

FARMING BEHIND THE WALL

You just want to dominate us, there are so many who think for us now – why so much pressure, we will manage things just as we do every year.¹

(The complaint of farmers in Kreis Arnstadt in September 1962 as functionaries from the district administration sought to control the harvesting of crops.)

On 13 August 1961 the obstacles to an illegal departure from the GDR to West Germany were suddenly made considerably more severe. Along with the Wall running through Berlin, measures were taken to strengthen security along the entire border with West Germany, a considerable part of which ran along the northern and western edges of Bezirk Erfurt. Although attempts continued to be made to get across the border by citizens of the GDR – with some limited success in the first weeks after the Wall's construction – the steady flow of people to the West was brought to an abrupt halt. This brought to an end the drain on manpower and expertise from the GDR, which was severely undermining the East German economy as well as any claims the SED regime made to legitimacy. With the economic security lent by the Wall, the prospects for the survival of the GDR under SED dictatorship improved significantly.

This security lent the leadership of the SED greater self-confidence in pursuing radical and often unpopular policies and taking punitive action against those it considered hostile. However, it also encouraged East Germans as a whole to reassess how to make the best of their lives within the SED dictatorship now that they were deprived of the possibility of an alternative life in the West and the likelihood of reunification had receded significantly. It thus ensured that a much increased proportion of the population reconsidered their future in the GDR and were moved to participate in it and in so doing sustain and shape the structures and systems of authority by which the SED dictatorship was run over the coming years. There is no doubt that the construction of the Wall was thus a major turning point in the GDR's social and economic development and had an impact, in both the short and long term, on the way in which the authority of the SED leadership was communicated and understood within East German society.

In the past, flight to the West had certainly not been an easy option that citizens of the GDR had taken lightly. This was perhaps especially so for farmers where an inherited or long-standing connection and sense of responsibility to the land, to their livestock and to their community could act as an additional restraint on the desire to leave the country. Nonetheless a very large proportion of the population, many of them farmers, had deemed the risks and losses involved in flight to the West worthwhile. For those farmers who had thus far remained in the GDR despite collectivisation, departure to the West had thus always been a potential alternative to remaining in the LPG. The complete locking of the border removed this alternative, bringing stability and greater certainty as to the long-term survival of the LPG. The subsequent forcible resettlement of 'unreliable' villagers away from the border regions also made clear the limits of opposition and the lengths of repression possible in the GDR. Now that the SED leadership could afford to be less tolerant, the test of conscience, loyalty and obedience put to farmers and rural functionaries during the collectivisation campaign was reapplied from August 1961 with still less room for dissent and greater incentive to support the consolidation of the LPG.

The Limits of Dissent

Public outbursts of resentment directed towards the regime or the LPG continued to occur in Bezirk Erfurt despite the construction of the Wall. Swastikas were graffitied on LPG buildings and in instances in 1961 and 1962 in Kreis Heiligenstadt manure was spread on a field in such a way that a swastika became apparent in a darker shade of green, making it visible for miles around.² There were now, however, very severe repercussions for any LPG members suspected of deliberately hindering the successful development of collective farming. There had certainly been instances of draconian punishments meted out for acts of supposed economic sabotage against the LPG before August 1961. On a national level the death penalty was applied and publicised in two cases of arson both before and after the construction of the Wall.³ Nevertheless the more secure position of the SED leadership after 13 August 1961 immediately allowed the stricter application of ideological discrimination both within the ranks of the regime's own apparatus and among the population at large.

Communities within the 5 km exclusion zone along the Bezirk's border with the Federal Republic were subjected to a sudden crackdown on 'hostile' elements. In part because of the strength of religious affilia-

tion in the border areas of the Catholic Eichsfeld and in part because of the proximity of the West, villages in this area were suspected of being potentially dangerous hotbeds of enemy agents and sympathetic reactionaries.⁴ Individuals and families deemed politically unreliable – not least on the basis of their behaviour during the collectivisation campaign and the degree of their acceptance of the LPG – were forcefully deported in early October 1961 with little or no warning. The brutality and, in a large number of cases, the arbitrary nature of these actions sent a clear signal of the ruthlessness with which the regime was willing to go about consolidating its authority in rural communities.⁵

In some cases seemingly arbitrary expulsions provoked attempts by villagers to have the decision revoked. Petitions were signed and sent to the Central Committee of the SED in Berlin – these had very little success, however. Rather such evidence of unchecked negative opinion towards the regime resulted in further investigations by the Stasi and the SED Party Control Commission not only into those involved in the petition but also into those village functionaries who had failed to act against it on the ground.⁶ The virulence of the SED regime's actions against sections of the population in the border areas succeeded in demonstrating the potential repercussions of any future behaviour that might be construed as hostile to the state. This no doubt limited any potential support which those who sought to flee the GDR received from locals in the border regions. No less significantly, it also raised the spectre of forced resettlement as a possible punishment for 'hostile' villages elsewhere in the Bezirk, as one villager in Kreis Bad Langensalza pointed out: 'with the actions on the border, it would not be long before people in Reichenbach will be expelled too'.⁷

During late summer in 1961 action was taken, in the words of the Ministry for Agriculture in Berlin, to 'unmask hostile and counterrevolutionary forces in the village'. Public confrontations were staged with numerous farmers, above all those who had been local agricultural functionaries under the Nazis (*Ortsbauernführer*), as well as other Nazi party members and *Wehrmacht* officers, resulting in a number of arrests or restrictions on their movements. The crackdown on such elements of the rural population resulted, it was claimed, in immediate improvements to the labour discipline and the work ethic of LPG members. Villagers generally had become more active in their 'confrontations with hostile and unprogressive forces in the villages and LPGs'. Moreover, several thousand farmers around the country who had up until then continued to farm individually had been moved to 'participate actively in the collective'. Nevertheless, for all the confidence and authority lent the regime's apparatus by the construction of the Wall, there were still

considerable limitations on the scale of the confrontation with 'hostile forces' which could be mounted in rural communities. Local functionaries could not always be relied upon to pursue the class conflict with the degree of zeal required. Nonetheless, it is likely that the construction of the Wall itself and the exemplary punitive action which followed, targeted particularly against those who could be easily identified as having 'reactionary tendencies', had a monitory effect on the rural population – LPG members included.⁸

According to district police reports from around Bezirk Erfurt, even minor acts or expressions of anti-GDR and anti-LPG sentiment in villages were punished severely, especially if they were combined with other evidence of a reactionary attitude such as a Nazi past or regular watching of Western television.⁹ One farmer in Bad Sulza who had in previous months come to the attention of the police for his 'hostile attitude' was now given a one-year prison sentence for ripping down a GDR flag from a sports ground.¹⁰ In a particularly severe case, action was also taken against religious opposition to the collectives, which was hampering progress particularly in Catholic areas. A Catholic lay preacher was arrested and sentenced to as much as four years' imprisonment, charged with having persuaded a number of board members in LPGs across the Bezirk to give up their posts.¹¹

The potential for a criminal and ideological interpretation to be applied by the police and Justice Ministry to almost any circumstance which undermined collective farming or damaged productivity was a strong incentive for farmers to disassociate themselves from any manifestations of hostility towards the LPG. Outbreaks of disease or sudden death among livestock, damage to crop stores caused by fires and even petty vandalism or damage to LPG property tended to be classed as the result of 'enemy activity', and where the 'perpetrators' were identified, very severe punishments could be handed out. According to police reports from February 1962, one LPG member in Kreis Mühlhausen was sentenced to four and a half years' hard labour for mistreating and neglecting the cows in his charge, thereby contributing to livestock losses.¹² In Heringen, Kreis Nordhausen, the LPG chairman and two members of the board were arrested for 'consistently hostile activities'. Alleged to have once been active Nazis, they were held responsible for 'consciously' causing a high livestock mortality rate in the LPG and thereby bringing about the failure of the LPG to fulfil its market production quota. In one case, an LPG member was sentenced to fourteen months' imprisonment for not declaring the full number of potatoes which were in his possession, farming other villagers' small plots of land for them and declaring that he had been forced into the LPG.¹³

That the new climate had an impact on collective farmers themselves can be seen in the attitude expressed by the district shepherd in Kreis Weimar when faced with a severe shortage of feed for the animals in his charge. In a report by a Stasi informant on an assembly in the LPG Type III Legefeld held in January 1962, the shepherd was heard to comment that: 'he knew from experience the police would hold him responsible and he wasn't going to let himself be locked up for this!'¹⁴

With the construction of the Wall came new legislation enabling serious punitive action to be taken against farmers who refused to work in the collective. Classified as 'work-shy' and truants, they could be sentenced to serve in a labour-education camp if they chose to resist the 'will of the majority' and refused to work for the LPG. The number of farmers actually punished on this charge is not clear, given the ambiguous legal position of those who withdrew from LPGs.¹⁵ Nevertheless police sources in Bezirk Erfurt do refer to a few, seemingly exemplary arrests where LPG members were known consistently to refuse to work for the collective farm. For example, a farmer in Hohenfelden, Kreis Weimar-Land was reported to have been put under arrest for truancy. He had failed to do more than a few days' work in the LPG since the previous year and had encouraged other members to do likewise.¹⁶

Action also began to be taken against those LPG members who were thought to maintain an excessive household plot or private livestock and thereby earn an income without participating fully in the LPG. A report by the District SED Party Control Commissions (*Kreispartei-kontrollkommission* or KPKK) in Kreis Arnstadt and in Kreis Langensalza in December 1961 discovered one farmer in the LPG Type III Arnstadt who was allegedly earning over 15,000 Marks a year for produce from his private plot and livestock, while farming 1.4 hectares rather than the 0.5 hectares officially allowed him.¹⁷ Police also investigated an LPG Type III in Kreis Sondershausen where it was revealed that a large proportion of the members gained incomes from private production that were significantly higher than their incomes from the collective. Of the sixty-three members, only thirty ever appeared for work in the LPG on a regular basis, while twenty-nine of the men had completed less than one hundred work units in the year.¹⁸

That such situations should have arisen is demonstrative of the limits to which functionaries of the LPG or indeed the local state authority had been able or willing to curtail abuses of the statute up to this point. The construction of the Wall and the escalation thereafter of punitive action against those who appeared to be undermining collective farming began to create a new climate in which the limits to dissent were clearly marked. With this background LPG functionaries stated

clearly the connection between the limited success of the LPG and the behaviour or attitude of recalcitrant members who preferred to work on their private land and contributed little time to the LPG. The Rat des Bezirkes reported approvingly, for example, of an LPG in Kreis Arnstadt where farmers who had completed few work units were addressed by name and house number during the main annual members' assembly in 1962, shaming them with the censure of their neighbours.¹⁹ Similarly local committees of the National Front also sought wherever possible to publicise the efforts or lack of them of individual members of the collectives. Agitation groups addressing farmers in 1962 came thus armed with information on how much each one had contributed to the fulfilment of the plan.²⁰

With the realisation that there was little benefit in opposing the LPG and few if any alternatives to working within it, many new and reluctant collective farmers accepted their LPG as the institution within which they would be allowed to earn a livelihood, and set about working for its profitability. One collective farmer in Kreis Heiligenstadt reportedly admitted that he had been among those who sought to hinder the development of the LPG. He claimed, however, to have changed his mind and considered it in his own and everyone else's better interests to make the LPG work.²¹ How far such realisations were widespread is difficult to gauge. Nevertheless, instances of a general 'go slow' attitude did clearly diminish as acceptance of the LPG increased during 1962. Many more LPG members thus began to work effectively as collective farmers, within the framework laid out in the LPG statutes.²²

There is no doubt that the building of the Wall and the subsequent crackdown diminished the level of overt hostility towards collective farming, particularly among those farmers who objected to the LPG on principle. It was certainly an important step too towards raising the level of acceptance of the LPG as the essential framework in which the land was farmed. However, while there remained little evidence of the benefits of collectivised agriculture, rural communities continued to be marked too by outbursts of popular dissatisfaction, not least because fear of financial destitution remained very real for some collective farmers.

Sources of Continued Instability

The pay and conditions for large numbers of LPG members, particularly those in LPG Type IIIs, appeared to have little prospect of improving in 1962, resulting in demonstrations of discontent at the start of the new year. For 1960, the state guaranteed an annual income of 3,120

Marks for each LPG member working full time, which corresponded approximately to a work unit value of 6 Marks.²³ This amount was considerably lower, however, than most considered reasonable compensation for the difficulty of the work they put in and the restrictions preventing them seeking better-paid work elsewhere. A member of the LPG Type III 'Fortschritt' in Kindelbrück made this clear to representatives of the Rat des Kreises Sömmerda in May 1960, shouting out at the members' assembly: 'You yobs, food-stuffed officials, you're alright for money. We're not going to be kept quiet with promises. We want the work unit to be paid at 7 Marks.'²⁴

At the end of 1960 there were at least 126 Type III LPGs in the Bezirk which were officially deemed loss-making. Although this was considered a marked improvement on the previous year, the value of the work unit in most Type III LPGs remained barely more than the minimum. In the upland districts the situation was particularly dire: 63 per cent of Type IIIs in Kreis Mühlhausen and 54 per cent in Kreis Heiligenstadt continued to be financially unviable.²⁵ This already difficult situation was compounded further in 1961 when heavy rainfall in the Bezirk in May and June promised to do serious damage to the first fully collective harvest.²⁶ By the end of the harvest in 1961 – thanks to a combination of bad weather and the disruption resulting from collectivisation and the flight of farmers to the West – the gross production of crops in Bezirk Erfurt had reached only 71 per cent of the 1958 level,²⁷ prompting comments such as the parodying slogan 'Mit Regen und Gott geht die LPG Bankrott' ('With the help of God and rain, the LPG goes down the drain').²⁸ From all appearances the rush for full collectivisation had failed to bring about the dramatic rise in production that had been a prime motive for its introduction.

The poor harvest exacerbated the difficulties faced by LPG chairmen in mediating the demands of the state, while maintaining some degree of harmony among their members. It is unsurprising that some LPG chairmen threatened to resign if the production plan targets set for their LPG were not lowered. Not only would failure to exceed plan targets reduce the price paid for produce by the state, it would also mean the LPG members received a smaller portion of the produce for their own use.²⁹ In September 1961 in Bezirk Erfurt, all collective farmers were required to allow inspection of their private stores of potatoes and allow a portion of them to be bought by the state to ensure the requirements of the population as a whole were well covered.³⁰ The actual extraction of produce from LPG members' stores appeared to some collective farmers as an incontrovertible demonstration of their second-class status in the GDR and gave grounds for hostility towards local state functionaries

required to oversee this process. In the village of Mellingen, Kreis Weimar, it was rumoured for example that the mayor and the ABV were receiving a bonus for every sack of potatoes they could collect from farmers. The complaints of LPG members were clearly born out of frustration with the lack of options available to them to resist (what they considered) unfair treatment. According to a report by an informant for the Stasi in Mellingen, some LPG members had indeed attempted to conceal some of their potatoes. On being discovered, one was reported to exclaim: 'Why don't you just take the whole lot and give me a train ticket to Bonn.'³¹ This way out was of course now barred. Those who felt aggrieved by the state's treatment of them had little choice other than to make their protests within the bounds of their current situation.

At the end of 1961 LPG accountants assessed the impact of the year's harvest on the financial status of collective farms. The state of affairs in Type III LPGs in the Bezirk was dire. In Kreis Mühlhausen alone Type III LPGs had to be subsidised by 1,400,000 Marks to bring members' incomes up to the minimum level, which itself was considered a famine wage.³² In the Bezirk as a whole 50 per cent of Type III LPGs had required subsidies in order to be able to pay their members the minimum value of the work unit. When the value of the work unit was publicly announced in each of the LPG assemblies at the start of the new year, there was, unsurprisingly, considerable disgruntlement. In Kreis Bad Langensalza members of a number of LPGs complained openly about the money which they were to receive, while elsewhere in the district slogans were graffitied in LPGs such as: 'We work cheaper than coolies', 'SOS we want money' and 'Work slow'.³³

The ones most directly affected by the LPGs' low profits were those machine operators and former industrial workers who did not supplement their regular income from the LPG with their own livestock or household plot and relied exclusively on being paid in monthly advance instalments for their work over the year. Faced by the failure of the LPG to provide a sufficient income and discussion of a possible state directive to LPG chairmen to limit the amount paid out in monthly advance wage instalments, a number of LPG Type III members sought to show their dissatisfaction.³⁴ Professional tractor drivers – who had been moved to join the LPG from the MTS with the transfer of machinery – and former industrial workers, many of them SED members, held work stoppages and sought officially to withdraw their membership of the LPG in protest.³⁵ Between 12 December 1961 and 15 January 1962, the Bezirk police authority recorded at least 162 withdrawal declarations.³⁶ In February 1962 at least 101 attempted withdrawals were registered from LPGs in the Bezirk.³⁷

Where in previous years withdrawal had represented an act of resistance to the end of private farming and was a reaction against surrendering land into the collective, in 1962 it represented more a matter of protest at the poverty of working for the LPG – primarily by those who had not contributed land in the first place. A report from the Rat des Bezirkes in November 1962 notes the tendency of members of weak LPGs in Kreis Mühlhausen and Nordhausen to threaten withdrawal during discussions over rates of payment.³⁸ Similarly in an LPG Type III in Kreis Heiligenstadt, a large proportion of the members threatened withdrawal unless they continued to receive the state subsidies required to increase the income level.³⁹ Withdrawal or the threat to do so was more a means of drawing attention to perceived injustices within the LPG and gaining the required investment to raise wages than a serious attempt to oppose the continuation of collective farming.⁴⁰

The Bezirk Police Authority's political department, reporting on the role of the ABV in that year, stressed that 1962 was the year of transition in agriculture whereas 1963 would be the year of 'normality'.⁴¹ Certainly there were still numerous instances in the Bezirk at the start of 1962 where police investigations were deemed necessary as collective farmers not only protested but appeared also to be attempting to subvert or manipulate the structures of the LPG. The Ministry for State Security began an investigation in early 1962 into the LPG Type III in Trügleben, Kreis Gotha, after only three LPG members were found to have attended the annual members' assembly.⁴² Elsewhere secret ballots for the election of the collective farm's managing board prompted police investigations, especially where fewer SED members were selected for these positions than had previously been the case. Odd cases also came to light where the members' assemblies were held secretly in the private home of the chairman, deliberately to prevent local state or party functionaries from attending.⁴³ In Kreis Nordhausen state functionaries attending an LPG assembly found themselves having to talk down 'negative elements' who were strongly opposed to SED agricultural policy. More seriously in the LPG Type I Niederzimmern in Kreis Weimar, plans to vote out of office the current LPG chairman – the only SED member in the collective farm – and replace him with someone else had to be stopped by the intervention of the SED Kreisleitung and the Rat des Kreises.⁴⁴

Throughout the spring, troubleshooting brigades continued to operate around the Bezirk and agitators were deployed on certain festival days to encourage farmers to adhere to the state demands for increased planting of certain unpopular crops or to develop collective practices further. At the end of February, in Kreis Nordhausen alone, in one day

as many as 1,200 agitators were at work.⁴⁵ At the same time, a tense atmosphere clearly continued to exist in many rural communities. In March 1962 suggestions seemed to be made during the VII German Farmers' Congress that the boards and functionaries of Type I and II LPGs might be given access to the private bank accounts of their members in order to enable the purchase of machinery from the state. This sparked rumours of obligatory contributions to the funds of the LPGs being removed from farmers' bank accounts, with police reporting a panic rush by farmers to withdraw money from banks throughout April 1962 in Kreise Weimar, Worbis and Sondershausen.⁴⁶ If nothing else, there remained an atmosphere of considerable mistrust in LPGs as to what new means the SED state might employ to reduce farmers' control of their own resources or at least short-change them for the use of their labour.

Two years on from the completion of the collectivisation campaign and a year on from the construction of the Berlin Wall, the situation in the various LPGs in Bezirk Erfurt continued to be highly variable. There had been a general reduction in outright opposition to or even subversion of collective farming and indeed an increase in the acceptance of the collective farm as an institution with a long-term future. Acceptance of the LPG as the only means through which it would be possible to secure a livelihood and a willingness to work for the prosperity of the farm were not necessarily reflected, however, in a harmonious relationship with the regime's apparatus for running agriculture. There remained a considerable degree of mistrust among farmers that the state was in the process of finding new ways to underpay (largely Type III LPGs) or expropriate them further (largely Type I LPGs). At the same time, the huge pressure for collectivised farming to prove itself and for the 1962 harvest to be successful, after the difficulties of the previous years, coupled with the uncompromising confidence of sections of the regime apparatus since the building of the Wall, made for continued confrontations.

Confrontation and Control

The collectivisation campaign itself had been characterised from the regime's perspective as an assertion of the science of socialist necessity over the conservative selfishness of farmers. However, a potent basis of opposition to the collectivisation in practice, if not in principle, was the demonstrable proof that it damaged production. The organisational turmoil of 1960 and 1961 left a large number of fields uncultivated and while this was clearly the result of the manner of the collectivisation

and not the notion of collectivised agriculture in itself, the resulting low production figures were grist to the mill of those who had opposed the process in the first place. As farmers in Kreis Nordhausen pointed out, 'with so many fields uncultivated, things cannot go on like this'.⁴⁷

In those LPGs where farmers had been compelled, in the interests of larger plantations of crops, to fill dividing ditches and remove hedging between fields, opposition to the LPG found still further vindication. Farmers blamed the collective farming system for exacerbating the effects of the bad weather in 1961. Heavy rains had caused widespread damage to fields and because the intervening ditches had been removed between the various plots, it was argued, the water could not drain, thus preventing any attempts to recultivate the soil.⁴⁸

Even as the LPGs became more stable, there was still a clear gulf on numerous farming issues between socialist agricultural policy and farmers' own sense of good practice. The methods already initiated during the 1950s to improve the levels of livestock in the LPGs rapidly and raise the overall productivity of the GDR in meat and dairy products above that of the FRG – namely the extensive cultivation of low-maintenance maize as a feed crop and the construction of large yet inexpensive open sheds (*Offenställe*) for more concentrated livestock holdings – had had only limited success. In the opinion of many farmers they also clearly contradicted received wisdom and good practice. The construction of *Offenställe* had too often been seen to have disastrous consequences for livestock. Use of shoddy materials and poor choices of location exposed the animals kept in them to poor conditions.⁴⁹ In extreme weather, such conditions in these sheds too easily became fatal to livestock. Investment was thus wasted on livestock and on buildings that ultimately were of little value.⁵⁰ Discussions among voluntary auxiliary policemen from across the Bezirk at a conference in April 1961 highlighted *Offenställe* as a particular cause of irritation in the LPGs. The report of this meeting indicates too, however, the resistance of the Bezirk functionaries present to recognising this problem. Despite the insistence of these voices from below, the discussion was closed with the remark: '*Offenställe* will continue to be built and we will learn from the experiences we collect.'⁵¹

Erwin Strittmater's popular novel *Ole Bienkopp*, published by the East German Aufbau Verlag in 1964, controversially confronted directly some of the problems associated with the *Offenställe* and the frustration of LPG farmers upon whom they were imposed:

Yes this *Offenstall*! Did it fly into the [LPG] 'Blooming Field' on a magic carpet in order to unleash controversy? Not at all. It all really and truly happened.

Building *Offenställe* for cattle is a directive from *up top*. From heaven? No, no but perhaps from the Ministry. Directives aren't issued out of sheer boredom! Milk makes money! Lots of cattle! Cheap sheds!

Are *Offenställe* cheap? They're made of wood, they're light and quick to transport. That's been proved.

Has it been proved that cows feel at ease in a shed built in the form of a theatre stage and milk as briskly as they would in a warm solidly constructed shed? No answer.

Perhaps the building of *Offenställe* is just a recommendation, but recommendations become commands by the time they have reached the village. Various employees of the district administration call village mayors their *long arms*. From the construction of *Offenställe* will be gauged whether the *long arms* are responding in a modern and progressive way.

At conferences village mayors ask one another: 'Well, how's your *Offenstall*?'

'It's still standing.'

'How are the cows doing?'

'I said: it's still standing!'

Good, the *Offenstall* is still standing and the district's statisticians can record it, count it and report it present.⁵²

The imposition of maize as a feed crop was also not well received amongst the GDR's farmers. The cultivation of maize had been adopted by the Soviet Union, mimicking the U.S.A., as a safe means of producing reasonably high quality feed in large quantities, which could be cheaply and easily harvested with machinery if planted over large enough expanses. Thus, in turn, farmers in the GDR were initially encouraged to 'learn from the Soviet friends' and later then directed to devote a certain proportion of land to cultivating maize. In meeting these directives, LPG functionaries found themselves required to go against their own knowledge of the suitability of the land for this purpose. Even though the effectiveness of the maize crop was compromised by insufficient silage capacity in most LPGs, arguments were ignored in favour of traditional feed crops. As a result the number of animals sustainable was overestimated and led naturally to shortages of quality feed.⁵³

Although maize came gradually to be recognised by farmers as an essential part of the diet of livestock, at the start of 1962 in some Type I LPGs the size of maize plantations was still being hotly debated. The Rat des Bezirkes insisted that a minimum of 12 per cent of the arable land of an LPG be used for cultivating maize to ensure feed stocks were sufficient to prevent a repeat of the shortages arising from the previous year. LPG members continued, however, to refuse to use this much land for maize production, arguing that they themselves had enough pasture land to ensure their own livestock were well fed – come what may.⁵⁴

The greater self-confidence of the regime a year after the construction of the Wall and two years after the completion of the collectivisation campaign was reflected in the treatment of collective farmers during the harvest in 1962. During the heightened pressure of the harvest period, district state and party functionaries sought more than ever to assert their authority over collective farmers. The crucial point of contention remained how in particular this harvest was to be conducted – with mistrust apparent as to the effectiveness of the methods and the true motives of farmers and functionaries alike.

The arguments were finely balanced. On the one hand, the state administration claimed to be able to maximise the cost-efficiency and productivity of the harvesting, collection, storage and distribution of crops if the whole process was run according to a strict timetable on a sufficiently large scale. This claim, however, did not always ring true, seeming to be at times a thin veil for the exertion of authority by the administration, at the expense of the interests of LPG members. As one field brigade leader asked a delegate from the Rat des Kreises in Kreis Apolda: 'What sort of bonus are you getting for putting us under all this pressure?'⁵⁵ On the other hand, farmers reasonably claimed to know best when their crops ought to be harvested, how long it would take them and what was possible with the machinery available in practice, especially when faced with state or party officials who had little or no agricultural training. As the accountant in one LPG in Kreis Apolda put it: 'the comrade functionaries should let the farmers get on with their work and not set down regulations ...'⁵⁶ Nevertheless, the superiority of modern machinery and equipment for drying, storing and distributing crops in theory refuted the need to follow the traditional, local rules on what and when to plant and harvest and what the weather would be. Farmers' objections to the interference of the regime's representatives could thus at times be disregarded as part of an unhealthy regard for tradition and an unfounded suspicion of modern methods, as well as a simple hostility towards the SED state.

Confrontations occurred in a number of LPGs particularly where district and MTS functionaries insisted upon measures to speed up the harvest. In Kreis Apolda a brigadier was abused and threatened with the Stasi by the director of the MTS for refusing to allow grain to be harvested just after it had rained. Although the brigadier was motivated by a desire to maximise the yield and prevent it from rotting in storage, the MTS director regarded the delay as an unnecessary – and costly – interruption to the progress of the harvest machines under his command.⁵⁷ Still more common were disputes over the state's deployment in collective farms of outsiders (students, school children and factory workers

from the towns) to 'help' with the harvest. LPG members opposed such measures, claiming that such helpers were not only unnecessary, but also would not do the job well and would undercut farmers' incomes. In one LPG in Kreis Gotha, it was reported that two women farmers opposed the arrival of the harvest helpers from the town, suggesting, presumably with reference to bygone years, that the workers 'had only come because they were hungry'. As a result of such antipathy some LPG chairmen sent the helpers away, pointing out too that they would not be able to offload their entire crop if they harvested too quickly.⁵⁸ Despite the various instances of LPGs rejecting help, the *Bezirksleitung* registered a total of 50,000 harvest helpers deployed during the harvest in the Bezirk, recruited both locally and in the towns and factories of the region. There was a documented tendency of the district authorities to overestimate these figures. Nevertheless they appear to have been successful at imposing helpers on LPGs in large numbers.⁵⁹

District functionaries' moves to speed up the harvest against the better judgement of LPG chairmen and collective farmers provoked considerable irritation in some places. A police report in late September noted 'widespread discussion among farmers that the pace of the harvest is too quick and that instructions are being given by functionaries of the Rat des Kreises which are causing damage to the LPG'. The chairmen of an LPG in Schwobfeld, Kreis Heiligenstadt was quoted, bitterly pointing out that 'LPG members would have to keep their mouths shut and the gentlemen from the Rat des Kreises decide when the grain is to be brought in'.⁶⁰ Board members in the LPG Aschara Kreis Weimar complained that 'everything was being dictated from above', while the chairman of the LPG Wolfsbehringen complained that the SED 'had no need to concern itself with everything'.⁶¹

Such matters concerned not only ordinary farmers and LPG chairmen but also, at times, local functionaries of party and state who could see only the negative impact of bureaucratic interference where it took precedence over local and practical understanding of the situation. A report from September 1962 noted that leading local SED members and village mayors openly spoke out against SED policies and in some cases sought to resign their positions in protest. The mayor of Gamstädt was reported to have argued that it was no good setting administrative campaign targets during the harvest. Rather, he argued, it should be left up to the farmers to set their deadlines. Even a leading member of the SED Kreisleitung Mühlhausen, concerned by the situation in his home village, argued against any action that might jeopardise the quality of the harvest for the sake of saving time.⁶² The mayor of Herbsleben, Kreis Bad Langensalza even reportedly asked to resign, saying the

measures of the party were 'stuff and nonsense' (*'Käse und Quatsch'*). Other leading village functionaries, among them SED members, were openly hostile to outside interference. In nearby Henningsleben, a leading member of the SED party organisation was reported saying during a meeting: 'We should be out working not holding discussions. Next year we should plant five hectares of clubs and with them thrash all the functionaries who come out here.'⁶³

Such comments were indicative of the extent of local irritation at the interference of the district authorities and the unnecessary dictates of the SED leadership. They were made too with some justification. At the beginning of 1963 an assessment was made of the numbers of LPGs still struggling in the Bezirk and those that had improved sufficiently to be classed as financially stable. Of the 175 LPGs counted in 1962 as 'left behind', eighty-four had improved. However, a further twenty LPGs had sunk into financial difficulty during the year, leaving the net total of struggling LPGs in the Bezirk at 111, approximately one in ten.⁶⁴ Moreover, with the results of the harvest only marginally better than in previous years, collective farmers continued to show their dissatisfaction with the LPG by seeking to withdraw from it.⁶⁵

Conclusion

With the removal of lingering doubt over the future existence of the GDR, a degree of coherence had been lent to previously fragmented collective farms. Moreover, farmers had been made well aware of the limits of dissent. However, there had been no consistent and comprehensive stabilisation of the LPG, either financially or politically, while the bullying tactics of the 1962 harvest had shown themselves only of limited value and were in some cases literally counter-productive. Despite the security gained by the SED regime through the construction of the Wall, farmers in both Type I LPGs and Type III LPGs remained thus hostile to further state intervention in agriculture. Collectivisation in the vast majority of LPGs was by the end of 1962 far more than just collectivisation on paper. However, the SED leadership's prospects of gaining consistent and comprehensive control over the conduct and development of agricultural production at the grass roots were severely limited, not least by the deficit of ideological support for socialism and the lack of confidence in socialist agricultural policy among collective farmers and LPG functionaries alike.

The next section deals with the conflicts, compromises and consensus of interests that developed between collective farmers and the func-

tionaries of the LPG and the party and state administration in Bezirk Erfurt during the 1960s. It will show how attempts to reform the financial and agricultural organisation of collectivised farming were shaped by the changing circumstances in which SED policy was communicated and received in the LPG. In the next chapter, I shall look back in particular to the beginnings of a drive to increase the proportion of farmers who had received technical training since the late 1950s and the attempts to extend the network of SED party organisations into the LPGs both before and after the construction of the Wall, as part of the gradual transformation of the context in which SED agricultural policy was implemented on the ground in the farms of Bezirk Erfurt.

Notes

1. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt BIV/2/7-557 Bericht der Arbeitsgruppe die in Arnstadt zur Ernte eingesetzt ist, 10.9.1962, p. 20.
2. ThHStAW BDVP 20.1/241 BDVP Kripo an die Hauptverwaltung der Deutschen Volkspolizei, Hauptabteilung K, Abt. U. Berlin, Brennpunktmeldung für den Monat Mai 1962, 28.5.1962, p. 376.
3. F. Werkentin, *Politische Strafjustiz in der Ara Ulbricht*, Berlin, 1995, pp. 106–9.
4. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt BIV/2/4-59 SED Kreisleitung Heiligenstadt an die BPKK Einschätzung über die Feindarbeit im Kreis im 2. Quartal 1961, 30.6.1961, p. 455; BPKK, Information über die Feindarbeit im Bezirk entsprechend den vierteljährlichen Berichten der KPKK, 17.7.1961, p. 400.
5. BArch DP 1, Nr. 1152 Ministerium der Justiz, HA II, Hauptverwaltung Deutsche Volkspolizei – Operativstab, Rapport Nr. 275, 5.10.1961 and Nr. 276, 6.10.1961.
6. For example ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt BIV/2/4-59 KPKK Nordhausen, Bericht über Feindarbeit im IV. Quartal 18.12.1961, p. 79.
7. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt BIV/2/4-59 KPKK Bad Langensalza, Bericht über Feindarbeit im IV. Quartal, 13.12.1961, pp. 62–67.
8. SAPMO BArch DY30/IV 2/7/376 Ministerium für Landwirtschaft, Erfassung und Forstwirtschaft, Einschätzung der Entwicklung der Lage auf dem Lande in Vorbereitung der Wahlen zum 17.9.1961, pp. 65–70.
9. BStU Aussenstelle Erfurt, Kreisdienststelle Weimar 379, Analyse über die Gemeinde Legefild, 11.10.1961, p. 62.
10. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt BIV/2/4-59 SED Kreisleitung Sondershausen an die BPKK, Einschätzung über einige Erscheinungen im Kr. Sondershausen, 25.9.1961, p. 344; KPKK Erfurt-Land, Bericht über Feindarbeit im III. Quartal, 25.9.1961, p.

- 222; KPKK Mühlhausen, Bericht über Feindarbeit im III. Quartal, 26.9.1961, p. 300.; SED Kreisleitung Apolda an die BPKK, Bericht über Feindarbeit im III. Quartal, 29.9.1961, p. 135.
11. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt BIV/2/4-59 SED Kreisleitung Worbis an die BPKK, Quartalsbericht über Feindarbeit im III. Quartal, 29.9.1961, p. 379.
 12. ThHStAW BDVP 20.1/352 VPKA Mühlhausen, Abt. K an den Leiter des VPKA, Einschätzung der Lage in der Landwirtschaft im Kreisgebiet, 5.2.1962, p. 154.
 13. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt BIV/2/4-59 SED Kreisleitung Nordhausen an die BPKK, Einschätzung über den Umfang und die Wirkung der Feindarbeit im Kreisgebiet Nordhausen im III. Quartal 1961, 28.9.1961, p. 310; KPKK Arnstadt, Bericht über Feindarbeit im IV. Quartal, 21.12.1961, p. 2; SED Kreisleitung Apolda an die BPKK, Bericht über Feindarbeit im IV. Quartal, 20.12.1961, p. 10.
 14. BStU Aussenstelle Erfurt, Kreisdienststelle Weimar 379, GI 'Max' Bericht über die Jahresendversammlung der LPG Legefeld, Abschrift 2.2.1962, p. 33.
 15. BArch DP 2, Nr. 1272 Oberstes Gericht, Entwurf – Beschluss des Plenums des Obersten Gerichts zur Anwendung der Verordnung vom 24.8.1961 ... Anordnung der Arbeiterziehung, p. 6: 'Fundamentally not work-shy are those who have proper employment. If a citizen with proper employment is repeatedly absent from work and unexcused, it is necessary to examine why this is the case.'
 16. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt BIV/2/4-59 KPKK Erfurt-Land, Bericht über Feindarbeit im III. Quartal, 25.9.1961, p. 222; SED Kreisleitung Weimar-Land an die BPKK, Informatorischer Bericht über Feindarbeit im Kreis Weimar-Land im Zusammenhang mit den Sicherheitsmassnahmen vom 13.8.1961, 9.9.1961, p. 360.
 17. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt BIV/2/4-59 KPKK Arnstadt, Bericht über die Feindarbeit im IV. Quartal, 21.12.1961, p. 2; KPKK Bad Langensalza, Bericht über die Feindarbeit im IV. Quartal, 13.12.1961, p. 62.
 18. ThHStAW RdB Erfurt L52 BDVP Operativstab, Information 6/62 Landwirtschaft, 9.1.1962.
 19. ThHStAW RdB Erfurt L1153 Rat des Bezirkes Erfurt, Abt. Landwirtschaft, Informatorischer Bericht über den Stand der Jahresendabrechnung in den LPG am 29.1.62, 1.2.1962.
 20. ThHStAW NF 126 Bezirkssekretariat, Referat zu der Entwicklung der Nationalen Front (undated) p. 61.
 21. ThHStAW BDVP 20.1/352 BDVP Operativstab, Information: Vorkommnisse in der Landwirtschaft 18/62, 9.2.1962, p. 72.
 22. ThHStAW RdB Erfurt L1153 Rat des Bezirkes Erfurt, Abt. Landwirtschaft Informatorischer Bericht über den Stand der Jahresendabrechnung in den LPG am 29.1.62, 1.2.1962.
 23. This work unit value takes into account the amount deducted for payment in kind over the course of the year. To qualify for subsidies to ensure the income of members did not sink below 3,120 Marks, LPGs were required to

- keep to limits on the amount accumulated as capital and the number of work units performed by the members. ThHStAW L562 Rat des Kreises Worbis, Abt. Landwirtschaft, Analyse der Entwicklung der LPG hinsichtlich der Erfüllung der Produktions- und Finanzpläne im Jahre 1960, 20.2.1961.
24. ThHStAW BDVP 20/065 BDVP Stab/Operativstab, Information über Vorkommnisse in der Landwirtschaft 24/60, 20.5.1960.
 25. ThHStAW RdB Erfurt L562 Rat des Bezirkes Erfurt, Abt. Landwirtschaft Bericht über die politische und ökonomische Entwicklung der LPG des Bezirkes im Jahre 1960, 27.2.1961.
 26. D. Gabler, *Entwicklungsabschnitte der Landwirtschaft in der ehemaligen DDR*, Berlin, 1995, p. 118: in six Kreise 80 per cent of fields suffered some damage; ThHStAW RdB Erfurt L591 Rat des Bezirkes Erfurt, Abt. Landwirtschaft Einschätzung des Standes der Entwicklung der LPG, besonders der LPG Typ I und II im Bezirk, 1.7.1961; ThHStAW RdB Erfurt L1153 Rat des Bezirkes Erfurt, Abt. Landwirtschaft Begründung zur Erhöhung der Überbrückungskredite re Ratsbeschluss Nr. 186-104/61 Undated (Nov. 1961); ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt, BIV/2/4-59 SED Kreisleitung Eisenach an die BPKK, Bericht über die Feindtätigkeit im Kreis Eisenach, 30.6.1961, p. 429.
 27. Gabler, *Entwicklungsabschnitte*, p. 118.
 28. ThHStAW BDVP 20.1/139 BDVP Stab/Operativstab, Information 56/61, 23.8.1961.
 29. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt BIV/2/4-59 SED Kreisleitung Gotha an die BPKK, Feindtätigkeit im Kr. Gotha im III. Quartal 1961, 29.9.1961, p. 275.
 30. BArch DE 1, Nr. 29131 Zentrale Kommission für Staatliche Kontrolle – Der Vorsitzende, Informationsbericht Nr. 36, 10.11.1961; Beschluss des Politbüros über operative Massnahmen zur Sicherung der Versorgung mit einigen Nahrungsgütern und Futtermitteln, 13.3.1961.
 31. BStU Aussenstelle Erfurt, Kreisdienststelle Weimar 772, GI 'Buchmann', Lageeinschätzung der Gemeinde Mellingen übergeben am 10.11.1961, 14.11.1961, pp. 91–94.
 32. ThHStAW BDVP 20.1/352 BDVP Operativstab, Information 21/62, Vorkommnisse in der Landwirtschaft, 15.2.1962, p. 80.
 33. ThHStAW RdB Erfurt L52 BDVP Operativstab, Information 11/62 Landwirtschaft, 26.1.1962.
 34. BArch DK1, Nr. 928 Ministerium für Landwirtschaft, Erfassung und Forstwirtschaft, Protokoll über die Auswertung der bisherigen Durchsetzung des Beschlusses vom 18.1.1962 mit den Verantwortlichen für die Bezirke, 21.2.1962, pp. 218–26.
 35. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt BIV/2/5-43 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Org./Kader, Einschätzung der MV in den PO der Landwirtschaft zur Auswertung des Briefes des 1. Bezirkssekretärs der Bezirksleitung, 4.1.1962, pp. 1–6.
 36. ThHStAW BDVP 20.1/353 BDVP Operativstab, Zur Situation in der Landwirtschaft, 20.1.1962, p. 18.
 37. ThHStAW BDVP 20.1/352 BDVP Operativstab, Information 29/62, Vorkommnisse in der Landwirtschaft, 9.3.1962, p. 91.

38. ThHStAW RdB Erfurt L1153 Rat des Bezirkes Erfurt, Abt. Landwirtschaft, Bericht über die Vorbereitung und Durchführung der Jahresendabrechnung der LPG, besonders in den Nomenklatur-LPG, wirtschaftsschwachen LPG sowie LPG in den Grenz und Höhengemeinden, 5.11.62.
39. ThHStAW RdB Erfurt L52 BDVP Operativstab, Information 61/62, 27.7.1962.
40. ThHStAW RdB Erfurt L52 BDVP Operativstab, Information 4/62: Einige Hinweise zur Beurteilung der Lage in der Landwirtschaft, 5.1.1962.
41. ThHStAW BDVP 20.1/083 BDVP Politabteilung, Protokoll über die Arbeitsberatung der Politabteilung, 9.7.1962, p. 15.
42. ThHStAW RdB Erfurt L1153 Rat des Bezirkes Erfurt, Abt. Landwirtschaft Informatorischer Bericht über den Stand der Jahresendabrechnung in den LPG am 29.1.1962, 31.2.1962.
43. ThHStAW BDVP 20.1/352 BDVP Operativstab, Information 18/62, Vorkommnisse in der Landwirtschaft, p. 75.
44. ThHStAW BDVP 20.1/352 BDVP Operativstab, Information 21/62, Vorkommnisse in der Landwirtschaft, 15.2.1962, p. 80.
45. ThHStAW BDVP 20.1/352 BDVP Operativstab, Information 23/62, Vorkommnisse in der Landwirtschaft, 22.2.1962, p. 86.
46. ThHStAW RdB Erfurt L52, BDVP Stab/Operativstab Information 35/62, 5.4.62; 36/62, 13.4.62; 39/62, 28.4.1962.
47. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt BIV/2/4-59 SED Kreisleitung Nordhausen an die BPKK, Einschätzung über den Umfang und die Wirkung der Feindarbeit im Kreisgebiet Nordhausen im III. Quartal 1961, p. 310.
48. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt BIV/2/4-59 SED Kreisleitung Eisenach an die BPKK, Bericht über die Feindtätigkeit im Kreis, 30.6.1961, p. 429; SED Kreisleitung Gotha an die BPKK, Feindarbeit im Kreis Gotha, 23.6.1961, p. 449.
49. ThHStAW RdB Erfurt L562 Rat des Kreises Worbis – Abt. Finanzen: Landwirtschaft. Analyse der Entwicklung der LPG hinsichtlich der Erfüllung der Produktions- und Finanzpläne im Jahre 1960, 20.2.1961.
50. ThHStAW BDVP 20/065 BDVP Stab/Operativstab Information 54/60 Vorkommnisse in der Landwirtschaft, 22.9.1960.
51. ThHStAW BDVP 20.1/225 BDVP Abt Schutzpolizei, Protokoll von der Bezirkshelferaktiv-Tagung am 24.4.1961, 26.4.1961, p. 75.
52. E. Strittmatter, *Ole Bienkopp*, East Berlin, 1971, pp. 260–2.
53. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt IV/2/3-335 SED Bezirksleitung Sekretariat Beschluss-Protokoll Nr. 22/60 der Sekretariatssitzung Bericht über der Arbeitsgruppe zur Untersuchung der Ursachen des derzeitigen Standes der Produktivität der Milchkühe (im Kreis Weimar), 4.7.1960, p. 1; ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt BIV/2/4-58 SED Kreisleitung Eisenach an die BPKK, Bericht über die Feindtätigkeit, 18.4.1961, p. 199. See also J. Gruhle, *Ohne Gott und Sonnenschein*, Nauendorf, 2000, p. 89.
54. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt IV/2/3/414 Bezirkssekretariat der Nationalen Front, Informations-

- bericht V/62: Stand der Vorbereitung des VII. Deutschen Bauernkongresses, 17.2.1962, pp. 14–24.
55. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt BIV/2/7-557 Bericht der Arbeitsgruppe die in Arnstadt zur Ernte eingesetzt ist, 10.9.1962, p. 25.
 56. ThHStAW BDVP 20.1/364 VPKA Apolda, Aufklärung und Meldewesen an die BDVP, Informationsbericht über die Lage in der Landwirtschaft, 3.10.1962, p. 124.
 57. ThHStAW RdB Erfurt L1086 Brief an den Vorsitzenden des RdB Erfurt, 19.9.1962: Beschwerde über die Arbeit mit den Menschen durch den Direktor der MTS Apolda-Heusdorf.
 58. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt BIV/2/5-44 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Org./ Kader, Informationsbericht zur Erntesituation in den Kreisen, 5.9.1962, pp. 154–8.
 59. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt BIV/2/5-44 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Org./ Kader, Situationsbericht Getreideernte, 9.9.1962, pp. 172–4.
 60. ThHStAW BDVP 20.1/352 BDVP Aufklärung und Meldewesen, Information 66/62, p. 158.
 61. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt BIV/2/5-44 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Org./Kader, Informationsbericht Nr. 29/62, undated, pp. 281–91.
 62. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt BIV/2/5-44 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Org./ Kader, 5. Informationsbericht über die Erntesituation in den Kreisen, 7.9.1962, pp. 163–7.
 63. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt BIV/2/5-44 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Parteiorgane, Abt. Org./Kader, Informationsbericht Nr. 29/62, undated, pp. 281–91.
 64. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt IV/A/2/3-051 Sekretariat der Bezirksleitung, Abt. Org./Kader, Information an das Sekretariat, 1.Anlage, 7.2.1963, p. 155.
 65. In Kreis Gotha a total of sixty-five withdrawal notices were recorded in fifteen LPGs: ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt BIV/2/5-10 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Org./ Kader, Information über die Tätigkeit der Arbeitsgruppe der Bezirksleitung auf der Grundlage des Sekretariatsbeschluss vom 12.11.1962 im Kreis Gotha, 17.12.1962, pp. 401–6.