Introduction

Seaborne commerce between West Africa and Europe was first established in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries along the coast of Senegambia. Within the northern reaches of ‘Guiné do Cabo Verde’, the Casamance region (south-western present-day Senegal) became an early focus for this commerce. The enduring structures of the burgeoning Atlantic trade were established there by the late sixteenth century. Among the lasting characteristics of Atlantic commerce was the importation of weapons from overseas. The early weapons trade, primarily in ‘armas brancas’ or steel swords and daggers, connected Casamance, through Senegambian trade networks, to a global web of production and commerce that extended not only to Europe but also to North Africa, the Indian Ocean and Spanish America.

The blade weapons trade expanded early in the seventeenth century, by which time it was tied inextricably to the slave trade; weapons figured significantly among the goods exchanged for captives. Two centuries later, as the Casamance entered the geopolitical orbits of France and England on the eve of the colonial period, the weapons trade again came to play a prominent role in overseas exchange with Europe. This time, however, it was not blade weapons but firearms that were imported into Casamance. Our chapter describes and compares the two stages in the weapons trade to the Casamance. Although the twentieth century lies outside the focus of our research, the observer may ironically wonder whether the contemporary independence struggle in the Casamance constitutes a third act in the importation of weapons to this beautiful but volatile land.
We will revisit Martin Klein’s classic article, published in 1972 in *The Journal of African History* and entitled ‘Social and Economic Factors in the Muslim Revolution in Senegambia’. Klein argued cogently that nineteenth-century legitimate commerce differed from the earlier slave trade in that goods imported into Senegambia were far more widely distributed than the earlier trade items. The result, he argued, was to foster a process of political change that ultimately challenged and then toppled the old warrior elite. He interpreted the ostensibly Islamic warfare of the mid and late nineteenth century as being a result of this more widespread dissemination of wealth from trade, including firearms.

Confirming Klein’s main thesis, we raise new evidence to support it. Further, by taking a comparative approach we widen the context that led to transformations in the arms trade. These historical changes become thoroughly understandable when placed within their interregional and transnational context in different periods. We compare the spread of guns to the earlier (1590–1620 and later) spread of cavalry swords and daggers on the northern Upper Guinea Coast and, in smaller numbers, in southern Guiné do Cabo Verde. This blade weapons trade was almost wholly unknown before our recent research, published in our book *The Forgotten Diaspora*. In fact, the blade weapons trade was a crucial element facilitating the growing importance of cavalry in Senegambia. This historical development, in turn, helped to entrench the warrior elite whose decline Klein traces. (Another factor in the earlier rise of cavalry, the desiccation of coastal areas, is covered by George Brooks [1993] in his discussion of climate change.) So our research confirms the impact of trade on warfare. The inclusion of blade weapons in the early history of Senegambian warfare and trade makes the picture more complex. The model of a ‘horse-slave cycle’ followed by a ‘gun-slave cycle’ is not an accurate assessment of the role of Atlantic markets in the regional slave trade.² Not that another ‘cycle’ – of blade weapons – should be added: the chronology of blade arms extends into the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, contemporary with the introduction of guns in Senegambian markets. But blades could also be produced locally. Thus, African markets made their choices about when to take the opportunity to import ‘armas brancas’ from the Atlantic.

For the nineteenth century, besides revisiting Klein, we have uncovered new information on the traffic in firearms in the Casamance. Oral sources collected in 1975 by Mark, correlated with French archival records from c 1860, testify to the mid-nineteenth-century circulation of firearms from England and France in several Jola [Diola] communities of the Casamance. The presence of these weapons, even in limited numbers, in a northern Jola society characterized by small-scale polities attests that, as Klein argues, guns were more widely distributed than were the means of warfare in the earlier age of cavalry and blade weapons.

These developments are also connected, as happened throughout Guiné do Cabo Verde, with changes within Euro-African trade networks and the European presence. In 1886, the year that France acquired Ziguinchor and the territory
along the south bank of the Casamance River from Portugal, thereby marking the advent of French colonial power in the region, the people of northern Casamance successfully fought off a raid by the Manding warriors of Combo Sylla. This Jola victory was possible because several villages that were traditional enemies had allied with each other. The defeat of Sylla was also achieved because the local communities had amassed sufficient guns to defend themselves against mounted cavalrmen. This, too, clearly illustrates the accuracy of Klein’s model.

**Part I: The Seventeenth Century**

Recently discovered sixteenth- and seventeenth-century archival documents of the Lisbon Inquisition illustrate the production of blade weapons, or ‘armas brancas’, by Lisbon-based artisans. These men worked with traders who, in turn, contracted for the swords. Many of these contractors were New Christians. Their work is documented for the thirty-year period from 1590 to 1618. The weapons were transported to the rivers of Guinea, where they were traded to African elites. After 1608, the approximately three dozen Jewish merchants who had settled on the Petite Côte became important players in this coastal commerce. In West Africa, the weapons were exchanged for slaves and other goods. This commerce in swords and daggers contravened a Papal Bull that prohibited Catholics from trading weapons to non-Christians. The commerce, largely ignored by historians, is corroborated by Portuguese travel narratives from the period.

Both the production and the military use of ‘armas brancas’ – a name that refers to the white tinge of steel-bladed hand weapons – were highly developed in Portugal. These specialized arms came in many different forms. Espadas were double-edged, full-length swords wielded in the right hand. The more readily handled terçados (or espadas curtas, short swords), mentioned above, were ideal for cavalry use. Shorter arms took the form of adagas with a broad, short, pointed blade, generally with two cutting edges, and punhais with narrower, shorter blades.

In Lisbon in the second decade of the seventeenth century, a minimum of 300 swords but perhaps as many as 500 or 600 were produced annually for export to Upper Guinea. Over the period of eight or nine years documented by the Inquisition report of 1618, this trade would have totalled between 2,500 and 5,000 weapons. The figures for the 1590s may have been slightly higher, as the Inquisition documents list eight artisans for that period. Production of these weapons was truly an international activity. Only the assembly and decoration of the swords and scabbards took place in Lisbon. There, espadeiros or barbeiros de espadas assembled the finished weapons from blades that they imported from Italy and from Flanders. One type of sword, the terçado, was about 77 to 88 cm long.

Weapons made in Europe were not the only ones to arrive on the northern Upper Guinea Coast. Documents discovered by Linda Newson and Susie Minchin
in the Archivio General de la Nación in Lima, Peru, document swords exported from India as part of the same worldwide network. In the African markets, these oriental weapons were even more highly valued than European-made weapons.9

As other European nations challenged Portugal’s trading monopoly, the ban on selling weapons to non-Christians could not be enforced. Two of the competitors, England and the United Provinces, were not Catholic states. Their merchants ignored the Papal ban with impunity, as did French Huguenot privateers. Portuguese lançados and their Luso-African descendants who had settled among African populations on the West African mainland quickly entered into contact with the French, English and Dutch interlopers, providing them with African trade goods in return for weapons. There is evidence that as early as c 1590, Protestant ‘pirates’ (as the Portuguese refer to them) also brought blade weapons directly to Northern Senegal.10

Unsurprisingly, after the Inquisition discovered the Lisbon-based sword-trade network, an alternative had to be found to pursue this important trade. This alternative was the use of French ports to bring weapons from Portugal to the African markets. As early as c 1622 the former governor D. Francisco de Moura (1618–1622) stated in a memorial addressed to the king that

As [the ‘gentes da Nação’] were forbidden by the Contractor [of the Guinea trade] to bring from this Kingdom [Portugal] forbidden merchandise, not granting any ships licences to sail to Guinea, they pass this merchandise to France. From there they take the goods to the Coast (Petite Côte), trading more by this way than by the Kingdom, and they come from Cacheu to collect [the swords] and hide them in their houses.11

These short swords and daggers served primarily to arm cavalry. The horses were acquired from European merchants along the coast and, in the interior, from the ‘Moors’. These Arab-Berber merchants may have been the commercial mediators between the coast and the Sahelian hinterland.12 The European export of weapons to West Africa was actually part of a complex intercontinental and interregional traffic. The Atlantic trade complemented the caravan traffic across the southern Sahara, which provided horses from Arguim and across the Sahel (Austen 1993: 311–50). Yet even in the forested coastal zone to the south, blade weapons were highly in demand.

In the Casamance and in northern Guinea-Bissau, where the heavier forestation rendered cavalry ineffective, soldiers were armed with iron weapons and, when possible, espadas. In the Oporto manuscript of his Tratado (1594), Almada writes of the Cassangas of the Casamance, who were redoubtable warriors: ‘In warfare they use spears, arrows, shields, knives, short swords like the Wolof, and the same clothing.’13 In these southern regions in the late sixteenth century, short
swords would also have been used, in fewer numbers, by elite cavalry; infantry too used similar types of weapons. The fact that the late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century accounts attest to the scarcity of horses in the kingdom of ‘Casamança’ (then called Kasa) – horses were imported only among the elite14 – seems to confirm that small numbers of cavalry swords would have been used in Casamance.

In fact, the animals most frequently used for travel through the forested coastal region between the Casamance and Geba Rivers were not horses at all, but cattle. Almada offers several accounts of local rulers riding on bulls. ‘The Kings of this land’, he writes, ‘occasionally ride about on horses, but most of the time they use bulls, if the journey is short.’15 There are other references to royal use of horses among the Biafada peoples of present-day Guinea-Bissau.16

From the Casamance to the Geba, the Blacks rarely rode on horses. A few ‘Kings’ and ‘nobles’ (fidalgos, individuals ranked high by lineage) did, but rarely. Most of the time they went about on cows or bulls, which in these parts they tame and pierce through the nose by means of which the animals wear rope similar to a bit, with which they guide the animals. And in this manner they can travel for several days and they have a very good ride; the same method is used among the Casangas, Banhuns, Buramos and Bijagós.17

South of the Rio Grande, in Nalu land, no horses were used or traded (Almada 1594 [1964]: 112). In Sierra Leone cavalry are only mentioned among the Manes, coming from the Mande savannah heartland. Nevertheless, even if cavalry was essentially absent in the forest zone, the use of short swords by infantry was not precluded. A later report, the 1663–1664 account of the Franciscan Friar André de Faro, may attest to the extension of the short swords market, referring to the abundance of ‘traçados’ (terçados) in the ‘Kingdom of the Banhuns (Bainuk)’, namely in the port of Quinguim.18

In no known account from the late sixteenth to the late seventeenth century is there any mention of Felupe19 use of short swords. Further south, blade weapons were found during this period among the Buramos/Papel and Biafada, as well as the ‘Sapes’ and Manes in the Guinea-Conakry and Sierra Leone regions, according to Almada (1594 [1964]: 69, 73, 132, 139), Jesuit sources (Brásio 1968: 393) and Franciscan sources (Brásio 1991: 242). The use of these weapons by both the Sapes and the Manes, who had moved into their territory in the mid-sixteenth century, could have implications for the historical reassessment of the Mane ‘invasions’.20 In fact, if the means of defence and destruction were not substantially different between the local Sapes and the Manes (Hair 1977: n. 169, 263)21 coming from the Futa Jalon, the unbalanced relation between them, which changed the political map of Sierra Leone, must be found elsewhere. It
was based less on warfare technology than on tactics and military formation as well as demographic factors between local societies that were politically more fragmentary, facing the Manes’ migrations.

The role played in the region by a different type of weapons, guns, is attested by Francisco de Lemos Coelho’s descriptions of 1669 and 1684. These accounts give information primarily from the 1650s and 1660s. Lemos Coelho reports that firearms were imported in the Gambia region and adds important references to the Casamance region:

All of these above-named Kingdoms of the Banhuns, four in number outside of the Kasa Mansa, say that they were subjugated to the Kasa Mansa, and today they all live in liberty, they do not observe any religion, even if there is no lack of Manding who delude them with their cheating and the Falupos live in more barbarian manner and they have no communication with these people, and among them the Catholic religion could gain adherents and even more towards the south, the goods that are needed for these rivers are iron and kola and textiles and crystal and amber and spirits and powder and escopetas (short guns) and black, white and tile colour glass beads.

Clearly, short guns (flintlock muskets) were only one among many desired trading items (Peres 1990). Iron was more in demand, as local blacksmiths could fashion it into both agricultural implements and blade weapons.

The crucial point is that the only local use of imported firearms in the Casamance region clearly evoked by Lemos Coelho is hunting: the Bainunk of the independent kingdom of Jasé considered themselves experts in shooting. No where does Coelho or the slightly earlier writing of Father André de Faro refer to the use of guns in warfare, although Europeans may have used them against the Africans. Blade weapons seem still to have been the main weapon. This would shortly change, however. John Thornton has gathered evidence that European muskets introduced in the armies of Casamance (and the Gambia) in the 1670s as infantry weapons were decisive in the Casamance king’s defeat of an English naval attack (Thornton 1999: 45 and 12 n. 11–12). Be that as it may, the growing quest for firearms in connection with the growth of the Senegambian slave trade from the late seventeenth century onwards is asserted by Walter Rodney (1970) in *A History of the Upper Guinea Coast* and confirmed by Philip Curtin’s (1975) statistics of gun imports.

## Part II: The Nineteenth Century

Although there may have been some continuity of trade from the late seventeenth century (which we do not intend to study in this chapter), by the early
nineteenth century there were still relatively few firearms in Casamance. According to George Brooks, during the eighteenth century Diola groups began to exclude Europeans and Eurafricans from the waterways linking the Gambia, Casamance, Cacheu and Geba Rivers, thus forcing Portuguese and Luso-Africans to use sea passages in longer sailing routes between trading posts like Ziguinchor and Cacheu. The closing of the Senegal and Gambia Rivers to slave trade in 1809 and 1816 caused a redirection of caravans of African slave traders to Casamance and southwards, hence to the profit of Portuguese and Luso-African slave traders (though there is evidence that inland water routes south of the Casamance River were still used in the early nineteenth century). But Brooks does not mention weapons among the products of what he names the ‘Cacheu-Casamance commercial sphere’ between the 1780s and the 1810s. After 1816 these Luso-African traders’ activities were more severely affected by French and Franco-Africans and English and Anglo-Africans who became either their competitors or collaborators (Brooks 2010: xviii, 4, 47ff., 161).

Firearms were acquired from the English trading post at Elinkin in the mouth of the Casamance River, near the island of Carabane. In 1836–37, however, French officials opened two trading posts in the Casamance. The fort they constructed at Sedhiou, relatively far east in ‘Moyen Casamance’, followed the old Portuguese and Luso-African model of establishing trading escales at the point where the westward-flowing rivers became impassable for any but the smallest draft vessels. The other trading post was on Carabane Island, near the mouth of the river. There, as Mark (1985: 56) wrote, ‘Within months of the opening of the new comptoir, Diolas from both banks of the river were coming to exchange quantities of rice and wax for guns, textiles, iron, copper, and other items’. This provided the local populations in the lower river with a second source of firearms. Previously, they had purchased guns from the English trading post established early in the century at Elinkin. An undated report that is apparently from 1850 states that Lower Casamance villages were armed with ‘guns, which they acquire from the English.’ The French official in the region, E. Bertrand-Bocandé, wrote that year that Elinkin (the etymology comes from ‘Lincoln’) was still ‘un hameau anglais’[‘an English hamlet’]. During his visit to Thionk-Essyl, the largest community in the region of Djougoutes, Bertrand-Bocandé estimated that 800 to 1,000 men of this village cluster were armed with guns.

By mid-century, some northern Jola were travelling to English Combo (in the Gambia) to obtain trade goods, most likely including weapons. These the Jolas acquired in exchange for captives and cattle, but also and primarily for rice, their staple crop and the basis of their financial transactions (Mark 1985: 64).
arms incised with the brand name Tower persisted, but eventually the Jola also procured weapons from the French. Brooks (2010: 172) observes that a French company employed Franco-Africans as ‘compradors’ to navigate pirogues along the Casamance River and its tributaries specifically selling English Tower muskets, ‘because Africans disdained French models’. Gunpowder, musket balls and flints as well as sabres were also exchanged for local products such as rice, beeswax and hides. Rice often served as the unit of exchange value.

Early in 1860 the colonial authorities in Dakar sent a military force of eight hundred men under Pinet-Laprade on a punitive expedition against Thionk-Essyl. The men of Thionk had earned a reputation as pirates and had recently captured and held for ransom the wife and young child of Bertrand-Bocandé, the ‘resident’ at Carabane. When the French met the men from Thionk in battle, some of the Diola forces were armed with guns, others with lances and shields. Thionk-Essyl sustained losses of 40 dead and 200 cattle; the French forces suffered no fatalities. Thionk was then, as it remains today, the largest community in Djougoutes (now called Buluf). Yet the weapons at its disposal, and the fact that many of the men were armed with spears and hippopotamus-skin shields, left them unable to offer meaningful resistance to a modern military force.

In his post-expedition report Pinet-Laprade wrote, evidently speaking of the eighteen or twenty villages grouped along the edge of Djougouttes Plateau, ‘These villages have a general population of 18,000 inhabitants and 3,000 firearms.’ It is not clear how Pinet-Laprade arrived at his estimate of 3,000 guns, especially in view of the fact that he did not visit all of the villages. But, given that his estimate of the population – 18,000 – is in line with late nineteenth-century estimates (in 1960 the population was over 40,000; today, urban migration and ongoing civil war have probably decreased this number), and crediting Pinet-Laprade with similar accuracy for the weapons census, it appears a considerable quantity of firearms were already dispersed through Buluf. Nevertheless, the ‘Floups’ had nowhere near sufficient firepower to protect themselves from the French.

A generation later, the situation was radically transformed by the influx of thousands of weapons, quite clearly associated with growth in the production of wild rubber and palm produce throughout the Casamance. Jola men sold these forest products in Bathurst or at Carabane. By the 1880s, palm kernels and palm oil, along with wild rubber, provided a regular, if small, source of income for the people of the Casamance. By 1880, seasonal migration to the Gambia to collect palm produce was giving the people of Djougoutes regular access to English goods, including weapons (Mark 1976: 341–61). The proximity of the Gambian border, easily accessible by pirogue, meant that the Jola of Djougoutes had their choice of either French (at Carabane) or English goods. Hence, their geographical situation and their earlier trading links gave them increased access to interregional and international markets. One result of this labour migration and the associated influx of consumer goods was that within a few years, the peo-
ple of Djougoutes were able to defend themselves effectively against the recurrent attacks of Muslim slave raiders, most notably Fodé Sylla and Brahim NDiaye.

In Djougoutes in 1886, the men of several villages came together and inflicted a crushing defeat on the Mandinka warlord and slave trader Fodé Sylla (also known as Combo Sylla). The Jola victory is recorded both in contemporary French reports preserved in the Senegalese archives, and in local oral traditions in Boulouf. In 1975, when Mark interviewed the elders in several of the villages that had united to defeat Sylla, the oldest of these informants had been born a decade after the battle. The men stopped the conversation to sing; the verse was about the battle. They then recounted that ‘we captured a horse belonging to one of Sylla’s horsemen.’ (They also captured his war drum, which they keep to this day.) ‘Until then we had thought that horse and rider were one frightful beast.’ [interview with the elders of Thionk-Essyl, Batine, including Cheikh Abba Badji, March 1975.] These men were reciting songs they had learned at their own initiation in 1919, but the initiation songs had ‘belonged’ to their grandfathers, who were themselves the victorious soldiers.

The same oral traditions also preserve a memory of the importance of firearms. When Jola living in the village of Kartiak observed Sylla’s preparations for his attack, they gave the pre-arranged alarm – the firing of their guns – to the neighbouring villages. Warriors from the other villages arrived in time to ensure the Jola victory. This oral tradition is confirmed, at least in part, by an 1888 report written by the ‘Administrateur Supérieur’ of the Casamance:

Sylla attacked the people of Djougoutes … but they resisted courageously and repulsed him … of Sylla’s forces, only nine managed to escape and the Jola are said to have captured 45 horses. This fact is highly significant as what had always facilitated the trouble-makers’ success was the fear that the Jola had of horses; if they are no longer afraid, they will certainly defend themselves even more successfully.29

The Jolas of Djougoutes prevailed. What contributed significantly to their victory, besides the alliance among several villages that traditionally were at odds with each other, was the wide distribution of firearms by the 1880s, which enabled the Jola to effectively form a local militia. Klein’s thesis is supported by the nineteenth-century history of the northern Casamance.

Conclusion

The Casamance region of southern Senegal was an important part of the Portuguese commercial sphere in Greater Senegambia as early as the mid-fifteenth century. By the mid-sixteenth century it had become an important focus of the nascent Atlantic system. As such it was linked to a global economy that reached
from Portugal to Brazil to India. The resulting commerce brought the Casamance a wide range of goods, including, by the last two decades of the sixteenth century, blade weapons. Access to these weapons, however, was limited to those who controlled the export trade in slaves. Hence, the distribution of the imported blade weapons was limited to, or at least controlled by, the local rulers who dominated the ‘production’ of slaves for export.

It is important to point out that in the Casamance, the focus of our investigation, cavalry never played a central role in warfare. From the seventeenth century, blade weapons (but not horses) were valued trade imports – as was iron, for local blacksmiths were able to craft new swords from iron bars. In this geographical area there was no warrior elite consisting of cavalry, nor – with the possible exception of the sixteenth-century Kassanké ruler named Massatamba – did local rulers maintain the means to raise and support fighting forces of horsemen. Rather, weapons were distributed broadly through the population, at least among those who had access to trade goods – beeswax early on, rice and hides, but also captives. Three centuries later, the situation differed substantially. Again, international trading networks brought access to weapons, but by the 1880s at the latest, palm produce and rubber had replaced the earlier primary exports of wax and probably rice. These forest products could be collected and sold by households or even by individuals. The main transformation to follow the growth of this trade was the widening of access to imported trade goods, including firearms. A village armed with guns could stave off slave raiders and maintain local communities’ independence.

What was similar between the two contexts, and what changed? In both cases the arms came from abroad, not from an African market, although for seventeenth-century Casamance we are not sure how many blade weapons arrived through the Atlantic trade and how many were made locally. Nevertheless, unlike the trade in blade weapons, the import of firearms represented access to weapons that local technology was not readily able to appropriate and reproduce.

Paradoxically, a mid-nineteenth-century protocolonial European implantation by the French gave Felupe/Jola access to a means of defence against both European and African (Mande) offensives. Between 1600 and 1800 the Casamance had gone from being a central focus of the Portuguese coastal commercial network to being only on its periphery. This loss of importance was due in part to the Luso-African network’s increasing inability to compete with Franco-Africans and Anglo-Africans. Unable as well to supply weapons to all of the Casamance from its local ‘escale’ at Ziguinchor, the Luso-African network lost its paramount role among the local Felupe/Jola.

In contrast to the earlier period of centralized trade, this latter commerce was more widely distributed among the population. Whereas the earlier swords were concentrated in the possession of wealthy and powerful individuals – for exam-
ple, the King of Bussis in what is now Guinea-Bissau – the nineteenth-century trade placed guns in the hands of individuals. At first sight this change looks like either a factor or a result of the remarkably egalitarian society that characterized the Jola of Djougoutes/Boulouf at the beginning of the colonial period. However, rather than mechanically linking social organizational factors to warfare technology,30 this chapter has raised evidence to support the major role played by the market-based transformation in access to weapons that ultimately resulted from African purchasers’ choices. In either case, and despite the differences between the seventeenth- and the nineteenth-century long-distance commerce affecting the Casamance, the weapons trade played an important role in connecting regional trade networks with wider, interregional and transnational commerce.

This chapter has offered a diachronic comparative approach to the weapons trade in a single region, the Casamance, or northern Guiné do Cabo Verde. This methodological choice enabled us to show the relevance of differential access to various kinds of weapons in different historical contexts. This comparative approach includes in the equation an important blade weapons trade that we have recently discovered. We compare this early period to the subsequent African consumption of guns in the Casamance, following the comprehensive perspective taken in recent historiography of African warfare (Thornton 1999). The shift from swords to guns seems to correspond to more than a technological change. It reflects, not the decline of Portuguese influence and the rise of French and British influence in the region, but rather, a shift in African market conditions.

This exercise in comparative history, based both on written sources and oral traditions, demonstrates that the major transformation in arms commerce in the Casamance region from the early seventeenth through the mid-nineteenth century took the form of replacing limited acquisition of blade weapons (‘armas brancas’) with more widespread access to firearms in local communities. This enabled the communities to resist the attacks of nineteenth-century slave warriors and to maintain their autonomy. Paradoxically, this change was related to a new, protocolonial power, specifically the growing European presence in the region, in a new transnational historical context.

Peter Mark is a professor of African art history at Wesleyan University. He has held appointments in the History Department at the University of Lisbon and at the EHESS in Paris. He was a senior fellow at Re:work (Humboldt University, Berlin) in 2012/13 and an Alexander von Humboldt fellow at the Frobenius Institut in Frankfurt am Main. Mark is the author of five books, including The Wild Bull and the Sacred Forest (Cambridge University Press, 2011), Portuguese Style and Luso-African Identity (Indiana University Press, 2002), and (together with José da Silva Horta) The Forgotten Diaspora (Cambridge University Press, 2013).
José da Silva Horta is an associate professor at the Department of History, Faculty of Letters, School of Arts and Humanities of the University of Lisbon. A researcher and member of the board of directors of the UL Centro de História, he is also director of the FLUL African Studies B.A. programme. Among his publications are (with Peter Mark) *The Forgotten Diaspora: Jewish Communities in West Africa and the Making of the Atlantic World* (Cambridge University Press, 2013); *A ‘Guiné do Cabo Verde’: Produção Textual e Representações (1578–1684)* (Fundação Gulbenkian and Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, 2011); and *A Representação do Africano na Literatura de Viagens, do Senegal à Serra Leoa (1453–1508)* (Mare Liberum, 1991).

**Notes**

1. In this chapter we use the concept of Senegambia as meaning Greater Senegambia (which can be identified with the Portuguese concept of ‘Guiné do Cabo Verde’). See Boubacar Barry (1988), as reformulated and developed by Horta and Mark (2007 [2010]) and Eduardo Costa Dias and Horta (2007 [2010])

2. This ‘cycle’ model has been critically reassessed by John K. Thornton (1999: 5–6). For a full discussion of African warfare factors in perspective and in several Atlantic regions, also see Thornton (1999).

3. Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo (Hereafter ANTT), Inquisição de Lisboa, Livro 194, folios 159–160v; Livro 208 fol. 640–644v. We are deeply grateful to Florbela Frade for having called our attention to the second reference and to Miguel Sanches de Baena for sharing with us his expertise on weapons and weapons production history. For a more detailed account of this trade see Mark and Horta (2011: chap. 4).

4. In the same period an indeterminate number of swords assembled in Lisbon were also going to Angola (see Marques 2009), but the Inquisidores’ attention was focused on the weapons sent to the Upper Guinea Coast.

5. Philip Curtin (1975) lists swords and cutlasses among the Senegambian imports from the 1680s to 1730s. Walter Rodney (1970) also makes reference to the importance of blade weapons among other merchandize traded by Luso-Africans. Although the earliest reference he gives is the 1669 account of Lemos Coelho, this trade developed much earlier.

6. Not all of the sword makers or barbeiros de espadas named by one of them, Gaspar Cardoso, were involved in the trade for the entire eight or nine years. In addition, one of the men is reported to have produced only 18 swords, and two others 20 or 30 per year; another man made 40 per year. This renders any estimation of the total number of weapons exported quite approximate.


8. ANTT, Inquisição de Lisboa, Livro 203, fol. 643v: ‘preguntado que terçados cujos quantos são disse que são espadas larguas de quatro palmos pouco mais ou menos humas voltas (curved) e outras direitas que coustumão vir de Frandes e de Veneza, e aqui se guoarnessem com cabos d’estanho.’
9. Archivo General de la Nación, Lima; Leg. 34; 1578–1624; Nueva signatura; SO-CO Ca 2; Do 8; Año 1573 F 1014v: ‘cargazones llevadas a Cacheu, en el Nuestra Señora del Vencimiento y San Juan Bautista, a cargo de Manoel Batista Peres; fecha August 15–26 November 1616. We wish to thank Linda Newson and Susie Minchin for making this document available to us.

10. See Blanco (n.d. [1990]) for a translated edition of the ‘Instrucion que A. V. Magestad se da, para mandar fortificar el mar Oceano, y defender se de todos los contrarios Piratas, ansi Franceses, como Ingleses, en todas las nauegaciones de su Real Corona dentro de los Tropiccos’.

11. ‘Porque prohibindolhes o Contratador leuarem deste Reino fazendas defezas, e naõ dando licença a alguns nauios para irem a Guiné, as passaõ a França e dahi as leuaõ á dita Costa, comercendo mais nella por aquella via que pella deste Reino, e de Cacheu as voõ buscar para as recolherem em suas cazas’, D. Francisco de Moura, ‘Lembranças e advertencias’ (Brásio 1968: 698–700).

12. Almada’s account of c 1596 makes clear that there was an association between the horse trade and the cavalry expertise taught to the Wolof courts by these merchants. André Álvares de Almada, untitled abridged version of his Tratado Breve dos Rios de Guiné do Cabo Verde: Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal (BNP, Lisbon), codex 525, fol. 7v.

13. ‘Usam nas guerras azagaias, frechas, adargas, facas, espadas curtas como os Jalofos e os mesmos vestidos’ (Almada 1594 [1964]: 69).

14. ‘… usam cavalos, mas poucos, porque alguns que têm se levam da Ilha do Cabo Verde, ou da terra dos Jalofos ou Mandingas’ (They use horses but a few, because some are taken from the island of Cabo Verde [Santiago] and others from the lands of Wolof and Mandinka) (Almada 1594 [1964]: 63).

15. ‘Cavalgam os Reis desta terra algumas vezes em cavalos, e as mais das vezes em bois, sendo a jornada perto’ (ibid.: 68).

16. Ibid.: 95. At that time, the horses came from inland networks, such as from the Geba basin.

17. ‘Os mais dos negros, de Casamança até este Rio, … usam pouco cavalgarem cavalos; alguns Reis e fidalgos o fazem, mas poucas vezes: a mais das vezes é em vacas e bois, que para isso têm mansos, com as ventas furadas, nas quais trazem uns cordeis ao modo de freio, com que os governam. E andam muitas jornadas e têm muito bom passeio; o mesmo usam Casangas, Banhuns, Buramos, Bijagós’ (ibid.: 98).

18. ‘… se leuantarão quanti(da)de de gentios com armas contra hum dos dittos mercadores sobrue duuidas de seus negosios: aos gritos, e brados, acodimos os Religiozos a ver se podíamos aquieter e azagiar a briga, hera tão grande a furia dos gentios, e tantos os traçados (sic for traçados, i.e. treçados or terçados, short swords), flexas (frechas) e azagaias, q cahirão soubre os portuguezes e soubre nos, q todos estiuemos arriscados a mortte.’ Friar André de Faro, in A. Brásio (1992: 192–93): ‘a large number of men rose up with arms against one of these merchants, because they doubted his trade [i.e. his honesty] screaming and shouting and we, the friars intervened, to see if we could calm and pacify the situation, (but) so great was their anger and they had so many terçados and frechas and spears, that they raised against the Portuguese and against us, that we felt we all risked being killed’.

19. Felupe (fem. Felupa; Eng: Floop), a term used as early as the sixteenth century, is the label corresponding most closely to the ancestors of the Jola (Diola; Joola) peoples.

20. A change in the dominant political power in the Serra Leoa region in the mid-sixteenth century was characterized by Mane migrations followed by military actions. Nevertheless, the image of Mane invasions destroying the indigenous coastal Sapes societies was a Por-
tuguese and Luso-African interpretation of local oral traditions. As Horta (2011: 308–10) has shown by confronting Almada’s Oporto ms. (and Lisbon ms.) with the abridged version in the BNP codex 525, Mane polities attacked coastal Sapes to get tribute when the tribute was not paid. Although there was a first moment of political change by military force, no destruction of the local societies whom Portuguese writers called ‘Sapes’ took place. This is confirmed by Almada’s representation of a fusion of cultures as well as an example of continuity of previous Temné royal lineages, described by André Donelha (Horta 2007: 410–11). Furthermore, Sapes’ material culture was not destroyed, as Mark has shown in his revision of the dating of Sapes or Luso-African ivories (Mark and Horta 2011: chap. 5). For a different perspective on the effects of Mane invasion, see Green (2012). Green is correct to point to a rise in Sapes captives in the Atlantic trade as evidence of fighting. Such fighting does not, however, imply the destruction of Sapes society. Indeed, Manuel Álvares, writing in 1615, clearly indicated that Sapes society survived – at least in part – the incursions of the Manes (Mark 2007: 189–211).

21. According to Hair: ‘At the beginning of the sixteenth century, it was stated that the Sape used daggers called *adibes* and swords called *adibe sabane*, that is “large dagger” (Fernandes, f. 125). Cf. Temne *atbis abana* “knife big” (indef.), or Landuma *atis* “knife”. Many of the items of vernacular vocabulary quoted by the Portuguese and stated to be associated with the Mane turn out to be “Sape”. Possibly this indicates that the informants were “Sape” — i.e. Temne-speaking. But it also suggests that there may have been much less cultural discontinuity as a result of the Mane invasions than is argued by Rodney’ (Hair 1970: 60-68).


23. ‘… todos estes Reinos dos Banhús que tenho nomeado que são quatro fora de Caçamança dizem forão subgeitos ao de Caçamança, hoje vivem todos em sua liberdade, não observão religião nenhuma, se bem que não faltão mandingas que os enganão com seus embustes, e mais barbaramente vivem os Falupos que não tem comunicação com esta gente, e aqui já se pode fazer muito fruto na religião catholica, e quanto mais para o sul mais, os generos que são necessarios para estes rios he ferro, colla, roupa, chrístal, alambre agua ardente, polvora, escopetas, e avelorio preto, branco, e côr de telha’ (Peres 1990: 1–88, 32). See also Francisco de Lemos Coelho, *Descripção da Costa da Guiné* desde o cabo Verde athe Serra Liao com Todas Ilhas e Rios que os Brancos Navegão Feita por (…) no Anno de 1669: Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal /Lisbon (BNL), Res. Cód. 319.


27. ANS 13G 361 1.

28. Ibid.

29. ANS 13H 462 2, 17 July 1888, ‘Administrateur Supérieur de la Casamance au Gouverneur du Senegal. (The correct date is undoubtedly 1886.) ‘Sylla … a attaqué les Djougoutes … mais les Djougoutes ont bravement résisté, l’ont repoussé, (des) hommes de Sylla, neuf seulement auraient pu échapper, et (les Jolas) auraient pris 45 chevaux. Ce fait d’avoir pris des chevaux a un grand importance, car, ce qui avait toujours fait le success des perturbateurs, était la crainte que les Yolas avaient des chevaux; s’ils n’en ont plus peur, ils se défendront certainement avec avantage’.

30. For a development of this discussion see Thornton (1999).
References


