPGs supported cooperation or merger, the head of the BLR made it clear at the end of 1965 that, in future, access to new machinery would be predicated on the development of effective cooperative relations. Type I
LPGs with less than 100 hectares would not be able to purchase machinery until they could prove that it would be used to the maximum of its capacity. Similarly, no credit would be given to enable the construction of larger sheds for livestock unless Type I LPGs were participating in a cooperative enterprise.\textsuperscript{23} Reporting in March 1966, the agriculture department in the SED Bezirksleitung suggested that in most cases it was relatively clear to the LPG functionaries with whom and how cooperative relations could be set up. The essential problem was that these leading cadres either claimed to find it impossible to gain the support of members or had simply refused to confront them on this issue.\textsuperscript{24}

particularly in the Type I LPGs in the Bezirk, there was a willingness to resist cooperation in practice and a continuing suspicion of the regime’s motives in insisting upon it. In Kreis Worbis, the SED Kreisleitung reported a range of arguments widely raised against those state and party officials advocating cooperation between LPGs in the district: ‘We don’t need cooperative relations for machinery; we’ll carry out our own work alone, we’ve got enough tractors and horses … you want to take away from us our right to use the machinery we bought ourselves.’ It was clear too that there was a fundamental hostility to the state’s repeated attempts to interfere in the running of the collective farms. LPG Type I members in Kreis Worbis responded to SED Kreisleitung functionaries with comments such as: ‘Why don’t you leave the LPGs in peace? You’ve always got something new.’\textsuperscript{25}

During 1966 LPG chairmen were put under increased pressure by the KLR to sign their LPGs up to participation in a KOG and commit their machinery to cooperate in crop production during that year’s harvest, regardless of the attitudes of the collective farmers themselves.\textsuperscript{26} By August 1966, at least on paper, the development of cooperation appeared to have advanced with all but twenty of the Bezirk’s 1062 LPGs apparently signed up to participation in a cooperative community (KOG) with other LPGs. The KLRs’ administrative success in this regard, however, again failed to match up with the actual practice of the LPGs during the harvest. Rather as during the collectivisation, it was one thing to gain agreement in theory, it was quite another to see to a policy’s implementation in practice. In this respect, LPG chairmen remained as clearly beholden to their members’ opinions when it came to carrying out the harvest, as they were, at least outwardly, to conforming to the demands of the KLRs.

Thus, in much of the Bezirk harvest machinery was reported to have been used with only the minimum lip service paid to the notion of cooperation between LPGs. Until strict agreements had been reached between LPG chairmen and ratified in a vote of the respective members’
assemblies of the LPGs, it was argued that cooperative use of machinery could only occur under the terms of ‘socialist aid’ and hence not in a coordinated deployment, as the KLR might have wished. Even where tentative agreements had been made, LPG Type I chairmen tended, as they had the previous year, to withdraw their machinery and return to working independently after only a matter of days. In Kreis Worbis the development of cooperation had been outwardly successful, with the inclusion of all the LPGs in the district in one or another KOG. In practice, individual LPGs resisted using their machinery in cooperation with one another, reaching agreements only on temporary exchanges of machinery.

At this stage it was clear that few LPG chairmen were either willing or able to begin more than superficial cooperation during the harvest. Collective farmers, if not LPG chairmen themselves, had by this stage not been sufficiently persuaded of the value to them of cooperating with their neighbours in crop production. Until they could be persuaded, the KLRs were forced to accept that cooperative relations would not develop with any degree of consistency or comprehensiveness. The balance of interests which defined the organisation of agriculture remained heavily influenced by farmers’ concern to protect their rights of ownership and the independence of local decision making, against the SED leadership’s project of industrialising production and rationalising administrative control over LPGs and rural communities at large.

Competing Interests and the Obstacles to Persuasion

During 1967 and 1968 the SED leadership in the Bezirk sought to make more rapid strides towards the development of advanced cooperative relations between LPGs in crop production and the implementation of a set of financial controls in the LPGs which would make them more responsive to incentive-based economic planning. The extent to which this was achieved continued, however, to be hampered by the insufficient reliability of LPG functionaries and the inadequacy of the network of regime supporters at the grass roots – primarily in the SED party organisations but also in the DBD.

In the mid-1960s there were simply not enough LPG leaders who could be relied upon to advocate cooperation to their members and to cooperate successfully with their neighbours, being themselves neither convinced of the logic of such measures agriculturally nor indeed supportive of any steps which appeared to compromise their own personal authority. How far LPG chairmen’s attitudes towards cooperation con-
formed to those of the SED leadership depended in large part on how beneficial to them and to their LPG it might prove to be. It was also dependent on how strongly they were influenced as well as supported by the SED party organisation attached to their collective farm. As far as cooperation was concerned, however, LPG chairmen and even SED party organisations in the LPG, let alone the rank-and-file collective farmers, found that they had good reason to be sceptical of the benefit to them of the policy in practice, if not in theory. In the rhetoric of the administration’s documents, ‘Betriebsegoismus’ (‘Enterprise Egotism’) was seen to be at the root of the failure of cooperation.30

With regard to the LPG, the phrase ‘Betriebsegoismus’ covered a multitude of apparent sins against the spirit if not always the letter of SED agricultural policy. Essentially it was used to describe any behaviour or act undertaken by LPG chairmen which was considered to be purely in the interests of the success of their own collective farm and consequently to the cost of others. Although it was clearly used as a label to criticise the behaviour of LPG functionaries who were not wholehearted in their support for cooperation on the terms proposed to them, it did identify a real obstacle to successful conduct of cooperative relations between LPGs. Regardless of political loyalties, collective farmers were openly hostile to any measures which threatened to compromise their incomes or their independence and were capable of bringing pressure to bear on their leading functionaries to prevent their implementation. How well these cadres worked together was crucial to the success of cooperation. However, there were considerable obstacles to a harmonious relationship between LPG chairmen. Not only did they have their own individual concerns not to be seen to be outdone, the scorn they could face from their constituent collective farmers if thought to have failed to act in their best interests could make their position untenable.

Within the LPG and the KOG Walschleben, Kreis Erfurt-Land, clashes of personalities became a serious problem between 1965 and 1967. At one point members of the LPG Type III Gebesee were reportedly openly opposed to continuing with cooperative relations with their neighbours, accusing their chairman of being so subservient that he was little more than ‘the coach driver’ of the chairman of the LPG Type III Walschleben.31 During a discussion in Heringen, Kreis Nordhausen over the future of cooperation between LPGs in the area in April 1967, the chairman of the LPG Type III in Urbach pointed out how difficult it was for chairmen of the Type I LPGs to persuade their members:

Our colleagues in the Type I and II LPGs, the chairmen and board members who are concerned to participate [in the KOG] are still subject to serious attacks. The development, which would have been reckoned good
thus far, reached its high point with an almost catastrophic collapse. The chairman of the LPG Type II was heavily criticised by his members who accused him of wanting to throw everything away; they had given him the title ‘the red general’ and said that he was selling the LPG out … 32

Under such pressures, cooperative relations tended to break down. Thus it was that a working group from the Bezirksleitung monitoring the harvest in 1967 in Kreis Apolda found a number of LPGs refusing to allow their harvesters to be used in combination with those of other LPGs. One LPG chairman reportedly defended his actions on the basis that he could not afford not to look after his own farm’s interests first: ‘Last year we were conned by the integrated deployment of machinery. We gave up our harvesters when the weather was good and then all we received was wet grain.’ 33

Part of the opposition to cooperative relations even from among those who were ordinarily supportive of the regime’s goals for industrialising and modernising agricultural production was the result of divergent opinions on the means to achieve these goals. There had long been strong tendencies among LPG functionaries to seek to create large self-contained mixed arable and livestock farms. These would operate on a scale sufficient to use the latest technologies and scientific theories to increase productivity, while overseeing the balanced development of both strands of production. 34 The essential argument in favour of Groß LPGs was the importance of maintaining the traditional direct relationship between feed production, livestock and organic fertiliser under one administration. Adherence to this principle did not, however, tally with the principles of a progressive industrialising agricultural policy, which sought to dispense with such outdated approaches to farming.

From a production perspective, maintaining mixed farms on this scale threatened to put unnecessary limits on the extent of specialisation of production possible. Agricultural production had to be responsive to the demands of the economy as a whole and had to develop accordingly. As part of a wider complex economic system, the potential for increasing production through intensive specialisation where possible took precedence over maintaining what appeared to be simplistic and outdated notions of the interdependence of crop and livestock farming. Additionally, the Groß LPGs gave too much power to the individual chairmen who ran these giants. They also created a degree of bureaucracy and administrative complexity internal to the LPG which not only made them difficult to run efficiently but limited the extent to which their practices could be scrutinised by the state.

In their size, Groß LPGs bore the stigma of the Soviet Kolkhoz, in which farmers – according to popular perceptions born in part, no
doubt, out of Nazi propaganda as well as the actual experiences of German POWs – were deprived of an individual status and condemned ultimately to work as farm labourers ruled by office-bound apparatchiks. However, as an approach to developing autarkic production in the GDR, it appeared to offer a happy compromise for some LPG functionaries between modern practices and scale, on the one hand, and traditional farm organisation and local identity, on the other. It also made redundant any complex cooperative agreements between neighbouring LPGs and appeared to avoid the traps of suspicion and conflict that went with cooperation. Moreover, as more LPG Type I members were persuaded to relieve themselves of the burdens of private livestock production by joining the Type III LPGs, merger rather than cooperation appeared to be a more successful approach to reaching an expanded yet sustainable scale of agriculture.

During the late 1960s, economic pressures and an ageing workforce were beginning to have an effect on the ability of the Type I LPGs to maintain their independence. A stagnation in the level of production had already begun to take place since 1967, with percentage increases in production in a number of upland districts, where Type I LPGs predominated, growing at a slower rate than the Bezirk average. The extreme age of many members of the Type I and II LPGs, whose children could not be kept in the LPGs and who were unwilling or unable to continue to farm, naturally limited the quantity of produce that they made available to the state. In the past the burden of work on individual members had been kept down by transferring animals from private holdings to collective holdings in sheds which had been extended for the purpose, as it became necessary. However, without extensive investment in modern livestock sheds, the potential options for accommodating animals with the workforce and the buildings available were becoming increasingly limited in the Type Is. Given bottlenecks in the supply of materials and a general lack of funds to invest in a suitably extensive programme of construction in the upland districts of the Bezirk, those members of Type I LPGs who were not seeking to retire found themselves forced to petition to join the Type III LPGs in order to sustain an adequate income.

Type III LPGs did not necessarily respond to the plight of their neighbours with great sympathy. Previous conflicts and rivalries between neighbouring LPGs of different types, as well as the high incomes of many Type I farmers over previous years, tempered the willingness on the part of Type III farmers to help. At the very least this manifested itself in tough conditions for merger set by Type III LPGs, who were often only willing to take over whole LPGs rather than accepting merely those
farmers who were unable to keep their own private livestock any longer. Mergers inevitably took place without the consent of all members of the Type I LPGs. Disgruntlement among former LPG Type I farmers following merger into an LPG Type III could indeed be serious enough to make clear to the Ministry for State Security the need for further recruitment of informants to give regular reports on the situation.35

The compromise position of allowing some farmers to maintain extensive private livestock despite having become members of the LPG Type III was one method of easing the immediate burden of merger on both parties. However, in Bezirk Erfurt in 1968 the practice appeared to be largely limited to LPGs in Kreis Eisenach, with only odd examples thus far in other districts.36 In some Type Is the resolve to resist merger among the members hardened and farmers echoed their comments made during the original collectivisation campaign, insisting that ‘as long as it’s still possible, we continue as we are’.37 In 1968 for more Type I LPGs than ever before, merger with LPG Type IIIs was, however, unavoidable. Of the 517 LPG Type Is in existence in Bezirk Erfurt in September 1967, only 289 existed in 1969.

The expansion of the proportion of agricultural land that was farmed under the statute of LPG Type III and the reduction of the extent of private livestock farming to the benefit of collective livestock holdings certainly aided the evolution of the SED leadership’s general policy of transformation of agriculture and rural society. The incorporation of more pasture and arable land, machinery and buildings and, above all, financial resources certainly enabled the development of production on a grander scale. More importantly, the incorporation of Type I LPGs into Type III LPGs promised to enable the communication of agricultural policy to collective farmers in a more comprehensive and consistent manner.

The pockets of hostility to change which Type I LPGs so clearly represented during the earlier 1960s were increasingly subsumed in the Type III LPGs. Recalcitrant chairmen and board members of Type I LPGs were no longer in a position to delay changes to the structure or practices of farming in their local area and the members in general who were hostile to agricultural transformation could no longer necessarily expect to win a majority of votes during members’ assemblies. Nevertheless, the expansion in size of Type III LPGs did not necessarily make them entirely pliant to the demands of the KLRs for agricultural development. Indeed, in some respects the growth in power of single LPGs as economic units enabled LPG leaders to seek to run agriculture more on their own terms rather than those proposed by the district party and state administration.
Some chairmen of large Type III LPGs on the plains of Bezirk Erfurt began to assert themselves, maintaining that cooperation was not necessary for their farms. By 1967 mergers between LPGs (whether preceded by cooperation or not) had enabled LPG chairmen to expand the size of single collective farms sufficiently to claim to have no need of developing formal cooperative relations with their neighbours. At their current size, chairmen pointed out, the LPGs were easily capable of developing field sizes sufficient to use the machinery currently available to its full capacity. Members of large LPGs in Bad Langensalza thus maintained that they already had developed the conditions for industrial-scale farming and had no need of cooperation in order to use their machines efficiently. The size of their fields, they claimed, matched the specifications set by the VIII German Farmers’ Congress for the use of the latest machine systems.38 Similarly, in Kreis Erfurt-Land resistance to cooperation was based on the LPG leaders’ confidence in being able to cope without it, with arguments such as: ‘We have a high level of production, we deliver a lot to the state, why should we introduce something new?’ Even when the value of cooperation was conceded, there was seen to be no reason why it should be permanent cooperation.39

Such attitudes, however, showed up a serious deficit among leading cadres, even in Type III LPGs, of obedience to or understanding of the ‘correct’ path of future development in agriculture in the GDR. As often as not, LPG chairmen appeared more willing to ensure that their LPG increased production than back SED agricultural policy. As conduits of the SED leadership’s authority and participants in the apparatus of social and economic management of the countryside, they were by no means consistently effective or obedient.

The Ideological Deficit in the LPG

The balance in authority between LPG chairmen and the LPG members who sat on the directing board of the collective farm, on the one hand, and the SED party secretary and the party organisation, on the other, was crucial to the way in which proposals for significant change in the organisation and structure of LPGs were communicated to and received among the collective farmers. Ideally, there was considerable overlap between the members of the SED party organisation and the leading LPG members who made up the LPG board. Equally, the chairman of the LPG was ideally also a member of the SED, ensuring that the party organisation took a leading role in shaping the development of the collective farm in line with the latest proposals of the SED leadership.
In practice, SED party organisations in the LPGs varied considerably in size and activity, and the degree of influence which they sought or were able to exert over the LPG’s leaders – or indeed the collective farmers in general – was often minimal. LPG chairmen, regardless of their party affiliation, were not consistent in their support for the concerns of the party secretary or the party organisation where they appeared to differ from his conception of the interests of the LPG. Moreover, the board members of the LPG (the majority of whom were largely without a party affiliation) could represent a more dominant, influential body of opinion among the members than any party organisation.

SED Party organisations in the farms (Betriebsparteiorganisationen or BPOs) appeared at times to be either ineffective or indeed themselves not united in support of SED agricultural policies. The attitudes of SED members on the ground in the individual LPGs also certainly did not always conform to those expected of them by the SED Kreisleitung. Where Type III LPGs were concerned, the unreliability of the SED members and the SED party organisation were particularly apparent on the issue of cooperation. SED BPOs, where they existed and where they supported cooperation, were unable to have much of an impact on LPG chairmen let alone LPG boards, mid-level managers (i.e. work brigade leaders and technical advisers) and collective farmers in general. In Kreis Sömmerda throughout 1967 the SED Kreisleitung received reports of discord – even where BPOs were considered to have some influence – between members of the board, the chairmen and the SED party leadership on essential questions of cooperation.

Even in Type III LPGs with relatively large party organisations, issues such as cooperation between LPGs still provoked enough opposition to the party line as to render party members powerless in the face of such opposition. In the LPG Type III in Beichlingen, for example, the Kreisleitung Sömmerda claimed in 1968 that: ‘the influence of the opposing forces goes so far that the class conscious forces of the party organisation are being pushed onto the defensive’. A general overview of the district farmers’ conferences throughout the GDR in 1968 revealed continuing antipathy towards cooperative relations.

Just as had been the case after collectivisation – when individual farmers adopted the trappings but not the actual practices of collective farming – so too now were LPGs found to be cooperating in name alone. KOGs were found to have formed to the extent that a cooperative council had been organised but beyond this no practical action was actually being taken to alter the structure of the farms or the organisation of work. Even where chairmen had gone so far as seemingly to cooperate fully in the farming of the arable land between the constituent LPGs,
the reality was not always very far removed from the practice pre-cooperation. The brigades and crops continued to be organised primarily in accordance with the territorial boundaries of the constituent LPGs. In Kreis Sömmerda in July 1968 attempts to introduce the integrated deployment of harvesters were reportedly rejected by LPG functionaries despite the insistence of the SED BPOs. The effectiveness of the BPOs of a number of Type III LPGs was thus increasingly called into question, particularly as regarded making the case for cooperation.

The failure of the SED BPOs to influence LPG cadres with regard to the implementation of economic reforms within the LPGs was also apparent. This was most obvious in the Type I LPGs, where SED party organisations – if they existed at all – tended to be small and where the LPG chairmen and certainly the LPG board members were often not party members. It was also the case, however, even in a number of Type III LPGs, that leading cadres were basically unresponsive to the SED party organisation's proposals to develop their LPGs in accordance with the principles of sozialistische Betriebswirtschaft. In meetings of the SED party organisations in October 1967 in Kreis Sömmerda, among the reasons cited for their continuing failure to influence the development of their collective farms was the repeated failure of management cadres to speak politically to the work collectives. LPG cadres were reported to be continuing to oppose economic reform on the basis that it caused disquiet among members of the LPGs and that the LPGs lacked sufficient numbers of cadres to implement it in any case.

The DBD and Voices of Conservatism

While the numbers of SED members in leading positions in the LPGs had increased by 1968, the KLRs and the SED Kreisleitungen were still reliant on a considerable proportion of functionaries in the LPGs who had not joined a party or who were members of one or other of the bloc parties (primarily the DBD, the Democratic Farmers' Party of Germany) to advocate their agricultural policy. The DBD leadership's role in the collectivisation campaign had long since signalled an end to the DBD's potential to be a political refuge for those with opinions about agriculture in the GDR that diverged radically from those of the SED. However, the DBD continued to claim a membership among newly collectivised farmers, particularly among members of the Type I LPGs where the SED struggled to find any support following collectivisation.

In 1963 the DBD leadership formally adopted the party programme of the SED as its own, making thereby a definite statement of its subor-
ordinate position in agriculture as in other matters to the SED. After 1963 the DBD hierarchy could thus, on the whole, be relied upon to speak publicly in favour of SED policy and maintain party discipline within its ranks. However, DBD members did not automatically become nearly as accepting of the SED’s claim to know best how to develop agriculture. An assessment by the SED Central Committee of the ideological situation in the DBD prior to the elections to the Volkskammer (National Parliament) in 1963 noted that there were signs of dissent among DBD members throughout the country at their party leadership’s apparent capitulation. Wherever local groups of the DBD had a large membership, resistance to accepting the SED’s leading role in agriculture remained strong. Arguments were reported to be prevalent among DBD members such as: ‘the SED should decide things among workers and in industry and the DBD should do so in the countryside’. DBD members who were members of Type I LPGs certainly did not appear as a result of the DBD’s new status to have developed any less suspicion for aspects of SED policy which appeared to put them at a financial disadvantage. Many DBD members clearly continued to have little regard for SED agricultural policy or indeed for SED functionaries’ ability to decide agricultural matters correctly.  

Despite the proclaimed loyalty of the DBD to the SED agenda, at the grass roots members of the DBD often claimed greater technical expertise and were willing to criticise any proposals that they considered impractical. Some DBD functionaries recast the old debate of received farming wisdom and accepted practice versus the SED’s progressive agricultural policy as practical conservatism in the LPG versus change for change’s sake. With the LPG Type III Neuholland held up as a national model for the introduction of socialist business economics in LPGs, many mid-level cadres in the LPGs who had joined the DBD explained their reluctance to introduce similar measures themselves by emphasising the differences between this model LPG and their own situation. ‘We lack the qualified staff to do the office work,’ they protested, ‘We don’t have the sort of support from academics like they do in Neuholland.’ Alternatively they pointed out, with the sort of (justified) self-satisfaction which infuriated the district functionaries of the SED, ‘We fulfil our plans even without Neuholland’s methods.’ The so-called ‘green comrades’ (Grüne Genossen) of the DBD were thus regularly criticised for their lack of support for the evolution of socialist agricultural policy, for the sake of their own LPG’s interests.

In March 1968 speakers at the SED Bezirkparteiaktivtagung reviewed the causes of the failure of LPG cadres to adopt the economic reforms
required of them. Mid- and top-level cadres had, according to the SED Bezirkleitung’s agricultural secretary, failed to grasp the ‘systematic character’ of the NÖS. The financial organisation of LPGs had to be transformed in order for agriculture to be integrated efficiently into the wider reformed economy. Agriculture was to be seen as a part of a wider system that created flexible responsive links between aspects of agricultural production and other interrelated sectors of the economy. It had therefore to develop appropriate corresponding forms of financial organisation as defined by socialist business economics. The fact that economic reform had not been fully achieved appeared therefore to be in large part down to the failure of LPG cadres to see the value or necessity of this project of economic integration.

It was apparent that there was a deficit in the extent to which LPG chairmen sought actively to implement change, responding in part to the concerns of their members. In the Bezirk as a whole only seventy-five LPGs had actually introduced the reforms comprehensively. In Kreis Weimar six LPG chairmen were named and shamed at the District Farmers’ Conference in April 1968 for having done nothing to implement socialist business economics. Rather more had failed to implement one or other of the essential reforms required of them. The continuing failure of these cadres to take action in their LPGs smacked therefore either of a lack of ability or a lack of reliability. Either, it was suggested, they did not understand the issues involved or they were afraid of confronting old traditions and ideas about farming.

Uncertainty and the Limits of Transformation

At the heart of the reticence of farmers and functionaries within LPGs of all types to accept cooperation or the economic reforms was a lack of confidence in the positive effect of further change. There was no doubt that the development of cooperation raised numerous fundamental existential questions. Many women farmers feared that they would not be given work in their own village once cooperation was underway. The loss of flexible working hours and proximity to the household and children represented a considerable upheaval in the lifestyles of women in rural communities, which were not necessarily thought to be positive. Men also had their doubts about going to work away from their local area as a result of cooperation. Nor were they particularly confident of having to work alongside strangers. A number of tractor drivers were found to doubt whether the other drivers they worked with would be as diligent as them. More generally, the fear of loss of earnings or finan-
cial insolvency as a result of having to cooperate was paramount. In July 1968 mid-level cadres in the LPGs were reported, too, to be in fear of losing their positions as a result of cooperation. Ordinary farmers, among them SED members, predicted it would be their ‘doom’.

The arguments against socialist business economics reportedly given by mid- and top-level cadres in LPGs tended to see reforms as too much extra work and hardly worth introducing as a passing fad. The differing genesis of LPGs, in the course of the ten to fifteen years since collectivisation had begun to occur, left neighbouring farms with fundamentally similar potential for production at vastly different stages of development and different degrees of financial security looking forward to an uncertain future. Given these differences in past development, collective farmers could have very different conceptions of how their best interests were to be served. There is no doubt that many Type III LPGs benefited from leading the way in economic reform, gaining in status as well as material reward. On the other hand, successful LPGs were understandably loath to alter what appeared to be a well-functioning organisation. Equally, the members of struggling LPGs were not always open to the latest measures, fearing further reductions in their incomes or still less control over their farm as a result. The problems faced by state functionaries suggesting alterations to farmers’ ways of working over the last ten years were well summed up by a former functionary in the state agricultural apparatus: ‘How often have I personally had to hear in the thirteen years of my employment in the State apparatus as I gave good advice in the farms: “it’s all right for you to talk, you get good money anyway”.’ As long as LPG members and LPG functionaries were uncertain what economic reform entailed for their future prosperity as stakeholders in their LPG, they remained unpersuaded of the value of change.

In practice, however, giving security to the LPGs with regard to their future development was not easily achieved. The beginnings of an economic meltdown in the economy at large in 1968 undermined the validity of long-term economic planning. Not for the first time and certainly not the last, LPG members complained that they were being made to bear the brunt of an increase in prices for the sake of industry. Despite the supposed existence of buffers, which reduced some of the prices charged LPGs for essential products from industry, there appeared to have been a systematic increase across the board for the machines, equipment and materials required for LPGs to develop industrial-scale production. Any savings on costs as a result of a reduction in manpower were reportedly being outweighed by excess costs for material and machinery.
A report by the Agricultural Council of the GDR in March 1968 on the mood in the LPGs pointed to a number of perceived injustices that were causing anger among farmers around the country. LPG chairmen found that they were unable to meet the rising costs of production with the income from the sale of their produce. In other words, industrial prices appeared to be rising faster than the prices and bonuses paid for increased deliveries of agricultural produce. On top of this farmers complained they were not even getting value for money. Despite the raised prices there appeared to be no guarantee of availability as far as the provision of machinery and tools was concerned. Any long-term planning or contractual supply even for the coming year was out of the question. Just to add insult to injury, some of the machines with which farmers had been supplied were found to be faulty.61

The degree of concern among collective farmers over their future status in agriculture was highlighted by discussion of the new national constitution to be introduced in 1968. Article 13 of the proposed constitution appeared to describe the products produced by collective farming of the soil as collective property. Given that livestock owned privately by Type I farmers relied on the crops farmed collectively, some LPG members in Bezirk Erfurt reportedly expressed fears that the produce from their individual livestock farming could now be construed as collective property. More seriously, farmers in general voiced questions as to whether the development of cooperation between LPGs, particularly in crop production, signalled the end to the distinction between collective use, yet private ownership of land – a de facto expropriation of farmers.62

For Type III LPGs which had struggled for years to achieve better results without success, there was, too, a good deal of scepticism towards making changes without a clear prospect for the long-term future. In the LPG Type III in Buttsstädt, for example, farmers responded to attempts to interest them in discussion of the upcoming national referendum on the constitution with a straightforward refusal, unless somebody came to give them a clear indication of how they were to be helped to develop: ‘first there must be clarity about our future, then we’ll talk about other problems’.63

**A Changing Context for SED Authority**

By 1968 much had been changed already in socialist agriculture. The number of Type I LPGs had been reduced to less than the number of Type III LPGs in most of the districts of the Bezirk. As the size of the ag-
Agricultural workforce had declined, levels of qualification had risen significantly (see Figure 5.1). The percentage of LPG members in Bezirk Erfurt who belonged to the SED rose too from a paltry 6.9 per cent in 1962 to 14.2 per cent in 1968.

Much, too, had been achieved in establishing the conditions for mechanised production on a large scale, with mergers and some forms of cooperation taking effect. Despite resistance to the NÖS, in many LPGs performance-related pay, bonuses and detailed accounting of costs and profits were an accepted part of the production process. The trappings of collective democracy – meetings of LPG commissions, weekly board meetings, plenary members’ assemblies and particularly brigade assemblies – had to some extent become a routine part of the functioning of the LPGs, essential to the sharing of information and the transmission of authority within the collective farm. There had, however, by no means been uniform progress across all the districts of the Bezirk in the development of cooperative relations, the implementation of economic reform or indeed the improvement of productivity. There were still a number of struggling Type III LPGs and Type I LPGs whose members despaired of the future, particularly in the uplands in the north and west of the Bezirk. Moreover, the evolution of working conditions in livestock production was still very differentiated between LPGs.

A survey of opinion by the SED Central Committee’s Institute for Research into Popular Opinion among farmers in a number of LPGs from each of the Bezirke in the GDR in 1967 illustrated clear limits to the extent to which collectivised farming had been embraced by a considerable proportion of farmers. Although technological improvements

Figure 5.1 Convergence of rising qualification levels and declining workforce in Bezirk Erfurt, 1960–78

were broadly welcomed, collective farming had clearly failed to con-
vince many farmers that they were in a better position than they had
been as private landowners. Only 5.5 per cent of respondents from the
LPG Oberreissen in Bezirk Erfurt agreed that they enjoyed their work
more today in the LPG than they had prior to collectivisation. Most
respondents in all four LPGs surveyed in Bezirk Erfurt, as well as in the
average for the GDR as a whole, agreed with the statement that work
gave them as much pleasure today as it did before. Very few respon-
dents valued the work organisation in their LPG or regarded personal
income as a benefit of collectivisation – in the rest of the GDR as in
Bezirk Erfurt fewer than half of the respondents recognised any other
benefits than improved access to modern machinery.68

Nevertheless, identification with the LPG appears also to have grown
among all farmers, not least perhaps given the futility of continuing to
hark back to the days of private farming. While concessions continued
to be made to farmers in the form of household plots and livestock,
working conditions had changed considerably. Many (although not all)
residual elements of private farming had been replaced with a collec-
tive working culture.69 As a woman farmer in the LPG Bachra, Kreis
Sömmerda described at a district farmers’ conference in May 1968: ‘the
brigade members do not just produce together, they spend a part of
their spare time in the work collective. Group trips, events and discus-
sion are a fixed part of life in the Brigade…’70 At the same conference a
member of the LPG Schillingstedt offered his conception of the trans-
formation over the last ten years. Ten years ago ‘that was still my
field and my animal and it became only later gradually our
field and our
animal and today it is a matter of course that every individual thinks
collectively’.71

Of course this sentiment was not shared by all collective farmers;
nonetheless it seems that increasingly the LPG did provide formerly
private farmers with a new sense of identity. Shortly before the VIII
SED Party Congress, a survey was carried out by the Institute for So-
cial Sciences at the ZK. Asked whether they felt personally connected
with their LPG, 81.4 per cent of the 2,462 respondents to this question
agreed. When questioned as to the main changes which they consid-
ered to have taken place among the people during the development
of the LPG, far and away the most popular answer was the level of
qualification. Second highest was the ‘development of comradely col-
laboration and mutual aid between colleagues’.72 Some of the essential
changes associated with the development of agriculture, such as tech-
nical education and collective work practices, appeared thus to have had
an impact on the way farmers perceived themselves.
Conclusion

It was certainly true that by this stage SED party organisations had made significant strides not only in the quantity but also in the quality of their members in the farming community in the Bezirk. Technical training had also gone hand in hand with political conformity. The positive benefits of collective farming had begun to become visible and more and more farmers were being incorporated through technical training and qualification into a socialist system of modern agriculture which promoted cooperation. Nevertheless, considerable persuasion was required still to win over even loyal leading functionaries in the LPGs, let alone sceptical mid-level cadres and the majority of rank-and-file collective farmers, to the next steps in the development of agriculture. Fear of future expropriation and redundancy, loss of independence and subordinate status loomed large in farmers’ responses to the rate at which change was supposed to occur in agriculture. The mechanisation, specialisation and concentration of production on an industrial scale promised exciting and dramatic improvements in productivity as well as working and living conditions in rural communities. However, such developments also cast doubt over the future status and security of work in agriculture and life in the village for all members of the collective farms.

Notes

2. ‘Groß LPG’ was often (though not always) a pejorative label given to LPGs which had been formed or expanded through merger to an extraordinary size, retaining unified administration of both arable and livestock production.
3. Examples of LPG members’ opinions to this effect may be found in ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt IV/B/2/2-022 Protokoll der Bezirksparteiaktivtagung zu den Fragen und Aufgaben der soz. Landwirtschaft am 7.3.1968 Beitrag Genossin Zessin, p. 103; Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt IV/B/2/13-378 SED Bezirksleitung, Einschätzung über das Einwohnerforum in der Grenzgemeinde Berka/Werra Kr. Eisenach, 27.1.1969, p. 1.
5. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt IV/A/2/2-042 Sekretariat der Bezirksleitung, Protokoll der Bezirksparteiaktivtagung Landwirtschaft am 18.12.1964 Referat (unnamed), p. 70.


7. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt IV/A/2/3-112 Bezirkslandwirtschaftsrat, Schlussfolgerungen zur Verallgemeinerung … 18.3.1965, p. 31.


10. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt IV/A/2/3-112 Bezirkslandwirtschaftsrat, Einschätzung der Kreisbauerkonferenzen im Bezirk Erfurt, Schlussfolgerungen, p. 152.


15. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt BIV/2/7-547 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Landwirtschaft, Einschätzung der Führungs- und Leitungstätigkeit … 11.11.1965, p. 41.


19. Five out of 475 Type III LPGs were less than 100 hectares and 135 Type III LPGs less than 300 hectares in size. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt BIV/2/7-588 Bezirksvorstandes der DBD, Bericht über die Entwicklung von Kooperationsbeziehungen ... 25.11.1965, p. 23.


25. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt IV/A/2/3-159 SED Kreisleitung Worbis, Bericht über die Führung der polit-ideologischen Arbeit ... 3.6.1966, p. 29.


27. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt IV/A/2/3-159 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Landwirtschaft, Stellungnahme zum Massnahmeplan des Rates des Bezirks ... 13.6.1966, p. 132.


34. Examples of LPG members’ opinions to this effect may be found in ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt IV/B/2/2-022 Protokoll der Bezirksparteiaktivtagung zu den Fragen und Aufgaben der soz. Landwirtschaft am 7.3.1968 Beitrag Genossin Zessin, p. 103; Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt IV/B/2/13-378 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Landwirtschaft, Einschätzung über das Einwohnerforum in der Grenzgemeinde Berka/Werra Kr. Eisenach, 27.1.1969, p. 1.


38. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt IV/A/2/3-186 Sekretariat der Bezirksleitung, Thesen für den Bericht der Bezirksleitung an die Bezirksdelegiertenkonferenz, p. 42.

39. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED
128 • After the ‘Socialist Spring’


43. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarzchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt IV/B/2/5-161 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Parteiorgane, Faktenmaterial für die Berichterstattung des Sekretariats der SED Kreisleitung Sömmerda, 8.5.1968, p. 59.

44. SAPMO BArch DY30 IV A 2/2.023/72 Büro Gerhard Grüneberg, ZK der SED Abt. Landwirtschaft, Einige weitere Probleme, die aus den KBK sichtbar werden 8.5.1968.


52. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarzchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt IV/B/2/5-410 SED Kreisleitung Eisenach an die Bezirksleitung der SED, Einschätzung über die Kreisdelegiertenkonferenz der DBD am 12.1.1968 in Eisenach, 1.2.1968, p. 42.

53. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarzchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt IV/B/2/2-022 Protokoll der Bezirksparteiaktivtagung zu den Fragen
and Aufgaben der soz. Landwirtschaft 7.3.1968, Referat des Genossen Lüdecke, p. 3.
55. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt IV/B/2/5-165 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Parteiorgane, Information über einige Probleme aus der operativen Tätigkeit, 23.7.1968, p. 112.
57. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt IV/B/2/5-165 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Parteiorgane, Information zu Führungsproblemen der Sekretariate der Kreisleitungen ... 16.7.1968, p. 105.
60. SAPMO BArch DY30 IV A 2/2.023/72 Büro Gerhard Grüneberg, ZK der SED Abt. Landwirtschaft, Einige weitere Probleme, die aus den KBK sichtbar werden 8.5.1968.
61. BArch, DK 1 VA Neu 2846 Landwirtschaftsrat der DDR, Information zum Verlauf der Frühjahrsbestellung sowie Kritiken, Hinweise und Anfragen, 22.3.1968.
62. BArch, DK 1 VA Neu 2846 Landwirtschaftsrat der DDR, Information zu einigen Problemen der Verfassungsdiskussion in den sozialistischen Betrieben der Landwirtschaft, 1.3.1968.
63. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt IV/B/2/5-161 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Parteiorgane, Ergänzung zu Problemen der Führungstätigkeit im Kr. Sömmerda, 15.4.1968, p. 33.
64. By 1968 the proportion of the agricultural workforce with the basic qualification (Facharbeiterprüfung) was at 47 per cent. The proportion of those qualified as master farmers, or with a technical college or university qualification, was at 7.8 per cent. Staatliche Zentralverwaltung für Statistik, Bezirksstelle Erfurt, Statistisches Jahrbuch, Bezirk Erfurt 1970, Vol. I, Erfurt. 1971, p. 126.
67. For example ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt IV/B/2/9.01-289 SED Kreisleitung Erfurt-Land, Grup-
penaussprache mit Mitgliedern der Viehwirtschaftsbrigade, Kerspleben, 1.11.1968, p. 79.

68. SAPMO BArch DY30/IV A 2/2.023/82 Büro Gerhard Grüneberg, Genosse Norden an Grüneberg, Material des Instituts für Meinungsforschung über einige Probleme der sozialistischen Landwirtschaft, 24.4.1967.

69. Private home production (individuelle Hauswirtschaften) remained central to life as a collective farmer and was a crucial means of supplementing income. It also came to be essential to the production of certain items of produce for the GDR as a whole from the late 1970s. See, for an example of the meaning of the individuelle Hauswirtschaft to members of an LPG, B. Schier, Alltagsleben im ‘Sozialistischen’ Dorf, Münster, 2001, pp. 223–37.


72. SAPMO BArch DY30/IV A 2/2.023/83 Büro Gerhard Grüneberg, Institut für Gesellschaftswissenschaften beim ZK der SED, Lehrstuhl marxistisch-leninistische Soziologie, Einschätzung und Wertung der Beantwortung der Fragen 1-21 und der Rangfolge der Vorgaben in diesen Fragen (nach ihrer Häufigkeit) aus der schriftlichen Befragung der Genossenschaftsbauern ... 17.2.1971.