PART II

COMMUNICATING REFORM: THE LIMITS OF ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION
STEPS TOWARDS REFORM

We still have time and anyway we’re not ripe for becoming candidates for party membership!1
(Comments by LPG members to SED recruiters in Bezirk Erfurt, July 1963.)

During the 1960s, the impact of the hasty completion of the collectivisation campaign on the consistency with which SED agricultural policies were communicated to the LPGs and implemented on the ground continued to be felt. In 1960, the agricultural workforce in Bezirk Erfurt, as in the rest of the GDR, was marked by a lack of technical qualifications and only very low levels of participation in political parties or indeed mass organisations. From the late 1950s, in conjunction with the collectivisation campaign, the pace of recruitment of farmers by the SED as well as the bloc parties had increased.2 At the same time the proportion of the agricultural workforce in training for a technical qualification had also increased. Nonetheless, the rate at which both political recruitment and technical qualification, particularly to an advanced level, could occur by no means matched the speed with which ultimately collectivisation was completed. This defined the context in which LPGs were formed and collective farming was subsequently consolidated and developed in an era of economic reform and technological development in agriculture, as in the rest of the economy.

The use of overt force and mass agitation in rural communities had had some success in ensuring that resistance to SED policies was overcome. Nevertheless, in the process productivity had been severely compromised. Moreover, such an approach was not practically a sustainable basis for the long-term transmission of agricultural policy in any comprehensive or effective manner. The consistency with which district state functionaries were able to see to the implementation of SED agricultural policy continued thus to be hampered by the lack of a clear body of support on the ground within the LPGs. Steps were taken to increase the size and influence of SED party organisations over the LPGs and improve the political reliability and technical and managerial abilities of LPG functionaries.
The construction of the Wall undeniably played a role in encouraging LPG members to pursue their own interests in conjunction with those of the SED regime, by joining a political party or at the very least pursuing advancement in the collectivised system through participation in agricultural training. Additionally, the transition of the state apparatus for agriculture to a production-oriented administration in 1963 appeared to offer better scope for winning over LPG members to participation in and acceptance of agricultural reform in the pursuit of common material interests. However, in the early 1960s, hostility to SED membership remained strong. Financial and agricultural reform in the LPGs continued therefore to be tempered by the inadequate communication of authority between the district state and party administration and collective farmers. Without the influence of an active and capable body of SED supporters or themselves lacking in a political or technical appreciation for SED agricultural policy, LPG chairmen often lacked either the ability or the desire to implement change in the collective farm, especially where it appeared to be against their own interests or indeed the will of the majority of their constituent collective farmers.

Changing the Context for Communication of Authority

Both technical education within the parameters of socialist agricultural policy and the expansion of the regime’s political network at the grass roots were essential to reconciling farmers with active participation in and development of collective farming. By redefining the terms in which the transmission of authority occurred between the SED regime and farmers, political recruitment and technical qualification were necessary elements in the long-term process of establishing a new stable context in which SED policies could be comprehensively and effectively implemented. A feature of the early 1960s in particular was therefore the concurrent growth of adult qualification levels in agriculture, on the one hand, and, on the other, the expansion of the network of SED party organisations with specific responsibility for the LPGs.

The strength of support for the SED in the countryside was limited in the 1950s by a range of factors. The desire of rural communities for a return to peace following the upheavals of the Second World War, the Soviet occupation and the subsequent de-nazification and land reforms hindered the SED’s attempts to find a foothold of support among them. In the face of radical communist policies, the farmer proclaimed himself apolitical and focused on his land and livestock. In its turn, the largely urban SED hierarchy was suspicious and resentful of the rural
population: villages were religious, conservative and bound by local tradition and long-established social networks which made them impenetrable to an outsider. Some progress had without doubt been made by the second drive for collectivisation, beginning in 1958, in aligning the interests of certain groups of farmers more closely with those of the regime. However, often this alignment was achieved by proxy through the VdgB – the farmers’ mutual aid union – and the DBD – the farmers’ party established under the auspices of the SED – whose independence at the grass roots made them at best unreliable outposts of loyalty to the party line.

The SED itself struggled in the eyes of most rural communities to be taken seriously as an advocate of farmers’ interests, being seen as the party of the urban proletariat more than anything else. Hence, where it did recruit members, it tended to be among those who stood outside the traditional farming circles – the school teacher, the pub landlord, craftsmen, industrial workers who commuted from the villages to the factories as well as the mechanics and drivers who worked in the Machine and Tractor Stations and those workers who had been persuaded to move to the countryside and were organised in either the pioneering – and heavily subsidised – Type III LPGs or the state-owned farms (Volkseigene Güter or VEG).

From the late 1950s onwards important initial steps were taken in recruiting LPG members to the SED and establishing party organisations dedicated to organising and influencing collective farmers. The two exceptional years (1958–60) of exponentially increasing pressure on farmers to collectivise, culminating in the critical last weeks of March 1960, drew lines of loyalty or submission, active opposition and passive resistance towards the regime within rural communities more starkly than before. While forced collectivisation without doubt provoked broad resistance and deepened hatred of the communist regime, it also persuaded some individuals to come off the fence and work together with the SED. In the course of the confrontation, people necessarily grew more accustomed to the idea of collectivisation and took seriously the prospect that once achieved it might not be reversed. Those who saw their future in agriculture undoubtedly considered how best to position themselves within the new system. As a result, alongside the resentment of the SED state, there was also some readiness to compromise with it, which grew as collective farming began to pay off and opportunities for advancement were tied up with party membership. By the same token, as the land was collectivised, more and more members of the LPG began to participate in a process of qualification, which redefined their status and prospects within collectivised farming.
Nonetheless, the SED lacked a consistently reliable base of active supporters in many LPGs, particularly in the Type I LPGs, for much of the 1960s. Where there were SED members in the LPGs, they did not necessarily have sufficient influence over the running of the collective, being massively outnumbered by non-party members. In January 1961 the SED Bezirksleitung recorded 709 LPGs in the Bezirk without an SED party organisation dedicated to the collective farm (i.e. an SED Betriebsparteiorganisation or SED BPO). While party organisations existed in all but nineteen villages by June 1961, only 3 per cent of collective farmers in Type I and II LPGs and 8 per cent of farmers in Type IIIs were members of the SED. By December 1963 there were still 503 LPGs without any SED organisation, despite concerted efforts to recruit SED members among the Bezirk’s collective farmers; 423 of these were Type I LPGs.

Recruitment proved especially difficult in the largely Catholic northern and western border districts of Worbis and Heiligenstadt, which continued into the mid-1960s to have the most LPGs without SED party organisations. There were strong disincentives for LPG members to join the SED or even take an active role in so-called LPG-Aktivs, committees of ‘progressive’ collective farmers which served as pools for potential SED recruits. The potential for social exclusion, particularly where religious loyalty was also a factor, remained in the 1960s a considerable barrier to membership. Speaking at the end of the SED Bezirksparteitagung in 1964, the first secretary of the SED Bezirksleitung, Alois Bräutigam, despaired at the number of LPGs without a functioning party organisation. He recommended overcoming the reluctance of potential candidates by persuading them all to sign up in alphabetical order so that: ‘no one takes the blame for being the first or for being the last. As that’s important in villages’.

Very often objections to joining the party focused on the poor example given by existing SED members. Party membership in such small communities was as much a social as a political decision and dislike of those already in the club at a personal level made membership naturally less attractive. Certainly the low reputation of SED members in the village was given as a reason by LPG members for not wishing to join the SED, with arguments such as: ‘We’re not joining the party, because the comrades are no model for us’, ‘Put your own ranks in order first’, ‘Teach your comrades to work like we do first.’

In 1962 the KPKK was called in to investigate a particularly severe division between the SED members and other members of an LPG in a village in Kreis Sondershausen. The SED party organisation was at-
tached to an LPG Type III which had been established there for the past five years and consisted of twelve members, most of whom were LPG members. Given the standards of the time, this was ostensibly a good basis for the SED to influence the day-to-day running of the collective. Unfortunately, the LPG BPO was flawed in a number of aspects. Meetings were only held when the SED Kreisleitung instructor arranged them, and the course of ideological instruction supposed to take place in each of the LPG BPOs annually had not been held once. The party secretary, an SED member since only 1960, had left school after finishing only the 4th grade of primary school and, despite having become a good farmer, had difficulty reading and writing; he was thus more or less unable to run the administrative side of party life and relied heavily on the SED Kreisleitung instructor responsible for this part of the world to do it for him. He was not, however, particularly open to instruction on the ideological issues of the day and knew very little of the party resolutions for which he was supposed to lobby in the LPG. Additionally, he liked his drink and several of his fellow party members were prone to getting drunk in the pub (run, incidentally, by another SED member) and getting into arguments with the other collective farmers.

Non-party members, which included the chairman of the LPG, objected to what the KPKK described as the party secretary’s ‘selfish private ambitions’ (privategoistische Bestrebungen) and relations were marked by continual confrontation. Even in those situations where the party secretary was deemed to have been correct to address deficiencies in the running of the LPG, his actions ‘usually took on a hurtful guise so that his criticism gave cause for conflicts from which he drew the wrong conclusions and found himself in opposition to the LPG’s economic functionaries’. To make matters worse, the members of the LPG BPO were all originally factory workers who had themselves brought no land into the collective – a circumstance which gave rise necessarily to conflicts of interest with the established farmers within the LPG.7

Even where a party organisation was formed in an LPG in the 1960s, there was no guarantee that its members would be active advocates of SED policies or even take part in the life of the party. In early 1964, an investigation in Kreis Sömmerda found that the agricultural department in the SED Kreisleitung was not particularly efficient in making sure that LPG party organisations were functioning properly.8 In the Bezirk as a whole in late 1964 attempts were made to improve the effect of the party organisations on collective farms. Working groups were sent into problem areas by the Kreisleitungen and party activists delegated into LPG party organisations. Severe problems in the LPG BPO
in the Kreise Apolda and Erfurt-Land were found to be the result of the small proportion of actual LPG members in the party organisations.9

The help which party secretaries ought to have been receiving from the Kreisleitung was also found to have been limited owing to a lack of personnel. Instructors found that they were rarely able to do more than give basic administrative help. Instructors for the SED Kreisleitung Sömmerda complained of having to manage the party organisations of up to twelve villages and consequently could achieve little in any one of them.10 Party secretaries often tended to do the work of the party on their own with little or no help from other members of the party, with the consequence that in the absence of the party secretary the party organisation ceased to be effective.11 Certainly the apathy of a large proportion of SED members in LPG BPO undermined their effectiveness. Party secretaries were encouraged to name and shame non-attendees, and, failing that, to begin a process of party punishments and discussions forcing members to justify their behaviour. Ultimately persistent refusal to attend should have ended in exclusion. An alternative method to such disciplinary proceedings used by party secretaries was simply to report false figures to the Kreisleitung, showing higher attendance than was actually the case. Nevertheless, the attendance levels at party meetings remained a constant source of worry for functionaries in the agriculture departments of the Kreisleitungen because they were regularly found to be lower than in other sectors of the economy.12

For the majority of LPG members, the disadvantages of party membership seemed quite clearly to outweigh the benefits, as one disgruntled member of the LPG Olbersleben was reported to have put it to recruiters: ‘What influence does the little man have on things, the big men do just what they want anyway?’13 There was also little enthusiasm for the additional work required by participation in party life. Farmers claimed that they had neither the time nor the energy after work to attend party meetings or prepare for them properly by reading up on the political issues of the day, particularly if they had to spend time tending their household plot or livestock.14 Nor, indeed, was the prospect of receiving a task assigned by the party particularly welcome. For the ordinary member this could mean taking on extra work in the commissions of the collective farm or at the very least taking an active role in agitating for party policy. For a manager, party membership could result in being selected to advocate SED policy in another (weaker) LPG – again not always an enticing prospect. For example, an attempt to recruit a brigadier in Kreis Apolda failed because he did not want to be delegated into a struggling LPG. Party membership could thus be seen as making for extra duties with few privileges to balance them out.15
Supplying Loyal Cadres

It was vital to the SED’s long-term goals of transforming agriculture that leading functionaries in the LPG were loyal to the party as well as being efficient managers of production. In the new hierarchy of agricultural production, the LPG chairmen, the board members of the LPG and the mid-level managers of the farms (the brigade leaders and above) were ideally conduits of information and authority, bringing about the most effective implementation of SED agricultural policy by the collective farmers in their local conditions. Politically reliable, technically proficient and managerially capable LPG cadres had thus to be found to communicate the policies of the regime to LPG members and successfully oversee their implementation in practice.

Owing to the decision to complete collectivisation in a very short space of time, by the time full collectivisation was announced, it was clear that insufficient preparation had been made to provide LPGs with functionaries trained in socialist agricultural theory and prepared to organise and run collective farms. Furthermore, there were insufficient numbers of politically suitable cadres willing or able to be delegated into leading posts in new or newly expanded LPGs, either from already established LPGs, other sectors of the economy or indeed the state administration. As a consequence, it was inevitable that the majority of the new LPG cadres were deficient either in political reliability, managerial skill or technical ability.

During the early 1960s the SED made concerted efforts to improve its position in the LPGs. During 1962 SED members involved more broadly in agricultural administration were given targeted training to take up functionary positions in the collective farms. Furthermore, a programme of delegation of functionaries from the district state apparatus, state-owned farms and other stable LPGs, as well as the VdgB and the MTS, into politically or financially unstable collective farms was established. Overall the number of mid-level functionaries in the LPGs (such as brigade leaders, agronomists and technicians) who were SED members in the Bezirk increased by six times from 1961 to 1962 – the result of an influx of trained and party-loyal cadres as well as SED recruitment campaigns in the LPGs. This was important progress as far as the SED leadership was concerned, in making some collective farms more consistently responsive to new developments in collective farm practices and economic administration. Nevertheless, in 1963 the Bezirk still lacked just fewer than 300 agricultural functionaries with suitable political and technical backgrounds, despite having organised the delegation of 208 cadres since the beginning of 1962.
The majority of the LPGs then in existence in 1960 were new and barely functional. Most of them had adopted the statute of the Type I collective farm, opting for the minimum degree of collective ownership and collective farming practice allowed them. The running of many of these new collectives thus did not automatically fall immediately into the hands of those who could be relied on politically. Leaders were chosen by members of such LPGs for their farming credentials and local connections, not for their subservience to the regime. At the very least, LPG members continued to assert an apolitical stance. As one farmer in an LPG in Kreis Heiligenstadt argued, ‘we want practical not political men on the board of our LPG’.

Nevertheless, chairmen of LPGs of all types were certainly soon removed from their posts where they had not proved themselves subsequently to be sufficiently constructive in their leadership of the LPG. By the time of the annual members’ assemblies, at the start of 1962, the questions of whether or not LPG functionaries wished to remain in their posts and whether or not they were considered suitable – on a political and ideological basis – had become much clearer in the post-Wall climate. At the same time, the state’s efforts made since 1959 to cover the deficit of both politically reliable and agriculturally trained cadres available for deployment in the LPGs had begun to pay off in a small way. In April 1961 the Bezirksleitung had passed a resolution on the improvement of the development of cadres in agriculture and the qualification of the rural workforce as a whole. This resolution foresaw a range of measures to improve the numbers of LPG members with sufficient political as well as practical abilities to advance collective farming. All production plans produced by LPGs in 1961 were to be accompanied by a qualification plan. Delegates of the Kreisleitungen attached to the various MTS areas were given the central responsibility of ensuring action was taken, not only to persuade farmers of the value of qualifications but also to develop some plans reflecting future cadre requirements.

As a result of such measures the number of farmers exposed to basic agricultural training conducted with a view to application in an LPG increased, providing the basis for the development of a future generation of cadres. Although there were many capable farmers, the long-term transformation of agriculture depended upon the creation of professional managers and technicians of collective production. The expansion of the system of qualification in the early 1960s was a crucial first step in this process, altering the basic context in which farmers perceived agriculture and its future development under the SED regime. By the late 1960s, as the size of the agricultural workforce declined and...
qualification programmes took effect, the proportion of the total working population in agriculture with a qualification was more than doubled in the Bezirk, from 16.5 per cent to 39.75 per cent. Perhaps still more significantly, the number of LPG members with the technical college certificate increased by 88 per cent. On the basis of these figures it appears that an ever-growing number of farmers were gaining qualifications in order to take up positions as mid- and top-level cadres in the LPGs and were thus now defining their interests and their prospects for promotion in the context of collectivised farming. As a consequence, chairmen of LPGs who had failed to prove themselves good managers of collective farmers and who had failed to ensure the farm met minimum production targets increasingly could be replaced with more suitable candidates.

Nevertheless, the proportion of LPGs with both a successful and politically reliable chairman remained low. Moreover, while individual party members in positions of authority in the LPGs were certainly necessary if SED agricultural policy was to be seriously proposed for implementation, such individual figures needed, too, the backing of others within the collective farm. Without an effective party organisation to back them, LPG chairmen were slow to develop the financial or agricultural organisation of the collective farm.

**New Departures in the Administration of Agriculture**

In the mid-1960s the first steps of a radical transformation of agricultural production were to be taken. The reforms of the New Economic System of Planning and Management (*das Neue Ökonomische System der Planung und Leitung* or NÖS) and the announcement of plans to progress to industrial-style production in agriculture were intended to bring about a fundamentally new ethos in all types of LPGs, combining both an appeal to farmers’ material interests and an insistence on a specifically socialist modernisation of production. Gradual increases in state investment during the mid-1960s brought financial stability to most LPGs and encouraged steps to be taken by collective farmers to increase the scale of production in accordance with SED policies. The processes of economic integration of agriculture into the planned economy and the internal reorganisation of the collective farms which this entailed, however, created fruitful ground for further conflict between the district state apparatus and LPG members.

Type I LPGs began to adopt collective practices more fully, and in some cases accepted mergers with neighbouring collective farms. Lim-
ended forms of cooperation between LPGs also began to develop. None-
theless, collective farmers retained opinions on the way in which their
LPG, and indeed agriculture as a whole, should develop which di-
verged considerably from those of the SED leadership. Although the
SED state had the potential in individual cases to impose its will upon
LPG members and their functionaries, the effective implementation of
policy in the long term demanded a less confrontational approach, not
least in the interests of increasing production levels.

In 1963, the state administration running agriculture was reconfig-
ured with the creation of Agricultural Councils (Landwirtschaftsräte) at
national, Bezirk level (Bezirkslandwirtschaftsrat or BLR) and Kreis level
(Kreislandwirtschaftsrat or KLR). The creation of the agricultural coun-
cils promised to result in a better standard of leadership by the state
in agricultural matters, with a new professional approach to the pro-
duction process in the LPGs. The agricultural departments within the
Räte der Kreise, which had overseen the collectivisation process, were
considered now too bureaucratic and unsuitable for guiding the develop-
ment of collectivised farming as a fully incorporated sector of the
planned economy. The new agricultural councils, in contrast, promised
to be more active, professional bodies with primary responsibility for
maximising production in the LPGs. Leading collective farmers were
to be explicitly included in the decision-making process at district and
regional level with the intention of improving the flow of information
into the administration from the collective farms themselves. Thus sci-
entists, veterinary surgeons and other agricultural experts were to work
alongside collective farmers to come up with the most effective means
of raising production using the latest technologies available.

This policy of inclusion was also designed to put aside the ‘class’
conflicts of the collectivisation campaign in the interests of pursuing the
common goal of raising production levels. As the chairman of the LPG
Type III Söllnitz put it to his fellow SED members at the SED Bezirk-
sparteiaktivtagung at the end of 1963, economic success depended on
including rather than controlling the newer and reluctant members of
the LPG. Describing the grounds for the success of his LPG over the pre-
vious year, he explained: ‘We attempted together in our territory to win
over those collective farmers who before [collectivisation] had had the
best results. That wasn’t easy, since they had been bossed around in the
past and their suggestions for improvements to the collective work had
been ignored.’ With their recategorisation as the ‘Class of the Collective
Farmers’, once-reluctant members of the LPG were now, in theory, to be
seen less in terms of their potential for counter-revolution. Rather, due
consideration was to be given to their abilities as productive farmers,
whose opinions on how to improve production in the Type III LPGs should, within reason, be taken into account.28

The introduction of this new system of agricultural administration went hand in hand with a number of other proclaimed changes to the conditions in which the LPGs were to function. Plans were announced to begin the development of industrial-scale production in agriculture and were marked by the completion of the transfer and sale of the remaining machinery of the MTS to collective farms. Moreover, new economic reforms for agriculture were announced for 1964 as part of the policies of the New Economic System introduced by Ulbricht in 1963. The aim behind both reforms in agriculture and the creation of the agricultural councils was to shift the emphasis of agricultural administration on to stimulating productivity rather than merely controlling production. The KLRs were to coordinate agricultural plans more realistically with accurate assessments of the productive capacities and profiles of the LPGs in each district.29 Equally, with economic reforms, it was expected that LPG members would be encouraged by a system of profit incentives to improve productivity.

At the same time, planning of production would, in theory at least, be organised with greater input from collective farmers rather than foisted upon the LPGs by the district administration. To this end, the number of products for which administrative plan targets would be set was reduced and the dual price system for production over and above the plan was abandoned for arable crops.30 As the director of the state produce purchasing organisation at Bezirk level mentioned in December 1963, he expected the introduction of the New Economic System into agriculture to resolve past inconsistencies between the plans of the farms themselves and those of the district and regional administrations.31 Following the grim upheavals of the collectivisation campaign and the struggles of the first years of collective farming, there was much optimism among loyal supporters of the SED regime that the NÖS and the agricultural councils would bring both increased production and greater unity within agriculture.32

Despite this apparent optimism and the at least rhetorical emphasis on conciliation, neither collective farmers nor all LPG functionaries were quick to embrace attempts to reform their LPG. The increased revenues which accompanied changes to price regulations were welcomed by LPG members. However, there remained considerable suspicion of any new measures which appeared to restrict the incomes of LPG members or diminish or deprive collective farmers of control over their funds, land or livestock in the future. The KLRs’ attempts to persuade LPG members to adopt greater degrees of collective use of land, live-
stock and machinery, and set about the implementation of more refined degrees of financial organisation to stimulate production thus achieved only limited success.

Hostility to Change: the Limits of Reform

Opposition to outside interference was especially strong in Type I collective farms where, not least owing to the lack of LPG functionaries or members who had joined the SED, mistrust outweighed support for state interference in agriculture. The fear of losing still further control over their land, livestock and machinery was fundamental cause for LPG Type I members to be sceptical of all proposals to restructure the work organisation or reform the financial arrangements of the LPG. For much of the early 1960s the district agricultural councils therefore struggled to ensure the implementation of the basic practices and work organisation of an efficient collective farm in Type I LPGs. It was one thing to establish the LPG as an administrative institution, replete with a hierarchy of command, responsible commissions and the routines of collective democracy, capable of coordinating collective work on arable land; it was another to develop a functioning collective farm which was taking steps to reduce and control the element of private ownership among its members.

Establishing collective livestock herds; organising collective farming of meadowland and of household plots; increasing the level of accumulated capital rather than the level of consumption of profits as income; reducing the significance of contributed land in the distribution of income; introducing internal competition between members; and establishing performance-related pay were all steps which LPG Type I members sought, with greater and lesser degrees of success, to resist. With the implementation of each of these measures, the prospect of the loss of both individual control over private production and the profits arising from it came nearer.

To LPG Type I members, there was not much to recommend merger with a neighbouring LPG Type III either. Merger meant not only having a smaller voice in the running of the farm, it very likely meant coming under the direct influence of an SED party organisation. Most obviously, the transfer of private livestock into collective use amounted to something akin to expropriation as far as some LPG Type I farmers were concerned. The monetary value of the contribution required from Type I farmers joining an LPG Type III was felt to be exaggerated too, while the animals and machinery contributed were often thought to have been
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undervalued. Type I farmers had little confidence either in the greater profitability of collective livestock holdings and indeed expected to suffer financial hardship in the LPG Type III. As can be seen from Figure 4.1, between September 1960 and September 1970 the number of Type I LPGs in existence in the Bezirk dropped at a fairly steady rate, while the number of Type III LPGs remained stable. In a few cases, mergers, or rather take-overs, undoubtedly occurred with Type III LPGs despite the opposition of the majority of LPG Type I members, although what proportion of mergers occurred on this basis is uncertain. Even where ballots of the LPG Type I members were held, complaints were sometimes heard from collective farmers that they had been forced to vote under duress or misled as to what they were voting for.

Nevertheless on the whole, functionaries at KLRs were aware of the problems created by forcing through mergers of LPGs without sufficient preparation, if not the whole-hearted enthusiasm, of collective farmers. The potential damage to production levels as well as the financial stability of LPGs as a result of the discontent of collective farmers and general disorganisation within the collective farm had been clearly demonstrated in many LPGs in the course of collectivisation. Mergers of Type I LPGs with Type IIIIs were necessary to the transformation of agriculture in both the short and long term. As repositories of money, machinery and good stock, as well as farming expertise, Type I LPGs

![Figure 4.1](image-url)

**Figure 4.1** Number of Type I and Type II LPGs vs. number of Type III LPGs in Bezirk Erfurt, 1960–74


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potentially provided the solution to struggling Type III LPGs in need of all these resources.

Pressure from the KLRs on Type II LPGs to merge with neighbouring LPGs, particularly other Type I LPGs, was motivated by practical concern for organising more efficient farming of arable land, enabling larger plantations of single crops. It could also be motivated by the recognition that very small Type I LPGs had very little prospect of sustaining the personnel or the machinery to provide the increases in production necessary to remain profitable in the future. At the start of 1964, nine Type I and II LPGs in Kreis Sömmerda were singled out by the SED Kreisleitung as having no real future as independent economic units. Consequently the provision of financial support from the KLRs was made contingent on these LPGs planning to merge with a neighbouring farm.34

The feeling was widespread in rural communities that having once been forced into the LPGs, farmers should at least now be left to get on with improving production without unwanted state interference. In particular, attempts to gauge labour productivity via the introduction of an official documented competition between farmers or the creation of work norms were still widely met with opposition during the early 1960s, particularly in Type I LPGs. The introduction of schemes to increase labour productivity was regarded at best as an unnecessary administrative burden by LPG farmers and functionaries.35 At worst, the socialist competition was recognised and rejected as a means of state interference in the running of the LPGs and a lever with which to force increased productivity. The organisation of a competition internal to the LPG, between individual members, appeared too to undermine LPG members’ conception of their special identity as farmers, as naturally hard working and dedicated to their land and livestock, putting them rather in the same bracket as mercenary industrial wage labourers. In the words of the chairman of the LPG Type I in Nottleben, Kreis Erfurt-Land: ‘Competition is an expression of mistrust. It suggests that farmers are lazy and are only motivated to work by money.’36

Moreover, competition between farmers in the same collective farm was seen as unnecessarily divisive. LPG functionaries already had difficulty in maintaining harmonious relations between the various different members and were unwilling to heighten tension further by adding money to the equation. In August 1962 only ten of the ninety-six LPGs in the district of Gotha had drawn up an internal competition, with LPG chairmen arguing that ‘competition causes bad blood’ and even that competition ‘represents an illegal increase in the work unit’.37 In April the following year reports on Type I LPGs in the Bezirk as a whole
reported the commonplace opinion of farmers that: ‘Competition brings disharmony in the LPG, especially between the older and the younger collective farmers. Competition does not increase work productivity.’

Reiterating the rhetoric of the labour movement in the Weimar period, an explicit comparison was made between capitalist exploitation and exploitation under state socialism: ‘Today we say competition and before it was called piece work and piece work is murder [Akkord ist Mord].’

Other administrative methods designed to stimulate productivity in LPGs were also considered with scepticism. In February 1963 information reports on the mood of the population pointed to a number of expressions of opposition to any form of performance-related pay in the collectives on the basis that ‘material incentive leads to mutual chicanery between individual farmers; payment according to the final product means discrimination against older farmers since they can’t put in the work the young ones can’. Instructors from the KLRs thus met with arguments which dismissed these innovations as unnecessary or even as downright destructive. Comments such as ‘competition is just passing fad’ or even ‘our LPG is too small to run a competition’, accompanied more serious complaints as to the divisiveness of competition.

By November 1963 it was noted that socialist competition was still being resisted, with only 228 out of 723 Type I and II LPGs in the Bezirk participating. By the beginning of 1964, the KLR in Kreis Sömmerda could claim only eight Type I LPGs had developed a good degree of collective work, which included adopting both internal and external competition and some form of performance-related pay. At the other end of the spectrum, six LPGs were found to be still functioning as collectives in name only. The vast majority of Type I and II LPGs had made some – but by no means enough – steps to implement ‘good collective practice’.

Having implemented the highest degree of collectivisation of property on the farm, in contrast to the Type I LPGs, the Type IIIs were expected to lead the way in the implementation of the latest elements of economic planning and administration in farming. Their leading functionaries tended more often than in the Type I LPGs to be members of the SED and the size of the party organisation tended to be larger, too, making for a stronger base of support for the latest methods or work organisation proposed by the SED leadership. As a consequence, Type III LPGs were often quicker to develop new incentive-based pay structures and to develop the conditions for specialised and industrial-scale production.

In Bezirk Erfurt as a whole, there was some evidence that Type III LPGs were beginning to prove themselves more capable of producing efficiently. The average income of a member working full-time in an
LPG Type III rose from 3,360 Marks in 1962 to just over 4,000 Marks in 1963, according to figures from the BLR. Type III LPGs were able, too, to close the gap in productivity on the average LPG Type I and II in some parts of the Bezirk. According to figures on volume of produce (as measured in grain units) per hectare, production in Type IIIs in Kreis Sömmerda was able to match that of Type I/IIs in livestock and was only slightly lower in crop production in 1963. Nevertheless there remained in 1963 a large number of loss-making Type III LPGs, which were reliant on considerable credits and subsidies from the state, and many more in which working conditions left much to be desired.

There was thus much scepticism about any change which did not immediately promise to improve the conditions under which these LPG members worked or, worse still, which threatened to compromise their incomes. Arguments were made in several LPGs against payment according to work norms and the introduction of performance-related pay, such as: ‘What do we need norms for? The main thing is that the work units are correct.’ In the LPG Type III Tuttleben in Kreis Gotha, the women of the field brigade were reported to have expressed the opinion: ‘Our menfolk had to do piece-work twenty years ago. You lot [i.e. Socialists] are against piece-work, but the performance principle is no different.’ Despite improving incomes, it was clear that at the start of 1964, a large proportion of LPG members in the Type IIIs continued to suspect the state via the LPG of seeking to exploit them as workers.

Leading functionaries in the Type III LPGs too resented the burden of implementing management methods which caused disquiet among the members. They objected also to the greater level of responsibility and accountability foisted upon them by the detailed gauges of the LPGs’ economic performance now demanded by the KLRs. In 1965, reasonably clement weather over the previous year and a degree of success in the use of machinery collectively had led to a much improved harvest around the Bezirk. As a result, the members’ assemblies at the start of the year were marked less than ever by signs of disgruntlement. To the dismay of the BLR, however, LPG chairmen failed to suggest to their members that their improved incomes were a direct consequence of the systems of economic incentive which had so far been introduced. Even, it was noted, in the most advanced of the Type III LPGs, the internal competition was widely thought to serve no purpose.

Assessing the discussions and statements made at district farmers’ conferences held around the Bezirk in March 1965, the BLR found that there was still a considerable shortfall in the extent to which economic reforms had been implemented in the LPGs. Socialist business economics (sozialistische Betriebswirtschaft) – a collective term used to de-
scribe the combination of administrative regulations, economic levers and systems of material incentive which LPGs were ideally to employ – appeared neither to be fully understood nor accepted by collective farmers and LPG functionaries alike. An information report on the state of the implementation of the NÖS in March 1965 pointed to some sudden progress having been made in winning over LPG cadres in the Bezirk. Following a series of lectures and a propaganda campaign to help LPG chairmen and accountants understand socialist business economics, twice as many Type III LPGs in the Bezirk had reportedly reached an advanced stage in the implementation of various forms of performance-related pay and strict accounting methods. Nevertheless, proposals to index LPG functionaries’ pay directly to the financial results of the LPG still provoked opposition among both brigadiers and LPG chairmen.

If chairmen of the Type III LPGs were not always supportive of new methods by which to run their collective farms, the leaders of Type I LPGs were still slower to insist on the implementation of changes in theirs. The threat to their livelihoods and their independence, which farmers in the LPG Type I perceived to come from the KLR’s proposals for the introduction of performance-related pay or greater collectivisation of land or livestock, prevented such issues even coming up for discussion in some Type I LPGs in 1964. In Flarchheim, Kreis Erfurt-Land, where the LPG Type I was among the most successful in the district, LPG members were reportedly easily able to resist attempts by the LPG’s board to introduce performance-related pay and ‘socialist competition’. It was suggested even that the LPG members would seek to vote those board members out of their positions if they continued to advocate such measures. Elsewhere in 1964 attempts to introduce collective farming of pasture land and develop collective livestock herds continued too to fail in Type I and II LPGs. Although by May 1965 in the Bezirk as a whole 72 per cent of Type I LPGs had some sort of collective livestock holding alongside privately kept animals, more than half continued to farm their pasture land on an individual basis.

LPGs which resisted any form of change were most numerous in those parts of the Bezirk where Type I LPGs predominated and the SED had failed to establish an effective network of party organisations among either collective farmers, or indeed the rural population in general. This was particularly the case in the hilly northeast of the Bezirk, where the strength of the SED was limited by the resilience of close-knit Catholic communities and where the terrain and the pre-collectivisation pattern of land ownership precluded the rapid development of industrial-scale crop production or intensive livestock holding. In Kreis
Worbis suggestions that LPGs should begin to specialise production in single crops or in livestock were met with scepticism from farmers. Establishing a coherent arrangement of fields for concentrated production of a single crop was compromised in any case by the patchwork of household plots and dividing walls and hedges which had yet to be removed.

More seriously, farmers refused to countenance such measures on the grounds that they were just the beginning of a plan to expropriate farmers completely. In the neighbouring districts of Mühlhausen and Nordhausen, farmers similarly argued that concentration of production was just going to turn ‘farmers’ into ‘labourers’ or that it would make LPGs too dependent on one another to be efficient. The head of the district ideological commission in the SED Kreisleitung Worbis reported on the ongoing of resistance of farmers to change at the end of 1964. At the root of the problem, he noted, was the fact that LPG chairmen agreed with the SED in principle but when it came to putting policies into practice were either unwilling or unable to see them through. Where LPG functionaries were themselves in favour of implementing reforms, the unopposed front of resistance presented by LPG members in those collective farms where no or few political ties or loyalties to the SED regime existed meant they found little support within the LPGs.

Progress was made, at least on paper, in many Type I LPGs and Type III LPGs around the Bezirk following the holding of members’ assemblies at the start of 1966. Approximately three-quarters of LPGs, it was reported, had introduced forms of material incentive-making incomes dependent on specific improvements in productivity. Nevertheless, the number of LPGs that had instituted the full raft of economic reforms which were supposed to drive the NÖS in agriculture remained limited. Type I LPGs in areas such as Kreis Worbis remained particularly resistant to the introduction of performance-related pay, indexed payment of leading cadres, collective farming of household plots and grassland or higher rates of capital accumulation.

**Conclusion**

During the course of the 1960s the problem of introducing new working practices into the LPGs was partially solved by a process of qualification, expansion of the party organisations, merger and cooperation between collective farms. Economic reform and the transformation of the conditions of production (however gradual) were nevertheless not warmly received by collective farmers. Functionaries of the KLRs con-
tinued to face serious difficulties in persuading members and cadres of the LPGs to accept policies which at best they did not understand and at worst to which they maintained a fundamental ideological opposition. The long-term goals of SED agricultural policy ran too often contrary to collective farmers’ own conception of their best interests and their own sense of good practice. As a consequence, the implementation of the economic reform required to establish specialised agriculture on an industrial scale and integrate agricultural production into a comprehensive system of economic planning required considerable time and effort. Until loyal and capable cadres occupied the leading positions in most LPGs and reliable political lobbies had been established at the grass roots of farming, it remained problematic for the regime effectively and forcefully to persuade collective farmers – particularly those in the Type I LPGs – that they should and would change their working practices in accordance with SED policy.

The social practices through which the SED leadership sought to exert its authority were by no means straightforward. LPG chairmen clearly had to be responsive to the demands placed upon them by the district agricultural councils to implement reforms and persuade their members to support the state’s plans for developing agricultural production. However, they were also bound, if they were to retain the support of their fellow farmers and continue to run a successful farm, to act in their members’ interests and respond to their concerns. Attaining good production results and showing themselves not to be hostile to SED agricultural policy – matters on which their future careers depended – entailed balancing and mediating these twin pressures. As long as LPG members sought to assert interests which did not appear to be served by SED agricultural policy, and as long as LPG functionaries lacked the desire or the strength and political support on the ground to overcome divergent opinions, the transformation of agriculture remained a slow process.

By the completion of the administrative collectivisation of farms in Bezirk Erfurt, as in the rest of the GDR in spring 1960, there was a basic deficiency of personnel in the LPGs, but particularly in the Type I LPGs, who would support the introduction of measures designed to reform the financial and agricultural organisation of the collective farms. Steps had been taken since the 1950s to provide sufficient numbers of cadres, loyal to the SED, and trained to run the LPGs in accordance with SED policy. Steps had also been taken to recruit LPG members to the SED in order to create a lobby of support for SED policies within each of the collective farms. However, in the early 1960s the deficiency of personnel remained a problem.
Despite the construction of the Wall, the stabilisation of the LPGs in the aftermath, and development of a more production-orientated administration for agriculture, the quality and quantity of loyal LPG cadres and LPG members remained insufficient. Collective farmers continued to resist further changes to the organisation of the LPG, not least where these changes appeared to expose the individual farmer to further outside interference. The existence of the LPG had been put beyond doubt; how, and how quickly, it would develop remained a matter of some contention.

Notes


2. In Kreis Apolda, there was a particularly large contingent of DBD and LDPD members in the LPG: ThHStAW BDVP 20.1/353 6 Bericht zur Situation in der Landwirtschaft, 24.2.1962, p. 43.


7. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt BIV/2/4-107 KPDK Sondershausen, Bericht über die Untersuchung in der GO der LPG West-Greussen durch die KPDK, 15.8.1962, p. 22.
9. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt IV/A/2/3-099 Sekretariat der Bezirksleitung, Abt. Parteiorgane, Informationsbericht Nr. 22/64, p. 55.
17. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt BIV/2/7-495 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Landwirtschaft, Analyse über den Stand der Entwicklung der PO der LPG, VEG, MTS/RTS … 24.5.1963, p. 15.
20. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt BIV/2/5-043 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Org/Kader Informationsbericht Nr. 5/62, Neunter Bericht zur Durchsetzung der Direktive des ZK zur Sicherung der Staatsgrenze West, 30.1.1962, p. 80.

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23. The same opinion with regard to farmers in the GDR as a whole is given in SAPMO BArch, DY30/IV 2/7/581 ZK der SED Abt. Landwirtschaft, Bericht über einige Schlussfolgerungen bei der Durchsetzung der Grundsätze zur weiteren Entwicklung des Systems der Berufsausbildung in der DDR auf dem Gebiet der Landwirtschaft, 26.2.1960, p. 21.

24. The proportion of the agricultural workforce with the basic qualification Facharbeiterprüfung rose from 4.5 per cent to 11.5 per cent between 1960 and 1961, while the number of master farmers and those with technical college and university qualifications rose from 2 per cent to 3.5 per cent within Bezirk Erfurt. Statistisches Jahrbuch – Bezirk Erfurt, 1970, Teil I, p. 126.


27. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt IV/A/2/3-051 Sekretariat der Bezirksleitung, Protokollauszug von der Bürositzung am 8.2.1963.


34. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Kreisleitung der SED Söm-


42. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt IV/A/2/2-38 Protokoll der Bezirksparteiaktivtagung Landwirtschaft am 17.12.1963, Referat Genosse Thieme, Stellv. Leiter des Büros für Landwirtschaft, p. 22.


44. ThHStAW RdB Erfurt L599 Bezirkslandwirtschaftsrat, Analyse über die ökonomische Entwicklung der LPG im Jahre 1963 (undated).


47. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Kreisleitung der SED Sömmerda IV/A/4.10/092 Kreislandwirtschaftsrat Sömmerda – Produktionslei-


50. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt IV/A/2/3-112 Bezirkslandwirtschaftsrat, Einschätzung der Kreisbauernkonferenzen im Bezirk Erfurt, Schlussfolgerungen, 29.3.1965, p. 152.


53. ThHStAW NF 172 Bezirkssekretariat, Vorlage an das Büro für Landwirtschaft bei der Bezirksleitung der SED, 13.6.1964, p. 117.

54. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt IV/A/2/3-084 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Parteiorgane, Informationsbericht, 7.4.1964, p. 16.


56. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt IV/A/2/3-096 SED Bezirksleitung Abteilung Parteiorgane, Informationsbericht 18/64, 20.8.1964, p. 45.


