‘You cannot have two ID cards, you know’, Daouda explains.1 Sitting on the porch of one of the numerous mud-built tin-roofed houses on the periphery of the city of Ziguinchor, in Casamance, southern Senegal, he has come from Gambia to participate in a funeral in his native town in Bandial, an hour’s drive from the regional capital. He shows his Gambian ID card. It is new and fancy, looks like a debit card, and has a built-in chip. The card states: ‘Born in Serrekunda, Gambian national.’ Asked whether he is a national only of Gambia – the nation in which he lives – or also of Senegal – the nation in which he was born – he replies: ‘They will think you are a criminal if they catch you with two ID cards’. Confronted with the fact that nevertheless numerous people hold both nationalities, he clarifies: ‘You have to keep them [the IDs] apart’. Daouda left his home village in the heart of the Casamance as a young man. Illnesses had plagued him for too long: ‘You know in the village there is a lot of witchcraft’, he explains, ‘so I followed a friend who had been to Gambia and I stayed’. Asked how he had obtained Gambian nationality and, moreover, why his birthplace had been changed to a Gambian town, he said: ‘You know that is how it is done’, adding: ‘But they ask you a lot of questions. They want to know everything now. A lot of questions. It is not easy’.2

Daouda stays overnight at his sister’s place before he goes to the ceremony the next day. He explains that he almost always comes for funerals, rarely for occasions such as weddings or other life-cycle festivities. The ancestors are important, he points out. But apart from that, his life seems to be in Gambia. When visited in Gambia he seems to be well integrated there. His children do not speak French; he does not have parallel households. None of his children are sent away to attend school, work or live in Senegal. This level of integration is nevertheless not the rule in the region. Many people are frontier runners: cases abound where individuals cross borders whenever a better opportunity emerges on the other side. In this case, opportunities refer to such things as better prices for consumer goods, a more developed public infrastructure, more plentiful job opportunities and so on (cf. Højbjerg et al. 2012).3
Diasporas or Autochthons?

How much is the cohesion and functionality of a nation-state affected by different individual trajectories, such as Daouda's described above? In other words, regarding whether people commit themselves to one nationality rather than remain frontier runners with multiple national identities, what difference do their choices make with respect to nation-building? According to Fox and Miller-Idriss (2008), the fact that people have to be made national to make the nation has been somehow neglected. It is interesting to examine how the identification marker of nationality has come to overrule all others at the actor’s level. How did this marker become so important that people have sacrificed their lives for it? And what role does the distinctive feature of European nation-building play in the making of those models? Examining the less successful examples of nation-building and describing exceptions to the rules can produce a detailed explanation of the actual set of rules. The issue of national integration is truly mirrored by alienated, exiled, discriminated groups. To ask why and how these excluded groups retain loyalties and networks beyond the prioritized national identification sheds light on the question of national integration in general.

This chapter asks whether ‘diaspora’ can be used, beyond the classic understanding of the term, as an analytical concept to isolate transnational markers of national integration. It furthermore argues that a study of diaspora groups reveals the qualities of national identification and the distinctive features of the we-group’s majority that are necessary assets to be integrated. To test this idea, this essay compares the integration of one regional group in different locations. These locations stretch from what is usually understood as a typical immigrant diaspora destination, that is, overseas somewhere, to what is considered a classical homeland – the birthplace of its natives everywhere. The case of interest is the Casamançais, those people originating from the Casamance. Among other places they are found in other parts of Senegal, in Gambia and in France. The findings indicate that transcending the nation-state framework of classical diaspora studies can help to better understand characteristic features of nation-building in Senegal and elsewhere: looking at the subjects who are excluded makes clearly evident which national subjects are integrated into the nation and how.

Before using the term diaspora as a tool of analysis it helps to differentiate three contexts of meaning. First, diaspora is used to identify and describe a certain transnational group different from the current national majority within the nation-state. Second, it is used as a category of self-description and belonging that transcends time and space for certain individuals. In both of these cases diaspora ascribes special characteristics to a group. Third, there is the analytical use of the term, which differentiates it from the everyday uses above. This analytical meaning can be delineated by considering the historical origin of the term and then isolating and making explicit its constitutive features and comparing them
in various contexts to determine what makes a group a diaspora in one place and not in another. In short, this means the term can be used as an analytical category, regardless of its self-ascribed and ascribed uses in different national contexts. Consequently this essay is not about groups that are referred to generally as comprising a diaspora, but about the integration and exclusion of groups that are analytically differentiated as diasporas.

**Nation-State Role Models**

Could Daouda, the Bandial native introduced above, be labelled as an example of a diasporic individual? Certain typical features are evident. An international border separates Gambia from Senegal. The Senegalese living in Gambia are therefore part of an immigrant group, and the Casamançais are Senegalese citizens as well. Yet the quality of integration for Casamançais in Gambia differs from other groups of immigrants. This might seem natural in frontier areas – where, for example, immigration from Senegal to Gambia can mean going no farther than next door to stay with your neighbour, as many villages are indeed divided by the border. But also in the Gambian capital and the entire Banjul-Serrekunda region, Casamançais are mostly well integrated, or at least more integrated than other groups, and are never explicitly labelled as a diaspora. A possible explanation might be that the Casamançais are not a category involved in the struggle for primacy in Gambia. The autocratic president of Gambia is a Diola. In public discourse (manifest in everyday discrimination practice) Gambia remains a Mande country. The Diola and Mande are also autochthons in the Casamance.

Other groups, such as the Wolof from Senegal and the Peul from the Fouta Djallon, are not considered autochthons. Ousmane, a Peul whose father came from the Fouta Djallon on foot in colonial times, explains:

> The police control the fair-skinned ones. They just control them [and nobody else]. When a policeman asked me to step out of the bus, I told him – ‘Why? Because of my skin colour? I am a Gambian like you. I was born here.’ ‘They are stupid. It is always the same.’

He complains that people are discriminated against because they are considered to have come from somewhere other than the immediate vicinity of Gambia (Casamance in the south and Sine Saloum in the north). ‘My brother Yellowman, you know him, they control him all the time. They [the Mande] think they own the country. But it was the Diola who were here first – you know.’

This differentiation between who belongs to the nation – who is indigenous and who is not – constitutes the nation. As the dividing line between nation A and nation B, its existence complicates the ability of nation A/B to exist. How to integrate people from different national backgrounds into a single society has
therefore remained a question that haunts nation-states. Public debate in the West (Washington Post 2010) centres on the question of immigrants’ varying points of reference with respect to values, traditions and behaviour. There appears to be a serious effort to define a framework by which to judge whether or not immigrants comply with the ideal conception of a citizen of the given nation-state. The question of belonging is also debated in migrants’ countries of origin, but from a different perspective. A country like Senegal tries to profit from its migrant communities worldwide, and politicians plead for investment by the international diaspora (africa-eu-partnership 2010; Fleury 2012; Red Mangrove Development Advisors 2012).

This last example illustrates two points that commonly arise in the debate concerning integration. First, the administrative answer to the question of belonging in general is often influenced by economic considerations. Second, the question of whether a diaspora is ignored or courted, and whether migrants are integrated or rejected, is answered from within the prevailing logic of the nation-state. Such a perspective becomes clearly problematic when diaspora communities produce claims to a homeland that is not included in the landscape of modern nation-states. After all, diasporas are transnational. Therefore it seems worthwhile to reflect on their role in nation-building. During the last decades the goal for studies of nation-building has been to explain how this construct – the nation-state – has become the supreme form of political organization worldwide. It is also interesting to analyse how this social construction became the most important manner of identification for individuals as well.

Transformation of the Term Diaspora

For the purposes of this essay ‘Diaspora’ is analysed as a counterexample, and thus the term must first be clearly defined. Diaspora studies show that the African and Jewish Diasporas are paradigmatic in both popular and scientific discourse (Cohen 2008; Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008). Historically the Jewish Diaspora essentially created the term. It stems from the scattering of the Jews by the Babylonians (sixth century BC) and the Romans (AD 70). It also has been used to describe the consequences of the later transatlantic slave trade (fifteenth to nineteenth centuries). Today it can be argued that it has become an undifferentiated word of identification with various meanings for different circumstances. Nevertheless, the classical definition of Diaspora goes back to the Greek term meaning ‘dispersion’. And because it is historically defined first and foremost by Jewish history, the meaning goes beyond a mere synonym for dispersion. The features that are most important to keep in mind for a working definition are the following: The historic case is characterized by a homeland, which defines a common point of reference for people scattered by force, who in consequence migrate, hold a minority status abroad, and establish a transnational community that persists over
time and space. Today the term diaspora is ever expanding – Chinese, Lebanese and Armenian diasporas are joined by countless others. One might come to the conclusion that the meaning of the term itself has become so ‘dispersed’ that its actual analytical value is doubtful (Brubaker 2005). But to keep matters simple, here the analysis of diaspora groups is used only to make possible a broad comparison of the mechanism of inclusion and exclusion. The concept is employed to assess the modes of belonging of group members from both the majority and the minority. This chapter therefore proposes to look at diaspora on different levels. The concept shall be applied to a well-known international case as well as to examples within a nation in order to approach the concept of everyday nationalism and the prioritization of identifications from different perspectives.

To start with an example of a classical migration group overseas: Senegalese are well known for their workforce diaspora. Senegalese people will tell you that a young man generally is expected to seek out his fortune abroad.13 There are Senegalese communities in Gabon and other oil-producing countries of Africa and the Middle East, but the destination of choice is Europe – particularly France – and French-speaking Canada.14 It is most of all the French diaspora that is ever present in Senegalese media, politics and family networks: it would be hard to find any (extended) Senegalese family without relatives in France. But while in Senegal ethnic differentiation stratifies society and overrules national identification, Senegalese abroad reach a common national identification that overrides such differences. According to the label attached to them by outsiders who are unaware of any regional differentiation, the Senegalese diaspora to a certain degree is labelled, and perceives itself, as a homogeneous group.15 As a member of the diaspora in Paris stated: Once Senegalese arrive in France they become the same. He also said that no other sub-Senegalese community – such as a Casamançais or any other regional diaspora – was visible and recognizable in France.

**Shifting of Boundaries**

In different circumstances markers of distinctions might differ. The same person identified as a Senegalese in France may have a last name that is rather uncommon in his region of origin, the Casamance.16 One such person explained how he had to convince people that he truly was a native to the region when he was still living there.

Les gens ont dit que je suis Nordiste. On connaît que ça [the last names common in the region]. Je disais – Tu es malade, je suis d’ici, grandi ici. Il fallait que je m’explique. … [Abbé] Diamacoune a raconté d’un grand guerrier au temps [who was from the Casamance and bore the same last name].17
In other words, he had to defend his status as an autochthon by pointing out his and his family’s origin, stretching the latter back in time and supporting his story with an account of the political leader (Abbé Diamacoune) of the secession movement. The discrepancy between how an individual’s markers become relevant for his social placement in his region of origin and how they are relevant in his exile in the diaspora seems odd at first. But the mechanisms underlying this discrepancy will crystallize more clearly when the comparison is expanded. Specifically, the international (France) / regional (Casamance) case will be contrasted with the transnational (Gambia) / national (Dakar/Ziguinchor) cases.

First, though, it is necessary to explain the label *Nordiste*, mentioned above. A divide exists between people from Senegal’s north and south (namely the Casamance). There are many other points of rupture within Senegal, but this north/south division has been the source of a low-grade civil war since 1982. A secession movement in the Casamance has violently challenged the nation-building project of Senegal. In consequence the Casamançais are stereotyped as conspiratorial rebels and regarded as outsiders from and within Senegal. For this reason, the Casamançais are an apt group through which to determine whether the analytical tool at issue in this chapter can be applied, and whether our understanding benefits by analysing the Casamançais as a diaspora. Applying the concept allows elaboration on certain peculiarities of the Casamance conflict: for example, that the Diola are said to be both the fiercest supporters of secession (for an overview of the debate see Barbier-Wiesser 1994) and one of the best integrated groups in Senegal (Foucher 2002) appears contradictory. However, this contradiction can be resolved by placing a spotlight on groups that are not integrated and using the concept of diaspora. Such an approach reveals how individuals’ belonging to a regional (Casamançais) or national (Senegalese) project is related to the conflict. It is indeed a dialectical relation: the former are shaped and reified by the latter and vice versa: ‘Les nordistes, ce sont des racistes. Ce n’est pas comment chez nous’, was the experience of Diatta, a Casamançais in northern Senegal. ‘Ils te disent rebelle. Tous les Casaçais pour eux sont des rebelles. On te insulte. Ils ne connaissent pas Cabrousse – ou est-il. Le conflit ce sont les nordistes…. Ils dirigent tout. On ne peut rien faire.’ When questioned about how he is identified and labelled as a Casamançais, Diatta said: ‘Moi, je parle mieux Wolof qu’eux. Mais quand ils entendent [que tu parle] Diola…’ here he paused, then summarized: ‘… c’est mieux chez moi’. After years of working in the north, Diatta finally returned to his hometown for economic reasons and apparently also because he had been unable to integrate on a personal level in the north.

**Diaspora within the Nation**

Is the case of the Diola above a singular case, or is it representative of a common pattern? To answer this question we asked Casamançais in Dakar (N = 133)
whether they socialize mostly with other Casamançais, and how they appraise the relations between northerners and Casamançais. We were interested in the length of time the interviewees had been in Dakar and the level of integration they experienced in their jobs, religious practices and daily lives, always keeping in mind that there are no apartheid-like ghettos in Dakar that separate the different ethnic groups.

The relative unanimity of opinions was extraordinary.21 The interviewees pointed out that most of the non-Casamançais in Dakar stereotyped the Casamançais as rebels. Therefore the Casamançais kept mostly to themselves, confining interactions with northerners to professional life. On the one hand, the Casamançais appear well integrated into modern Senegalese society. In general they have been integrated into certain professions (housework, security, military) more successfully than most other groups (see Foucher 2002), as is especially visible in Dakar.22 On the other hand, the people who were questioned clearly felt they had not managed to fit in. This self-perception is characterized by the attributes of diaspora: a people migrate from home; they are identified as different and classified into a certain group; and even though they have been dispersed, their community transcends space and national identification (Sökefeld 2006).

Another question arises: To what extent is diaspora necessarily about distance? Of course dispersion as such necessarily includes being distant from one another. But an often-implied prerequisite to qualify as a diaspora – that is, that an ocean or similar great distance has to separate people from their homeland – does not even hold true for the Jewish Diaspora.23 No studies have as yet highlighted the Casamançais/Diola24 diaspora in Dakar. This might be due to the fact that this label does not appear to be verifiable – there is no such thing as a fixed minority status. There are, on the contrary, many examples of individuals activating different layers to flexibly alter their transnational and regional identity according to the circumstances (de Jong 2002). Further, neither personal observation nor previous research shows that the Diola are more marginalized than any other ethnic group in Senegal (Diouf 1994).25 Finally, even if diaspora is not about long-distance dispersion in theory, it might not be applicable as an analytical tool for short-distance diaspora in practice.

**Nobody Is from Here**

The above doubts seem justified after a closer look at a short-distance diaspora. Shifting focus from the national to the regional level to consider how individuals are identified in Ziguinchor, diaspora suddenly seems omnipresent. Ziguinchor is the capital of the region of the same name and is also the old capital of the Casamance (a region that has been divided to undercut the separatism cause linked to the old name). The city was founded by the Portuguese, who were the first
Europeans to colonize along the Casamance River. The Portuguese were never active administrators in the region, so present-day Ziguinchor is a relatively new city that has only recently experienced tremendous growth. Still, it began as a Portuguese settlement in a region where founding families are traditionally the landowners, who function as the hosts of whomever is a latecomer. Just as it is acknowledged that the Portuguese were the founders, it is common knowledge that the original population was Bainouk, who once maintained rice fields on the land now occupied by the Casamance capital. Therefore the Bainouk and their Creole descendants are considered the landowners.

‘Ici, personne n’est d’ici’, a young man explained in Boudoudi, a neighbourhood in Ziguinchor. ‘Chacun a son village, c’est un rencontre, c’est le capital’. All respondents to a survey in Boudoudi stated that they were from other villages. A young man born in Dakar and bearing a common Bainouk name (patronym) declares himself to be from Brin, the next village. He visits his official home village ‘régulièrement’, but even though it is only a few kilometres away, ‘c’est ici que je connais plus’. Boudoudi was among the original settlements, and one of its peculiarities is that after Senegalese independence, it was displaced to build government housing for ‘fonctionnaires’ [civil servants]. Displacement in this case actually meant moving as little as two blocks – a hundred metres – back from the river into the rice paddies. The tiny neighbourhood of Boudoudi consists of two paved streets with modern apartment buildings between them, and a few dozen rather unstable houses behind the modern block. In other words, in Boudoudi the expropriated landowners live next to the land titleholders who profit from this displacement. This is especially interesting, considering that people continue to regard a northern governor’s expropriation of Bainouk/Diola rice fields as the root cause of the conflict. It is said he gave the land to his compatriots from northern Senegal. The rice paddies were on the river, in swampland on both sides of the colonial harbour. The western side, right next to the governor’s seat, is the neighbourhood of Boudoudi.

According to a common line of argumentation that classifies the conflict in the Casamance as a clash of interests between landlords and intruders, the antagonism between the two groups in Boudoudi is the conflict’s flashpoint. Boudoudi, in other words, is an open wound, a constant reminder of the problem underlying the Casamance conflict. But our survey in the neighbourhood showed that on both sides, people refer to their original villages outside Boudoudi in identifying themselves. That is, neither side feels as though it comes ‘from there’ – from Boudoudi. It is true that the ‘northerners’ are found only in the new part, but Creole/Bainouk/Diola as ‘originaires du Ziguinchor’ live alongside them and with other original Casamançais in the new blocks as well. In other words, the very conflict that has cast the Diola in the role of conspirators, rebels, challengers of nation-building – and thus the very reason they are isolated as a de facto diaspora in Dakar – is said to be rooted in the expropriation perceptible
in Boudoudi; yet the division between Casamançais and northerners is far from visible in the very neighbourhood itself.

Diaspora or Latecomers?

If being amongst foreigners means being in a diaspora, then there could be a diaspora ‘around every corner’: a scattering from one’s homeland might only be as far as the next village. Quaintly enough, in the Casamance, ‘foreigner’ essentially means anyone who does not belong to the same quartier or neighbourhood. ‘When my father went to the next village [a stone’s throw away] he took his arms with him’32 was a common description of the hostile – and above all, isolated – situation that characterized villages in the region. By pointing to this oral history, to narratives of historic rivalries, to differences in the language and to specific customs separating one village (and often each quartier) from another, distinctions of exclusion can be claimed. In a similar manner but to a converse end, integration can be emphasized: by pointing to a common descent (from a village, or a region from which forefathers immigrated) or to a common resistance against outsiders (slave traders [Baum 1999] or French colonizers [Mark 1985: 66–67]), historic ties can be stressed in order to establish similarities and union with others. Depending on the specific context, the identification changes and expands, presenting a series of nesting categories: quartier (e.g. Djibonker) – village (e.g. Youtou) – kingdom (e.g. Bayot) – region (e.g. Kasa) – department (e.g. Ziguinchor) – nation (e.g. Casamance) – state (e.g. Senegal). It may appear complicated, but it is also the basic answer to the most common greeting: ‘Kasumay (Peace), what is your name? Where are you from?’ As to the efficacy of the label ‘internal diaspora’, one might argue that it makes little sense to speak of a migration next door, but in fact many internally displaced people live next door to one another in the Casamance, and they have in fact been dispersed by force. In the end it seems a matter of choice whether both characteristics are counted as a given or not.33 Here violence is seen as a crucial element of the working definition, whereas a minimal distance (e.g. in kilometres) or a certain quality of distance (across an ocean) is not regarded as a prerequisite. Violence is counted as an element if it is perceived as such by the individuals concerned. The objective criterion for distance becomes a self-defined remoteness.

But what are the advantages to analysing a given situation relying on the categories of diaspora? Where does it make the picture sharper rather than more blurry to speak of diasporas? Landlord/stranger relations seem the more appropriate term in many cases. Therefore, applying the analytical term diaspora depends on which social condition you want to label.34 Historically, Diaspora is about forced displacement and permanent migration from home.35 And of course other terms might cover all of these conditions just as well. But diaspora is also characterized as a social materialization of a perceived/ascribed common point of
reference for identification. This point of reference provides a transnational mode of belonging, but at the same time it hinders the group from embracing the local identity. This does not mean that the minority has no say in the label that is applied to them. But having been excluded from the majority’s we-group, individuals have a big incentive to integrate themselves into the other-group in which they are categorized. For instance, your counterpart in the north might simply ignore your point of reference, say, Cabrousse, and insist on another label, say, Diola, Casacaïs, or rebel. You do not fit into his group; furthermore, you are integrated into another group – a negative of his, an ‘other’ group contrasted to ‘us’.

Individuals react differently. They can accept and embrace their ascribed status as ‘other’, they can accept but still seek to alter this ‘other’ status, or they can seek to escape it. The escape option works in one of two ways. Individuals can lay claim to the ‘we’ group – a process observable, for example, in assimilation via assertion of common historic or ethnic affiliation by individuals among both the Diola and Wolof, who now claim to have emigrated from Egypt. Or individuals may seek to enter a different ‘other’ group – for example, to be identified as a (regional) Casamançais, or as a (transnationally orientated) youngster rather than accepting an (ethnic) identification as a Diola. The frame of reference and the situation define who you are. The question is to whom you are speaking, and under what circumstances. The same man may speak of the Senegalese as ‘us’ when he talks about himself as part of a Senegalese diaspora in France, but then refer to the Senegalese as ‘them’ (‘who will never understand us [the Casamançais]’) when discussing the conflict in the Casamance; then again, he may even refer to other Casamançais as ‘them’ when explaining the problem of being accepted as a true originaire (an autochthon) de la Casamance because of his untypical family name.

**Differentiation of Otherness**

Consideration of similarities to other diasporas and systematic comparison with the working definition of diaspora can aid the analysis of the situation and its consequences. This perspective might lead to an understanding of how identifications are prioritized. Let us keep in mind that migration does not lead automatically to the formation of a diaspora. Even if the stipulations of forced migration, subsequent minority status, anchors in the homeland and rudimentary transnational networks are met, assimilation is not impossible. The first benefit of focusing on the diaspora is the insight gained into a given society’s capacity to accept integration. The question then becomes how flexible culturally constructed differences are. Describing the ascribed and perceived attributes separating diaspora from the majority provides clues to the answer. On one hand are markers that are perceived to be essential for the majority (through a negative image of what constitutes group membership); on the other hand are the features of identification that bind the diaspora together. Looking at a diaspora such as that of
the Casamançais in Dakar, furthermore, makes differentiation markers salient when they otherwise would not be detectable. Simmel pointed out an often overlooked quality of strangers: The stranger is different by definition – he is strange, not like ‘us’, his ‘otherness’ is evident. But if the ‘other’ is similar and close, then distance and difference (in discourse) have to be reified more assertively. A self is established by boundaries that distinguish a similar other – not a complete stranger (Simmel 1992 [1908]). In sum, the less obvious the differences are, the more strongly they have to be affirmed. In other words, the less distinguishable the markers of differences are, the more explicit they must be.

The cases in the Casamance frontier zone seem to contradict this last point. Here we return to the observation of Daouda, the Casamançais living in Gambia who was quoted at the beginning of this chapter. Historically, the Diola population of Gambia has lived in the Brikama and Fogni region of Gambia – not in Banjul and Serrekunda. In the last decades the latter areas have seen a large influx of Gambian and Senegalese Diola migrants who nevertheless are not seen as foreigners – unlike migrants from Northern Senegal who also moved to these urban areas. Here one might reconsider the earlier quote describing the Gambian Diola as the ‘first’ historical natives – that is, as the true ancestors of Gambia. Even as the ‘other’ is a necessary asset to establish a self, the question of who is considered the ‘other’ obviously depends on the circumstances. The Gambian and the Senegalese Diola are not differentiated in the lines of argumentation observed. Rather, it seems that especially in the metropolitan area of Serrekunda, the dividing line does not run between national groups but between the ‘indigenous’ and the ‘others’. In this case the ‘others’ are usually ‘Freetonians’ or ‘Nigerians’. But the national and linguistic markers of distinctions are subject to situational shifts: in one instance it is them the Francophones versus us the Anglophones, with Nigerians and Freetonians included in the latter group. But in another instance it is us ‘the locals’ or ‘the indigenous’ versus them the ‘foreigners’, assigning Mande, Diola and Wolof to the first group and the non-Gambian Anglophone population to the other.

The point is that the Casamançais groups do not figure as prominent ‘other’ groups. On the contrary, they are mostly subsumed into one’s own group in order to prove autochthony. The Mande will stress that many Diola are often already considered Mande (e.g. in the Karon region), as they have adapted Mande traditions and language. This reference seemingly serves to substantiate the narrative of glorious Mande kingdoms of the past civilizing the region. The same pattern of autochthonization is observable within other ethnic groups: Peul who arrived from the Fouta Djallon highlands of Guinea-Conakry refer to the Casamançais Peul from the Fuladou region of Senegal to stress their autochthonous status, arguing that those Casamançais groups are more indigenous than the Mande, as indicated in Ousmane’s statement earlier. Ultimately this is seen as proof that the Peul are more indigenous than the Mande. That is, there is a tendency to
integrate and co-opt the Casamançais in order to establish an autochthony that is recognized in Gambia.

How Firstcomers in the Casamance Become Latecomers in Senegal

The differing levels of integration in similar conditions (as in the region Senegambia, which is often regarded as a single historical and sociocultural entity) show how circumstances can be decisive. In such situations relatively slight dissimilarities may be highlighted to stress difference (Dakar), whereas in other situations (frontier Casamance) these same dissimilarities would be considered quite minor. In sum, it is obvious that the process of identification is different for migrants overseas, migrants within the nation, internally displaced people inside the homeland and transnational short-distance migrants (see below). People living across the border as refugees showed many parallels with people living in Dakar in diaspora, but the Diola living in exile across the border in Gambia and Guinea-Bissau showed more integrative qualities than members of the diaspora in Dakar. The hypothesis is that they embody transnational ties, because they are the majority and ‘at home’. Another observation underlines how surrounding conditions, rather than the features themselves, define the quality of a marker: if virtually everywhere ‘nobody comes from here’, then a factor that sets you apart from the majority in Dakar binds you together in Ziguinchor. In both cities a majority of residents are immigrants, but obviously the identification as a Casamançais and a Senegalese is different. In Dakar it was much harder to speak about the Casamance in the first place. People were much more suspicious and unwilling to talk about their identification. But differences with the north were hardly ever mentioned in the Casamance, even though it is the place where people suffer from the conflict (said to be caused by those very differences). In Dakar it was much easier to get an idea of what binds the Casamançais together and to isolate their respective markers (beyond a common fate through an external threat). Different groups in Dakar were set apart (and assimilated them into smaller units, sometimes even antagonistic ones) by the same condition that brought them together in Ziguinchor – namely, not being from the place they lived in.

The research findings encircle what appears to be the crucial element for analysis: the identification Casamançais, a category that has unquestionably been used. Currently, this category is closely linked to the Casamance conflict. The political wing of the Casamance rebels always claim to have been fighting for the values that the Senegalese nation inherited from the French: Liberté, égalité, fraternité! Even though the population has been subjected to discrimination on an ethnic base, the rebels have not played the ethnic card – for example to draft or to ‘motivate’ combatants. Instead they have chosen to criticize the state for betraying these values and failing to fully integrate its citizens. But how, then, are the ranks of the rebels filled, if not on an ethnic, religious, generation, class
or clan basis? What actually ties individuals together? Who claims autonomy or independence? The research found a common denominator: identification as Casamançais (Rudolf 2013). In this case then – to grasp the markers – the study of the diaspora in Dakar turned out to be the most rewarding. The identification Casamançais proved to be based on common cultural practices, similar sociopolitical systems, a common ascribed label and a common self-identification embracing this label.41

The hypothesis shows that this Casamançais identity sustains itself – apart from exclusion and discrimination – by performances, especially initiation rituals through which the community is united and reified (Mark, de Jong and Chupin 1998; de Jong 2007; Mark 1992, 1994). To do so, Casamançais from every part of their diaspora must make an effort to return to their village of origin in the Casamance in order to participate; in this way the entire extended family is able to contribute. Extended family members then live together for a time, whereby the community becomes visible, graspable and enacted repeatedly. Casamançais themselves often point to participation in life-cycle rituals, even those co-organized with different ethnic groups, as a strong identification marker. Such opinions should be accepted as valid, for the performance – the joint experience of community, of singing, dancing and eating together and being a part of the organization team – should not be underestimated.42 Identity is by and large performed; it is both reified and recognized in performances.43

Conclusion: Diaspora as an Analytical Tool

Studying the various levels of integration experienced in differing contexts in diasporas has proven to be fruitful, with social mechanisms becoming salient and underlying structures being revealed. Examples in the region at issue indicate that diaspora is not the opposite of integration; rather, carrying out research in a diaspora is an outstanding approach for understanding the conditions that do or do not exist for integration. For its recent nation-building, Sierra Leone has deployed a Krio-diaspora identity and language to unify people (Knörr 2010). The role of the Creole in Guinea-Bissau has been similar. Even though the creole identity has never been proclaimed as a unifying model in this case, it has nonetheless played an implicitly decisive role in nation-building (Trajano Filho 2010). As a clearly formulated category, diaspora as an analytical term can be used to assess social identifications across neighbourhoods and the Seven Seas alike.44 In analysing identification, its advantage over other categories is that diaspora captures a trans(across/beyond)-national/regional/local dimension, whether as a tacit or explicit identification, that in regard to the prioritized national identity provides its group members with an exit option that would not have been apparent otherwise.

Looking only at how genealogies, language, religion, ethnicity and so on differ among the Diola, Peul, Balanta and Manjacos in Dakar, one cannot grasp
their common reference of regional identification and subsequently cannot comprehend the grounds on which individuals refer to this identity. How many of the Casamançais actually identify themselves with this marker? How many are identified as such, and by whom and for how long? Whether living in the region or in the diaspora, how many of them oppose, ignore, sympathize or support the secession movement? Many answers to these questions depend on the circumstances in which markers are identified and appropriated by actors to include members in a group or exclude them from it (Donahoe et al. 2009). But the sine qua non for an analytical understanding in this regard is to identify what it is that qualifies an individual for, or disqualifies an individual from, membership.45

The genesis of social groups and their boundaries, markers, and identification of actors, or in other words their dynamic evolution, is central to anthropological research and analysis. Periods of rapid social change have been identified as especially suitable for discerning group boundary mechanisms (Schlee 2004, 2010). The analysis of diaspora holds similar promise for facilitating understanding of the relative importance that actors attribute to different identifications. The examples presented herein furthermore should make clear that a case study of instances where nation-building fails to integrate its subjects (and make them national) has wider implications for difficulties that the ‘nation-state’ model faces today, not only in postcolonial nations but virtually everywhere.

Acknowledgements

This chapter benefitted from suggestions by Joanna Davidson, Ferdinand de Jong, Christian Højbjerg, Peter Mark, William Murphy and Wilson Trajano Filho, all of whom I wish to thank hereby.

Markus Rudolf is a researcher and lecturer in peace and conflict studies and a consultant for humanitarian issues. He was a doctoral student at the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology in Halle (Saale). His research focuses on conflict analysis, protection, vulnerability, resilience and Do-No-Harm in DR Congo and Senegal. Currently he is working for the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC). Among his recent publications are Assessing the Humanitarian Response to Chronic Crisis in North Kivu (Do More Good Consortium 2014) and ‘Integrating Conflict: Assessing a Thirty Years War’ (Ph.D. thesis 2013).

Notes

1. All names are changed to guarantee anonymity. Interview Ziguinchor, 2009.
2. The English translations provided here are based on recollections of conversations that were recorded in writing later. The French quotes are as faithful to the original structure
and style of the spoken word as possible, even though the language used may not be grammatically correct.

3. Gambia is completely contained within Senegalese territory, except for its short western border where it meets the Atlantic Ocean. The Senegalese territory south of Gambia, stretching to the border with Guinea-Bissau and cut off from the north of Senegal by Gambia, is the region of Casamance. It comprises the greatest density of ethnic groups in Senegal, of which the Diola is the dominant ethnicity. The north in turn has a different ethnic, religious, climatic and social mosaic, and here the Wolof are the most prominent. A low-grade conflict between those two parts of Senegal has plagued the country since 1982, occasionally affecting and involving the neighbouring countries of Gambia and Guinea-Bissau.

4. Identification here points to a process. The term ‘identity’ in turn is understood as the result of this process. As a social fact both the process and the result are seen as fluid, dynamic and situational (for a deeper discussion of this issue, see Richard Jenkins 2000; Brubaker and Cooper 2000; Donahoe et al. 2009).

5. The uppercase ‘Diaspora’ is used here for the paradigmatic cases, while the lowercase ‘diaspora(s)’ is used elsewhere.

6. In other words, the Casamançais include those who refer to villages in the Casamance as their places of origin.

7. The terms ‘autochthon’ and ‘native’ are used synonymously here; both are rarely used in the Casamance. Usually the differentiation is made through labels: ‘we/them’; ‘from here/not from here’; ‘they come from …’, ‘they originate in …’. In Gambia the term ‘indigenous’ is used, while generally in Senegal (outside of the Casamance) ‘autochthon’ is used. In both cases it is assumed everybody knows who is native and who is not. Yet, the flexibility of boundaries is astonishing.

8. Both the Wolof and the Peul are not uncommon in the region. There are Wolof villages (such as Loudia Wolof) in the Casamance, and the Wolof are numerous in Gambia. The Peul (also called the Fula) are the majority in the Fulada region of Casamance, and since this region is between Gambia and Guinea-Conakry, the Peul/Fula from the area are considered in-between as well: as Casamançais, they are autochthons to the Senegambia region and are differentiated from the more ‘fair-skinned’ Peul/Fula from Guinea-Conakry, mostly traders who are considered foreigners. It is interesting to note that many complaints about Wolofization – that is, the ever increasing influence of the Wolof people and Wolof language – are also linked to their position in trade.

9. The best-known example of a diaspora claiming its own nation-state is the Kurds. Their relation to the homeland and self-image is considerably different from other examples (Wahlbeck 2002; Alinia 2004; Curtis 2005). Other, less prominent cases, such as the Parsi and Ismaili communities, are equally interesting for comparison regarding the concept of homeland and transnational nationalism (Hinnells 1994; Kassam-Remtulla 1999; Falzon 2003).

10. Hobsbawm, Anderson and others have shown how nation-building is grounded in a primordial, essentialist and ex post explanation (discourse) of the status quo: A rigid national history is constructed from the present ex post: natural national identity stretches back through time (Kohn 1967; Hobsbawm 1992; Tilly 1992; Anderson 1999).

11. From the Oxford Dictionaries Online (2010):

diaspora(diaspora), Pronunciation:/dɪəˈspɔːrə/. Noun (often the Diaspora): Jews living outside Israel. The dispersion of the Jews beyond Israel. The dispersion or spread of any people from their original homeland. People who have spread or been dispersed from their homeland.
The main diaspora began in the 8th–6th centuries BC, and even before the sack of Jerusalem in AD 70, the number of Jews dispersed by the diaspora was greater than that living in Israel. …

*Origin:* Greek, from diaspeirein ‘disperse’, from *dia* ‘across’ + *speirein* ‘scatter’. The term originated in the Septuagint (Deuteronomy 28:25) in the phrase *esē diaspora en pasais basilieus tēs ē̂̄̂s* ‘thou shalt be a dispersion in all kingdoms of the earth’.

12. The four characteristics chosen are both specific enough to distinguish diasporas from other transnational groups and broad enough not to be confined to a single case, as to a certain extent are Safran’s (1991) often-cited six points. This essay intends to show whether this working definition is of any value for comparative analysis.

13. Whether an immigrant should take his bride and consequently establish his family abroad, too, is a matter of discussion among Senegalese. Most men nowadays feel that women become ‘uncontrollable’ once they live in Europe or North America. Therefore the preferred model is to build a house and leave the spouse(s) and children in the country of origin. Female migration differs: It is virtually confined to seasonal work in the region or to ‘follow a Toubab’ (a white man). In the first case the immigrant is without children, and the second entails the question of establishing a family, predating migration, and guarantees its permanency (Fleischer 2008).

14. For a better understanding of the context in Senegal see Lambert (2002) and Wabgou (2008); for the role of remittances see Jettinger (2005); and for Italy see Sinatti (2006).

15. This of course is a stereotype not shared by or valid for all individuals.

16. Whoever has been to Senegal has observed the greeting ceremony in which, after questions on well-being, there inevitably follow questions on name, last name and origin. These are the coordinates used to position the communication partner and eventually discover links to individual networks.

17. ‘People said I am a *Nordiste*. They do not know anything. I told them you are mad, I am from here. I grew up here. I had to explain myself. … Diamacoune told about a great warrior once upon time’ (interview, Paris, September 2009).

18. Evans and Foucher, among others, offer brief summaries of the complex Casamance conflict (Evans 2003; Foucher 2007).

19. ‘The *Nordistes*, they are racists. It is not like here. They call you a rebel. All the Casaçais are rebels for them. You are insulted. They do not know Cabrousse – where it is. The conflict, that are the northerners … they direct everything. You cannot do anything … I speak Wolof better than they do. But if they hear Diola … It is better at home’ (Diatta, interview in Cabrousse, March 2011).

20. This decision was reached a year after participating in his home village’s Bukut, a Diola initiation ritual that plays a central role in the process of identification as Casamançais (Rudolf 2014).

21. Nevertheless, the Diola are far from unanimous in their approach to living in Dakar. Many in fact do try to mingle and become less noticeable. This might cause biased results: the individual identification depends on the circumstances, and the survey was not representative. But the issue here is not whether all Diola feel and act as a tightly organized diaspora, but whether the conditions are such that they are encouraged to do so, and how much individuals are aware of it.

22. It might be argued that an already high level of integration into the modern system of education and public work is a precondition for individuals to perceive themselves as lagging behind. Playing according to the rules sets the ground for aspirations that in the end cause individuals to feel alienated and consequently to distance themselves.
23. What tends to be overlooked in the classical definitions closely attached to the historic Jewish case is that even Jews who were living in the homeland, e.g., in Jerusalem, could be considered part of the Diaspora because they were not living in a Jewish state. The same could be said for the Orthodox to this very day; only the Messiah can lead them out of the Diaspora.

24. For a number of reasons Diola and Casamançais are often equated. First, as has been shown, outsiders tend to equate the Diola and Casamançais in everyday practice. Numerous people outside the Casamance, especially in the north of Senegal, affirmed this stereotype: ‘Casamançais? – the Diola. Like here in Fatick people are called Fatickois. Here everybody is Serer. There they are Diola’ (interview, Fatick, February 2011). Second, on a political level the government demonized the secession movement as an ethnic uprising and blamed the Diola along with the Casamançais: according to the government’s logic the two groups are essentially the same, so if one group is labelled as rebels, the other is too. Third, no research has been done exclusively on the Casamançais as such. The vast majority of the comparative studies in what now is the Département de Ziguinchor are mostly filed under the label Diola.

25. Studies have shown that the Diola are better educated and better integrated into the state apparatus than other ethnic groups in many aspects, but there are no studies focusing on other Casamance ethnic groups such as the Balanta, Manjacos and so on, which are usually subsumed under Guinea-Bissau.

26. ‘Here [in Ziguinchor] nobody is from here’.
28. ‘Everybody has his village, this is a meeting point, it is the capital’.
30. ‘Regularly’/ ‘It is here I know better’.
31. The landlord/stranger relation in general (Mouser 1975), as in a diachronic analysis, is of particular interest in the Casamance – especially with regard to the question of who owns land. During its history the region has seen many invasions (Mark 1985). Many regional inhabitants fled to remote backwater islands and often ended up settling there. Current points of contention are land issues regarding hotels (Cabrousse), the question of national borders for the purposes of farming rights (along the southern border) and the previously mentioned claim that the northerners had taken land from the southerners. Furthermore, fierce disputes between villages revolve around whether land was loaned or given away permanently, based on historical founder/latecomer claims. A thorough historical study of these cases, as they play out in modern courtrooms, would prove illuminating.

32. Interview with a villager from Edioungou, August 2008.
33. Diaspora is not solely about being dispersed over a great distance, as has been pointed out. Nevertheless distance might well be the most crucial element of dispersion to consider in the future. Modern means of communication have made distance more relative than ever. Isolation of minorities who have migrated from their homelands is therefore greatly reduced. In the global village, the sheer abundance of means of transnational communication affects integration more than anything else. Whereas transnational orientation among migrants (often already in the second and third generations) used to be the exception – and mostly was due to religious beliefs – it could become the rule, simply because distance from the homeland has shrunk in manifold ways.

34. Migrant is the encompassing entity, and landlord/stranger the encompassing relationship. Both are preconditions but do not necessarily produce conditions for a diaspora – the question is how and when these conditions are met.
35. Consequences of the transatlantic slave trade have been studied in this region, but the role of the Diola diaspora has drawn comparatively less attention in the social sciences. Focusing on transregional or transnational ties, however, furthers understanding of the mechanisms of group boundaries, their construction and their origins. Discussion of the ties between the diaspora and the rebellion has been quite heated in Senegal (see articles on the extradition of Nkrumah in the newspaper *Walfadjri*: http://www.walf.sn/politique/suite.php?rub=2&id_art=63020).

36. It is important to keep in mind that reification of identification markers depends on established categories of *self* and *others* according to the situation (Elwert 2002).

37. ‘Casaçais’ is the colloquial form for Casamançais, while ‘rebel’ is a derogatory label that politicians, military and police affix to individuals who refer to themselves as combatants. While Casaçais and Diola are categories of identification for both members and outsiders, rebel is simply a discriminatory label that excludes individuals from the community.

38. Social reality is understood here to be constructed, which does not imply any judgement about reality, that is, about the basis of the constructs. It simply acknowledges that our access is a culturally defined one, and therefore that no insights into anything outside of social reality can be offered (Searle 1995; Berger and Luckmann 2003). But even if social reality in general and the consequent specific identifications are always subjectively constructed, this does not imply that identifications as ‘we’ and ‘others’ cannot rise to the level of great importance – or even become a matter of death or life – for the individuals involved.

39. In his diachronic analysis of this region, Nugent (2007) showed how its transborder quality has always been a decisive historical feature for its inhabitants.

40. Given the record of ethnic clashes in modern Africa, this seems extraordinary, and all the more so as there was a concerted policy to discriminate against the Diola – virtually all Diola have such experiences to relate.

41. The four (fluid) markers for identification identified thus far include the following: (1) place of origin – marked by the *quartiers*’ oral history of the origin of ancestors; (2) common cultural events such as rituals – which the whole neighbourhood usually attends or follows; (3) common suffering – grievances caused by livelihood, historical geopolitics, the current conflict and so on; and (4) identification imposed by outsiders that assigns someone to a particular ethnic or regional group such as the Diola and later the Casamançais.

42. Actually the hypothesis is that performance is the point where *Identifizierung* – interpersonal identification marking (being identifiable due to markers) – and *Identifikation* – intrapersonal self-identification (identifying oneself with markers) – can occur (Leary 2003). The relation and interaction between *Identifizierung* and *Identifikation*, in a dialectical relation with imposed social restrictions, is decisive for individuals’ flexibility to choose, alter and switch identification.

43. While such an opinion can be accepted as valid, its propagated qualities have to be differentiated: even though these markers are often explicitly called traditions, they nevertheless are flexible and fluid (cf. de Jong 2002).

44. The analysis of diasporas evidently helps to answer certain questions of nation-building. Is it possible for individuals to live in a certain nation-state and yet retain different loyalties? When does the prioritized national identification become relevant to such an extent that it becomes problematic for those who do not accept it? Which circumstances favour a diaspora’s upholding of its status instead of assimilating?

45. To provide another example relative to the Diaspora from which the word originates: if one had considered the different ethnic or clan-based identifications in Ethiopia to assess the alternatives of individuals and predict possible conflict lines and alliances in the
1980s and 1990s, one would have been surprised to find that the exit option for some individuals was to claim an identity enabling them to immigrate to Israel (Abbink 1990). Specifically, the Falasha claimed to belong to Israel tribes that have been considered ‘lost’ because the Bible does not mention them after the Babylonian captivity. The interesting twist concluding this chapter is that they were able to pursue their exit option by referring to the original Diaspora narrative.

References


