

*Chapter 4*

## 1970–71

### Transition to Western Multilateralism



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**ILLUSTRATION 4:** The representatives of the Six at the first EPC foreign ministers' meeting in Munich on 19 November 1970. From left to right: State Secretary Mario Pedini (Italy) and foreign ministers Maurice Schumann (France), Gaston Thorn (Luxembourg), Pierre Harmel (Belgium), Joseph Luns (The Netherlands) and Walter Scheel (FRG).

Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, B 145 Bild-00107702,  
Photographer: Lothar Schaack.

[I]f the GDR showed the co-operation needed for the achievement of a satisfactory Berlin agreement, the Federal Government would regard this as a sufficient sign of grace to meet their earlier requirement about progress of the inner-German relationship.

– State Secretary Frank to the Bonn Group, March 1971<sup>1</sup>

The CSE is a logical continuation of the policy that found its expression in the Moscow Treaty. The CSE will, regardless of the differences in the societies of the European states, determine the future of Europe for decades to come.

– Foreign Minister Scheel to Soviet Ambassador Falin, May 1971<sup>2</sup>

At a high-level Anglo-German meeting in December 1970, the Deputy Under Secretary of the FCO, Sir Thomas Brimelow, told his West German interlocutors that in his view the FRG held the keys to the CSCE: ‘The Federal Government were the judges on Berlin and were conducting the inner-German talks. All questions regarding a European security conference were therefore dependent on the Federal Government’s view.’<sup>3</sup> In identifying the potential for a West German lead within the West in CSCE matters, Sir Thomas was certainly not mistaken. As I will argue in this chapter, however, the consequences of this position in Bonn were twofold.

Firstly, when it came to the timing of the conference and using it to draw concessions from the East, the West Germans were no longer so eager as before to rise to the occasion. Once the attempts to continue to hold on to the linkage of inner-German talks with the CSCE in the autumn of 1970 had proved impractical in the face of French hostility, the Federal Republic gave up that objective without much resistance. A multilateral Western linkage focusing the attention on the Berlin talks, where the Soviet demands were countered by the positions of the three major Western Allies, was soon considered to be a better option than a strictly bilateral one. On the one hand, this decision, agreeing to transfer the main responsibility for the CSCE preconditions to the Three Powers and NATO in general, amounted to giving up part of the leverage on bilateral *Ostpolitik* which had originally been envisaged. But on the other hand, multilateralising the leverage to include the Allies also amplified its influence – as a member of the Alliance the FRG was able to achieve more than when acting alone.

Secondly, in the preparations of the CSCE agenda the potential of the West German lead was actually utilised. Here, in the interplay of NATO, EPC and the Bonn Group, the German discovery of the virtues of Western multilateralism was even more apparent than in the attempts to instrumentalise the conference for linkage purposes. At first, this lead was above all reflected in the mediating role the FRG assumed between the French and US extremes, trying to avoid confrontation within the West in order to

make multilateral cooperation work as effectively as possible. But gradually, the Federal Republic also began to make its presence felt in pushing through its own CSCE objectives as common Western positions.

## Following the French Lead on the Berlin Connection

As described in the preceding chapter, NATO had effectively given up the explicit precondition of completion of the inner-German talks before a CSCE in the Foreign Ministers' meeting in Brussels in December 1970. This did not escape the attention of the opposition in Bonn. At a meeting of the *Bundestag* Foreign Policy Committee in January 1971, the Parliamentary State Secretary of the *Auswärtiges Amt*, Karl Moersch, was pressed by CDU parliamentarians to define the government line on the preconditions for a CSCE. While Moersch made clear that a conclusion of the Berlin talks was needed before the conference, his evasive reference to continuing Alliance discussions on whether 'other on-going talks' included the inner-German negotiations was hardly convincing.<sup>4</sup>

Admittedly, in early 1971 some of the middle-rank CSCE experts in the *Auswärtiges Amt* still harboured hopes of getting acceptance for West German views regarding the inner-German precondition in the Alliance. Von Groll, for instance, pointed out that France continued to be the only exception among the NATO Allies – if the going got tough, all the others were likely to support the West German preference that a CSCE should not be convened before a conclusive stage in the inner-German negotiations had been reached.<sup>5</sup> Wolfgang Behrends, head of the NATO unit in the *Auswärtiges Amt*, seconded von Groll and argued that the 'moment of truth' in the Alliance would arrive only shortly before the conclusion of the Berlin negotiations. Since such a conclusion was not in sight, there was no need yet to change the West German view on the inner-German precondition.<sup>6</sup> Accordingly, von Groll assured a US embassy official in Bonn that the West Germans saw the 'other on-going talks' in exactly the same way as the US did, and would therefore be firm in holding on to the inner-German precondition in the upcoming Franco-West German summit.<sup>7</sup>

Yet the exact opposite occurred in Paris at the end of January 1971. As it turned out, the leading officials of the *Auswärtiges Amt* had already altered their views and had begun to align themselves with the French position. Shortly before the Franco-West German summit, Hans Ruete, the former Political Director who had just been appointed West German Ambassador in Paris, reported a persuasive argument used by Foreign Minister Schumann in their discussion. According to Schumann, focusing on the Berlin precondition alone, instead of presenting further prerequisites for

a CSCE, would be the best way to ensure Soviet readiness for concessions in the Berlin negotiations.<sup>8</sup>

This argument seemed to be convincing enough to the West Germans, for in the bilateral consultations in Paris there was no trace of the bitter disagreements witnessed in the NATO Foreign Ministers' meetings in Brussels less than two months earlier. As before, the Federal Republic and France agreed on the need for a satisfactory Berlin agreement before entering a security conference. In addition, however, Brandt and Scheel both pledged to their French colleagues that the FRG would no longer insist on inner-German progress as a separate precondition for the multilateral preparations of a CSCE. The Chancellor as well as the Foreign Minister now argued that a Berlin agreement would already necessarily imply a partial normalisation of the inner-German relationship. Therefore, the Federal Government considered the conclusion of the Berlin negotiations to be sufficient – as soon as that had been achieved, multilateral preparations of the CSCE could be opened.<sup>9</sup>

Immediately after the Franco-West German summit, this line was the subject of a long debate in the *Auswärtiges Amt* CSCE working group.<sup>10</sup> Subsequently, official instructions on this new position of focusing exclusively on the Berlin precondition were circulated to West German embassies in February. From then on, the standard West German line was that since a result in the Berlin negotiations by definition had to include a certain amount of progress in the negotiations between the two German states, no other preconditions for entering the CSCE preparations were necessary.<sup>11</sup> Thus, forced to withdraw his previous assurances, von Groll admitted to his contact at the US embassy in Bonn that after the Brandt-Pompidou meeting in January, the FRG had 'undergone some shift towards the French position' in this matter. While the Federal Republic remained committed to maintaining a satisfactory Berlin agreement as a precondition, a 'de-emphasis of other prerequisites' was now favoured.<sup>12</sup>

This French-inspired change in the West German approach also became apparent during Foreign Minister Scheel's visit to the United States in February 1971. In Washington, Scheel told Rogers that the FRG wanted to concentrate on the Berlin precondition, because firstly, a Berlin agreement would also contain elements of improvement of the inner-German relationship, and secondly, confronting the Soviet Union with further preconditions would weaken the link between Berlin and the CSCE.<sup>13</sup> In an adjoining discussion, Berndt von Staden openly told his State Department colleague that Scheel had been convinced by Schumann of this view. Echoing French tones, the West Germans now stressed that 'if the linkage which NATO established between a Berlin agreement and a CES was to be effective, then it was better to make Berlin the one and only precondition for a CES, and not

suggest to the Soviets that other unspecified pre-conditions exist[ed]'.<sup>14</sup> In the West German memorandum of the discussion, this view presented to the Americans was explicitly referred to as 'French argumentation'.<sup>15</sup>

Whether this French argumentation on the Berlin precondition was going to prove fruitful was by no means certain during the early spring of 1971. On the contrary, the hostility of the Soviet Union to the stricter formulation of the Berlin precondition agreed on in the NATO communiqué in December 1970 was obvious – Moscow launched a broad diplomatic offensive in NATO capitals against it.<sup>16</sup> In the *Auswärtiges Amt* this Soviet criticism was considered to be unjustified. In the view of the officials in Bonn, the linkage of Berlin with the CSCE was not a new precondition invented at the December ministerial, as Moscow seemed to imply – it had merely been formulated more precisely than before.<sup>17</sup> The German Foreign Ministry concluded that the main motive behind the Soviet criticism appeared to be the attempt to sow dissension within the Alliance by approaching individual NATO members differently, and particularly to win over the French as a separate partner.<sup>18</sup> All the same, on the basis of the evidence at hand around January and February 1971, the Soviet Union seemed anything but willing to make concessions on Berlin in return for a CSCE.

The swift West German adaptation to the French line and the voluntary departure from the priority previously given to the inner-German precondition was a major surprise to the Allies. Even the British officials, although constantly confirming their preparedness to be guided by the West Germans in this matter, were perplexed by their sudden change of direction. As Rodric Braithwaite from the FCO put it to the US Ambassador in London, they were 'prepared to let Germans take lead in setting or not setting progress in inner-German talks as precondition for multilateral East-West discussions, but British want to make sure Germans know where they are going if they in fact are prepared to ease up on this precondition.'<sup>19</sup> Moreover, US and UK officials suspected that the U-turn in Bonn might have been partly a result of a gross overestimate of the extent of French pressure. The US Ambassador in Bonn reported the British belief that 'the Germans went unnecessarily far to meet French desires on this point'.<sup>20</sup>

In any case, by March 1971 at the latest the West German shift was already complete and irreversible. And it had direct implications for Western policy, making the convening of the security conference more imminent. In an EPC meeting in the beginning of March, the Six agreed that the exclusive concentration on the Berlin precondition had an obvious flipside. As a result, as soon as the Berlin talks were concluded, it would be next to impossible to avoid going to Helsinki.<sup>21</sup> The US NATO Ambassador expressed his concern about this new, automatic element: once a

Berlin agreement was in place, he said, 'I see little reason to believe we can avoid almost immediate Alliance movement to multilateral exploratory talks with the East.'<sup>22</sup>

Nevertheless, although the West Germans had given up the inner-German precondition relatively easily, they were determined to hold on to the need to complete the Berlin negotiations before the CSCE preparations could begin. The *Auswärtiges Amt* was highly sensitive, at times perhaps also overreacting, even to the smallest of indications of any of the Allies – particularly the French – distancing themselves from this position.<sup>23</sup> In a Bonn Group meeting in March 1971, van Well strongly opposed any discussion in NATO about a 'weakening or abandoning of the linkage' of Berlin with the CSCE as harmful for the further course of the Berlin negotiations.<sup>24</sup> In response, all of the Three Powers reconfirmed their commitment to the Berlin precondition.<sup>25</sup> As it turned out, French and Belgian ideas voiced in the NATO discussion, rather than suggesting abandoning the Berlin precondition altogether, had been aiming to make the Berlin precondition 'operative' and to encourage the Soviet Union to make concessions in the stagnated Berlin talks – something that was certainly not against West German interests.<sup>26</sup>

But if the perceived threat to the Berlin precondition from within the Alliance was, at least for the time being, a false alarm, there was a genuine one coming from Moscow. As a sequel to the *démarches* distributed in Western capitals at the end of 1970, in March 1971 another round of Soviet approaches followed. This time, the Soviet Union called for immediate practical steps towards the CSCE and accused 'certain countries' of trying to postpone the conference indefinitely with their preconditions.<sup>27</sup> Having received the memorandum from the Soviet *Chargé d'Affaires* in Bonn, State Secretary Frank pointed out to him that the position of the Federal Republic remained very clear. As soon as the Berlin negotiations were concluded, the road to convening a CSCE would be open.<sup>28</sup> However, the *Auswärtiges Amt* saw the Soviet memorandum as posing new and dangerous challenges to the maintenance of this position. On the one hand, the Soviet Union appeared to be trying to multilateralise the CSCE preparations through the back door, so to speak, by encouraging 'multiple bilateral' talks in Helsinki already before a completed Berlin agreement. On the other hand, the Soviet memorandum was seen as an attempt to reverse the linkage imposed by NATO – suggesting in turn that a Berlin agreement would only come about after ratification of the FRG's Eastern Treaties and the convening of a CSCE.<sup>29</sup> As it turned out, the *Auswärtiges Amt* was correct in this estimate – this kind of 'reverse linkage' was precisely what the Soviet Union introduced in the autumn of 1971.<sup>30</sup>

## Defending the Berlin Precondition in Lisbon

Faced with the new Soviet threats, the FRG approached the preparations of the following meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in Lisbon in June 1971 with increased determination to defend the Berlin precondition – and that condition alone. In a joint position paper of the *Auswärtiges Amt* and the Chancellery in March 1971, the Federal Government confirmed its preparedness to enter multilateral preparations of a CSCE as soon as the Berlin negotiations had been concluded. If the issue was to be raised in the NATO communiqué text in Lisbon, the FRG could live with deleting the previous references to ‘ongoing talks’ completely. But one red line was clear: under no circumstances would the Federal Republic agree to remove or weaken the Berlin precondition.<sup>31</sup> In a *Bundestag* debate on 26 March, Parliamentary State Secretary Moersch presented this line, marking the first time the government publicly declared that it was ready to enter CSCE preparations immediately after the Berlin Agreement had been concluded. In response, the Christian Democrats demanded further explanation from the government for this sudden ‘reduction to the minimum’ of preconditions – if the government had changed its policy, it should be openly discussed in the Foreign Policy Committee as well as in the plenary sessions of the *Bundestag*.<sup>32</sup>

The policy had indeed been changed for good. It was not to be reversed, not even when allies explicitly offered the possibility of doing so to the West Germans, as happened during the visit of the British Prime Minister Edward Heath to Bonn in April. In a meeting of the delegations, Sir Thomas Brimelow told Walter Gehlhoff, the Deputy Political Director of the *Auswärtiges Amt*, that it was up to the West Germans to decide whether they wanted to include the ‘other on-going talks’ as preconditions for the CSCE in the upcoming Lisbon communiqué. Either way, the UK was prepared to follow Bonn’s lead. After a brief consultation with Chancellor Brandt, Gehlhoff replied that a satisfactory Berlin agreement was sufficient – in the view of the Federal Government no other preconditions for a CSCE were needed.<sup>33</sup>

Not all the Allies were happy about this change of position. The Dutch in particular would have preferred to see the inner-German precondition for a CSCE maintained.<sup>34</sup> The United States was also against changing the language of the December 1970 communiqué, including the intentionally imprecise reference to ‘progress in other on-going talks’.<sup>35</sup> But, since the inner-German negotiations were for good reason considered to involve above all German interests, a British embassy official in Bonn spoke for most of the NATO members when he declared at a quadripartite meeting in April 1971 that his government was ‘prepared to be guided by the FRG

and would not take a tougher position than the FRG themselves' in this matter.<sup>36</sup> In May, the US was also coming round to this view.<sup>37</sup>

In May 1971, the West Germans presented their position coherently in all of the frameworks of Western cooperation. The German NATO mission was instructed to underscore that in order to emphasise the link between the CSCE and Berlin, the 'other on-going talks' should no longer be mentioned in the Lisbon communiqué.<sup>38</sup> In Paris, at a Franco-West German meeting on the level of Political Directors, von Staden confirmed that the FRG would be content with the conclusion of the Berlin talks as the only precondition for a CSCE. The additional 'escape clause' suggested by the West Germans in NATO ('barring unfavourable developments in other relevant fields') had only been inserted to please the US and the UK.<sup>39</sup> This West German position of focusing exclusively on the Berlin precondition was repeated at the EPC meeting of the Ten.<sup>40</sup> Behind the scenes, some of the officials responsible for the CSCE in the *Auswärtiges Amt* continued to voice views critical of dropping the 'on-going talks', but in the end had no choice but to accept the views of their superiors.<sup>41</sup>

Meanwhile, however, the French showed further signs of wavering. During his visit to Moscow on 7 May 1971, Foreign Minister Schumann did precisely what the West Germans had feared after the March démarches of the Soviet Union – agreed to the idea of holding 'multiple bilateral' talks in Helsinki already prior to a conclusion of the Berlin negotiations.<sup>42</sup> In response, at an EPC meeting of the Six in mid-May, Scheel strongly emphasised the importance of getting the timing of the East–West multilateralisation right. Scheel warned against 'experimenting' with it, since that could only weaken the connection between the Berlin talks and the CSCE preparations.<sup>43</sup> Nevertheless, on 26 May the French representative in the NATO Political Committee, apparently following instructions directly from President Pompidou, declared that the French would firmly oppose a repetition of the Berlin precondition in Lisbon in the way it had been formulated in the previous ministerial communiqué.<sup>44</sup> Indeed, as the West German NATO Ambassador pointed out in his preview of the June 1971 Lisbon meeting of the Foreign Ministers, the views within the Alliance on this matter were increasingly diverging – with the French as well as the Scandinavians running out of patience in their desire to open multilateral preparations of the CSCE as soon as possible.<sup>45</sup>

This momentum was obviously also recognised in Moscow. Only a week before the NATO Foreign Ministers met in the Portuguese capital, Valentin Falin, the new Soviet Ambassador in Bonn, delivered yet another memorandum on the CSCE, criticising attempts to link 'questions of different character and dimension' and arguing instead for a parallel approach on the CSCE and Berlin.<sup>46</sup> Replying to Ambassador Falin, State Secretary

Frank refused to accept the assertion that the questions at hand were of a different character, and again emphasised the nature of the Berlin negotiations as a test. As soon as this test was passed, the road would be free for the CSCE. Frank assured Falin that once a Berlin settlement was concluded, the FRG would not establish any further obstacles to a security conference. Foreign Minister Scheel went even further and confided to Falin that in his view after a Berlin agreement the dynamics towards a CSCE would be so strong that nobody would be able to slow it down any longer.<sup>47</sup>

These statements made by Frank and Scheel to Falin on the eve of the Lisbon meeting reflected the increasingly pessimistic views in Bonn about the further leverage the West could hope to have on the Soviet Union and the GDR with the help of the CSCE.<sup>48</sup> Another good example of this view is the working paper the influential German political scientist Richard Löwenthal sent to the Chancellery in early May 1971. In his paper, Löwenthal stressed the need for the Federal Republic to regain the initiative in East–West détente, especially in *Deutschlandpolitik*. Interestingly, however, Löwenthal argued that the CSCE was a particularly unsuitable bargaining chip in this respect, since there were hardly any means to make a conference dependent on a preceding inner-German arrangement.<sup>49</sup> By the late spring of 1971, this sentiment was widespread in the *Auswärtiges Amt*. The Western support for the necessity of an inner-German *modus vivendi* before a CSCE had already been lost for good. As a matter of fact, there was no longer even a Western consensus on the Berlin precondition. But as soon as a Berlin arrangement was achieved, it would be impossible to stop the dynamics of the CSCE – regardless of the situation in the inner-German negotiations at that time.<sup>50</sup>

Since the Berlin negotiations appeared to be the only issue left where the CSCE leverage held any promise for functioning as a bargaining tool, the West Germans considered it extremely important to find common ground with the French on it prior to the Lisbon meeting. At the end of May, Scheel and Schumann met in Bonn, trying bilaterally to come up with a suitable Berlin formulation for the NATO communiqué.<sup>51</sup> These last-minute efforts produced no results, and the quadripartite meeting in Lisbon preceding the NATO meeting was anything but cordial on this issue. The French Foreign Minister insisted on a clearly softer formulation on the Berlin–CSCE linkage than that of any of his three colleagues, arguing that instead of being presented with strict and explicit conditions, the Soviet Union should be encouraged by a more forthcoming language to allow further progress in the Berlin talks. After a lengthy debate, the four Foreign Ministers finally agreed on a compromise formulation, in which they

hope[d] that before their next meeting, the quadripartite talks on Berlin [would] have reached a successful conclusion and that multilateral conversations intended to lead to a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [might] then be undertaken.<sup>52</sup>

This compromise, arguably less confrontational than before but nonetheless maintaining the Berlin precondition, was adopted unaltered in the communiqué issued by the NATO Foreign Ministers.<sup>53</sup> In sum, then, the Lisbon meeting confirmed the change in the Western approach to the preconditions for a CSCE, which had been in the making throughout the spring of 1971. In the end, even the United States agreed to give up the ‘other on-going talks’, which were no longer mentioned in the Lisbon communiqué at all.<sup>54</sup> Neither did the communiqué contain any form of the ‘escape clause’ which had been discussed by the Allies a few weeks earlier. A successful conclusion of the Berlin talks was now officially laid down as the only remaining condition set by the Alliance for the opening of multilateral CSCE preparations.

Seen from a purely West German perspective, this change between two successive NATO ministerial meetings could hardly have been more remarkable. Whereas in December 1970 the FRG strongly demanded the inclusion of ‘progress in inner-German talks’ as a precondition for the multilateralisation of the CSCE, during the preparations of the Lisbon meeting of June 1971 the West Germans were just as decisively against it as the French. In an internal analysis of the Lisbon communiqué, the *Auswärtiges Amt* was prepared to ‘fully agree’ with the main result of the meeting in this respect. As soon as the Berlin talks were concluded, the CSCE preparations would automatically follow.<sup>55</sup> Presenting the Lisbon results to the *Bundestag* Foreign Policy Committee, State Secretary Frank argued that the previous ‘escalation of preconditions’ had indirectly hurt West German interests. It was better to concentrate on the only connection that truly mattered for the Federal Republic – that between the Berlin negotiations and the CSCE.<sup>56</sup>

Nevertheless, it seems that in addition to a genuine satisfaction with this new position, concern about Alliance dynamics had continued to influence the West Germans’ behaviour. Immediately after Lisbon, Günther van Well, the Deputy Political Director of the *Auswärtiges Amt*, admitted to his US interlocutor in Bonn that ‘the [West] German posture during the whole exercise of drafting the communiqué had been heavily influenced by the need, as the [West] Germans saw it, to avoid a [West] German confrontation with the French’.<sup>57</sup>

## Divergent Interpretations of the ‘Successful Conclusion’

In the immediate aftermath of the Lisbon meeting, the impact of the NATO communiqué appeared to be far from what had been intended. Western reports from the quadripartite negotiations on Berlin on 9 June 1971 recorded a decisive hardening of Soviet positions. State Secretary Frank brought this up in his meeting with Ambassador Falin. The West had kept its side of the bargain, Frank told Falin, by formulating the link between the Berlin talks and the CSCE in positive terms, as well as by dropping references to the ‘on-going talks’ from the communiqué. With their current behaviour, Frank argued, the Soviets were only providing ammunition for the critics of this softer Western policy, and thus running the risk of missing a great opportunity to improve East–West relations.<sup>58</sup>

In addition to being worried about the possible failure of the Berlin talks, the West Germans were simultaneously concerned about the interpretation of what would constitute the successful conclusion of those talks, and thus the crucial threshold for the opening of the multilateral CSCE preparations. The Four Powers responsible for Berlin and Germany as a whole had already agreed that the Berlin Agreement would eventually come about in three stages: first the quadripartite ‘umbrella’ agreement, then supplementary negotiations on the Berlin question between the two German states, and only after their conclusion the signature of the final quadripartite protocol. But as van Well told his Bonn Group colleagues at the end of June 1971, Chancellor Brandt was increasingly worried that the Soviets would try to exploit the first stage as a sufficient signal for multilateral conference preparations. ‘If this were to be the case, much of the FRG leverage on the GDR for successful negotiations on implementing details on access to inner-Berlin matters might be dissipated because of the GDR’s gain in international status through participation in multilateral CES preparations.’ Therefore the West Germans were seeking support from the Bonn Group for their view that the multilateral CSCE preparations should begin only once the final quadripartite Berlin protocol had been signed by the Foreign Ministers.<sup>59</sup> Interestingly, this statement implied that, although the direct linkage of the CSCE with bilateral inner-German negotiations on a *modus vivendi* had been given up, there were still some hopes attached to using the CSCE leverage in the inner-German negotiations on the implementation of the Berlin Agreement.

The United States fully agreed with this West German view, and pledged to support it in the Bonn Group as well as in NATO. George Vest from the US mission to NATO also argued that the West Germans should be encouraged to move quickly in order to convince other Allies:

Once first stage of a Berlin agreement is achieved, many of our allies, led by France, will argue that Berlin precondition has been satisfied. ... If FRG tries only then to introduce apparently 'new' precondition of inner-German talks on Berlin it will be looked upon by allies as unacceptable for both policy and public relations reasons. ... FRG must take the lead starting with France. The sooner the Germans begin to sell their position to the allies the better, since a long-term educational process will be required.<sup>60</sup>

For the time being, it seemed that the French were prepared to follow the West German lead in this matter. The US Ambassador in Paris reported that the Deputy Political Director of the *Quai d'Orsay* had 'categorically reaffirmed that GoF [the French Government] will not oppose Brandt by pressing for multilateral CES preparations before entire Berlin accord wrapped up'.<sup>61</sup>

Against this backdrop, the FRG responded to the Soviet memorandum Falin had delivered in May. In their response in late July 1971, the West Germans once again made clear that they considered the satisfactory result of the Berlin negotiations to be the decisive test case for the viability of a CSCE. If East Berlin were to cooperate in bringing about a Berlin agreement, the FRG would consider this as a contribution to inner-German détente, and the multilateral CSCE preparations could be started.<sup>62</sup> However, despite the earlier fears about Soviet interpretations, the statement Allardt gave to Gromyko in Moscow did not explicitly define the West German view of a 'satisfactory conclusion' of the Berlin talks. Internally in Bonn, by contrast, the distinction between the various stages of the Berlin Agreement was given considerable attention. As von Staden wrote to Frank in mid-August, neither the ratification of the Eastern Treaties nor the multilateralisation of CSCE preparations could be started before the second and third stage of the Berlin talks were completed.<sup>63</sup>

All this talk about conflicting definitions was academic so long as none of the stages of the Berlin Agreement had been achieved. In this respect, the situation changed completely on 3 September 1971, when the Ambassadors of the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union signed the quadripartite Berlin Agreement. Although the inner-German Berlin Agreement and the subsequent final Four-Power protocol were still pending, the 'moment of truth' for West German CSCE policy had clearly arrived. Only a few days after the signature of the quadripartite agreement, von Groll reported the latest French interpretation, according to which the completion of this first stage qualified as 'successful conclusion' of the Berlin talks.<sup>64</sup> The mood favouring an immediate start of the multilateral preparations of the CSCE was rapidly spreading in the Western Alliance. Nevertheless, when the Secretary General of NATO, Manlio Brosio, asked Brandt shortly after the Berlin Agreement whether it had any implications

for the CSCE multilateralisation, the West German Chancellor stressed that the FRG still considered the completion of all the three stages to be necessary first.<sup>65</sup>

Indeed, in the new situation brought about by the quadripartite Berlin Agreement, the Brandt Government had a clear-cut 'roadmap' for the preferred foreign-policy timetable for the near future. At first, the inner-German negotiations on the Berlin arrangements were to be concluded, followed by the signature of the final quadripartite protocol on Berlin. It was only after that that the ratification procedure of the Eastern Treaties and the multilateral CSCE preparations could be opened simultaneously. Next on the list was the completion of an inner-German *modus vivendi*, which was then to be followed by UN membership of both German states and the convening of the CSCE proper.<sup>66</sup> As can be seen in this plan, the distinction between conference preparations and the actual conference was gaining in importance for the decision-makers in Bonn. From September 1971 onwards the discussion about remaining preconditions for a security conference – within the West as well as between East and West – was beginning to diverge onto two different paths along these lines: multilateral CSCE preparations on the one hand, the CSCE proper on the other.

Meanwhile, however, Western preparations for the substance of the CSCE had accelerated dramatically. Fresh openings in the NATO discussion on the possible CSCE agenda, spurred and supplemented by the introduction of the European Political Cooperation as a completely new Western mechanism for CSCE deliberations, had helped the West gain the initiative in the CSCE dialogue with the East. The Federal Republic played an important role in this increasingly active Western framework. Long before the CSCE proper, the West Germans were beginning to discover the CSCE preparations within the West as a suitable means for multilateralising *Ostpolitik*.

## Nothing Quiet on the Western Front

As has been argued in the previous chapter, for almost a year until the autumn of 1970 the Western preparations for the substance of a security conference had been somewhat half-hearted. Since October 1969, NATO had no longer proactively drafted Alliance positions on possible issues to be negotiated between East and West. Although potential topics had been listed in the semi-annual Foreign Ministers' meetings, NATO's approach had been predominantly reactive – in essence only responding to initiatives from the East. The change that occurred in this respect within a few weeks in October to November 1970 was remarkable, bringing in a

completely new level of activity and dynamism to Western planning and preparations for the CSCE – in NATO, as before, but now also in the new foreign-policy coordination framework of the EC Six. Simultaneously, the *Auswärtiges Amt* in Bonn stepped up its own efforts for more efficient internal coordination.

First of all, there was new movement in NATO. In mid-October 1970, as part of the preparations for the next Foreign Ministers' meeting in December, the Council commissioned a new report from the Political Committee. This time, the report was to analyse the essential questions for the state of East–West relations, thus broadening the scope from merely listing potential issues and calling for their more detailed elaboration.<sup>67</sup> After a month of intensive negotiations in Brussels, the Senior Political Committee released the final product on 13 November 1970. This report on 'East–West negotiations' was an important qualitative step forward in the NATO preparations for a CSCE. Although still structured as an analysis of and reaction to various Warsaw Pact proposals, the document was more than the preliminary review it claimed to be – in fact it already significantly outlined future Western thinking on the CSCE agenda. The report divided the possible substance of the conference into four groups of topics: (1) principles which should govern relations between states, including the renunciation of force; (2) economic, scientific and technical East–West cooperation; (3) cultural relations and freer movement of people, ideas and information; and (4) confidence-building measures. A significant part of the report was also devoted to considerations of procedural aspects of a conference as well as to the possible East–West machinery following a CSCE.<sup>68</sup>

In the intra-Alliance consultations preparing this report, the West Germans still took a fairly reserved role. It was the United States that most firmly demanded a clear agenda for the conference before any procedural decisions were made. As it turned out, the structure of the SPC report reflected by and large the proposals the US made at the beginning of the consultations.<sup>69</sup>

The most controversial issue in the SPC discussions was that of the principles governing relations between states. This was also precisely the area where a number of quintessential West German interests were at stake – the section on 'principles' in the report included several references to the German question, GDR participation and the formulations on renunciation of force in the Moscow Treaty. It is all the more surprising, then, that in the official records there are practically no signs of direct intervention in this field from the West German delegation.<sup>70</sup> Behind the scenes, however, the FRG must have been defending its *Deutschlandpolitik* views. One indication of the success of influencing Allied positions indirectly is the fact that the report gave particular attention, as a specific consideration to be taken into account by the Allies, to 'the political objective of the Federal Republic of

Germany to work for a state of peace in Europe in which the German nation will recover its unity in free self-determination'.<sup>71</sup> This was exactly the same formulation used in the 'letter on German unity' the West Germans had delivered to the Soviets at the signature of the Moscow Treaty.<sup>72</sup>

The second part of the report, covering possible areas of East–West cooperation, was the only area to which the FRG had formally contributed. The West German working paper on the economic aspects of a CSCE welcomed in principle the idea of putting economic East–West cooperation on the conference agenda, especially if this facilitated true economic cooperation rather than a mere exchange of goods. But the basic tone of the West German contribution was cautious, warning of Soviet-led disturbance to the further economic integration of Western Europe if subjects under the responsibility of the EC were dealt with in an East–West conference. Some of these concerns were also reflected in the Senior Political Committee report, including the West German preference to include the United Nations Economic Committee for Europe (ECE) in Geneva as an existing organisation competent to deal with economic East–West questions.<sup>73</sup>

As far as the 'freer movement' issues were concerned, the report underlined their potential as a Western position, going well beyond just an expansion of existing cultural exchange programmes. A discussion of this topic before and at a CSCE would 'put the Soviets on the defensive and focus public opinion on the closed nature of Communist regimes'. Essentially, the freer movement items were seen as a possible bargaining lever for the West, since 'by keeping up the pressure, the Allies may eventually obtain some meaningful concessions from the Soviets'.<sup>74</sup> For the time being, the West Germans saw no need to oppose this approach within NATO. But as will be argued below, this was to change, as the West Germans became convinced of the advantages of a less confrontational position towards the East in the CSCE context, particularly when it came to 'freer movement'.

In the November 1970 report of the SPC, the possibility of talking about confidence-building measures such as advance notification of military manoeuvres and exchange of observers in the CSCE framework was left open. But more importantly, mutual and balanced force reductions were beginning to be dealt with on a separate track from the CSCE. This development was certainly contrary to West German preferences. During the preparation of the report, the West Germans had continued to insist on MBFR being included in all forms of a CSCE. If the conference were to become merely a propaganda event laden with atmospherics but devoid of content, the risks contained would be 'incalculable'. In the West German view a suitable means to prevent that happening was to insist

on MBFR being discussed in all East–West preparatory conferences and expert meetings connected with the CSCE.<sup>75</sup> Against this background, the SPC report must have been a disappointment in Bonn.

But although still unsurpassed in importance, in the autumn of 1970 NATO was no longer the only show in town in Western CSCE preparations. Simultaneous with the revival of discussions in NATO, there had been a completely new initiative on the European level, as the European Political Cooperation of the six members of the EC started. The foundation document of this foreign policy coordination, the Davignon report, which was endorsed by the EC Foreign Ministers in late October 1970, did not explicitly list themes to be discussed by the EC members in this framework, but the CSCE was from the outset chosen as one of the test balloons of EPC consultations.<sup>76</sup>

Chancellor Brandt has been mentioned as the initiator of choosing the CSCE as a topic to be covered by the EPC.<sup>77</sup> It seems more probable, however, that the initiative came from the Belgians, with active French support.<sup>78</sup> In any case, on the working level in the *Auswärtiges Amt* first reactions to the inclusion of the CSCE on the EPC agenda were highly sceptical, pointing out the well-established technical mechanisms within NATO to deal with CSCE matters. Firstly, NATO consultations on the CSCE were seen as a valuable political adhesive within the Alliance, since the CSCE had finally provided a reason for the French to cooperate with other NATO members. Moreover, a joint approach of the EC members on the CSCE could raise suspicions in Washington, something the FRG wanted to avoid, particularly in the immediate aftermath of the Moscow Treaty. Therefore, the *Auswärtiges Amt* unit responsible for the CSCE recommended that political EC consultations on the security conference should be restricted to regular mutual briefings – harmonisation and agreement on joint positions should be left to NATO as before.<sup>79</sup> While this level of resistance was not completely shared by the higher ranks of the Foreign Ministry, the potential of the EPC to spawn disagreements between Paris and Washington was certainly a valid observation. As will be argued below, the Germans later often found themselves as mediators between the French and the US as a result.

Since the FRG held the rotating six-month presidency of the EC, the first Foreign Ministers' EPC meeting took place in Munich on 19 November 1970, partly also in the presence of the European Commission. Foreign Minister Scheel, hosting the meeting, argued that there were clearly going to be questions on the CSCE agenda that were part of the EC's remit – in those issues the inclusion of the EC in preparations and actual negotiations of the CSCE was essential. In this respect, the division of labour with NATO was clear. In Scheel's view it was important to complement the on-going discussions within NATO with EPC preparations on economic

cooperation.<sup>80</sup> With Scheel's colleagues agreeing with this view, at its initial meeting the EPC mechanism did not yet present itself as competition for NATO. But once out of the starting blocks, the EPC was to gain in importance rapidly during the following spring.

Coinciding with and in part resulting from the increased NATO and EPC activity, preparations for a CSCE were also stepped up in Bonn. The *Auswärtiges Amt* working group on the CSCE was reconvened on 24 November 1970 – over a year since the preceding working group had finished its job – to coordinate German positions and instructions on the security conference for discussions in NATO as well as in the EPC.<sup>81</sup> Meeting approximately once a month, this working group became an important hub of the CSCE policy-making in the *Auswärtiges Amt*. In addition to the reconstitution of the working group, the growing attention given to the CSCE in Bonn at this stage is also reflected in the amount of material to be found in the archives of the *Auswärtiges Amt*. The number of detailed background papers on the conference and country-specific analyses of CSCE positions provided by West German embassies began to pile up significantly in the late autumn of 1970.<sup>82</sup> The enthusiasm of individual officials was also a significant factor contributing to the rising West German influence in Western preparations. Particularly, the promotion of Götz von Groll to head the unit responsible for the CSCE in the *Auswärtiges Amt* in late 1970 was to have important ramifications.<sup>83</sup>

Preparing the first meeting of the CSCE working group, von Groll toyed with the idea of supporting the emerging EPC work by convening representatives of the Six in Bonn for regular round table discussions on the CSCE.<sup>84</sup> This suggestion, in effect copying the existing Bonn Group mechanism and expanding it for the use of the EC Six in the CSCE context, was never followed up. But what the West Germans did was to try to engage the Bonn Group more efficiently with CSCE matters. On 19 November 1970, the FRG proposal to arrive at a joint Bonn Group position on the relationship of the German question and the CSCE was discussed in the group at length.<sup>85</sup> Despite initial doubts about allied reactions to this kind of separate discussion of a key issue of the CSCE, the Bonn Group took up the West German initiative – and only a few weeks later, the group issued its first study on the CSCE and the GDR.

It was against this backdrop of rapidly expanding CSCE activity in all Western fora that the Finnish Government stepped in with a new proposal. In their memorandum delivered to the potential CSCE participants on 24 November 1970, the Finns suggested that heads of the diplomatic missions in Helsinki could open bilateral or possibly even multilateral consultations with the Finnish Foreign Ministry – building on the idea of a diplomatic 'tea party' raised by the Belgians in the preceding spring.<sup>86</sup>

Timed shortly before the NATO Foreign Ministers' autumn meeting, the Finnish move sparked a lively debate in the NATO Council. The delegations agreed, however, that the Finnish memorandum should not be allowed to influence the preparations for the Foreign Ministers' meeting.<sup>87</sup> This reflected the increasing independence of the Western deliberations. The NATO approach on the conference was becoming more proactive, less reactive. And for the time being, in spite of the opening up of the EPC track, it was still the NATO framework that truly mattered as the dominant Western forum for CSCE preparations.

However, in the autumn of 1970 Bonn was not yet making full use of this forum. Although the West German NATO delegation in mid-November informed the Allies that the FRG was preparing a working paper on cultural relations in East–West negotiations,<sup>88</sup> the West German proposal for the text of the upcoming ministerial declaration revealed the continued one-sidedness of the approach of the Federal Republic. In this proposal, the accent was again heavily on MBFR.<sup>89</sup> Accompanying instructions from Bonn to the NATO delegation maintained the agreed German position. MBFR was a self-contained topic that could be addressed independently of a CSCE, but every form of a CSCE, including multilateral preparations for a conference, should also address the topic of MBFR.<sup>90</sup> In the NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting in Brussels in December 1970, Scheel brought the West German view to a point: 'MBFR without CSCE yes! – CSCE without MBFR no!'<sup>91</sup> At least in the West German analysis of the discussions, Scheel's colleagues concurred, and the principle of MBFR as a necessary agenda item of a CSCE continued to be accepted by the Allies.<sup>92</sup> The ministerial communiqué, however, did not explicitly spell out such an agreement. While it did include paragraphs on MBFR as a separate agenda item, the sections more directly related to the substance of a possible CSCE left force reductions unmentioned:

Ministers recalled that any genuine and lasting improvement in East–West relations in Europe must be based on the respect of the following principles which should govern relations between states and which would be included among the points to be explored: sovereign equality, political independence and territorial integrity of each European state; non-interference and non-intervention in the internal affairs of any state, regardless of its political or social system; and the right of the people of each European state to shape their own destinies free of external constraint. ... In the field of international co-operation, the contacts ... might provide an opportunity to consider ways and means of ensuring closer co-operation between interested countries on the cultural, economic, technical and scientific levels, and on the question of human environment. Ministers reaffirmed that the freer movement of people, ideas and information is an essential element for the development of such co-operation.<sup>93</sup>

This text made it apparent that the decision-makers in Bonn had sidelined themselves with their almost exclusive focus on MBFR. On the whole broad range of potential issues for the CSCE agenda mentioned in the NATO communiqué, there had so far been hardly any genuine West German contribution to Western objectives and positions. But from early 1971 onwards, this slowly began to change. The West Germans started truly to discover the uses of Western multilateralism and the CSCE in pursuing their substantive interests. A careful combination and interplay of the NATO and EPC frameworks was the means to this end. At first, the main emphasis was in NATO.

### **Broadening the German Horizon in the NATO Framework**

Following up the Foreign Ministers' meeting in December 1970, the North Atlantic Council commissioned a new study from the Senior Political Committee on 13 January. This exercise dominated the work on political questions in NATO during the spring of 1971, sparking a series of negotiations in Brussels and finally resulting in a new report on substance and procedures of a CSCE in May.<sup>94</sup> As the discussion was opened in the Political Committee in late January, the West German delegation signalled its willingness to contribute particularly to the issues of cultural relations and freer movement, possibly also to the relationship between the FRG's bilateral Eastern treaties and a multilateral renunciation of force agreement.<sup>95</sup>

A few weeks later, the West German position was consolidated in instructions von Staden sent to the NATO mission. For the Federal Republic, MBFR was still the highest priority among issues to be addressed in a CSCE, but the *Auswärtiges Amt* now spiced up this position with a considerably broader view. Regarding the 'principles governing relations between states', Bonn highlighted the problematic effect any agreement on borders would have on the German question. Since the agreement in a CSCE on a renunciation of force and on respect of existing borders would carry the signatures of the Four Powers (US, UK, France and the Soviet Union) as well as both German states, it could easily be misunderstood as a substitute peace treaty on Germany – something the Federal Republic could not accept under any circumstances. Measures should also be taken to ensure that the Four Powers' responsibility for Berlin and Germany as a whole would not be endangered by a CSCE. Regarding the cooperation elements of a conference, von Staden saw good prospects for both economic and cultural cooperation as well as for negotiations on environmental questions. But referring to freer movement, von Staden

cautiously stressed the need to differentiate between concrete short-term steps and long-term objectives.<sup>96</sup> Based on von Staden's instructions, the West German NATO delegation delivered a working paper to the Allies on 12 February, outlining the West German position on the substance and procedures of possible East–West negotiations.<sup>97</sup>

Although the working paper also had 'procedures' in its title, at this stage the West Germans were already mainly interested in the substance of the conference. The West German representatives argued constantly that a CSCE should not be exhausted in discussions over long statements, but should truly aim at suggesting concrete measures to enhance security and cooperation in Europe.<sup>98</sup> This approach differed strikingly from that chosen by the French, who spent a considerable amount of effort in developing their three-stage conference model.<sup>99</sup> In Franco-West German consultations in March 1971, the West Germans held the view that procedural questions should be left in the background – what truly mattered was the agenda of the possible conference and a European security system.<sup>100</sup> If the initiative was not to be left to the Warsaw Pact, NATO should concentrate seriously on the conference agenda.

Accordingly, in February 1971 the FRG raised its commitment to the CSCE agenda preparations to a new level. In fact, the position presented by the West German delegation to NATO included several significant guidelines of the CSCE policy of the Federal Republic which began to take shape during the spring of 1971. First of all, as an element of consistency, there was continued West German insistence to hold on to MBFR as a key topic of a future CSCE. Not even the resistance increasingly voiced by the major Allies was enough to discourage the West Germans from demanding a place for force reductions on the CSCE agenda.<sup>101</sup> In Bonn, MBFR continued to be seen as the appropriate Western addition and counterweight to the Eastern initiative for a CSCE. More than any other topic, it was MBFR that could make the CSCE useful for Western détente policy.<sup>102</sup> But whereas this position was consistently repeated in the working-level meetings,<sup>103</sup> on the political level there were at first some visible contradictions in the West German line. When Brandt met Prime Minister Heath in April in Bonn, the West German Chancellor assured his British counterpart that the FRG was prepared to discuss MBFR in the CSCE framework, although this meant also including the neutral countries not directly affected by the troop reductions. But when the West German and British delegations met for a concluding plenary discussion, Defence Minister Helmut Schmidt openly disagreed with Brandt, arguing that MBFR was not a suitable topic for a CSCE.<sup>104</sup> For Schmidt, the main West German

advocate of MBFR, the force reductions were too important to be included in a CSCE – in his view MBFR deserved an exclusive forum.

In addition to MBFR, the Federal Republic was beginning to pay more attention to the elements on the possible CSCE agenda grouped under the heading ‘principles governing relations between states’. Those questions dealing with respect for or recognition of existing borders in Europe, as well as those touching on the status of Berlin and Germany as a whole, were studied particularly carefully in Bonn. The resulting stance was predominantly defensive in nature. As a sort of damage control, the West Germans tended to prefer a provisional approach, aiming at a CSCE focusing on a temporary *modus vivendi* on a European scale rather than on fixed principles of inter-state relations. The overarching goal was to avoid even the remotest possibility of having the CSCE results interpreted as a substitute peace treaty on Germany.<sup>105</sup>

In the NATO discussion, the most controversial question among the ‘principles’ was the handling of European borders.<sup>106</sup> By the end of April 1971, the French and the Americans were badly at loggerheads over the issue, with the US refusing to discuss borders in a CSCE at all. In order to avoid further confrontation in front of other NATO members, the FRG suggested an advance mediation of the positions in the Bonn Group.<sup>107</sup> The representatives of the US, the UK and France agreed with the FRG that a four-power split on this issue was damaging, and that a common position should be sought in a smaller circle.<sup>108</sup> In this context the arguably most fundamental element of the German approach to the CSCE, that of seeking consensus behind the scenes in order to avoid open confrontations, became apparent in two respects simultaneously – unnecessary conflicts were to be avoided within the West as well as between East and West. In the Bonn Group meeting in late April van Well presented the West German preference to seek agreement on difficult issues, such as the question of borders, with the Soviet Union and the GDR at an earlier exploratory stage rather than risking an open collision at the conference proper.<sup>109</sup> After the meeting, van Well instructed the West German NATO delegation to refrain from a discussion of the borders in the NATO framework until a common position of the Bonn Group had been found – this was a question that needed to be solved by the powers responsible for Berlin and Germany as a whole.<sup>110</sup>

On the other hand, the concern over quadripartite rights being undermined in the CSCE was balanced by the worry in the *Auswärtiges Amt* that the CSCE might actually strengthen the quadripartite rights over Germany too much, leading to a loss of sovereignty for the Federal Republic. The ‘full powers of a sovereign state in its internal and external affairs’,

assured for the FRG in the post-war arrangements, had to be defended also in the CSCE framework.<sup>111</sup> This concern over sovereignty was also the reason for West German reluctance to have the formulations on borders and on renunciation of force in the Moscow Treaty used as a model for the CSCE, as suggested by some of the NATO Allies. In the West German view, the treaties negotiated with the Soviet Union and Poland were based on a specific and unique bilateral situation, and the formulations as such were not suitable for pan-European consumption. This position was also spelled out in clear terms to the Allies in the NATO Council.<sup>112</sup>

In addition to the 'hard' issues covered in the principles governing relations between states, the FRG had also discovered a greater interest in the 'softer' questions concerning cooperation with the East in various fields, from economic to that of the environment.<sup>113</sup> What arose as the main interest of the FRG, however, was the topic of 'freer movement of people, ideas and information'. It was in this field that the cautious principle of avoiding East–West controversies and making gradual progress, a fundamental characteristic of West German CSCE policy, began to surface particularly clearly. This had been in the making for some time already. In November 1970, the *Auswärtiges Amt* had argued that the West should not insist too strongly on freer movement at the beginning of an East–West dialogue, in part because the West itself was not yet fully prepared to receive the 'people, ideas and information' from Eastern Europe without limitations.<sup>114</sup> Although the West Germans agreed with their allies that freer movement was an essential topic to be covered at a CSCE, they also underscored their view that the goal of a more liberal exchange between East and West could be achieved only very slowly.<sup>115</sup> In the early spring of 1971, the West Germans considered enhanced cultural cooperation to be the most appropriate way to address the question of freedom of movement.<sup>116</sup>

In von Staden's instructions to the West German NATO mission in February 1971 the gradual approach to the freedom of movement was stressed. This was not a topic in which quick results should be expected. Instead, patience was called for: 'The achievement of the free exchange of people, ideas and information with Eastern-European countries is our declared long-term objective.'<sup>117</sup> In the British analysis, the West German preference to combine cultural relations with freer movement was condemned as both 'muddled and complacent'.<sup>118</sup> The United States, for its part, was also worried by the FRG's desire to concentrate on cultural relations at the expense of freer movement.<sup>119</sup> This was part of a more general concern in Washington about the Alliance drifting into a 'hortatory conference devoid of substance'.<sup>120</sup> In the US analysis, the possible euphoria resulting from such a conference could be detrimental to the West, leading to high yields for the Soviet Union, and merely 'meaningless atmospher-

ics' for the West. In short, as one of Kissinger's key advisors wrote in May, the result would be a 'disaster'.<sup>121</sup>

The West Germans were not willing to enter a conference lacking in substance either. But their perspective on the conference was different. For the FRG the CSCE was a long-term process, in which objectives would be best achieved by a gradual step-by-step approach.<sup>122</sup> The freer movement questions were a case in point. In March, von Staden explained to his French colleague that the West Germans wanted to move carefully in the CSCE. It was essential to avoid ideological confrontations – instead, one should aim at limited but concrete steps forward.<sup>123</sup> Accordingly, in the NATO discussion based on competing French and US contributions, the *Auswärtiges Amt* sided with the French approach, aiming at the long-term goal of liberalising East–West contacts through gradual improvements in cultural cooperation. It was important not to raise suspicions in the Warsaw Pact of the West attempting to undermine their societies. This, in the West German view, was the case in the US proposal, which gave too much weight to propaganda by focusing on controversial elements such as travel restrictions and radio jamming.<sup>124</sup>

This budding controversy between the United States and the Federal Republic over the freedom of movement items had not yet fully materialised, as the Senior Political Committee concluded its consultations in May 1971 with the presentation of its report on 'substance and procedures of possible East–West negotiations'. This report, circulated on 17 May, was a significant update and expansion of the previous report of November 1970. On over fifty pages, this report gave a detailed account of the state of play in the CSCE preparations of NATO. Now the substance of a possible CSCE agenda was divided into six categories: (1) principles governing relations between states; (2) economic, scientific and technical cooperation; (3) cooperation to improve the human environment; (4) freer movement of people, ideas and information; (5) mutual and balanced force reductions; and (6) possible machinery for future East–West negotiations. In contrast to previous NATO reports on the CSCE preparations, the emphasis had now clearly moved to substance at the expense of procedure. In a number of issues, differences in opinion within the Alliance were already visible, since it had not been possible to achieve consensus in all agenda questions. On balanced force reductions, for example, the report merely referred to 'varying views' of member states on the relationship between MBFR and a CSCE.<sup>125</sup> This SPC report was presented to the NATO Foreign Ministers in their June meeting in Lisbon. The ministers instructed the SPC to continue its work, with the objective of achieving a unified view on the substance and procedures by the autumn of 1971.<sup>126</sup>

In a note circulated to West German embassies in late July, the *Auswärtiges Amt* affirmed that the FRG was fully behind the latest CSCE report of the SPC, having influenced the contents of the report significantly during its creation. The main positions of the Federal Republic had been adequately taken into consideration. Starting with the principles, the West Germans had won recognition for their argument that the Brezhnev Doctrine<sup>127</sup> should not be the centre of attention. The Western focus should rather be on renunciation of force and peaceful settlement of disputes. On freer movement, the note presented a very sober view. In the long term the FRG naturally welcomed a more independent role for the individual Warsaw Pact states. However, if this trend were to get out of control, the uncertainty of the Soviet Union could lead to critical developments, which would not serve Western interests.<sup>128</sup>

Another *Auswärtiges Amt* analysis of the latest SPC report underlined the role the FRG had assumed in the NATO discussions, successfully building bridges between the ‘conservative’ (led by the US and the UK) and ‘progressive’ (led by the Belgians, Scandinavians and Canadians) extremes within the Alliance. West German mediation was mostly needed between the US and France, although the latter, because of its preference to move the CSCE preparations completely to the EPC of the Six, had been relatively passive in the actual discussions in the NATO Council.<sup>129</sup> The need for West German mediation between the Allies had indeed grown dramatically because of the emergence of the EPC track.

## From America’s Advocate to the Main Proponent of EPC

In parallel with the accelerating NATO preparations during the spring of 1971, the work on the CSCE in the EPC framework had also truly started. In the consultations of the Six, the main West German concern at first was to maintain a clear division of labour between NATO and the EPC. There was ample reason for this, because of a new burst of French activity.

In late January 1971, building on a Belgian working paper from the previous autumn, the French suggested that the EPC mandate on CSCE preparations be expanded to cover the whole range of CSCE issues. Additionally, the French wanted to coordinate all CSCE positions of the Six prior to NATO consultations. Particularly the latter proposal met with stiff resistance from Bonn. Von Groll pointed out that this would necessarily lead to apprehension from the UK and the US, the main NATO partners outside the EPC. Moreover, the West Germans argued, the pace of the NATO deliberations was often so rapid that there would simply be no time for the Six to negotiate common positions for those consultations.<sup>130</sup>

On the other hand, the FRG supported France in the idea of opening up the EPC discussion on the whole range of the CSCE. In the West German view the EC should in principle be free to discuss all elements of the CSCE, but in order to maintain the division of labour with NATO it was preferable to focus specifically only on those issues with particular relevance for the EC.<sup>131</sup>

France also pushed for an institutional strengthening of the CSCE preparations in the EPC framework. Following the French initiative, the EPC political committee decided in February 1971 to establish a separate EPC working group on the CSCE.<sup>132</sup> The constitutive session of this working group was held in Paris on 1 March. The mandate of the working group was broader than the West Germans had initially wanted, since the Six agreed that should there be problems in moving on in NATO discussions, it was possible to use joint instructions agreed in the EPC framework to 'enliven' the NATO process, even if the topics discussed did not directly affect EC interests. As a countermeasure to avoid stepping on the toes of the NATO machinery, the West German delegation suggested that the EPC should come up with a 'negative list' of topics that were better left to the experts in NATO, such as disarmament and renunciation of force.<sup>133</sup>

This opening meeting of the CSCE working group of the EPC left the West Germans worried. France was apparently intending to create a strong and independent role for Western Europe in the CSCE. This was bound to lead the FRG into a difficult dilemma – having to choose between the US and France. The conclusions drawn in the *Auswärtiges Amt* were clear. It was up to the West Germans to make sure that US positions in all individual aspects of the CSCE were taken into consideration in the discussions among the Six. And on the other hand, the emergence of the Six as a serious actor in the Western CSCE preparations seemed to highlight the need for the FRG to have regular bilateral consultation on CSCE matters with the United States.<sup>134</sup>

In West German thinking, this became a central point. The EPC work on the CSCE should not be allowed to lead to the isolation of the US in the West. EPC coordination should focus only on matters of direct relevance for the EC, not for example on MBFR and renunciation of force, items clearly in NATO territory. The US positions should always be taken into consideration in the EPC discussions, for it was both inconsiderate and risky to present the most important guarantor of European security with a *fait accompli*. At most, the EPC should facilitate the decision making of NATO, not overtake it.<sup>135</sup> As a result, the West Germans came to the conclusion that they had a genuine interest in assuming the mediating role between France and the US. In late March, after a meeting with a US em-

bassy official, von Groll recommended taking up the US offer of bilateral exchanges of opinion on CSCE, since that would enable the West Germans to dispel US suspicions on the one hand, and to gain authority to represent the US position in the EPC on the other.<sup>136</sup>

The French, for their part, continued to be active in their attempts to expand the EPC mandate on the CSCE. In the Franco-West German consultations of the Political Directors in March, Beaumarchais suggested that the NATO missions of the Six could be instructed to use the joint positions arrived at in the EPC discussions as ‘inspiration’ for the NATO debates. Von Staden replied that it was important to distinguish between two sets of questions in the CSCE context – those areas in which the Six as a community had genuine and specific interests, and those in which the Six were not yet addressed as a community. In the previous questions it was only natural that the Six had common positions, but in the latter it should be very carefully considered.<sup>137</sup> But the French push in the EPC framework was a genuine concern for the Federal Republic. In fact, the NATO unit of the *Auswärtiges Amt* was already having second thoughts about the whole concept of the EPC working on the CSCE. Under the French presidency during the first half of 1971 the cooperation had been developing in a completely different direction than originally envisaged by the West Germans. In the West German view, there were more than enough suitable venues for discussing the CSCE in general, so that the EPC should do so only where the EC’s interests were directly at stake.<sup>138</sup> Under no circumstances should the CSCE discussion in NATO be prejudged by the EPC.<sup>139</sup>

To alleviate these concerns, the West Germans voluntarily assumed the role of the advocate of the United States in bridging the EPC–NATO gap. Over the course of the spring of 1971, the West Germans had established regular contacts with the US diplomats to discuss the CSCE proceedings in the EPC. Due to French insistence, those NATO members outside the EPC Six, including the US, had only been informed very superficially and restrictively about EPC reports and discussions. The *Auswärtiges Amt*, however, consistently kept the US embassy in Bonn well informed about the material contents of the EPC report, even during its preparations. Technically speaking, EPC confidentiality had been maintained, since the actual texts had not been given to the Americans. In the West German view, satisfying the information needs of the US would be necessary for as long as the EPC discussions in parallel with those in NATO continued to irritate the Americans.<sup>140</sup> Avoiding unnecessary irritants to the US–European relationship was the primary cause for West German insistence on maintaining a clear division of labour between the EPC and NATO in the CSCE preparations. The Federal Republic firmly opposed all ideas

of broadening the scope of the EPC to include ideas clearly perceived to be in the NATO domain. Thus, for example, the Italian proposal to begin discussing MBFR in the EPC was dismissed from the outset.<sup>141</sup>

But the active West German advocacy of US interests in the EPC framework turned out to be a temporary state of affairs. The controversy between West German and US views on the best approach to the freedom of movement, which had already been developing for some time, became an open disagreement from the summer of 1971. In late August, von Groll laid the West German-US disagreement out in the open in a discussion with a US embassy official, expressing the 'serious misgivings' of the Federal Government. In the West German view, certain CSCE agenda items proposed by the US, especially cessation of radio jamming and greater movement between East and West, 'seemed almost designed to ensure that a CES would fail'. While the Federal Republic also wished to achieve these objectives, they should follow later in the 'evolutionary process of détente initiated by a CES'. Instead of tackling controversial issues at the outset of the process, one should rather focus on developing East-West relations for more realisable objectives, for example expanding cultural exchange programs.<sup>142</sup>

The disagreement with the US over the tactical approach to be taken on the freer movement items was a symptom of the increasing Europeanisation of West German CSCE policy. The division of labour between NATO and EPC was one thing, but when it came to the agenda of the conference, the West Germans had few reasons to be worried about the development in the EPC framework. In late April, the EPC Political Directors meeting in Paris agreed on a twenty-point document which was to become the introduction to the first EPC report on the CSCE. This paper contained several ideas the West Germans held dear, such as the principle of formulating Western proposals in a way which would appear attractive to the East as well. Suitable areas of cooperation mentioned in the report ranged from industrial cooperation and trade to environmental protection and development aid.<sup>143</sup>

West German wishes to move on in the field of East-West cooperation were also met in the EPC Foreign Ministers' meeting on 13-14 May. There the Six agreed that the procedure of the conference was secondary in importance to the actual content. It was not enough simply to list topics for the agenda. Questions of content needed to be addressed seriously before the conference met. Questions of economic, cultural, scientific and technological cooperation all touched on vital interests of the European Community. In order to prevent disturbances to the further development of the European Communities by the Eastern CSCE suggestions, the EPC needed

to be active in these fields. As a signal of this willingness to deepen substantive preparations, the ministers decided to convene an ad hoc group of the EPC working on economic questions of a CSCE.<sup>144</sup> Although the deliberations on the cooperation items were fairly noncommittal at this stage, as a result of the Paris meeting there were two EPC bodies focusing on the CSCE: the working group (or sub-committee, *sous-comité*) for general affairs and the ad hoc group specialising on economic questions.

The *Auswärtiges Amt* had already for months been engaged in preparing various cooperation elements for the CSCE agenda. But in August 1971 this was supported by a new opening from the Chancellery. In a detailed memorandum on the ‘civilian’ aspects of a CSCE, Per Fischer, one of the specialists on European policy in the Chancellery, stressed the importance of the role of the EC in pursuing the European peace order as a long-term goal. In the CSCE context, Fischer argued for a European approach founded on making attractive offers to the East (*Angebotspolitik*). In Fischer’s view, the West should present a wide variety of substantive offers, ranging from East–West trade to financial and scientific cooperation, from transport, energy and development aid to culture and information exchange. The European Political Cooperation was the best means to pursue this policy, for it was important that the Europeans spoke with one voice. By making these attractive offers to the Warsaw Pact, it was also to be expected that the Soviet Union would be more inclined to recognise the EC as a negotiating partner.<sup>145</sup> Fischer’s ideas went down well in the *Auswärtiges Amt*, since only a few days later the Foreign Ministry also spoke in favour of an active, coordinated and balanced *Angebotspolitik* of the West.<sup>146</sup>

The essence of this new approach was spelled out in late August. In an inter-ministry CSCE meeting in Bonn, Fischer declared that ‘the CSCE provides the possibility of embedding the *Ostpolitik* efforts of the Federal Government in a “European *Ostpolitik*”’.<sup>147</sup> As will be shown in the following chapter, this idea of a ‘European *Ostpolitik*’ set the tone for the future West German CSCE policy, until the opening of the multilateral preparatory talks in Helsinki in November 1972 and beyond.

## Conclusion

The conclusion of the first stage of the quadripartite Berlin talks in September 1971 was, just as the Moscow Treaty had been a year earlier, an important milestone for West German CSCE policy. In terms of the linkage approach, the second of the three major objectives the Federal Republic wanted to achieve before entering the CSCE preparations, the Berlin

Agreement, was getting closer. But the choices made in Bonn in order to facilitate the achievement of these two objectives – the commitment to the CSCE in the Bahr Paper and the exclusive focus on the Berlin talks as the only precondition for a CSCE – had diminished the possibilities of using the CSCE leverage to achieve the final and most important objective, the Inner-German Treaty. The agreement of the Federal Republic to follow the French lead and single out the successful conclusion of the Berlin talks as the final threshold before multilateral CSCE preparations was irreversible. The West Germans managed to hold to their interpretation of this ‘successful conclusion’. At the same time it was clear that after the Berlin Agreement it would no longer be possible to return to the linkage between the Inner-German Treaty and the CSCE, as originally envisaged by Bahr. As will be argued in the following chapter, in the end the Federal Republic became the victim of its own strategy in its efforts to instrumentalise the CSCE by linking it to other negotiations. Now time favoured the GDR, not the FRG. Instead of being able to hold back CSCE preparations until an Inner-German Treaty was in place, Bonn was now under pressure to conclude the inner-German negotiations before the CSCE preparations started.

However, rather than a sign of West German weakness and inability to pursue its own interests, this was a sign of a fundamental shift in priorities in Bonn. Already in the period covered in this chapter, the importance attached to the substance of the conference had clearly overtaken the expectations of the instrumental value of the CSCE. West German policymakers had come to the conclusion that instead of bargaining with their CSCE participation, it was actually West German conference participation itself that held the more valuable promise for the future. Operating in the multilateral framework preparing the CSCE agenda in the West, the Federal Republic had in effect already multilateralised *Ostpolitik*. Defending its vital interests in the ‘principles governing relations between states’, emphasising elements of East–West cooperation, underscoring the need to avoid unnecessary confrontation both within the West and between East and West, and finally, by stressing the nature of the CSCE as a long-term process, the FRG was attempting to get its key objectives adopted by its allies. The following chapter will show that these attempts were to a large extent successful.

## Notes

1. TNA, FCO 41/88, Jackling (Bonn) to FCO, 16 Mar 1971.
2. AAPD 1971, doc 189, 27 May 1971.
3. TNA, FCO 28/922, 16 Dec 1970; PAAA, B150, 220, Fischer-Dieskau (London), 16 Dec 1970.
4. PA-DBT, 3104 6/3, Prot. 31, 21 Jan 1971.
5. PAAA, B150, 222, von Groll, 21 Jan 1971.
6. PAAA, B150, 222, Behrends to IIA3, 25 Jan 1971.
7. NARA, RG 59, Box 1705, Rush (Bonn) to State, 25 Jan 1971.
8. AAPD 1971, doc 21, Ruete (Paris) to AA, 19 Jan 1971.
9. AAPD 1971, doc 29, Franco-German consultations, 25 Jan 1971; AAPD 1971, doc 31, meeting Brandt-Pompidou, 25 Jan 1971; PAAA, B150, 222, Franco-German consultations, 26 Jan 1971.
10. PAAA, B40, 186, von Groll, 28 Jan 1971.
11. PAAA, AV Neues Amt, 4215, Frank to embassies, 4 Feb 1971.
12. NARA, RG 59, Box 1705, Rush (Bonn) to State, 20 Feb 1971.
13. AAPD 1971, doc 64, von Staden (Washington) to Frank (AA), 16 Feb 1971.
14. NARA, RG 59, Box 2288, meeting von Staden-Hillenbrand, 17 Feb 1971.
15. AAPD 1971, doc 67, Pauls (Washington) to AA, meeting von Staden-Hillenbrand, 17 Feb 1971.
16. AAPD 1970, doc 615, Hartmann, meeting von Braun-Tsarapkin, 28 Dec 1970; AAPD 1971, doc 11, Boss (Natogerma) to AA, 12 Jan 1971. The key points of the Soviet démarches, delivered in somewhat different forms to all NATO members in late December, were also brought to the attention of the Finns. See UMA, 7B, 11.2, NATO-*maiden kokoukset*, Kekkonen, 30 Dec 1970.
17. PAAA, B1, 342, von Groll, 13 Jan 1971.
18. PAAA, B150, 221, von Groll, 15 Jan 1971. See also PAAA, B20, 1808, meeting Moersch-Leskinen, 24 Feb 1971.
19. NARA, RG 59, Box 1705, Annenberg (London) to State, 19 Mar 1971. See also TNA, FCO 41/88, Jackling (Bonn) to FCO, 16 Mar 1971.
20. NARA, RG 59, Box 2288, Rush (Bonn) to State, 12 Mar 1971.
21. PAAA, B40, 192, Lahn to D Pol and StS, 2 Mar 1971.
22. NARA, RG 59, Box 1705, Ellsworth (US NATO) to State, 12 Mar 1971.
23. PAAA, B150, 225, Grewe (Natogerma) to AA, 9 Mar 1971; NARA, RG 59, Box 1705, Ellsworth (US NATO) to State, 15 Mar 1971.
24. NARA, RG 59, Box 2288, Rush (Bonn) to State, 12 Mar 1971.
25. PAAA, B150, 226, von Staden to Natogerma, 23 Mar 1971. See also PAAA, B150, 226, Oncken to von Staden, 19 Mar 1971.
26. PAAA, B150, 225, von Groll to Diesel and von Staden, 10 Mar 1971.
27. For the unofficial German translation of the Soviet memorandum delivered on 18 March, see PAAA, B40, 197, 18 Mar 1971. See also PAAA, B150, 226, van Well, 24 Mar 1971.
28. PAAA, B150, 226, Hartmann, meeting Frank-Bondarenko, 19 Mar 1971.
29. PAAA, B40, 197, von Groll, 22 Mar 1971; PAAA, B150, 226, von Staden (AA) to Helsinki and Natogerma, 29 Mar 1971; PAAA, B40, 182, von Groll, 21 Apr 1971.
30. See Chapter 5.
31. PAAA, B40, 186, IIA3, 22 Mar 1971.

32. VdDB, VI/111, 26 Mar 1971, 6556–8. See also NARA, RG 59, Box 1705, Rush (Bonn) to State, 27 Mar 1971. The debate was continued in the Foreign Policy Committee a few days later, see PA-DBT, 3104 6/3, Prot. 36, 1 Apr 1971.
33. PAAA, B150, 227, Gehlhoff, 6 Apr 1971. For the consolidation of this line, see PAAA, B40, 186, IIA3, 13 Apr 1971; PAAA, B150, 228, von Groll and Dahlhoff, 23 Apr 1971.
34. PAAA, B150, 228, Scheibe (Den Haag) to AA, 16 Apr 1971.
35. PAAA, B150, 228, Behrends, 22 Apr 1971.
36. TNA, FO 1042/424, Richards (Bonn), 19 Apr 1971.
37. NARA, NSC Files, Box H-182, Folder 2, NSSM-121, Hillenbrand to Kissinger, 5 May 1971.
38. PAAA, B150, 229, van Well to Natogerma, 4 May 1971; NARA, RG 59, Box 2289, Rush (Bonn) to State, 5 May 1971.
39. PAAA, B150, 229, Hansen, 19 May 1971.
40. PAAA, B1, 496, Simon to embassies, 18 May 1971.
41. NARA, RG 59, Box 1706, Rush (Bonn) to State, 18 May 1971; PAAA, B40, 186, von Groll, 21 May 1971; PAAA, B150, 230, von Groll, 18 May 1971.
42. PAAA, B40, 190, IIA3, 7 May 1971; PAAA, B40, 193, von Staden (Paris) to Scheel (AA), 13 May 1971.
43. AAPD 1971, doc 174, von Staden to embassies, 15 May 1971; PAAA, B150, 230, Lahn to Frank, 17 May 1971; PAAA, B40, 193, 14 May 1971.
44. PAAA, B150, 230, Boss (Natogerma) to AA, 26 May 1971.
45. PAAA, B150, 230, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 22 May 1971.
46. For the full German translation of the Soviet memorandum, see PAAA, B150, 230, 27 May 1971. The memorandum was identical to the one delivered to the Americans in Washington on 28 May 1971, see NARA, RG 59, Box 1706, Fessenden (Bonn) to State, 5 June 1971.
47. AAPD 1971, doc 188, Blumenfeld, meeting Falin-Frank, 27 May 1971; AAPD 1971, doc 189, Blumenfeld, meeting Scheel-Falin, 1 June 1971; PAAA, B40, 195, Blumenfeld, 18 June 1971. See also the US report from the West German briefing of these two meetings, NARA, RG 59, Box 1706, Fessenden (Bonn) to State, 15 June 1971. In fact, Scheel had made a similar remark to Falin already a few weeks earlier, see PAAA, B150, 229, Blumenfeld, meeting Falin-Scheel, 6 May 1971.
48. See, for instance, PAAA, B150, 229, von Groll, 4 May 1971.
49. AdsD, Dep. Ehmke, 307, Richard Löwenthal, 'Um die Wiedergewinnung der ostpolitischen Initiative', 4 May 1971.
50. AAPD 1971, doc 192, van Well to Frank and Scheel, 28 May 1971.
51. AAPD 1971, doc 194, van Well to embassies, 29 May 1971; NARA, RG 59, Box 3147, Rush (Bonn) to State, 29 May 1971.
52. NARA, RG 59, Box 3147, Rogers (Lisbon) to State, 4 June 1971; AAPD 1971, doc 196, Frank (Lisbon) to AA, 3 June 1971; TNA, FCO 33/1558, quadripartite dinner, 2 June 1971.
53. *NATO Communiqués*, Final Communiqué of the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial Session, Lisbon, 3–4 June 1971; AAPD 1971, doc 197, Krapf (Lisbon) to AA, 5 June 1971.
54. PAAA, B40, 186, IIA3, 7 June 1971.
55. PAAA, B40, 191, IIA3, 18 June 1971.
56. PA-DBT, 3104 6/3, Prot. 41, 9 June 1971.
57. NARA, RG 59, Box 1706, US Bonn to State, 5 June 1971.
58. AAPD 1971, doc 207, Blech, meeting Frank-Falin, 14 June 1971.
59. NARA, RG 59, Box 2289, Rush (Bonn) to State, 28 June 1971.
60. NARA, RG 59, Box 2289, Vest (US NATO) to State, 29 June 1971.

61. NARA, RG 59, Box 2290, Watson (Paris) to State, 1 July 1971.
62. AAPD 1971, doc 248, Frank (AA) to Moscow, 16 July 1971 (sent on 21 July 1971); PAAA, B150, 234, Frank (AA) to Moscow, telegram 687, 26 July 1971; AAPD 1971, doc 259, Al-lardt (Moscow) to AA, 28 July 1971.
63. PAAA, B150, 236, von Staden to Frank, 17 Aug 1971.
64. PAAA, B40, 187, von Groll, 8 Sep 1971.
65. AAPD 1971, doc 294, Pfeffer, meeting Brandt-Brosio, 7 Sep 1971.
66. PAAA, B40, 197, IIA4, 9 Sep 1971; AAPD 1971, doc 301, von Braun (AA) to von Hase (London), Pauls (Washington), Ruete (Paris), 10 Sep 1971.
67. PAAA, B150, 214, Grewe (Natogermania) to AA, 14 Oct 1970.
68. NATOA, C-M(70)56, East–West Negotiations, 13 Nov 1970.
69. TNA, FCO 41/745, Grattan (UK NATO) to Braithwaite (FCO), 23 Oct 1970.
70. PAAA, B130, 2667, POLADS(70)58, 5 Nov 1970; PAAA, B130, 2667, POLADS(70)57, 6 Nov 1970.
71. NATOA, C-M(70)56, East–West Negotiations, 13 Nov 1970.
72. EA 1970, D 399.
73. TNA, FCO 41/745, German Delegation (NATO), 29 Oct 1970.
74. NATOA, C-M(70)56, East–West Negotiations, 13 Nov 1970.
75. PAAA, B150, 216, Gehlhoff to Frank, 3 Nov 1970; PAAA, B150, 217, Grewe (Natogermania) to AA, 18 Nov 1970.
76. AAPD 1970, doc 499, von Staden to embassies, 28 Oct 1970; PAAA, B150, 217, Gehlhoff, 11 Nov 1970.
77. Becker, *Die frühe KSZE-Politik*, 124; Höhn, *Aussenpolitik der EG-Staaten*, 151.
78. Möckli, *European Foreign Policy*, 60; Romano, ‘The Nine and the Conference of Helsinki’, 84–5.
79. PAAA, B130, 2667, Pommerening to Lahn, von Staden, 9 Oct 1970. For the initial criticism in the *Auswärtiges Amt*, see also Mayer, ‘National Foreign Policy’, 132–3; Höhn, *Aussenpolitik der EG-Staaten*, 139.
80. AAPD 1970, doc 564, von Staden to embassies, 24 Nov 1970; PAAA, B150, 217, 26 Nov 1970; *Historical Archives of the European Union* (HAEU), FMM-36, Malfatti, 30 Nov 1970.
81. PAAA, B150, 218, von Groll, 25 Nov 1970. See also PAAA, B40, 185, Lahm, 23 Nov 1970.
82. See PAAA, B40, 185–189.
83. On the significance of von Groll, see also Spohr Readman, ‘National Interests’, 1082.
84. PAAA, B40, 185, von Groll, 24 Nov 1970.
85. PAAA, B150, 217, van Well, 19 Nov 1970.
86. PAAA, AV Neues Amt, 4215 (Botschaft Washington), von Groll (AA) to embassies, 25 Nov 1970; PAAA, B150, 218, D. Scheel (Helsinki) to AA, 26 Nov 1970. For the original documents related to the Finnish memorandum, see UMA, 7B, 11.3, Suomen muistio 24.11.70.
87. PAAA, B150, 218, Grewe (Natogermania) to AA, 27 Nov 1970.
88. TNA, FCO 41/746, Peck (UK NATO) to FCO, 18 Nov 1970.
89. PAAA, B150, 218, von Staden (AA) to Natogermania, 24 Nov 1970.
90. PAAA, B150, 216, Nov 1970 (undated).
91. PAAA, B150, 219, Lahn and Grewe (Natogermania) to AA, 3 Dec 1970.
92. AAPD 1970, doc 586, Grewe (Natogermania) to AA, 4 Dec 1970.
93. *NATO Communiqués*, Final Communiqué of the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial Session, Brussels 3–4 Dec 1970.
94. NATOA, C-M(71)40, Substance and Procedures of Possible East–West Negotiations, 17 May 1971.
95. PAAA, B150, 222, Boss (Natogermania) to AA, 26 Jan 1971.

96. AAPD 1971, doc 46, von Staden (AA) to embassies, 10 Feb 1971.
97. TNA, FCO 41/882, Rantzau to Kastl, German Delegation: Substance and Procedures of Possible East–West Negotiations, 12 Feb 1971 (the document itself dated 15 Feb 1971).
98. PAAA, B40, 184, von Groll, 25 Mar 1971.
99. Yamamoto, 'The Road to the CSCE', 199–207.
100. PAAA, B150, 226, von Staden to Frank and Scheel, 31 Mar 1971.
101. AAPD 1971, doc 31, meeting Brandt-Pompidou, 25 Jan 1971; AAPD 1971, doc 47, Gehlhoff (London) to AA, meeting Scheel-Douglas-Home, 5 Feb 1971; AAPD 1971, doc 53, Pauls (Washington) to AA, 8 Feb 1971.
102. PAAA, B150, 225, Grewe (Natogerma) to AA, 3 Mar 1971; AAPD 1971, doc 95, Roth to von Staden and Frank, 16 Mar 1971.
103. PAAA, B150, 228, Boss (Natogerma) to AA, 22 Apr 1971; PAAA, B43, 107297, Mertes, Ruth, 26 Apr 1971; NARA, NSC H-Files, Box H-182, Folder 2, Hillenbrand to Kissinger, 5 May 1971.
104. PAAA, B150, 227, Gehlhoff to DgIA, Ref IA7, 6 Apr 1971.
105. PAAA, B150, 223, Joetze, 1 Feb 1971.
106. PAAA, B150, 227, Boss (Natogerma) to AA, 8 Apr 1971.
107. PAAA, B150, 228, Boss (Natogerma) to AA, 23 Apr 1971.
108. NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 2264, Folder 2, Vest (US NATO) to State, 24 Apr 1971.
109. NARA, RG59 (1970–73), Box 1706, Rush (Bonn) to State, 4 May 1971.
110. PAAA, B150, 228, van Well (AA) to Natogerma, 30 Apr 1971.
111. AADP 1971, doc 154, von Groll, 4 May 1971.
112. AAPD 1971, doc 140, von Staden (AA) to Natogerma, 27 Apr 1971 (sent 3 May 1971). For the origins of the response, see PAAA, B150, 228, Mertes to DgIIB, von Staden, 22 Apr 1971; NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 2264, Folder 3, Vest (US NATO) to State, 14 May 1971.
113. PAAA, B40, 199, von Groll, 9 Mar 1971; PAAA, B150, 227, von Groll (AA) to Natogerma, 2 Apr 1971.
114. PAAA, B20, 1601, IIA3, 26 Nov 1970.
115. PAAA, B40, 184, von Staden (AA) to embassies, 21 Dec 1970.
116. PAAA, B150, 224, Reichel to IIA3, 18 Feb 1971.
117. AAPD 1971, doc 46, von Staden (AA) to embassies, 10 Feb 1971.
118. TNA, FCO 41/882, Braithwaite to Grattan, 4 Mar 1971.
119. NARA, RG 59, Box 2264, Folder 2, Vest (US NATO) to State, 23 Apr 1971.
120. NARA, RG59 (1970–73), Box 1705, Ellsworth (US NATO) to State, 12 Mar 1971.
121. PAAA, B150, 226, von Groll to von Staden, 31 Mar 1971; NARA, NSC H-Files, Box H-57, Folder 1, Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, 10 May 1971.
122. NARA, RG59 (1970–73), Box 1705, Ellsworth (US NATO) to State, 17 Mar 1971.
123. PAAA, B150, 226, Steger to Dg I A, von Staden, 29 Mar 1971.
124. PAAA, B150, 227, Boss (Natogerma) to AA, 14 Apr 1971; PAAA, B150, 228, Lahn (AA) to Natogerma, 22 Apr 1971.
125. NATOA, C-M(71)40, Substance and Procedures of Possible East–West Negotiations, 17 May 1971.
126. AAPD 1971, doc 197, Krapf (Lisbon) to AA, 5 June 1971; PAAA, AV Neues Amt, 4215 (Botschaft Washington), von Staden (AA) to embassies, 27 July 1971.
127. On the 'Brezhnev Doctrine', a label attached to the Soviet policy of possible intervention in domestic affairs of other Warsaw Pact states after the Prague invasion in 1968, see Matthew J. Ouimet, *The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press 2003.
128. PAAA, AV Neues Amt, 4215 (Botschaft Washington), von Staden (AA) to embassies, 27 July 1971.

129. PAAA, B40, 184, von Groll, 24 May 1971.
130. PAAA, B40, 188, von Groll, 29 Jan 1971.
131. PAAA, B40, 192, von Staden to Frank, 3 Feb 1971.
132. PAAA, B1, 496, von Staden, 10 Feb 1971.
133. PAAA, B40, 192, Lahn to von Staden and Frank, 2 Mar 1971.
134. PAAA, B21, 735, Simon to von Staden, 5 Mar 1971.
135. PAAA, B40, 186, IIA3, 22 Mar 1971.
136. PAAA, B150, 226, von Groll to von Staden, 31 Mar 1971. See also Geir Lundestad, *'Empire' by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945–1997*, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press 1998.
137. PAAA, B150, 226, Steger to DgIA, von Staden, 29 Mar 1971.
138. PAAA, B150, 228, Steger to IIA3, 20 Apr 1971.
139. PAAA, B40, 193, von Groll, 7 May 1971.
140. PAAA, B40, 186, IIA3, 7 June 1971.
141. PAAA, B150, 233, Rossbach to DgIIB, von Staden, 1 July 1971.
142. NARA, RG 59, Box 1706, Rush (Bonn) to Secstate, 2 Sep 1971.
143. PAAA, B40, 192, 28 Apr 1971.
144. AAPD 1971, doc 174, von Staden, 24 Aug 1971. See also PAAA, B150, 230, Lahn to Frank, 17 May 1971. See also Nuttall, *European Political Cooperation*, 63.
145. BArch, B136, 6419 (1), Fischer, 9 Aug 1971.
146. BArch, B136, 6419 (1), IIA3, 13 Aug 1971; PAAA, B150, 236, IIA3, 24 Aug 1971.
147. PAAA, B40, 193, IIA3, 26 Aug 1971.