A State of Peace in Europe
West Germany and the CSCE, 1966–1975
Petri Hakkarainen

In a balanced way the author blends German views with those from Britain, France and the United States, using these countries’ official documents as well. His book represents a very serious piece of scholarship and is interesting to read. It reveals a novel hypothesis, a very careful use of varied archival sources, and an ability not to lose his argument in the wealth of material.

Helga Haftendorn, Free University, Berlin

I don’t know of any other book that deals so thoroughly with German CSCE policy in the years described here... The author has done a vast amount of research, using documents from different archives and different countries. While he is of course not the first scholar to write about the origins of the CSCE, the author does contribute new elements and interpretations to the topic.

Benedikt Schönborn, University of Tampere, Centre for Advanced Study

From the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s West German foreign policy underwent substantial transformations: from bilateral to multilateral, from reactive to proactive. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was an ideal setting for this evolution, enabling the Federal Republic to take an early lead in Western preparations for the conference and to play a decisive role in the actual East-West negotiations leading to the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. Based on extensive original research of recently released documents, spanning more than fifteen archives in eight countries, this study is a substantial contribution to scholarly discussions on the history of détente, the CSCE and West German foreign policy. The author stresses the importance of looking beyond the bipolarity of the Cold War decades and emphasizes the interconnectedness of European integration and European détente. He highlights the need to place the genesis of the CSCE conference in its historical context rather than looking at it through the prism of the events of 1989, and shows that the bilateral and multilateral elements (Topolnik and the CSCE) were parallel rather than successive phenomena, parts of the same complex process and in constant interaction with each other.

Petri Hakkarainen received his doctorate in Modern History from the University of Oxford in 2008. In 2009 he was awarded the Willy Brandt Prize for the ‘advancement of outstanding young scholars’ by the Chancellor Willy Brandt Foundation. He joined the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 2006 and currently works at the Finnish Embassy in Berlin.

A State of Peace in Europe
Studies in Contemporary European History

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A State of Peace in Europe: West Germany and the CSCE, 1966–1975

*Petri Hakkarainen*

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CONTENTS

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms viii
Acknowledgements xi

1. Introduction: Era of Negotiations 1
   European Détente 3
   The CSCE 5
   West German Foreign Policy 6
   On Structure and Sources 8

2. 1966–69: Incubation of Strategies 17
   The Early Years and the Eastern ‘Propaganda Circus’ 19
   The Budapest Appeal: ‘We Could Have Drafted it Ourselves’ 23
   Consultations Abroad, Electioneering at Home 29
   Nobody Expects the Finnish Initiative 33
   Promises of East–West Cooperation or an Instrument of
   Deutschlandpolitik? 39
   Chancellery versus Auswärtiges Amt 47
   Emphasis on Linkage: Bahr’s Foreign Policy Plans on the Eve
   of the Election 49
   Bonn and the Security Conference during the Interregnum 53
   Conclusion 56
3. 1969–70: Bilateral Leverages and European Security

- Western Support for the Linkage of CSCE Plans with *Deutschlandpolitik* 69
- Horse-Trading in Moscow 72
- Rethinking the Linkage Strategy 79
- Berlin Surpasses Other Preconditions 83
- Discovering the Potential of the CSCE 89
- Conference on Security or Conference on Cooperation? 94
- Conclusion 99

4. 1970–71: Transition to Western Multilateralism

- Following the French Lead on the Berlin Connection 110
- Defending the Berlin Precondition in Lisbon 114
- Divergent Interpretations of the ‘Successful Conclusion’ 118
- Nothing Quiet on the Western Front 120
- Broadening the German Horizon in the NATO Framework 126
- From America’s Advocate to the Main Proponent of EPC 131
- Conclusion 135

5. 1971–72: Towards a European Peace Order?

- The Decline of the Linkage between the CSCE and the Inner-German Treaty 144
- Hesitating on the Berlin Precondition 149
- Blackmailing the Finns? 153
- An Inner-German Shotgun Wedding 157
- Europeanisation of *Ostpolitik* 161
- In Defence of the Eastern Treaties and Bonn’s Sovereignty 169
- A New Flow of German Activity 172
- Peaceful Change, Self-Determination of Peoples and Military Security 176
- Freer Movement: Change through Rapprochement? 182
- Berlin as a CSCE Location? 190
- Avoiding Bilateralism 193
- Conclusion 198
6. 1972–75: *Deutschlandpolitik at the Conference*  
   Alphabet Diplomacy in Diplomacy 215  
   Peaceful Change, Act 1: Defending the Moscow Treaty 218  
   Peaceful Change, Act 2: Enter Genscher 224  
   Peaceful Change, Act 3: Commas for the National Interest 229  
   Basket III: Human Contacts 233  
   Follow-up and Berlin 238  
   Conclusion 240

7. Conclusion: Evolution Instead of Revolution 246

Sources and Bibliography 258

Index 275
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AA   Auswärtiges Amt
AAPD Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
AdG  Archiv der Gegenwart
AdL  Archiv des Liberalismus
ADMAE Archives diplomatiques du Ministère des affaires étrangères
Adsd Archiv der sozialen Demokratie
BK-Amt Bundeskanzleramt
BMVg Bundesministerium für Verteidigung
BSR Bundessicherheitsrat
BWBS Bundeskanzler-Willy-Brandt-Stiftung
CDU Christlich-Demokratische Union
CES Conference on European Security
CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSE Conference on Security in Europe
CSU Christlich-Soziale Union
DBPO Documents on British Policy Overseas
EA Europa-Archiv
EC European Communities
ECE United Nations Economic Committee for Europe
ECS European Conference on Security
EPC European Political Cooperation
ESC European Security Conference
FAZ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FDP Freie Demokratische Partei
FRG Federal Republic of Germany
FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>GDR</td>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>MBFR</td>
<td>Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPT</td>
<td>Multilateral Preparatory Talks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATOA</td>
<td>NATO Archives</td>
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<tr>
<td>Natogerma</td>
<td>NATO Mission of the FRG in Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAAA</td>
<td>Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA-DBT</td>
<td>Parlamentsarchiv des Deutschen Bundestages</td>
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<tr>
<td>PHP</td>
<td>Parallel History Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALT</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Limitation Talks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>Senior Political Committee of NATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNA</td>
<td>The National Archives (formerly Public Record Office)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UD</td>
<td>Utrikesdepartementet [Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDA</td>
<td>Utrikesdepartementets arkiv [Archive of the UD]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKA</td>
<td>Urho Kekkosen arkisto [Presidential archive of Urho Kekkonen]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ULA</td>
<td>Ulkopiittisia lausuntoja ja asiakirjoja [Statements and documents on foreign policy]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UM</td>
<td>Ulkoasianministeriö [The Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMA</td>
<td>Ulkoasianministeriön arkisto [Archives of the Foreign Ministry]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unogerma</td>
<td>FRG Representation at the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VdDB</td>
<td>Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages</td>
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<tr>
<td>WBA</td>
<td>Willy-Brandt-Archiv</td>
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<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The publication of this book is the final leg of a long journey. What began in early 2002 with a first visit to the archives in Berlin as part of a research project at the University of Helsinki soon turned into full-time research for a D.Phil. degree at the University of Oxford. This book is a revised and expanded version of the doctoral thesis I defended at Oxford in the spring of 2008. The main work on the revision was completed in the autumn of 2010, with the finishing touches put to it in 2011.

As is the case with any project spanning almost a decade, this one has been accompanied by a number of people whose assistance has been invaluable. This is the appropriate moment to express my gratitude to at least some of them.

First of all, I want to thank my academic supervisor at Oxford, Jonathan Wright, for his wisdom, thoughtful advice and patience with a student whose work often only proceeded in sudden bursts, with long silent lulls in between. Jonathan’s comments on my essays, working papers and chapter drafts – always covering the whole spectrum from linguistic detail to broad substance questions – guided me in the right direction and immensely helped improve the quality of this manuscript. I could not have hoped for a better supervisor. Another powerful Oxford figure to whom I am deeply grateful is Anne Deighton, the main reason why I chose Wolfson as my college in the first place. In my first year at Oxford, I was fortunate enough to have Anne as my college advisor, but I have been able to rely on her witty and razor-sharp observations ever since.

Seppo Hentilä deserves credit for the original idea for the topic of this book – he was the one who talked me into doing research on German CSCE policy. Although I soon eloped to Oxford from the project he ran in Helsinki, Seppo always continued to be very supportive of my work. He has also, I believe, been a key figure in verifying the credibility of my applications to several Finnish funding bodies. Alongside him, Juhana
Aunesluoma, Mikko Majander and Kimmo Rentola formed an influential trio at the University of Helsinki even during my undergraduate studies. It is in those years where my interest in Cold War history is rooted. It was also largely because of their inspirational example, and despite their warnings, that I decided to embark on the doctoral road. Specific thanks are therefore due to them for all the brilliant days during this project – responsibility for the few miserable ones is all mine. Kimmo also took the time to read and comment on the entire manuscript before my viva, alerting me to several useful perspectives which I was able to incorporate in the final version of the thesis and this book.

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A multiarchival research project such as this one could not be conducted without an army of professional archivists. From all the helpful personnel in the archives I have used for my research two individuals stand out and deserve to be thanked separately. Johannes von Boeselager at the Auswärtiges Amt archive in Berlin and Anne-Marie Smith at the NATO archive in Brussels spared no efforts in their attempts to provide me with access to essential documents.

Where the paper trail has ended, I have been able to continue with thought-provoking discussions with a number of former diplomats, officials and politicians. I am deeply thankful to all of these interviewees for their willingness to travel over thirty years back in time. Their ability to do so as thoughtfully and accurately as they have has been a marvellous thing to observe.

For the financial support necessary to sustain years of full-time research I am indebted to several funding bodies. The main source of my funding came from the relatively small Osk. Huttunen Foundation, which has a distinguished tradition in supporting Finnish scholars at the oldest English universities. Before securing the three-year scholarship from the Osk. Huttunen Foundation, my first steps at Oxford were funded by two larger Finnish bodies – the Helsingin Sanomat Centenary Foundation and the Alfred Kordelin Foundation. In addition to these three major Finnish benefactors, I was awarded travel grants and other short-term assistance.
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This publication is closely linked to the honour of having been awarded the Willy Brandt Prize for my thesis in 2009. This biennial distinction of the Federal Chancellor Willy Brandt Foundation in Berlin, given to an outstanding and unpublished thesis, confirmed my desire to conclude this project with an expanded published monograph. Special thanks are due to Wolfram Hoppenstedt and his colleagues at the foundation for their publication subsidy and their help in identifying a suitable publisher. Berghahn Books was clearly the correct address to turn to. From the very start, Marion Berghahn, Ann Przyzycki and their team made an extremely professional impression. The cooperation with them has been pleasant and has continued to run smoothly throughout the whole production process.

Professional and financial support alone, however, would not be sufficient to carry a project of this length. The encouragement I have constantly received from my family and friends has been priceless. This list of people is too long to complete here, but outweighing others, it has been my parents, Lea and Pentti, who have never wavered in their belief in me. In more material terms, my parents always stepped in with financial assistance when I was between grants. But it is above all their moral and mental support that I will never be able to repay. For all this, I am forever grateful.

Finally, I unfortunately find myself unable to break with an irritating academic tradition. Rather than putting the most important person at first place, I am left with thanking Anna-Kaisa, my wife, at the very end. In addition to being the most loving wife one can think of, she has also been an understanding colleague all along. She has never had the heart to refuse my wishes for her critical proof-reading, something which has always helped me tremendously. Our joint ‘writing camps’ in Oxford, Helsinki and Berlin would probably have seemed insane to an external observer. Even in these extreme times, although submerged in her own work, it was always Anna-Kaisa who made sure that I remembered to eat, breathe fresh air at least once a day and get my daily dose of ‘The West Wing’ on DVD. Much has changed now that the CSCE is less of a presence in our daily lives, but not her importance. Thank you, for everything.

P.H., Berlin, February 2011
Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Era of Negotiations

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ILLUSTRATION 1: Chancellor Willy Brandt, Foreign Minister Walter Scheel and Minister of the Interior Hans-Dietrich Genscher (from right to left) during a Bundestag session in December 1972.

I was resented in the East for it, and not everybody in the West agreed with me either, when I said that the participation of the Federal Republic of Germany in a European security conference would be pointless if the relationship between the two parts of Germany had not been settled first. The Federal Republic had some leverage here; I did not overestimate it, but we had it. My argument: if a wedding is planned and the other half of the bridal couple does not turn up, the other partner will not be very happy about it.

– Willy Brandt in his memoirs

This conference will simultaneously address the possibilities of cooperation and the questions of security. Between East and West, North and South, I see the possibility to create common interests and responsibilities in Europe through economic and other connections which can develop more security for everyone.

– Willy Brandt’s Nobel Peace Prize speech, December 1971

In his seminal work on the German role in Europe during the Cold War division, Timothy Garton Ash points out that an attempt to fairly characterise the CSCE position of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) would be a ‘mammoth’, bordering on a ‘virtually impossible’ task. Admittedly, Garton Ash’s comment refers to the entire duration of what became known as the Helsinki Process, whereas the focus here is restricted to the prehistory of the conference, with only the final chapter addressing the CSCE proper and its multilateral preparations. But the task is nonetheless ambitious.

This book analyses the role of the Federal Republic in the decade leading to the Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE in 1975. It particularly concentrates on the multilateral Western framework of policy construction in the years of 1969–72. During that period, the CSCE policy of the FRG was characterised by a fascinating combination of the two complementary elements inherent in the quotes from Chancellor Willy Brandt above. On the one hand, Bonn was interested in instrumentalising the CSCE, attempting to use the FRG’s agreement to participate in the conference as a bargaining chip in the game where the fulfilment of its bilateral Ostpolitik was the main target. In the beginning, it was this short-term tactical approach that prevailed. On the other hand, the Federal Republic was also increasingly interested in the conference itself, hoping to be able to achieve substantive national foreign policy goals multilaterally in the CSCE. Over time, this long-term strategic approach surpassed the emphasis on short-term linkages. When the actual CSCE was opened, the FRG was well prepared to defend its national interests in this new multilateral framework.

In narrow terms, seen merely from the perspective of the FRG and the CSCE, this book embarks on a relatively uncharted territory. Existing scholarship on this particular case is sparse. Peter Becker’s book from the early 1990s covers much the same substantive ground, but it employs a systemic
decision-making analysis rather than an historical approach. At times Becker provides a useful reference to the chronological development, but the book suffers from the complete lack of archival evidence to support it, leading to several factual mistakes and a relatively superficial analysis.\textsuperscript{5} Stefanie Halle’s master’s thesis, in spite of its title, focuses almost exclusively on the Ostpolitik treaties as a backdrop for the FRG’s CSCE policy.\textsuperscript{6} Kristina Spohr Readman, in contrast, has written a compelling article on the politics of language in the CSCE policy of the FRG in 1972–75. Working partly with the same original documents as this book, Spohr Readman’s conclusions – highlighting the FRG’s pursuit of national interests and its key role in the West – fit well with and thus confirm the arguments put forward here.\textsuperscript{7}

West German CSCE policy has also been the topic of individual articles in edited volumes, including one by this author.\textsuperscript{8} Elements of the West German approach to the CSCE have also been touched upon in a number of excellent dissertations recently completed, but their focus has been broader, relating to actors, themes or time period.\textsuperscript{9} This book is therefore necessarily based on original research on recently released archival documents. However, it does not concentrate solely on the role of one particular state in a particular set of negotiations. Instead, it builds on and contributes to a scholarly discussion on three broader themes – European détente, the CSCE and West German foreign policy. I will next examine these three overlapping themes in more detail.

**European Détente**

The late 1960s and early 1970s ushered in a new period in the Cold War. Although far from replacing the Cold War confrontation completely, détente brought about a genuine reduction of tension, literally Entspannung in German, into the East–West relationship. Nowhere was this more visible than in Europe, on the continent most directly affected by the post-war division. It is therefore all the more surprising that the dominant current in the scholarship on the history of détente has up to this day focused predominantly on bipolar superpower relations.\textsuperscript{10} A more diverse picture is emerging, fortunately.\textsuperscript{11}

For a long time, the research that did exist on European détente was that in name only, never really breaking free from the dominant paradigm.\textsuperscript{12} Only recently have more nuanced interpretations surfaced, with outstanding general accounts of the global Cold War\textsuperscript{13} as well as of European post-war history.\textsuperscript{14} Jeremi Suri has raised the exciting new argument of détente as a global force for stability, even counterrevolution, rather than change.\textsuperscript{15} With the widespread thirty-year rule in archives, the front line of basic re-
search with original documents has also moved well into the 1970s. This is reflected in a recent flow of conferences and subsequent edited publications, significantly broadening our understanding of détente in general, and European détente in particular. Piers Ludlow has drawn attention to the importance of bridging the divide between scholarship on European integration and that on the Cold War. All of this has brought détente scholarship closer to the general trend of ‘retroactive de-bipolarisation’ of Cold War history.

This approach should not be overworked, of course. Looking at the big picture, the United States and the Soviet Union did play a more significant role in the Cold War and détente than did, say, Belgium and Bulgaria. But that is not to say that the allies of the dominant superpowers, be they members of NATO or the Warsaw Pact, were always merely passive objects. The relationships within the alliances were far from constant – the configuration of power changed back and forth over time. In fact, in many respects the rapid dynamics within the alliances during the détente years are more fascinating than the actual East–West development that often moved at a sluggish pace.

In the West, multilateral cooperation underwent a fundamental change in the decade beginning in the mid-1960s, with interaction between three institutional frameworks increasingly overlapping – especially in the CSCE context. Firstly, following the 1967 Harmel Report, NATO assumed a more outspoken political role than before, aiming to combine defence with détente. This element of NATO, transforming the military alliance into a political actor and into a political forum for multilateral negotiations among its members, has not yet received the scholarly attention it merits. Secondly, NATO soon received a serious challenger, as another intra-Western forum for debating East–West policy emerged. As a result of the so-called Davignon Report in 1969, the six original members of the European Communities began to coordinate their foreign policy more closely, particularly in the areas of the Middle East and the CSCE. After the first Foreign Ministers’ meeting of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) in November 1970, the procedure was institutionalised in frequent meetings on ministerial and bureaucratic levels, first among the six original members, but soon also including the four applicant countries. With the exception of a few early analyses, the literature has for a long time neglected these early years of the EPC’s development and glossed over them only as a prelude to what is now the common foreign and security policy of the European Union. Recently, however, Daniel Möckli’s brilliant volume on the years 1969–74 has underscored the importance of this formative period. Angela Romano has also contributed to a better understanding of the role of the EPC in the CSCE context.
Thirdly, there was the extremely influential small circle called the Bonn Group. Consisting of representatives of the US, Britain, France and the FRG, this four-power consultation group had been set up in the mid-1950s as an informal forum to discuss issues pertaining to Berlin and Germany as a whole. During the high tide of Ostpolitik, however, the work of the Bonn Group swiftly intensified, with meetings taking place on various levels on a weekly basis, and sometimes every day. When its influence peaked in 1969–72, its de facto mandate was considerably broader than originally foreseen. On the Bonn Group, Helga Haftendorn remains the most authoritative scholar.27

This book sets out to investigate the complex interplay within these Western frameworks from the perspective of the Federal Republic. As will be seen, the profoundly multifaceted nature of European détente becomes apparent. In the period covered here, all of these formations were developing, each expanding their efforts from their own niches – NATO from the military, the EC from the politico-economic, and the Bonn Group from the focus on Germany and Berlin – towards the centre of European détente. In this centre lay the CSCE.

The CSCE

The concept of a pan-European conference on security issues was an old idea of the Soviet Union, suggested for the first time in 1954, shortly before the Federal Republic joined NATO. But the process towards the actual CSCE truly got under way in the late 1960s, with successive Warsaw Pact proposals and particularly the so-called Budapest Appeal in 1969. When an initiative of the Finnish Government to host such a conference brought a neutral terrain into the equation, NATO and the Warsaw Pact engaged in a curious three-year dialogue of communiqués about the conference. The direct negotiating contact between East, West and the neutrals was finally initiated in the multilateral preparations for the conference in the autumn of 1972, and went on until the following summer, when the Foreign Ministers of the participating countries launched the CSCE proper in Helsinki. After two years of intensive negotiations in Geneva in 1973–75, the landmark Helsinki Final Act was signed in the Finnish capital in the summer of 1975.28

Given the significance of the CSCE in the general development of détente, the early years of the conference have so far been surprisingly little in the limelight. Within the research that exists, the years prior to the Final Act have usually merely been treated as a prologue to the ‘real’ history of the CSCE, beginning in 1975. Moreover, with the privilege of knowing the outcome of the Cold War and the role that the Helsinki Final Act, particu-
larly its principles of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the provisions on cooperation in humanitarian fields in the so-called Basket III, played in it, it is certainly a challenge to see the early CSCE years in historical context. Most of the post-1989 literature on the CSCE fails to avoid this ‘hindsight trap’, emphasising either the role of human rights or the general idea of dynamic change excessively, often leading to a touch of triumphalism.29

Another set of CSCE literature are the memoirs of former diplomats who had participated in the conference.30 These reminiscences provide fascinating inside information about the negotiations, especially in the Geneva phase of the CSCE. For the period leading up to the conference, however, they are of little use. Again, it has only been in the past few years that the archival situation has enabled historians to engage in thorough research on the early stages preceding the Final Act.31 The authoritative general history of the CSCE still remains to be written.

This book aims to place the early period of the CSCE in its historical context, instead of looking at it through the prism of 1989. Conventional wisdom has it that most of the contents of the Helsinki Final Act were already in place after the multilateral preparatory talks in Dipoli, collected in the so-called Blue Book in the summer of 1973. Naturally, several crucial details only emerged during the meticulous negotiations in Geneva in 1973–75. Nonetheless, this book ventures to argue that a majority of the pieces had fallen into place already before the Dipoli phase of the conference. The formative years of the CSCE were in 1969–72, when the West attempted to get its own act together for the East–West talks. In that intra-Western process, the FRG was a decisive actor.

**West German Foreign Policy**

The third broad theme within which this book is written is that of the foreign policy of the Federal Republic during the Cold War. This was a curious construct, characterised by a ‘double containment’ – restricted by the burden of past horrors as well as by the East–West confrontation.32 Accepting the external limits set to its sovereignty, the FRG nevertheless sought to expand its freedom of manoeuvre as far as those limits permitted by an increasing multilateralisation of its foreign policy. Throughout the Cold War decades, the so-called German question constantly remained in the core of the foreign policy decision-making in Bonn. Regardless of the coalition in power at a given time, no option chosen could endanger the overarching principle of keeping the German question open and with it the possibility of reunification. This principle was best formulated in the
so-called ‘letter on German unity’ in connection with the Moscow Treaty in August 1970. In this letter, the Federal Government declared that the Moscow Treaty was in no contradiction with the political aim of the FRG to create ‘a state of peace in Europe in which the German people can regain its unity in free self-determination’.33 It is from this sentence that the title of this book is drawn, too.

Nevertheless, the ways in which this principle was implemented varied considerably over time. From the late 1960s, the inflexible Hallstein Doctrine, in effect refusing to recognise the existence of two German states, began to give way to new approaches to Deutschlandpolitik – West German policy towards the GDR, as well as to Ostpolitik – West German policy towards the East in general. Small-step changes occurred during the Grand Coalition of Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger in 1966–69. But it was Kiesinger’s successor, Willy Brandt, who led the Federal Republic to the dramatic changes in its relations with the East. The credo of this policy had been expressed by Brandt’s aide Egon Bahr already in his 1963 landmark speech in Tutzing – Wandel durch Annäherung, change through rapprochement.34

And change there was. In the time frame of a mere three years, the Brandt Government completed all the major Ostpolitik achievements. The FRG signed and ratified renunciation-of-force agreements with the Soviet Union and Poland, signed the so-called traffic accords with the GDR, and concluded the negotiations on the Basic Treaty with the GDR. The US, the Soviet Union, Britain and France also signed and ratified the Quadripartite Agreement on the status of Berlin. On 19 November 1972, just three days before the beginning of the multilateral CSCE preparations, Brandt’s coalition won a decisive victory in the federal election, which was widely perceived as a plebiscite on Ostpolitik. When Brandt suddenly resigned in May 1974 due to the Guillaume spy affair, his successor, Helmut Schmidt, could pick up the leadership of West German foreign policy from a completely transformed starting point.

There is naturally an abundance of first-rate literature on the foreign policy of the FRG in that era which Gottfried Niedhart has characterised as the second formative phase of the Federal Republic.35 General accounts of the history of Germany or the Western part of it have embedded foreign policy in a broader framework, taking also into account the domestic and societal developments.36 Volumes focusing on the foreign policy of the Federal Republic highlight the degree of continuity between the various governments.37 Moreover, there is plenty of research focusing more specifically on the late 1960s and early 1970s, with a clear emphasis on the Brandt years at the expense of Kiesinger.38 And finally, all the research is substantiated by numerous memoirs of key politicians and officials.39
From the perspective of this book, however, there is one significant shortcomings in the existing literature. There has been a tendency to see the bilateral Ostpolitik and the multilateral CSCE process as separate developments, with the latter only having properly started once the former had been completed. The argument in this book is that the bilateral and multilateral elements were part of the same complex process and interacted constantly from the very beginning. Ostpolitik and the CSCE were thus parallel, not consecutive phenomena. The time frame chosen here, concentrating largely on the ‘prehistory’ of the CSCE proper, serves the purpose of underscoring this early connection.

The Federal Republic was in many ways at the epicentre of the CSCE. On the one hand, the German question was both geographically and substantively at the heart of any considerations of enhancing European security and cooperation. On the other, the exceptional position of the FRG as a full member in all of the three relevant frameworks – NATO, the EPC and the Bonn Group – gave it an ideal institutional setting to exert influence over common Western conference preparations. The CSCE provided the Federal Republic with unprecedented opportunities to utilise multilateral mechanisms to pursue its national interests.

When those interests were defined in Bonn, the inner-German relationship was always the core factor. From that perspective, finding ways to come to terms with the existing division of Europe was often at least as important as attempting to overcome it. As a result, West German interests were seen to lie in gradual and non-controversial steps towards more cooperation, accompanied by a considerable number of defensive measures to protect the provisional, modus vivendi nature of the status quo. As this book argues, the pursuit of those interests was to a large extent successful. But it was not a recipe for sudden change.

On Structure and Sources

In the past decade, the scholarly discussion about new approaches and new interpretations has led some historians to talk festively about a ‘new Cold War history’, following the traditionalist, revisionist and post-revisionist phases of the ‘old’ one. Perhaps the most striking element of this discussion has been the way in which the importance of ‘ideology’ in explaining the Cold War has been en vogue. But in taking ideas, beliefs and perceptions seriously one should not forget the importance of old-fashioned Realpolitik. It is often futile to try to find a clear-cut division between motives based on interests on the one hand, ideas and beliefs on the other. Instead, it is important to understand this interrelationship, to see how
interests and ideas influenced each other, leading to constant redefinition of both sides of the equation, before merging into policy. Neither interests nor ideas were carved in stone. Reactions to changes in the international environment reshaped interests as well as ideas and beliefs. Melvyn Leffler’s thoughts on these dynamics have been inspirational for this book, although one of his latest books, with its focus on US and Soviet leaders, indirectly tends to consolidate a bipolar view of the Cold War.43

The structure of this book also emphasises the interaction between interests and ideas. In the case at hand, bargaining with clear national interests in the form of linkages and leverages constantly merged with the approach based on the more elusive ideological concept of a European peace order. In fact, for the FRG this concept of a peace order was not purely ideological, either. As the potential ‘state of peace in Europe’ this peace order was intimately linked to Deutschlandpolitik interests. The general structure of the book is chronological, dividing the subject matter into five chapters in sequential order. Whereas chapter 2 also follows chronology internally, the following three chapters are clearly divided in two. Each of the chapters 3, 4 and 5 focuses first on the FRG’s ‘linkage’ policy approach to CSCE preparations, then on its agenda interests. As becomes apparent, the respective weightings changed over time, with the long-term strategy concentrating on the conference agenda surpassing the short-term tactics of instrumentalisation and linkage. Finally, chapter 6 portrays the way in which the FRG tackled those issues at the CSCE proper which it considered to be in its immediate national interests.

The chronological watersheds between the chapters arise genuinely from the developments in the foreign policy of the FRG and in the preparations for the CSCE. Chapter 2 covers the years 1966–69, the reign of the Grand Coalition in Bonn. At the same time as the Kiesinger Government slowly prepared ground for a sea change in Ostpolitik, the Western perception of the prospective CSCE changed from outright rejection to a more forthcoming scepticism.44 Chapter 3, addressing the years 1969–70, falls into the first year of the Brandt Government, ending with the signature of the landmark Moscow Treaty. On the CSCE front, following the Budapest Appeal and the Finnish initiative in 1969, the Western conference preparations started earnestly, albeit slowly, within NATO.

Chapter 4 deals with the years 1970–71, and witnesses the shift from strictly bilateral Ostpolitik to the emphasis on the Quadripartite negotiations on Berlin, which were completed in September 1971. Meanwhile, from the autumn of 1970 there was new movement in the Western CSCE deliberations, as the nascent EPC began to challenge NATO as the central Western framework. Chapter 5 leads us through the years 1971–72, with Bonn focusing on its negotiations with East Berlin on the Ostpolitik front. In
parallel, there was a completely fresh burst of West German activity on the CSCE track. West German interests were increasingly pursued by multilateral means, defensively as well as offensively. Ultimately, chapter 6 moves from the landslide election victory of the Brandt–Scheel Government and the opening of the conference in Helsinki to track the unfolding of the West German CSCE policy under the new Schmidt–Genscher leadership.

In addition to a reconsideration of ideological factors, another key feature of the ‘new’ Cold War history has been the growing emphasis on the need for multiarchival research. Much of the discussion about the novelty of that approach can safely be disregarded as unnecessary hype. Nevertheless, the discussion, originating from the end of the Cold War and the partial opening of archives in the former Eastern bloc, has had the important result of making scholars more generally alert than before to the opportunities of a multiarchival approach within the West as well. Even if the archives of the former Soviet Union for the time being remain by and large inaccessible for research on the 1960s and later periods, combining, say, French, German, American and British sources with each other enables a more thorough picture of the Cold War years to be seen.

Also in this respect, this book joins in the ‘new’ debate. Concentrating on a multilateral conference project, a multiarchival approach has come in naturally. The perspective here is not only multiarchival but truly international, making use of archives in eight countries. Since the focus is on the CSCE policies of the FRG, the most essential archives for my research are located in Germany. Of central importance is the archive of the Auswärtiges Amt (AA) in Berlin. The papers of the German Foreign Ministry are in principle accessible according to the thirty-year rule, but in effect this applies directly only to unclassified and low-rated confidential material. This deficiency is partly overcome by the excellent publication series Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (AAPD), which gives access to numerous secret and highly confidential documents, carefully edited and referenced. Moreover, the archive of the AA holds a far broader set of documents originally declassified for the editors of the AAPD series, afterwards microfilmed, organised chronologically and made accessible to all researchers in the collection B150.

Put together, these documents provide a reasonably wide body of evidence. Nonetheless, as far as the AAPD and B150 series are concerned, the arbitrary nature of the selection remains – someone else has made the choices. Requests for additional declassification have proved to be frustrating experiences. In Germany, further useful archives are the Bundesarchiv in Koblenz which, along with the papers of the Chancellery, also holds some interesting personal collections. At least as significant are the archives of the political parties, especially those of the SPD in the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Bonn and the CDU in the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Sankt Augustin.
In addition to Germany, national archives in two other countries of the Western alliance have provided important additional information. The US and UK sources have helped me enormously in putting the West German position into perspective. Regarding the published documents from these countries, the record is mixed. In the case of the US, the outstanding series *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS) covers the Nixon and Ford years widely. The FRUS volumes dealing with European security on the one hand, and Germany and Berlin on the other, have been particularly valuable.\(^47\) The British equivalent to FRUS, *Documents on British Policy Overseas* (DBPO), pales in comparison, but offers nonetheless some useful additions to the documents accessible in the archives.\(^48\)

As far as the Western organisations are concerned, the results from the EC archives in Florence were largely disappointing – since there was no permanent EPC secretariat, documents on the EPC process are far more prolific in the individual national archives. The opposite is the case with NATO documents. Without exception, official non-public NATO documents are removed from the files in the national archives before they are made available to researchers. Technically, a unanimous consensus of all NATO members is required before a declassification decision can be made. Thus, although the NATO archives in theory follow the thirty-year rule, in practice it has come to resemble forty years. Nonetheless, after persistent efforts over several years, in the winter of 2006 I was finally given access to a set of CSCE-related documents from the years 1969–72 in the NATO archives in Brussels. Those documents have been precious in substantiating my argument in this book.

Two obvious omissions in the archival evidence of this book stand out – the Soviet Union and France. Regarding the Soviet Union, as already indicated above, the situation is unequivocal. Foreign policy documents from the 1960s and 1970s are simply not available. Given the focus on the Western coordination in this book, this is less of a loss. To a certain extent, the problem can be circumvented by the use of East German and Finnish archives, which provide useful, albeit partial glances at Soviet thinking. Beyond that, on a more general level, the Finnish archives offer a helpful view on the CSCE from the perspective of the conference host.

As far as France is concerned, taking into account the third Western country among the Four Powers responsible for Berlin and Germany as a whole, alongside the US and the UK, would undoubtedly be advantageous. Originally, it was the notoriously difficult access to the French archives that led to the decision to exclude them. Later on, as the situation improved, I have corrected this omission at least superficially. Due to time constraints, however, the research in the French archives has not been even close to as comprehensive as elsewhere.
Finally, I have also benefited from a broad variety of interviews with \textit{Zeitzeugen}—former diplomats and politicians who in their time were directly or indirectly involved with the CSCE. Although not all of the interviewees have been included with explicit references in the footnotes, they have all provided me with invaluable insights and background information. Simultaneously, their contributions have helped make the topic more lively to the author. Hopefully some of that liveliness is conveyed to the reader on the pages that follow.

\textbf{Notes}


3. The acronyms used for the conference during its preparatory stages varied repeatedly over time, from ESC (European Security Conference) to CES (Conference on European Security) to CSE (Conference on Security in Europe). For the sake of clarity, I have chosen to refer to the conference consistently by its final name, the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe). The only exceptions to that rule are in direct citations, where the acronyms of the original documents are used.


20. For recently declassified documents from the NATO archives on the genesis of the Harmel Report, see the Parallel History Project (PHP) website <http://www.php.isn.ethz.


Introduction: Era of Negotiations


40. Of other Bonn Group members, the United States was obviously not included in the EPC. The UK joined the EPC mechanisms later on, but for a while only with the status of an EC applicant. France, then again, having pulled out of its military command in 1967, had a somewhat special position in NATO.

41. See in particular Westad (ed.), Reviewing the Cold War.


44. ‘Elastic scepticism’ is the characterisation used of the West German CSCE attitude during the Kiesinger Government in Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa (KSZE): Analyse und Dokumentation, edited by Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Wolfgang Mallman and Christian Meier, Köln: Wissenschaft und Politik 1973, 42.

45. In order to avoid a cacophony of languages, direct quotations have throughout the book been translated into English by the author, unless otherwise indicated.


Chapter 2

1966–69
Incubation of Strategies

ILLUSTRATION 2: Chancellor Willy Brandt (right) with State Secretary Egon Bahr in June 1972.

We hold the view that a mitigation and clarification of the relationship between the two parts of Germany is essential before the start of East–West conferences.

– Egon Bahr, September 1969

Governments and representatives of the economy and the sciences in East and West should already now be seeking ways of cooperation, so that useful discussions can be had on as many areas as possible. Genuine progress in practical cooperation will also benefit European security.

– Willy Brandt, June 1969

By early 1967 at the latest, all the major parties in Bonn had come to understand that the foreign policy pursued until then was only pushing the FRG into self-inflicted isolation – not only in the East, but also in the West. Instead of stubbornly holding on to the so-called Hallstein Doctrine, a new, more flexible approach towards the East, and especially towards the other German state, was badly needed. The partners of the Grand Coalition, the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democrats (SPD), as well as the liberal Free Democrats (FDP), now in opposition, were each eagerly discussing the prospects of a ‘European peace order’ (europäische Friedensordnung) as a possible solution to the impasse. To be sure, all of the parties had different ideas about such a future order. It remained a very elusive construction, since none of the parties was able to define the contents of this peace order in precise terms. Nevertheless, the thinking on foreign policy options was clearly in a state of flux. While this resulted in open controversies, and, towards the end of the decade, in an increasing paralysis in the decision-making of the Grand Coalition, it was also of fundamental importance in ushering in new strategies and approaches. Anything but a mere passive lull between two eras, therefore, the years of the Grand Coalition had a considerable impact on the reformulation of the foreign policy of the Federal Republic.

This also applies to West German policies with regard to a possible European security conference. On the surface, the Grand Coalition was remarkably reluctant to make any moves in the nascent conference process. However, as argued below, behind the scenes in Bonn things were certainly not dormant on the CSCE front. The focus in this chapter will be predominantly on the final six months of the Grand Coalition. A serious debate in Bonn on the prospects of a European security conference did not emerge until the spring of 1969, when the Warsaw Pact’s so-called Budapest Appeal in March and the subsequent Finnish initiative in May suddenly gave new impetus to the project. Simultaneously, the coalition partners in Bonn were finding it increasingly difficult to agree on a common position on foreign policy in general, and on the security conference
1966–69: Incubation of Strategies

in particular. But in spite of this deadlock, vitally important groundwork for the future West German CSCE policy was done precisely during these six months, from March to September 1969. Initial ideas for both main tracks covered in the following chapters of this book – the instrumental as well as the substantive approaches to the CSCE – were already developed before the formation of the SPD-FDP Government in the autumn of 1969.

The Early Years and the Eastern ‘Propaganda Circus’

Although the concept is, in retrospect, usually connected only with the Eastern Treaties accomplished by the subsequent Brandt–Scheel Government, it was already the Grand Coalition’s Eastern policy that was labelled the ‘new Ostpolitik’ at the time. And in fact, the change of government in the middle of the electoral term in late 1966 brought about a clear change in tone to the foreign policy of the Federal Republic. In his government declaration on 13 December 1966, Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger laid out his commitment to pursue a European peace order.5

While it was building on the peace note of the preceding Erhard Government and echoing even older ideas of Germany as a bridge between East and West, the suggested way forward was new. The European peace order was to be pursued by negotiating bilateral renunciation-of-force agreements with individual members of the Warsaw Pact. The Hallstein Doctrine was effectively given up during the first year of the Grand Coalition, beginning with the establishment of diplomatic relations with Romania in January 1967 and finalised with the similar move towards Yugoslavia in December.6 Yet there were clear limits to how far the Grand Coalition was prepared to go. Although Kiesinger agreed to commence a correspondence with the East German premier Willi Stoph in the summer of 1967, at this stage a diplomatic recognition of the GDR, or any lesser action indicating such recognition, was completely out of the question for Kiesinger’s CDU and Brandt’s SPD alike.

This, in turn, ensured that the Grand Coalition at first remained as sceptical as its predecessors to the idea of a European security conference. The latest Eastern call for a conference, issued at the Bucharest meeting of the Warsaw Pact in July 1966, had, in spite of some more forthcoming elements, included all the usual demands directed mainly at the Federal Republic, ranging from full diplomatic recognition of the GDR to a consolidation of the post-war borders in Europe.7 These preconditions alone were enough to make the security conference unacceptable in Bonn.

And in the beginning of the Grand Coalition’s term in office, the Soviet Union did not make the acceptance of its own proposal any easier for the
West Germans. The Kiesinger–Brandt Government had its first direct encounter with Eastern suggestions for a security conference in April 1967. A conference of national leaders of twenty-four communist parties in the Czechoslovakian town of Karlovy Vary resulted in a very harsh and provocative ‘declaration for peace and security in Europe’. Resembling, as Helga Haftendorn has put it, a ‘treatise on moral rearmament’, this statement, while also repeating the call for the convocation of a European security conference, was clearly a step or two in a less compromising direction than that of the Bucharest statement a year before. Not surprisingly, this Karlovy Vary statement, in essence a frontal attack against West German ‘imperialism’ and ‘revanchism’, led to no official response from the Federal Republic.

Among themselves, the Western Allies had been discussing the prospects of a possible security conference ever since the Bucharest statement in 1966. At a meeting of the planning staffs of the US, British and West German Foreign Ministries in July 1967, the Allies more or less agreed that entering East–West negotiations in a security conference according to the Soviet proposals was not likely to result in anything more than a mere ‘propaganda circus’. Although the idea of a security conference in general still deserved to be given further thought, it was considered necessary for all members of the Alliance to make it clear that they were not prepared to enter a conference under Soviet terms.

For the moment, the coalition partners in Bonn agreed in their evaluation of the Eastern conference initiatives. In December 1967, Foreign Minister Brandt was applauded by the Christian Democratic MPs at the Bundestag when he declared that the time was not yet ripe for a security conference. Instead, Western – and West German – détente efforts at that time were focused on two other major projects. First of all, since late 1966 the NATO countries had been active in outlining the ‘future tasks of the Alliance’, as the second decade of its existence was drawing to a close. In December 1967 the result of this exercise, the Harmel report, named after the Belgian Foreign Minister, was approved at ministerial level. The report emphasised the dual nature of defence and détente and, at the same time, also gave the military alliance a more outspoken political role than before. Secondly, partly as a response to the repeated Eastern proposals for a security conference, NATO Foreign Ministers gave a common declaration in the Icelandic capital in June 1968, calling for mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) in Europe. This ‘signal of Reykjavik’ marked the beginning of the MBFR process which was to run in parallel with the CSCE for years to come.

Significantly, the West Germans – Brandt himself and numerous officials of the Auswärtiges Amt – were actively involved in the drafting of the Harmel report as well as in the preparations of the Reykjavik MBFR initia-
tive. But in all, these moves were not enough to block the growing interest of certain NATO allies in the idea of a CSCE. In mid-March 1968, on The Netherlands’ initiative, the European security conference issue was again discussed in the political committee of NATO. The new instructions sent from Bonn to the West German NATO mission soon after that were unambiguous: for as long as the Soviets showed no sign of retreating from the maximal demands directed at the FRG, the Federal Government considered a European security conference to be an ‘unsuitable instrument’. Nevertheless, during the spring of 1968, some, especially Belgium, Denmark and Norway, continued to argue in favour of moving forward with the conference idea.

On the domestic level in Bonn, the FDP, the only opposition party in the Bundestag, was the first to develop a certain enthusiasm for a possible European security conference. The Free Democrats had started to revise their views on foreign policy immediately after the establishment of the Grand Coalition. The more progressive views in the party on foreign policy, especially on Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik, were articulated in a study drafted by Wolfgang Schollwer in January 1967. Schollwer, working for the press service of the FDP and a controversial figure within the party, had presented similar views in an earlier memorandum already in 1962. In the internal struggle for the leadership of the party, two supporters of a new course in foreign policy, Walter Scheel and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, finally gained the upper hand in the party conference in January 1968. Genscher, for his part, had spoken in favour of a European security conference, with the inclusion of the United States, as early as in 1966. In a Bundestag debate in April 1968, Genscher once again argued that the Federal Government should actually be the main proponent of an all-European security conference, since it stood to gain the most from it: such a conference was, Genscher stated, ‘in the long run probably the only international organ in which it would be possible, with at least some hope of success, also to discuss the German problems’.

In his response to Genscher a few days later, Herbert Wehner (SPD), Minister for All-German Affairs and the true dynamo behind the Grand Coalition, warned of the danger of slipping into a ‘conference slope’, which had originally been set up only to make the FRG the scapegoat for all East–West problems. However, Wehner implied that the Federal Government was considering possibilities to turn the tables and to make the conference useful for its own purposes. In June 1968, in another foreign policy debate in the Bundestag, Brandt declared that his recent discussions with foreign leaders, in the East and in the West, had confirmed his view that the time for a European security conference had not yet arrived. Nevertheless, both Brandt and Wehner now suggested that further discussion of the idea was
needed and that more emphasis should be given to developing a German contribution to a ‘security component of a European peace order’.  

One highly controversial attempt at this kind of contribution was delivered only a week later, when Brandt’s trusted adviser, Egon Bahr, at this time head of the Auswärtiges Amt planning staff, finished his draft on possible conceptions of European security. This memorandum was later leaked to the West German press, and published in September 1973 under the provocative title ‘How Egon Bahr wants to neutralise Germany’. Bahr has consistently distanced himself from that label, but Alexander Gallus is correct in identifying certain neutralist tendencies in Bahr’s thinking at that time. Yet Anthony Nicholls makes a valid point in reminding us that the Ostpolitik of the FRG was never truly neutralist. Although Bahr clearly was toying with the idea of a neutral German role between East and West, one should not draw too far-reaching conclusions on the basis of this single planning-staff paper. As Timothy Garton Ash has argued in this very context, planners are indeed there to think the unthinkable.

Nevertheless, Bahr’s thoughts were certainly explosive at the time. In the paper, Bahr listed three different détente scenarios. In conception A, NATO and the Warsaw Pact were to remain antagonistic organisations but individual states in the East and the West were to seek a maximum of détente and disarmament. In conception B, NATO and the Warsaw Pact were to remain separate organisations but to lose their antagonistic nature because of their ‘enmeshment’ in common institutions, possibly leading to a ‘European security commission’ after a preceding European security conference. In conception C, the alliances were to be dissolved and replaced by a completely new common European security system, guaranteed by the United States and the Soviet Union, but without their participation. In Bahr’s view, the third option was clearly the most promising one for the FRG, possibly creating suitable circumstances for reunification and at least leaving the solution of the German question open. Replacing NATO and the Warsaw Pact with a pan-European security system, the organs of which would be seated in Berlin, Bahr argued, would help to overcome the status quo and would be a move closer towards a European peace order.

However, to Bahr none of this seemed compatible at this stage with the idea of a CSCE. By contrast, for all the radical thoughts in the memorandum, Bahr’s views on the European security conference remained fairly conventional. Bahr did suggest that the Western MBFR initiative, aired only a few days earlier in Reykjavik, might be useful in filling the Eastern conference idea with needed substance. But, he went on, it would be illusory to think that the conference agenda could be limited to this topic. Instead, the Soviet Union would use the conference to push ahead its maximal demands, especially the recognition of the GDR. Therefore, Bahr ar-
gued, for the time being any multilateral negotiations involving the GDR in general, and a European security conference in particular, especially as foreseen in his scenario B, were to be avoided. Since East German participation in a security conference was inevitable, Bahr reasoned, the GDR would as a result gain an immense enhancement in its international position, without the West receiving anything in return. Thus, at this moment, Bahr joined the majority of decision-makers in Bonn in perceiving the security conference as harmful to West German interests.

The theoretical considerations of the future shape of East–West cooperation in Europe were rapidly overtaken by events in the night of 20–21 August 1968. The Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia dealt a crushing blow, not only to the reformists led by Alexander Dubček in Prague, but to proponents of détente all over the world. The impact of the Prague invasion was also deeply felt in Bonn. In fact, it marked an important watershed in the Grand Coalition’s time in office, since the conclusions drawn by the coalition partners were almost diametrically opposite to each other. Whereas Brandt, Bahr and their entourage stressed the importance of continuing détente efforts, Kiesinger was under increasing pressure from the ranks of his own party to take a harder line in foreign policy towards the East. Thus, from August 1968 onwards, the mistrust and distance between Kiesinger and Brandt, to a certain extent inherent to begin with, started to grow dramatically. As Dirk Kroegel has pointed out, from then on Kiesinger was no longer prepared to publicly defend the views of his Foreign Minister, let alone be in any way influenced by them.

All the same, as far as the CSCE was concerned, the severely damaged working relationship between Kiesinger and Brandt was not seriously tested for a while. The events in Prague ensured that the idea of a European security conference was temporarily off the table. Although the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko repeated the suggestion for such a conference in his speech at the UN General Assembly in October 1968, the response in the West was lukewarm at best. And so it remained for the following months. It was not until March 1969 that a more serious discussion about the European security conference resurfaced. The decisive push came, once again, from the East.

The Budapest Appeal: ‘We Could Have Drafted it Ourselves’

As a result of the one-day summit meeting of its Political Consultative Committee in Budapest on 17 March 1969, the Warsaw Pact issued, in addition to the usual communiqué, an ‘appeal to all European states’. This
Budapest Appeal, as it became known, explicitly referred to the declaration made in Bucharest in July 1966, calling again for a pan-European conference to address questions of European security and peaceful cooperation. But the tone of the appeal was new – implying that the Soviet attitude had changed significantly in a more conciliatory direction. Above all, this change was sparked by the Sino-Soviet border clashes on the Ussuri River in early March 1969. Confronted with a potential conflict in the East, the Soviet Union needed stability in the West. Against this backdrop, the Budapest Appeal was in all likelihood an effort to offset the negative impact of the Prague invasion.

Accordingly, the change in the Western response, compared with the very shallow attention given to the Karlovy Vary statement in the summer of 1967, was also quite remarkable. This time, in spite of the heavy burden of the recent Prague invasion, the Warsaw Pact document was carefully examined in Bonn, as in other European capitals. In the Federal Republic, the harsh attacks on West German militarism and ‘revanchism’ included in previous Warsaw Pact initiatives were naturally well remembered. Therefore, the clearly less aggressive tone of the Budapest Appeal was greeted with a mixture of old suspicions of Soviet motives and careful optimism. It can fairly be said that the former mood was more prevalent within the CDU/CSU and in the Chancellery, the latter within the SPD, the opposition party FDP, and in the Auswärtiges Amt. After the Budapest Appeal, for the remaining six months before the federal election, the discussion about the security conference was one – although certainly not the only – symptom of two simultaneous developments: the increasingly differing foreign policy views between the coalition partners on the one hand, the rapprochement of the ideas of the SPD and the FDP on the other.

In the Foreign Ministry, the first planning staff analysis of the Budapest Appeal immediately after the Warsaw Pact meeting characterised the appeal as a surprising change of course in Soviet foreign policy. The tone and contents of the appeal were substantially more conciliatory than those in the Bucharest proposal three years earlier. Although the Soviet insistence on recognition of the European status quo was still visible in it, the appeal was seen as the ‘most positive general declaration heard from the East for a long time’. The memorandum even suggested that large sections of the appeal could in fact have been drafted in the Auswärtiges Amt.

Foreign Minister Brandt followed suit in the foreign policy debate at the Bundestag on 19 March 1969. Whereas Rainer Barzel (CDU) left no doubt about his reservations regarding the latest Warsaw Pact proposal, Brandt argued that the appeal did constitute a surprising change of course, at least one of a tactical nature. Brandt noted the minimum of polemics contained in the appeal, in comparison with the aggressive Karlovy Vary dec-
laration. Nevertheless, in his Bundestag address, Brandt suggested that the initiative might also be a sign of a more active strategy of the Warsaw Pact – instead of waiting for an internal erosion of NATO, the Warsaw Pact might again be trying to weaken the coherence of the Alliance by addressing the European states separately.  

In a statement given to the Hungarian news agency on the same day, Brandt’s tone was clearly more optimistic. While calling for concrete deeds instead of mere declarations, for example in the form of force reductions, and demanding that the conference had to be carefully prepared, Brandt supported the idea in principle: ‘We embrace this idea. The realisation of such a conference could bring closer the solution of the existing problems in Central Europe, and that would meet the interests of the German people and the countries in question.’  

Within the Auswärtiges Amt, this Hungarian interview with the Foreign Minister became the first point of reference for an official West German position on the security conference.  

Ulrich Sahm, a key official in Brandt’s Foreign Ministry, struck a slightly more careful note in a memorandum which was also forwarded to Chancellor Kiesinger. In Sahm’s view, although the unusually realistic tone of the appeal was remarkable and numerous points in it were ‘compatible with the Ostpolitik of the Grand Coalition’, that change was unlikely to be anything other than a tactical move. Because of this, Sahm argued, at that moment a European conference as well as a suggested preparatory conference would be against West German interests. For the time being, a conference could only end in failure, for which the Federal Republic would be blamed. Nevertheless, Sahm continued, if the conference was convened ‘without preconditions, with the inclusion of the US, and if thorough preparation gave well-founded reason to expect success from it’, it was in the West German interest to declare Bonn’s readiness to it, in principle. Importantly, Sahm also noted that the surprisingly conciliatory tone of the appeal would almost certainly have an impact on the ‘politically influential public of the West European states’, and therefore increase pressure on the respective governments to work in favour of a security conference.  

Sahm’s memorandum brilliantly highlights the dichotomy visible in all of the early reactions to the Budapest Appeal in the Auswärtiges Amt. On the one hand, the appeal was welcomed for being ‘unusually realistic’ and ‘polemically abstinent’. Its demands for reduction of tension, renunciation of the use and the threat of force, and enhanced cooperation were recognised to be ‘strikingly moderate’ and ‘in accordance with the principles of our Ostpolitik’. But, on the other hand, the Soviet motives behind the appeal and their implications for the German question were deeply mistrusted. Conciliatory rhetoric alone was not enough to assure West Ger-
man officials that a European security conference would be anything else than yet another instrument for the Soviet Union to pursue its old objectives: cementing the status quo in Europe and the German division, reducing the American presence in Europe, and weakening the coherence of NATO. In the week following the Budapest Appeal, Brandt specifically instructed the top officials in the Auswärtiges Amt to deal with the initiative ‘delicately’ and to ‘refrain from negative statements’. Thus, in spite of a fair amount of scepticism still making the rounds in the Auswärtiges Amt, by late March 1969 the Foreign Minister was clearly no longer willing to dismiss the CSCE offer.

In Kiesinger’s Chancellery, by contrast, outright mistrust of the Warsaw Pact initiative continued to be the predominant mood. Immediately after Brandt’s Bundestag statement in March, Walter Boss from the foreign policy department of the Chancellery wrote a memorandum to Kiesinger, comparing the declarations issued by the Warsaw Pact in Bucharest and Budapest. In Boss’s view, the Bucharest declaration of 1966, to begin with, had not been as forthcoming as some in the West had interpreted it to be. Furthermore, Boss argued, as far as the German question was concerned, the Warsaw Pact took an even harder position in the Budapest Appeal than had been the case in Bucharest. Therefore he thought it was simply wrong to see the Budapest declaration as a ‘change of course’ in the Soviet Union’s Western policy. In Boss’s view the latest appeal had also encountered ‘remarkable reservations’ in most Western capitals, especially in Paris, London and Washington.

This view of strong Allied reservations was indeed supported in various discussions of the Bonn Group in late March 1969. Jonathan Dean from the US embassy in Bonn expressed his worries of a ‘free two-year period of propaganda’ that a security conference would grant to the Soviets. If a conference was ever to be convened, Dean argued, the least the West should do would be to secure notable concessions in return, for example by linking the conference to progress on the Berlin situation. At the monthly quadripartite lunch, the Budapest Appeal was touched upon only briefly – but enough to make the State Secretary of the Auswärtiges Amt, Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz, stand out with clearly a more positive attitude towards the conference idea than the three ambassadors.

In line with the scepticism of his advisors and the major allies of the FRG, Chancellor Kiesinger appeared to be utterly suspicious of the latest Warsaw Pact move. Actually, instead of openly criticising the conference proposal, he maintained an almost complete silence on the topic in the weeks following the Budapest Appeal. While Brandt referred to it in numerous public statements, Kiesinger hardly mentioned the document at all. One of the rare exceptions was his visit to Vienna in late March. There,
the Chancellor stressed to his Austrian colleague Josef Klaus that, unlike Brandt, he did not consider that the appeal marked a change in Soviet policy. However, Kiesinger also told Klaus that he, too, was in favour of putting the ‘hard core’ of the appeal, the part regarding Germany, to the test.44

Kiesinger was certainly correct in identifying the actual core of the Budapest Appeal. Just like the preceding calls for a security conference, the Budapest Appeal included a long list of ‘main prerequisites (Hauptvoraussetzungen) for safeguarding European security’, aimed directly at the Federal Republic. These included the inviolability of borders, recognition of the Oder-Neisse border, diplomatic recognition of both German states, renunciation of the FRG’s claim for sole representation of the German people, German abstention from nuclear weapons, and recognition of the special status of West Berlin.45 For Kiesinger and for the CDU/CSU in general this list of demands was reason enough to reject the conference proposal altogether. By contrast, Brandt and his key advisors were, from the outset, interested in finding out the nature of these claims: were they to be understood as preconditions (Vorbedingungen) for convening a conference or as a list of objects to be negotiated at a conference?46

To address this and other open questions regarding the Budapest Appeal, Brandt arranged to have a meeting with the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn, Semjon Tsarapkin, on 1 April. Brandt stressed that clarification of the contents of the appeal was important for forming a West German position on the issue before the NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Washington. Rather circumspectly, Tsarapkin stated that although the conditions listed in the Budapest Appeal were prerequisites (Voraussetzungen) for safeguarding European security, that did not mean that the signatories of the appeal saw them as preconditions (Vorbedingungen) for convening the conference. As Brandt insisted on the importance of US and Canadian participation, Tsarapkin evaded with the standard Soviet reply: European security was first and foremost a European question, and there were hardly any forces outside Europe that would have as strong an interest in it as the European countries. Brandt was also unable to receive an answer to his question on whether the Budapest Appeal’s references to arms limitation meant that the Warsaw Pact was willing to consider the MBFR initiative made by NATO in Reykjavík.47

A sequel to this meeting followed only three days later, at Tsarapkin’s request. In between the Soviet Ambassador had obviously received new instructions from Moscow, and was prepared to meet Brandt closer to halfway. Tsarapkin was determined to reassure Brandt that convening the security conference would not be connected with any kind of preconditions. He also told the Foreign Minister that the Soviet Government was fully prepared to engage in discussions and consultations on the entire complex
of issues related to the conference. Furthermore, the Soviet view on US participation had suddenly softened. Because European security was the issue, it was up to the European states to decide whether they welcomed US participation or not. Brandt welcomed this Soviet readiness for discussion, but argued that careful preparation was needed. It was better not to have a conference at all than to have a failed one. Overall, however, Brandt seemed to be very content with the results of the meeting – the Warsaw Pact was not setting any preconditions for the conference and seemed to be interested in genuine improvements in East–West relations.48

The change of tone between these two meetings is actually quite remarkable. Although Tsarapkin attempted, in the latter meeting, to suggest that other Western states were accusing the FRG of blocking the security conference with its rigid views, his behaviour rather indicated the opposite. The Soviet Ambassador was at pains to convince the West German Foreign Minister of the viability of the European security conference, probably hoping that Brandt would be key to winning over the support of other NATO countries. If the security conference issue had been raised for propaganda purposes alone, the Soviets would hardly have signalled their willingness to negotiate with the West about its terms.

In any case, the two discussions between Tsarapkin and Brandt were crucial in forming the West German position on a security conference before the NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Washington. Whereas the Chancellery had been very doubtful all along, the Auswärtiges Amt had from the outset drawn the conclusion that the West should signal its preparedness for a European security conference, provided that four conditions were met – there were no preconditions set for it, the United States and Canada would participate in it, the conference was carefully prepared and there was reason to expect some tangible results from it.49 Now, the irony of a West German ‘precondition for no preconditions’ notwithstanding, Brandt’s meetings with Tsarapkin and reports from West German embassies abroad indicated that the Soviet Union was prepared to meet the first two demands. The catch was obviously in the latter two, the ambiguous demand for careful preparations and tangible results, which in effect left open the possibility to hold back negotiations for as long as was considered necessary. In any case, Brandt and his trusted officials in the Auswärtiges Amt had reason to be optimistic about the prospects of a security conference. What they had to take into consideration, however, were the suspicions of their allies. As Sahm put it in a memorandum even before the Brandt–Tsarapkin meetings, it was important to avoid giving the impression that the Germans were suddenly trying, bilaterally with the Soviets, to rush ahead of their allies on the conference front.50
Consultations Abroad, Electioneering at Home

In the North Atlantic framework, the Budapest Appeal had, at German and Dutch requests, been on the agenda of the NATO Council in Brussels already on 24 March. Then, the French Ambassador had been the only one equipped with more detailed – and rather sceptical – instructions from his government. The majority of the representatives had agreed that the security conference initiative should be discussed by the Foreign Ministers at their upcoming meeting in Washington.51

Prior to this twentieth anniversary gathering of NATO Foreign Ministers on 10–11 April, embassy reports from West German missions signalled that most NATO members had serious doubts about the security conference idea.52 Despite this disadvantageous starting point, Brandt did his best to make sure that the Budapest Appeal was high on the agenda in Washington. In bilateral and quadripartite discussions prior to the actual ministerial meeting, Brandt tried to convince his US, British and French colleagues William Rogers, Michael Stewart and Michel Debré to take the appeal seriously. While assuring his fellow ministers that he did not consider the security conference to be topical immediately, Brandt argued that bluntly rejecting the proposal would only strengthen ‘wrong elements’ in the Warsaw Pact. Although the three Allied Foreign Ministers were clearly more sceptical, at least the West German record shows them agreeing with Brandt that it would be unwise to respond to the Budapest Appeal negatively.53

In his official statement in the Washington ministerial meeting, Brandt made the case strongly for ‘taking the Warsaw Pact countries at their word’. Instead of rejecting the proposal, Brandt argued, NATO members ought to respond to it by signalling their willingness to pursue a European security conference, while also reminding the Warsaw Pact of the MBFR initiative. This, Brandt pointed out, would be the best way to find out what motives lay behind the Warsaw Pact suggestion.54 Other delegations agreed with the West German view that a European security conference would only make sense if the United States and Canada took part in it, if it was carefully prepared, if tangible results could be expected from it, and if no preconditions were set for the conference and its results.55 Thus, the four West German ‘essentials’ regarding a possible CSCE, formulated in the Auswärtiges Amt soon after the Budapest Appeal, were adopted as a common NATO position.

In his final dispatch from the Washington meeting, Hans Ruete, Political Director56 of the Auswärtiges Amt, concluded that Brandt’s statement was greeted with interest and general acceptance. Most of Brandt’s colleagues agreed that the moderate tone of the appeal was notable, and that
the NATO Council should examine it in more detail. However, in the end the Budapest Appeal was not explicitly mentioned in the final communiqué of the ministerial meeting. The main reason given for leaving the appeal out of the communiqué was the sharp declaration the Soviet Government had published on the twentieth anniversary of NATO. The Alliance could either discuss both documents or neither of them, Brandt later argued.

On the whole, it seems, Brandt was fairly successful in making his point understood among his colleagues. To be sure, most Foreign Ministers – with the exception of Italy’s Pietro Nenni – were somewhat more reserved in their attitudes towards the security conference than Brandt. But, as both Ruete and Brandt stressed after their return to Bonn, the ministers had unanimously agreed that the Budapest Appeal should not be rejected completely. In spite of the scepticism of many members, the Alliance had laid out its own ‘balanced and constructive’ position to the security conference. And in fact, it was already in the Washington meeting that the Foreign Ministers agreed to begin discussions within the NATO structures about how to proceed in East–West negotiations. The Council was instructed to prepare a list of possible issues for fruitful negotiation and early resolution, and to report on the progress of that exploration at the following meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in six months. As Hartmut Mayer has pointed out, therefore, the Alliance basically accepted the idea of a CSCE already in April 1969.

It was at home in Bonn that Brandt’s position caused greater controversy. Throughout the ministerial meeting, the large national West German newspapers had reported disagreements between Brandt and his colleagues in Washington about a suitable line on the security conference. This, as was to be expected, was not at all well received in the Chancellery. On 10 April, in a letter to Kiesinger, State Secretary Karl Carstens referred to the news reports as well as the protocols of the Foreign Minister’s earlier discussions with Tsarapkin, and argued that Brandt had talked ‘too positively’ about the security conference. On the following day, Kiesinger brought this criticism into the open in a public speech. Some Germans, the Chancellor said, had ‘unfounded illusions’ about the Budapest Appeal and the security conference. The Federal Government had continuously stressed that ‘a European peace order could not be created by making the German people accept the Soviet demands for eternalising the forced status quo in Europe’. Yet those hard and unconditional demands, Kiesinger argued, were exactly what were hidden behind the friendly-sounding sentences of the Budapest declaration.

Within the Chancellery, Carstens was especially active in attacking Brandt in this context. In a further memorandum to Kiesinger a few days
later, the State Secretary stressed that recent foreign policy developments in Bonn ‘filled him with great concern’. One of the main reasons for this was the positive statement on the security conference Brandt had made in Washington. In Carstens’ view, Brandt’s behaviour was difficult to understand, since the Warsaw Pact wanted to use the conference first and foremost to weaken the position of West Berlin and the Federal Republic. To press his point, Carstens suggested that Kiesinger should take the matter up with Brandt personally, and also drafted a letter of his own to be sent to the Foreign Minister, highlighting their disagreements on the CSCE issue. In it, Carstens criticised Brandt for failing to tell the Soviet Ambassador in their recent meeting that the Federal Government did not approve of the suggestions of the Budapest Declaration regarding Germany and Berlin. As for the NATO ministerial meeting in Washington, Carstens would have wished to hear Brandt declare there that the most important purpose of the conference for the Soviets was to seal the German division.

Thus, the growing rift between the two views within the Grand Coalition on the European security conference was becoming increasingly apparent. Since the differences in the statements made by Kiesinger and Brandt were so easily discernible, Ruete’s attempt to assure a Soviet embassy official in mid-April that the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister had agreed in their analyses about the situation ‘before, during and after the NATO conference’ was half-hearted and futile. Even more so, since Ruete added that the Soviet embassy should consider Brandt’s statements in a press conference on 14 April as the official West German position.

The disagreements were no longer confined to the domestic arena, either. In April Kiesinger told the Swedish Prime Minister Tage Erlander he did not believe that a European security conference would actually be convened. Whereas Erlander approved of the conference idea, provided that the United States took part in it, Kiesinger argued that the Americans simply did not want this kind of conference and that the only thing that could be advanced by it was the recognition of the European status quo. In Kiesinger’s view Brandt and Nenni had been the only exceptions to the otherwise reserved statements in the Washington meeting. Kiesinger also told the Swedish premier that prior to the NATO ministerial meeting he had warned Brandt ‘not to go too far’.

Brandt defended his views at an SPD party conference in Bad Godesberg. Reminding his audience that there was no reason to overestimate the significance of the Budapest Appeal, he nevertheless stressed how important it was to find out whether it had been meant to be taken seriously. In this view, Brandt declared, he had been fully supported by allies in Washington. ‘And I am certain’, he added, ‘that at the end of the day even the chairman of the CDU will not have any objections to it’. So far, however,
neither the Chancellor nor his subordinates showed any sign of changing their minds. Instead, Hermann Wentker, a specialist on Deutschlandpolitik at the Chancellery, strongly criticised Brandt’s views, calling it ‘politically inexpedient’ to enter a conference which would only suck the West Germans into the ‘maelstrom of Eastern ideas on the German question’. Furthermore, Wentker considered attempts to present the Budapest Appeal as a serious proposal to be a deception of the general public.\textsuperscript{72}

Towards the end of April, the security conference issue was also discussed in the parliamentary framework in Bonn – confidentially in the Foreign Policy Committee of the Bundestag as well as publicly in the plenary debates. In the session of the Foreign Policy Committee on 24 April, Brandt told the members that he was certainly not expecting the conference to be convened ‘next week at 5 p.m.’. Nevertheless, Brandt declared, contrary to some press reports the Allies had supported him in Washington in the view that it was not advisable to reject the Eastern proposal completely. Instead of arguing about technicalities, the focus should be on the agenda of a possible conference. Agreement to coordinate the bilateral East–West contacts of individual NATO members in this respect had, in Brandt’s opinion, been the essential achievement of the NATO ministerial meeting.\textsuperscript{73}

On the following day, in the plenary debate of the Bundestag, Brandt was again confronted with the alleged contradiction between his actions and the scepticism of his NATO colleagues regarding Soviet proposals for a ‘mammoth conference on European security’. Brandt, in his response to this question posed by a Christian Democrat MP, denied the allegation. On the contrary, he argued, there had been a high degree of agreement in principle on the judgement of the Budapest Appeal in Washington: ‘In agreement with most of my colleagues, I consider it essential that the West does not allow itself to be pressed into a negative position or into a merely reactive role’.\textsuperscript{74} In fact, for all their disagreements in the large foreign policy debate in the same Bundestag session, the leaders of all three parliamentary groups – Helmut Schmidt (SPD), Rainer Barzel (CDU/CSU) and Wolfgang Mischnick (FDP) – managed to agree that it would be useful to sound out the Soviet proposal through diplomatic channels, in order to discover what it was truly made of.\textsuperscript{75}

Purely in substance, then, there was hardly sufficient reason for the domestic controversy about the West German position towards a possible CSCE, and especially about Brandt’s role in the NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting. There were genuine differences of opinion, but by and large all the three major political parties agreed that if the necessary precautions were met, the idea of a European security conference was worth looking into further. However, those minor differences that did exist were dramat-
ically sharpened by the overall state of the Grand Coalition. With still five more months to go until the federal election in September, the partnership between the CDU/CSU and SPD had already turned into rivalry, especially in foreign policy issues. The security conference provided the main contenders, Kiesinger and Brandt, with one possible issue to make their differences felt – at times leading both sides to an inadvertent exaggeration of their own positions, as Waldemar Besson has noted. In addition, apart from being personal, between the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister, the controversy about the prospective CSCE during the remainder of the Grand Coalition’s time in office was to a large extent also institutional, between key officials in the Chancellery and the Auswärtiges Amt. Short-term electioneering and long-running institutional rivalries were central factors in the inability of the Grand Coalition to form a firm West German position towards the security conference.

But on the international level, at the same time, Brandt and his Auswärtiges Amt played an important role in initiating a serious discussion about the security conference within the West. Although most of Brandt’s colleagues were not as responsive to the Budapest Appeal as the West German Foreign Minister, the NATO ministerial meeting in April 1969 marked the beginning of multilateral Western preparations for a possible East–West meeting. For the time being, admittedly, these preparations were very speculative in character, given that the Eastern proposals lacked any concrete ideas of procedure and timetable leading to the convening of a European security conference. This situation was soon to change, with a surprise move by the Finnish Government.

Nobody Expects the Finnish Initiative

Following the instructions in the Washington communiqué (paragraph 5), the permanent NATO machinery in Brussels was engaged with the proposed CSCE already in late April. At a Political Committee meeting on 22 April, comparing their recent experiences, the representatives noted that especially Soviet, Romanian and Hungarian diplomats had been very active in Western capitals lately, trying to promote the conference idea. This ‘Soviet smile offensive’, as a French official called it, had failed to make a convincing impression. Nevertheless, the Allies started their discussion on a ‘list of issues for possible East–West negotiations’, as prescribed by the ministers in Washington. In the first Senior Political Committee (SPC) meeting, the West German representative argued for dividing the issues into three categories, to be approached chronologically in that order: (1) smaller steps to sound out the intentions of the Warsaw Pact countries and
to reduce suspicion on both sides; (2) discussion of topics in the cultural, scientific, technological and economic sphere; and (3) a wide range of disarmament and arms control issues, including balanced force reductions. Interestingly, the West German official concluded that a solution of the problems regarding Germany and Berlin could only be attempted at the end of all these negotiation rounds. In its report in early May, the NATO Council stressed the importance of ‘due caution and careful preparation of positions’.

But a completely new variable in the nascent debate about a European security conference was introduced on 5 May 1969, when Finland suddenly distributed an aide-mémoire to all European governments as well as to the United States and Canada. In the memorandum, the Finnish Government declared itself to be ‘favourably disposed to the convening of a conference on European security problems’ and offered to act as a host to such a conference as well as a possible preparatory meeting, ‘provided that the Governments concerned consider this as appropriate’. Arguing for their suitability to host the conference, the Finns especially stressed their ‘impartial attitude towards the most vital problem of European security, the German question’.

In view of Finland’s problematic position as a neutral country under constant political pressure from its large Eastern neighbour, such a move coming from Helsinki was destined to raise suspicions in the West that Finland was acting merely as a Soviet puppet in Moscow’s pet project. The blunder of opening the memorandum with a direct reference to the Soviet Government was hardly helpful to the Finnish officials trying to avert Western suspicions. In the light of archival sources and recent scholarship, however, the assurances of the Finns at the time seem to have been well-founded. The Soviets certainly put pressure on Finland to act in favour of the conference, more so than the Foreign Ministry in Helsinki was willing to admit openly. But the formulation, contents and timing of the memorandum were truly of Finnish origin.

Clearly, both Finland and the FRG had a special position in the Soviet blueprint for a security conference. On 8 April, the Soviet Ambassador in Finland, Andrei Kovalev, showed up on the doorstep of Tamminiemi, President Urho Kekkonen’s residence in Helsinki. Kovalev called for Finnish support for the recent Budapest Appeal, explicitly arguing with the West German case. ‘If several European countries approach the proposal positively, the Federal Republic of Germany can no longer take an opposing position.’ Yet although Soviet suggestions always had to be taken seriously in Helsinki, the memorandum issued four weeks later was actually quite skilfully drafted to serve Finnish interests as well, in domestic and foreign policies alike. Kimmo Rentola, a Finnish scholar, has put it
1966–69: Incubation of Strategies

poignantly: ‘When bowing to Soviet pressure, Kekkonen clearly wanted to give the idea a touch of his own.’ Moreover, from the Soviet perspective, at the turn of the decade the Finns were no longer such trustworthy messengers as they had once been. As Rentola argues, in 1969–70 the Kremlin leadership was increasingly worried about Finland’s threatening ‘slide’ away from its grip.

Interestingly, the Finnish initiative was not completely new in May 1969. Paavo Keisalo, one of the key Finnish officials involved with the CSCE process in the 1970s, told the author that the Finnish Foreign Ministry had toyed with the idea of getting active in the CSCE context already a year earlier. Secretly prepared in the spring of 1968 for Kekkonen’s visit to the Soviet Union, the speech containing the original initiative to act as host for a security conference was, however, never made during that trip. Having been suppressed by the Prague events in August 1968, the idea was then rediscovered at a lunch between Kekkonen and the Finnish UN Ambassador Max Jakobson in Tamminiemi on 29 April 1969.

Paradoxically, the main goal behind the Finnish proposal was not the convening of a security conference. Instead, as Keijo Korhonen, then Deputy Political Director in the Foreign Ministry, has said, its main aim was to serve as a ‘driving anchor’ of Finnish policy towards the two German states. At the time, Finland was the only country in Europe that had not fully recognised either of the German states yet maintained diplomatic relations with both of them on equal footing – instead of embassies, these relations were taken care of on the level of trade missions. In order to maintain this status as a cornerstone of the policy of neutrality, and to dodge growing domestic and foreign pressures to recognise the GDR, the conference initiative was intended to highlight the value of this exceptional Finnish position in the German question. This has also been confirmed by Jakobson, who argues that the CSCE initiative was only a diversionary move, intended to safeguard Finnish neutrality. Focusing on this instrumental value of their initiative, in May 1969 nobody in the Finnish leadership actually expected it to lead to anything substantial as far as the security conference was concerned. Yet only a few weeks later, faced with a flow of positive responses to the CSCE memorandum, ‘the magician himself was surprised’, as President Kekkonen wrote under his pen name.

The West Germans, at the time, naturally did not know the complete background of the Finnish surprise move. Nevertheless, first analyses of the memorandum in the Auswärtiges Amt were relatively sober and positive. Having received the aide-mémoire on 5 May, Ruete told the head of the Finnish trade mission in Bonn that the West German view of a possible security conference was ‘fairly similar’ to that of the Finns. Ruete also
confirmed that Bonn did not oppose the participation of the GDR. The representatives of the FRG in Moscow and Helsinki concluded that the Finns seemed to have thought out their initiative more or less on their own. Although the Soviets had probably been consulted, ‘it would certainly be wrong to see the memorandum only as the extended arm of the Kremlin’.92

Yet in spite of the general benevolence towards the Finnish move in the Auswärtiges Amt, it also posed the Federal Republic with a dilemma. At least temporarily, it complicated the emerging plans to make the conference project useful for the Deutschlandpolitik of the FRG. First hints of these plans can be seen in the widely noted speech Brandt gave in Hamburg on 7 May 1969, focusing precisely on the European security conference. Drafted before the delivery of the Finnish memorandum, the speech had been intended by Egon Bahr to be perceived as an ‘important political step’ by the audience in Hamburg as well as by the Soviet Union.93

In his speech, Brandt underscored the implications of the Budapest Appeal for inner-German relations. They were twofold. On the one hand, in Brandt’s view, the appeal indicated that it would be possible to overcome the ‘unrealistic preconditions’ for talks between Bonn and East Berlin. Because the GDR was among the signatories of the Budapest Appeal, Brandt argued, there was reason to believe that the East Germans finally agreed that solving the problems arising from the German division could not be treated as preconditions for entering inner-German talks, any more than for convening a security conference. On the other hand, Brandt went on to explain that for the Federal Republic it was even more important now than before to improve inner-German relations prior to a security conference. Otherwise, the conference would be unnecessarily burdened by ‘German quarrels’.94

This was a prime example of the paradoxical relationship the FRG had to the ‘Europeanisation’ of the German question. It was essential for Bonn to press the GDR to admit that the German division was a European problem, and that solving the problem by negotiations was in a general European interest. But at the same time, the FRG insisted on tackling these problems bilaterally, not in a pan-European conference. Putting the solution of the German problem on the agenda of a multilateral forum was certainly one of the last things that any Federal Government in Bonn – regardless of its composition – wanted. For as long as the allies of the FRG remained suspicious of the conference, however, Brandt and Bahr seem to have thought that it would be possible to delay its being convened long enough in order to make substantial progress in the inner-German relationship before that. Arguing with the threat of ‘German quarrels’ at a future security conference, they hoped to put pressure on the GDR to agree to inner-German negotiations.
And it was precisely here that the Finnish initiative contradicted West German interests. The move by a neutral country made the idea of a European security conference more acceptable in the West than when it had been exclusive to the Warsaw Pact. Simultaneously, it dramatically accelerated the process from a speculative idea towards an actual conference. Moreover, it required every addressee to react to it. For the West Germans, even those who had so far been vocally in favour of a CSCE, this turned out to be a difficult task. In his Hamburg speech, given two days after the Finnish initiative, Brandt did not mention the Finnish memorandum at all. In subsequent weeks, the Auswärtiges Amt, let alone the Chancellery, was extremely reluctant to comment on the Finnish initiative publicly in any way.

This silence clearly irritated the Soviet Union. In Bonn, the Soviet Ambassador even made the extraordinarily clumsy effort to persuade the head of the Finnish trade mission, Martti Salomies, to act on behalf of Moscow. At a meeting organised at very short notice in mid-May, Tsarapkin urged the Finn to contact State Secretary Duckwitz or other influential figures in the Auswärtiges Amt in order to ‘squeeze out’ at least a preliminary reply, and then to inform Tsarapkin of it. Salomies cautiously refused, arguing that he could neither put pressure on German officials, nor share confidential information from third parties with Tsarapkin without permission from the Finnish Government.

Meanwhile, the NATO members had agreed to consult each other about the Finnish initiative and pledged that none of them would give a binding answer to the Finns before that. The issue was set on the agenda of the Political Committee and the Council for 13–14 May. In preparation for these consultations in Brussels, Ruete sent detailed instructions to the West German NATO mission. In the telegram, Ruete praised the ‘soberly balanced’ text of the Finnish memorandum, which was considered to reflect the endeavours of the Finnish Government to maintain correct neutrality. However, Ruete was clearly concerned about the implications of the Finnish initiative for the German question, especially its characterisation of the German question as ‘the most vital problem of European security’.

In the NATO Council meeting on 14 May, the Allies struggled to find a common position on the Finnish memorandum. The Scandinavian countries and Canada assessed the move in very positive terms, whereas the United States, supported by the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Turkey and Britain, suspected that the Finns were, first and foremost, advancing Soviet interests and increasing the propaganda effect of the Budapest Appeal. The West German NATO Ambassador Wilhelm Grewe stood between these extremes. Following instructions, Grewe suggested that ‘no reply should be given to the proposal for preparatory work and a subsequent
conference, but that after consultation in NATO individual replies should be sent which could state interest in the Finnish proposal and agree that “detailed bilateral soundings” would be the necessary first stage. Summing up the consultation, NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio declared that the members should reply to the Finnish initiative individually. The possibilities ranged from the British proposal (‘take note and undertake to bear in mind’) to the ‘more forthcoming’ West German view.

Given a closer look, however, the position on the Finnish memorandum in the Auswärtiges Amt was not too forthcoming either. The FRG was prepared to conduct ‘bilateral soundings’, but for the time being, there was not going to be an official reply to the Finns. Accordingly, in a press conference on 19 May in Bonn, Foreign Minister Brandt replied very evasively to a question on the Finnish proposal. Brandt described the Finnish initiative as an important document, which would be taken into consideration in the common consultations on European security in NATO. Fortunately for the West Germans, the Finns did not seem to insist on a rapid response to their memorandum. At the end of May, Salomies said that Ruete’s oral comments at the delivery of the document were considered to be sufficient and that no further statement was required or expected.

The impact of the Finnish security conference initiative in May 1969 on the whole CSCE process was significant. In addition to raising the idea to another, more serious level from a one-sided Warsaw Pact action, it gave, as a chief US negotiator in the later CSCE has put it, the prospective security conference its first fixed element – the site. At this stage, however, fixed elements were not necessarily something that the West German decision-makers, not even those in principle in favour of a security conference, wanted. On the contrary, during the spring of 1969 Brandt, Bahr and a few key officials in the Auswärtiges Amt had started to see the instrumental value of the possible security conference: a means to lure the GDR into negotiations with the Federal Republic. This tactical approach required delaying the convening of the conference to meet a timetable suitable for Bonn. For as long as there was nothing more substantial around than a series of rather elusive Warsaw Pact proposals to respond to, this seemed manageable within the Alliance. With the Finnish move, however, the security conference idea became more presentable in the West. Thus, when a number of Western Allies also started to show interest in the conference, the process threatened to begin advancing too rapidly for West German tastes. But the acceleration of the progress towards a security conference was by no means just bad news for Brandt and Bahr. Over the summer of 1969 it started to become obvious that, in their view, the instrumental value was not the only side to the story. Especially Brandt was increasingly manifesting genuine interest in the possible contents of a CSCE.
Promises of East–West Cooperation or an Instrument of *Deutschlandpolitik*?

With the federal election getting closer, in the summer months of 1969 the security conference became an increasingly controversial issue within the Grand Coalition. To be sure, the conference was nowhere near the top of the foreign policy agenda in Bonn. Other, more severe arguments within the government – most notably that over the response to the Cambodian decision to recognise the GDR – were the ones that brought the Grand Coalition deeper and deeper into a crisis. At the same time, these circumstances further diminished the likelihood of achieving an agreed official position on the CSCE.

Both abroad and at home, Brandt continued his active engagement in favour of the security conference. Increasingly, there were two strands simultaneously visible in Brandt’s argumentation. On the one hand, he emphasised the genuine promises for a European peace order provided by the conference. On the other, he presented progress in the inner-German relationship as a necessary prerequisite for the convocation of the CSCE. In the meeting of the Western European Union (WEU) in The Hague at the beginning of June, Brandt praised the Budapest Appeal as one of the most remarkable changes in East–West relations during recent years. Precisely because of indications that the Warsaw Pact countries were not merely engaged in the conference project for the sake of tactical manoeuvring, Brandt stressed that the West should continue to ‘take the Eastern statesmen at their word’. In particular, the West German Foreign Minister was intrigued by the references in the Budapest Appeal to common projects dealing, for instance, with energy, traffic and the environment.

At the meeting of the Socialist International, Brandt compared reading this section on East–West cooperation in the Budapest Appeal with ‘meeting an old acquaintance’. In the mid-1960s, as mayor of West Berlin, Brandt himself had suggested taking up similar pan-European infrastructure projects. In another speech in July, Brandt regretted that the positive importance of these elements, especially of economic cooperation, had so far been underestimated in the discussion about the European security conference.

Meanwhile, Brandt’s growing interest in the CSCE had also been evident in his decision to set up a specific CSCE working group in the *Auswärtiges Amt*, to discuss issues related to the security conference. On 12 June, Ulrich Sahm was appointed to lead the working group. During the summer, prior to submitting its final report shortly after the federal election in October, this working group was convened for at least eight sessions. One of the opening moves of the working group during the summer of 1969 was to widen its agenda. Instead of focusing on political
and security issues alone, it was considered necessary to include economic and cultural contacts as well as common projects on energy and traffic, for instance, in the working group meetings.110

Accordingly, in his speech to the Bundestag Foreign Policy Committee in late August, Brandt pleaded forcefully for serious consideration of the possibilities opened by the conference. Since not even the Soviets were counting on the conference to be convened in the near future, Brandt argued, ‘the West is rather stupid if it only ever talks about the label on the bottle, instead of focusing on what is supposed to be inside the bottle. The subject matter at stake here is more important than the procedural questions’.111 This emphasis on the softer elements of the proposed security conference, increased East–West cooperation in a number of different fields ranging from large-scale economic cooperation to individual scientific projects, was definitely a crucial part of the thinking of Brandt and Bahr. Instead of solidifying the East–West divide with uncompromising positions, the only way forward in Europe was to make the iron curtain more permeable. There was genuine interest in enhanced cooperation, as a means towards the ‘European peace order’. In fact, on this track the discussions within NATO on the ‘list of issues’ proceeded quite rapidly over the summer. Summing up the state of play so far, an SPC report in July grouped the topics under four categories: (1) measures to reduce tension and promote confidence; (2) arms limitations and disarmament; (3) measures for economic, technological and cultural cooperation; and (4) Germany and Berlin.112

Yet the substantive interest in the security conference was only one dimension of Brandt’s and Bahr’s policies – tactical manoeuvring was at least as important. In addition to an endearment to the substance, Brandt was clearly also aware of the usefulness of the ‘bottle’ itself. Before anyone was allowed to taste its contents, the promise of a security conference was to be put to use in seeking a solution to the most pressing issue of West German foreign policy. Thus, throughout the summer, Brandt’s optimistic tones on East–West cooperation were constantly accompanied by references to the need to bring clarity to the inner-German relationship prior to the convocation of the conference.

Already in his WEU speech in early June, Brandt had firmly underscored that the inner-German relationship had to be clarified before the conference, if it was to have a chance of success.113 Within the Auswärtiges Amt, Bahr went considerably further on these lines. In a high-level meeting in the ministry in June, Bahr admitted that the security conference itself would not be able to solve the German question – the conference should thus focus on enhancing security and economic links between East and West. But Bahr argued that the CSCE could be utilised for the purposes
of the German question. As far as Bonn’s Eastern policy was concerned, Bahr considered there to be three main obstacles to West German attempts at rapprochement with Eastern Europe: borders, nuclear issues and the GDR. The first two could be solved with a renunciation-of-force agreement and with the non-proliferation treaty (NPT). The security conference, in Bahr’s view, could provide the lever with which to deal with the third problem. Therefore Bahr argued for turning a solution to the inner-German relationship into a prerequisite for the security conference. Most of Bahr’s colleagues, while agreeing with the goal, were hesitant to put such a controversial demand at the heart of the West German contribution, worried that Bonn would as a result be blamed for the postponement of the conference. Regardless of the sceptical reception, this meeting marked the first occasion when Bahr explicitly made the case for a direct linkage of the CSCE with progress in the inner-German relationship.

In mid-June, Brandt reassured the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn that the Federal Government was still not setting any preconditions for the security conference. At the same time, however, the Foreign Minister argued that during the lengthy preparations it would be very useful for everyone involved if the relationship between Bonn and East Berlin could be improved before the actual convocation of the conference. Otherwise the German question would ‘considerably burden the work of the conference’. There certainly was also genuine concern in Bonn about the affect an unsolved German question might have on a CSCE, and vice versa. Ensuring that an eventual conference would not founder on the issue of GDR participation, with the blame for it put on the FRG, was ‘uppermost’ in the thinking of the Auswärtiges Amt, as a US embassy official was assured in Bonn. In late August, one paper drafted in the Auswärtiges Amt warned that even a substantial improvement in the inner-German relationship might not be enough to prevent problems arising from East German participation. In fact, dreading as it was a ‘mammoth conference on German questions’, the rhetoric of the paper closely resembled that of Brandt’s fiercest critics from the CDU/CSU backbenchers a few months earlier.

Yet the motives behind constant references to the troublesome impact of the ‘German quarrels’ on the conference were also of a tactical nature. In view of the number of ‘third world’ countries that had recently recognised the GDR, what was left of the Hallstein Doctrine was rapidly crumbling. However, the FRG still wanted to maintain the initiative in regulating the relationship with its Eastern neighbour. And in this respect, by far the worst case scenario for Bonn was broad international recognition of the GDR and a European security conference with both German states participating in it prior to an inner-German agreement. Therefore, as Bahr’s
planning staff argued in early July, it was essential to continue holding up all developments leading towards a general recognition of the GDR. During the summer of 1969, Brandt and Bahr seem to have started to see the security conference not only as one of the symptoms of the problem, but also as a possible cure for it. In a meeting of European Socialist leaders in early July, Brandt told his colleagues that the participation of both German states in a security conference would not be a problem to him. But the time during the preparations of the conference, he argued, should be devoted to seeking some kind of modus vivendi between Bonn and East Berlin. Indeed, the approaching conference might be used to apply pressure on the East German Government to respond to earlier proposals. Significantly, Brandt asked for support from the Allies for this policy: ‘if West Germany’s friends could give the Russians similar advice on this it could be helpful’.

Unwilling to take the blame for slowing down the preparations, the Auswärtiges Amt and Brandt at its head were at pains to deny that they were setting their own preconditions for the conference. In fresh instructions sent to NATO Ambassador Grewe in late June, Ruete emphasised that the West German insistence on a resolution in inner-German relations was not a precondition, but that an improvement in that relationship was essential if any results were to be expected from the conference. Bahr, on his behalf, argued that the West German position was merely an ‘expectation’ – just as the Soviet Union took it for granted that the GDR would participate in the conference, the FRG took it for granted that the mutual relationship of the German states was clarified before it.

Semantics aside, it was quite obvious that the West German officials were doing precisely what they denied: turning progress in the German question into a precondition for a security conference. No matter how careful and subtle the formulations were, they were making clear to their allies and to the Soviet Union that the FRG would insist on reaching at least some kind of agreement with the GDR before agreeing to enter a CSCE. Suitably, in a meeting of the CSCE working group of the Auswärtiges Amt on 22 July, Sahm stated that the main interest for the FRG in the security conference was to use it as a means to make advances in Bonn’s Deutschlandpolitik, and, as Bahr then added, to ‘unblock’ West German relations with Eastern Europe.

Whereas a consensus was slowly emerging within the Foreign Ministry about the suitable line for the Federal Republic to take on the security conference, on the level of domestic politics it remained a controversial and potentially explosive issue in the run-up to the federal election in September. For its part, the opposition party FDP had been an outspoken
advocate of the CSCE already for some time. At their party conference at the end of June, the Free Democrats passed a resolution for the forthcoming election, setting a European peace order as the central foreign policy goal of the FRG. In order to achieve this peace order, ‘a European security conference without preconditions’, in which members of both military alliances as well as other European states would take part, was needed.124

By contrast, Chancellor Kiesinger and his foreign policy advisors still refused to become entangled with the conference in any way. On the parliamentary level the disagreements between the CDU/CSU and the SDP over the security conference did not prevent attempts to discuss the matter, but the bridging of the divide between the Chancellery and the Auswärtiges Amt turned out to be a next to impossible task. Kiesinger’s attitude towards the conference was apparent in the preparations for the Chancellor’s Bundestag address on the ‘state of the nation in divided Germany’ on 17 June, commemorating the East Berlin uprising of 1953. In late May, Bahr’s planning staff had drafted a paragraph on the security conference to be included in the speech. In this draft, Bahr certainly did not paint too enthusiastic a picture of the CSCE, arguing that it was not certain whether the time was yet ripe for a conference: ‘The aim is not to hold a conference at any price. In other words, more important than all the formalities of a conference is its substance. A conference not resulting in any notable progress would be a setback for European security.’125 Yet this formulation was not cautious enough for Kiesinger. In the coalition talks a week before his speech, Kiesinger made it clear that he was reluctant to mention the CSCE at all. It is worth noting that faced with the Chancellor’s opposition, Brandt did not insist on its inclusion either, arguing that recent information from the Finns suggested that not even the Soviets counted on the conference being convened any time before 1971.126 Accordingly, in the declaration Kiesinger gave to the Bundestag on 17 June, there was not a single reference to the security conference.127

Nevertheless, in the Bundestag discussion following Kiesinger’s statement the CSCE was brought up by the leader of the CDU/CSU group, Rainer Barzel. While offering assurances that his party also wanted a European peace order, he went on to stress that the Christian Democrats were sceptical of the Warsaw Pact’s invitation to a European security conference since the words of the Budapest Appeal were contradicted by completely different deeds. Therefore, Barzel welcomed recent statements by Brandt and the Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph Luns, both of whom had stressed the importance of progress on the German question before the conference would make any sense. In the ensuing discussion, Brandt replied that one had indeed to judge the Budapest Appeal with
a fair amount of scepticism. To Brandt, a core element in the appeal had been the abstinence from demanding a diplomatic recognition of the GDR as a precondition for the conference. In his view, if this claim were to be included retrospectively due to East German pressure, it would no longer be possible to take the Budapest Appeal seriously, regardless of how well it would fit in with ideas about a European peace order.¹²⁸

This fairly harmonious exchange between Barzel and Brandt was a far cry from the contradictions between the latter and Kiesinger. In numerous background briefings with German and international journalists during the summer, Kiesinger openly acknowledged this difference of opinion, adding, however, that Brandt did not sincerely believe in the conference project either. Although the Foreign Minister was talking about the conference a lot more than the Chancellor would have preferred, Kiesinger explained that Brandt had assured him that he was using it only as a tactical means. In Kiesinger’s view, Brandt was using his positive statements on the CSCE to present himself as an important ‘peace politician’ and to win capital for his own party. As for his own position, Kiesinger stressed that he did not have any illusions about the security conference. For reasons of Deutschlandpolitik it was unwise to reject it straight away, but in the Chancellor’s opinion there was not much to be expected from it.¹²⁹

The widening gap between Kiesinger and Brandt had not escaped Western observers. ‘There was no fixed federal policy as yet on this matter’, a British memorandum noted in July.¹³⁰ The US embassy in Bonn reported in June that the Christian Democrats remained far more sceptical of the conference than Brandt. However, the CDU had not yet launched a public offensive against Brandt, ‘perhaps because it suspects that there may exist latent support for the project among the Western German public’.¹³¹

But if the Christian Democrats were reluctant to confront Brandt openly at home, they did not have similar inhibitions when it came to making their view understood in Washington. At the end of June, the CDU parliamentarian Kurt Birrenbach met the US Secretary of State, William Rogers, in Washington, conveying a message from Kiesinger. ‘Notwithstanding what he [Rogers] might hear from other quarters, the Chancellor firmly believed that a European security conference should come about only at the end of very careful preparations and negotiations and that the Federal Government would strictly keep within the limits of the NATO resolution on this subject’.¹³² The West German Ambassador to Washington, Rolf Pauls, supported Kiesinger’s view, telling Henry Kissinger in July that ‘he did not think a European Security Conference was desirable at this time since it was bound to fail and produce a situation worse than the existing one.’¹³³
During his state visit to the United States in early August, Kiesinger continued to sow suspicion about Brandt’s comments. When the Chancellor met Nixon and Kissinger, he referred to the understandable need to make sanguine statements about the CSCE, if one wanted to improve relations with the East. But, Kiesinger told the US leadership, Brandt himself was convinced, and had told the Chancellor so, that the security conference would never be convened. Interestingly, in this respect Kiesinger spoke beyond the talking points prepared for him for the meeting. Although sceptical of the conference, the points Carstens had drafted for the Chancellor did not include any references to Brandt. In fact, the Carstens paper was very close to the line represented by the Foreign Minister, arguing as it was for using the CSCE to influence the East German leader: ‘If the Soviet Union is really interested in the security conference, it should put pressure on Ulbricht accordingly.’

This element, however, was omitted by Kiesinger in his talks.

In all, Kiesinger’s systematic efforts to downplay Brandt’s positive remarks about the security conference during the summer of 1969 are partly explained by the truly conflicting views of the Chancellor and his Foreign Minister, not to mention the accelerating election race between the coalition partners. However, Kiesinger’s repeated references to Brandt explicitly admitting in private that he did not actually believe in the prospects of the conference do suggest that Brandt might in fact have done just that. In retrospect, Egon Bahr considers that this may well have been possible. It was a time, Bahr points out, when Brandt said one thing about the conference to the Chancellor to calm him down, and another to the Americans to encourage them to take it seriously.

Brandt’s attempts to calm Kiesinger were obviously futile. But in the view of the allies of the Federal Republic – especially the smaller ones – the overtures of the West German Foreign Minister were also problematic, for two reasons. On the one hand, Brandt’s statements had raised worries of the Germans ‘going it alone’. Echoing old Rapallo fears, referring to collusion of West Germany with Soviet Russia in a treaty signed in 1922, some of the Western partners were afraid that the FRG was trying to bypass the Alliance structures completely in settling the most important European question, the inner-German relationship, in order to move forward to the conference. In addition, the idea of having to wait for this inner-German agreement before a CSCE could be kicked off was also irritating to some of the smaller NATO countries. Perhaps partly due to the Finnish initiative in May, the interest in advancing the security conference was on the rise and pressures for a rapid drafting of a first version of the list of issues for East–West negotiations, as prescribed at the NATO ministerial meeting in April, were mounting. Already in June, other members
of the Alliance were criticising the Bonn Group members, and especially the West Germans, on the slow progress made in preparing the elements regarding Berlin and Germany. In Brussels, the West German NATO Ambassador 'expressed irritation at what he said Bonn felt was undue pressure on questions of vital concern to FRG'.\textsuperscript{138} Paradoxically, then, the West Germans felt they were being ‘attacked both for a “Rapallo deal” and for restrictive preconditions’.\textsuperscript{139} In other words, for moving too fast and too slowly at the same time.

But what mattered most to Bonn, naturally, was the mood of the three major Allies – the United States, Britain and France. During the summer, embassy reports confirmed that all of them remained strictly sceptical of the security conference.\textsuperscript{140} In trying to figure out whether the Soviet Union was using the Budapest Appeal to look for genuine détente or just to pursue its old goals and divert attention from the Prague invasion, all of the Three Powers considered the latter option to be more likely.\textsuperscript{141} During Kiesinger’s visit to Washington in August, leading State Department officials expressed their deep concern about the possible impacts a security conference might have on the coherence of the Western Alliance.\textsuperscript{142}

With the Three, who were anything but enthusiastic about the CSCE, implementation of the ‘linkage’ strategy hatched in the \textit{Auswärtiges Amt} during the summer seemed to be possible, at least theoretically. For as long as the major Allies were not interested in a rapid convocation of the security conference, it was thinkable that the FRG could postpone the conference long enough to enable some kind of progress in the inner-German talks before that. Furthermore, if the West Germans were in charge of the schedule leading up to the security conference, it could even be used to squeeze concessions from the East Germans in those talks.

Yet there were several obstacles in the way of this plan. First of all, while Brandt certainly supported this ‘linkage’ strategy most strongly advocated by Bahr, he was also genuinely interested in the substantial questions to be dealt with at a conference. This led to a paradoxical situation for Brandt and many officials in the \textit{Auswärtiges Amt} – like trying to have their cake and eat it, they wanted to support the process towards the conference because of its subject matter, yet wanted to slow down the same process because of its instrumental value. Moreover, even if the Foreign Ministry had been able to come up with a firm and unequivocal position, there was not much Brandt could accomplish without the support of Kiesinger. The visible disagreement between Chancellor and Foreign Minister in this particular matter, not to mention the general paralysis in the foreign policy of the Grand Coalition during the summer, ensured that such support was not to be expected. In addition, the criticism from Western Allies for going
either too fast or too slowly in the conference issue made the West German position all the more difficult.

In these complicated circumstances, any moves concerning the CSCE during the final weeks before the election in late September were almost destined to lead to controversies in Bonn. The delivery of the West German response to the Finnish security conference initiative, at first sight a routine diplomatic procedure, turned out to be a case in point.

Chancellery versus Auswärtiges Amt

Although the Finns had previously indicated to West German officials that they did not expect a formal reply to their initiative, in the late summer of 1969 the original oral acknowledgement given upon the delivery of the memorandum no longer seemed sufficient. In August, the Finnish Government informed recipients of the May initiative that it had already received positive replies from seventeen countries, including four NATO members (the UK, the Netherlands, Portugal and Norway) but not the Federal Republic. To the Auswärtiges Amt in Bonn, this situation started to feel awkward. According to Political Director Ruete, a formal response would only be an ‘unbinding act of political courtesy to the Finns’, and thus not harmful for the FRG. But in Ruete’s view the foremost reason in favour of giving an official reply at this stage was to avoid the risk of remaining among the few European governments who ‘had not even considered the Finnish peace gesture worthy of an answer’. Therefore, fear of isolation was a main motive for the decision to respond to the Finns.

During the next few weeks a West German reply was drafted in the Foreign Ministry and on 9 September it was sent to Detlev Scheel, the new head of the FRG’s trade mission in Helsinki. Scheel was advised to present the text orally and to submit the text only as a non-paper. He carried out these instructions on 12 September. The text of the West German reply which Scheel delivered at the Finnish Foreign Ministry did not contain anything dramatic – it merely welcomed the fact that the initiative had also been addressed to the North Americans, greeted its ‘constructive spirit’ and emphasised the need for careful preparation of a conference. In fact, as Haftendorn has argued, the reply was characterised by a considerable lack of commitment, deliberately avoiding taking a definite position for or against the security conference. But, symptomatic of the lack of communication between the coalition partners as well as between the Chancellery and the Auswärtiges Amt, the delivery of the statement led to a minor storm within the government in Bonn.
When Brandt made a public announcement of the West German reply to the Finns at a press conference in Bonn on 16 September, he argued that the Federal Government saw the Finnish initiative as a ‘constructive step towards the creation of a just and durable European security order, which we are also aiming at’.\footnote{148} In fact, however, there had not been an official government decision about the response. Brandt, in both of his memoir volumes, has flatly rejected later accusations by the controversial leader of the Bavarian CSU, Franz Josef Strauss, according to whom Brandt as Foreign Minister had authorised a reply to the Finns without prior consultation with Kiesinger.\footnote{149} But the archival evidence suggests that Strauss’s claims were not completely unfounded. Due to a set of misunderstandings, and with Brandt’s tacit approval, it seems, the Auswärtiges Amt did in the end take the matter into its own hands, giving the West German reply without explicit authorisation from the Chancellery.

The draft of the reply had already been completed in the Auswärtiges Amt by the end of August. On 1 September Brandt approved the text and decided that the next thing to do, before sending the instructions to Helsinki, was to inform the Chancellery about the procedure. Nevertheless, Brandt added that if no response was received from the Chancellery within forty-eight hours, the instructions should be sent without further confirmation.\footnote{150} On 4 September, State Secretary Duckwitz wrote a letter to the head of the Chancellery, Karl Carstens, arguing for the need to reply to the Finnish security conference initiative and attaching the text of the reply. Duckwitz also told Carstens that the West German mission in Helsinki would be instructed to deliver the text to the Finnish Foreign Ministry.\footnote{151} No date was mentioned, but it was clear from the letter that action would be taken soon. When there had been no response from the Chancellery by 8 September, the head of Brandt’s bureau called the responsible desk officer in the Auswärtiges Amt and told him to proceed with the instructions to Helsinki on the following day.\footnote{152}

On 11 September, however, Carstens wrote back to Duckwitz, arguing that the reply to the Finnish initiative was such an important question of foreign policy that it should be dealt with on cabinet level. No reply to the Finns should be given before that.\footnote{153} By then, as we have seen, the instructions to Helsinki had already been sent. The Foreign Ministry made no last-minute efforts to stop Scheel from acting as previously instructed. Instead, Duckwitz replied to Carstens only \textit{ex post facto}, after the statement had been delivered in Helsinki, explaining that the West German statement did not include anything that had not already been said in the name of the Federal Government and that, lacking objections from the Chancellery, the instructions had been sent according to the original plan.\footnote{154} Meanwhile, Carstens had himself learned from a telegram from Helsinki
that the statement had indeed been made, in spite of his insistence on a preceding cabinet decision. There was no longer anything to be done, but the sequence prompted a further bitter correspondence between the Chancellery and the Auswärtiges Amt. Although Carstens admitted that he had received Duckwitz’s letter on 4 September, he claimed that he had been promised by the Foreign Ministry that no steps would be taken before the Chancellor had commented on the matter.\textsuperscript{155}

Obviously, the election campaign did cast its shadow over this controversy. More than about the lack of communication between Kiesinger and Brandt, however, the story is indicative of an institutional antagonism between the Chancellery and the Auswärtiges Amt. Whenever it came to foreign policy matters, these institutions had traditionally been battling for the top position. In addition, there certainly was no sympathy lost between the respective top officials, Carstens and Duckwitz. At least in part precisely because of its relatively unimportant and uncontroversial subject matter, the issue of responding to the Finnish security conference initiative provided the State Secretaries with a brilliant opportunity to teach each other a lesson. The controversy was, above all, a final showcase of the bureaucratic infighting within the Grand Coalition.

**Emphasis on Linkage: Bahr’s Foreign Policy Plans on the Eve of the Election**

In the planning staff of the Auswärtiges Amt, Egon Bahr was not distracted by the intensifying election campaign. On the contrary, in the month of September alone, Bahr drafted a large number of long-term plans for the foreign policy of the Federal Republic, many of which addressed the security conference as well.\textsuperscript{156} Regardless of the strained situation within the government, Bahr maintains that they were written on the assumption that the Grand Coalition would remain in office after the election.\textsuperscript{157}

In these memoranda, Bahr’s earlier idea of using the conference primarily as an instrument of Deutschlandpolitik was crystallised and elaborated further.

As far as an actual conference was concerned, Bahr’s long-term vision reserved only a transitional role for it. Bahr had for a long time been keen on making the distinction between a temporary security system (Sicherheitsystem) and a permanent European peace order (Friedensordnung), the former being not an end in itself, but rather a necessary station on the road to the latter. Within this conceptual framework, Bahr considered the East–West negotiations on a security conference to be useful in opening the way towards the first stage, a temporary security system.\textsuperscript{158}
In the beginning of September, Bahr circulated a detailed memorandum, laying out his vision for a Western – and West German – position on the European security conference, which is worth a closer look. In addition to the four essentials already agreed in NATO (no preconditions, thorough preparation, reason to expect useful results, participation of the US and Canada), Bahr stressed the importance of developing and pursuing Western goals for the procedure and agenda of the conference, as counterweights to Soviet suggestions. In the sphere of political security, he argued, the West should prepare a treaty focusing on renunciation of force and principles of sovereignty. On military security, Bahr suggested that the conference should result in a permanent eight-power disarmament commission for Europe, which would, above all, deal with balanced force reductions. But as far as economic cooperation was concerned, Bahr was very reserved. Substantial advances could be expected only once progress had been made in the security issues.159

In all, Bahr did not have high hopes of the substance of the security conference. In his view, if the West were to insist on solving all important questions before the final CSCE, it would be easy for Eastern propaganda to put the blame on the West for a possible failure of the conference. Thus, Bahr argued for aiming at a conference that would issue only broad declarations of intent, with the details then further developed in one or several permanent committees. ‘If these were not to achieve results later on, at least the actual conference would not have collapsed. A failed ESC would be a serious setback for Western détente policy.’

Rather than multilateral security and cooperation, therefore, the true core of Bahr’s memorandum on the security conference was clearly its implications for the German question. He once again emphasised the need for mitigating the inner-German relationship before the beginning of a CSCE. Instead of being a precondition, he claimed, this was merely a part of careful conference preparations. Holding on to this principle, Bahr admitted, was going to be difficult – but possible, provided that the key Allies backed it.

It will also depend on how manifestly we make the point that we will not take our seat at the table of an ESC without a preceding clarification of the relationship between the two parts of Germany .... In the West, we cannot count on an understanding of our position from all states, whether part of the Atlantic Alliance or not. But for as long as we have the support of the Three Powers, we can stay the course without larger difficulties.160

Moreover, Bahr also suggested that the West should propose a joint resolution on the German question. To be signed by all the conference participants, this resolution would request the Four Powers responsible for Berlin
and Germany as a whole and the two German states ‘in the interest of European security, to conclude an agreement on the relationship between the FRG and the GDR as well as on the external relations of the two parts of Germany’, as an interim solution before a reunification.¹⁶¹ In other words, Bahr wanted to mobilise the preparations for a European security conference to put pressure on the GDR to enter inner-German negotiations.

Bahr presented some of these thoughts to his NATO colleagues in mid-September, at the autumn meeting of the Atlantic Policy Advisory Group, which focused on issues related to troop reductions and a possible security conference. Bahr’s idea of using the preparatory phase of a CSCE to improve the relationship between the German states was received approvingly. Generally, the meeting was characterised by a common unease with the development towards the conference – the Soviet position was seen to be strong, the Western weak. The participants shared a concern about public opinion at home. ‘Especially the younger generation’ was clearly expecting some kind of détente gesture from the West.¹⁶²

Less than two weeks before the federal election scheduled for 28 September, Bahr circulated two further significant foreign policy documents: an analysis of a future ‘framework agreement’ (Rahmenvertrag) with the GDR and a more general paper entitled ‘Reflections on the foreign policy of a future Federal Government’. These documents reflected Bahr’s desire for using the security conference as a tool of Deutschlandpolitik. As far as inner-German relations were concerned, Bahr’s main message was that West German foreign policy had to come to terms with reality. While the German division would probably be sustained for an indefinite period, the GDR would achieve world-wide recognition during the next few years, whether or not the FRG opposed it. Therefore, if the Federal Republic wanted to gain something in return for the enhanced international status of the GDR, it had to act quickly. ‘Abstaining from preventing the international recognition of the GDR is a reward we can offer the GDR only for as long as we are able to do so. …The sooner the GDR can expect to reach its goal without our involvement, the smaller will be the value of the reward.’¹⁶³

In Bahr’s view, this had direct and crucial implications for future West German foreign policy, including the policy on the security conference. Although Bahr was by no means certain that a CSCE would actually be convened, he was sure that the debate about it would continue with varying intensity. Regardless of the likelihood of success of the actual conference, Bahr was keen on the possibilities the process opened up for the Federal Republic. The Soviet conference proposal, he argued, should be ‘instrumentalised’ for West German purposes:
we have to try to use it as an instrument for the realisation of our interests. It gives a possibility to submit suggestions aiming at a security system in Europe and creating … conditions for a peace order. Above all, we should use the conference idea as a lever, forcing the GDR to agree to a rapprochement of the two German states. We should utilise the interest of the East European countries and, if necessary, of the Soviet Union in the ESC for this.164

Thus, more explicitly than before, Bahr was making the case for a direct linkage of the European security conference and progress in the inner-German dialogue. The ‘framework agreement’ between Bonn and East Berlin would in the end enable frictionless participation of both German states in the conference. But before agreeing to participate in the security conference, the Federal Republic should use it as leverage on the GDR. Or, to put it the other way round, Bonn should show the green light to the CSCE only after an inner-German treaty had been concluded. This crystallisation of the instrumental value of the security conference was crucially important for the FRG’s CSCE policy. Instead of perceiving the security conference as a threat and focusing on defensive preconditions to minimise the damage inflicted on Deutschlandpolitik, Bahr’s approach called for a more offensive strategy in which the FRG would actively use the conference as a bargaining chip to pursue its own interests.

This approach, outlined by Bahr in a memorandum concluded in New York during the UN General Assembly, where Brandt was meeting his colleagues, may have had an immediate impact on the Foreign Minister’s discussions. Bahr wrote later that Brandt, having read his foreign policy suggestions during the New York trip, had commented: ‘Not bad at all. I hope we can use this soon.’165 It is obviously very hard to distinguish between subtle changes in tone on the basis of the written record, but there seems to be a slightly more assertive touch than before in the way Brandt referred to the CSCE in New York. The Foreign Ministers of the three major Allies – Rogers, Stewart and Schumann – all agreed with Brandt that all possible attempts should be made to keep the conference free from the ‘German quarrels’, preferably through inner-German talks prior to the conference.166 In his discussion with the Soviet Foreign Minister, Brandt also made the by then standard remark that ‘at the present stage the “German quarrels” would completely overshadow the conference’. More concretely, Brandt added that progress in Bonn’s negotiations with East Berlin on traffic and postal issues would be helpful. Gromyko stressed that no attempts to call for a change in the policy of the GDR as a precondition for the security conference would be acceptable. Yet Brandt did not back down: ‘We do not wish to nor will we set any preconditions. We are only saying that elimination of difficulties on our soil, such as travel restrictions, would ease the way towards the conference.’167
Indeed, in his memoirs Brandt suggests that it was already around this time, shortly before the federal election of September 1969, that he realised that the security conference might actually provide the Federal Republic with some leverage. Yet given the disagreements between the coalition partners, none of these deliberations had any hope of being implemented for as long as the Grand Coalition was in office. Therefore, the result of the election on 28 September was of fundamental significance to the future CSCE policy of the Federal Republic.

**Bonn and the Security Conference during the Interregnum**

The federal election of 1969 was an extremely close-fought one. In fact, when the polls in West Germany had closed and the first results started pouring in, the US President Richard Nixon already called Kiesinger to congratulate him on his re-election. As it turned out, however, Nixon had been too hasty. Although the Christian Democrats (CDU and CSU) successfully defended all but one of their seats in the Bundestag and maintained their position as the largest parliamentary group, substantial gains (3.4 percentage points and twenty seats) made by the Social Democrats enabled Brandt to take the initiative. He chose to start negotiations with the Free Democrats, relying on a thin but sufficient parliamentary majority for a ‘social-liberal’ coalition. The FDP, for its own part, had been the main loser in the election, scoring its worst result ever and only narrowly making it over the five-percent hurdle needed to enter the Bundestag. This equation opened the way for the first fundamental change of government in the twenty-year history of the Federal Republic. The Christian Democrats were left in opposition for the first time, and Brandt was set to become the first Social Democratic Chancellor of the Bonn Republic.

In spite of the narrowness of the mandate, the West German electorate had clearly sent a message for change with its increased support for the Social Democrats. And in the autumn of 1969, the main motive for change was in the field of foreign policy. Catching the essence of this, Peter Pulzer has argued: ‘No election is ever decided by one single issue, but if any predominated in this one it was the question of relations with the East. It was an irony that foreign policy, the midwife of the Great Coalition, had become the grounds for divorce.’ On the other hand, as Wolfgang Jäger has pointed out, the importance of foreign policy should not be overestimated either – in the autumn of 1969 nobody could foresee just how rapid the advances in Ostpolitik were about to become. And for sure, while foreign policy may have tipped the balance in favour of Brandt instead of
Kiesinger, the question of the European security conference had certainly not been an issue at the election.

In any case, although much of the transitional period between the election and Brandt’s official appointment as Chancellor by the Bundestag on 21 October was consumed by the intense coalition negotiations between the SPD and the FDP, foreign policy was not the bone of contention. And just as with Ostpolitik in general, the Social Democrats and Free Democrats also found it relatively easy to agree on the general line to take with regard to the CSCE. Freed from the controversies so dominant in the Grand Coalition, the foreign policy consensus between the new coalition partners finally promised to make the implementation of an agreed CSCE policy of the government possible. As it happened, Bahr and the leading foreign policy thinker of the FDP, Wolfgang Schollwer, did not really get on and were never engaged in a thorough exchange of opinions. All the same, although with different goals in mind, both saw opportunities for the FRG in the security conference. In October, Schollwer’s working paper on West German foreign policy positioned the preparation and convocation of a European security conference, respectively, at first place among both the medium- and long-term objectives. Bahr, for his part, continued to emphasise the instrumental value of the conference. In a draft foreign policy programme for the future government, presenting most of the central thoughts made public in the Chancellor’s government declaration a few weeks later, Bahr argued that the conference idea should be used to force the GDR to agree to an inner-German rapprochement.

On the institutional level, moreover, expectations for smoother cooperation were further supported by the personnel reshuffle resulting from the change of government. Brandt brought many of his trusted men at the Auswärtiges Amt to the Chancellery, including Egon Bahr as State Secretary and Ulrich Sahm as head of the department responsible for foreign policy and inner-German questions. In addition, Brandt had a close relationship with Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz, who continued as State Secretary in the Foreign Ministry. In fact, Brandt’s hold on foreign policy issues was so strong that it took some time before the chairman of the FDP, Walter Scheel, could effectively take control of his own house as the new Foreign Minister. Not only during the early stages, but for a good part of the first year of the Social–Liberal Coalition, the making of West German foreign policy was clearly dominated by the Chancellery.

Meanwhile, the Auswärtiges Amt was beginning to take a more careful position on the security conference. This was visible already in early October in the final report of the CSCE working group which had been set up in June. According to the detailed fifty-page report, the Budapest Appeal had already been a success for the Soviet Union. Moscow had been able
to set the agenda and the course of the discussion on European security, forcing the West to act as a *demandeur* if it wanted to achieve its own objectives. Therefore, the mere proposal had given the Soviet Union substantial advantages. Regarding the participation of the German states in the CSCE, the report suggested the development of a model for a ‘qualified’, ‘all-German’ participation. In order to avoid setting a dangerous precedent for the participation of the GDR in other international conferences and organisations, the representation of the two German states at the conference was to be subordinated to an institutional cooperation in specific committees consisting of the Four Powers, the FRG and the GDR. Some sort of regulation of the inner-German relationship before the conference was considered absolutely necessary, but the report included no hint of actually trying to use the CSCE process as a means to that end.\textsuperscript{176} By contrast, some officials in the *Auswärtiges Amt* predicted that the ongoing discussion about the security conference would bring difficult times for maintaining the unity of the Western Alliance. In particular, there was growing concern that the European security conference would turn into a general conference on Germany, in which decisions would be made more about the FRG, less with the FRG.\textsuperscript{177}

But during the transitional period in October, these worries were overshadowed by Bahr’s enthusiasm for the instrumentalisation of the security conference. In his meeting with Kissinger in Washington in mid-October, Bahr gave Nixon’s national security adviser a broad outline of what was to be expected from the foreign policy of the new West German Government. Bahr told Kissinger that they wanted to see the inner-German relationship ‘normalised’ before the security conference, although this could not officially be formulated as a precondition. If this condition was not met, the Federal Republic would rather not take part in a conference, including a preparatory conference, at all. To his surprise, Bahr wrote, the Americans did not object to this. Helmut Sonnenfeldt from the White House National Security Council, also present at the meeting, explained that while the United States did not reject the conference idea altogether, they considered that it was up to the Europeans to decide what to do about it.\textsuperscript{178}

The changing of the guard from the Grand Coalition to the SPD-FDP Government was completed on 21 October, when the *Bundestag* elected Brandt as the fourth Chancellor of the Federal Republic. One week later, Brandt gave his first government declaration to the *Bundestag*, laying out the main principles of the future policy of the Social–Liberal Coalition.\textsuperscript{179} This declaration is best remembered for its section on *Deutschlandpolitik*, in which Brandt publicly accepted the existence of ‘two states in Germany’, but added that they could never ‘be foreign countries to each other’. The declaration also touched upon the proposed European security confer-
ence. In it, Brandt declared on behalf of the Federal Government that it was committed to the position given in the official reply to the Finnish Government on 12 September. ‘After careful preparation’, the new Chancellor continued, ‘such a conference can become an important leg on the road to greater security with less armament and to progress between the partners in Eastern and Western Europe’. Thus, the security conference was closely linked with the concept of a European peace order, a goal which the government pledged to work towards in the first sentence of the declaration.

The focus being on bilateral Ostpolitik, in October 1969 the security conference was obviously not at the top of the foreign policy agenda of the new government. Nevertheless, the change of government had important repercussions on that front as well. Having secured at least the passive support of the major Western ally to proceed as they saw fit, and with no disagreements in principle with the junior coalition partner at home to worry about, there seemed to be no impediments for Brandt and Bahr to start implementing their version of a West German policy towards the CSCE. Albeit at first glance contradictory in nature, both tracks of the plans developed in the Auswärtiges Amt during the last six months of the Grand Coalition were now about to be united, shaping the official approach of the Federal Republic on the project of a European security conference in the first half of the 1970s. On the one hand, there was Bahr’s pet project, the tactical linkage approach. According to it, the West Germans should attempt to use their agreement to participate in the multilateral conference as a bargaining chip in order to receive concessions from the East in bilateral negotiations. On the other hand, there was an interest in advancing the substantive elements of the security conference. Arrangements to improve security in Europe and increased East–West cooperation promised to bring the elusive long-term goal, the European peace order, at least a few steps closer. The evolution of each of these halves of the West German policy during the CSCE preparations and at the conference itself will be analysed in the following chapters.

Conclusion

The short era of the Grand Coalition was significant for the formation of the West German CSCE policy in the 1970s. International as well as domestic developments occurring during the Kiesinger–Brandt Government had an important impact on subsequent choices made in Bonn. To begin with, on the international level, the years 1966–69 witnessed a substantial change in Western perceptions of the idea of a European security confer-
ence. Having been equally mistrustful of Warsaw Pact calls for a CSCE throughout the 1960s, the unity of the Atlantic Alliance began to crack towards the end of the decade. Some of the smaller NATO members started to take the conference proposals more seriously, forcing them on the agenda of the NATO machinery in Brussels. Although détente was dealt a major setback by the Prague invasion in August 1968, two documents distributed in the following spring – the Warsaw Pact’s Budapest Appeal in March and the Finnish memorandum in May 1969 – speeded up the CSCE discussion in the West. In their semi-annual meeting in Washington in April, the NATO Foreign Ministers instructed the Political Committee to draft a list of issues for possible East–West negotiations before the end of the year, thus in effect starting multilateral CSCE preparations within the West.

The West German role in these early Western discussions reveals two key characteristics that were also present later on. First of all, the security conference was clearly an issue where it was possible for the Federal Republic to show initiative and assume a high profile. Given the importance of the German question for any deliberations on European security, West German opinions were carefully listened to in the Allied capitals. Especially during the final year of the Grand Coalition, Foreign Minister Brandt eagerly seized this opportunity, working hard to convince his more sceptical colleagues that the security conference could turn out to be useful for the West and would not just give a propaganda victory to the East. But on the other hand, the period dealt with here also showed the limitations – or rather perceived limitations – of the West German freedom for manoeuvre. Politicians and officials in Bonn were constantly very alert to even the smallest signs of Allies disagreeing with West German positions. Opposition from the smaller NATO members was something that could be lived with, but ending up at odds with one or more of the Three Powers (United States, United Kingdom and France) was immediately seen as posing a danger of isolation within the Alliance. Thus, at times perhaps more than was actually needed, the West Germans felt they were dependent on finding a consensus with their three major allies.

Although these two main features of the Federal Republic’s international role in the CSCE context – a new opportunity to exert influence, limited by heightened sensitivity to dynamics within the Alliance – were beginning to show already during the Grand Coalition, in 1966–69 the CSCE was first and foremost a question of domestic politics for the FRG. Due to the disagreements between the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister, the approaching federal election as well as the bureaucratic infighting between the Chancellery and the Auswärtiges Amt, the Federal Republic never had an official CSCE position during the Grand Coalition – no mat-
ter how much Brandt discussed the security conference with his colleagues abroad. Then again, at the same time as the coalition partners were rapidly drifting apart, the SPD and the FDP began to find common ground in foreign policy issues, the CSCE included. This rapprochement laid the foundation for the foreign policy of the Brandt–Scheel Government.

But why was the European security conference such a contested issue within the Grand Coalition? As has been shown above, there clearly were genuine substantive disagreements about the security conference between the various actors on the domestic level. At the heart of these disagreements were conflicting views about the correct way forward in addressing the German question. The long-term goal of a European peace order as a possible solution was shared by all major German parties, but their definitions of the characteristics of such an order were not identical. And different approaches called for different measures, also towards the CSCE. Yet at times the still hypothetical CSCE also provided the individuals, parties and institutions with a suitable excuse to argue. Because all the participants saw that the actual conference was not yet topical, they could afford to use it in the domestic power struggles. And as the federal election drew closer, these power struggles became more apparent. The election of Gustav Heinemann as Federal President in March 1969, resulting from cooperation between the SPD and FDP to defeat the candidate of the Christian Democrats, was a sign of what was to be expected. For the remaining six months before the federal election, the Grand Coalition entered a ‘time of political paralysis’.181 The election battle started ahead of schedule, badly disrupting the work of the government for the rest of its term.

One should also not neglect the impact of personal chemistry. There were more than enough examples of functioning cross-party cooperation within the coalition: Herbert Wehner and Kurt Georg Kiesinger, Karl Schiller and Franz Josef Strauss, as well as Helmut Schmidt and Rainer Barzel, all got along reasonably well.182 But, with the most importance for foreign policy, there was never a similar meeting of minds between Kiesinger and Brandt, let alone between the Chancellor and Bahr. In fact, already in 1967 Kiesinger confidentially told a West German journalist that he considered Bahr to be a ‘very dangerous man’, whose influence in the Auswärtiges Amt ought to be limited.183 Furthermore, shared ambitions played into the intensity of the rivalry. As Christian Hacke has argued, Kiesinger was one of the most passionately foreign-policy oriented Chancellors in the history of the Federal Republic.184 Bahr himself has admitted that the ‘misery of the Grand Coalition resulted from the abundance, not from the lack, of ambitious foreign-policy talents’.185
Despite the paralysing effect the domestic controversies had on the foreign policy of the Grand Coalition, these talents were not completely lost. Extensive planning work in Brandt’s Auswärtiges Amt had resulted in a ‘blueprint’ for a new foreign policy of the Federal Republic. After the election in September 1969, there were no longer any internal obstacles to its implementation. Regarding the European security conference, as has been shown in this chapter, the plans consisted of two main elements: instrumental and substantive approaches to the CSCE. This twin-track approach to the security conference is actually a perfect example of the two sides constantly present in the foreign-policy ideas put forward by Brandt and Bahr. The instrumental approach, to a larger extent Bahr’s contribution, was based on realpolitik and linkages. The substantive approach, then again, better represented by Brandt, was building on a more ideological view of cooperation and the vision of a European peace order.

With the inauguration of the Brandt–Scheel Government in October 1969, this blueprint was put to the test. As will be shown in the chapters below, the implementation of plans incubated during the Grand Coalition was by no means an easy and straightforward task. And in comparison with the preparations of the bilateral Ostpolitik treaties, which the Federal Republic was at least to some extent able to control, the development towards a multilateral CSCE turned out to consist of a far greater number of variables. The decisive battles were fought within the West more often than between East and West.

Notes


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7. For the text of the declaration, as well as other documents related to the Bucharest meeting, see the PHP website.
12. PHP collection on the Harmel Report; Wenger, ‘Crisis and Opportunity’.
22. AAPD 1968, doc 207, Bahr to Duckwitz and Brandt, 27 June 1968; ‘Wie Egon Bahr Deutschland neutralisieren will’, Quick, 27 Sep 1973; Bahr, Sicherheit für und vor Deutschland, 60–82. On Bahr’s later recollections about this working paper, see Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit, 226–9. For the various drafts preceding the memorandum, see AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 316 (folder 3).
25. Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name, 80.
27. AAPD 1968, doc 207, Bahr to Duckwitz and Brandt, 27 June 1968.
30. EA 1969, D 151–3, Budapest Appeal, 17 Mar 1969. For some recently declassified documents from East European archives, see the PHP website. In more detail, Csaba Békés,


34. Archiv der Gegenwart (AdG), Vol. 5, 4761, Brandt’s statement to the Hungarian news agency MTI, 19 Mar 1969. See also WBA, A3, 299.

35. See, for example, Ulrich Sahm’s meeting with a Soviet embassy official, in Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts (PAAA), B150, 149, Sahm to Moscow and New Delhi, 19 Mar 1969.


40. PAAA, B150, 149, handwritten note from Duckwitz to Sahm, 23 Mar 1969.

41. Bundesarchiv (BArch), B136, 6346, Boss to Kiesinger, 21 Mar 1969.

42. The National Archives (TNA), FO 1042/313, Quadripartite Meeting, 20/21 March 1969.


45. Ea 1969, D153. The source for the German-language version of the Budapest Appeal cited in Ea is Neues Deutschland. There are different English translations of the document, often contradictory, especially with regard to the word Hauptvoraussetzungen. The clear distinction in German between Voraussetzungen and Vorbedingungen is, however, in my opinion best reflected by using ‘prerequisites’ and ‘preconditions’, respectively.

46. PAAA, B1, 350, 18 Mar 1969. Brandt’s handwritten notes on the AA press review on the day after the Budapest Appeal: ‘Vorbeding. oder Verhandl.gegenst.’.

47. PAAA, B1, 350, meeting Brandt-Tsarapkin, 1 Apr 1969.


50. PAAA, B150, 149, Sahm, 26 Mar 1969.

51. PAAA, B150, 149, Grewe (Natogerma) to AA, 24 Mar 1969.

52. See, for instance, PAAA, B40, 179, Allardt (Moscow) to AA, 9 Apr 1969.


56. At this moment the organisational structure of the AA contained two political directorates. Until their fusion into one political directorate in June 1970, Paul Frank was Political Director of the Politische Abteilung I (responsible for Western Europe, the United Nations and the ‘Third World’), whereas Hans Ruete’s Politische Abteilung II concentrated on German questions, Eastern Europe, the US and Canada, NATO and the WEU, as well as on issues concerning disarmament and European security.

59. TNA, FCO 41/538, Jackling (Bonn) to FCO, 15 April 1969. For the Soviet declaration on 9 April 1969, see EA 1969, D 237–42.
60. Becker, Die frühe KSZE-Politik, 111.
61. PAAA, B43, 107294, Ruete, 14 April 1969, PAAA, B150, 150, Ruete, 14 April 1969; PAAA, B40, 179, undated.
63. Mayer, ‘National Foreign Policy’, 82.
64. See, for example, ‘Differenzen’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), 12 April 1969, 1.
65. BArch, B136, 6449, Carstens to Kiesinger (Bebenhausen), 10 April 1969.
67. BArch, N1337, 668, Carstens to Kiesinger, 14 April 1969.
68. BArch, N1337, 591, Carstens to Brandt; undated handwritten letter draft, April 1969.
69. PAAA, B150, 151, Ruete, 17 April 1969.
71. WBA, A3, 301, Brandt’s speech at the SPD party conference in Bad Godesberg, 18 April 1969.
72. BArch, B136, 6346, Wentker to Kiesinger, 21 April 1969.
77. PAAA, B150, 151, Gnodtke (Natogerma) to AA, 22 April 1969.
78. NATO Archives (NATO), AC/119–R(69)31, 5 May 1969; NATOA, C-M(69)24, 9 June 1969.
79. PAAA, B150, 151, Pommerening, 30 April 1969.
80. NATOA, C-M(69)18(Final), The State of East–West Relations and its Implications for the Alliance, 5 May 1969.
82. The very first paragraph of the memorandum reads ‘The Government of the Soviet Union approached recently the Governments of European countries in the matter of the arrangement of a European security conference and of its preparations. This proposal concerning a special preparatory meeting was extended to the Government of Finland on April 8, 1969’, ULA 1969, 65.

86. Author’s interview with Keisalo. Already in the summer of 1969 a British diplomat reported from Helsinki that the initiative ‘had been kicked around in various Foreign Ministry papers for the last 12 months’, see TNA, FCO 41/542, Stuart (Helsinki) to Waterfield (FCO), 4 June 1969.


91. PAAA, B43, 107295, Ruete to Brandt, 5 May 1969; UKA, 21/160/3, Salomies (Bonn) to UM, 5 May 1969; Ulkosaaministeriön arkisto (UMA), 7B, 11.0, Väänänen, 7 May 1969.

92. PAAA, B150, 152, Allardt (Moscow) to AA, 8 May 1969; PAAA, B150, 152, Kempff (Helsinki) to AA, 9 May 1969.


96. UMA, 7B, 11.3, Suomen muistio 2.5.69 (folder I), Salomies (Bad Godesberg) to UM, 14 May 1969; UMA, 7B, 11.3, Suomen muistio 2.5.69 (folder II), Salomies (Bad Godesberg) to Hyyrinen (UM), 20 May 1969.

97. PAAA, B150, 152, Gnothke (Natogerma) to AA, 9 May 1969.

98. AAPD 1969, doc 155, Ruete (AA) to Natogerma, 12 May 1969.


100. TNA, FCO 41/540, Burrows (UK NATO) to FCO, 15 May 1969; NATOA, C–R(69)22, 4 May 1969.

101. PAAA, B150, 152, Grewe (Natogerma) to AA, 14 May 1969.


103. PAAA, B43, 107294, Ruete to Duckwitz, 30 May 1969.


105. PAAA, B150, 154, Blankenhorn (The Hague) to AA, 6 June 1969.


108. PAAA, B40, 179, Brandt to Duckwitz, 11 June 1969; PAAA, B40, 179, Ruete, 12 June 1969.

See also Becker, *Die frühe KSZE-Politik*, 92.


111. PA-DBT, 3104 5/3, Prot. 96, 27 Aug 1969. Brandt had used the same metaphor (bottle – label – contents) already in July 1969 during a meeting of European leaders in Harpsund, Sweden. See TNA, FCO 41/544, PMV (S), Copy No. 54.

112. NATOA, C-M(69)34, List of Issues for Possible Negotiation with the East, 14 July 1969.

113. PAAA, B150, 154, Blankenhorst (The Hague) to AA, 6 June 1969.

114. Sahm’s handwritten notes of the meeting in BArch, N1474, 73, 12 June 1969.

115. PAAA, B150, 155, Buring, meeting Brandt–Tsarapkin, 19 June 1969.


117. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), RG 59 (1967–69), Box 1538, Fessenden (Bonn) to State, 21 June 1969.


120. TNA, FCO 41/544, PMV (S), Copy No. 54, undated.

121. AAPD 1969, doc 208, Ruete (AA) to Natogerma, 24 June 1969. See also PAAA, B150, 157, Ruete, 28 July 1969.


123. Sahm’s handwritten notes, BArch, N1474, 74, 22 July 1969.


126. ACDP, I-226, A010, Carstens, 10 June 1969.


130. TNA, FCO 41/544, Morgan to Bendall, 24 July 1969.

131. NARA, RG 59 (1967–69), Box 1538, Fessenden (Bonn) to State, 21 June 1969.

132. NARA, RG 59 (1967–69), Box 1538, meeting Rogers–Birrenbach, 24 June 1969.

133. NARA, Nixon Presidential Materials Program, National Security Council (NSC) Files, NSC Country Files, Europe, Box 682, Folder 1, Sonnenfeldt, 7 July 1969.


135. BArch, N1337, 670, Carstens, undated.


137. This point was emphasised by the Foreign Minister of Luxembourg, but he implied that his feeling was shared especially by the Americans. See PAAA, B150, 154, Lüders (Luxemburg) to AA, 12 June 1969; B150, 155, Lüders (Luxemburg) to AA, 16 June 1969.

138. NARA, RG 59 (1967–69), Box 1538, Fessenden (Bonn) to State, 7 June 1969; NARA, RG 59 (1967–69), Box 1538, Cargo (US NATO) to State, 11 June 1969.

139. TNA, FCO 41/543, Jackling (Bonn) to FCO, 26 June 1969.


141. PAAA, B40, 179, 10 July 1969.


143. PAAA, B43, 107295, Kempff (Helsinki) to AA, 12 Aug 1969.

144. PAAA, B43, 107295, Ruete to Brandt and Duckwitz, 22 Aug 1969.

145. PAAA, B43, 107295, Ruete to Helsinki, 9 Sep 1969.
146. PAAA, B43, 107295, Scheel (Helsinki) to AA, 12 Sep 1969. For the complete text of the German reply, see UMA, 7B, 11.3, Suomen muistio 2.5.69 (folder IV), Vanamo, 12 Sep 1969.

147. Haftendorn, Sicherheit und Entspannung, 430.


149. Brandt, Erinnerungen, 183; Brandt, Begegnungen und Einsichten, 248; Becker, Die frühe KSJE-Politik, 136.

150. PAAA, B43, 107295, Ruete to Duckwitz, 2 Sep 1969; PAAA, B43, 107295, Rantzau to Ruete and Duckwitz, 16 Sep 1969.

151. PAAA, B43, 107295, Duckwitz to Carstens, 4 Sep 1969.

152. PAAA, B43, 107295, Rantzau to Ruete and Duckwitz, 16 Sep 1969.

153. PAAA, B2, 177, Carstens to Duckwitz, 11 Sep 1969.

154. PAAA, B2, 177, Duckwitz to Carstens, 15 Sep 1969.

155. PAAA, B2, 177, Carstens to Duckwitz, 15 Sep 1969; PAAA, B2, 177, Carstens to Duckwitz, 18 Sep 1969.

156. For a collection of the confidential and secret documents of the planning staff in 1969, see AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 396.


164. AAPD 1969, doc 296, Bahr (New York), 21 Sep 1969; Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name, 68.


166. PAAA, B150, 161, Ritzel to Boss, 23 Sep 1969.


170. For official statistics on all federal election results in the FRG to date, see <http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de>.

171. Pulzer, German Politics, 88.


173. Author’s interview with Schollwer.


Chapter 3

1969–70
Bilateral Leverages and European Security

ILLUSTRATION 3: State Secretary Egon Bahr, Foreign Minister Walter Scheel and Chancellor Willy Brandt (from left to right) at a press conference in Moscow on 12 August 1970.

Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, B 145 Bild-00106789,
Photographer: Ludwig Wegmann.
Brandt hopes to exploit the presumed Soviet interest in this project as a lever that may bring Moscow to put pressure on the East Germans to enter into negotiations with Bonn.

– US Ambassador in Bonn, Kenneth Rush, on the CSCE, January 1970

We see in the CSE a means to safeguard peace, to reduce tension in the East–West relationship, and to overcome inner-German contradictions.

– Position paper of the Auswärtiges Amt, May 1970

The pace of West German foreign policy during the first year of the Brandt Government was breathtaking to say the least. Before the end of 1970, the Federal Republic had concluded two cornerstone agreements of its bilateral Ostpolitik – the Moscow Treaty with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty with Poland. Official negotiating contacts had also been opened with the GDR, albeit so far with meagre results. On top of that, the Ambassadors of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union had started their negotiations on the status of Berlin. All these new leaps forward in European détente and German Ostpolitik certainly kept the policy makers of the Federal Republic busy in the period covered in this chapter.

But in spite of the understandable predominance of bilateral Ostpolitik, I will argue that the project of a European security conference also already figured on the political radar in Bonn. At first, the main emphasis in this respect was clearly on the instrumental use of the CSCE. As described in the preceding chapter, during the Grand Coalition the Auswärtiges Amt had developed meticulous plans for making use of the Soviet interest in the CSCE to receive concessions in return – in Ostpolitik in general and in Deutschlandpolitik in particular. Once in office, the Brandt Government did not hesitate to implement this linkage strategy. In the beginning, the atmosphere among the Western Allies was favourable for the linkage, and the Federal Republic felt relatively uninhibited in using the CSCE as a bargaining chip in its bilateral negotiations. Appropriately, it was above all Egon Bahr, the main architect of the ‘linkage’ idea, who had the opportunity to apply it in his negotiations in Moscow. But as soon as the leverage had been used once, its further application turned out to be problematic.

On the other hand, I will argue that the instrumental value of the CSCE was already during this period supplemented by a genuine interest in the agenda of the conference. The potential of the CSCE as a valuable tool in its own right in pursuing German objectives was realised in Bonn early on. Initial efforts of the FRG to influence the conference agenda in the multilateral Western preparations focused primarily on the inclusion of mutual and balanced force reductions. In the West German view, if a European security conference was truly to live up to its name, it could not neglect issues of hard security. The strong concentration on MBFR, however,
partly blinded the Federal Republic from seeing other possibilities for the CSCE agenda. This continued to impair the West German CSCE preparations into the latter half of 1970, when the Auswärtiges Amt slowly began to have a broader perspective on the conference agenda.

**Western Support for the Linkage of CSCE Plans with Deutschlandpolitik**

Among the first messages sent out from the Auswärtiges Amt after the Social-Liberal Government had officially been sworn in was Foreign Minister Walter Scheel’s telegram to all FRG Ambassadors on 30 October 1969. Explaining the government declaration Chancellor Willy Brandt had given to the Bundestag a few days earlier, Scheel’s instructions underscored three new elements in the Deutschlandpolitik of the new government. In addition to setting the goal of negotiating a ‘regulated special relationship’ with the GDR as a central priority and renouncing the automatic consequences for third countries recognising the GDR, as had been prescribed in the Hallstein Doctrine, the instructions also introduced a new tactical approach. ‘We will attempt to use the question of the GDR’s external relations as a means to advance an inner-German modus vivendi.’

As has been argued above, the Auswärtiges Amt had already during the end of the Grand Coalition held the view that an ‘improvement of climate’ between East and West – and particularly between the two German states – prior to the CSCE was an essential prerequisite for the success of the conference. This position was reflected also in a letter Hans Ruete, the Political Director of the Auswärtiges Amt, drafted for Brandt to send to the East German Prime Minister Willi Stoph immediately after the government declaration. Ruete’s draft had the Warsaw Pact calls for a security conference as its starting point. Having affirmed Bonn’s genuine interest in a CSCE, the letter stated that efforts to pave the way for such a conference should not be ‘additionally burdened by unregulated questions in the relationship between the two parts of Germany’.

This argument, stressing the need to avoid ‘German quarrels’, was repeated by the Federal Republic, time and again, in discussions with their Western, Eastern and neutral counterparts during the autumn of 1969. On the working level many of the Auswärtiges Amt officials hesitated to go beyond this position. Although bilateral negotiations were Bonn’s top priority, the argument went, ‘the impression should be avoided that we are making a successful conclusion of those discussions an unconditional prerequisite’ for European security negotiations. It was, above all, the concern of potential isolation in the West and of being blamed for the fail-
ure of the security conference that called for more careful formulations. Accordingly, in his first appearances as Foreign Minister, Walter Scheel preferred to refer to the possible bilateral contacts with the Soviet Union, Poland and the GDR as ‘test cases’, useful in estimating the possibilities of an eventual security conference, rather than presenting them strictly as formal preconditions.

But in confidential discussions with their allies, top FRG officials referred to the growing pressure to open the doors of international organisations and conferences for the GDR. In particular, the momentum of the CSCE discussion was clearly increasing. At the end of October in Prague, the Warsaw Pact issued yet another declaration calling for a rapid convening of an all-European conference. If the CSCE was to be used as a bargaining chip for achieving some kind of inner-German solution, time was running out. As Ruete put it to a member of the British NATO delegation, ‘it was therefore necessary to use this bait fairly soon, or it might lose its value’.

Thus, the ‘linkage’ policy began to be implemented more actively. Instead of merely pointing to the favourable impact an inner-German rapprochement might have on the prospects of a CSCE, the FRG started to insist more openly that bilateral negotiations between Bonn and East Berlin were needed before a security conference could take place. This sent a new message to the Allies, as Haftendorn has accurately pointed out. Whereas some of the NATO members had at first been afraid that the FRG would move too far and too quickly in its Ostpolitik, they now started to suspect that the new Brandt Government wanted to put others’ détente policies on hold until it had found a suitable bilateral solution with East Berlin.

Such suspicions, if they did exist, were not unfounded. In instructions sent out to several West German embassies in mid-November, Ruete stressed the intention of the Federal Government to ‘make use of the dynamics of the European security discussion and of the Eastern interest in a European security conference’ in order to achieve an inner-German settlement. In this context, it is worth mentioning that the East Germans were perfectly aware of these tactical considerations. In late December 1969, a memorandum prepared for the East German party leader Walter Ulbricht included lengthy verbatim quotations from Ruete’s instructions referred to above. Nevertheless, at a time when an official contact between Bonn and East Berlin had not yet been opened, it was in any case more important for the West Germans to convince their allies of the ‘linkage’ strategy. And as far as the major allies were concerned, it turned out to be anything but a hard sell.

On 3 December, the Foreign Ministers of the FRG and the Three Powers met in Brussels for their traditional quadripartite get-together preceding the NATO ministerial meeting. Here the French Foreign Minister Mau-
rice Schumann turned out to be the main advocate of the FRG’s linkage policy. Instead of being prepared to enter a CSCE without any preconditions whatsoever, Schumann argued, the FRG should at first demand progress in the various negotiations that were about to begin – bilateral West German-Soviet negotiations, Allied soundings on the status of Berlin, and inner-German talks. In Schumann’s words, ‘Germany was at the centre of this whole issue and it was for it to take the lead in formulating the conditions for Allied participation in a European Security Conference’. Since others in the quadripartite group more or less agreed with this view, the West German position was adopted without Scheel having to insist on it. On the contrary, in his statement Scheel continued to distance himself from setting firm preconditions, talking rather about the bilateral negotiations as ‘substantive prerequisites’ for a CSCE, testing the Soviets’ willingness to come to terms with the West at a possible conference.15

Following the quadripartite dinner, the NATO Foreign Ministers’ autumn meeting itself was unproblematic in this respect. Although the individual views that member states held of the CSCE varied considerably, with some of the smaller Allies seeing the conference in a more favourable light, there were no fundamental disagreements about the steps that were seen as the necessary preconditions for a conference.16 In the separate declaration on the future development of East–West relations, issued by the ministers in addition to the usual final communiqué, the Alliance supported the bilateral initiatives of the FRG as well as the efforts to improve the situation in Berlin. Regarding the security conference, the Brussels declaration in December 1969 stated:

Ministers consider that, as part of a comprehensive approach, progress in the bilateral and multilateral discussions and negotiations which have already begun, or could begin shortly, and which relate to fundamental problems of European security, would make a major contribution to improving the political atmosphere in Europe. Progress in these discussions and negotiations would help to ensure the success of any eventual conference.17

This circumspect statement could be – and was – interpreted in various ways. Some Allies saw the declaration, as Hartmut Mayer has argued, as a clear instruction for the FRG to achieve results on the German question in order to free the way for the security conference.18 This naturally applied in particular to those NATO members who were favourably inclined to the general idea of a CSCE. By contrast, those less enthusiastic about the conference project saw this as a means to procrastinate on the CSCE front as well as to control the pace of Brandt’s bilateral policies. In his memoirs, Henry Kissinger referred to the results of the NATO ministerial meeting in December 1969 as embedding Ostpolitik in a ‘matrix of negotiations’,
including the CSCE. Kissinger argued that this matrix not only enhanced the bargaining position of the FRG, but also set limits beyond which it could not go without an Allied consensus.19

The interpretation in Bonn was different. In the discussions with the Three Powers and within the wider NATO framework in early December the FRG had been encouraged, almost persuaded, by others to take the lead in setting Western preconditions for a CSCE. The West Germans saw this as a clear mandate to implement their ‘linkage’ policy – to utilise the prospect of a CSCE for bilateral purposes. With this fillip to their self-confidence, the FRG approached the first real test of the linkage approach, the bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union, with high hopes.

**Horse-Trading in Moscow**

The expectation, attached in Bonn to the CSCE, of it being a tactical tool in the bilateral negotiations with Moscow had been on the rise already before the December meeting of NATO. On 15 November 1969 Helmut Allardt, the FRG Ambassador in Moscow, delivered a verbal note from his government to the Soviet leadership, formally suggesting the opening of bilateral discussions about a renunciation of force between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union.20 The following day, the Romanian Deputy Foreign Minister, Gheorghe Macovescu, assured Egon Bahr in one of their secret meetings that the security conference was the key to the Soviet Union: ‘If the Federal Republic takes a positive attitude to the security conference, it will get the Russians on its side’.21 And a long discussion Scheel had with the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn gave the Germans further testimony of the importance the Soviet Union attached to the CSCE.22

Equipped with this information, Chancellor Brandt felt encouraged to raise the security conference as one of the central issues of his letter to the Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin on 19 November. In this letter, pleading for the importance of bilateral renunciation-of-force agreements between the FRG and the Soviet Union, Poland and the GDR, Brandt also established a direct connection between these agreements and the prospects of a European security conference. In Brandt’s view, these bilateral agreements could set an important example for the conference and, after their conclusion, ‘flow into a multilateral renunciation of force’.23 In his memoirs Bahr has underscored the significance of this letter, which in his view presented the ‘contours of the programme leading all the way to 1975 in Helsinki’. Moreover, Bahr writes that the US President, Richard Nixon, who was confidentially informed about the contents of the letter,
expressed his gratitude to the Germans for holding back the process towards a CSCE with it.24

But Brandt’s letter also shows the understandable limitations the Germans faced in pursuing their strategy. In dealing with a superpower, imposing inflexible and unconditional preconditions was hardly a good opening move for the FRG. Answering questions in the Foreign Policy Committee of the Bundestag on 11 December, Foreign Minister Scheel admitted this rather frankly. Although the Federal Republic for the time being preferred bilateral East–West talks over multilateral ones, Scheel explained, ‘we cannot make a condition out of it. That would endanger our own negotiations.’25

The linkage had to be presented in slightly more subtle terms. As the bilateral West German–Soviet contacts were opened in December 1969 with three meetings between Ambassador Allardt and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in Moscow, Allardt was consistently instructed to refer to the favourable impact that progress in and conclusion of the bilateral negotiations – with the Soviet Union, Poland and the GDR – as well as the Berlin talks would have for the prospects of a European security conference. According to the instructions, the Federal Government did not want to impose an immediate link between the bilateral and multilateral processes, but insisted on seeing an ‘inner connection’ between them.26 Yet sensitivity to such subtle messages at the negotiating table was hardly among the virtues of Gromyko. In his first two meetings with Allardt, the Soviet Foreign Minister responded furiously to any suggested connections between the CSCE and other negotiations, warning the Germans not to create ‘artificial difficulties’ – the establishment of such links was ‘neither appropriate nor useful’.27 In spite of this stonewalling, Allardt’s own estimate of the tactical situation after the first meetings was surprisingly optimistic: in his view Gromyko had clearly realised the significance the West German-Soviet negotiations would have for a CSCE.28

It is essential to note that the West German-Soviet negotiations were by no means the only – although the most obvious and immediate – target of West German efforts to instrumentalise the CSCE in Moscow. Deutschlandpolitik objectives were constantly looming in the background. As one of Bahr’s subordinates in the Chancellery argued in early December, the Soviet Union was in any case needed to persuade the GDR to the negotiating table – and for that purpose the inclusion of the CSCE in the offer could be helpful.29 In fact, the US embassy in Bonn, in a set of insightful telegrams at the end of December 1969 and in early January 1970, seems to have captured the essence of the situation. The FRG had indeed made the inner-German rapprochement ‘almost a precondition’ for its participation in the CSCE.30 According to the interpretation of the US embassy,
the Brandt Government considered the security conference to be a useful lever which might lure the Soviet Union to put pressure on the GDR to enter into inner-German negotiations.31

In this context, it is particularly interesting that although the instructions to Allardt were formally sent out from the Foreign Ministry, all the sections containing elements of the link to the CSCE were – without exception – direct results of interventions from the Chancellery.32 In particular, the more complex attempt to use the CSCE card to persuade Moscow to put pressure on East Berlin was originally a brainchild of Brandt’s entourage. At the request of the Head of the Chancellery, Horst Ehmke, one of the key sentences of the first set of instructions to Allardt read: ‘The clarification of the inner-German relationship would create the basis for a successful process of a European Security Conference.’33 Instead of the Auswärtiges Amt, the Chancellery was in charge. And in addition to Moscow, the other addressee of the CSCE linkage policy was East Berlin.

Although the Allardt–Gromyko talks ended in December after only three meetings without any concrete results to speak of, the belief in the potential impact of the CSCE leverage remained firm in the Chancellery. In yet another secret meeting with Macovescu, Egon Bahr told his Romanian interlocutor that his government saw the security conference as a ‘fundamental lever in the discussion with Moscow’.34 It did not take long before Bahr himself had the opportunity to test this lever in practice. After pulling the strings behind the scenes already during Allardt’s discussions, the Chancellery completely took over the responsibility for the West German-Soviet discussions in January 1970, when Bahr was appointed to continue the ‘exchange of opinions’ with Gromyko. Before his departure for Moscow, Bahr presented an ambitious – and, as it turned out, realistic – timetable to Brandt. In Bahr’s opinion, the bilateral renunciation of force had to be completed, or at least its completion had to appear certain, before the early summer of 1970. According to Bahr, the time pressure calling for such rapid progress in the West German-Soviet negotiations was in part due to the CSCE process:

a) There will be no ESC without the Federal Republic. This is our lever. b) This lever serves the bilateral renunciation of force. c) This lever becomes the weaker the closer an ESC gets without us having the bilateral renunciation of force.35

In his idiosyncratic fashion, Bahr thus claimed to have identified an exceptional tactical momentum – yet in the same breath argued that the momentum was on the wane. If the FRG wanted to make use of the CSCE in Moscow, it had to act quickly.

The first round of the Bahr–Gromyko talks was opened in Moscow in late January 1970. At the end of their first meeting, Gromyko took the ini-
tiative and briefly returned to the link between the CSCE and the bilateral talks: ‘We do not want any horse-trading. It would not be good if you were to make your participation in the ESC conditional on the successful conclusion of the current talks.’ Bahr merely replied that his party was not interested in horse-trading either. But the topic was covered more extensively in their following meeting. After another attack by Gromyko on ‘artificial connections’, Bahr defended the West German position, arguing that it was neither about horse-trading nor about setting preconditions. Instead, Bahr stressed, the West German-Soviet negotiations were an important part of improving security and détente in Europe. If the talks in Moscow were successful, the FRG would have a strong argument to convince the more sceptical Western powers of the possibilities of a security conference. But on the other hand, Bahr went on: ‘If we failed, the Three Powers would say: “Do you have bats in the belfry? You don’t get the one thing you want the most and now you are rushing there [into the conference]?”’

Apparently this approach, appealing to potential German influence on the CSCE discussions within the West, struck the right chord in Moscow. Gromyko immediately took it up, pointing out to Bahr that if the FRG made use of its influence on the Three Powers in the CSCE context, the Soviet Union would naturally see that in a positive light. After the meeting, Bahr reported that Gromyko had appeared to understand the West German position completely. This optimistic evaluation of the potential leverage was also shared in the upper echelons of the Auswärtiges Amt. Moreover, the NATO Ambassador Wilhelm Grewe even called for a stronger West German initiative in the conference preparations of the Alliance, since ‘the influence that we are able to have on the development towards an ECS in the Western camp is significant for our negotiating chances in Moscow’. In other words, Grewe, an outspoken CSCE sceptic, suggested a demonstrative increase in German CSCE activity in the NATO framework in order to further increase the momentum in the Bahr–Gromyko talks.

As the talks in Moscow resumed on 3 March 1970 after a two-week pause, Gromyko repeated Soviet suspicions of West German intentions to link the bilateral negotiations with the CSCE. Bahr reassured the Soviet Foreign Minister that the position of the Federal Government in this respect remained unchanged. Only a few days later, Gromyko tabled a Soviet non-paper, in effect already containing the main elements of what would become the final Moscow Treaty and the so-called declarations of intent that supplemented it. In point number 10 of the Soviet document, the Soviet Union and the FRG pledged to ‘undertake the efforts needed to prepare and convene the all-European conference on questions of consolidating security in Europe’. In their meeting on 10 March, Bahr told Gro-
myko that he had been somewhat surprised to see the CSCE paragraph included in the non-paper but admitted that the question had indeed been touched upon in the negotiations. With certain reformulations, Bahr said, the West German side was prepared to agree to this part of the Soviet proposal. In Bahr’s counter-suggestion, the problematic ‘all-European’ attribute (potentially implying the exclusion of the North American Allies) was dropped, the level of commitment slightly reduced and the element of cooperation introduced.44 Already, on the following day, the delegations were able to agree on a compromise between the Soviet and West German versions of the non-paper. This working paper also included the declaration of intent regarding the CSCE, now in the form: ‘The FRG and the USSR welcome the plan for a conference on questions of consolidating security and cooperation in Europe and will do everything in their power for the preparation and successful implementation of this plan.’45 On 21 March, Bahr and Gromyko gave their final blessing to this formulation.46

The compromise about the CSCE paragraph was probably the easiest one to arrive at among the points in the working paper. And at first sight, compared with the historical proportions of the main clauses of the West German-Soviet renunciation-of-force agreement which was slowly beginning to take shape, the declaration of intent to support a European security conference might appear of minor importance. In fact it was far from insignificant. When Bahr appeared before the Bundestag Foreign Policy Committee in March to report on the latest state of the talks in Moscow, he referred to several official and unofficial discussions with Gromyko about the CSCE.47 The security conference was part and parcel of the Moscow talks, although Brandt for some reason was on many occasions at pains to belittle the influence of the CSCE in the Moscow negotiations.48

As a matter of fact, it seems that the Soviet Union was at least as keen as the Germans to establish a link between the CSCE and the bilateral talks. After all, it was a Soviet initiative to include the CSCE statement as one of the declarations of intent. A fascinating memorandum of the State Department from April 1970, based on US intelligence reports, claims that although Gromyko had consistently rejected the efforts by first Allardt and then Bahr to link the bilateral renunciation of force with West German support for a security conference, ‘Bahr and Brandt have stated in private that it was the Soviets who had been suggesting that Bonn’s support for the CES would facilitate progress toward a renunciation of force agreement.’ According to these clandestine US sources, Bahr’s analysis of the situation already in late February was that the Soviets wanted Bonn to ‘make it clear to its own allies that it would unconditionally support the calling of a CES’ before a renunciation-of-force agreement could be discussed seriously.49 Later in the summer, in defence of the CSCE com-
mitment, Auswärtiges Amt officials told their British colleagues that the Germans had ‘really had no option but to take a position in Moscow on what was a scheme of particular interest to the Soviet Government’. 50

In any case, the ‘linkage’ policy was beginning to pay dividends. Although it is impossible to pin down direct causality from the archival record, it is certainly plausible to think that the agreement reached on the CSCE formulation served as a useful additional lubricant to the progress of the negotiations in Moscow. Moreover, it may also have had the intended triangular impact, via Moscow to East Berlin. Coinciding with the advances made in Moscow in March, there was a parallel development on the inner-German front. On 19 March, at the end of the second round of the Bahr–Gromyko talks, Chancellor Brandt met Willi Stoph in Erfurt. After difficult preparations, a direct contact between the two German states was finally established. As Mary Sarotte has pointed out, the breakthrough in the preparation of the Erfurt meeting was achieved after a Soviet intervention on 11 March, with immediate effect on the behaviour of the GDR. 51 This, as we have seen, was the day when the compromise working paper in Moscow had been agreed on.

When Bahr and Gromyko met again on 12 May for the third and final round of their talks, the common undertaking of the FRG and Soviet Union to work towards the CSCE was no longer a contested issue. 52 In Bonn, however, the legal department of the Auswärtiges Amt gave a harsh verdict on the working paper under review in Moscow: virtually all the guidelines were in the Soviet interest alone and it was impossible to achieve a balanced treaty on their basis. The CSCE paragraph was no exception. According to the legal experts, this declaration would mark a departure from the common CSCE consultations within NATO, committing the FRG to go it alone and support the conference in line with Soviet interests. 53 Nevertheless, making full use of his independent negotiating position in Moscow, Bahr kept his head. The CSCE formulation agreed in March remained unchanged as the final declaration of intent in the end product of the Bahr–Gromyko talks, the document later known as the ‘Bahr Paper’. 54 And again, the end of a Bahr–Gromyko round in Moscow coincided with an inner-German summit. On 21 May Brandt and Stoph had their second meeting within two months, this time in Kassel. In contrast to Erfurt, however, there is no indication of a direct link between progress in Moscow and the timing of the Kassel meeting.

But if the West German commitment to the CSCE in Moscow was indeed bearing fruit in facilitating the process towards a West German-Soviet treaty, the Soviets were also quick to demand that the Federal Republic lived up to its word. The ink on the Bahr Paper was hardly dry when Ambassador Tsarapkin met Foreign Minister Scheel in Bonn to call
for further German efforts to promote the CSCE at the upcoming NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Rome.\textsuperscript{55} In July, the Soviet Ambassador suggested to Chancellor Brandt that bilateral West German-Soviet consultations about the CSCE should be opened.\textsuperscript{56} Brandt and Scheel were able to evade these approaches, but the Soviets clearly interpreted the CSCE formulations of the Bahr Paper as a genuine commitment.

The Bahr Paper as a whole laid the ground for the actual negotiations for the Moscow Treaty between Scheel and Gromyko in July and August, but its final declaration of intent threatened to become a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it does appear that Bahr was successful in using the CSCE lever in his discussions in Moscow more or less as planned. But on the other hand, whatever had been gained by Bahr in return for promises of support for the CSCE, that leverage was spent at the moment the commitment was locked into the Bahr Paper. From May 1970 onwards, that particular German-Soviet connection could only work the other way. Moreover, any hopes there may have been for using the security conference as a direct bargaining chip in the contacts with the GDR were dealt a severe blow precisely by the CSCE commitment made in Moscow. When the Scheel–Gromyko negotiations were concluded on 7 August with the initialling of the Moscow Treaty, the Foreign Ministers also exchanged initialled copies of the six final declarations of intent of the Bahr Paper. Although these commitments were not officially part of the Moscow Treaty, they naturally did not go unnoticed in East Berlin, either. In a memorandum of the GDR Foreign Ministry, the commitment of the Federal Republic to the CSCE project was greeted as a triumph. ‘This binding promise of the FRG can be used in the future to rebut its objections to and preconditions for a security conference.’\textsuperscript{57}

With important repercussions for the later CSCE discussions about inviolability of frontiers, the Germans also managed to get the Soviet Union to register the receipt of a separate ‘letter on German unity’ on the occasion of the signing of the Moscow Treaty. In this letter, the Federal Government stated that the treaty did not contradict the aim of the Federal Republic to create ‘a state of peace in Europe in which the German people can regain its unity in free self-determination’.\textsuperscript{58}

While the Federal Government, in its official statement regarding the Moscow Treaty, tried to give an assurance that ‘this declaration of intent does not interfere with the prerequisites the Federal Government considers indispensable for such a conference’\textsuperscript{59}, the implications that commitment had for any potential leverage on the GDR must have been obvious in Bonn as well. Already during the spring, the appropriate location for applying the CSCE linkage had been clearly perceived to be in Moscow. This was not only witnessed by the constant presence of the CSCE in the
Bahr–Gromyko talks, but also by the complete absence of the conference from the agenda of the Brandt–Stoph discussions. In his conversations with the East Germans, Brandt made no attempt, either in Erfurt or in Kassel, to use the security conference directly as a bargaining tool. The Moscow Treaty and the CSCE commitment attached to it emphasised further that the inner-German element of the CSCE linkage strategy had to be thought of in triangular terms: going through Moscow in order to have an impact on East Berlin. Accordingly, in conjunction with the signing of the Moscow Treaty on 12 August, Brandt suggested to Kosygin that Soviet support in bringing about genuine inner-German negotiations would also help the preparations of a security conference – but did not present them as an absolute precondition. 60

With the Moscow Treaty signed, although still far from being ratified and entering into force, in less than a year after the inauguration of the Brandt–Scheel Government, Ostpolitik had got off to a flying start. Indeed, for many observers – foreign and domestic alike – the pace was too quick, resulting in unnecessary concessions by the West German negotiators in Moscow. Ambassador Allardt later bitterly criticised Bahr and Brandt for their premature use of the CSCE leverage: ‘Our agreement [to the conference] was of a very special value to the Kremlin. It was a trump card which would have deserved an adequate reward’. 61 Allardt’s criticism is difficult to subscribe to completely, since the Moscow Treaty itself ought to have been more than enough of a reward. Given the historic weight of the German-Soviet agreement, if the commitment to the security conference helped in part to bring about the treaty, it was certainly a price Bonn could afford to pay. Yet there is also a kernel of truth in Allardt’s attack. Once the West German commitment to the CSCE was laid on the table in Moscow, its value as a lever elsewhere was dramatically diminished.

Rethinking the Linkage Strategy

In the new situation after the Moscow Treaty, the West Germans basically had two alternative ways to continue using the CSCE leverage. On the one hand, the FRG could continue its attempts to have Moscow persuade East Berlin to come to the inner-German negotiating table, pointing out the advantageous impact that this would have on the CSCE. As shown above, there had been a consistent tendency in Bonn to see the CSCE lever on the GDR as most efficient when applied through Moscow. On the other hand, a perhaps more promising alternative was to try to multilateralise the linkage approach in the West, by focusing increasingly on the Berlin
talks instead of bilateral negotiations as further preconditions for a security conference.

As the contents of the Bahr Paper were leaked to West German newspapers in June 1970, the final declaration of intent of the Bahr–Gromyko agreement also came into the public domain. This naturally led to misgivings at home as well as abroad. Was the Federal Republic now acting as the advocate of Moscow in the CSCE discussions of the West? In an effort to dispel these suspicions, Egon Bahr appeared before the NATO Council, explaining the results of his negotiations with Gromyko and emphasising to the Allies that no promises regarding the security conference had been made in Moscow that went beyond agreements made in the NATO framework, and that the CSCE policies of the Federal Republic in NATO were in no way prejudiced by the Bahr Paper. In Bonn, the Auswärtiges Amt made similar explanations, arguing that there was no absolute yardstick for the undertaking to do ‘everything in their power’ in favour of a CSCE. In particular, this commitment could not override the democratic principles of NATO decision-making – the FRG still had to respect majority decisions in the Alliance.

Indeed, no matter how thoroughly planned, any FRG attempts to use the CSCE as a tool for its Ostpolitik could succeed only if they were backed by constant multilateral support from the NATO allies. From the spring of 1970, this support was no longer unanimous and unconditional. The changing situation within the Alliance was one factor contributing to West German reconsideration of the linkage strategy.

As we have seen above, in December 1969, NATO Foreign Ministers had agreed that tangible progress in the Berlin question and in the inner-German relationship had to be made before the opening of any multilateral discussions. Subsequently, it was increasingly the Berlin negotiations that were moving to the centre of attention in NATO. The French especially, eager to maintain their particular position as one of the Big Four, appeared to be ‘obsessed’ with Berlin. They were concerned that a de facto recognition of the GDR resulting from its participation in a CSCE would lead to significant deterioration of the Berlin situation, if that had not been regulated beforehand. The quadripartite talks about the situation in the divided city were started on 26 March 1970, with the first meeting of the three Western Ambassadors to Bonn and the Soviet Ambassador to East Berlin. But progress in these four-power Berlin negotiations during the spring of 1970 was minimal. Given the widespread consensus in the Alliance on the importance of the Berlin precondition, this also made rapid movements towards a CSCE unthinkable for the time being.

But in the spring of 1970 there were signs of wavering in the NATO members’ willingness to support the FRG when it came to the bilateral
Ostpolitik negotiations – and in particular the inner-German talks – as preconditions for a CSCE. The French, especially, with a growing interest of their own in the conference, began to voice their suspicions. During his visit to Moscow in January, Hervé Alphand, the top official of the French Foreign Ministry, had argued that the FRG should not be allowed to become the judge of the fate of the conference. In April, another high-ranking official at the Quai d’Orsay delivered a similar message in Paris to the Finnish Ambassador Ralph Enckell, who was sounding out CSCE positions of potential participants. The French also turned directly to the Germans, asking whether the FRG still continued to hold to the view of demanding progress in inner-German negotiations before a security conference. In response, the embassy in Paris was instructed to reconfirm the known West German position. The Federal Republic could agree to a CSCE only after concrete steps had been taken in the inner-German discussions. Additionally, the FRG continued to see its bilateral discussions with Moscow and Warsaw as well as the Berlin talks of the Four Powers as test cases of Soviet preparedness for genuine détente.

However, it was becoming clear that there was a significant internal shortcoming in the linkage strategy of the FRG. The West Germans themselves appeared unable to define precisely what constituted the degree of progress in the inner-German and Berlin talks required to justify West German agreement to enter a multilateral security conference. An FRG embassy official in London conceded as much in February 1970, saying that it was impossible to say how far such progress would have to go: ‘The main thing was that it should have gone sufficiently far to make it certain that there would be no confrontation between the Germans at a conference.’ In internal background papers the problem was recognised with greater clarity. ‘The Federal Government has not been able to determine what amount of inner-German development is considered sufficient for a CES.’ For the time being, the ambiguous West German line was to refuse to be drawn into a CSCE before the ‘necessary degree of maturity’ in the bilateral negotiations and the Berlin talks had been achieved. This hesitation was particularly awkward in a situation where most of the Allies still agreed that due to the ongoing SALT and Ostpolitik negotiations, it was the United States and the FRG that held the keys to determining whether sufficient progress had been made to justify multilateral talks. In the British view of the Western CSCE preparations ‘most of the cards were in Federal German hands’.

In the short term, the Germans were able to play their hand well. Preparing the communiqué for the spring 1970 ministerial meeting, the NATO allies agreed that the opening of actual multilateral negotiations still continued to be conditional on the progress in the talks that were al-
ready under way. However, the UK and Belgium, actively supported by the Scandinavians, argued that the ministers should balance this by expressing NATO’s preparedness already to enter ‘multilateral exploratory talks’ about a security conference – partly in order to keep public opinion at home satisfied.\(^75\) The FRG led the opposing camp, condemning this idea of an ambassadorial ‘tea party’ in Helsinki to sound out the prospects of a conference, dating back to a Belgian proposal from March 1970. In the West German view, such a ‘tea party’ would have the same collateral effects as a conference proper. Although this conflict was not resolved in time for the NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Rome in May, the Germans were able to count on the support of the US in preventing the Anglo-Belgian proposal from being accepted.\(^76\)

According to the US NATO Ambassador, in the Rome meeting the FRG ‘did its best to avoid taking a position on anything’, probably in order to maintain maximum flexibility in the sensitive phase of Ostpolitik.\(^77\) The French did most of the legwork in finding a compromise position, and in the end, the option for exploratory talks was not mentioned. Moreover, the relevant paragraph in the Rome communiqué referred, for the first time, explicitly to progress in the inner-German and Berlin talks as a prerequisite for the conference preparations:

In so far as progress is recorded […] in the on-going talks – in particular on Germany and Berlin – the Allied Governments state that they would be ready to enter into multilateral contacts with all interested governments. One of the main purposes of such contacts would be to explore when it will be possible to convene a conference or a series of conferences on European security and co-operation.\(^78\)

In short, the Germans had reason to be content with the outcome of the Rome meeting.\(^79\) Not only was the linkage between the inner-German talks and the CSCE maintained – it was also articulated in clearer terms than before. Nevertheless, the budding discontent within NATO during the spring of 1970 had made its presence felt: it was obvious that the Allies would not be prepared to grant the FRG a de facto veto on the CSCE preparations indefinitely, if this veto was based on bilateral German negotiations alone. In June the Auswärtiges Amt estimated that it might be possible to hold this question open for a further six months, until the following NATO ministerial meeting in December 1970, but hardly any longer than that.\(^80\) This turned out to be a prophetic statement.
Berlin Surpasses Other Preconditions

During the summer of 1970, the West Germans’ own position on linkage of the Berlin talks with the CSCE was already on the move, yet still far from a firmly established new line. In their discussions with Allied colleagues, Auswärtiges Amt officials were prepared to soften the preconditions required for a CSCE, conceding that they did not expect all of the Eastern treaties to be ‘signed, sealed and delivered’ before there could be progress towards a security conference. Simultaneously, however, the same officials continued to refer to the leverage the Soviet interest in the security conference gave to the West and to argue that the Alliance ought to see progress in the bilateral negotiations of the Federal Republic as a ‘touchstone’ for deciding when to multilateralise contacts. Egon Bahr took this dialectical approach even further, saying in the same breath that on the one hand, the bilateral negotiations were not a precondition for a CSCE but that on the other hand, if they failed, the idea of a conference would be dead. Brandt, for his part, was more cautious, pointing to the inadvisability of creating hard and binding links between different areas of foreign policy.

In fact, as the positions began to take shape, there was a fascinating divergence of views between the views of the Chancellery and the Foreign Ministry during the autumn of 1970. Brandt’s Chancellery had reason to believe that there could be movement in Deutschlandpolitik even without the direct use of the CSCE leverage. On 29 October, an East German delegation – prompted by the Soviet Union – arrived in Bonn to meet Brandt, suggesting the reopening of talks between the FRG and the GDR. Brandt welcomed the idea, and a month later in East Berlin, Bahr and his GDR colleague Michael Kohl began their negotiations on transit questions between the two German states. The pace of these negotiations was admittedly glacial in the beginning, but the six-month ‘pause for reflection’ in inner-German relations was nonetheless overcome.

This also had important repercussions for the CSCE policy of the FRG. In an interesting shift, just when the Auswärtiges Amt leadership had adopted the brainchild of Brandt and Bahr, the very creators of the linkage strategy were already beginning to depart from it. For the Chancellery, the CSCE linkage had already served its major purpose in the West German-Soviet negotiations, and there was no longer much to be hoped for from it in the strictly bilateral inner-German context. The divergence between the Chancellery and the Auswärtiges Amt in late 1970 was further consolidated by the internal division of labour. During the first year of the Brandt Government, the Chancellery had effectively taken charge of all the bilateral issues considered to be the hard core of West German foreign policy –
the Moscow negotiations being a case in point. This had left the Foreign Ministry sidelined, with responsibility for less important issues, such as the emerging CSCE process. After a fairly weak first year in office, Foreign Minister Scheel, supported by the new State Secretary of the Auswärtiges Amt, Paul Frank, was now willing to make his presence felt. More or less excluded from the Chancellery-dominated Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik, Scheel and his subordinates attempted to make the CSCE a policy area of their own, in an effort to prove their independence.

To complicate matters further, the Auswärtiges Amt was not speaking with one voice. Over the summer, Scheel had tended to emphasise the Berlin negotiations, at the expense of the inner-German talks, to the Soviets as the major test that needed to be passed before the CSCE. This corresponded with the ideas of the less rigid elements in the Foreign Ministry. For example Berndt von Staden and Günther van Well, two high-ranking officials in the political department, were both of the view that although agreement on some kind of treaty with the GDR before a CSCE was desirable, it was better to speak merely about a ‘clarification’ of the inner-German relationship or a modus vivendi, in order to avoid the ‘impression of preconditions’ and damaging effects on Ostpolitik resulting from it.

In this line of reasoning, it was considered tactically advantageous to multilateralise the ‘linkage’ policy and to share the responsibility for delaying the CSCE by focusing on progress in the Berlin talks as the main prerequisite, rather than to appear as the sole demandeur blocking the road to the conference. This emphasis on Berlin instead of inner-German talks was also reflected in Scheel’s discussions in October 1970 with various interlocutors, whether Western, Eastern or neutral. Somewhat curiously, the Berlin precondition actually seemed to go down better in Moscow than in Brussels. Whereas the Soviet Union appeared, albeit grudgingly, to be prepared to accept the need for a Berlin agreement before a CSCE, a number of smaller NATO members increasingly voiced their discomfort about it. Their main concern was that the secretive handling of the Berlin negotiations by the Bonn Group powers would also give them a monopoly on Western decision-making about the fate of the security conference.

But in the autumn of 1970 there was a clear backlash from the hardliners in the Auswärtiges Amt, attempting to rescue and restore the link between inner-German talks and the CSCE. They considered it essential to hold firmly to the formulations of the Rome communiqué: no form of a multilateralisation of the CSCE preparations should be considered until substantial progress in the bilateral negotiations of the FRG and in the Berlin question had been recorded. In September 1970 the West German representative in the NATO Council declared that progress in the inner-German negotiations continued to be the major yardstick for their deci-
sion whether to take part in a CSCE. Against the backdrop of the West German CSCE commitment made in Moscow, this position was certainly ‘stiffer than may have been expected’, as the US Ambassador to Bonn, Kenneth Rush, commented. Rush’s conclusion, that the unexpected firmness was in part a German reaction to Western suspicions raised by the very same declaration of intent in the Bahr Paper, was probably not very far off the mark.

In the latter half of the autumn, the hardliners seemed to be getting the upper hand in the Auswärtiges Amt. In a meeting with Gromyko on 30 October, Scheel surprised his Soviet colleague by returning progress in inner-German negotiations and other bilateral talks – on an equal footing with the Berlin negotiations – to the list of developments that ought to precede the security conference. Indeed, instead of just referring to ‘progress’, Scheel went further and suggested that practical preparations for a security conference could commence when ‘circumstances for the accession of both German states to the United Nations had been created’. Gromyko immediately rebutted this suggestion as a West German attempt to create new preconditions for the conference.

It was precisely in this element that the views of the Chancellery and the Auswärtiges Amt were going in separate directions. In his comments to a Foreign Ministry working paper on the CSCE and Deutschlandpolitik, Egon Bahr in early November 1970 underscored that from a tactical point of view it was essential now to avoid the impression of posing new preconditions. But at least in the short term the dominant Auswärtiges Amt view – prepared to risk that impression – prevailed. The working paper, with only minor modifications, was presented to the Bonn Group on 5 November, emphasising that in spite of the recent focus on the Berlin talks, progress was still also needed in the inner-German talks before a security conference. Moreover, this Auswärtiges Amt study for the first time made a clear distinction between multilateral conference preparations and the conference proper. Multilateral CSCE preparations had to be preceded by the ‘beginning of genuine negotiations between the two German governments’. Before the actual conference, then again, these inner-German negotiations had to be underway and an agreement reached on the ‘essential features of an inner-German settlement’. Two weeks after the Bonn Group meeting, this West German position paper was also delivered to the other NATO allies.

The US saw this as a major shift in the West German approach: the FRG now wanted to see progress in the inner-German modus vivendi as well, instead of only in the Berlin talks, before a CSCE. Although the West German position was considered ‘entirely reasonable’ and received full US support, George Vest from the US NATO mission admitted that ‘this may,
as an apparently new and additional “precondition”, be hard to sell to
some members of the Alliance. […] To switch emphasis to inner-German
talks – or at least to argue that this was what was always intended – may
be regarded as rewriting history’. Therefore Vest recommended that the
FRG, to improve its chances of success, ought to seek support from the
Bonn Group before the upcoming meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers.102

This was precisely what the Auswärtiges Amt intended. At a quadripart-
tite meeting in mid-November 1970 the political directors of all the Three
Powers agreed with the West Germans on the need to find a common
position on the progress in the German and Berlin questions needed to
justify a CSCE. The main argument for finding a consensus in the Bonn
Group was the ability to speak with one voice to the remaining NATO al-
lies, although their sensitivities about being left out of the CSCE prepara-
tions were well known.103 Using the Bonn Group in the CSCE context was
a powerful tool. Hans Otto Bräutigam, who was at that time a desk officer
in the Deutschlandpolitik unit of the Auswärtiges Amt, has later stressed the
extraordinary influence of the Bonn Group during the intensive coopera-
tion in the Berlin negotiations. If the Bonn Group agreed on something on
the working level, it was very difficult for any of the four governments
involved to reverse that decision later on.104

When it came to actually finding substantive support for the West Ger-
man view in the Bonn Group, two thirds of the task were relatively easy.
The United States and Britain had little reason to oppose West German
insistence on a ‘clarification’ of the inner-German relationship before any
multilateral conference preparations. The US had never been enthusias-
tic about the CSCE, but the reservations the UK had on the conference
resulted from the change of government in June 1970. Under the lead-
ership of the new Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath, the Brit-
ish Government focused its European policies on accession to the EC and
assumed a distinctly more passive role in the CSCE discussion.105 This
was spelled out clearly by Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home in December
1970: ‘It is chiefly the Federal German Government who, in their wish to
see progress in the Berlin negotiations and in the inner German talks, are
pressing their allies to go slow on the question of the Conference. … When
the Federal German Government are ready for a Conference on European
Security, we shall not oppose it.’106

Whereas this change in Alliance dynamics was favourable for West
German efforts to uphold the link between the inner-German negotiations
and a CSCE, it was neutralised by a simultaneous change in the oppo-
site direction, that in Paris. In the autumn of 1970, convincing the French
of the inner-German precondition for a security conference turned out
to be next to impossible. France was a very recent convert to the CSCE cause. The one-week visit of President Pompidou to Moscow in October 1970 had marked the first occasion of a positive French statement about the proposed CSCE. But following that visit, the transformation was rapid. In a true volte-face, after previously being among the most sceptical Western voices, the French officials now spoke actively in favour of the conference project. At the same time, a successful conclusion of the Berlin Agreement became the only precondition for a CSCE the French were willing to discuss.

At first, the change in the French position did not diminish the confidence with which the Auswärtiges Amt looked at the forthcoming Western consultations. In preparation for the back-to-back Foreign Ministers’ meetings of NATO and the European Political Cooperation (EPC) due in early December 1970, the West German officials were certain that they could convince their allies of the need to achieve substantial progress in the inner-German talks, in addition to the Berlin negotiations, before multilateralisation of the CSCE preparations would be justified. The US Ambassador in Bonn reported that despite being acutely aware of the criticism such a blocking position might incur, the FRG was prepared to ‘hold out for some progress on inner-German talks, even if this would mean … exercising a “veto” over the conference’. Yet the French were not to be persuaded. In the EPC negotiations of the Ten on 2 December in Brussels, Scheel argued that certain prerequisites for the improvement of the political East–West climate were needed before a conference, and those included not only progress in Berlin, but also in the inner-German relationship. If not a conclusion of an inner-German treaty, then at least a ‘conclusive stage’ in those negotiations had to be achieved prior to multilateral preparations of a security conference. But reflecting the new French policy on the CSCE, Schumann now vehemently opposed this. In complete contradiction to his position a year earlier, the French Foreign Minister argued that progress in the Berlin negotiations should be the only Western precondition for a CSCE. Schumann added that a result in the Berlin talks would necessarily lead to an improvement of the inner-German relationship, making a separate precondition unnecessary. Accordingly, in the final analysis of the EPC meeting, the Auswärtiges Amt was able to point to an agreement of the Ten only on the necessity of a Berlin agreement before a CSCE. Due to French opposition, the same could not be said about the inner-German precondition.

The same drama was replayed in the NATO ministerial meeting the following day, also in Brussels. The potential leverage on the Soviets, resulting from the linkage of the Berlin negotiations and the CSCE, enjoyed
widespread support in the Alliance. In fact, the number of members calling for immediate multilateralisation of CSCE preparations had fallen since the previous ministerial meeting in Rome. Apart from the Scandinavian countries cautiously in favour of swift multilateralisation, the others now all agreed that the progress achieved in the form of the West German-Soviet and West German-Polish treaties, welcome as it was, did not yet fulfil the conditions set in the Rome communiqué in May, since a Berlin agreement was still missing.

But when the discussion moved to other possible preconditions for a CSCE, Schumann showed no signs of retreating from the rigid position of his government: it was Berlin and nothing but Berlin. Although France was left alone in opposing the further inclusion of ‘progress in inner-German negotiations’ as a prerequisite for a conference, not even US and British support for the West Germans was of any avail. Faced with French intransigence, Scheel had to budge. The West Germans had no option but to settle for a lukewarm compromise formulation on vaguely defined ‘ongoing talks’, inserted into the final communiqué on their behalf by the Belgians. Consequently, the NATO communiqué signalled a clear priority given to the Berlin talks. The Berlin precondition was spelled out in stronger terms than before (‘satisfactory conclusion’ rather than ‘progress’), but in contrast to the Rome communiqué six months before, the one agreed on in Brussels in December 1970 no longer explicitly mentioned the inner-German talks. Instead, the ministers affirmed the readiness of their governments, as soon as the talks on Berlin have reached a satisfactory conclusion and in so far as the other on-going talks are proceeding favourably, to enter into multilateral contacts with all interested governments to explore when it would be possible to convene a conference, or a series of conferences, on security and co-operation in Europe.

Afterwards, when briefing the Finns about the Brussels meeting, Political Director Berndt von Staden explained that the communiqué negotiations had been straightforward and unproblematic, and that there had not been any major differences in opinion between the Allies. The Swedish embassy in Bonn, reporting from a similar briefing, noted that the Auswärtiges Amt viewed the French lead in Brussels and the subsequent focus of the Alliance on the Berlin precondition ‘not without satisfaction’. Moreover, in a memorandum written by the leading Auswärtiges Amt official directly responsible for CSCE affairs, Götz von Groll, the ‘on-going talks’ clause was interpreted as including the need to reach a ‘conclusive stage’ in the negotiations between the FRG and the GDR before multilateral preparations for a CSCE.
But no upbeat explanations given in retrospect could change the fact that the Brussels meeting marked a clear defeat for the Federal Republic – or, to be precise, for the hardliners in the Auswärtiges Amt – within NATO. As Bahr had predicted already in September 1969, bargaining with the CSCE in order to achieve an inner-German arrangement was sustainable only for as long as the support of the Three Powers was secured.\textsuperscript{122} With France no longer behind the FRG in this, no measure of support by the other two – fairly passive in the case of Britain, somewhat more active in that of the US – was sufficient to persuade the Alliance to adopt the West German line. Having learned this lesson the hard way, the Auswärtiges Amt was quick to come back in line with the Chancellery. Within weeks after the December 1970 NATO ministerial meeting, West German demands for an inner-German agreement as a formal precondition for the CSCE preparations had disappeared completely from the diplomatic stage. However, in late 1970 it was already impossible to think about the CSCE merely in terms of linkage. Far from being only a theoretical Warsaw Pact propaganda initiative, the agenda of a future security conference had already in 1969 become a subject of serious European discussion. The Federal Republic was no exception.

\section*{Discovering the Potential of the CSCE}

The focus of West German foreign policy in the first year of the Brandt Government was beyond doubt on bilateral Ostpolitik. Accordingly, as witnessed above, the approach to the CSCE in 1969–70 was also dominated by attempts to utilise the conference project for that purpose. But in addition to being seen as a useful tool in pursuing the most immediate goals of the Eastern treaty framework, the CSCE in and of itself was increasingly given serious thought in Bonn. The latter half of this chapter will trace this development, starting again from October 1969.

In 1969–70, the general momentum for the conference was clearly growing, as recurrent Warsaw Pact statements were supported by interventions from the neutral and non-aligned countries. The most notable move from outside the alliances came again from the Finns, who in February 1970 appointed Ralph Enckell as a roving ambassador to sound out views on the CSCE held in European and North American capitals.\textsuperscript{123} In the broader policy considerations made in Bonn at the time, the possible CSCE was already seen as an integral part of West German foreign policy planning for the medium to long term, potentially also serving fundamental West German interests in the conference substance \textit{per se}, not merely by its instrumental use.
Already at this early stage of the discussions about a possible security conference, one defining characteristic of the CSCE policy of the Federal Republic was beginning to show: the policy-makers in Bonn were not expecting quick and immediate gains from it. The notion of the conference as a process (Prozesscharakter), something the longest-serving Foreign Minister in the history of the FRG, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, emphasises as the quintessential quality of the CSCE, was present in West German thinking from the outset. Rather than any sudden results, the West Germans hoped to gain something from the gradual yet dynamic development the CSCE might bring about. As the Auswärtiges Amt CSCE working group, which had been set up under Foreign Minister Brandt in June 1969, presented its final report four months later, this process approach was already visible. The CSCE would not be a one-time event leading immediately to political results, the report stated, but part of a long-term process, probably consisting of a number of conferences. Along the lines drafted by Bahr during his time in the Auswärtiges Amt, the working group envisaged a CSCE contributing to a European security system, as a step towards a lasting European peace order.

Having moved to the Chancellery, Bahr continued to present his foreign policy concept as one entity, interweaving the bilateral treaties currently pursued with possible multilateral arrangements, leading to détente and peace in Europe. In the Chancellery, Brandt’s Parliamentary State Secretary Katharina Focke took on the CSCE even more enthusiastically. In March 1970, Focke wrote to Brandt, Ehmke and Bahr, calling for a revision of the foreign policy strategy papers Bahr had drafted before the election. In Focke’s view, they were insufficient for the current government and more thorough groundwork was urgently needed. Interestingly, she argued that the CSCE itself should be the main point of reference for this new, cohesive German foreign policy concept, outlining the contours of a European security system and peace order alike. Focke argued that particular German interests in the CSCE context as well as suitable ways to pursue general German interests in the conference needed to be defined as clearly as possible – for it was the CSCE that would ultimately link the Western and Eastern policies of the FRG. Focke, suspicious of the competence in the Auswärtiges Amt planning staff after Bahr’s departure, even suggested convening a small special task force within the government to focus on this exercise.

In public speeches as well as in internal memoranda the Chancellery continued to elaborate on the importance of the CSCE, in terms of the twin concepts of security system and peace order, but there is no evidence of the task force suggested by Focke ever being convened. When it came to the implementation of these larger schemes, at this stage the Chancellery
was simply too preoccupied and overstretched with the bilateral negotiations to concentrate on the detailed preparations of the CSCE. It was symptomatic of the detachment of the Chancellery from the CSCE at this stage that Brandt, although in principle favouring the conference, on several occasions in 1970 told his interlocutors that the conference probably would not amount to much more than the participants taking turns in reading aloud their prepared speeches. This situation left an opening for the Auswärtiges Amt to operate independently at the working level.

Although free from the intra-governmental constraints in defining West German CSCE policy, the Auswärtiges Amt identified two major external factors, pulling in opposite directions, potentially having an impact on the position of the Federal Republic. Just like other NATO allies, the West Germans, too, paid attention to Soviet objectives on the one hand, and public opinion at home on the other. The new chief of the Auswärtiges Amt planning staff, Dirk Oncken, expressed this dilemma pointedly in May 1970: ‘If we support the CES, we take the risk of supporting the Soviet status quo policy; if we reject the CES, we take the risk of isolating ourselves in the eyes of the Western public’. The need to analyse Soviet motives behind its push for the CSCE had urgently resurfaced at the end of October 1969, as the Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Pact states in their Prague meeting took the initiative yet again in plans for a conference. In the Czechoslovak capital, the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers presented two separate resolutions to be issued by the CSCE: one on the renunciation of force, the other on the expansion of cooperation in trade, economy, science and technology. The Prague declaration, which the Soviets were actively promoting in Western capitals afterwards, also suggested convening the conference in Helsinki already in the first half of 1970. The West Germans considered the suggested timing to be intentionally completely unrealistic, attempting to put the West under pressure and to ‘mobilise public opinion in this propaganda-efficient question’. The Prague declaration was seen as not only a ‘clever move to split the West’, but also a Soviet effort to undermine German bilateral negotiations – making it possible for the Soviets to ‘put the noose of the European security conference around [the FRG’s] neck’ at every West German attempt to open political discussions.

But in the Auswärtiges Amt these suspicions were quickly turned into an asset for the West. Since an outright rejection of Eastern proposals could easily lead to the West being blamed for the failure of the conference, it was felt that constructive efforts to prepare an agenda that would meet Western interests should instead be accelerated. In order to return the ball to the Eastern court, Political Director Ruete in November 1969 suggested proposing human contacts and balanced force reductions as additional
topics to be covered by the CSCE. This approach, countering concerns over the reasons behind Soviet CSCE enthusiasm by focusing more intensively on preparation of the agenda of the conference within the West, was quickly adopted as the standard West German line. And after the negotiations on a bilateral West German-Soviet renunciation of force agreement started in December 1969, the attention given in the Auswärtiges Amt to pondering Soviet intentions receded noticeably. This indicates that in Bonn the CSCE was already in 1969 seen not only as a necessary evil, but also as a welcome development in European détente.

Further evidence for the argument that the FRG took the CSCE seriously early on is provided by the Federal German approach to the German question and the participation of the GDR in the conference. The constant underscoring of the need to clarify the inner-German relations before the CSCE could be convened was not merely an effort to link the two sets of negotiations together for instrumental purposes – it also reflected genuine concerns in Bonn about the procedure of the future conference. The problems provided by the German question were twofold. On the one hand, it was essential that the participation of the GDR in the conference should not prejudge the international recognition of the East German state. It is interesting here that the participation of the GDR in such a conference was never questioned by the Brandt Government, not even in the autumn of 1969, when inner-German negotiations had not yet started. Instead, the focus was on efforts to rule out unwanted consequences of this participation. On the other hand, Bonn was concerned at having issues dealing with Germany as a whole discussed and handled at the conference. It was essential to ensure that the CSCE would not become a conference on the German question.

A natural forum for regulating these problematic German issues was the Bonn Group. But the fact that the West Germans started to think about concrete measures in this respect as early as November 1969, when the idea of tasking the Bonn Group with drafting a disclaimer clause on GDR participation first came up, speaks volumes about the degree of seriousness with which the CSCE was regarded. In December 1969 the Three Powers accepted the West German proposal for preparing a disclaimer declaration, in effect stating that the participation of the GDR would not mean its recognition under international law by other participants. This declaration was to be issued, if possible, jointly with the Soviet Union at the beginning of the CSCE. This was no longer mere contingency planning – this was already a part of concrete preparations for the conference.

Coming back to the other source of potential pressure Oncken referred to in May 1970, public opinion, its impact was in fact rather limited. When
the substantive preparation for the CSCE truly began, the West German decision-makers and Foreign Ministry officials did not feel under any pressure from their own public opinion. As the US embassy reported in late December 1969, the Auswärtiges Amt believed there was ‘little genuine popular interest in an ESC in Western Europe, certainly hardly any in the FRG itself’. This position was in striking contrast to many of their colleagues within the West, particularly in the UK. In the spring of 1970, British officials repeatedly referred to growing public pressure for the West to move towards a pan-European conference. This, particularly coming from the left wing of the Labour Party, was also one of the main reasons behind their initiative for a Standing Commission on East–West relations, an idea later quietly given up, as Wilson was succeeded by Heath. The British were not alone in their concern. In the ministerial meeting of NATO in Rome in May 1970, where the Allies agreed on the need to give a clear impulse to the improvement of East–West relations, several Foreign Ministers pointed to the need to demonstrate to the young generation at home that ‘NATO represented an important element of political progress’.

In the larger Western context, the West Germans were not oblivious to these concerns either. But with regard to domestic opinion, the West Germans could state baldly: ‘We are not under pressure from public opinion’. This was probably a fairly accurate estimate. With all the simultaneous negotiations of bilateral Ostpolitik, the Brandt Government hardly needed to worry about being blamed for lack of movement – if anything, it was accused of the reverse in some quarters. Ostpolitik in general was not opposed by public opinion. At the same time, it overshadowed other developments in the public perception. It was not only the government that was at times overstretched by Ostpolitik, the same also applied to the opposition, parliamentary and extra-parliamentary alike. In the Bundestag plenary debates, for example, the CSCE was referred to only occasionally. Interestingly, in one of the rare exceptions, when the CSCE was indeed discussed in the Bundestag in February 1970, several parliamentarians from the opposition CDU urged the government to contribute to the conference by raising ‘security of human dignity’ and freedom of movement on the CSCE agenda, as a means towards a European peace order.

In all, the genuine interest in a CSCE in Bonn was limited to a small number of government officials. Therefore, West German policy-makers could take on the substantive preparations of the CSCE as a truly multilateral exercise within the West, fairly isolated from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries on the one hand, and from their domestic constituency on the other. For the time being, the main arena for these preparations was the NATO framework.
Conference on Security or Conference on Cooperation?

Within NATO, the Allied discussions of the CSCE agenda were based on a Senior Political Committee report on the ‘list of issues for possible negotiations with the East’, the first version of which had been circulated in July 1969. This document identified four possible groups of themes: (1) measures to reduce tension and promote confidence; (2) arms limitations and disarmament; (3) measures for economic, technological and cultural cooperation; and (4) Germany and Berlin. In an updated report in October 1969, the Allies elaborated their views on these groups further, subdividing them into categories according to their political attractiveness and ‘negotiability’. The West Germans were keen on stressing that the list of issues discussed within NATO was not yet a suggested list of agenda items for a possible CSCE. While this was technically correct, given that the SPC reports did not specifically refer to a CSCE but only to ‘East–West negotiations’ in general, there was no denying that these documents already laid a substantial, wide-ranging and relatively advanced foundation for what was to become the Western CSCE position, in particular on the security issues. Ranging from the renunciation of force and a ‘code of good conduct’ between states to the advance notification of military manoeuvres, it contained numerous elements that were to become vital Western positions in the forthcoming negotiations.

From the autumn of 1969 onwards the ‘list of issues’ dominated the CSCE discussion within the Alliance – this was also visible in the declaration of the NATO Foreign Ministers in December 1969. One interesting addition, however, which had not been mentioned in the Senior Political Committee papers, was included in the ministerial declaration in December. Referring to cultural exchanges, the ministers declared that ‘more could be achieved by freer movement of people, ideas, and information between the countries of East and West’. The origin of this addition is hard to substantiate, but Takeshi Yamamoto has pointed out that the United States and France were both keen on similar formulations on the eve of the ministerial meeting. On the other hand, in the spring of 1972, the West Germans in retrospect claimed the credit for the insertion of this paragraph in the declaration. The suggestion of the Political Director of the Auswärtiges Amt to add human contacts as a reaction to the Prague declaration referred to above also speaks for the West German initiative.

Whether or not the particular reference to freer movement originated from Bonn, it was obvious that the Federal Republic was beginning to step up its efforts in NATO at this time. In January 1970, the Auswärtiges Amt instructed the West German NATO mission to pay increased attention to procedural questions in the CSCE preparations. In order to steer
1969–70: Bilateral Leverages and European Security

153 These instructions were backed by an intervention from the bureau of Foreign Minister Scheel in March. For the first time in the CSCE context, Scheel gave direct political guidance to his ministry, calling for more activity by the Federal Government in CSCE preparations, in questions of content as well as of procedure. 154

In their reaction to Scheel’s instructions, the Auswärtiges Amt officials responsible for the CSCE questions pointed to the importance of coordination of Western positions:

German proposals, were they not previously discussed and agreed within NATO, would be criticised from the West and possibly also be met with suspicion from the East. … This leaves us only with the admittedly not very spectacular route of being particularly active and taking the initiative in preparing proposals within NATO. 155

This ‘not very spectacular’ route began to be followed as early as February, with the circulation in NATO of a working paper on an ‘issue by issue approach to security questions’, the first substantial West German contribution to the Alliance discussion on East–West negotiations. This working paper skilfully combined procedural and substantive elements, arguing that the two could not be separated from each other. In terms of the CSCE agenda, the paper specifically raised MBFR and cultural relations as suitable topics for multilateral negotiations. 156 Although a number of other Allies also presented their views on the CSCE in the early spring of 1970, there was a qualitative difference. The FRG went further into discussion of the agenda than others, and was even criticised by some representatives in the SPC for not limiting its contribution to procedural questions alone. 157

However, the scope of West German initiatives soon narrowed. The West German CSCE policy in NATO in the spring of 1970 turned out to be a single-issue movement. All West German efforts were focused on MBFR. When it came to the general idea of multilateral East–West negotiations, the balanced force reductions in Europe were the top priority for the FRG. The West Germans were particularly keen to engage in MBFR in order to prevent unilateral troop reductions by the United States. 158 In addition, in an interview with the author, Egon Bahr stressed that the West Germans considered the Soviet empire to rest on two pillars: one was ideology, the other ‘missiles and tanks’. The building of the Berlin Wall had already damaged the ideological pillar; MBFR was the means to get at the other pillar. 159 The West German Defence Minister Helmut Schmidt was an especially enthusiastic proponent of MBFR, but he also had many supporters in the Auswärtiges Amt. 160 Already in the autumn of 1969, the West Germans had argued that the East’s willingness to enter negotiations should be put
to the test by repeating and strengthening the signal of Reykjavík.\textsuperscript{161} The Allies had agreed, and MBFR was included in the ‘list of issues’.\textsuperscript{162}

In a meeting with the Soviet Ambassador, who was not at all pleased with the idea, State Secretary Duckwitz had assured him in December 1969 that it was not planned to put the specific MBFR issue on the agenda of a possible CSCE.\textsuperscript{163} But only two months later the West German NATO Ambassador Grewe launched an initiative aiming to do just that – to turn MBFR into the main theme of a CSCE. At a working breakfast of the NATO Ambassadors in February 1970, Grewe argued that the CSCE, or a series of conferences, should not be reduced to covering vague and general topics such as economic cooperation and trade. Instead, the conferences should be used to discuss genuine security issues. Expressing his personal opinion, Grewe stressed, he therefore called for the West to suggest MBFR as the topic of the first security conference.\textsuperscript{164} In a further elaboration of his proposal, Grewe pointed out that ‘genuine progress could only be achieved if the first European security conference truly made security in Europe the main topic of negotiations’.\textsuperscript{165}

Grewe had operated without instructions from the capital, but his idea enjoyed support within the government, as was apparent in the joint memorandum drafted by the \textit{Auswärtiges Amt} and the Defence Ministry for the Federal Security Council (\textit{Bundessicherheitsrat})\textsuperscript{166} in early March. This paper, while highlighting the positive interest of the FRG in a CSCE, stated that such a conference would not fulfil its purpose if the actual security problems of the continent were excluded from it. Therefore, if a CSCE was to be convened, MBFR had to be on its agenda. The Federal Security Council fully endorsed this view.\textsuperscript{167} Admittedly, there were also differences between Grewe’s position and that of the government: whereas Grewe wanted to limit the first CSCE to covering MBFR alone, the official West German line was to include MBFR in a broader CSCE agenda.\textsuperscript{168}

Moreover, MBFR specialists in the \textit{Auswärtiges Amt} as well as leading figures in the cabinet and in the Chancellery considered MBFR to be more important than the CSCE for the Federal Republic. From this perspective, too firm a link with the CSCE could jeopardise the prospects of MBFR negotiations.\textsuperscript{169} Accordingly, in April the FRG delegation in NATO was instructed not to link MBFR and the CSCE too closely together – force reductions could also be discussed without a security conference. But on the other hand, if a CSCE was to be convened, it was essential to make sure that MBFR was a central issue covered in that framework as well.\textsuperscript{170} Following these lines, the West Germans delivered a memorandum in Brussels, suggesting that members of the Alliance should raise MBFR ‘as the main topic of discussion for an initial conference on European security’.\textsuperscript{171}
The United States had from the outset opposed combining MBFR and the CSCE in any form. But during the spring of 1970, the West German insistence in the NATO discussions seemed to pay off. When the NATO Foreign Ministers met in Rome in May 1970, MBFR topped the agenda. The separate MBFR declaration issued by the Foreign Ministers, the so-called Signal of Rome, reinforced the call for force reductions in Europe. In the actual communiqué, the ministers listed three broad groups of items that could be dealt with at a CSCE. Firstly, the principles governing relations between states, including the renunciation of force; secondly, the development of international relations with a view to contributing to the freer movement of people, ideas and information and to developing cooperation in the cultural, economic, technical and scientific fields as well as in the field of human environment; and thirdly, the balanced force reductions. While the connection between a CSCE and MBFR in the communiqué language remained looser than the West Germans would have preferred, it was largely due to West German efforts that MBFR was still included among the topics of a CSCE in the NATO deliberations.

After the Rome meeting, the West German approach to the relationship of the CSCE and MBFR was clarified further during the summer of 1970. MBFR was an independent topic which could be discussed before, during or after a CSCE; but if there was a CSCE, MBFR had to be discussed there as well. This position was consolidated in the Federal Security Council in October, and from then on consistently repeated in various discussions the West Germans had with their allies.

For several months, the dominant focus on MBFR had overshadowed West German thinking on other possible elements of the CSCE agenda. But in the summer of 1970, coinciding with the CSCE commitment made in the Bahr Paper in Moscow, West German positions slowly began to change. Instead of focusing exclusively on MBFR as far as the possible agenda of the CSCE was concerned, the original idea of viewing the conference in broad terms, as a long-term process possibly leading to the coveted European peace order, was again gaining ground. In speaking notes and background papers of the Auswärtiges Amt, it was soon established as a standard line to take that the CSCE would contribute to safeguarding peace, reducing tension between East and West as well as overcoming inner-German contradictions. This was also an argument used in favour of the conference, in defence of the undertaking to work towards the CSCE laid down in the Bahr Paper. As a specific West German position on the CSCE, in addition to a common NATO line, the West German Foreign Ministry highlighted the goal of ‘constructing a security system for Europe as a basis for a European peace order’.
This increasingly welcoming attitude to the conference project as such was also visible in the West German reaction to the Warsaw Pact declaration given in Budapest in June 1970. The Budapest document of the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers was a further step in the communiqué dialogue between the two blocs – on the one hand building on the Prague documents from the preceding October as a continuation of Warsaw Pact deliberations on the CSCE agenda, but on the other essentially a direct reply to the NATO communiqué of Rome. In the West German analysis the Budapest document was definitely a step in the right direction. Although the Warsaw Pact did not refer to freer movement at all and the response to the MBFR suggestion was not yet satisfactory, the Auswärtiges Amt read it as seizing many of the substantive suggestions NATO had made in Rome. In the NATO discussion on the Budapest document, the West Germans were joined only by the Danes and Norwegians in this positive estimate – all others were distinctly more sceptical, arguing that the Warsaw Pact suggestions were nothing substantially new, only another attempt to undermine Western unity. Further discussions were called for, in order to find a common line on the Warsaw Pact proposals.

In this respect, an important aspect in the West German CSCE policy was the conscious tendency to treat the Warsaw Pact as a single bloc. The officials in Bonn were well informed about the internal pressures in the Eastern alliance, reflected in the conflicting motives behind the enthusiasm for the CSCE of the individual Warsaw Pact members. If the Soviet Union was interested in consolidating the status quo, the primary motive for the GDR was to achieve international recognition, whereas other ‘satellites’ wanted to use the conference to increase their contacts with the West. Nonetheless, from the spring of 1970 onwards the Auswärtiges Amt consistently acted as if these differences did not exist. Dealing with the Warsaw Pact as a unified, monolithic bloc in the CSCE context was in line with the overall Ostpolitik of the Brandt Government. Instead of approaching the individual Warsaw Pact countries separately, as the Kiesinger Government had attempted, during Brandt’s reign Ostpolitik was primarily conducted via Moscow. Any moves that could be interpreted as encouragement for dissident members of the Warsaw Pact to act independently would have undermined this approach. In the CSCE context, it translated into a bloc-to-bloc approach, further emphasising the importance of the multilateral preparations within the West.

In these Western considerations, for the time being, MBFR continued to be at the top of the West German wish list for topics to be dealt with at a CSCE. But as a sign of the changing perspective, when the NATO institutions reconvened after the summer pause, the West German Ambassador promised that the FRG delegation would soon submit a working paper
on economic and cultural cooperation. At the same time, he stressed that further study of these elements would be needed in NATO, for example on the free movement of people. It was precisely in these fields that the West in general and the Federal Republic in particular were to show a completely new level of activity from the late autumn of 1970 onwards.

**Conclusion**

The main characteristic of the CSCE policy of the Federal Republic in the period covered in this chapter is that of old-fashioned *Realpolitik*. The ‘linkage’ approach – using the CSCE as a lever in the Moscow negotiations – was a classic example of tit-for-tat, whereas the main item on the agenda of the possible CSCE the West Germans were interested in was military security in the form of troop reductions. However, on both of these tracks the West German approach was also undergoing fundamental change. Already in 1969–70 the direction of both of these changes was towards more multilateralism at the expense of bilateralism, more idealism at the expense of *Realpolitik*. The Moscow Treaty was an important watershed in this respect, further speeding up the transformation of West German CSCE policy.

As far as the Chancellery-driven ‘linkage’ strategy is concerned, after Bahr’s negotiations in Moscow a large amount of the capital of the bilateral leverage had been spent. But after initial hesitation the Federal Republic adapted to the new situation by turning towards a multilateral linkage – using the potential CSCE in order to achieve progress in the Four-Power Berlin negotiations. Henry Kissinger triumphantly described this situation in retrospect as the moment where the US had ‘harnessed the beast of détente’, making both the CSCE and ratification of the German Eastern Treaties dependent upon a Berlin agreement that met US objectives. Seen from the Bonn perspective, this meant that Western multilateralism was the only option left for applying the CSCE linkage strategy, whether directly to the Berlin talks or indirectly to *Deutschlandpolitik*.

Regarding the agenda of the CSCE, the realm of the *Auswärtiges Amt*, the initial West German preoccupation with MBFR and hard security issues also began to give way to softer elements of East–West cooperation and the broader idea of a European peace order. Here it was clear from the outset that the relevant discussions had to take place in a multilateral forum, first within Western institutions before moving on to the actual conference preparations between East and West and including the neutral countries. In this respect, the first year of the Brandt Government was a learning process for the West Germans in the art of Western multilateral-
ism. As will be argued in the next chapters, these skills came in useful in the years that followed.

For the time being, NATO was the only significant Western forum for the CSCE preparations. But for over a year, NATO had been predominantly reactive, not proactive. With its Prague and Budapest documents, the Warsaw Pact had maintained the initiative in formulating the CSCE agenda. Discussion in the Alliance on the possible CSCE agenda had been surprisingly limited after the onset of Brandt’s Ostpolitik, only really becoming active in the weeks preceding the semi-annual meetings of the Foreign Ministers. It took a full year after the ‘list of issues’ document of 1969, until October 1970, for the NATO Council to commission the political committee to prepare a further substantive report on East–West negotiations.¹⁸⁵

A similar passivity was typical of the West German CSCE policy as well. Theoretically, interest in the CSCE agenda was clearly on the rise in the Auswärtiges Amt. But although the possible contents of a security conference were constantly present in the paperwork the ministry produced, with the exception of the MBFR moves in the spring of 1970 its ideas were not yet translated into concrete actions within the Alliance. In fact, there was not a truly coherent CSCE strategy to speak of during the first year of Scheel’s reign in the ministry. A good indication of – and possibly one reason for – this lack of coordination was the fate of the internal CSCE working group in the Foreign Ministry. The original working group had completed its final report by early October 1969, but it was not until November 1970 that this group was reconvened within the Auswärtiges Amt. In the meantime, the period covered in this chapter, Bonn’s approach to the concrete CSCE preparations consisted mostly of uncoordinated actions of individual diplomats. The origin of the West German focus on MBFR as a solo project of Ambassador Grewe was a prime example of this.

As will be argued in the following chapter, all of this was to change rapidly in the late autumn of 1970. Increased Western activity on the CSCE front in NATO as well as in the new framework of European Political Cooperation accelerated the development of the West German CSCE approach towards multilateralism. At the same time, the Auswärtiges Amt started to invest considerably more time, effort and resources into the conference preparations. The substantive value of the CSCE began to surpass the instrumental value – a genuine West German CSCE policy was in the making.
Notes

1. NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 1703, Rush (Bonn) to Secstate, 6 Jan 1970.
4. For a position paper in late October 1969, see for instance PAAA, B40, 179, IIA3, undated.
5. AAPD 1969, doc 333, Ruete, 29 Oct 1969. The letter was never sent in this format. When Brandt actually did write to Stoph in January 1970, the CSCE was not mentioned at all and the letter was substantially shorter than the one proposed by Ruete. See EA 1970, D 205, Brandt to Stoph, 22 Jan 1970.
7. PAAA, B150, 164, Pommerningen, 3 Nov 1969.
11. TNA, FCO 41/547, Burrows (UK NATO) to FCO, 5 Nov 1969.
15. AAPD 1969, doc 386, Ruete (Natogerma) to AA, 4 Dec 1969; NARA, RG 59 (1967–69), Box 1539, Rogers (US NATO) to State, 5 Dec 1969.
20. AAPD 1969, doc 363, Scheel (AA) to Allardt (Moscow), 14 Nov 1969.
22. AAPD 1969, doc 368, meeting Scheel-Tsarapkin, 17 Nov 1969. For van Well’s briefing to the Bonn Group, see NARA, RG 59 (1967–69), Box 1538, Rush (Bonn) to Secstate, 19 Nov 1969.
27. AAPD 1969, doc 392, Allardt (Moscow) to Scheel (AA), 8 Dec 1969; AAPD 1969, doc 398, Allardt (Moscow) to Scheel (AA), 11 Dec 1969. For Soviet briefings of the East Germans about the meetings, see Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik (DzD) VI/1, doc 40, Florin, meeting Winzer-Abrassimow, 11 Dec 1969; DzD VI/1, doc 41, Florin, meeting Winzer-Kusnezow, 15 Dec 1969.
28. PAAA, B150, 166, Allardt (Moscow) to AA, 14 Dec 1969.
29. NARA, RG 59 (1967–69), Box 1539, Sanne to Bahr, 2 Dec 1969.
30. NARA, RG 59 (1967–69), Box 1539, Fessenden (Bonn) to State, 30 Dec 1969.
31. NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 1703, Rush (Bonn) to State, 6 Jan 1970; NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 1703, Rush (Bonn) to State, 9 Jan 1970.
32. For comments and/or amendments from the Chancellery to Auswärtiges Amt drafts, see PAAA, B150, 166, Ehmke to Scheel, 6 Dec 1969; AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 429A, Bahr to Sahm, 12 Dec 1969; AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 431B, Bahr to Brandt, 16 Dec 1969.
33. AAPD 1969, doc 390, Scheel (AA) to Allardt (Moscow), 6 Dec 1969; PAAA, B150, 166, Ehmke to Scheel, 6 Dec 1969.
34. AAPD 1970, doc 33, meeting Bahr-Gromyko, 3 Feb 1970; see also PAAA, B150, 196, Bahr and Allardt (Moscow) to Scheel and Duckwitz (AA), 3 Feb 1970; AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 392, Bahr (Moscow) to Scheel and Duckwitz (AA), 4 Feb 1970. For the Soviet briefing to the East Germans, see DzD VI/1, doc 67, 6 Feb 1970.
36. See, for example, PAAA, B150, 197, Ruete (AA) to Natogerma, 19 Feb 1970.
38. For his views on the CSCE, see Grewe, Rückblenden, 671–8.
43. PAAA, B150, 199, Stempel (Moscow) to Scheel and Duckwitz (AA), meeting Bahr-Gromyko, 27 Mar 1970.
44. PA-DBT, 3104 6/3, Prot. 12, 19 Mar 1970.
46. NARA, NSC Country Files, Box 683, Folder 1 [1/2], Cline to Rogers, 7 Apr 1970.
47. TNA, FCO 28/922, Anglo-German talks, 18 June 1970.
49. For the West German and Soviet views on the working paper after the first two rounds, see AAPD 1970, doc 196, Ruete, 5 May 1970.
64. PAAA, B40, 180, Pommerening, 11 Dec 1969.
67. This is how the Soviet embassy in Helsinki briefed the Finnish Foreign Minister of Alphand’s visit. UKA, 21/159/2. UM:n ja TP:n muistiot, Karjalainen, 4 Feb 1970.
69. PAAA, B150, 201, von Braun (Paris) to AA, 16 Apr 1970.
71. TNA, FCO 41/740, Stewart (FCO) to Bonn, 13 Feb 1970.
72. PAAA, B150, 199, IIA3, 31 Mar 1970. See also PAAA, B150, 200, Menne (AA) to Natogerma, 10 Apr 1970.
73. NARA, RG 59, Box 1704, Ellsworth (US NATO) to State, 26 Mar 1970.
74. TNA, FCO 41/743, Cradock to Bendall, 15 July 1970.
75. PAAA, B150, 202, Grewe (Natogerma) to AA, 12 May 1970. Concern about public opinion had played a role in the British CSCE positions for quite some time, see for instance PAAA, B150, 195, Wickert (London) to AA, 25 Jan 1970.
79. AAPD 1970, doc 244, Lahn (AA) to embassies, 2 June 1970.
80. PAAA, B150, 205, Lahn (AA) to Natogerma, 29 June 1970.
81. NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 1704, Rush (Bonn) to State, 30 June 1970. See also TNA, FCO 28/922, Anglo-German talks, 18 June 1970; NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 1704, Ellsworth (US NATO) to State, 24 July 1970.
82. PAAA, B1, 354, von Alten, 23 June 1970.
86. For a good case study of the dominant role of the Chancellery, see von Dannenberg, *The Foundations of Ostpolitik*.
87. Schollwer’s manuscript, which he kindly made available to the author, highlights the ‘indispensable’ role of Frank in supporting the inexperienced Foreign Minister Scheel from the summer of 1970 onwards. Wolfgang Schollwer, ‘Tagebücher, Band VII, Kampf um die Verträge (1970–72)’, unpublished manuscript.
93. PAAA, B40, 185, Pomerenering and Dahlhoff, 20 Aug 1970.
94. AAPD 1970, doc 413, Gehlhoff (AA) to Natogerma, 2 Sep 1970; TNA, FCO 41/743, Richards (Bonn) to FCO, 10 Sep 1970; NARA, RG 59, Box 1705, Rush (Bonn) to State, 12 Sep 1970.
95. TNA, FCO 41/744, Pemberton-Pigott (UK NATO) to FCO, 28 Sep 1970; NARA, RG 59, Box 2263, Ellsworth (US NATO) to State, 26 Sep 1970.
96. NARA, RG 59, Box 1705, Rush (Bonn) to State, 11 Sep 1970.
99. NARA, RG 59, Box 1705, Rush (Bonn) to State, telegram 13160, 10 Nov 1970. For the original German text, see TNA, FCO 41/746, Mineeff (Bonn) to Gladstone (FCO), 12 Nov 1970.
100. TNA, FCO 41/746, Peck (UK NATO) to FCO, 18 Nov 1970; NARA, RG 59, Box 3146, Vest (US NATO) to State, 18 Nov 1970; TNA, FCO 41/746, German Delegation, 18 Nov 1970; NARA, RG 59, Box 1705, Vest (US NATO) to State, 18 Nov 1970.
102. NARA, RG 59, Box 1705, Vest (US NATO) to State, 16 Nov 1970; NARA, RG 59, Box 1705, Rogers (State) to Bonn and US NATO, 20 Nov 1970.


109. NARA, RG 59, Box 1705, Rush (Bonn) to State, 19 Nov 1970; see also NARA, RG 59, Box 1705, REUS-39, 23 Nov 1970.

110. PAAA, B150, 219, 2 Dec 1970; TNA, FCO 41/746, Beith (UK Brussels) to FCO, 2 Dec 1970.

111. PAAA, B130, 2667, Hansen to IIA1 and IIA3, 3 Dec 1970.


113. Scheel, Schumann, Douglas-Home and Rogers had agreed on it already at their traditional quadripartite meeting before the NATO ministerial meeting. AAPD 1970, doc 583, Boss (Natogerma) to AA, 3 Dec 1970; TNA, FCO 33/1114, quadripartite meeting, 2 Dec 1970.


116. PAAA, B150, 219, van Well (AA) to Paris and Moscow, 7 Dec 1970. For the Belgian mediation, see also NARA, NSC Files, Box H-57, Folder 1, SRG Meeting, NSSM 121 NATO, 5/14/71, Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, 10 May 1971.


118. UMA, 7B, 11.2, NATO-maiden kokoukset, Väänänen (Bonn) to UM, 10 Dec 1970.

119. Utrikesdepartementets arkiv (UDA), HP1, Ct 285, Montan (Bonn) to UD, 22 Dec 1970.

120. Götz Freiherr von Groll, who was to become an eminent figure in the formulation of the West German CSCE policy, succeeded Horst Pomerening as the head of the Auswärtiges Amt unit IIA3 (‘structural questions of the East’) at the end of 1970.

121. PAAA, B40, 184, von Groll, 13 Jan 1971.


125. PAAA, B40, 185, 6 Oct 1969.


128. BArch, B136, 6419 (1), Schauer to Sahm and Focke, 14 April 1970. For the limitations of Focke’s influence in the Chancellery, see Möckli, European Foreign Policy, 41.


132. PAAA, B150, 164, Pommerening, 3 Nov 1969.

133. PAAA, B150, 165, Ruete, 18 Nov 1969.

134. PAAA, B1, 350, Ruete, meeting Scheel-Tsarapkin, 27 Nov 1969.


138. AAPD 1969, doc 386, Ruete (Brussels) to AA, 4 Dec 1969.

139. This view has not changed with the passing of time. In answering a standard question in the author’s interviews with West German officials and politicians, not a single one of them recognised in retrospect that public opinion would have had any impact on West German CSCE decision-making.

140. NARA, RG 59 (1967–69), Box 1539, Fessenden (Bonn) to State, 30 Dec 1969.


144. See Wolfrum, Die gegliederte Demokratie, 286.


146. NATOA, C-M(69)34, List of issues for possible negotiation with the East, 14 July 1969.

147. NATOA, C-M(69)46, List of issues for possible negotiation with the East, 21 Oct 1969.


151. PAAA, B28, 109307, Deutsche Delegation, 17 Mar 1972; TNA, FCO 28/1679, Note by the German Delegation (NATO), 7 Apr 1972.

152. PAAA, B1, 350, Ruete, meeting Scheel-Tsarapkin, 27 Nov 1969.

153. PAAA, B150, 194, Ruete (AA) to Natogerma, 12 Jan 1970.


156. PAAA, B150, 197, Ruete (AA) to Natogerma, 19 Feb 1970; TNA, FCO 41/747, German Delegation, 20 Feb 1970.

157. TNA, FCO 41/747, Wilcock (UK NATO) to Elam (FCO), 27 Feb 1970.


159. Author’s interview with Bahr.
160. TNA, FCO 33/1015, Jackling (Bonn) to FCO, 21 Feb 1970. See also Yamamoto, ‘The Road to the CSCE’, 103–8.
161. PAAA, B150, 161, IIA3, Sep 1969; B150, 164, Grewe (Natogerma) to AA, 6 Nov 1969.
162. NATOA, C-M(69)34, List of issues for possible negotiation with the East, 14 July 1969; NATOA, C-M(69)46, List of issues for possible negotiation with the East, 21 Oct 1969.
164. PAAA, B150, 197, Grewe (Natogerma) to AA, 26 Feb 1970.
166. A specific cabinet committee responsible for security policy issues.
168. NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 1704, Ellsworth (US NATO) to State, 5 Mar 1970.
170. PAAA, B150, 201, Duckwitz (AA) to Natogerma, 16 Apr 1970.
171. PAAA, B150, 200, Working Paper for NATO Council Meeting, undated. For the German version of this text, see AAPD 1970, doc 160, IIB2, 16 Apr 1970.
180. PAAA, B150, 205, Lahn (AA) to Natogerma, 29 June 1970; PAAA, B150, 206, Allardt (Moscow) to AA, 7 July 1970.
183. TNA, FCO 41/744, Pemberton-Pigott (UK NATO) to FCO, 28 Sep 1970; NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 2263, Ellsworth (US NATO) to State, 26 Sep 1970.
184. Kissinger, White House Years, 534.
185. PAAA, B150, 214, Grewe (Natogerma) to AA, 14 Oct 1970.
Chapter 4

1970–71
Transition to Western Multilateralism

ILLUSTRATION 4: The representatives of the Six at the first EPC foreign ministers’ meeting in Munich on 19 November 1970. From left to right: State Secretary Mario Pedini (Italy) and foreign ministers Maurice Schumann (France), Gaston Thorn (Luxembourg), Pierre Harmel (Belgium), Joseph Luns (The Netherlands) and Walter Scheel (FRG).

[I]f the GDR showed the co-operation needed for the achievement of a satisfactory Berlin agreement, the Federal Government would regard this as a sufficient sign of grace to meet their earlier requirement about progress of the inner-German relationship.

– State Secretary Frank to the Bonn Group, March 1971

The CSE is a logical continuation of the policy that found its expression in the Moscow Treaty. The CSE will, regardless of the differences in the societies of the European states, determine the future of Europe for decades to come.

– Foreign Minister Scheel to Soviet Ambassador Falin, May 1971

At a high-level Anglo-German meeting in December 1970, the Deputy Under Secretary of the FCO, Sir Thomas Brimelow, told his West German interlocutors that in his view the FRG held the keys to the CSCE: ‘The Federal Government were the judges on Berlin and were conducting the inner-German talks. All questions regarding a European security conference were therefore dependent on the Federal Government’s view.’ In identifying the potential for a West German lead within the West in CSCE matters, Sir Thomas was certainly not mistaken. As I will argue in this chapter, however, the consequences of this position in Bonn were twofold.

Firstly, when it came to the timing of the conference and using it to draw concessions from the East, the West Germans were no longer so eager as before to rise to the occasion. Once the attempts to continue to hold on to the linkage of inner-German talks with the CSCE in the autumn of 1970 had proved impractical in the face of French hostility, the Federal Republic gave up that objective without much resistance. A multilateral Western linkage focusing the attention on the Berlin talks, where the Soviet demands were countered by the positions of the three major Western Allies, was soon considered to be a better option than a strictly bilateral one. On the one hand, this decision, agreeing to transfer the main responsibility for the CSCE preconditions to the Three Powers and NATO in general, amounted to giving up part of the leverage on bilateral Ostpolitik which had originally been envisaged. But on the other hand, multilateralising the leverage to include the Allies also amplified its influence – as a member of the Alliance the FRG was able to achieve more than when acting alone.

Secondly, in the preparations of the CSCE agenda the potential of the West German lead was actually utilised. Here, in the interplay of NATO, EPC and the Bonn Group, the German discovery of the virtues of Western multilateralism was even more apparent than in the attempts to instrumentalise the conference for linkage purposes. At first, this lead was above all reflected in the mediating role the FRG assumed between the French and US extremes, trying to avoid confrontation within the West in order to
make multilateral cooperation work as effectively as possible. But gradually, the Federal Republic also began to make its presence felt in pushing through its own CSCE objectives as common Western positions.

**Following the French Lead on the Berlin Connection**

As described in the preceding chapter, NATO had effectively given up the explicit precondition of completion of the inner-German talks before a CSCE in the Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Brussels in December 1970. This did not escape the attention of the opposition in Bonn. At a meeting of the *Bundestag* Foreign Policy Committee in January 1971, the Parliamentary State Secretary of the *Auswärtiges Amt*, Karl Moersch, was pressed by CDU parliamentarians to define the government line on the preconditions for a CSCE. While Moersch made clear that a conclusion of the Berlin talks was needed before the conference, his evasive reference to continuing Alliance discussions on whether ‘other on-going talks’ included the inner-German negotiations was hardly convincing.4

Admittedly, in early 1971 some of the middle-rank CSCE experts in the *Auswärtiges Amt* still harboured hopes of getting acceptance for West German views regarding the inner-German precondition in the Alliance. Von Groll, for instance, pointed out that France continued to be the only exception among the NATO Allies – if the going got tough, all the others were likely to support the West German preference that a CSCE should not be convened before a conclusive stage in the inner-German negotiations had been reached.5 Wolfgang Behrends, head of the NATO unit in the *Auswärtiges Amt*, seconded von Groll and argued that the ‘moment of truth’ in the Alliance would arrive only shortly before the conclusion of the Berlin negotiations. Since such a conclusion was not in sight, there was no need yet to change the West German view on the inner-German precondition.6 Accordingly, von Groll assured a US embassy official in Bonn that the West Germans saw the ‘other on-going talks’ in exactly the same way as the US did, and would therefore be firm in holding on to the inner-German precondition in the upcoming Franco-West German summit.7

Yet the exact opposite occurred in Paris at the end of January 1971. As it turned out, the leading officials of the *Auswärtiges Amt* had already altered their views and had begun to align themselves with the French position. Shortly before the Franco-West German summit, Hans Ruete, the former Political Director who had just been appointed West German Ambassador in Paris, reported a persuasive argument used by Foreign Minister Schumann in their discussion. According to Schumann, focusing on the Berlin precondition alone, instead of presenting further prerequisites for
a CSCE, would be the best way to ensure Soviet readiness for concessions in the Berlin negotiations.  

This argument seemed to be convincing enough to the West Germans, for in the bilateral consultations in Paris there was no trace of the bitter disagreements witnessed in the NATO Foreign Ministers’ meetings in Brussels less than two months earlier. As before, the Federal Republic and France agreed on the need for a satisfactory Berlin agreement before entering a security conference. In addition, however, Brandt and Scheel both pledged to their French colleagues that the FRG would no longer insist on inner-German progress as a separate precondition for the multilateral preparations of a CSCE. The Chancellor as well as the Foreign Minister now argued that a Berlin agreement would already necessarily imply a partial normalisation of the inner-German relationship. Therefore, the Federal Government considered the conclusion of the Berlin negotiations to be sufficient – as soon as that had been achieved, multilateral preparations of the CSCE could be opened.

Immediately after the Franco-West German summit, this line was the subject of a long debate in the Auswärtiges Amt CSCE working group. Subsequently, official instructions on this new position of focusing exclusively on the Berlin precondition were circulated to West German embassies in February. From then on, the standard West German line was that since a result in the Berlin negotiations by definition had to include a certain amount of progress in the negotiations between the two German states, no other preconditions for entering the CSCE preparations were necessary. Thus, forced to withdraw his previous assurances, von Groll admitted to his contact at the US embassy in Bonn that after the Brandt-Pompidou meeting in January, the FRG had ‘undergone some shift towards the French position’ in this matter. While the Federal Republic remained committed to maintaining a satisfactory Berlin agreement as a precondition, a ‘de-emphasis of other prerequisites’ was now favoured.

This French-inspired change in the West German approach also became apparent during Foreign Minister Scheel’s visit to the United States in February 1971. In Washington, Scheel told Rogers that the FRG wanted to concentrate on the Berlin precondition, because firstly, a Berlin agreement would also contain elements of improvement of the inner-German relationship, and secondly, confronting the Soviet Union with further preconditions would weaken the link between Berlin and the CSCE. In an adjoining discussion, Berndt von Staden openly told his State Department colleague that Scheel had been convinced by Schumann of this view. Echoing French tones, the West Germans now stressed that ‘if the linkage which NATO established between a Berlin agreement and a CES was to be effective, then it was better to make Berlin the one and only precondition for a CES, and not
suggest to the Soviets that other unspecified pre-conditions exist[ed].\textsuperscript{14} In the West German memorandum of the discussion, this view presented to the Americans was explicitly referred to as ‘French argumentation’.\textsuperscript{15}

Whether this French argumentation on the Berlin precondition was going to prove fruitful was by no means certain during the early spring of 1971. On the contrary, the hostility of the Soviet Union to the stricter formulation of the Berlin precondition agreed on in the NATO communiqué in December 1970 was obvious – Moscow launched a broad diplomatic offensive in NATO capitals against it.\textsuperscript{16} In the \textit{Auswärtiges Amt} this Soviet criticism was considered to be unjustified. In the view of the officials in Bonn, the linkage of Berlin with the CSCE was not a new precondition invented at the December ministerial, as Moscow seemed to imply – it had merely been formulated more precisely than before.\textsuperscript{17} The German Foreign Ministry concluded that the main motive behind the Soviet criticism appeared to be the attempt to sow dissension within the Alliance by approaching individual NATO members differently, and particularly to win over the French as a separate partner.\textsuperscript{18} All the same, on the basis of the evidence at hand around January and February 1971, the Soviet Union seemed anything but willing to make concessions on Berlin in return for a CSCE.

The swift West German adaptation to the French line and the voluntary departure from the priority previously given to the inner-German precondition was a major surprise to the Allies. Even the British officials, although constantly confirming their preparedness to be guided by the West Germans in this matter, were perplexed by their sudden change of direction. As Rodric Braithwaite from the FCO put it to the US Ambassador in London, they were ‘prepared to let Germans take lead in setting or not setting progress in inner-German talks as precondition for multilateral East-West discussions, but British want to make sure Germans know where they are going if they in fact are prepared to ease up on this precondition.’\textsuperscript{19} Moreover, US and UK officials suspected that the U-turn in Bonn might have been partly a result of a gross overestimate of the extent of French pressure. The US Ambassador in Bonn reported the British belief that ‘the Germans went unnecessarily far to meet French desires on this point’.\textsuperscript{20}

In any case, by March 1971 at the latest the West German shift was already complete and irreversible. And it had direct implications for Western policy, making the convening of the security conference more imminent. In an EPC meeting in the beginning of March, the Six agreed that the exclusive concentration on the Berlin precondition had an obvious flipside. As a result, as soon as the Berlin talks were concluded, it would be next to impossible to avoid going to Helsinki.\textsuperscript{21} The US NATO Ambassador expressed his concern about this new, automatic element: once a
Berlin agreement was in place, he said, ‘I see little reason to believe we can avoid almost immediate Alliance movement to multilateral exploratory talks with the East.’

Nevertheless, although the West Germans had given up the inner-German precondition relatively easily, they were determined to hold on to the need to complete the Berlin negotiations before the CSCE preparations could begin. The Auswärtiges Amt was highly sensitive, at times perhaps also overreacting, even to the smallest of indications of any of the Allies – particularly the French – distancing themselves from this position. In a Bonn Group meeting in March 1971, van Well strongly opposed any discussion in NATO about a ‘weakening or abandoning of the linkage’ of Berlin with the CSCE as harmful for the further course of the Berlin negotiations. In response, all of the Three Powers reconfirmed their commitment to the Berlin precondition. As it turned out, French and Belgian ideas voiced in the NATO discussion, rather than suggesting abandoning the Berlin precondition altogether, had been aiming to make the Berlin precondition ‘operative’ and to encourage the Soviet Union to make concessions in the stagnated Berlin talks – something that was certainly not against West German interests.

But if the perceived threat to the Berlin precondition from within the Alliance was, at least for the time being, a false alarm, there was a genuine one coming from Moscow. As a sequel to the démarches distributed in Western capitals at the end of 1970, in March 1971 another round of Soviet approaches followed. This time, the Soviet Union called for immediate practical steps towards the CSCE and accused ‘certain countries’ of trying to postpone the conference indefinitely with their preconditions. Having received the memorandum from the Soviet Chargé d’Affaires in Bonn, State Secretary Frank pointed out to him that the position of the Federal Republic remained very clear. As soon as the Berlin negotiations were concluded, the road to convening a CSCE would be open. However, the Auswärtiges Amt saw the Soviet memorandum as posing new and dangerous challenges to the maintenance of this position. On the one hand, the Soviet Union appeared to be trying to multilateralise the CSCE preparations through the back door, so to speak, by encouraging ‘multiple bilateral’ talks in Helsinki already before a completed Berlin agreement. On the other hand, the Soviet memorandum was seen as an attempt to reverse the linkage imposed by NATO – suggesting in turn that a Berlin agreement would only come about after ratification of the FRG’s Eastern Treaties and the convening of a CSCE. As it turned out, the Auswärtiges Amt was correct in this estimate – this kind of ‘reverse linkage’ was precisely what the Soviet Union introduced in the autumn of 1971.
Defending the Berlin Precondition in Lisbon

Faced with the new Soviet threats, the FRG approached the preparations of the following meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in Lisbon in June 1971 with increased determination to defend the Berlin precondition – and that condition alone. In a joint position paper of the Auswärtiges Amt and the Chancellery in March 1971, the Federal Government confirmed its preparedness to enter multilateral preparations of a CSCE as soon as the Berlin negotiations had been concluded. If the issue was to be raised in the NATO communiqué text in Lisbon, the FRG could live with deleting the previous references to ‘ongoing talks’ completely. But one red line was clear: under no circumstances would the Federal Republic agree to remove or weaken the Berlin precondition.\(^{31}\) In a *Bundestag* debate on 26 March, Parliamentary State Secretary Moersch presented this line, marking the first time the government publicly declared that it was ready to enter CSCE preparations immediately after the Berlin Agreement had been concluded. In response, the Christian Democrats demanded further explanation from the government for this sudden ‘reduction to the minimum’ of preconditions – if the government had changed its policy, it should be openly discussed in the Foreign Policy Committee as well as in the plenary sessions of the *Bundestag*.\(^{32}\)

The policy had indeed been changed for good. It was not to be reversed, not even when allies explicitly offered the possibility of doing so to the West Germans, as happened during the visit of the British Prime Minister Edward Heath to Bonn in April. In a meeting of the delegations, Sir Thomas Brimelow told Walter Gehlhoff, the Deputy Political Director of the Auswärtiges Amt, that it was up to the West Germans to decide whether they wanted to include the ‘other on-going talks’ as preconditions for the CSCE in the upcoming Lisbon communiqué. Either way, the UK was prepared to follow Bonn’s lead. After a brief consultation with Chancellor Brandt, Gehlhoff replied that a satisfactory Berlin agreement was sufficient – in the view of the Federal Government no other preconditions for a CSCE were needed.\(^{33}\)

Not all the Allies were happy about this change of position. The Dutch in particular would have preferred to see the inner-German precondition for a CSCE maintained.\(^{34}\) The United States was also against changing the language of the December 1970 communiqué, including the intentionally imprecise reference to ‘progress in other on-going talks’.\(^{35}\) But, since the inner-German negotiations were for good reason considered to involve above all German interests, a British embassy official in Bonn spoke for most of the NATO members when he declared at a quadripartite meeting in April 1971 that his government was ‘prepared to be guided by the FRG
and would not take a tougher position than the FRG themselves’ in this matter.\(^{36}\) In May, the US was also coming round to this view.\(^{37}\)

In May 1971, the West Germans presented their position coherently in all of the frameworks of Western cooperation. The German NATO mission was instructed to underscore that in order to emphasise the link between the CSCE and Berlin, the ‘other on-going talks’ should no longer be mentioned in the Lisbon communiqué.\(^{38}\) In Paris, at a Franco-West German meeting on the level of Political Directors, von Staden confirmed that the FRG would be content with the conclusion of the Berlin talks as the only precondition for a CSCE. The additional ‘escape clause’ suggested by the West Germans in NATO (‘barring unfavourable developments in other relevant fields’) had only been inserted to please the US and the UK.\(^{39}\) This West German position of focusing exclusively on the Berlin precondition was repeated at the EPC meeting of the Ten.\(^{40}\) Behind the scenes, some of the officials responsible for the CSCE in the Auswärtiges Amt continued to voice views critical of dropping the ‘on-going talks’, but in the end had no choice but to accept the views of their superiors.\(^{41}\)

Meanwhile, however, the French showed further signs of wavering. During his visit to Moscow on 7 May 1971, Foreign Minister Schumann did precisely what the West Germans had feared after the March démarches of the Soviet Union – agreed to the idea of holding ‘multiple bilateral’ talks in Helsinki already prior to a conclusion of the Berlin negotiations.\(^{42}\) In response, at an EPC meeting of the Six in mid-May, Scheel strongly emphasised the importance of getting the timing of the East–West multilateralisation right. Scheel warned against ‘experimenting’ with it, since that could only weaken the connection between the Berlin talks and the CSCE preparations.\(^{43}\) Nevertheless, on 26 May the French representative in the NATO Political Committee, apparently following instructions directly from President Pompidou, declared that the French would firmly oppose a repetition of the Berlin precondition in Lisbon in the way it had been formulated in the previous ministerial communiqué.\(^{44}\) Indeed, as the West German NATO Ambassador pointed out in his preview of the June 1971 Lisbon meeting of the Foreign Ministers, the views within the Alliance on this matter were increasingly diverging – with the French as well as the Scandinavians running out of patience in their desire to open multilateral preparations of the CSCE as soon as possible.\(^{45}\)

This momentum was obviously also recognised in Moscow. Only a week before the NATO Foreign Ministers met in the Portuguese capital, Valentin Falin, the new Soviet Ambassador in Bonn, delivered yet another memorandum on the CSCE, criticising attempts to link ‘questions of different character and dimension’ and arguing instead for a parallel approach on the CSCE and Berlin.\(^{46}\) Replying to Ambassador Falin, State Secretary
Frank refused to accept the assertion that the questions at hand were of a different character, and again emphasised the nature of the Berlin negotiations as a test. As soon as this test was passed, the road would be free for the CSCE. Frank assured Falin that once a Berlin settlement was concluded, the FRG would not establish any further obstacles to a security conference. Foreign Minister Scheel went even further and confided to Falin that in his view after a Berlin agreement the dynamics towards a CSCE would be so strong that nobody would be able to slow it down any longer.  

These statements made by Frank and Scheel to Falin on the eve of the Lisbon meeting reflected the increasingly pessimistic views in Bonn about the further leverage the West could hope to have on the Soviet Union and the GDR with the help of the CSCE. Another good example of this view is the working paper the influential German political scientist Richard Löwenthal sent to the Chancellery in early May 1971. In his paper, Löwenthal stressed the need for the Federal Republic to regain the initiative in East–West détente, especially in Deutschlandpolitik. Interestingly, however, Löwenthal argued that the CSCE was a particularly unsuitable bargaining chip in this respect, since there were hardly any means to make a conference dependent on a preceding inner-German arrangement. By the late spring of 1971, this sentiment was widespread in the Auswärtiges Amt. The Western support for the necessity of an inner-German modus vivendi before a CSCE had already been lost for good. As a matter of fact, there was no longer even a Western consensus on the Berlin precondition. But as soon as a Berlin arrangement was achieved, it would be impossible to stop the dynamics of the CSCE – regardless of the situation in the inner-German negotiations at that time.

Since the Berlin negotiations appeared to be the only issue left where the CSCE leverage held any promise for functioning as a bargaining tool, the West Germans considered it extremely important to find common ground with the French on it prior to the Lisbon meeting. At the end of May, Scheel and Schumann met in Bonn, trying bilaterally to come up with a suitable Berlin formulation for the NATO communiqué. These last-minute efforts produced no results, and the quadripartite meeting in Lisbon preceding the NATO meeting was anything but cordial on this issue. The French Foreign Minister insisted on a clearly softer formulation on the Berlin–CSCE linkage than that of any of his three colleagues, arguing that instead of being presented with strict and explicit conditions, the Soviet Union should be encouraged by a more forthcoming language to allow further progress in the Berlin talks. After a lengthy debate, the four Foreign Ministers finally agreed on a compromise formulation, in which they
hope[d] that before their next meeting, the quadripartite talks on Berlin [would] have reached a successful conclusion and that multilateral conversations intended to lead to a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [might] then be undertaken.52

This compromise, arguably less confrontational than before but nonetheless maintaining the Berlin precondition, was adopted unaltered in the communiqué issued by the NATO Foreign Ministers.53 In sum, then, the Lisbon meeting confirmed the change in the Western approach to the preconditions for a CSCE, which had been in the making throughout the spring of 1971. In the end, even the United States agreed to give up the ‘other on-going talks’, which were no longer mentioned in the Lisbon communiqué at all.54 Neither did the communiqué contain any form of the ‘escape clause’ which had been discussed by the Allies a few weeks earlier. A successful conclusion of the Berlin talks was now officially laid down as the only remaining condition set by the Alliance for the opening of multilateral CSCE preparations.

Seen from a purely West German perspective, this change between two successive NATO ministerial meetings could hardly have been more remarkable. Whereas in December 1970 the FRG strongly demanded the inclusion of ‘progress in inner-German talks’ as a precondition for the multilateralisation of the CSCE, during the preparations of the Lisbon meeting of June 1971 the West Germans were just as decisively against it as the French. In an internal analysis of the Lisbon communiqué, the Auswärtiges Amt was prepared to ‘fully agree’ with the main result of the meeting in this respect. As soon as the Berlin talks were concluded, the CSCE preparations would automatically follow.55 Presenting the Lisbon results to the Bundestag Foreign Policy Committee, State Secretary Frank argued that the previous ‘escalation of preconditions’ had indirectly hurt West German interests. It was better to concentrate on the only connection that truly mattered for the Federal Republic – that between the Berlin negotiations and the CSCE.56

Nevertheless, it seems that in addition to a genuine satisfaction with this new position, concern about Alliance dynamics had continued to influence the West Germans’ behaviour. Immediately after Lisbon, Günther van Well, the Deputy Political Director of the Auswärtiges Amt, admitted to his US interlocutor in Bonn that ‘the [West] German posture during the whole exercise of drafting the communiqué had been heavily influenced by the need, as the [West] Germans saw it, to avoid a [West] German confrontation with the French’.57
In the immediate aftermath of the Lisbon meeting, the impact of the NATO communiqué appeared to be far from what had been intended. Western reports from the quadripartite negotiations on Berlin on 9 June 1971 recorded a decisive hardening of Soviet positions. State Secretary Frank brought this up in his meeting with Ambassador Falin. The West had kept its side of the bargain, Frank told Falin, by formulating the link between the Berlin talks and the CSCE in positive terms, as well as by dropping references to the ‘on-going talks’ from the communiqué. With their current behaviour, Frank argued, the Soviets were only providing ammunition for the critics of this softer Western policy, and thus running the risk of missing a great opportunity to improve East–West relations.58

In addition to being worried about the possible failure of the Berlin talks, the West Germans were simultaneously concerned about the interpretation of what would constitute the successful conclusion of those talks, and thus the crucial threshold for the opening of the multilateral CSCE preparations. The Four Powers responsible for Berlin and Germany as a whole had already agreed that the Berlin Agreement would eventually come about in three stages: first the quadripartite ‘umbrella’ agreement, then supplementary negotiations on the Berlin question between the two German states, and only after their conclusion the signature of the final quadripartite protocol. But as van Well told his Bonn Group colleagues at the end of June 1971, Chancellor Brandt was increasingly worried that the Soviets would try to exploit the first stage as a sufficient signal for multilateral conference preparations. ‘If this were to be the case, much of the FRG leverage on the GDR for successful negotiations on implementing details on access to inner-Berlin matters might be dissipated because of the GDR’s gain in international status through participation in multilateral CES preparations.’ Therefore the West Germans were seeking support from the Bonn Group for their view that the multilateral CSCE preparations should begin only once the final quadripartite Berlin protocol had been signed by the Foreign Ministers.59 Interestingly, this statement implied that, although the direct linkage of the CSCE with bilateral inner-German negotiations on a modus vivendi had been given up, there were still some hopes attached to using the CSCE leverage in the inner-German negotiations on the implementation of the Berlin Agreement.

The United States fully agreed with this West German view, and pledged to support it in the Bonn Group as well as in NATO. George Vest from the US mission to NATO also argued that the West Germans should be encouraged to move quickly in order to convince other Allies:
Once first stage of a Berlin agreement is achieved, many of our allies, led by France, will argue that Berlin precondition has been satisfied. … If FRG tries only then to introduce apparently ‘new’ precondition of inner-German talks on Berlin it will be looked upon by allies as unacceptable for both policy and public relations reasons. … FRG must take the lead starting with France. The sooner the Germans begin to sell their position to the allies the better, since a long-term educational process will be required.60

For the time being, it seemed that the French were prepared to follow the West German lead in this matter. The US Ambassador in Paris reported that the Deputy Political Director of the Quai d’Orsay had ‘categorically reaffirmed that GoF [the French Government] will not oppose Brandt by pressing for multilateral CES preparations before entire Berlin accord wrapped up’.61

Against this backdrop, the FRG responded to the Soviet memorandum Falin had delivered in May. In their response in late July 1971, the West Germans once again made clear that they considered the satisfactory result of the Berlin negotiations to be the decisive test case for the viability of a CSCE. If East Berlin were to cooperate in bringing about a Berlin agreement, the FRG would consider this as a contribution to inner-German détente, and the multilateral CSCE preparations could be started.62 However, despite the earlier fears about Soviet interpretations, the statement Allardt gave to Gromyko in Moscow did not explicitly define the West German view of a ‘satisfactory conclusion’ of the Berlin talks. Internally in Bonn, by contrast, the distinction between the various stages of the Berlin Agreement was given considerable attention. As von Staden wrote to Frank in mid-August, neither the ratification of the Eastern Treaties nor the multilateralisation of CSCE preparations could be started before the second and third stage of the Berlin talks were completed.63

All this talk about conflicting definitions was academic so long as none of the stages of the Berlin Agreement had been achieved. In this respect, the situation changed completely on 3 September 1971, when the Ambassadors of the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union signed the quadripartite Berlin Agreement. Although the inner-German Berlin Agreement and the subsequent final Four-Power protocol were still pending, the ‘moment of truth’ for West German CSCE policy had clearly arrived. Only a few days after the signature of the quadripartite agreement, von Groll reported the latest French interpretation, according to which the completion of this first stage qualified as ‘successful conclusion’ of the Berlin talks.64 The mood favouring an immediate start of the multilateral preparations of the CSCE was rapidly spreading in the Western Alliance. Nevertheless, when the Secretary General of NATO, Manlio Brosio, asked Brandt shortly after the Berlin Agreement whether it had any implications
for the CSCE multilateralisation, the West German Chancellor stressed that the FRG still considered the completion of all the three stages to be necessary first.65

Indeed, in the new situation brought about by the quadripartite Berlin Agreement, the Brandt Government had a clear-cut ‘roadmap’ for the preferred foreign-policy timetable for the near future. At first, the inner-German negotiations on the Berlin arrangements were to be concluded, followed by the signature of the final quadripartite protocol on Berlin. It was only after that that the ratification procedure of the Eastern Treaties and the multilateral CSCE preparations could be opened simultaneously. Next on the list was the completion of an inner-German modus vivendi, which was then to be followed by UN membership of both German states and the convening of the CSCE proper.66 As can be seen in this plan, the distinction between conference preparations and the actual conference was gaining in importance for the decision-makers in Bonn. From September 1971 onwards the discussion about remaining preconditions for a security conference – within the West as well as between East and West – was beginning to diverge onto two different paths along these lines: multilateral CSCE preparations on the one hand, the CSCE proper on the other.

Meanwhile, however, Western preparations for the substance of the CSCE had accelerated dramatically. Fresh openings in the NATO discussion on the possible CSCE agenda, spurred and supplemented by the introduction of the European Political Cooperation as a completely new Western mechanism for CSCE deliberations, had helped the West gain the initiative in the CSCE dialogue with the East. The Federal Republic played an important role in this increasingly active Western framework. Long before the CSCE proper, the West Germans were beginning to discover the CSCE preparations within the West as a suitable means for multilateralising Ostpolitik.

Nothing Quiet on the Western Front

As has been argued in the previous chapter, for almost a year until the autumn of 1970 the Western preparations for the substance of a security conference had been somewhat half-hearted. Since October 1969, NATO had no longer proactively drafted Alliance positions on possible issues to be negotiated between East and West. Although potential topics had been listed in the semi-annual Foreign Ministers’ meetings, NATO’s approach had been predominantly reactive – in essence only responding to initiatives from the East. The change that occurred in this respect within a few weeks in October to November 1970 was remarkable, bringing in a
completely new level of activity and dynamism to Western planning and preparations for the CSCE – in NATO, as before, but now also in the new foreign-policy coordination framework of the EC Six. Simultaneously, the Auswärtiges Amt in Bonn stepped up its own efforts for more efficient internal coordination.

First of all, there was new movement in NATO. In mid-October 1970, as part of the preparations for the next Foreign Ministers’ meeting in December, the Council commissioned a new report from the Political Committee. This time, the report was to analyse the essential questions for the state of East–West relations, thus broadening the scope from merely listing potential issues and calling for their more detailed elaboration. After a month of intensive negotiations in Brussels, the Senior Political Committee released the final product on 13 November 1970. This report on ‘East–West negotiations’ was an important qualitative step forward in the NATO preparations for a CSCE. Although still structured as an analysis of and reaction to various Warsaw Pact proposals, the document was more than the preliminary review it claimed to be – in fact it already significantly outlined future Western thinking on the CSCE agenda. The report divided the possible substance of the conference into four groups of topics: (1) principles which should govern relations between states, including the renunciation of force; (2) economic, scientific and technical East–West cooperation; (3) cultural relations and freer movement of people, ideas and information; and (4) confidence-building measures. A significant part of the report was also devoted to considerations of procedural aspects of a conference as well as to the possible East–West machinery following a CSCE.

In the intra-Alliance consultations preparing this report, the West Germans still took a fairly reserved role. It was the United States that most firmly demanded a clear agenda for the conference before any procedural decisions were made. As it turned out, the structure of the SPC report reflected by and large the proposals the US made at the beginning of the consultations.

The most controversial issue in the SPC discussions was that of the principles governing relations between states. This was also precisely the area where a number of quintessential West German interests were at stake – the section on ‘principles’ in the report included several references to the German question, GDR participation and the formulations on renunciation of force in the Moscow Treaty. It is all the more surprising, then, that in the official records there are practically no signs of direct intervention in this field from the West German delegation. Behind the scenes, however, the FRG must have been defending its Deutschlandpolitik views. One indication of the success of influencing Allied positions indirectly is the fact that the report gave particular attention, as a specific consideration to be taken into account by the Allies, to ‘the political objective of the Federal Republic of
Germany to work for a state of peace in Europe in which the German nation will recover its unity in free self-determination. This was exactly the same formulation used in the ‘letter on German unity’ the West Germans had delivered to the Soviets at the signature of the Moscow Treaty.

The second part of the report, covering possible areas of East–West cooperation, was the only area to which the FRG had formally contributed. The West German working paper on the economic aspects of a CSCE welcomed in principle the idea of putting economic East–West cooperation on the conference agenda, especially if this facilitated true economic cooperation rather than a mere exchange of goods. But the basic tone of the West German contribution was cautious, warning of Soviet-led disturbance to the further economic integration of Western Europe if subjects under the responsibility of the EC were dealt with in an East–West conference. Some of these concerns were also reflected in the Senior Political Committee report, including the West German preference to include the United Nations Economic Committee for Europe (ECE) in Geneva as an existing organisation competent to deal with economic East–West questions.

As far as the ‘freer movement’ issues were concerned, the report underlined their potential as a Western position, going well beyond just an expansion of existing cultural exchange programmes. A discussion of this topic before and at a CSCE would ‘put the Soviets on the defensive and focus public opinion on the closed nature of Communist regimes’. Essentially, the freer movement items were seen as a possible bargaining lever for the West, since ‘by keeping up the pressure, the Allies may eventually obtain some meaningful concessions from the Soviets’. For the time being, the West Germans saw no need to oppose this approach within NATO. But as will be argued below, this was to change, as the West Germans became convinced of the advantages of a less confrontational position towards the East in the CSCE context, particularly when it came to ‘freer movement’.

In the November 1970 report of the SPC, the possibility of talking about confidence-building measures such as advance notification of military manoeuvres and exchange of observers in the CSCE framework was left open. But more importantly, mutual and balanced force reductions were beginning to be dealt with on a separate track from the CSCE. This development was certainly contrary to West German preferences. During the preparation of the report, the West Germans had continued to insist on MBFR being included in all forms of a CSCE. If the conference were to become merely a propaganda event laden with atmospherics but devoid of content, the risks contained would be ‘incalculable’. In the West German view a suitable means to prevent that happening was to insist
on MBFR being discussed in all East–West preparatory conferences and expert meetings connected with the CSCE. Against this background, the SPC report must have been a disappointment in Bonn.

But although still unsurpassed in importance, in the autumn of 1970 NATO was no longer the only show in town in Western CSCE preparations. Simultaneous with the revival of discussions in NATO, there had been a completely new initiative on the European level, as the European Political Cooperation of the six members of the EC started. The foundation document of this foreign policy coordination, the Davignon report, which was endorsed by the EC Foreign Ministers in late October 1970, did not explicitly list themes to be discussed by the EC members in this framework, but the CSCE was from the outset chosen as one of the test balloons of EPC consultations.

Chancellor Brandt has been mentioned as the initiator of choosing the CSCE as a topic to be covered by the EPC. It seems more probable, however, that the initiative came from the Belgians, with active French support. In any case, on the working level in the Auswärtiges Amt first reactions to the inclusion of the CSCE on the EPC agenda were highly sceptical, pointing out the well-established technical mechanisms within NATO to deal with CSCE matters. Firstly, NATO consultations on the CSCE were seen as a valuable political adhesive within the Alliance, since the CSCE had finally provided a reason for the French to cooperate with other NATO members. Moreover, a joint approach of the EC members on the CSCE could raise suspicions in Washington, something the FRG wanted to avoid, particularly in the immediate aftermath of the Moscow Treaty. Therefore, the Auswärtiges Amt unit responsible for the CSCE recommended that political EC consultations on the security conference should be restricted to regular mutual briefings – harmonisation and agreement on joint positions should be left to NATO as before. While this level of resistance was not completely shared by the higher ranks of the Foreign Ministry, the potential of the EPC to spawn disagreements between Paris and Washington was certainly a valid observation. As will be argued below, the Germans later often found themselves as mediators between the French and the US as a result.

Since the FRG held the rotating six-month presidency of the EC, the first Foreign Ministers’ EPC meeting took place in Munich on 19 November 1970, partly also in the presence of the European Commission. Foreign Minister Scheel, hosting the meeting, argued that there were clearly going to be questions on the CSCE agenda that were part of the EC’s remit – in those issues the inclusion of the EC in preparations and actual negotiations of the CSCE was essential. In this respect, the division of labour with NATO was clear. In Scheel’s view it was important to complement the on-going discussions within NATO with EPC preparations on economic
cooperation. With Scheel’s colleagues agreeing with this view, at its initial meeting the EPC mechanism did not yet present itself as competition for NATO. But once out of the starting blocks, the EPC was to gain in importance rapidly during the following spring.

Coinciding with and in part resulting from the increased NATO and EPC activity, preparations for a CSCE were also stepped up in Bonn. The Auswärtiges Amt working group on the CSCE was reconvened on 24 November 1970 – over a year since the preceding working group had finished its job – to coordinate German positions and instructions on the security conference for discussions in NATO as well as in the EPC. Meeting approximately once a month, this working group became an important hub of the CSCE policy-making in the Auswärtiges Amt. In addition to the reconstitution of the working group, the growing attention given to the CSCE in Bonn at this stage is also reflected in the amount of material to be found in the archives of the Auswärtiges Amt. The number of detailed background papers on the conference and country-specific analyses of CSCE positions provided by West German embassies began to pile up significantly in the late autumn of 1970. The enthusiasm of individual officials was also a significant factor contributing to the rising West German influence in Western preparations. Particularly, the promotion of Götz von Groll to head the unit responsible for the CSCE in the Auswärtiges Amt in late 1970 was to have important ramifications.

Preparing the first meeting of the CSCE working group, von Groll toyed with the idea of supporting the emerging EPC work by convening representatives of the Six in Bonn for regular round table discussions on the CSCE. This suggestion, in effect copying the existing Bonn Group mechanism and expanding it for the use of the EC Six in the CSCE context, was never followed up. But what the West Germans did was to try to engage the Bonn Group more efficiently with CSCE matters. On 19 November 1970, the FRG proposal to arrive at a joint Bonn Group position on the relationship of the German question and the CSCE was discussed in the group at length. Despite initial doubts about allied reactions to this kind of separate discussion of a key issue of the CSCE, the Bonn Group took up the West German initiative – and only a few weeks later, the group issued its first study on the CSCE and the GDR.

It was against this backdrop of rapidly expanding CSCE activity in all Western fora that the Finnish Government stepped in with a new proposal. In their memorandum delivered to the potential CSCE participants on 24 November 1970, the Finns suggested that heads of the diplomatic missions in Helsinki could open bilateral or possibly even multilateral consultations with the Finnish Foreign Ministry – building on the idea of a diplomatic ‘tea party’ raised by the Belgians in the preceding spring.
Timed shortly before the NATO Foreign Ministers’ autumn meeting, the Finnish move sparked a lively debate in the NATO Council. The delegations agreed, however, that the Finnish memorandum should not be allowed to influence the preparations for the Foreign Ministers’ meeting. This reflected the increasing independence of the Western deliberations. The NATO approach on the conference was becoming more proactive, less reactive. And for the time being, in spite of the opening up of the EPC track, it was still the NATO framework that truly mattered as the dominant Western forum for CSCE preparations.

However, in the autumn of 1970 Bonn was not yet making full use of this forum. Although the West German NATO delegation in mid-November informed the Allies that the FRG was preparing a working paper on cultural relations in East–West negotiations, the West German proposal for the text of the upcoming ministerial declaration revealed the continued one-sidedness of the approach of the Federal Republic. In this proposal, the accent was again heavily on MBFR. Accompanying instructions from Bonn to the NATO delegation maintained the agreed German position. MBFR was a self-contained topic that could be addressed independently of a CSCE, but every form of a CSCE, including multilateral preparations for a conference, should also address the topic of MBFR. In the NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Brussels in December 1970, Scheel brought the West German view to a point: ‘MBFR without CSCE yes! – CSCE without MBFR no!’ At least in the West German analysis of the discussions, Scheel’s colleagues concurred, and the principle of MBFR as a necessary agenda item of a CSCE continued to be accepted by the Allies. The ministerial communiqué, however, did not explicitly spell out such an agreement. While it did include paragraphs on MBFR as a separate agenda item, the sections more directly related to the substance of a possible CSCE left force reductions unmentioned:

Ministers recalled that any genuine and lasting improvement in East–West relations in Europe must be based on the respect of the following principles which should govern relations between states and which would be included among the points to be explored: sovereign equality, political independence and territorial integrity of each European state; non-interference and non-intervention in the internal affairs of any state, regardless of its political or social system; and the right of the people of each European state to shape their own destinies free of external constraint. … In the field of international co-operation, the contacts … might provide an opportunity to consider ways and means of ensuring closer co-operation between interested countries on the cultural, economic, technical and scientific levels, and on the question of human environment. Ministers reaffirmed that the freer movement of people, ideas and information is an essential element for the development of such co-operation.
This text made it apparent that the decision-makers in Bonn had sidelined themselves with their almost exclusive focus on MBFR. On the whole broad range of potential issues for the CSCE agenda mentioned in the NATO communiqué, there had so far been hardly any genuine West German contribution to Western objectives and positions. But from early 1971 onwards, this slowly began to change. The West Germans started truly to discover the uses of Western multilateralism and the CSCE in pursuing their substantive interests. A careful combination and interplay of the NATO and EPC frameworks was the means to this end. At first, the main emphasis was in NATO.

Broadening the German Horizon in the NATO Framework

Following up the Foreign Ministers’ meeting in December 1970, the North Atlantic Council commissioned a new study from the Senior Political Committee on 13 January. This exercise dominated the work on political questions in NATO during the spring of 1971, sparking a series of negotiations in Brussels and finally resulting in a new report on substance and procedures of a CSCE in May. As the discussion was opened in the Political Committee in late January, the West German delegation signalled its willingness to contribute particularly to the issues of cultural relations and freer movement, possibly also to the relationship between the FRG’s bilateral Eastern treaties and a multilateral renunciation of force agreement.

A few weeks later, the West German position was consolidated in instructions von Staden sent to the NATO mission. For the Federal Republic, MBFR was still the highest priority among issues to be addressed in a CSCE, but the Auswärtiges Amt now spiced up this position with a considerably broader view. Regarding the ‘principles governing relations between states’, Bonn highlighted the problematic effect any agreement on borders would have on the German question. Since the agreement in a CSCE on a renunciation of force and on respect of existing borders would carry the signatures of the Four Powers (US, UK, France and the Soviet Union) as well as both German states, it could easily be misunderstood as a substitute peace treaty on Germany – something the Federal Republic could not accept under any circumstances. Measures should also be taken to ensure that the Four Powers’ responsibility for Berlin and Germany as a whole would not be endangered by a CSCE. Regarding the cooperation elements of a conference, von Staden saw good prospects for both economic and cultural cooperation as well as for negotiations on environmental questions. But referring to freer movement, von Staden
cautiously stressed the need to differentiate between concrete short-term steps and long-term objectives. Based on von Staden’s instructions, the West German NATO delegation delivered a working paper to the Allies on 12 February, outlining the West German position on the substance and procedures of possible East–West negotiations.

Although the working paper also had ‘procedures’ in its title, at this stage the West Germans were already mainly interested in the substance of the conference. The West German representatives argued constantly that a CSCE should not be exhausted in discussions over long statements, but should truly aim at suggesting concrete measures to enhance security and cooperation in Europe. This approach differed strikingly from that chosen by the French, who spent a considerable amount of effort in developing their three-stage conference model. In Franco-West German consultations in March 1971, the West Germans held the view that procedural questions should be left in the background – what truly mattered was the agenda of the possible conference and a European security system. If the initiative was not to be left to the Warsaw Pact, NATO should concentrate seriously on the conference agenda.

Accordingly, in February 1971 the FRG raised its commitment to the CSCE agenda preparations to a new level. In fact, the position presented by the West German delegation to NATO included several significant guidelines of the CSCE policy of the Federal Republic which began to take shape during the spring of 1971. First of all, as an element of consistency, there was continued West German insistence to hold on to MBFR as a key topic of a future CSCE. Not even the resistance increasingly voiced by the major Allies was enough to discourage the West Germans from demanding a place for force reductions on the CSCE agenda. In Bonn, MBFR continued to be seen as the appropriate Western addition and counterweight to the Eastern initiative for a CSCE. More than any other topic, it was MBFR that could make the CSCE useful for Western détente policy. But whereas this position was consistently repeated in the working-level meetings, on the political level there were at first some visible contradictions in the West German line. When Brandt met Prime Minister Heath in April in Bonn, the West German Chancellor assured his British counterpart that the FRG was prepared to discuss MBFR in the CSCE framework, although this meant also including the neutral countries not directly affected by the troop reductions. But when the West German and British delegations met for a concluding plenary discussion, Defence Minister Helmut Schmidt openly disagreed with Brandt, arguing that MBFR was not a suitable topic for a CSCE. For Schmidt, the main West German
advocate of MBFR, the force reductions were too important to be included in a CSCE – in his view MBFR deserved an exclusive forum.

In addition to MBFR, the Federal Republic was beginning to pay more attention to the elements on the possible CSCE agenda grouped under the heading ‘principles governing relations between states’. Those questions dealing with respect for or recognition of existing borders in Europe, as well as those touching on the status of Berlin and Germany as a whole, were studied particularly carefully in Bonn. The resulting stance was predominantly defensive in nature. As a sort of damage control, the West Germans tended to prefer a provisional approach, aiming at a CSCE focusing on a temporary *modus vivendi* on a European scale rather than on fixed principles of inter-state relations. The overarching goal was to avoid even the remotest possibility of having the CSCE results interpreted as a substitute peace treaty on Germany.¹⁰⁵

In the NATO discussion, the most controversial question among the ‘principles’ was the handling of European borders.¹⁰⁶ By the end of April 1971, the French and the Americans were badly at loggerheads over the issue, with the US refusing to discuss borders in a CSCE at all. In order to avoid further confrontation in front of other NATO members, the FRG suggested an advance mediation of the positions in the Bonn Group.¹⁰⁷ The representatives of the US, the UK and France agreed with the FRG that a four-power split on this issue was damaging, and that a common position should be sought in a smaller circle.¹⁰⁸ In this context the arguably most fundamental element of the German approach to the CSCE, that of seeking consensus behind the scenes in order to avoid open confrontations, became apparent in two respects simultaneously – unnecessary conflicts were to be avoided within the West as well as between East and West. In the Bonn Group meeting in late April van Well presented the West German preference to seek agreement on difficult issues, such as the question of borders, with the Soviet Union and the GDR at an earlier exploratory stage rather than risking an open collision at the conference proper.¹⁰⁹ After the meeting, van Well instructed the West German NATO delegation to refrain from a discussion of the borders in the NATO framework until a common position of the Bonn Group had been found – this was a question that needed to be solved by the powers responsible for Berlin and Germany as a whole.¹¹⁰

On the other hand, the concern over quadripartite rights being undermined in the CSCE was balanced by the worry in the *Auswärtiges Amt* that the CSCE might actually strengthen the quadripartite rights over Germany too much, leading to a loss of sovereignty for the Federal Republic. The ‘full powers of a sovereign state in its internal and external affairs’,
assured for the FRG in the post-war arrangements, had to be defended also in the CSCE framework. This concern over sovereignty was also the reason for West German reluctance to have the formulations on borders and on renunciation of force in the Moscow Treaty used as a model for the CSCE, as suggested by some of the NATO Allies. In the West German view, the treaties negotiated with the Soviet Union and Poland were based on a specific and unique bilateral situation, and the formulations as such were not suitable for pan-European consumption. This position was also spelled out in clear terms to the Allies in the NATO Council.

In addition to the ‘hard’ issues covered in the principles governing relations between states, the FRG had also discovered a greater interest in the ‘softer’ questions concerning cooperation with the East in various fields, from economic to that of the environment. What arose as the main interest of the FRG, however, was the topic of ‘freer movement of people, ideas and information’. It was in this field that the cautious principle of avoiding East–West controversies and making gradual progress, a fundamental characteristic of West German CSCE policy, began to surface particularly clearly. This had been in the making for some time already. In November 1970, the Auswärtiges Amt had argued that the West should not insist too strongly on freer movement at the beginning of an East–West dialogue, in part because the West itself was not yet fully prepared to receive the ‘people, ideas and information’ from Eastern Europe without limitations. Although the West Germans agreed with their allies that freer movement was an essential topic to be covered at a CSCE, they also underscored their view that the goal of a more liberal exchange between East and West could be achieved only very slowly. In the early spring of 1971, the West Germans considered enhanced cultural cooperation to be the most appropriate way to address the question of freedom of movement.

In von Staden’s instructions to the West German NATO mission in February 1971 the gradual approach to the freedom of movement was stressed. This was not a topic in which quick results should be expected. Instead, patience was called for: ‘The achievement of the free exchange of people, ideas and information with Eastern-European countries is our declared long-term objective.’ In the British analysis, the West German preference to combine cultural relations with freer movement was condemned as both ‘muddled and complacent’. The United States, for its part, was also worried by the FRG’s desire to concentrate on cultural relations at the expense of freer movement. This was part of a more general concern in Washington about the Alliance drifting into a ‘hortatory conference devoid of substance’. In the US analysis, the possible euphoria resulting from such a conference could be detrimental to the West, leading to high yields for the Soviet Union, and merely ‘meaningless atmospher-
ics’ for the West. In short, as one of Kissinger’s key advisors wrote in May, the result would be a ‘disaster’.\textsuperscript{121}

The West Germans were not willing to enter a conference lacking in substance either. But their perspective on the conference was different. For the FRG the CSCE was a long-term process, in which objectives would be best achieved by a gradual step-by-step approach.\textsuperscript{122} The freer movement questions were a case in point. In March, von Staden explained to his French colleague that the West Germans wanted to move carefully in the CSCE. It was essential to avoid ideological confrontations – instead, one should aim at limited but concrete steps forward.\textsuperscript{123} Accordingly, in the NATO discussion based on competing French and US contributions, the Auswärtiges Amt sided with the French approach, aiming at the long-term goal of liberalising East–West contacts through gradual improvements in cultural cooperation. It was important not to raise suspicions in the Warsaw Pact of the West attempting to undermine their societies. This, in the West German view, was the case in the US proposal, which gave too much weight to propaganda by focusing on controversial elements such as travel restrictions and radio jamming.\textsuperscript{124}

This budding controversy between the United States and the Federal Republic over the freedom of movement items had not yet fully materialised, as the Senior Political Committee concluded its consultations in May 1971 with the presentation of its report on ‘substance and procedures of possible East–West negotiations’. This report, circulated on 17 May, was a significant update and expansion of the previous report of November 1970. On over fifty pages, this report gave a detailed account of the state of play in the CSCE preparations of NATO. Now the substance of a possible CSCE agenda was divided into six categories: (1) principles governing relations between states; (2) economic, scientific and technical cooperation; (3) cooperation to improve the human environment; (4) freer movement of people, ideas and information; (5) mutual and balanced force reductions; and (6) possible machinery for future East–West negotiations. In contrast to previous NATO reports on the CSCE preparations, the emphasis had now clearly moved to substance at the expense of procedure. In a number of issues, differences in opinion within the Alliance were already visible, since it had not been possible to achieve consensus in all agenda questions. On balanced force reductions, for example, the report merely referred to ‘varying views’ of member states on the relationship between MBFR and a CSCE.\textsuperscript{125} This SPC report was presented to the NATO Foreign Ministers in their June meeting in Lisbon. The ministers instructed the SPC to continue its work, with the objective of achieving a unified view on the substance and procedures by the autumn of 1971.\textsuperscript{126}
In a note circulated to West German embassies in late July, the Auswärtiges Amt affirmed that the FRG was fully behind the latest CSCE report of the SPC, having influenced the contents of the report significantly during its creation. The main positions of the Federal Republic had been adequately taken into consideration. Starting with the principles, the West Germans had won recognition for their argument that the Brezhnev Doctrine\textsuperscript{127} should not be the centre of attention. The Western focus should rather be on renunciation of force and peaceful settlement of disputes. On freer movement, the note presented a very sober view. In the long term the FRG naturally welcomed a more independent role for the individual Warsaw Pact states. However, if this trend were to get out of control, the uncertainty of the Soviet Union could lead to critical developments, which would not serve Western interests.\textsuperscript{128}

Another Auswärtiges Amt analysis of the latest SPC report underlined the role the FRG had assumed in the NATO discussions, successfully building bridges between the ‘conservative’ (led by the US and the UK) and ‘progressive’ (led by the Belgians, Scandinavians and Canadians) extremes within the Alliance. West German mediation was mostly needed between the US and France, although the latter, because of its preference to move the CSCE preparations completely to the EPC of the Six, had been relatively passive in the actual discussions in the NATO Council.\textsuperscript{129} The need for West German mediation between the Allies had indeed grown dramatically because of the emergence of the EPC track.

**From America’s Advocate to the Main Proponent of EPC**

In parallel with the accelerating NATO preparations during the spring of 1971, the work on the CSCE in the EPC framework had also truly started. In the consultations of the Six, the main West German concern at first was to maintain a clear division of labour between NATO and the EPC. There was ample reason for this, because of a new burst of French activity.

In late January 1971, building on a Belgian working paper from the previous autumn, the French suggested that the EPC mandate on CSCE preparations be expanded to cover the whole range of CSCE issues. Additionally, the French wanted to coordinate all CSCE positions of the Six prior to NATO consultations. Particularly the latter proposal met with stiff resistance from Bonn. Von Groll pointed out that this would necessarily lead to apprehension from the UK and the US, the main NATO partners outside the EPC. Moreover, the West Germans argued, the pace of the NATO deliberations was often so rapid that there would simply be no time for the Six to negotiate common positions for those consultations.\textsuperscript{130}
On the other hand, the FRG supported France in the idea of opening up the EPC discussion on the whole range of the CSCE. In the West German view the EC should in principle be free to discuss all elements of the CSCE, but in order to maintain the division of labour with NATO it was preferable to focus specifically only on those issues with particular relevance for the EC.\textsuperscript{131}

France also pushed for an institutional strengthening of the CSCE preparations in the EPC framework. Following the French initiative, the EPC political committee decided in February 1971 to establish a separate EPC working group on the CSCE.\textsuperscript{132} The constitutive session of this working group was held in Paris on 1 March. The mandate of the working group was broader than the West Germans had initially wanted, since the Six agreed that should there be problems in moving on in NATO discussions, it was possible to use joint instructions agreed in the EPC framework to ‘enliven’ the NATO process, even if the topics discussed did not directly affect EC interests. As a countermeasure to avoid stepping on the toes of the NATO machinery, the West German delegation suggested that the EPC should come up with a ‘negative list’ of topics that were better left to the experts in NATO, such as disarmament and renunciation of force.\textsuperscript{133}

This opening meeting of the CSCE working group of the EPC left the West Germans worried. France was apparently intending to create a strong and independent role for Western Europe in the CSCE. This was bound to lead the FRG into a difficult dilemma – having to choose between the US and France. The conclusions drawn in the \textit{Auswärtiges Amt} were clear. It was up to the West Germans to make sure that US positions in all individual aspects of the CSCE were taken into consideration in the discussions among the Six. And on the other hand, the emergence of the Six as a serious actor in the Western CSCE preparations seemed to highlight the need for the FRG to have regular bilateral consultation on CSCE matters with the United States.\textsuperscript{134}

In West German thinking, this became a central point. The EPC work on the CSCE should not be allowed to lead to the isolation of the US in the West. EPC coordination should focus only on matters of direct relevance for the EC, not for example on MBFR and renunciation of force, items clearly in NATO territory. The US positions should always be taken into consideration in the EPC discussions, for it was both inconsiderate and risky to present the most important guarantor of European security with a \textit{fait accompli}. At most, the EPC should facilitate the decision making of NATO, not overtake it.\textsuperscript{135} As a result, the West Germans came to the conclusion that they had a genuine interest in assuming the mediating role between France and the US. In late March, after a meeting with a US em-
bassy official, von Groll recommended taking up the US offer of bilateral exchanges of opinion on CSCE, since that would enable the West Germans to dispel US suspicions on the one hand, and to gain authority to represent the US position in the EPC on the other.\textsuperscript{136}

The French, for their part, continued to be active in their attempts to expand the EPC mandate on the CSCE. In the Franco-West German consultations of the Political Directors in March, Beaumarchais suggested that the NATO missions of the Six could be instructed to use the joint positions arrived at in the EPC discussions as ‘inspiration’ for the NATO debates. Von Staden replied that it was important to distinguish between two sets of questions in the CSCE context – those areas in which the Six as a community had genuine and specific interests, and those in which the Six were not yet addressed as a community. In the previous questions it was only natural that the Six had common positions, but in the latter it should be very carefully considered.\textsuperscript{137} But the French push in the EPC framework was a genuine concern for the Federal Republic. In fact, the NATO unit of the \textit{Auswärtiges Amt} was already having second thoughts about the whole concept of the EPC working on the CSCE. Under the French presidency during the first half of 1971 the cooperation had been developing in a completely different direction than originally envisaged by the West Germans. In the West German view, there were more than enough suitable venues for discussing the CSCE in general, so that the EPC should do so only where the EC’s interests were directly at stake.\textsuperscript{138} Under no circumstances should the CSCE discussion in NATO be prejudged by the EPC.\textsuperscript{139}

To alleviate these concerns, the West Germans voluntarily assumed the role of the advocate of the United States in bridging the EPC–NATO gap. Over the course of the spring of 1971, the West Germans had established regular contacts with the US diplomats to discuss the CSCE proceedings in the EPC. Due to French insistence, those NATO members outside the EPC Six, including the US, had only been informed very superficially and restrictively about EPC reports and discussions. The \textit{Auswärtiges Amt}, however, consistently kept the US embassy in Bonn well informed about the material contents of the EPC report, even during its preparations. Technically speaking, EPC confidentiality had been maintained, since the actual texts had not been given to the Americans. In the West German view, satisfying the information needs of the US would be necessary for as long as the EPC discussions in parallel with those in NATO continued to irritate the Americans.\textsuperscript{140} Avoiding unnecessary irritants to the US-European relationship was the primary cause for West German insistence on maintaining a clear division of labour between the EPC and NATO in the CSCE preparations. The Federal Republic firmly opposed all ideas
of broadening the scope of the EPC to include ideas clearly perceived to be in the NATO domain. Thus, for example, the Italian proposal to begin discussing MBFR in the EPC was dismissed from the outset.\textsuperscript{141}

But the active West German advocacy of US interests in the EPC framework turned out to be a temporary state of affairs. The controversy between West German and US views on the best approach to the freedom of movement, which had already been developing for some time, became an open disagreement from the summer of 1971. In late August, von Groll laid the West German-US disagreement out in the open in a discussion with a US embassy official, expressing the ‘serious misgivings’ of the Federal Government. In the West German view, certain CSCE agenda items proposed by the US, especially cessation of radio jamming and greater movement between East and West, ‘seemed almost designed to ensure that a CES would fail’. While the Federal Republic also wished to achieve these objectives, they should follow later in the ‘evolutionary process of détente initiated by a CES’. Instead of tackling controversial issues at the outset of the process, one should rather focus on developing East–West relations for more realisable objectives, for example expanding cultural exchange programs.\textsuperscript{142}

The disagreement with the US over the tactical approach to be taken on the freer movement items was a symptom of the increasing Europeanisation of West German CSCE policy. The division of labour between NATO and EPC was one thing, but when it came to the agenda of the conference, the West Germans had few reasons to be worried about the development in the EPC framework. In late April, the EPC Political Directors meeting in Paris agreed on a twenty-point document which was to become the introduction to the first EPC report on the CSCE. This paper contained several ideas the West Germans held dear, such as the principle of formulating Western proposals in a way which would appear attractive to the East as well. Suitable areas of cooperation mentioned in the report ranged from industrial cooperation and trade to environmental protection and development aid.\textsuperscript{143}

West German wishes to move on in the field of East–West cooperation were also met in the EPC Foreign Ministers’ meeting on 13–14 May. There the Six agreed that the procedure of the conference was secondary in importance to the actual content. It was not enough simply to list topics for the agenda. Questions of content needed to be addressed seriously before the conference met. Questions of economic, cultural, scientific and technological cooperation all touched on vital interests of the European Community. In order to prevent disturbances to the further development of the European Communities by the Eastern CSCE suggestions, the EPC needed
to be active in these fields. As a signal of this willingness to deepen substantive preparations, the ministers decided to convene an ad hoc group of the EPC working on economic questions of a CSCE. Although the deliberations on the cooperation items were fairly noncommittal at this stage, as a result of the Paris meeting there were two EPC bodies focusing on the CSCE: the working group (or sub-committee, sous-comité) for general affairs and the ad hoc group specialising on economic questions.

The Auswärtiges Amt had already for months been engaged in preparing various cooperation elements for the CSCE agenda. But in August 1971 this was supported by a new opening from the Chancellery. In a detailed memorandum on the ‘civilian’ aspects of a CSCE, Per Fischer, one of the specialists on European policy in the Chancellery, stressed the importance of the role of the EC in pursuing the European peace order as a long-term goal. In the CSCE context, Fischer argued for a European approach founded on making attractive offers to the East (Angebotspolitik). In Fischer’s view, the West should present a wide variety of substantive offers, ranging from East–West trade to financial and scientific cooperation, from transport, energy and development aid to culture and information exchange. The European Political Cooperation was the best means to pursue this policy, for it was important that the Europeans spoke with one voice. By making these attractive offers to the Warsaw Pact, it was also to be expected that the Soviet Union would be more inclined to recognise the EC as a negotiating partner. Fischer’s ideas went down well in the Auswärtiges Amt, since only a few days later the Foreign Ministry also spoke in favour of an active, coordinated and balanced Angebotspolitik of the West.

The essence of this new approach was spelled out in late August. In an inter-ministry CSCE meeting in Bonn, Fischer declared that ‘the CSCE provides the possibility of embedding the Ostpolitik efforts of the Federal Government in a “European Ostpolitik”’. As will be shown in the following chapter, this idea of a ‘European Ostpolitik’ set the tone for the future West German CSCE policy, until the opening of the multilateral preparatory talks in Helsinki in November 1972 and beyond.

**Conclusion**

The conclusion of the first stage of the quadripartite Berlin talks in September 1971 was, just as the Moscow Treaty had been a year earlier, an important milestone for West German CSCE policy. In terms of the linkage approach, the second of the three major objectives the Federal Republic wanted to achieve before entering the CSCE preparations, the Berlin
Agreement, was getting closer. But the choices made in Bonn in order to facilitate the achievement of these two objectives – the commitment to the CSCE in the Bahr Paper and the exclusive focus on the Berlin talks as the only precondition for a CSCE – had diminished the possibilities of using the CSCE leverage to achieve the final and most important objective, the Inner-German Treaty. The agreement of the Federal Republic to follow the French lead and single out the successful conclusion of the Berlin talks as the final threshold before multilateral CSCE preparations was irreversible. The West Germans managed to hold to their interpretation of this ‘successful conclusion’. At the same time it was clear that after the Berlin Agreement it would no longer be possible to return to the linkage between the Inner-German Treaty and the CSCE, as originally envisaged by Bahr. As will be argued in the following chapter, in the end the Federal Republic became the victim of its own strategy in its efforts to instrumentalise the CSCE by linking it to other negotiations. Now time favoured the GDR, not the FRG. Instead of being able to hold back CSCE preparations until an Inner-German Treaty was in place, Bonn was now under pressure to conclude the inner-German negotiations before the CSCE preparations started.

However, rather than a sign of West German weakness and inability to pursue its own interests, this was a sign of a fundamental shift in priorities in Bonn. Already in the period covered in this chapter, the importance attached to the substance of the conference had clearly overtaken the expectations of the instrumental value of the CSCE. West German policymakers had come to the conclusion that instead of bargaining with their CSCE participation, it was actually West German conference participation itself that held the more valuable promise for the future. Operating in the multilateral framework preparing the CSCE agenda in the West, the Federal Republic had in effect already multilateralised Ostpolitik. Defending its vital interests in the ‘principles governing relations between states’, emphasising elements of East–West cooperation, underscoring the need to avoid unnecessary confrontation both within the West and between East and West, and finally, by stressing the nature of the CSCE as a long-term process, the FRG was attempting to get its key objectives adopted by its allies. The following chapter will show that these attempts were to a large extent successful.
Notes

1. TNA, FCO 41/88, Jackling (Bonn) to FCO, 16 Mar 1971.
7. NARA, RG 59, Box 1705, Rush (Bonn) to State, 25 Jan 1971.
11. PAAA, AV Neues Amt, 4215, Frank to embassies, 4 Feb 1971.
12. NARA, RG 59, Box 1705, Rush (Bonn) to State, 20 Feb 1971.
16. AAPD 1970, doc 615, Hartmann, meeting von Braun-Tsarapkin, 28 Dec 1970; AAPD 1971, doc 11, Boss (Natogerma) to AA, 12 Jan 1971. The key points of the Soviet démarche, delivered in somewhat different forms to all NATO members in late December, were also brought to the attention of the Finns. See UMA, 7B, 11.2, NATO-maiden kokoukset, Kekkonen, 30 Dec 1970.
17. PAAA, B1, 342, von Groll, 13 Jan 1971.
19. NARA, RG 59, Box 1705, Annenberg (London) to State, 19 Mar 1971. See also TNA, FCO 41/88, Jackling (Bonn) to FCO, 16 Mar 1971.
20. NARA, RG 59, Box 2288, Rush (Bonn) to State, 12 Mar 1971.
21. PAAA, B40, 192, Lahn to D Pol and SIS, 2 Mar 1971.
22. NARA, RG 59, Box 1705, Ellsworth (US NATO) to State, 12 Mar 1971.
23. PAAA, B150, 225, Grewe (Natogerma) to AA, 9 Mar 1971; NARA, RG 59, Box 1705, Ellsworth (US NATO) to State, 15 Mar 1971.
24. NARA, RG 59, Box 2288, Rush (Bonn) to State, 12 Mar 1971.
25. PAAA, B150, 226, von Staden to Natogerma, 23 Mar 1971. See also PAAA, B150, 226, Oncken to von Staden, 19 Mar 1971.
27. For the unofficial German translation of the Soviet memorandum delivered on 18 March, see PAAA, B40, 197, 18 Mar 1971. See also PAAA, B150, 226, van Well, 24 Mar 1971.
28. PAAA, B150, 226, Hartmann, meeting Frank-Bondarenko, 19 Mar 1971.
30. See Chapter 5.
32. VdDB, VI/111, 26 Mar 1971, 6556–8. See also NARA, RG 59, Box 1705, Rush (Bonn) to State, 27 Mar 1971. The debate was continued in the Foreign Policy Committee a few days later, see PA-DBT, 3104 6/3, Prot. 36, 1 Apr 1971.
33. PAAA, B150, 227, Gehlhoff, 6 Apr 1971. For the consolidation of this line, see PAAA, B40, 186, IIA3, 13 Apr 1971; PAAA, B150, 228, von Groll and Dahlhoff, 23 Apr 1971.
34. PAAA, B150, 228, Scheibe (Den Haag) to AA, 16 Apr 1971.
35. PAAA, B150, 228, Behrends, 22 Apr 1971.
36. TNA, FO 1042/424, Richards (Bonn), 19 Apr 1971.
37. NARA, NSC Files, Box H-182, Folder 2, NSSM-121, Hillenbrand to Kissinger, 5 May 1971.
38. PAAA, B150, 229, van Well to Natogerma, 4 May 1971; NARA, RG 59, Box 2289, Rush (Bonn) to State, 5 May 1971.
40. PAAA, B1, 496, Simon to embassies, 18 May 1971.
42. PAAA, B40, 190, IIA3, 7 May 1971; PAAA, B40, 193, von Staden (Paris) to Scheel (AA), 13 May 1971.
44. PAAA, B150, 230, Boss (Natogerma) to AA, 26 May 1971.
45. PAAA, B150, 230, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 22 May 1971.
46. For the full German translation of the Soviet memorandum, see PAAA, B150, 230, 27 May 1971. The memorandum was identical to the one delivered to the Americans in Washington on 28 May 1971, see NARA, RG 59, Box 1706, Fessenden (Bonn) to State, 5 June 1971.
47. AAPD 1971, doc 188, Blumenfeld, meeting Falin-Frank, 27 May 1971; AAPD 1971, doc 189, Blumenfeld, meeting Scheel-Falin, 1 June 1971; PAAA, B40, 195, Blumenfeld, 18 June 1971. See also the US report from the West German briefing of these two meetings, NARA, RG 59, Box 1706, Fessenden (Bonn) to State, 15 June 1971. In fact, Scheel had made a similar remark to Falin already a few weeks earlier, see PAAA, B150, 229, Blumenfeld, meeting Falin-Scheel, 6 May 1971.
48. See, for instance, PAAA, B150, 229, von Groll, 4 May 1971.
51. AAPD 1971, doc 194, von Well to embassies, 29 May 1971; NARA, RG 59, Box 3147, Rush (Bonn) to State, 29 May 1971.
52. NARA, RG 59, Box 3147, Rogers (Lisbon) to State, 4 June 1971; AAPD 1971, doc 196, Frank (Lisbon) to AA, 3 June 1971; TNA, FCO 33/1558, quadrupartite dinner, 2 June 1971.
53. NATO Communiqués, Final Communiqué of the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial Session, Lisbon, 3–4 June 1971; AAPD 1971, doc 197, Krapf (Lisbon) to AA, 5 June 1971. This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale.
61. NARA, RG 59, Box 2290, Watson (Paris) to State, 1 July 1971.
63. PAAA, B150, 236, von Staden to Frank, 17 Aug 1971.
64. PAAA, B40, 187, von Groll, 8 Sep 1971.
67. PAAA, B150, 214, Grewe (Natogerma) to AA, 14 Oct 1970.
68. NATOA, C-M(70)56, East–West Negotiations, 13 Nov 1970.
69. TNA, FCO 41/745, Grattan (UK NATO) to Braithwaite (FCO), 23 Oct 1970.
70. PAAA, B130, 2667, POLADS(70)58, 5 Nov 1970; PAAA, B130, 2667, POLADS(70)57, 6 Nov 1970.
71. NATOA, C-M(70)56, East–West Negotiations, 13 Nov 1970.
73. TNA, FCO 41/745, German Delegation (NATO), 29 Oct 1970.
74. NATOA, C-M(70)56, East–West Negotiations, 13 Nov 1970.
75. PAAA, B150, 216, Gehlhoff to Frank, 3 Nov 1970; PAAA, B150, 217, Grewe (Natogerma) to AA, 18 Nov 1970.
77. Becker, Die frühe KSZE-Politik, 124; Höhn, Außenpolitik der EG-Staaten, 151.
78. Möckli, European Foreign Policy, 60; Romano, ‘The Nine and the Conference of Helsinki’, 84–5.
79. PAAA, B130, 2667, Pommerening to Lahn, von Staden, 9 Oct 1970. For the initial criticism in the Auswärtiges Amt, see also Mayer, ‘National Foreign Policy’, 132–3; Höhn, Außenpolitik der EG-Staaten, 139.
82. See PAAA, B40, 185–189.
83. On the significance of von Groll, see also Spohr Readman, ‘National Interests’, 1082.
84. PAAA, B40, 185, von Groll, 24 Nov 1970.
85. PAAA, B150, 217, van Well, 19 Nov 1970.
86. PAAA, AV Neues Amt, 4215 (Botschaft Washington), von Groll (AA) to embassies, 25 Nov 1970; PAAA, B150, 218, D. Scheel (Helsinki) to AA, 26 Nov 1970. For the original documents related to the Finnish memorandum, see UMA, 7B, 11.3, Suomen muistio 24.11.70.
87. PAAA, B150, 218, Grewe (Natogerma) to AA, 27 Nov 1970.
88. TNA, FCO 41/746, Peck (UK NATO) to FCO, 18 Nov 1970.
89. PAAA, B150, 218, von Staden (AA) to Natogerma, 24 Nov 1970.
90. PAAA, B150, 216, Nov 1970 (undated).
91. PAAA, B150, 219, Lahn and Grewe (Natogerma) to AA, 3 Dec 1970.
94. NATOA, C-M(71)40, Substance and Procedures of Possible East–West Negotiations, 17 May 1971.
95. PAAA, B150, 222, Boss (Natogerma) to AA, 26 Jan 1971.
96. AAPD 1971, doc 46, von Staden (AA) to embassies, 10 Feb 1971.
100. PAAA, B150, 226, von Staden to Frank and Scheel, 31 Mar 1971.
102. PAAA, B150, 225, Grew (Natogerma) to AA, 3 Mar 1971; AAPD 1971, doc 95, Roth to von Staden and Frank, 16 Mar 1971.
103. PAAA, B150, 228, Boss (Natogerma) to AA, 22 Apr 1971; PAAA, B43, 107297, Mertes, Ruth, 26 Apr 1971; NARA, NSC H-Files, Box H-182, Folder 2, Hillenbrand to Kissinger, 5 May 1971.
104. PAAA, B150, 227, Gehlhoff to DgIA, Ref IA7, 6 Apr 1971.
105. PAAA, B150, 223, Joetze, 1 Feb 1971.
106. PAAA, B150, 227, Boss (Natogerma) to AA, 8 Apr 1971.
107. PAAA, B150, 228, Boss (Natogerma) to AA, 23 Apr 1971.
108. NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 2264, Folder 2, Vest (US NATO) to State, 24 Apr 1971.
109. NARA, RG59 (1970–73), Box 1706, Rush (Bonn) to State, 4 May 1971.
110. PAAA, B150, 228, van Well (AA) to Natogerma, 30 Apr 1971.
112. AAPD 1971, doc 140, von Staden (AA) to Natogerma, 27 Apr 1971 (sent 3 May 1971). For the origins of the response, see PAAA, B150, 228, Mertes to DgIIB, von Staden, 22 Apr 1971; NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 2264, Folder 3, Vest (US NATO) to State, 14 May 1971.
115. PAAA, B40, 184, von Staden (AA) to embassies, 21 Dec 1970.
116. PAAA, B150, 224, Reichel to IIA3, 18 Feb 1971.
117. AAPD 1971, doc 46, von Staden (AA) to embassies, 10 Feb 1971.
118. TNA, FCO 41/882, Braithwaite to Grattan, 4 Mar 1971.
119. NARA, RG 59, Box 2264, Folder 2, Vest (US NATO) to State, 23 Apr 1971.
120. NARA, RG59 (1970–73), Box 1705, Ellsworth (US NATO) to State, 12 Mar 1971.
121. PAAA, B150, 226, von Groll to von Staden, 31 Mar 1971; NARA, NSC H-Files, Box H-57, Folder 1, Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, 10 May 1971.
122. NARA, RG59 (1970–73), Box 1705, Ellsworth (US NATO) to State, 17 Mar 1971.
123. PAAA, B150, 226, Steger to Dg IA, von Staden, 29 Mar 1971.
124. PAAA, B150, 227, Boss (Natogerma) to AA, 14 Apr 1971; PAAA, B150, 228, Lahn (AA) to Natogerma, 22 Apr 1971.
125. NATOA, C-M(71)40, Substance and Procedures of Possible East–West Negotiations, 17 May 1971.
126. AAPD 1971, doc 197, Krapf (Lisbon) to AA, 5 June 1971; PAAA, AV Neues Amt, 4215 (Botschaft Washington), von Staden (AA) to embassies, 27 July 1971.
129. PAAA, B40, 184, von Groll, 24 May 1971.
131. PAAA, B40, 192, von Staden to Frank, 3 Feb 1971.
132. PAAA, B1, 496, von Staden, 10 Feb 1971.
133. PAAA, B40, 192, Lahn to von Staden and Frank, 2 Mar 1971.
134. PAAA, B21, 735, Simon to von Staden, 5 Mar 1971.
137. PAAA, B150, 226, Steger to DgIA, von Staden, 29 Mar 1971.
138. PAAA, B150, 228, Steger to IIA3, 20 Apr 1971.
139. PAAA, B40, 193, von Groll, 7 May 1971.
140. PAAA, B40, 186, IIA3, 7 June 1971.
141. PAAA, B150, 233, Rossbach to DgIIB, von Staden, 1 July 1971.
142. NARA, RG 59, Box 1706, Rush (Bonn) to Secstate, 2 Sep 1971.
143. PAAA, B40, 192, 28 Apr 1971.
Chapter 5

1971–72
Towards a European Peace Order?

ILLUSTRATION 5: Minister of Economics and Finance Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor Willy Brandt and Foreign Minister Walter Scheel (from left to right) at the EC Summit in Paris on 19 October 1972.

There has been no other phase in diplomacy like the current one, with so many linkages and reverse linkages.

– State Secretary Frank to Soviet Ambassador Falin, December 1971

The FRG views it [the CSCE] as a long-range process seeking somehow to bridge the deep gap that exists between Eastern Europe and the Atlantic world. Much depends on whether we can find a way to begin this process without creating the impression in the USSR that we are trying to overthrow its regime.

– Political Director von Staden during his visit to Washington, March 1972

In September 1971 at the very latest, the CSCE ceased to be a theoretical construction looming in the distant future. The signature of the quadripartite Berlin Agreement had fulfilled one further Western precondition set for the conference, and the opening of the multilateral preparatory talks (MPT) was increasingly imminent. Although complementary agreements were still needed for the Berlin Agreement to enter into force, this was only a question of time. As it became apparent even to the staunchest of sceptics that the process towards a CSCE could no longer be halted, the policy of the Federal Republic accelerated its shift, moving from attempts to instrumentalise the CSCE towards an active approach to the conference agenda.

In terms of linkage, the position of the FRG changed dramatically. As the date for the opening of the MPT became *de facto* fixed, the FRG was under self-inflicted pressure to conclude the inner-German negotiations in time, thus reversing the original idea of linkage. Peter Becker has suggested that Allied resistance forced the FRG to abandon its attempts to link the opening of the CSCE with the conclusion of the Basic Treaty. My argument goes a step further, stressing that the prospects of succeeding in a further linkage were considered to be so small that the FRG never even made the genuine effort. There was no longer any active linkage to speak of – the schedule of the CSCE set the conditions for the schedule of the inner-German negotiations, not *vice versa*.

But the CSCE policy of the Federal Republic had undergone a remarkable change during the two years in office of the Brandt Government. In the period covered in this chapter, the policy of linking other negotiations with the CSCE preparations had already disappeared from the horizon of the key CSCE actors in Bonn. They sat in the Auswärtiges Amt, which was responsible for manoeuvring the increasingly complex multilateral Western web of CSCE preparations. Even with the dawn of the conference, the preparations were still to a large extent an intra-Western affair. The EPC was gaining in importance, leading to occasional conflicts between the political cooperation among the EC members and among members of NATO. With MBFR on a separate track, several of the key competences in CSCE preparations actually no longer rested in NATO.
This development opened a new possibility for the Auswärtiges Amt to pursue West German interests in various multilateral combinations. Multilateralism per se was perceived to be in the West German interest. With its own bilateral options to a large extent exhausted, the FRG saw numerous advantages in avoiding bilateralism in the future construction of East-West affairs. The CSCE was a means to expand the Ostpolitik approach to a multilateral level, and the FRG strove for joint Western positions taking into account essential West German interests. It was a means to exert control over the development of détente, and to defend the fundamental achievements of Ostpolitik. There was also a close nexus between Deutschlandpolitik and the CSCE. Potential agreements made in the multilateral conference were seen as a way to achieve step-by-step improvements in inner-German affairs.

The Decline of the Linkage between the CSCE and the Inner-German Treaty

In mid-September 1971, less than two weeks after the signature of the quadripartite Berlin protocol, Brandt paid a visit to Leonid Brezhnev in the Crimea. This unofficial meeting between the leaders of the FRG and the Soviet Union, organised at unusually short notice, caused a suspicious reaction in the West – again raising old doubts of bilateral West German-Soviet bargaining behind the scenes.4 The West Germans were at pains to convince their allies that the invitation to the meeting had come from Moscow.5 After the trip, Brandt did his best to alleviate the concerns with personal letters to Nixon, Heath and Pompidou, outlining the contents of the discussions and assuring the three major Allies that he had not overstepped any positions agreed in the Alliance.6

In terms of the CSCE linkage, the Crimean encounter was interesting precisely because of this fidelity to agreed Western lines. Prior to Brandt’s visit theAuswärtiges Amt had kept alive the idea of a linkage, treating the agreement of the FRG to ‘multiple bilateral’ talks on the CSCE as an ‘exchange object’, to be awarded in return for Soviet pressure on the GDR in the inner-German negotiations.7 Timothy Garton Ash has aptly demonstrated Brandt’s and Bahr’s attempts to work the Bonn–Moscow–Berlin triangle in Ostpolitik.8 But the German records from the meetings with Brezhnev show that in September 1971 Brandt made no efforts to play the triangle in this way in the CSCE context.

Instead, Brandt told Brezhnev that if the Berlin talks were concluded in time, NATO Foreign Ministers would give the green light to the multilateral preparations in their forthcoming meeting in December 1971.
Brezhnev remarked that the fate of the final Berlin Agreement depended on the complementary inner-German negotiations connected to it. When Bahr briefed the US Ambassador in Bonn about the Crimean discussions, he noted that Brezhnev had clearly indicated that the Soviet Union expected the necessary progress to have been completed by December.

The joint final communiqué of the Crimean talks raised the CSCE as one of the most important items the two leaders had discussed. The communiqué highlighted the willingness of the Soviet Union and the FRG to ‘accelerate the preparations’ for such a conference. This was a direct follow-up to the commitment made to the Soviets in the Bahr Paper and in the Moscow negotiations in 1970, and had been expected by the Auswärtiges Amt in advance. Appearing before the Bundestag Foreign Policy Committee a few weeks later, Brandt explained that the language in the communiqué was not in contradiction with agreed Allied positions – ‘acceleration’ simply meant attempting to move on from a bilateral to a multilateral phase, provided that the necessary conditions were met.

Nevertheless, the message from Crimea was clear. Without receiving any concrete concessions in return, Brandt pledged to accelerate the conference preparations. The days of horse-trading were long gone. This was further highlighted by another simultaneous development, originating in the North-western neighbour of the Soviet Union. On 10 September 1971, the Finnish Government suggested a package deal to address its relations with the FRG and the GDR simultaneously. This initiative had been secretly in preparation for some time, but had to be published sooner than planned because of an unfortunate slip of the tongue of the Finnish Foreign Minister. This opening transformed the German-Finnish relationship, ultimately resulting in the establishment of full-scale diplomatic ties between Finland and both German states in late 1972. But in the short term, it also had potential consequences for the CSCE policy of the FRG.

There had never been any widespread enthusiasm in Bonn for Helsinki as a conference location as such. It was Finland’s balanced approach to the two German states, below the level of full diplomatic relations, that had made it an acceptable candidate in Federal German eyes. Now that the Finns suddenly launched their initiative at such a critical juncture of the FRG’s Deutschlandpolitik, it would have been logical for Bonn to retaliate in the CSCE field. As a first reaction, the Auswärtiges Amt was not only irritated at not being informed about Finnish plans in advance, but also contemplated rethinking its position on the suitability of Helsinki to host the CSCE preparations.

But once the dust settled, it became obvious that Bonn was unwilling to create a direct link between the location of the MPT and Finnish policies towards the two German states. Two weeks after the Finnish initiative, State
Secretary Sigismund von Braun instructed the FRG mission in Helsinki not to make an explicit connection between the two. It would be sufficient if the Finns indirectly felt that Helsinki had lost some of its attraction as an absolutely neutral capital. But as far as the official West German position on the MPT site was concerned, the Finnish move had not changed anything. It was considered to be a separate development, not sufficient to question the suitability of Helsinki as a conference venue.

Both examples – the pledge for ‘acceleration’ in the Crimea and the reluctance to pull the plug from Finnish hopes of hosting the CSCE – reflected the change in West German thinking. There was no longer an interest in Bonn, either at the highest political level or at the working level in the Auswärtiges Amt, to attempt to use the CSCE as a bargaining chip in bilateral contacts. And there was also a similar decline in the willingness to continue with the ‘linkage’ policy through the multilateral route in NATO, although here the West German position was still slightly more ambiguous.

In the instructions sent out to embassies about the situation after the signing of the quadripartite Berlin protocol, State Secretary von Braun stressed that ‘the Federal Government does not insist on the conclusion of a general modus vivendi between the FRG and the GDR before entering the multilateral preparations of a CSCE’. According to von Braun’s instructions, not even the more modest bilateral traffic treaty with the GDR needed to be concluded before the opening of the MPT. In the view of the Auswärtiges Amt, the only remaining preconditions for the multilateral CSCE preparations were the completion of the Berlin Agreement and a secured legal position of the Federal Republic with respect to the participation of the GDR.

The reaction of the Allies to this West German position was twofold. On the one hand, they were surprised by the new flexibility. After the signature of the Berlin Agreement, the US had calculated that the FRG would be a major factor affecting European thinking on the timing of the CSCE. Bonn was expected to ‘wish to maintain some correlation’ between the pace of the CSCE and the sensitive question of the development of the inner-German relationship. On the other hand, now that this correlation turned out to be weaker than expected, even the minimum West German requirement of completing the Berlin negotiations was increasingly challenged within the Alliance. Pressure to enter multilateral CSCE preparations, or at least ‘multiple bilateral’ talks, as soon as possible was growing rapidly – particularly from the French side.

But this was a red line for the Federal Republic. The Berlin precondition for the MPT was not negotiable. The planning staff of the Auswärtiges Amt argued that it should be made clear to the Allies that Bonn still considered the timing of the CSCE to be a vital national interest. If necessary,
in extreme situations the FRG should also be prepared to block decision-making in NATO and in the EPC, even at the risk of short-term isolation. In matters of such fundamental importance, the atmospheric losses would be outweighed by substantive gains. Accordingly, State Secretary Frank told the Finnish roving CSCE Ambassador Enckell that the FRG saw no significant difference between multilateral and ‘multiple bilateral’ preparations – the time would be ripe for them after the completion of all three stages of the Berlin talks.

On the MPT, thus, the West German position was unequivocal. Berlin was the only remaining precondition, but an absolutely necessary one. However, the Auswärtiges Amt also for a short time sent confusing signals about potential new linkages with the CSCE proper, proposing that the Federal Government wanted to have the modalities of the UN membership of both German states negotiated before the actual CSCE could be convened. The US diplomats were surprised to hear this, and foresaw difficulties in convincing the French, since it might take years before UN entry would be achieved.

The French were indeed strongly against the idea. In a meeting of the CSCE working group of the EPC in mid-September, von Staden’s suggestion that the UN modalities needed to be clear before the GDR could take part in the CSCE at Foreign Ministers’ level resulted in an open Franco-West German dispute. After the row in the EPC, von Staden argued for the urgent need to consolidate the West German position on this matter and to organise support for it in the Bonn Group. The French, who flatly described the EPC discussion as ‘not successful’, returned to the question in a regular bilateral meeting with the West Germans in early October. By then, however, the West Germans had dropped the idea. The Federal Government in Bonn had meanwhile decided to refrain from any further linkage of the inner-German relationship with the CSCE.

In his telegram to London in late September, the UK Ambassador to Bonn, Roger Jackling, perceptively argued that with the French insisting on the conference, a number of smaller Allies also growing impatient and Brandt himself agreeing with Brezhnev to ‘accelerate’ progress towards the CSCE, a certain relaxation in the West German CSCE position and a less categorical presentation of it were to be expected.

As it turned out, this change in the West German position was made on the very same day Jackling filed his report. A high-level meeting held at the Chancellery in Bonn on 26 September 1971 was the final nail in the coffin of West German CSCE linkage strategies. A small circle, consisting of Brandt, Scheel and the Minister for Inner-German Affairs, Egon Franke, as well as a handful of key officials, effectively decided to give up every-
thing that was left of the plans to link progress in *Deutschlandpolitik* with the participation in and timing of the CSCE.29

The meeting had two main consequences for West German CSCE policy. Firstly, the Brandt-Brezhnev commitment in the Crimea to accelerate the CSCE process was to be interpreted literally – as soon as the necessary preparations made it possible, the conference should take place. In this view, it was explicitly mentioned, the FRG should closely support France. Secondly, as soon as the Berlin Agreement was in force, the Federal Republic would no longer raise any further reservations, neither concerning the multilateral preparations nor the conference itself. It was emphasised that this did not rule out the ‘disclaimer’ on GDR participation, to be issued in due time.30 The inner circle in Bonn had arrived at the position that there was no longer any reason to procrastinate over the preparation of the CSCE.

When von Staden formulated West German positions on the CSCE in preparation for an EC Political Committee meeting in mid-October, he referred to the decision made in the meeting in the Chancellery on the one hand, and to the ‘situation in the Alliance’ on the other. Both reasons rendered a further use of direct linkage between the CSCE proper and the inner-German *modus vivendi* impossible. The final Berlin Agreement had to be signed before multilateral East-West preparations of the conference, but that was all the West Germans could demand.31

In this question the Chancellor had taken the lead. In fact, Brandt’s retrospective account in his memoirs, referring precisely to this point in time, is revealing. Writing about linkages and reverse linkages, Brandt argues against imposing ‘political straightjackets’ on oneself and against the ‘fatal tendency’ in the political-diplomatic world to elevate a *de facto* relationship between two issues into a legal linkage. It was hardly a wonder, Brandt points out, if others then followed suit.32

And others certainly could play the linkage game as well. Just as the FRG had decided to let go of the particular link between the CSCE and inner-German relations, the overall picture of détente linkages took a further turn towards more complication. During the opening week of the UN General Assembly in New York, the Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko publicly declared that the Soviet Union was prepared to sign the final protocol of the Berlin Agreement only once the *Bundestag* had ratified the Moscow Treaty. This Soviet ‘reverse linkage’, as it became known, had direct implications for the CSCE as well. As Scheel told his French colleague in New York, this Soviet position could in effect block the ratification of the Eastern Treaties in Bonn as well as preparations for a security conference.33 The Soviet move changed the rules of the game once more. Instead of the familiar two-dimensional link between the Berlin Agreement and
the opening of the CSCE, the ratification of the Moscow Treaty was now added as a third element.

**Hesitating on the Berlin Precondition**

When it came to maintaining the grip on the Berlin precondition for the CSCE, the West Germans continued to be able to rely on the support of the major European Allies. The British remained content with ‘taking their cue from the Germans’ on the timing of the CSCE, and openly told the West Germans they did not want to move ‘slower than Bonn or faster than Bonn’. The French were also remarkably calm, not willing to upset the plans on timing agreed in NATO. The need for the conclusion – meaning the signature of the final protocol – of the Berlin Agreement before the multilateral CSCE preparations was also consolidated as a joint EPC position in October.

The firm line on the Berlin precondition was endorsed by the Auswärtiges Amt and approved by the Federal Government on 3 November 1971, the first time the CSCE was discussed in the cabinet as a separate agenda point. Gromyko’s reverse linkage had merely reinforced the Auswärtiges Amt view on the need to maintain the Berlin precondition unchanged. Multilateral preparations should be begun immediately after the signature of the quadripartite final protocol on Berlin – not sooner than that, not later than that. The West German NATO Ambassador gave assurances that an active and consistent West German policy in this matter would keep other NATO allies in line.

But although this position was consistently presented as the joint view of the government, there remained an element of indecision behind the scenes. Talking to his British colleague after a Bonn Group meeting in late October, Klaus Blech, a key West German official, insinuated that not everybody in government circles was in agreement. According to Blech, some outside the Auswärtiges Amt seemed to be prepared to enter multilateral conference preparations even before the Berlin Agreement had been completed.

Indeed, there was growing disagreement in this matter within the government, between the FDP and Scheel’s Auswärtiges Amt on the one hand, the SPD and the Chancellery on the other. The SPD was clearly having second thoughts on the advisability of holding on to the ‘Scheel Doctrine’ – the line of thinking where a third-party recognition of the GDR before the Inner-German Treaty was perceived as a hostile act – any longer. In an SPD presidium meeting on 27 October, it was Herbert Wehner who called for an immediate cessation of the blockage of GDR participation in international organisations. Brandt agreed with Wehner that this would be
tactically wiser. Supported by Egon Franke, however, Brandt argued that this could lead to severe problems with the FDP and the Auswärtiges Amt, who continued to believe in the potential leverage of the current policy on East Berlin.43

Nevertheless, Egon Bahr stepped in with a new policy line in mid-November 1971. Leading the negotiations with his East German counterpart, Michael Kohl, on the inner-German part of the Berlin Agreement, Bahr was optimistic that the talks would lead to a favourable result in time for the NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting.44 In a high-level meeting of the Bonn Group in Paris, Bahr argued that the current situation was a tactical dream-come-true, since the Soviets were putting pressure on the East Germans to conclude the inner-German part of the Berlin Agreement in order to allow for a positive NATO decision on the CSCE preparations.45 In a restricted informal discussion, Bahr then suggested that if the existing linkages were to postpone the signing of the Berlin Agreement so that it would occur simultaneously with the ratification of the Moscow Treaty, the FRG would be prepared to enter the multilateral CSCE preparations immediately after the conclusion of the inner-German part of the Berlin Agreement. ‘It would not be our business to give the green light in this case, but we would not oppose such a NATO decision’, Bahr said.46

This was a dramatic and sudden change in the West German position. Although Bahr stressed that he was merely stating his personal opinion, a British memorandum referred with certainty to a meeting in Bonn the preceding night, where Brandt, Bahr and ‘ministers directly involved’ had reviewed the situation.47 The change seemed to be genuine. All the more so, since von Staden from the Auswärtiges Amt supported Bahr, stating that the Federal Government was ‘conscious of the risk that they might incur criticism if they appeared to be holding up progress towards a conference for reasons connected primarily with Federal German politics’.48

For the Three Allies, this change in the West German position was a complete surprise, and naturally resulted in different interpretations. France, for its part, had already for some time been openly in favour of beginning the multilateral preparations. Accordingly, the Quai was quick to pick up the argument Bahr had delivered them on a silver plate. Only two days later, Foreign Minister Schumann suggested to Scheel that the MPT should be opened as soon as the second stage of the Berlin negotiations was completed.49 The UK Foreign Office, then again, was clearly irritated about the way in which it had been confronted by the change in West German thinking without any advance notice. Nevertheless, the UK continued to consider the CSCE timing to be primarily a West German affair, and maintained its support for Bonn.50
All of a sudden, then, the United States was alone in the Bonn Group in opposing the accelerated procedure towards the CSCE preparations. The general view in Washington on the whole linkage situation had been cynical to begin with. Kissinger’s aide Helmut Sonnenfeldt argued that sooner or later the West Germans were bound to deliver the CSCE as the next ‘instalment payment’ for the Moscow Treaty. Later, Sonnenfeldt made this point even more strongly, arguing that the West German Government had completely ‘mortgaged its freedom of action’ on the CSCE project during Brandt’s Crimean visit. All the same, the new situation was viewed with concern, and prompt steps were taken to restore West German support for the US view on the timing of the CSCE, that is, multilateral preparations only after the signature of the final quadripartite protocol.

The US was not alone in being uneasy with Bahr’s move. The West German NATO Ambassador Franz Krapf characterised the current West German CSCE position to his US colleague simply as ‘a mess’. In spite of Bahr’s recent statements in Paris that were also well known in Brussels, the official instructions Krapf received from Bonn were unchanged, insisting, as before, on a completion of the Berlin Agreement before the MPT. According to Krapf, Bahr had not informed the Auswärtiges Amt about his intentions in advance. In his official reports to Bonn, Krapf complained about this inconsistency and its repercussions on West German credibility within the Alliance. But whereas Krapf represented the sceptical wing of the West German diplomats, Götz von Groll, the main engine behind the CSCE policies of the Auswärtiges Amt in Bonn, enthusiastically took up the idea of endorsing the multilateral preparations already in the communiqué of the forthcoming NATO ministerial meeting.

This apparent lack of coordination of the CSCE policy of the Auswärtiges Amt was in part due to Foreign Minister Scheel’s visit to Moscow at the end of November 1971. According to rumours making the rounds in Brussels and Bonn, Scheel considered using a more flexible approach to the linkage of the Berlin talks with the CSCE preparations as a bargaining chip in his discussions with Gromyko. This concession would be made in return for Soviet agreement to drop the ‘reverse linkage’. It seems plausible that keeping this tactical option open was a reason for the Auswärtiges Amt to go along with Bahr’s more flexible line on the Berlin precondition. However, as Scheel arrived in Moscow, the Soviet Foreign Minister categorically refused to give in on the reverse linkage, arguing that it was impossible for the Soviet Union to sign the Berlin protocol before the Moscow Treaty was ratified. Moreover, Gromyko flatly rejected any attempts to include the timing of the CSCE preparations in the equation. In the Soviet view, the West was merely trying to set new obstacles to the security conference. Van Well later told the UK Ambassador in Bonn...
that Gromyko had, ‘metaphorically speaking, shrugged his shoulders’ at Scheel’s proposal.60

The conclusions drawn from this in the Auswärtiges Amt were unequivocal – for the Soviet Union the necessity to ensure ratification of the Moscow Treaty outweighed the need for a swift opening of the CSCE preparations.61 Scheel had been prepared to bargain with the MPT timing in Moscow but, once he had failed, the Auswärtiges Amt gained the upper hand in the domestic struggle about the line to take on the timing of CSCE preparations.62

If the Soviet reverse linkage held and the difficult ratification debates in the Bundestag were linked with the final round of the Berlin negotiations, opening the MPT before they were both concluded would be an unnecessary burden on the domestic parliamentary process. This argument was the bottom line for Scheel’s briefings to Brandt and the cabinet about his Moscow trip. The FRG should prefer to cling to the full Berlin precondition at the NATO meeting.63 According to US sources, it was in the cabinet meeting on 1 December that Brandt accepted Scheel’s recommendation that the CSCE preparations should be postponed until the signature of the final Berlin protocol.64 On the following day, the Auswärtiges Amt sent out new instructions, confirming that the full Berlin precondition was to be maintained.65

The brief interlude resulting from Bahr’s solo act as well as from Scheel’s willingness to test the leverage on Gromyko was thus over, and the West Germans returned to their previous position. This was partly due to their own reasoning, but US views certainly had their impact as well.66 As British officials noted, the West Germans were in the end aligning themselves with the US, not with the French, on this issue.67 The British themselves were remarkably indifferent to the question, a position which was succinctly formulated by their NATO Ambassador: ‘If the Germans feel it necessary to hold out until final signature, we agree. If they want to be more flexible we would not stand out against that. We don’t want to be more German than the Germans.’68

As the NATO Foreign Ministers met in Brussels in December 1971, the issue of multilateralisation of the CSCE preparations was one of the main questions on the agenda. The last-minute stagnation in the negotiations on the second stage of the Berlin Agreement gave the NATO meeting an additional flavour – contrary to earlier expectations, the inner-German part had not been initialled before the Brussels meeting. France would have preferred a formulation in the communiqué that would allow for the MPT to begin as soon as the second stage of the Berlin talks was concluded, but the majority position, suiting West German preferences, prevailed. The ministerial communiqué merely reiterated the previous Lisbon statement, that is, readiness to undertake multilateral preparations ‘as soon as the
negotiations on Berlin had reached a successful conclusion’. On this basis, the ministers further declared, they would be ready to initiate such talks ‘as soon as possible’.69 The ‘successful conclusion’ was still not explicitly defined, due to French resistance, but it was by now evident that it meant the signature of the final protocol.70 In a subsequent EPC meeting, all but the French delegation agreed that this was the case.71 Reports from Washington on the Nixon-Pompidou talks indicated that the French were also prepared to accept this.72

With the NATO consensus more or less intact behind the Berlin precondition for the CSCE, the West Germans argued that the Soviet ‘reverse linkage’ strategy was responsible for the delay inflicted on the CSCE preparations. The three NATO members involved in the quadripartite Berlin Agreement were prepared to sign the final protocol as soon as the complementary inner-German talks were concluded. It was the Soviet Union that had linked the signature with yet another, separate development, and thus postponed the possibility to enter multilateral CSCE preparations.73 But it was also a part of this logic, as Scheel pointed out in a Foreign Policy Committee debate at the Bundestag, that the FRG no longer had an option to slow down the process towards a CSCE. As soon as the Berlin protocol was signed, the conference preparations would begin.74

Blackmailing the Finns?

The December 1971 meeting of the NATO Foreign Ministers was clearly a turning point, as far as the linkages with the CSCE preparations were concerned. The case was closed, for NATO and the Warsaw Pact alike. The road for the multilateral preparations of the CSCE would be free after the signature of the final Berlin protocol, no sooner and no later. In the Anglo-West German consultations in late December 1971, Political Director von Staden was already able to predict accurately the schedule for the coming spring. Ratification of the Eastern Treaties in the Bundestag and the parallel signature of the Berlin Agreement would occur in May 1972. Subsequently, the spring meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers would declare that the Alliance was prepared to enter multilateral preparations for a CSCE.75

Even the leading opposition parliamentarian in European security affairs, Werner Marx (CDU), although sceptical of the CSCE as such, agreed to a large extent with this timetable.76 As a last effort, in the heated foreign policy debate in the Bundestag plenary in late February 1972, ex-Chancellor Kiesinger openly criticised his successor for abandoning the linkage of an inner-German treaty with the CSCE. Brandt, however, could respond
by referring to a joint Allied position on the Berlin precondition. Brandt also added that the FRG had been wise not to create an additional connection between the ratification of the Moscow Treaty and the CSCE.  

Instead of the timing of the opening of the MPT, the focus in West German thinking was moving towards the duration of the multilateral talks. The ‘tea party’ stage would not have a significant impact on the international status of the GDR, but the actual conference was a different story. Therefore, Bonn preferred a preparatory phase lasting long enough to allow an inner-German treaty on the modus vivendi to be completed before the actual conference. This tendency to stress the importance of ‘long and thorough multilateral preparations’ had been on the rise in West German thinking during the autumn of 1971. In December, the Auswärtiges Amt prepared a working paper on procedures of the multilateral preparations, suggesting that the road towards the CSCE should go through a complex three-stage model – first the preparation of the ‘tea party’ of ambassadors, then the ‘tea party’ itself followed by a consultation of expert delegations, and finally the preconference of deputy foreign ministers.

The working paper was discussed in the EPC and NATO in December 1971 and January 1972. In it, the West Germans argued that the experience of the Ostpolitik negotiations had shown that ‘difficulties can only be overcome without pressure of time, step by step and by flexible negotiations which are coordinated in all their stages’. As a matter of fact, by February 1972 at the latest both London and Washington had recognised the element of procrastination in West German thinking. Bonn’s ‘meticulous plan’ to engage in thorough preparatory talks was seen as an attempt by the West Germans to continue controlling the pace of the process. Additionally, the Federal Republic naturally wanted to avoid confronting high-level representatives of the GDR in the CSCE preparations for as long as possible.

In March 1972, the West German distinction between the MPT and the conference proper became clearer. Von Staden explained in Washington that the FRG was not yet committed to an actual conference. Possible problems in the inner-German negotiations would certainly have an effect on the procedure of the multilateral CSCE preparations. The West Germans were well aware of the delicacy of this, but seemed to be after some degree of linkage of the conference proper with their negotiations with the GDR. Asked about this in a NATO meeting in Brussels, van Well nonetheless denied the existence of such a linkage. According to him, the FRG merely hoped that ‘progress made in the general détente framework would also have an influence on the talks between Bonn and East Berlin’. Once again, it was Bahr who spoke more plainly. He told a US diplomat in Bonn that the FRG ‘did not wish at this point publicly to be seen to
make further political linkages in the Eastern policy context’. All the same, Bahr went on, because of the status the GDR would gain at a CSCE proper, it ‘should not take place until the FRG negotiations with the GDR were completed’. Later van Well confirmed this – it was indeed crucial for the FRG to ‘clarify its relationship’ with the GDR before a Foreign Ministers’ plenary at a CSCE. In van Well’s view, the means to achieve this was to engage in a lengthy preparatory stage, lasting well into the spring of 1973 if necessary. As the UK Ambassador in Bonn reported in April, the FRG was by no means prepared to ‘get off the escalator of East–West talks’ altogether. On the contrary, the West Germans had for quite some time been fully committed to a CSCE. What the Federal Government and the Auswärtiges Amt in particular wanted was to maintain a maximum amount of flexibility in order to control the pace of the preparatory phase, ‘so that this [could] be lengthened or shortened to fit with the tactical requirements of their negotiations with the GDR’.88

Regarding the timing of the MPT, the official CSCE policy guidelines for the FRG, approved by the Federal Government in mid-May, pointed out that the signature of the final Berlin protocol was the only remaining prerequisite for the multilateral CSCE preparations. In a Bonn Group discussion around the same time, the Three and the FRG agreed that there could no longer be any formal barriers to the opening of the MPT after the Berlin Agreement. Because of various fixed dates in the coming autumn, such as the presidential elections in the US and the European Summit, the end of November was considered to be the suitable time for the talks in Helsinki to begin.90

The Bundestag ratified the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties on 17 May 1972, and two days later the treaties also passed through the Bundesrat. In fulfilment of the ‘reverse linkage’, as the Eastern treaties entered into force on 3 June, the Final Quadripartite Protocol on Berlin was signed on the same day. With that, all Western preconditions for the opening of the CSCE preparations had been met. In the NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Bonn at the end of May, the Western Alliance officially gave the green light to the MPT.91 This was also the first occasion when NATO formally accepted the Finnish proposal to organise these talks in Helsinki. The date was left open, but the location was fixed.

Despite the positive echo in the NATO declaration in Bonn, the Finns continued to be uncertain about the West German position on Helsinki as a location for the MPT. ‘Bonn is blackmailing’, was President Kekkonen’s concise diary remark on the CSCE preparations at the end of May. In April 1972, as the Finns were concerned about rumours indicating that the FRG would refuse to participate in the MPT in Helsinki if Finland moved on with its initiative from September 1971 to recognise the German states,
officials from the *Auswärtiges Amt* on several occasions gave assurances that no such strings were attached.\(^\text{93}\)

The idea of such a linkage was not wholly unfounded. At the NATO meeting in May 1972, Scheel’s statement in favour of opening the MPT in Helsinki in the autumn was conditional – ‘provided that the Finnish Government did not make any unilateral move in respect of the GDR that would be contrary to the FRG’s efforts to achieve an inner-German *modus vivendi*’.\(^\text{94}\) Moreover, in the past six months, the head of the FRG mission in Helsinki had occasionally flashed the CSCE card in his dealings with the Finns, openly suggesting that unwarranted Finnish moves could jeopardise the suitability of Helsinki to host the multilateral talks.\(^\text{95}\)

In the general context of West German CSCE policy, however, the Finnish initiative to recognise the German states was only of marginal importance. Moreover, the concerns that did exist in Bonn about the suitability of Helsinki were more efficiently conveyed through the NATO channel, multilaterally and indirectly rather than bilaterally and directly. As agreed in the NATO consultations, the Norwegians and the Danes, who were the first NATO members to engage in ‘multiple bilateral’ CSCE discussions with the Finns in January 1972, also raised these potentially disadvantageous effects of unilateral Finnish moves with respect to the German states.\(^\text{96}\) When the Finns realised that Bonn’s position had broader support in NATO, they were quick to draw the conclusion that it was in their interest not to irritate the Federal Republic unnecessarily.\(^\text{97}\)

In this way, with the help of its allies, the FRG was indeed able to use the CSCE card to exert influence on the Finns. It certainly contributed to the Finnish decision to accept a proposal for negotiations from the FRG in January 1972, although President Kekkonen on several occasions stressed that Finland’s policies could not be ‘in Bonn’s pocket’.\(^\text{98}\) As this example shows, Bonn conducted its CSCE policy multilaterally in NATO and in the EPC, not bilaterally in Helsinki. In fact, the mission in Helsinki was deliberately kept out of the CSCE loop for most of the time. Von Groll openly admitted as much in February 1972. The *Auswärtiges Amt* wanted to make sure that their man in Helsinki did not start to negotiate on CSCE issues directly with the Finns.\(^\text{99}\) It was only in March 1972, long after several other Allies, that the FRG opened its official contacts with the Finnish Government on the modalities of the MPT in Helsinki.\(^\text{100}\)

In the German Ambassadors’ conference in June 1972, Foreign Minister Scheel pointed out that Helsinki was acceptable to the FRG as the site of the MPT. If Finnish circumstances were to change, they would naturally be taken into consideration when the location of the CSCE proper was discussed. For the time being, Helsinki was one of several candidates
for hosting the actual conference.\textsuperscript{101} A few days later, at a meeting of the Socialist International in Vienna, Chancellor Brandt told the Finnish Foreign Minister Kalevi Sorsa that the FRG would naturally prefer the Finns to wait with their recognition moves until the Basic Treaty between the two German states was concluded. However, Brandt added, if the Finnish Government did not consider this to be possible, it would not be the end of the world.\textsuperscript{102}

The Chancellor’s forthcoming attitude was shared by the leading officials of the \textit{Auswärtiges Amt}. The MPT would in any case be organised in Helsinki. As far as the location of the actual conference was concerned, von Staden argued in July, connecting it with any Finnish overtures in the German question should be carefully avoided. An impression of the FRG punishing the Finns would not be in the West German interest.\textsuperscript{103} As a result, the representative of the Federal Government in Helsinki remained isolated and unsuccessful in his efforts to turn Finnish sensitivities in the CSCE question into a means of defending Bonn’s \textit{Deutschlandpolitik}.\textsuperscript{104} As it turned out, there was plenty of CSCE-related movement on the \textit{Deutschlandpolitik} front in the summer of 1972. But the subject of the original linkage strategy had become its object.

\textbf{An Inner-German Shotgun Wedding}

At the end of May 1972, Foreign Minister Scheel admitted being fully aware that the GDR was expecting to enhance its international status with the help of the CSCE. ‘That is their trump card, and that is why we are under time pressure’, Scheel told his British colleague.\textsuperscript{105} For some reason, this situation led the West Germans to reconsider their position as far as the timing of the CSCE was concerned. As pointed out above, so far the idea had been to control the pace of the multilateral preparations and to make it meet the schedule of the inner-German negotiations. Multilateral preparations could be under way simultaneously with the negotiations for a Basic Treaty, as long as the Basic Treaty was concluded prior to the CSCE proper. Yet in June 1972 the patience and self-confidence in Bonn ran out in this respect. After the signature of the Berlin Agreement had lifted the final obstacle in the way of the CSCE preparations, the FRG decided to play it safe and aim at concluding the Basic Treaty already before the opening of the MPT after all.

The main argument of the \textit{Auswärtiges Amt} for this change was an old one. As soon as the East German regime sat at the same table with other future participants of the CSCE to prepare the conference, its international status would be raised to a completely new level.\textsuperscript{106} But in an ironical twist,
in the new circumstances this decision turned the roles in the old linkage blueprint completely upside down. The original idea of linking the multilateral CSCE preparations with Deutschlandpolitik had been based on the perceived ability to influence the timing of the MPT. Back in 1970–71, this had been tried through the multilateral route, ending in failure.

Now, after the signature of the Berlin Agreement, the option of postponing the MPT no longer existed. The date of the talks in Helsinki had in effect already been set for November 1972. If the FRG wanted to get anything in return for the GDR’s participation in Helsinki, time was running out – the inner-German negotiations had to be concluded rapidly, within the next six months. The pressure was on Bonn, not on East Berlin. The negotiations for the Basic Treaty, which were opened on 15 June 1972, were a race against time. In an interview with the author, Egon Bahr admitted that the Federal Government was afraid that the development was going to lead too quickly to the CSCE, before the basic relationship with the GDR was clarified. It was of fundamental importance for the FRG to be the gatekeeper for the GDR’s entrance onto the international stage.\footnote{107}

In a meeting of the Bonn Group in late June, Bahr soberly described the complicated situation to the other three Allies. The GDR would certainly be tempted to drag its feet in the talks in order to wait for the impact of the CSCE. The FRG, then again, attempted to complete the negotiations before the conference, and even the multilateral preparations of the conference, began.

Negotiations on a Basic Treaty will become more difficult once the GDR takes part in a CSCE. … Nevertheless, the Federal Government is not thinking of establishing a link between these negotiations and the CSCE. We will not set new preconditions for it.\footnote{108}

This dilemma of no longer being able to use the CSCE leverage was characteristic for Bonn’s position throughout the negotiations for the Basic Treaty. Bahr himself had fully understood that this was an inherent weakness that would only grow in importance as the opening of the MPT drew closer.\footnote{109} Nonetheless, as Foreign Minister Scheel told his French colleague in June, the FRG was firmly committed to concluding the Basic Treaty before the opening of the multilateral talks in Helsinki. As an added value, this would also liberate the CSCE from the burden of unsettled German problems.\footnote{110}

In July, the Finnish Government came out with an official proposal to open the multilateral preparations on 22 November 1972.\footnote{111} Although the US was reluctant to fix a precise date at this stage, the discussion in NATO made it obvious that a postponement of the MPT was no longer realistic. The Auswärtiges Amt argued that any attempts to change the date would have caused serious damage to the credibility of the Federal Government.
In particular, with explicit reference to the declarations of intent agreed in Moscow in 1970, a postponement would have brought about severe difficulties in the West German-Soviet relationship. Brandt’s letter to Brezhnev on 10 August speaks volumes about the situation. On the one hand, the Chancellor referred to the timing of the CSCE preparations in the latter half of November as a given. On the other hand, he tried to persuade the Soviet leader to understand the positive impact an inner-German treaty would have on the conference preparations, if the Basic Treaty was concluded before the MPT. In a similar fashion, Bahr told the Bonn Group ambassadors that he considered 22 November, the opening day of the MPT, to be a decisive deadline in the inner-German negotiations. After that the GDR would be a stronger and more difficult negotiating partner. Thus, although the FRG had not yet officially replied to the Finnish suggestion, by early August at the latest the MPT date was fixed in the calculations of the Federal Government.

When Bahr met Erich Honecker in East Berlin in September, he openly told the East German leader that the FRG wanted to conclude the inner-German negotiations by early November. Honecker, although stressing that there were limits to the flexibility of the GDR, curiously implied that he would do everything he could to ensure a victory for the current SPD–FDP Coalition Government in the forthcoming West German elections on 19 November. A few days later, Bahr told the Bonn Group that there was reason to believe the GDR also wanted to conclude the negotiations on the Basic Treaty before the CSCE preparations.

In early September 1972, the general reluctance of the West Germans to impose new preconditions on the CSCE and their particular caution when dealing with the potential hosts of the conference led to a minor confrontation with the Allies. When the Finnish Government had initialled an agreement on establishing diplomatic relations with the GDR, discussion in the NATO Council turned to possible countermeasures by the FRG concerning the Finnish role in the CSCE preparations. The instructions sent from Bonn to the West German NATO mission for this purpose were clear. In the view of the Auswärtiges Amt, there should be no direct consequences whatsoever, neither on the timing and the location of the MPT, nor on the level of representation at those talks. The CSCE and the bilateral Finno-German relationship should be kept apart. Moreover, the instructions underscored that other Allies should also refrain from using Deutschlandpolitik as an argument for postponing the MPT. The site of the CSCE proper was a different story. The FRG had never favoured Helsinki for the main conference, and now the reservations had grown further.

In the heated debate in the NATO Council, a number of Allies accused the FRG of excessive flexibility. All of a sudden the FRG seemed to be pre-
pared to tolerate a GDR Ambassador at the CSCE preparations, something the Allies had for years helped Bonn to prevent. In defence of the West German position, van Well wrote from Bonn that the FRG did not want to undermine Finland in its attempts to strengthen its neutrality. The Federal Government had considered its response carefully, and was prepared to pay the price of short-term tactical losses in the interest of a broader Western perspective. For the time being, the focus of the FRG’s policy should be to minimise disturbance of the inner-German talks. The reaction in the Alliance was puzzled, and the West German NATO Ambassador himself strongly opposed these instructions, which in his view took the GDR excessively into account. According to a British telegram, there was a lot of talk in the corridors of NATO about the ‘feeble’ attitude of the FRG. Even Secretary General Luns had described the West German behaviour as ‘really extraordinary’.

As Bahr again argued in October, it would naturally have been optimal if the Western Alliance as a whole had been able to make the CSCE or even the conference preparations conditional on the conclusion of the Basic Treaty. But, in Bahr’s view, the hands of the West had been tied ever since the entry into force of the Berlin Agreement. At this stage, a new linkage could no longer be established.

During the final stretch of the negotiations for the Basic Treaty, there was only one instance when the FRG was prepared to use the CSCE card. On 6 November, as the signature of the agreement establishing diplomatic relations between Finland and the GDR was becoming imminent, State Secretary Frank instructed the mission in Helsinki to tell the Finnish Government in clear terms that a premature recognition of the GDR would have an adverse effect on the Finnish potential to host the actual CSCE. But on 8 November this problem ceased to exist, as Bahr and his East German counterpart Michael Kohl, after almost sixty meetings since June, initialled the Basic Treaty between the two German states. The Finnish Government was quick to draw conclusions from this. On 9 November it sent out the official invitations for the multilateral preparatory talks for the CSCE, to be opened two weeks later. On 14 November the Federal Republic confirmed its participation in the MPT.

By the autumn of 1972, Bahr had come a long way from the linkage plans he had drafted over three years earlier. Although the Basic Treaty was, in the end, accomplished just in time before the MPT, the timing can hardly be attributed to a consistently implemented West German strategy. Indeed, from the spring of 1972 onwards, the CSCE–Deutschlandpolitik linkage was not merely ineffective from the Bonn perspective – it had turned against its authors. Instead of the FRG luring the GDR to the ne-
gotiating table with the promise of a CSCE, the pressure was on Bonn to settle its relations with East Berlin before the conference.

It is difficult to pin down any actual concrete concessions that the FRG might have made in the inner-German negotiations due to this pressure. The CSCE as such was not an issue in the talks. There also may well have been Soviet pressure on the GDR to conclude the negotiations. Nonetheless, it seems that the wedding comparison put forward by Brandt in his memoirs, quoted at the beginning of the introduction of this book, was not perfectly accurate. Instead, if one necessarily wants to force a marital analogy on the development, that of a shotgun wedding might be more appropriate. As the estimated due date, 22 November 1972, drew closer, the FRG had no choice. A timely inner-German arrangement was the only respectable option.

Certainly, the FRG was not keen on assuming the role of the difficult partner blocking European efforts at détente with selfish demands. However, rather than a fear of isolation, the genuine reason for the erosion of the ‘linkage’ strategy was the changing West German perception of the CSCE per se. From Bonn’s perspective, the substantive elements of the conference began to outweigh its instrumental value, even when it came to Deutschlandpolitik.

### Europeanisation of Ostpolitik

One of the most striking characteristics of the West German CSCE policy from autumn 1971 onwards was the idea of multilateralising or ‘Europeanising’ Ostpolitik. As has been argued in the preceding chapters, this approach had implicitly been in the making for some time, but after the conclusion of the first stage of the Berlin Agreement in September 1971 it was pursued in a more vigorous and conscious manner than before.

The Federal Republic clearly wanted more from the CSCE than just symbolism. In the memoranda of the Auswärtiges Amt the CSCE was seen as a logical continuation of the European détente which had been initiated with the Moscow Treaty. In this broader framework, the FRG was to pursue an active and evolving ‘strategy of cooperation’. In the long term, the goal of this strategy was a ‘European peace order’. For the time being the military alliances were necessary ingredients of the existing ‘security system’ in Europe, but in the future a peace order could possibly be built upon it – and surpass these alliances. Freer movement of people, ideas and information as well as increased economic cooperation were medium-term goals in the West German strategy.
In the West German thinking, only a ‘Europe of cooperation’ would be able to safeguard lasting peace on the continent. A peace order overcoming military blocs and the Cold War, and securing lasting stability and cooperation between countries with different social systems, would be more than simply an ‘absence of danger’. Moreover, the CSCE unit of the Auswärtiges Amt noted, the goal of safeguarding peace in Europe ultimately outweighed all other interests of the FRG, including that of German unification. This was in line with the declared objective of the Federal Government to work towards a state of peace in Europe, in which the German people could in free self-determination reclaim its unity – a formulation familiar from the ‘letter on German unity’ in 1970. The CSCE, if properly prepared, was seen as a suitable forum for jointly developing basic elements of European détente, later possibly leading to the peace order and a gradual overcoming of the division of Europe.128

It is worth noting that these considerations of the peace order were not just the subject of idealistic Sunday speeches, but were also seriously advanced on the operative level. In the Auswärtiges Amt, the CSCE was broadly seen as a means to the desired end. The planning staff of the Foreign Ministry constituted an exception rather than the rule, when it in October 1971 expressed its strong reservations on the ‘utopian’ references to a European peace order.129 Here it is important to remember that the direct influence of the planning staff on Auswärtiges Amt policy was far more limited under Dirk Oncken than it had been under Egon Bahr. The British embassy in Bonn later reported that Auswärtiges Amt officials had made a habit of pointing to Brandt’s Nobel Prize speech in Oslo in December 1971 as their ‘source of inspiration in working for a CSCE’. In the UK view, the idea of an eventual European peace pact contained in the speech was a ‘nebulous concept’, but Brandt’s thinking clearly indicated that the present agreements were not an end but rather the beginning of a dynamic process on East–West détente.130

The EPC was increasingly seen as the best framework for the implementation of the German cooperation strategy in the CSCE context. In the West German view, the members of the EC, seeking support from the other NATO members, should take the initiative in making attractive and balanced offers for active economic cooperation between East and West, ranging from increase in trade volumes to energy cooperation. At the same time, the West Germans were no longer prepared to limit European cooperation to issues strictly within the competence of the EC. Instead, the Auswärtiges Amt argued in September 1971, EPC members should attempt to coordinate their CSCE positions as broadly as possible, speaking with one voice whenever possible. This also applied to topics that were primarily a NATO responsibility.131
Indeed, in Bonn the EPC began to overtake NATO as the preferred framework of CSCE preparations. Until the spring of 1971 NATO had clearly been the number one forum for Western CSCE deliberations, but by the autumn of 1971 the EPC was in the ascendancy. Although NATO continued to be in charge of preparing the principles governing relations between states and the general procedure of the conference, and the Bonn Group had a certain privilege when it came to the question of borders and all kinds of legal formulations relating to the four-power rights, there was a growing tendency in the EPC to expand its CSCE work to cover all the issues involved.

As the Auswärtiges Amt saw it, the latest NATO document on the CSCE from May 1971 left plenty of room for improvement. This was particularly the case since NATO members had not been able to agree on a long list of specifics on the principles governing relations between states. In addition, a number of questions on economic, scientific, technical, cultural and environmental cooperation remained open. The attempts to resolve these differences within NATO were proceeding far too slowly for West German tastes – an ‘agreed document’ by the end of 1971 did not seem likely. In contrast, the development in the EPC framework had been rapid. CSCE preparations among the Six had already in some areas overtaken those within NATO, and the recent decision to constitute two separate EPC working groups on the CSCE promised a further acceleration on the European track.

At the end of September 1971 the EPC took significant steps towards more efficient CSCE preparation. The existing working group was now called a CSCE sub-committee, or sous-comité, since its French title was used in other languages as well. Following a West German initiative, the sous-comité was mandated to define specific interests of the Six at a CSCE. In addition, a new body, called an ad hoc group, was established to concentrate on the economic aspects of the conference.

Cooperation here was certainly not unproblematic, and the West Germans were often frustrated and puzzled by what they saw as French stubbornness. ‘Interpreting the French behaviour is not easy’, von Staden concluded in his analysis of the EPC experience in October 1971. The French vehemently opposed the direct representation of the European Community and the Commission at a CSCE, whereas the West Germans were of the view that the EC was a part of a future peace order, and needed to have an appropriate role in the process of East–West cooperation. Moreover, the West Germans argued that any hesitation by the Six in this matter would immediately weaken the position of the Community in Soviet eyes.
Despite the underlying Franco-West German tension, in agenda questions progress in the EPC was rapid. Already by late October 1971, based on reports by the sous-comité and the ad hoc group, the Political Committee of the EPC had agreed on its own suggestion for the CSCE agenda, consisting of: (1) a code of good conduct and renunciation of force; (2) military-political questions, including disarmament; and (3) economic, scientific, technical, cultural and environmental cooperation. The FRG’s main contribution to the EPC discussion was in identifying specific EC interests in a CSCE. A joint West German-Italian working paper underlined the importance of cooperation and freer movement. The achievement of concrete results in those areas would to a large extent determine whether the CSCE was a failure or a success for the West. At the same time, however, the paper argued that the West had to take political realities into account and recognise that the policy of cooperation needed to develop within the latitude allowed by the Soviet Union. Above all, the East was not to gain the impression that the West sought changes in existing political or social systems.

The fact that a verbatim quotation of this particular EPC document was found in the American archives is no coincidence. The West Germans were constantly at pains to keep the US informed about the CSCE preparations in the EPC, trying to reconcile US and French views on the conference. However, the attempted reconciliation led to a Franco-West German disagreement later in the autumn. Whereas the French wanted to maintain strict confidentiality within the EPC, in the West German view it was unthinkable to be serving Ireland, as one of the EC applicants, with documents before the US.

The second EPC report on the CSCE, which was approved by the Foreign Ministers of the Six in November 1971, highlighted the preparedness of the members of the European Community to engage in presenting constructive, balanced and attractive offers towards the East. Although the Dutch had had a leading role in drafting the EPC report, they had focused exclusively on security issues at the expense of cooperation. The cooperation elements in the report had then to a large extent been inserted by the FRG. Indeed, the West Germans saw themselves as the decisive engine within the EPC when it came to addressing increased East-West economic cooperation as an important part of détente.

At the same time, the West Germans were increasingly sitting on the fence between EPC and NATO. On the one hand, the Auswärtiges Amt hoped to have the latest EPC report also distributed to other NATO allies as soon as possible, to support the preparation of NATO’s own CSCE report. But on the other hand, whereas the FRG strongly supported EPC work on the cooperation elements of the CSCE, the West Germans called
for discipline in those issues that were also dealt with in NATO, proposing that the results of the on-going NATO discussion should be awaited before the EPC intensified its own activity.\textsuperscript{144}

In the West German view, experience had already shown that consultations in the EPC proceeded more rapidly and led to a more thorough harmonisation than in NATO. It was all the more important, therefore, to avoid excluding the United States from the preparation of issues such as military elements of security or the principles governing relations between states.\textsuperscript{145} The visit of Joseph Luns, the new Secretary General of NATO, to Bonn in November revealed that the NATO secretariat was also concerned about the overlapping activities of NATO and EPC in the CSCE context.\textsuperscript{146} An apparent reason for this concern was the sluggish movement on the NATO track during the autumn of 1971.

As the CSCE discussion in NATO was resumed after the summer break in September 1971, the official West German position highlighted the need to avoid the most delicate issues at the beginning of the conference. Instead, the West should start with an agenda promising short-term success, focusing on, for instance, cultural cooperation and youth exchange. Although freer movement of people, ideas and information was in the long-term interest of the FRG, the \textit{Auswärtiges Amt} argued that this could come about only at the end of a long process.\textsuperscript{147}

The West German NATO delegation implemented these instructions with a degree of reluctance. In fact, the deputy of the West German NATO mission privately told his US colleague that the instructions they themselves opposed were coming from the working level in the \textit{Auswärtiges Amt}. If the US wanted to influence the West German position, it was best to approach the FRG on a higher political level. George Vest from the US delegation in NATO recommended taking this course of action, since West German ‘persistence in this very soft line of [a] potentially useful freer movement item’ was beginning to jeopardise Allied positions.\textsuperscript{148} This suggestion was taken up by the State Department, and in mid-September 1971 the US embassy in Bonn presented van Well with a paper outlining the ‘substantive and tactical advantages of pushing this item at a conference’. In order to apply further pressure, the working level of von Groll was also approached directly.\textsuperscript{149}

The West German reaction was to defend their position even more vigorously.\textsuperscript{150} On 21 September, the West German delegation in NATO circulated a working paper on freer movement, arguing for a cautious approach:

For tactical reasons, we should be careful that long-term aims should not occupy the first place on a CES agenda. Otherwise we would run the risk of sharp disputes right from the very start of the conference, which would produce an atmosphere of irritation and make it very difficult to discuss other items where
agreement on concrete results would be possible. Rather should we select concrete individual questions in the cultural field where it would be possible to make progress step by step.\textsuperscript{151}

In the US analysis, this reinforcement of the West German position was seen as unfortunate, causing serious concern about the ability of NATO to develop a good bargaining position at the conference. The US embassy in Bonn was duly prompted to continue its efforts to change the West German attitude.\textsuperscript{152} In bilateral contacts, the \textit{Auswärtiges Amt} officials assured US diplomats in Bonn that the differences in opinion were tactical rather than substantive.\textsuperscript{153}

But this tactical approach quickly began to create genuine front lines within NATO. France sided with the FRG in favouring ‘easier’ subjects, with the UK supporting the US in the opposite view, stressing that freer movement was the most important trump card the West had.\textsuperscript{154} In the search for a compromise within NATO, the West Germans stressed that their order of preference was based on what was achievable, not importance. The West German differentiation between short- and long-term aims was not to be mistaken for a division into first- and second-rate issues, respectively.\textsuperscript{155} But the Americans were not convinced, criticising the FRG for an extensive focus on ‘soft’ issues such as the environment. This referred to a West German initiative for a CSCE resolution touching on precise and clearly defined problems of air and water pollution.\textsuperscript{156}

In November 1971, however, there was a new and broader surge of West German activity in the NATO discussion. First, the FRG presented a working paper on principles governing relations between states. The paper was tabled jointly with the US delegation, thus demonstrating that disagreement on freer movement did not prevent functioning West German-US cooperation over other CSCE issues. According to this West German suggestion, the declaration issued by the CSCE should consist of five sets of principles: (1) equal rights and self-determination of peoples and of sovereign equality of states; (2) universal respect by states for human rights and fundamental freedoms; (3) non-intervention and non-interference in the internal or external affairs of any other state; (4) restraint from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any other state; and (5) peaceful settlement of disputes.\textsuperscript{157} The idea of including human rights in the list of principles was a completely new initiative. Introduced in a nonchalant manner in a West German working paper in November 1971, the respect for human rights was in the end also one of the ten principles guiding relations between states listed in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975.
Only a week after the suggestion for the declaration of principles, the FRG made its next contribution in NATO. Reflecting Bonn’s concerns about the inadequate attention given to security issues so far, the Federal Republic made a CSCE agenda proposal of its own. Consisting of three major parts – principles, cooperation and security (including military aspects) – the West German suggestion was practically identical to the one agreed in the EPC framework a few weeks earlier. Additionally, the West Germans wanted the next NATO report on the CSCE also to address the relationship between the CSCE and MBFR. The FRG apparently wanted to intensify the substantive CSCE preparation in the West, calling for more emphasis on security from NATO, and more emphasis on cooperation from the EPC.

On the NATO track, however, progress in the autumn of 1971 was slow. Soon after the West German agenda proposal in mid-November, the latest CSCE study of the Senior Political Committee was circulated. The initial idea of this report on ‘negotiating approaches’ was to be an operational outline of Alliance positions from the perspective of a negotiator, for direct use in the opening round of multilateral talks. However, the report had to admit that while there was some agreement on the basic approach, differences of opinion between the Allies remained in basically all key areas. Moreover, several aspects, such as the precise Western proposal for a CSCE agenda and the question of the relationship between the CSCE and MBFR, were not addressed by the report at all. These omissions were particularly underscored by the West German delegation.

Regardless of its apparent failings, this NATO report was able to identify four potential agenda items of the conference: (1) principles governing relations between states; (2) freer movement and cultural relations; (3) economic, technological and scientific cooperation; and (4) cooperation to improve the human environment. On the principles, the Allies agreed that contradicting the Brezhnev Doctrine was one significant goal of any future declaration, and that it should contain at least the principles of sovereign equality, non-intervention, non-use of force and the peaceful settlement of disputes. But as the British delegation noted, the Alliance was ‘nowhere near agreement’ on the text of a declaration on principles.

As far as freer movement was concerned, the SPC report pointed out that ‘[i]n developing Western proposals ..., one of the principal difficulties lies in finding a suitable balance between the politically more difficult issues such as radio jamming and exit visas for Soviet and East European nationals and the relatively easier issues such as intensification of performing arts exchanges.’ This balance had clearly not yet been found.
The NATO Council spent a couple of sessions at the end of November trying to iron out central controversies regarding the report, but no progress was made. The West German push for the inclusion of MBFR on the CSCE agenda did not receive sufficient support. When the NATO Foreign Ministers met in December, they could only take note of the SPC report and urge a rapid settlement of the remaining differences.

In fact, the most advanced part of the NATO study focused on economic, technical, scientific and environmental cooperation. This was facilitated by the extensive groundwork done in the EPC on these items. With the EC Six, Norway, Denmark and the UK already on board, these issues were far less controversial in the NATO framework. Feeding the cooperation topics into the NATO discussion had obviously paid off.

Another lesson learned from the process in NATO was that there was a clear opening for a West German lead. In his telegrams to Bonn, Ambassador Krapf urged the FRG to take a more active role in the CSCE preparation. In Krapf’s view, the discussion in NATO had revealed that none of the Allies had developed a convincing concept of how best to pursue its own interests in the CSCE. Krapf argued that a ‘clear and consistently presented CSCE concept’ of the Federal Government would enable the FRG to take the lead within the Alliance. West German positions were already considered to be decisive in all central questions of a future CSCE – principles governing relations between states, freer movement and economic cooperation. ‘None of the other NATO members has its fundamental interests so directly affected by the CSCE as we do. ... From this perspective, we should attempt to commit the Alliance to our optimal positions.’ In its immediate reaction to Krapf’s initiative the Auswärtiges Amt merely reiterated known positions. But the experience in NATO in the autumn clearly planted the seed for the more active West German CSCE policy, which developed in the spring of 1972.

Meanwhile, frustrated by the inefficiency of the NATO mechanism, State Secretary Frank made a surprising proposal during his visit to the US in late November 1971. Frank suggested establishing a coordination instrument for the MBFR and CSCE policies of the West, based on the example of the Bonn Group. This instrument could be used to avoid open controversies of Western states in the actual CSCE, and to guarantee the cohesion of the Alliance policies for the next five to ten years. The US response was reserved, pointing out that the subject matter of the existing Bonn Group was a special case, but that the CSCE consultation could not that easily be taken out of the NATO framework into a smaller circle. Frank’s idea was obviously a non-starter, but symptomatic of growing West German frustration.
During his visit to Washington, Frank also presented West German ideas on general rules for the conduct of East–West cooperation, calling for a realistic approach. ‘One should start with proposals that have a chance of being fulfilled. For example, one cannot demand that the Berlin Wall be torn down.’ In Frank’s view, this gradual approach of realistic steps also applied to the freer movement items.  

Whereas Frank’s interlocutors in the State Department were sceptical of the step-by-step approach, Henry Kissinger in the White House seriously doubted the whole concept of the CSCE and asked Frank openly to explain why the Europeans were insisting on its preparation. Frank pointed out that faced with constant Soviet pressure for a conference it was impossible for the West always just to say ‘no’.  

For the Federal Republic, however, saying ‘no’ was also an important part of the CSCE policy. This defensive approach served the fundamental principle of keeping the German question open.

**In Defence of the Eastern Treaties and Bonn’s Sovereignty**

‘Our goals in the conference were solely defensive’, Günther Dahlhoff, a CSCE desk officer in the Auswärtiges Amt in 1969–72, later told the author. This was indeed an important characteristic of West German CSCE policy, but by no means the only one. In another interview with the author, Klaus Blech, head of the Deutschlandpolitik unit in the Auswärtiges Amt from the spring of 1971, more accurately stressed the dual nature of the FRG’s policy on the CSCE. Firstly, it was essential for the Federal Republic to make sure that the ‘last word in the German question had not been spoken’. The German question had to be kept open, and the two-state solution that was about to be formed needed to be understood as a temporary *modus vivendi*. But secondly, assuming a continued division of Europe and Germany, the FRG wanted to spare no efforts in alleviating the consequences of that division for the people, particularly in the two German states.

Keeping the German question open had also been the guiding principle of the negotiators in the bilateral treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland. Now that the preparations for the conference were accelerating, Bonn’s CSCE policy also gained a defensive flavour. The accomplishments of the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties had to be protected. Simultaneously, the sovereignty of the FRG, to the extent that the limits posed by the post-war arrangements allowed it, was also increasingly emphasised by the West Germans in the multilateral Western frameworks.

In order to avoid turning the CSCE into a conference about German affairs, the Auswärtiges Amt preferred regulating the relevant issues in
advances with the Bonn Group. Two thirds of these questions were relatively unproblematic. When it came to the participation of the GDR in the conference or formulations on European borders in the CSCE context, the interests of the FRG were usually not in conflict with those of the Three Powers. But in the third aspect, the delicate interplay between four-power rights and the ‘principles governing relations between states’, the Auswärtiges Amt was worried.

Von Groll pointed out in September 1971 that it was important not to let the CSCE undermine the four-power rights regarding Berlin and Germany as a whole, but from the West German point of view it was at least equally important to hold on to the ‘full powers of a sovereign state’ guaranteed to the FRG in the ‘general treaty’ in the 1950s. In other words, the existing rights of the four powers should not be expanded in the CSCE context at the expense of the FRG, neither accidentally nor consciously. In a Bonn Group meeting in October 1971 the West Germans stressed that a specific confirmation of quadripartite rights at the CSCE, as suggested by the US, could imply that the principles agreed on in the conference would not fully apply to the Federal Republic.

This was a real concern for the Auswärtiges Amt. In a memorandum to State Secretary Frank in October 1971, Political Director von Staden emphasised that whereas the idea of consultation in a small circle could at first seem attractive, the activity of the Bonn Group in the CSCE context would create the possibility for the three powers to enlarge their influence over the FRG. In von Staden’s view, the essential question for the FRG was whether the engagement of the Bonn Group would help the West Germans strengthen their grip on Euro-Atlantic development or increase the risk of further limits to West German sovereignty.

For the time being, the FRG was content with keeping the Bonn Group on board, since it ensured that none of the Deutschlandpolitik-related issues were raised by the US, the UK or France in broader Western discussion without a preceding consultation. Indeed, the FRG began to see the Bonn Group as a control mechanism for the relationship between the CSCE and Deutschlandpolitik, filtering out statements by the three powers that were seen as in conflict with West German interests.

At the end of October 1971, the Bonn Group agreed that disclaimer texts regarding the participation of the GDR in the conference were ‘highly desirable’. Such a disclaimer, stressing that participation in a conference together with the GDR did not imply its recognition, was to be issued in replies to the conference invitation as well as in remarks at the multilateral preliminary phase and the conference proper. The issue of borders, then again, was to be covered in a separate statement on quadripartite rights and responsibilities – preferably issued jointly with the Soviet Union.
The Auswärtiges Amt was satisfied with the state of play, since this position safeguarded the necessary flexibility for the FRG.\textsuperscript{178}

In order to reach the goal of integrating the CSCE into West German East–West policy, Frank argued in October 1971, the FRG needed to complement its efforts for more cooperation with a defence of legal positions that would not exclude eventual German unification. It was therefore essential to avoid ending up with multilateral regulations resembling a peace treaty, the more so since such formulations had just been avoided in the bilateral Moscow and Warsaw Treaties.\textsuperscript{179} The key embassies were instructed in detail along these lines. To preserve the specific characteristics of the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties as well as the \textit{modus vivendi} character of the East–West policy of the FRG, the CSCE should only issue a declaration on the renunciation of force, not sign an agreement. An outright recognition of existing borders in Europe, as suggested by the Warsaw Pact, was out of the question.\textsuperscript{180}

In the Bonn Group, the West Germans were increasingly concerned about the reference to borders in a future CSCE. Blech told his colleagues that the FRG’s first preference would be to completely avoid it, but given the level of Soviet insistence, this was unlikely to succeed. If the acceptance of, or respect for, existing borders was to be addressed at the CSCE, the West Germans wanted in some way to transfer the relevant qualifications made in the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties in this respect to the multilateral level, including the letter on German unity. Blech admitted that the Auswärtiges Amt had so far not been able to develop a concept on how this should be done.\textsuperscript{181}

Nevertheless, the standard CSCE background papers in the Auswärtiges Amt were amended with stronger language stating that the important border issues had already been settled in the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties bilaterally and should not be dealt with at a CSCE.\textsuperscript{182} A ‘recognition’ of the status quo borders in Europe was impossible for the FRG, but as a fallback position ‘respect’ for borders might be conceivable.\textsuperscript{183} The option of a renunciation of violent change of borders was also raised.\textsuperscript{184}

In the beginning of December, the Bonn Group agreed on a new formulation regarding borders, which corresponded perfectly with West German desires. According to the Bonn Group paper, the initial Allied position should be to decline to treat the border issue in a CSCE. If, however, some treatment of the issue in the CSCE texts became unavoidable, ‘utmost care should be given to their formulation in order to avoid the impression of an anticipated peace settlement on the basis of the present territorial status quo’. In particular, the West should agree only to respect, rather than to recognise, the existing borders. Moreover, the Bonn Group suggested, ‘the NATO members together, or the FRG alone, might also wish to consider
the possibility of a separate statement on “German unity” similar to the one delivered to the USSR when the FRG-USSR treaty was signed.\footnote{185}

With the support of the Bonn Group, the defensive West German posture held in the autumn of 1971. The core message was crystallised in State Secretary Frank’s discussions in Washington. As Frank stressed, for the FRG it was essential that the CSCE could not become a substitute for a peace treaty – the issue of the peace treaty as well the final regulation of the German question had to be kept open.\footnote{186} A gradual and peaceful overcoming of the status quo had to be maintained as an option.\footnote{187}

\section*{A New Flow of German Activity}

In early November 1971 the Federal Government in Bonn for the first time discussed the CSCE as a separate agenda item in the cabinet meeting, as Foreign Minister Scheel briefed his colleagues about the state of play in Western preparations.\footnote{188} Scheel’s speaking notes for the cabinet meeting were still remarkably non-committal, stressing that no final positions on the contents of a possible CSCE could at this stage be taken.\footnote{189} The Auswärtiges Amt wanted to keep its cards close to its chest. This was also apparent in the briefing given to the Bundestag Foreign Policy Committee.\footnote{190}

But in early December 1971 the preparations in Bonn were raised to a completely new level, as the Auswärtiges Amt hosted an inter-ministry meeting on the CSCE, thus for the first time directly including the Chancellery and the Economics and Defence Ministries. The participants agreed that a consolidated position of the Federal Government on the CSCE was needed, and that the preparation of a formal presentation to the cabinet (Kabinettvorlage) should begin immediately.\footnote{191} At the same time, the personnel arrangements were also given further attention. The Auswärtiges Amt began to consider strengthening its mission in Helsinki with a CSCE expert, since the most significant coordination at any conference was likely to occur on the spot.\footnote{192}

Most importantly, the increased attention given to the CSCE in Bonn was reflected in a remarkable expansion of West German activity in the Western agenda preparations. As its NATO Ambassador had suggested in late 1971, in February 1972 the Federal Republic suddenly adopted an active role on all fronts. In NATO, having submitted a joint paper with the US on the principles guiding relations between states the preceding autumn, the FRG delegation now amended that with a new paper of their own.\footnote{193} In the same meeting the West Germans also announced their forthcoming contribution on freer movement and cultural relations.\footnote{194} As far as security issues were concerned, the West Germans again stressed their
strong preference for addressing some elements of military security at a CSCE. Moreover, the NATO discussion on the procedure of the multilateral preparations was already based on West German suggestions. West German initiatives were equally prominent in each of the topics of importance dealt with in the EPC machinery. For example, the discussion on economic cooperation in the ad hoc group in February was guided by the West German working paper on industrial cooperation, which was of particular interest to the FRG.

The UK was astonished by this avalanche of West German contributions. ‘[N]early all the work the Committee has so far done has been based on a succession of German drafts. Inevitably they are considerably amended and this is tiresome for the German delegation but it does ensure certain advantages for the German point of view’, noted the British NATO mission in February 1972. In March, Rodric Braithwaite at the FCO reported being ‘struck by the importance which the Germans attach to the Conference. They seem to regard it as the only way of carrying on the “East/West dialogue” once the present round of Ostpolitik negotiations is finished.’

The exceptional size of the West German bureaucratic effort put into the CSCE gave the FRG a competitive edge, and for others it was increasingly difficult to keep up with the flow of documents from Bonn. Von Groll’s unit in the Auswärtiges Amt had half a dozen officials concentrating entirely on the CSCE, a luxury which other NATO and EPC members did not have at this stage. Braithwaite noted that this explained why ‘it is now the Germans who are making the running in NATO and in the EEC Political Committee in the mass production of memoranda.’ The West Germans had taken the lead in Western preparations.

According to the British view, there were still shortcomings in the West German CSCE policy. In the opinion of FCO officials, a lack of clear political guidance from ministers in the FRG was reflected in contradictory tendencies on the working level, particularly between the ‘hard-faced men’ in the NATO unit of the Auswärtiges Amt as opposed to von Groll’s ‘softies’. Braithwaite said in retrospect that the West Germans were at times so badly organised and at loggerheads in internal rivalries that it was a genuine problem for the UK to find out what they were up to with regard to the CSCE.

Braithwaite’s criticism was of course not fully unfounded. The internal rivalries and conflicting positions of West German officials reflected the magnitude of the change in the foreign policy of the FRG that was in progress. Not everyone in the Auswärtiges Amt agreed on the new course, and individual frustrations were often vented in unofficial discussions with Allied colleagues. However, as unprofessional as this sometimes was, it
did not adversely affect the overall dynamism and direction of West German CSCE policy. Moreover, firmer political guidance was on its way. In the end, as Kenneth Dyson has argued, the political control of the CSCE policy was in fact much closer in the FRG than in the UK.\textsuperscript{204} 

The preparation for the cabinet presentation on the CSCE, kicked off in December 1971, had taken longer than expected. Originally planned for the cabinet agenda in January, not even first tentative drafts of the material were available before March.\textsuperscript{205} The \textit{Auswärtiges Amt} had at first wanted to give the cabinet a thorough presentation of the conference preparations as well as to receive a negotiating mandate for the CSCE. But in the end, the Chancellery view prevailed, and only a more concise set of guidelines was to be delivered for cabinet approval.\textsuperscript{206} Moreover, von Staden pointed to the danger of leaks, and underscored therefore that all references to tactical considerations were best left out of the guidelines and arguments made only on a factual basis.\textsuperscript{207} 

On 25 April 1972, Foreign Minister Scheel sent the first draft of the CSCE guidelines to the Chancellery. In his introduction, Scheel stressed that rather than setting rigid formulas, the idea behind the paper was to provide ‘points of orientation’ for an active West German role in Western preparations as well as in the multilateral East–West negotiations. Moreover, the guiding principle of any West German policy in the CSCE had to be to avoid any commitments that affected the \textit{modus vivendi} character of \textit{Ostpolitik} or could be used to create anything resembling a peace treaty.\textsuperscript{208} Presenting the final CSCE guidelines at the cabinet meeting on 16 May, Scheel stressed that the FRG was not out to provoke anyone at the conference – the West Germans were aiming at genuine improvements, not propaganda events. Naturally, their own interests had to be defended vigorously if necessary.\textsuperscript{209} 

The guidelines paper approved by the cabinet on 16 May 1972 laid out the cornerstones of the CSCE policy of the FRG. According to the paper, circumstances were now suitable for a successful CSCE contributing to détente in Europe, a conference in which the Federal Republic would play an active role. The guidelines emphasised four main agenda areas: (1) the principles governing relations between states; (2) military aspects of security; (3) ‘improvement of communication’ or freer movement; and (4) cooperation in various areas.\textsuperscript{210} 

The CSCE guidelines declared that the West German preparations continued to be coordinated by the \textit{Auswärtiges Amt}, which was also to lead a new inter-ministry working group on the CSCE, to be set up before the multilateral preparations started.\textsuperscript{211} Already in preparation for the cabinet discussion, the \textit{Auswärtiges Amt} had produced a massive package of documents, elaborating the eighteen-point guidelines paper with fifteen
annexes, all together covering well over one hundred pages. In all, the package revealed an already rather sophisticated stage of preparations for the CSCE, ranging from considerations on individual agenda issues to personnel planning for West German delegations at the multilateral preparations and the CSCE proper.212

The most important agenda items raised in the guidelines will be explored in more detail below. Before moving on to them, however, a few words on the role of the parliamentary opposition in West German CSCE policy are in order. For the conservative wing of the CDU, the whole CSCE project had been seen for a considerable time as a dangerous undertaking for the Western democracies in general and for the Federal Republic in particular, giving the Soviet Union an unprecedented opportunity to increase its influence in Western Europe.213 Admittedly, there were also more moderate voices in the ranks of the Christian Democrats.214 But the harshest critics were the vocal ones, none more so than the leader of the Bavarian CSU, Franz Josef Strauss, who openly attacked the CSCE policy of the Brandt Government in the Bundestag plenary in February 1972. In response, the Chancellor pointed at the active agenda preparations undertaken within NATO as well as in the EPC. Were the Christian Democrats really questioning the policy of the complete Western Alliance, Brandt asked.215

At the cabinet meeting discussing the CSCE in May 1972, Scheel specifically asked for approval to make the key documents in the CSCE package available to the leadership of the Christian Democrats on the basis of confidentiality.216 A few weeks later, in an internal memorandum sent to the CDU leader Rainer Barzel, one of the key foreign policy figures of the party, Georg Kliesing, admitted that although the CSCE was the most dangerous part of Soviet strategy in Europe, the conference could no longer be avoided. Instead of a policy of self-isolation, the CDU needed to try to make the most of the situation. In order to safeguard West German interests, it was an important parliamentary task of the CDU/CSU group to push the Federal Government to give clear answers on its CSCE policy. So far, Kliesing argued, the basic position of the Federal Government was at least unclear, if not outright dubious. For the Christian Democrats, the tendency of the Government to see the CSCE as a continuation of its Ostpolitik and perhaps even as an opportunity to act as a bridge, merging Ostpolitik and Westpolitik, was a ‘disastrous development’.217

In August 1972, Barzel wrote a letter to Scheel, thanking the Foreign Minister for the CSCE material he had sent over, as a result of Barzel’s enquiry to Brandt in June. Barzel criticised Scheel for the omission of ‘freer movement’ from the list of CSCE topics contained in one of the Auswärtiges Amt documents he had received. In Barzel’s view, that item should constantly be pushed to the top of the CSCE agenda by the West Germans.218
In fact, the practice of the *Auswärtiges Amt* in sending CSCE material to the opposition leader was remarkably restrictive. The documents Barzel received in the summer of 1972 were of a very general and unclassified nature. That had also been the case earlier, when Barzel had asked for briefing material on the CSCE prior to his trip to Moscow in December 1971.²¹⁹ Indeed, for the CDU it was difficult to engage in an effective opposition policy when it had only a very partial picture of what was going on in the CSCE preparations. Admittedly, the opposition was naturally preoccupied and overstretched with the bilateral *Ostpolitik*, and could only afford a marginal interest in the future conference at this stage.²²⁰ But above all, even during the final stretch before the convening of the multilateral preparatory talks, the CSCE was very much a government issue, prepared by a small bureaucratic circle of officials and diplomats. It was these officials that led the West German surge in the Western preparations of the conference substance in the spring of 1972.

**Peaceful Change, Self-Determination of Peoples and Military Security**

In their NATO contribution in February 1972, the West Germans stressed that a CSCE declaration on principles governing relations between states needed to reflect the real possibilities of improvement of the East–West relationship, manifest the will to détente and promote concrete détente measures in the future. At the same time, two pitfalls had to be avoided – the impression of a substitute peace treaty for Germany and the creation of euphoria in the public opinion of NATO member states. Finally, the declaration needed to find the balance between actively pursuing Western interests in the conference and not unnecessarily hurting the sensitivities of the Warsaw Pact.²²¹

In this working paper on the declaration of principles the FRG for the first time introduced the concept of ‘peaceful change’, which was later to become a central element of the CSCE. The West Germans argued that in combining the necessary respect for basic rights (equality and self-determination of peoples; sovereign equality, territorial integrity and political independence of states; human rights and basic freedoms of individuals) with the principles particularly important for the West (non-interference in internal and external affairs of other states; non-use and non-threat of force; peaceful settlement of disputes), the concept of peaceful change was essential: ‘it should be clear that choice of means to effect peaceful change is up to the parties involved, that coercion is ruled out and that settlement must be between sovereign equals.’
But in spite of this insertion of a potentially dynamic element, the general tenor of the West German working paper was extremely cautious, as witnessed by this section:

The Western draft of a document on the principles of international relations should, for the time being, not contain appeals to general noble values (such as human values, welfare of humanity, elimination of all sources of conflict, solidarity of mankind, etc.) since they would detract from the sober and businesslike approach of the Alliance .... 222

This was a particularly controversial paragraph in the West German paper, and not all delegations agreed with it in the SPC discussion. 223 Based on the exchange of opinions, the NATO Secretariat circulated a revised version of the West German paper. This new draft was amended with a reference to the borders issue, reflecting West German interests and earlier Bonn Group agreement. If the Warsaw Pact were to press for the inclusion of a statement on borders in the CSCE declaration on principles, the Allies should only agree to it if the formulation was limited to ‘respect’ or ‘inviolability’ instead of ‘recognition’ of borders, if quadripartite rights for Germany as a whole and Berlin were safeguarded, and if Warsaw Pact countries made ‘major counterconcessions on matters of interest to the Allies in other aspects of the negotiations’. 224

The Deutschlandpolitik specialists in the Auswärtiges Amt saw the declaration on principles to be of great value to the West, stressing that atmospheric improvements could bring substantive improvements in their wake. From the perspective of the FRG, an important objective at a CSCE was for its agreement on principles to have a ‘stabilising or buttressing’ effect on the inner-German modus vivendi. But in April 1972 the Auswärtiges Amt was firmly opposed to any references in that declaration to the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties – the bilateral treaties needed to remain intact and unaffected by it. 225

The NATO work on the CSCE substance in the spring of 1972 culminated in the report of the SPC which was distributed on 16 May. In their introductory notes to the report, Secretary General Joseph Luns and the Chairman of the SPC, Jörg Kastl, admitted that the Council had not been able to reconcile the differences of opinion in a variety of areas. In fact, hardly any of the areas covered in the report were without remaining contentious questions. Luns and Kastl stressed that the need for a consensus was urgent, in particular regarding the overall tactical negotiating approach of NATO. 226

Despite the level of disagreement, the SPC report of 16 May managed to give a broad overview of the situation, both in terms of substance and procedure. On substance, the report was divided into nine dossiers – (1)
principles governing relations between states; (2) certain military aspects of security; (3) freer movement of people; (4) freer movement of information and ideas; (5) cultural relations; (6) economic cooperation; (7) cooperation in applied science and technology; (8) cooperation in pure science; and (9) cooperation to improve the human environment – each consisting of a confidential ‘guidelines paper’ for internal use and a more general ‘agenda paper’ for appropriate use with non-Allied governments, supported with relevant documentation. Moreover, the report tackled the questions of procedure and Allied consultations during the multilateral preparations.  

A reading of the SPC report makes it obvious that the West German efforts during the spring of 1972 had paid off. Although a general Allied consensus on the CSCE approach was still distant, numerous West German ideas had been efficiently fed into the NATO document. This was particularly the case in the dossier on ‘principles’, where the West German concerns on quadripartite rights, a substitute peace settlement, and the ‘respect’ or ‘inviolability’ – as opposed to ‘recognition’ – of borders were fully taken into consideration. The concept of peaceful change, introduced by the West Germans in their working paper a few months earlier, was also included. The only drawback in the dossier, in the West German view, was the inability of the Alliance to agree on the inclusion of the self-determination of peoples as well as human rights in the list of principles.

Both principles were of profound importance for the foreign policy of the FRG because of their direct implications for the inner-German relationship. Over the summer of 1972, at the same time as the negotiations for the Basic Treaty started, the Deutschlandpolitik element in the CSCE policy of the FRG became even more dominant. Von Groll stressed that the repercussions from the CSCE on the inner-German problems were of the utmost importance for the Federal Republic. The quintessential question in this respect was, in von Groll’s view, to what extent it would be possible to advance Deutschlandpolitik goals multilaterally through the CSCE.

Human rights and the right of self-determination were a case in point. When the key officials of the Auswärtiges Amt and the FCO met in Bonn for bilateral Anglo-West German consultations on the CSCE in June, the West Germans again insisted on the inclusion of self-determination and human rights in the declaration of principles. Since this had been one of the unresolved questions in the last SPC report, the West Germans suggested working on it at first trilaterally, in an Anglo-West German-US format. The British agreed to this, although they pointed out that further opposition to the inclusion of self-determination was to be expected from the Turkish and Canadian delegations, with their own minority issues. The West Germans followed up this initiative in July, and approached the UK and US delegations in NATO. The West German plan was to draft a joint
paper on ‘principles’, to be tabled before the SPC reconvened to resolve outstanding differences. Both Allies welcomed West German leadership in this issue.\textsuperscript{232} West German embassies in Ottawa and Ankara were also instructed to ask directly for Canadian and Turkish support. The main West German argument was that a failure to include self-determination in the declaration of principles would deal a significant blow to the achievements of Ostpolitik, retroactively diminishing the importance of the ‘letter on German unity’.\textsuperscript{233}

As it turned out, the West Germans did not succeed in this endeavour before the start of the multilateral talks. But during the actual CSCE, both human rights and the self-determination of peoples were negotiated into the Final Act. Importantly, however, the way in which Bonn addressed the issue in 1972 was illustrative of the new flexibility of West German multilateralism. Depending on the question at hand, suitable ad hoc alliances could be sought out to win over support for West German interests. Although this was not a completely new invention in the diplomatic history of the Federal Republic, as a conscious and consistent West German strategy the forging of issue-driven coalitions within the West was certainly novel.

In the CSCE context, the relationship between the EPC and NATO was an example \textit{par excellence} of an alliance within an alliance. In 1972, the West Germans were increasingly willing to use the EPC as a means to arrive at consensus in the broader NATO framework. In issues concerning economic cooperation there was a clear-cut division of labour – the EPC outweighed NATO. Therefore, the West German delegation in the EPC ad hoc group pointed out in January that in these questions preference should be given to arriving at common positions within the EPC; coordination with other NATO partners was secondary.\textsuperscript{234} But the extent of coordination of European CSCE positions began to cause uneasiness in the North American NATO partners.\textsuperscript{235} In response, the West Germans gave assurances that all fears of the EPC consultations disturbing preparations on the NATO track were unfounded. Instead, the two procedures were mutually supportive.\textsuperscript{236}

In fact, however, the EPC consultations had already for quite some time exceeded their original mandate which was to focus on issues directly falling within the competence of the EC. In retrospect, a senior French diplomat referred to the EPC as a ‘factory of ideas’ for NATO in the CSCE process.\textsuperscript{237} In May 1972, the \textit{Auswärtiges Amt} admitted as much, noting that the EPC was increasingly also acting as a general ‘clearing house’ for specific European interests and aspects of the complete subject matter of a CSCE, particularly in issues that were controversial in NATO.\textsuperscript{238}
The Federal Republic was particularly active in making use of this ‘clearing house’. It was also successful in enhancing the circumstances for it, downgrading the classification of documents concerning NATO preparations for the economic aspects of the CSCE as well as enabling the Commission representatives in the ad hoc group to see confidential NATO documents.\(^{239}\) The coordination of policies in the EPC and NATO was further facilitated by the fact that participants in the EPC meetings were the very same officials who were responsible for instructing their NATO representatives.\(^{240}\)

Even with the ascendancy of the EPC, there was still one element of the Western CSCE preparations that was firmly in the hands of NATO – that of military security. As has been pointed out in preceding chapters, the Federal Republic was keen on establishing a strong connection between the CSCE and MBFR. In 1971–72, this aim was vigorously pursued by the Chancellery. While Brandt acknowledged that the specifics of MBFR needed to be addressed in a separate forum, in his meetings with Brezhnev, Pompidou, Heath and Rogers he consistently raised the importance of including elements of military security on the CSCE agenda. The FRG wanted more from the conference than just normalisation of East–West relations and increased trade – at a conference on security one also needed to talk about security. ‘A general disarmament is the ideal’, Brandt told Brezhnev in September 1971.\(^{241}\) In February 1972, Brandt told Pompidou that the main West German emphasis at the CSCE would be on two points – on the declaration on principles and on the restriction of troop movements.\(^{242}\) In May, Brandt stressed that he fully agreed with Defence Minister Schmidt on the absolute necessity to discuss MBFR at the CSCE.\(^{243}\) All of this contradicts Christoph Bluth’s argument about Brandt losing interest in MBFR after the signature of the Eastern treaties.\(^{244}\)

For Helmut Schmidt, MBFR was particularly important as a Western *quid pro quo* for the Eastern CSCE. As witnessed in the preceding chapter, Schmidt had earlier argued strongly for keeping the two projects separate. Already in November 1971, however, his US colleague reported a complete turnaround in Schmidt’s position. Now the West German Defence Minister saw a combination of the CSCE and MBFR as a valuable means to ensure French participation in MBFR.\(^{245}\) This became apparent in the preparation of the CSCE guidelines of the Federal Government in May 1972. The material prepared by the *Auswärtiges Amt* argued for the need to address ‘certain military aspects of security’, such as principles and criteria for MBFR, at a CSCE.\(^{246}\) This was not sufficient for Schmidt, who insisted on a last-minute amendment of a more substantial section on MBFR in the guidelines. Scheel accepted this, but pointed out that other NATO members were unlikely to agree to a closer connection between the CSCE and MBFR.\(^{247}\)
On the working level, the US and France had long been the main opponents of establishing a link between the CSCE and MBFR. Ironically, their motives for this were the reverse of each other – whereas the US was sceptical of the CSCE, France resisted the idea of MBFR altogether. The West German counterargument was that the inclusion of elements of military security on the CSCE agenda would help to avoid the creation of a ‘false sense of security’, resting only on Soviet promises, the renunciation of force and recognition of borders. In March 1972, first signs appeared that the French might after all be willing to accept the discussion of ‘secondary security policy measures’ at a CSCE. But the US and West German positions remained far apart.

This was reflected in the SPC report on the CSCE in May. References in the report to MBFR and confidence-building measures were all extremely non-committal and merely ‘illustrative’ in nature, and there was no agreement on a possible joint MBFR declaration to be issued at the conference. Nevertheless, the West German NATO Ambassador was confident that consensus on the inclusion of confidence-building measures on the CSCE agenda was within reach. Accordingly, Scheel continued to push for this in the NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting at the end of May 1972. Scheel pointed out that the Western governments needed to avoid any euphoric tendencies and impressions that the CSCE would make it possible for the West to relax its defence efforts. MBFR and the CSCE should be firmly linked together, and elements of military security needed to be discussed in the CSCE.

After the meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers, the Auswärtiges Amt noted with satisfaction that the formulations in the final communiqué, referring to ‘the examination at a CSCE of appropriate measures, including certain military measures, aimed at strengthening confidence and increasing stability’ was sufficient to meet the West German demands to have elements of military security discussed at the CSCE. And indeed, in September 1972 NATO members agreed that advance notification of troop movements and manoeuvres as well as exchange of observers were suitable confidence-building measures to be taken up at the CSCE. Although differences in opinion between member states still remained on the agenda and guidelines papers for these confidence-building measures, circulated in October, the Federal Republic had successfully managed to include military elements on NATO’s CSCE agenda.

This was to a large extent due to the persistence of the Chancellery, which by now considered MBFR to be the decisive forum of détente. When Bahr visited Moscow in October 1972, his discussions with Brezhnev and Gromyko, as far as they dealt with the CSCE, were exclusively about the
relationship of the CSCE and MBFR. In Bahr’s view, it was MBFR that was concretely about détente and about safeguarding peace.

Détente in Europe cannot be solved at a CSCE, because it cannot be done without the reduction of the military potential. … The improvement of the political atmosphere will make practical decisions in the military area possible. But if these practical decisions do not follow, the political atmosphere will take a turn for the worse again.257

On a more tactical note, Bahr saw the role of the CSCE in this as giving all interested participants an opportunity to have their say about issues of military security. That would in turn make it easier to discuss the hard MBFR issues in a separate, smaller circle.258 This argument had been put forward by the MBFR unit in the Auswärtiges Amt for some time. If the smaller NATO allies, as well as neutral and non-aligned countries, were given the impression that they were not excluded from the development of security policy in Europe, it would be easier de facto to exclude them from the actual MBFR negotiations.259

The strong emphasis given to MBFR in the Chancellery was also visible in Brandt’s reluctance to address one of the quintessential questions of the CSCE, freer movement, in his discussions with Allies. Although his UK and US interlocutors brought up the topic and the issue figured prominently in the speaking notes prepared for Brandt, he preferred to focus on other CSCE issues – cultural relations and the environment on the one hand, and military security on the other.260 On the working level in the Auswärtiges Amt, however, the question of freer movement could not be avoided.

**Freer Movement: Change through Rapprochement?**

Speaking to a Social Democratic audience in February 1972, State Secretary Frank pointed out that while the general CSCE policy of the FRG consisted of avoiding changes to the *modus vivendi* and of striving for more security, cooperation and freedom of movement in Europe, the ‘egoistic core’ of that policy was the improvement of inner-German relations.261 Nowhere was this more apparent than in the field of freer movement. In addition to the Deutschlandpolitik connection, freer movement is also an illustrative example of the overall CSCE tactics of the Federal Republic, a cautious approach emphasising long-term evolution instead of short-term revolution.

In the spring of 1972, the correct way to approach freedom of movement in the CSCE framework became a particularly important issue for the FRG. Already at the end of 1971, the Auswärtiges Amt began to pay more attention to the freer movement elements in the CSCE as a potential
development with direct repercussions for Deutschlandpolitik. Agreements on freedom of movement on the European level could turn out to facilitate the desired ‘human relief’ (menschliche Erleichterungen) – the small improvements in people’s daily lives which had been outlined in the Brandt-Stoph meeting in Kassel in 1970 – in the inner-German relationship.\(^{262}\)

It was precisely this special relevance for the inner-German situation that led the Federal Republic to argue for a non-confrontational tactical approach in the freer movement question. In the West German view, maximum freedom of movement of people, ideas and information in Europe was an essential long-term goal but one which could only be achieved after a long and probably difficult process. A debate on the principles of freedom of movement at the outset of a CSCE could endanger the whole East–West dialogue. Instead, an improvement of cooperation one step at a time, beginning with concrete issues where agreement was conceivable, was seen as the most promising route to greater freedom of movement in all areas in the long run.\(^{263}\)

In January 1972, when challenged by the US, the Auswärtiges Amt defended this position adamantly. The US embassy in Bonn reported that the West Germans ‘stressed their preference for limiting freer movement to cultural exchange at this point, arguing that this served their particular interests vis-à-vis the GDR’. Interestingly, the FRG officials had also expressed their concern that the GDR could use any ‘lowest common denominator’ resolutions on freer movement at a CSCE as a ‘maximum threshold’ in the inner-German relationship.\(^{264}\)

The budding controversy with the US over this issue was certainly behind the German decision to begin also addressing it in the EPC framework. In early January 1972 Jürgen Diesel, a deputy head of the political department of the Auswärtiges Amt, had stressed that agenda items related to freer movement should be discussed primarily in NATO.\(^{265}\) But leading the West German delegation in the meeting of the EPC sous-comité a week later, Diesel spoke in favour of an intensive discussion of freer movement within the EPC, since NATO had so far not been able to agree on the approach to adopt. At least the Six should speak with one voice on this issue in the NATO framework. Due to its special importance for the inner-German relationship, the topic should not be discredited by introducing controversial questions such as radio jamming or exit visas at the beginning of the CSCE. Instead, cautiousness and patience were called for. Diesel also promised that a West German working paper on freer movement would be prepared in the near future for discussion in the EPC – before its submission to NATO.\(^{266}\) As the EPC deliberations continued in February, the French joined the FRG in arguing that the West should not propose freer movement as a specific agenda item of the CSCE. Rather than confronting

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the East with that topic early on, it would be better to seek improvements piecemeal when negotiating about cooperation in particular fields.  

For the US, the development of the West German position was worrying. The idea of a working paper on freer movement and cultural relations was a further sign of a continued West German ‘effort to de-emphasize freer movement and stress cultural relations’.  

These worries grew during the spring of 1972, although the West Germans gave assurances that the FRG did not wish to remove freer movement from the CSCE agenda. Officials in Bonn argued that it was in the West German interest to have freer movement as a key element of the Western position at the conference – but the best way to do it was to highlight freer movement in the general umbrella declaration on principles and then supplement it by more specific references in each of the various sections on cooperation.  

The US officials were not convinced. The West German position had been marked by ‘hesitation and ambiguity’ to begin with, and was now moving to an even softer direction. If the FRG was prepared to drop freer movement as a specific agenda item altogether, it would put it in direct opposition to the US, which had ‘consistently emphasized concrete issues, not vague declarations’.  

Visiting Washington, von Staden maintained that the US, France and the FRG were in complete agreement on substance, only disagreeing on the question of procedures. Although the question of freedom of movement was a problem in every aspect of a CSCE, von Staden argued that at the conference ‘one should start with things that can be done and follow a step-by-step approach’.  

This negotiating approach was something that the FRG argued for across the board. Starting with maximum Western demands of comprehensive scope would be ‘very off-putting to the Soviet side and perhaps lead to negative results’. Instead, the West Germans wanted to begin the conference by keeping options as open as possible. In the British analysis this line resembled the negotiating technique of Bahr, who liked to operate ‘from a position of fluidity’. The UK embassy saw this ‘Bahr flavour’, now prevalent in the Auswärtiges Amt, as aiming ‘to engage in negotiations, to avoid frightening the other side, to see what emerges, and to be committed to pursuing only that which emerges’. Fascinatingly, in the CSCE context the West Germans were implementing this non-controversial tactical method on two levels – first within the West in order to have NATO then adopt the method for the East–West talks. Intended as criticism of Bahr, these British observations are astonishingly accurate descriptions of the West German approach.

But the reluctance of the FRG to openly confront the Soviet Union on freer movement was also motivated by a perception of its limited abilities to actively promote change. Publicly, the Federal Government stressed the
positive prospects of an evolutionary development opened up by a CSCE and the principle that an improvement of the situation in divided Europe needed to improve the situation of the divided German nation.\textsuperscript{275} But behind the scenes, the West Germans were ‘very conscious of the dangers which might arise if the FRG appeared to be putting German policy before European policy’.\textsuperscript{276}

And appearances aside, West German leverage was perceived to be limited. This is strikingly clear in a memorandum von Staden sent to Frank in mid-March 1972, worth quoting at length. Although von Staden concluded the passage with a reference to reunification, ‘hoping for long-term changes possibly making it look conceivable’ was hardly a statement for an active policy towards that end. Rather, it was about coming to terms with the status quo that prevailed:

> Neither the economic nor the political (let alone the military) potential of the Federal Republic allows us to strive for a change in the political landscape in Central and Eastern Europe. In this respect we have to be static. Therefore, in the relationship to the East and particularly the Soviet Union, we have set ourselves the goal[s], 1) to mitigate the situation in Europe and to make peace more secure through renunciation-of-force treaties and the Berlin arrangement, and 2) to create a climate of security in Europe …, in the hope that 3) long-term changes could relativise systemic antagonisms and make reunification appear conceivable.\textsuperscript{277}

Implementing this combination of tactics and strategy on the working level, and encouraged by first experiences from handling the issue in the EPC, the West Germans submitted an updated position paper on freer movement to the EPC sous-comité in March 1972 – over two weeks before tabling the same document in NATO. More explicitly than before, the paper made the argument for the exceptional position of the FRG:

> Inadequate freedom of movement is the number one problem of our divided country. It is particularly in this field that it will have to be seen to what extent détente to which we want to contribute with our policy can become a reality. Therefore, none of the other countries participating in a CSCE is so directly affected as the Federal Republic of Germany by the discussion of ‘freer movement’ at the conference.\textsuperscript{278}

The paper went on to argue that freer movement was a significant basic element for any real progress in the East-West relationship – and \textit{vice versa}, progress in the freedom of movement was the most important and concrete yardstick for the achievements in détente and cooperation. Precisely because of the importance of the issue, the West Germans argued, it was essential for the West to approach it in as effective a manner as possible. Instead of confronting the East with rigid demands and ‘spectacular
moves’, the West ought to develop a long-term concept with prospects of tangible and practical results. Rather than focusing on a potentially provocative separate declaration on freer movement, the West would be better advised to include the topic in a general declaration of principles as well as to ensure that the principle of freer movement was an integral part of all areas of East–West cooperation.279

After a lively discussion in the EPC sous-comité, the West German approach found relatively broad support. Most of the EPC members agreed that by formulating the CSCE agenda so as to make it acceptable to the East, the West would also be able to speak freely about freer movement at the conference. In contrast, a polemical approach during the preparations could lead to the complete exclusion of the issue from the CSCE. The West Germans, in turn, supported the French proposal, according to which the freer movement items should be referred to as ‘cultural cooperation, development of contacts between persons and dissemination of information’.280

After the EPC meeting, the West Germans were confident that common ground could be found in the NATO framework.281 But as it turned out, the controversy with the US was anything but over. In late March, the US mission to NATO reported of a ‘potentially troublesome development’ in the EPC, regarding the French proposal to change the titles of the freer movement items. A member of the West German NATO delegation aggravated the situation, constantly telling his US and UK colleagues privately that he felt the instructions from Bonn to support the French in this were misguided, and even encouraging the Allies to lobby Bonn to change the West German position.282

The official West German position presented in NATO, arguing for the need to avoid polemics, led to consternation not only in Washington, but also in the Netherlands and the UK. The Dutch argued that there was ‘no need for us to treat the other side with kid gloves – they would certainly not pull their punches’.283 The British, who referred to the West German position as ‘feebleness’ and ‘an exceedingly wet line’, tried to figure out the motives behind it. ‘It may be that something more substantial (e.g. the hope of some special advantage in inner-German relations) lies behind this attitude. But if so the Germans have not brought their allies into the secret.’284 Later, van Well suggested to a US diplomat in Bonn that supporting the French in the question of the titles of the freer movement items had been a tactical decision, an attempt to pull France deeper into the concept of NATO instead of Franco-Soviet bilateralism.285 This, of course, may have been just a convenient explanation to give to the Americans in order to calm them down.

Nonetheless, apparently the West German effort to win over the EPC members before addressing the issue in NATO had not been such a com-
plete success as the FRG had thought. On 7 April, the West Germans finally circulated their freer movement working paper in NATO. For the US, it confirmed their worst fears about West German willingness to drop freer movement as an agenda item at the CSCE. The stalemate in NATO was further exacerbated by the West German decision to express their reservations on the title as well as the contents of an agenda paper on freer movement circulated by the international secretariat. In a Council meeting on 25 April, the disagreements were voiced more loudly than before, the West German Ambassador favouring as neutral a wording as possible, and the US Ambassador warning the Alliance of the consequences of backing away from its own insistence to deal with freer movement at the CSCE.

In a handwritten remark on the West German report from the meeting, von Groll noted that there was a need for new instructions, stressing that nobody in Bonn wanted to remove the freer movement items from the agenda or reduce their importance. Instead, the question was only about the right way in which to present these issues.

We want to avoid a confrontation in the multilateral preparations, to formulate the topics under the title ‘freedom of movement’ for the agenda in such a way that the other side can also agree to them – otherwise there is a risk that the items will not appear on the agenda at all.

To overcome the difficulties with the US, von Groll’s unit in the Auswärtiges Amt argued that it would be useful to convince the US of the positive broad impact the CSCE would have on détente – on NATO as well as on Deutschlandpolitik. In a further effort to mend fences, the US and the FRG agreed that they would improve their advance consultations on CSCE matters, to avoid situations where the West Germans supported positions known to diverge from US ones without previous warning. In their contacts with the US delegation in Bonn, West German officials continued to emphasise that the freer movement issue ‘should be the centerpiece of discussion at the conference itself, although presented in a non-polemical manner’.

The Auswärtiges Amt also increasingly highlighted the importance of the inner-German aspect of freer movement. Although the FRG wanted to avoid the appearance of pushing purely its own national interests in NATO, it was in repercussions for inner-German relations that the Federal Republic was primarily interested. Concrete progress in the area of freer movement in the CSCE could produce provisions with a binding effect on the GDR, in turn helping to improve the conditions for movement of people between the two parts of Germany. This was the main reason why Bonn wanted to have the topic introduced in a non-controversial manner at the CSCE. ‘It was simply too important to the FRG for it to be handled in
any polemical fashion.’²⁹³ Because of the connection with Deutschlandpoli-
tik, the Federal Republic considered even the smallest of improvements in
the field of freedom of movement to be better than none at all.²⁹⁴

Moreover, the West Germans were apparently serious about the sem-
tantics concerning the freer movement items. Reflecting the discussion
in the EPC and NATO, there were last-minute changes in the language on
freer movement in the CSCE guidelines of the Federal Government. The
original versions proposed by the Auswärtiges Amt had still referred to
‘freedom of movement’.²⁹⁵ But on 12 May, the relevant sections in the final
version were replaced with ‘improvement of communication’.²⁹⁶

This question was again addressed in the NATO Council on 10 May.
The US and the Netherlands argued for maintaining the old titles of freer
movement, whereas France and the FRG, this time supported by the UK
and Denmark, called for a less polemical compromise formula, which
would also be acceptable to the East – ‘development of contacts between
persons’ rather than ‘freer movement of people’, ‘expansion of the dis-
semination of information’ rather than ‘freer movement of ideas’. The dis-
agreement between the two camps remained unresolved.²⁹⁷

These disagreements notwithstanding, the freer movement dossiers of
the SPC report in May did identify a number of specific measures to be
covered at the CSCE. Many of these measures also held direct promises
for the inner-German relationship, in particular the ‘removal of arbitrary
obstacles to the exit of individuals and their families’ and the ‘lifting of
restrictions on marriage and the reuniting of families’. Suiting the prefer-
ences of the Federal Republic, the need for a gradual approach was under-
lined. The report also recognised certain limits to which it would be best
to adhere:

Not included in the list of measures … is the dismantling of the Berlin Wall,
largely because the Allies believe it would be counter-productive to make such
a far-reaching proposal during initial multilateral talks. Partly for public opin-
ion purposes, however, the Allies will not wish to overlook the existence of the
Berlin Wall, the East’s most graphic and best-known barrier to freer movement
of people.

The NATO dossier on the freer movement of ideas and information
also strikingly resembled the West German approach, particularly this
observation:

[T]he Allies will need to pursue this proposal with particular sensitivity and
a good sense of timing, bearing in mind Western public opinion which will
expect us to emphasize the importance of freedom of information. A frontal at-
tack on these repressive practices internally within the East would be unlikely
to produce any favourable results. On the other hand, a long-term campaign
of quiet persuasion, suggesting a few modest steps … to bring the Eastern external practices more in line with generally accepted international behaviour, could lead to significant improvements over the present situation.298

But the question of the titles for the freer movement items on the CSCE agenda was a persistent one. The EPC Political Committee invited the Foreign Ministers to take a stand on the issue in their meeting at the end of May. The West German compromise solution was to maintain the formulation ‘freer movement’ in the catalogue of principles under general human rights and individual basic freedoms, but to use ‘development of contacts’ on the conference agenda and in the titles of the CSCE commissions. No resolution was found, however, and the question was moved on to the NATO Foreign Ministers.299

Prior to the ministerial meeting of NATO, the US had clearly understood Bonn’s argument on avoiding unnecessary polemics on freer movement because of the potential value of the item for the inner-German relationship.300 But this did not change the US view. Secretary of State Rogers underlined that ‘for NATO to compromise on this issue in form or substance and to do so on its own initiative would weaken the Western position on its most advantageous issue in CSCE before the conference even started.’ Rogers himself planned to press Scheel on this at the quadripartite dinner before the Foreign Ministers’ meeting.301

But Scheel was not prepared to change the West German position. In his speech at the NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting, Scheel underscored that the crucial importance of freer movement, particularly for the FRG, was the reason why it should be ‘discussed as realistically as possible with the aim of securing practical improvements, not as a philosophical dispute’. Insisting on the inclusion of a controversial agenda item on freer movement would be tactically unwise.302

Since both the FRG and the US were persistent in their positions, the question of freer movement remained controversial all the way to the autumn of 1972. On the bilateral West German-US level, during Henry Kissinger’s visit to the Olympic Games in Munich, Scheel and Frank tried to convince him that the West German ‘objective was not to lose the substance but to avoid formulation of the agenda item in such a way as to make it ipso facto unacceptable to the Eastern side’.303

But no agreement was found. As a result, NATO had to enter the MPT without an agreed tactical position on freer movement. The two dossiers on freer movement from May 1972 were not updated in the run-up to the multilateral preparations, and the NATO steering brief for the MPT, issued on 7 November, explicitly referred to internal divisions within the West in this context.304 Consequently, NATO negotiations about the suitable line continued during the Dipoli talks. While this may have been harmful
for the cohesion of the Alliance, it did prevent the worst-case scenario of the FRG – an East–West confrontation about freer movement at the very beginning of the conference preparations. As the CSCE negotiations got under way, the West Germans were able to keep alive their idea of a long-term evolutionary approach to the improvement of personal contacts.

**Berlin as a CSCE Location?**

If one searches for case studies reflecting the pursuit of West German national interests in the CSCE preparations, German as the official conference language as well as the seating order at the conference are two obvious – and illuminating – examples. Here I will highlight a third, less known element. A particularly intriguing case in West German CSCE deliberations was the idea of finding a role for Berlin as a CSCE location, either for hosting parts of the actual conference or as a site for a possible permanent body established for the follow-up of the CSCE.

As has been pointed out in Chapter 2 above, Egon Bahr had already in the summer of 1968 toyed with the idea of having the organs of a ‘pan-European security system’ seated in Berlin. Over two years later, in November 1970, the idea surfaced for the first time in the CSCE context, when Bahr, meeting the Romanian Deputy Foreign Minister, suddenly suggested that hosting a permanent CSCE secretariat in Berlin might be a good idea. When asked in which part of the city, Bahr replied: ‘both’.

Later on, the idea was picked up by the US. In March 1971, Secretary of State Rogers raised Berlin as a potentially attractive CSCE site from the Western point of view. Berlin could offer psychological compensation for the gains otherwise made by the East in the conference. Rogers stressed that before tabling the idea in NATO, the issue should be discussed in the Bonn Group. The US embassy in Bonn was instructed accordingly, and in the Bonn Group meeting on 29 April 1971 all participants agreed that the idea of a CSCE in Berlin, hosted by the Berlin Senate, was worth considering. Von Groll, whom the US embassy had kept well informed in advance, saw the idea in a positive light, but argued that for the time being it was best not to include the non-members of the Bonn Group in the discussion.

This American initiative had focused on the site of the actual conference. But during Brandt’s visit to Washington in June 1971, Bahr returned to his thought of Berlin hosting a permanent body created by the CSCE. Bahr asked for US support for this idea, which would give the city ‘a much needed boost’. The State Department was happy to back the idea, but had doubts of its chances of being approved by the Soviet Union.
handwritten notes for the Crimean meeting with Brezhnev in September 1971 suggest that he had at least been prepared to discuss the idea of Berlin as a site for the permanent body. However, no reference to this issue is made in the official West German protocol of the meeting.

Although it would be an overstatement to speak about a campaign in favour of it, in the autumn of 1971 Berlin as a CSCE site was certainly given serious consideration in Bonn – and in Berlin. During his visit to Paris in October, Horst Grabert, the SPD Senator from West Berlin, suggested his city as a potential site either for the CSCE or a follow-up organisation. The French Foreign Minister Schumann reacted with interest but noted that the choice of Berlin might send unwanted signals concerning the status of the city, referring to the potential in claiming its neutral character.

In the official Auswärtiges Amt view, the whole question of the establishment of a permanent body was premature in the autumn of 1971. The issue should only be addressed in due time at the conference itself. But regarding the possibility of Berlin as a venue for the conference or parts of it, the German Foreign Ministry was divided. For Blech’s Deutschlandpolitik unit, the idea was dubious from the start. Although it could bring much needed prestige for the city, the identity of the actual host would be anything but clear. Instead of the FRG, the Three Powers – or even the Four, including the Soviet Union – would be legally responsible for it. This would unnecessarily underline the special status of Berlin and the limited sovereignty of the FRG. Since the idea of sharing the meetings between East and West Berlin was unlikely to succeed, the choice of West Berlin alone could additionally be interpreted as a sign of it being a neutral island, rather than comparable to ‘normal’ cities of the Federal Republic.

But Blech’s views were contradicted by von Groll. The head of the CSCE unit in the Auswärtiges Amt saw several advantages in holding a part of the CSCE in Berlin – beyond the mere prestige impact it could also ensure correct East German behaviour at the CSCE and increase the overall chances to overcome the division of the city. Von Groll admitted that Berlin was hardly suitable for a spectacular opening of the CSCE, but could well be considered as a site for some of the commissions working on specific items or as the location of a permanent body.

State Secretary Frank followed von Groll’s suggestion and raised this on his visit to the United States in November 1971. At the end of a discussion at the State Department, Frank offered Berlin, but this time only the Western half of the city, as the location of a permanent machinery of the CSCE. In Frank’s view, West Berlin was still also a suitable candidate for the CSCE proper, as an alternative to Helsinki and Geneva. In December, however, von Groll noted that Helsinki was de facto already chosen to be the site of the MPT, whereas Vienna and Geneva were the leading
candidates for the CSCE proper. Although von Groll stressed that the viability of Berlin as an alternative location should be carefully analysed, the idea seemed to die down.317

Enter Egon Bahr. In March 1972, commenting on a Chancellery memorandum on the CSCE state of play, Bahr was disappointed to see that the West German interest in a permanent body to be established by the CSCE was not mentioned. In response, the author of the memorandum referred to an Auswärtiges Amt paper on the continuation of the East–West dialogue after a CSCE, which had been delivered as a West German contribution to the EPC in late February. This paper had decisively opposed the establishment of a single permanent body by the CSCE, since it would prematurely set the new West European institutions in competition with a pan-European body.318

Bahr was not satisfied, and suggested to the Auswärtiges Amt that he should meet with State Secretary Frank to settle the differences. Bahr stressed that a permanent secretariat would be necessary for a continued East–West dialogue after the CSCE. The character of such an East–West mechanism would by its very nature, and due to the participation of the US and Canada, not threaten the institutions of the EC. Moreover, Bahr underscored, the FRG had ‘an interest in getting such a secretariat to Berlin’.319

In his response, von Staden argued that whereas the Auswärtiges Amt was not in principle against establishing a permanent machinery, such a decision should only be taken further down the road, not before it had been established that Western agenda interests were sufficiently represented at the conference.320 Internally, von Staden also expressed his concern at being committed by a premature declaration of willingness to have a possible secretariat in Berlin.321 Accompanying von Staden in Washington, von Groll told his interlocutors that the FRG strongly favoured the existing Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) as the forum for post-CSCE discussion on East–West cooperation, rather than any new permanent machinery established by the CSCE.322

But Bahr insisted adamantly on Berlin as a site for the possible permanent body. When the early versions of the cabinet presentation on the CSCE guidelines were discussed within the administration in April 1972, Bahr made sure that the Chancellery expressed its reservations accordingly. In general, the Chancellery admitted that there was widespread resistance in the West against establishing new institutions. Nonetheless, it argued, some commissions with limited mandates could continue their work after the CSCE, and Berlin should be an option for hosting them.323 Due to the Chancellery intervention, the option of offering Berlin as a location for a possible follow-up institution was explicitly kept open in the final version of the CSCE guidelines.324
The main problem with the candidacy of Berlin was that the general idea of a permanent follow-up institution of a CSCE had at that time no support at all in the West, neither in the EPC nor in NATO. The allies of the FRG saw a permanent body merely as an opportunity for the Soviet Union to meddle in West European affairs. Faced with this situation, von Staden argued in late May 1972 that it would be senseless to continue insisting on such an institution. Slowly, thus, the Berlin idea began to evaporate from the active CSCE policy of the FRG. The conclusion of the Berlin Agreement also played a role here. In retrospect, Bahr explained that Berlin as a CSCE site would have helped to stabilise the city politically. When the quadripartite agreement entered into force, this need for additional stabilisation receded.

Nonetheless, after a new Soviet proposal in October 1972 the question of a permanent body was suddenly again on the agenda. The Auswärtiges Amt was quick to remark that in return for Eastern concessions in other CSCE areas, the West would probably have to reconsider its position in this issue. Von Staden stressed that the West German attitude towards a permanent body was among the most positive ones in the West – not least due to certain national interests concerning the location of such a follow-up organisation. When the Federal Republic entered the CSCE, the Berlin option continued to be available for use in case it was needed.

Avoiding Bilateralism

As we have seen in this chapter, during the years 1971–72 the West German CSCE policy became a truly multilateral affair, diverging on several separate yet parallel routes. The development of the Western CSCE preparations in this increasingly multilateral direction had obviously served the West Germans well. It gave the FRG the opportunity to approach their allies on the most suitable forum and in the most advantageous constellation, depending on the issue. But although a large amount of West German CSCE policy was issue-driven in this sense, there was also an interesting, overarching line of thinking in Bonn, which saw multilateralism as a value in its own right.

The rapid increase in West German CSCE activity on all multilateral fronts was no coincidence. Towards the end of 1971, the Auswärtiges Amt began to see an inherent value in dealing with European questions on a multilateral level. The essential questions of security and cooperation, such as MBFR, principles of relations between states, and freer movement, were already on the European agenda – with or without a CSCE. Without a CSCE, the risk of a dynamic ‘multiplication of East–West bilateralism’ to
tackle these issues was on the rise.\textsuperscript{329} The CSCE was a means to steer and limit this development and replace it with an approach that better suited the West German concept – that of controlled and gradual change, with the necessary degree of adaptation.\textsuperscript{330} Interestingly, the White House also made similar calculations on the risks of rising bilateralism in the autumn of 1971. To avoid that development, Helmut Sonnenfeldt recommended that the US should be prepared to take the risks inherent in the CSCE, the conference Sonnenfeldt himself referred to as ‘the entire ghastly affair’.\textsuperscript{331}

For the West Germans, the CSCE opened anything but ghastly perspectives. Instead, having to a large extent exhausted its bilateral options to promote détente, aiming at joint solutions was the best way forward. In November 1971, this led to a disagreement with the French about the nature of the NATO study on CSCE negotiation approaches. Whereas the French considered the study to have merely an illustrative character, the FRG insisted on developing a common Alliance position for the conference.\textsuperscript{332} France insisted on its view that the SPC could only formulate ‘examples’ of Alliance positions, against the US and West German views calling for genuinely harmonised joint NATO positions.\textsuperscript{333}

In the West German view, leadership from the Federal Republic was urgently needed to steer the NATO discussion towards agreed positions. The alternative, individual French, US and UK policies at the CSCE, would make it extremely difficult to defend West German interests in a complicated multilateral conference. Common NATO negotiating positions, coordinated and harmonised as far as possible, were in the West German interest. Naturally, essential interests of individual member states should be respected – such as the modus vivendi character of the Ostpolitik of the FRG.\textsuperscript{334}

In January 1972, the US proposed that work should be started on drafting general ‘agenda papers’, combining Allied views on each issue potentially on the CSCE agenda, in order to arrive at common Alliance positions in the CSCE. The FRG considered this to be a time-consuming approach and would rather have seen the SPC directly drafting formal texts of CSCE declarations and agreements, since this would have been a more efficient way towards common positions.\textsuperscript{335} As a compromise, the SPC decided to address the open questions with a mix of guideline papers, agenda papers and, where appropriate, specific draft texts of declarations.\textsuperscript{336}

West German reservations about the concept of ‘agenda papers’ continued all the way until the spring.\textsuperscript{337} In late April, the West Germans maintained their general reserve on all of the agenda papers annexed to the SPC report on the CSCE, because the contents of the more operative guideline papers were still unclear. In fact, the West Germans argued that the NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting in late May should reach agreement on the guideline papers and issue a separate declaration setting out the basic
views of NATO on the CSCE. The British FCO considered this to be ‘a very bad idea’: firstly, since such a document would be considered prematurely as the opening bid of the West at the conference, unnecessarily tying their hands before the negotiations had even started; and secondly, because such an Allied consensus would be extremely difficult to arrive at.338

In the Auswärtiges Amt, the idea of a separate CSCE declaration of NATO Foreign Ministers was taken seriously. In early May 1972, von Groll drafted a proposal for such a declaration, based on the West German CSCE guidelines soon to be presented to the cabinet. The text of the declaration ran along familiar West German lines, presenting the CSCE as a first step of a long-term development rather than as a static element.339 But in the end, lack of support for such a declaration forced the FRG to give up the idea before the Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Bonn. At the same time, the West Germans also lifted their general reservation on the concept of agenda papers, although maintaining their preference for the adoption of NATO guideline papers, to be seen as binding background documents.340

The SPC report in May 1972 for the first time raised the idea of a ‘steering brief’ of the Alliance, possibly serving as guidance on tactical considerations in the negotiations.341 The Auswärtiges Amt was enthusiastically in favour of this. For such a steering brief, the West Germans argued, it was important to formulate negotiating positions in a fashion that would represent the essential Western interests while at the same time avoiding counter-productive provocations and confrontations.342 In bilateral contacts with the French, the FRG tried to sell the idea of unified Western positions at the CSCE. From the West German perspective, that was particularly important in the case of the declaration on principles, where a joint draft text, agreed by all NATO members, would be an extremely useful point of reference in the negotiations. If the West were to enter the conference without precise expectations and with conflicting opinions, the whole endeavour would be too risky. ‘We need to agree on a common line to take. In view of the multilateral preparations, we need to be clear on what we can or cannot say’, von Staden argued. But the French were adamant, refusing to agree to binding joint positions, let alone common texts.343

In late May, Scheel strongly urged his NATO colleagues to work out a common negotiating position for the multilateral CSCE preparations.344 This had become a central characteristic of the West German CSCE approach. Accordingly, when the Auswärtiges Amt in June 1972 listed five operative priorities in the preparation of the multilateral talks, Western coordination, as comprehensively as possible, was on the top of the list. The three following priorities were the usual suspects: a catalogue of principles reflecting the specific Deutschlandpolitik interests of the FRG; mili-
tary aspects of security; and communication and exchange, the by now established euphemism for freer movement. Interestingly, the final point on the list signposted the protection of the role of the European Community at the conference as a particular West German priority.345

The role of the EC, and particularly that of the Commission, had been the subject of a long tug-of-war between the FRG and France in the EPC. In the West German view, East–West cooperation could only be successful if the EC participated in the discussion appropriately from the beginning. Whenever the recommendations and decisions issued by the CSCE touched on EC competences, the Community should be represented by the member state holding the Council Presidency.346 The French stubbornly resisted this for a long time as an excessive signal of communality. Finally, in October 1972 the French indicated willingness for a more constructive approach, as they made a proposal for the CSCE agenda, to be agreed as a common EPC position. For the FRG, this was a breakthrough, testifying to the ability of the EPC to arrive at harmonised positions.347

There were also limits to the West German enthusiasm for the EPC. In September 1972 von Staden stressed that one should not move too many elements of the CSCE preparations to the EPC at the expense of NATO, for a simple reason. ‘Our most important ally is not a member of the Ten.’348 On the other hand, von Groll argued that the CSCE preparations in NATO and in the EPC had had a positive impact on the general nature of the US-West German relationship. ‘The Federal Republic is, more than before, valued by the US as an independent and mature partner and an important member in the EC. … The US increasingly sees the Federal Government as the main representative of its interests within the EC.’349 Indeed, the disagreements over freer movement and the tactical CSCE approach had not prevented the development of a more balanced US-West German partnership within the multilateral framework. Rather, the more assertive West German posture, supported by the role of the FRG as a mediator between the EPC and NATO, had probably contributed to it.

But no amount of West German mediation could erase the inherent tension between the EPC and NATO, which flared up again only a few days before the MPT in Helsinki. The Nine finally found common ground on the CSCE agenda proposed in the latest reports of the sous-comité and the ad hoc group.350 But when the EPC members presented their report to the NATO Council on 17 November, it resulted in very sharp exchanges of opinion, with the non-EPC members arguing that the EPC paper deviated from preceding NATO agreements, particularly in the case of freer movement.351 The EPC was therefore once again a step ahead of NATO. As far as the CSCE agenda went, NATO had to enter the MPT in Helsinki without a consolidated position.
Concerning the ability of NATO to reach common CSCE positions in the autumn of 1972, the first genuine test was the disclaimer text regarding the participation of the GDR. In August, the Bonn Group agreed to attempt to persuade other NATO members also to use the disclaimer language in their responses to the Finnish MPT invitation. In October, this disclaimer text, stating that ‘the acceptance of the invitation or participation does not affect the legal position that [the Government] has hitherto adopted in questions arising out of the special situation in Germany’, was finalised in the Bonn Group and presented to the other NATO allies.

After the Finns had extended their invitations on 9 November, however, the Scandinavian NATO members slipped away from the united front, arguing that a reference to the Finnish memorandum of November 1970 would be sufficient and that a separate disclaimer was not necessary. On 13 November the other NATO members agreed to use the Bonn Group disclaimer in their responses, but Denmark, Norway and Iceland declined to do so. This ended the discussion in NATO. The Federal Republic formally accepted the Finnish invitation on 14 November, naturally including the disclaimer in its response.

The first version of the NATO steering brief for the multilateral preparatory talks and the CSCE was circulated by the SPC on 7 November 1972. This ten-page paper was an operative document, drafted in order to assist the representatives of NATO members in the multilateral negotiations – but only as a guide, not as a rule. The steering brief left a reasonable amount of flexibility and full freedom for national decision-making for each government, but highlighted the importance of close consultation between the Allies during the negotiations.

More specifically, the steering brief listed three positive and five defensive aims for the West at the conference. The positive aims were: (1) securing genuine improvements in reducing the barriers within Europe; (2) achieving appropriate confidence-building measures relating to the levels of armed forces in Europe; and (3) increasing the freedom of manoeuvre of the East European countries by reducing the scope of the Brezhnev Doctrine. The defensive aims, meanwhile, were: (1) maintaining Western unity; (2) avoiding unjustified reactions undermining public support for necessary defence efforts; (3) persuading Western public opinion of the need for caution at the CSCE; (4) frustrating any attempts to slow down Western European integration; and (5) refuting Soviet concepts of peaceful co-existence and of the inapplicability of principles of equality and non-interference to relations between states with different political and social systems.

On the tactics to be used at the multilateral preparations, the steering brief closely followed the West German preference to see the prepara-
tions as ‘a step-by-step process which is controlled by governments at all times and which does not follow a fixed timetable’. As to the agenda of the CSCE, further study in NATO was still needed, but the document pointed out that it was probably to the Western advantage to propose an agenda based on four areas – (1) questions of security; (2) principles governing relations between states; (3) freer movement and cultural relations; and (4) economic and technological cooperation. In the closer elaboration on the security elements, the reference to a joint declaration on MBFR was bracketed, since consensus on that West German pet project had not been achieved. As far as freer movement was concerned, the steering brief argued strongly for maintaining it as a separate agenda item, in addition to its being included in statements of ministers, in the declaration of principles, and in all other appropriate agenda items.

On 16 November, the NATO Council agreed that the delegations in Helsinki would receive the steering brief as guidance before the Foreign Ministers had discussed it in their December meeting. Moreover, the Council agreed that the coordination of the NATO members’ policies in the MPT would continue not only in Brussels but also on the spot in Helsinki, in an ad hoc ‘open-ended group’.

On the opening day of the multilateral preparations, the NATO Council convened to discuss the draft declaration on principles. Although a considerable amount of time had been spent on its preparation, numerous disagreements remained. The revised version of the draft was circulated on 30 November 1972, superseding the earlier NATO dossiers on principles. This version of the NATO draft for a ‘Declaration on guiding principles for relations between the states attending the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe’ still contained several square brackets, but was the closest thing to a common position the Alliance had so far produced in the CSCE context. There was still work to do, but in terms of avoiding bilateralism, the West Germans had ample reason for satisfaction.

**Conclusion**

By the autumn of 1971, the time when the CSCE could only be regarded as a Soviet propaganda act was definitely over. Since the conference was inevitably going to take place, the West could no longer just ponder defensive reactions to Warsaw Pact initiatives. The CSCE needed to be filled with substantive content, meeting Western interests. In the year leading to the opening of the MPT in Dipoli in November 1972, this was visible in the mounting preparatory work for the CSCE carried out in the West.
With the momentum for the conference growing, prospects for postponing the conference with unilateral linkages rapidly diminished. Accordingly, the Federal Republic decided to settle for the fulfilment of the final multilaterally agreed Western precondition for the CSCE – the conclusion of the Berlin Agreement. Rather than attempting to establish a further precondition for the conference and insisting on a preceding inner-German agreement, the FRG agreed to adapt its bilateral timetable to the multilateral one. Linkage was no longer an option.

Indeed, the decision-makers in Bonn had come to the conclusion that West German interests were most effectively pursued multilaterally, first within the West in preparation of the CSCE, and ultimately in the conference itself. The idea of the CSCE as a long-term process became a guiding principle of the West German approach to the conference. Instead of using the CSCE for polemics in the hope of short-term gains, the Federal Republic wanted to avoid confrontation and engage in cooperation, hoping for small-scale and long-term improvements, not least in the relationship between the two German states. In addition, the accomplishments of bilateral Ostpolitik had to be defended at the conference. The German question needed to be kept open.

Many of the substantive initiatives the Federal Republic made in the Western conference preparations remained unresolved by the time the CSCE participants convened in Finland in November 1972. Over time, however, all of the essential West German ideas found their way into the Helsinki Final Act. In several ways, then, the CSCE was more than a continuation of Ostpolitik by other means. The multilateral CSCE policy was not suddenly invented after the bilateral treaties had been completed – there had been a West German CSCE policy all along. It had gone through an evolution, focusing first on linkage with bilateral negotiations, then on small substantive steps in East–West cooperation and on defending the West German position in the principles governing relations between states. But the essential aim of the West German CSCE policy was constant: it was there to amplify Ostpolitik.

By the onset of the multilateral preparatory talks and the actual conference, the FRG had established itself as a key player within the West. With effective multilateralism, it could influence the position of the Nine and NATO from within. As we will see in the following chapter, its national interests had by no means disappeared. By contrast, when it came to Deutschlandpolitik-related issues at the CSCE, the FRG was now prepared to defend its interests more assertively than before.
Notes

5. Falin had delivered the invitation to Bahr on 1 Sep; the Federal Government made the Chancellor’s acceptance public on 7 Sep 1971. AAPD 1971, doc 301, von Braun (AA) to von Hase (London), Pauls (Washington), Ruete (Paris), 10 Sep 1971.
10. NARA, NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Box 57, Folder 4, Rush (Bonn) to State, 20 Sep 1971.
12. PAAA, B40, 197, IIA4, 9 Sep 1971.
14. On the Finnish ‘German package’ in more detail, see above all Hentilä, Kaksi Saksaa ja Suomi. The suggestion is documented in ULA 1971.
19. NARA, NSC Files, Box H-187, Folder 5, NSSM-138 [2/2], Vest (US NATO) to State, 10 Sep 1971.
22. PAAA, B40, 189, von Groll and Diesel, 16 Sep 1971. See also NARA, RG 59, Box 1706, Vest (US NATO) to State, 29 Sep 1971.
23. AAPD 1971, doc 303, van Well (AA) to Pauls (Washington), 12 Sep 1971. As noted in Chapter 3, Foreign Minister Scheel made a similar suggestion to Gromyko in October 1970, then implying a link between the UN modalities and the multilateral CSCE preparations.
25. PAAA, B150, 238, von Staden to StS, 23 Sep 1971.
27. PAAA, B150, 239, Pfeffer to Dg II B, von Staden, 7 Oct 1971.
28. TNA, FCO 41/888, Jackling (Bonn) to FCO, 27 Sep 1971.
29. PAAA, B150, 238, Blech (AA) to von Staden (Unogerma), 27 Sep 1971; PAAA, B150, 238, von Staden, Gehlhoff (Unogerma) to Blech (AA), 27 Sep 1971.
30. PAAA, B150, 238, Blech (AA) to von Staden (Unogerma), 27 Sep 1971; PAAA, B150, 238, von Staden, Gehlhoff (Unogerma) to Blech (AA), 27 Sep 1971.
32. Brandt, Begegnungen und Einsichten, 510.
37. PAAA, B40, 184, 2 Nov 1971; PAAA, B130, 8404, cabinet meeting, 3 Nov 1971.
41. TNA, FCO 41/892, Audland (Bonn) to James (FCO), 27 Oct 1971. See also NARA, RG 59, Box 1707, Rush (Bonn) to State, 5 Nov 1971.
47. TNA, FCO 41/893, Soames (Paris) to FCO, 17 Nov 1971.
48. TNA, FCO 41/892, Soames (Paris) to FCO, 18 Nov 1971.
52. NARA, NSC Files, Box H-63, Folder 1, SRG Meeting, November 22, 1971, European Security Conference (NSSM 138), Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, 18 Nov 1971.
53. NARA, NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Box 24, Folder 1, Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, 5 Sep 1972.
54. NARA, RG 59, Box 3148, Vest (US NATO) to State, 19 Nov 1971; PAAA, B150, 243, Frank (AA) to Scheel (Moscow), 26 Nov 1971; NARA, Nixon Materials, NSC Files, H-Files, Box H-32, Folder 6, NSC Meeting, CES/MBFR (NATO Ministerial), 12/1/71, HAK Talking Points, 1 Dec 1971; NARA, NSC Files, Box H-32, Folder 6, NSC Meeting, CES/MBFR (NATO Ministerial), 12/1/71, NSSM 138, 1 Dec 1971.
55. NARA, RG 59, Box 3148, Vest (US NATO) to State, 25 Nov 1971.
56. PAAA, B150, 243, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 30 Nov 1971.
57. PAAA, B40, 187, von Groll, 24 Nov 1971. For an earlier reference to von Groll in favour of a more flexible take on the Berlin precondition, see NARA, RG 59, Box 1707, Rush (Bonn) to State, 5 Nov 1971.
58. NARA, RG 59, Box 3148, Vest (US NATO) to State, 25 Nov 1971; NARA, RG 59, Box 1707, Rush (Bonn) to State, 26 Nov 1971; NARA, NSC Files, Box H-187, Folder 5, NSSM-138 [2/2], REUS-42, 3 Dec 1971.
60. TNA, FCO 41/894, Jackling (Bonn) to FCO, 4 Dec 1971.
61. AAPD 1971, doc 422, Pauls (Washington) to AA, meeting Frank-Hillenbrand, 29 Nov 1971.
62. For a convincing US analysis of this domestic German element, see NARA, NSC Files, Box H-187, Folder 5, NSSM-138 [2/2], REUS-42, 3 Dec 1971.
63. PAAA, B150, 244, von Staden to Scheel, 1 Dec 1971; PAAA, B150, 243, von Staden to Scheel, 30 Nov 1971.
64. NARA, NSC Files, Box H-187, Folder 5, NSSM-138 [2/2], REUS-42, 3 Dec 1971.
65. PAAA, B150, 244, van Well (AA) to Natogerma, 2 Dec 1971.
66. See Gill Bennett’s comment in DBPO III/I, 426.
67. TNA, FCO 41/894, Peck (UK NATO) to FCO, 3 Dec 1971.
68. NARA, RG 59 Box 1707, Vest (US NATO) to State, 1 Dec 1971; PAAA, B150, 243, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 30 Nov 1971. See also NARA, RG 59, Box 1707, Watson (Paris) to State, 7 Dec 1971.
70. NARA, RG 59, Box 3148, Rogers to Nixon, 10 Dec 1971.
71. PAAA, B40, 193, von Staden to Frank, 16 Dec 1971.
72. PAAA, B150, 245, Pauls (Washington) to AA, 19 Dec 1971.
74. PA-DBT, 3104 6/3, Prot. 52, 16 Dec 1971.
75. PAAA, B150, 245, Hase (London) to AA, 22 Dec 1971; see also AAPD 1971, doc 452, Sahm, meeting Brandt-Nixon, 29 Dec 1971.
76. ACDP, Nachlass Marx (I-356), K034/2, Marx, 24 Jan 1972.
77. VdDB VI/171, 23 Feb 1972, 9787, 9792.
79. PAAA, B150, 244, Diesel to von Staden, 7 Dec 1971.
80. PAAA, B40, 193, Diesel, 15 Dec 1971; NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 1707, Cash (Bonn) to State, 17 Dec 1971; TNA, FCO 41/894, Stattham (Bonn) to FCO, 16 Dec 1971; PAAA, B28, 109307, Diesel to von Staden, 6 Jan 1972; BArch, B136, 6419 (3), Diesel to Natogerma and other embassies, 17 Jan 1972.
81. TNA, FCO 41/1037, Lever (UK NATO) to Ramsey (FCO), 24 Jan 1972.
82. TNA, FCO 41/1039, Hibbert (Bonn) to Brimelow (FCO), 7 Feb 1972; NARA, RG 59, Box 1708, Rogers (State) to US NATO, Bonn, and other embassies, 8 Feb 1972; TNA, FCO 41/1052, Hibbert (Bonn) to FCO, 9 Feb 1972.
84. TNA, FCO 41/1041, Jackling (Bonn) to FCO, 17 Mar 1972.
86. NARA, RG 59, Box 1708, Cash (Bonn) to State, 21 Mar 1972.
87. NARA, RG 59, Box 1708, Cash (Bonn) to State, 27 Mar 1972.
88. TNA, FCO 41/1070, Jackling (Bonn) to FCO and UK NATO, 10 Apr 1972; see also DBPO III/I, doc 8, Braithwaite (FCO) to Allan (Luxembourg), 25 Apr 1972.
89. To be precise, in the final version of the guidelines the prerequisite was ‘an agreed date for the signature’. AAPD 1972, doc 138, 18 May 1972; PAAA, B150, 253, Scheel to Ehmske, 25 Apr 1972.
90. TNA, FCO 41/969, Thomson (UK NATO) to Tickell (FCO), 19 May 1972.
92. Suomi (ed.), Urho Kekkosen päiväkirjat, 258 (Kekkonen’s diary entry on 31 May 1972).

94. TNA, FCO 41/969, Jackling (Bonn) to FCO, 30 May 1972.

95. AAPD 1971, doc 442, Scheel (Helsinki) to AA, 14 Dec 1971. See also PAAA, B150, 240, Blech to van Well and von Staden, 28 Oct 1971; NARA, RG 59, Box 2264, Folder 4, Vest (US NATO) to State, 8 Nov 1971.


100. UMA, 7B, 11.3, Bilateraaliset keskustelut, Karppinen, 16 Mar 1972.

101. PAAA, B28, 109295, Bazing to planning staff, 26 June 1972.


103. PAAA, B150, 259, von Staden to Frank, 26 July 1972.

104. PAAA, B150, 261, D. Scheel (Helsinki) to AA, 18 Aug 1972.


110. AAPD 1972, doc 184, van Well to embassies, 26 June 1972.

111. BArch, B136, 6420, Hauber (Helsinki) to AA, 21 July 1972; PAAA, B150, 259, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 25 July 1972.

112. PAAA, B28, 109310, Bazing to Diesel, 4 Aug 1972.


117. PAAA, B150, 262, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 6 Sep 1972.

118. PAAA, B150, 262, van Well (AA) to Natogerma, 7 Sep 1972; PAAA, B150, 262, Hillger, 14 Sep 1972.

119. PAAA, B150, 262, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 8 Sep 1972.

120. AAPD 1972, doc 272, van Well (AA) to Natogerma, 13 Sep 1972.

121. PAAA, B150, 263, Derix, 20 Sep 1972.

122. TNA, FCO 41/1047, Thomson (UK NATO) to FCO, 14 Sep 1972.


124. AAPD 1972, doc 366, Frank (AA) to Helsinki, 6 Nov 1972.

125. PAAA, B150, 267, von Staden (AA) to Helsinki, 14 Nov 1972.

126. Author’s interview with Bräutigam. See DzD VI/2.

127. AAPD 1971, doc 303, van Well (AA) to Pauls, 10 Sep 1971 (sent on 12 Sep 1971).


130. TNA, FCO 41/1041, Jackling (Bonn) to FCO, 17 Mar 1972. In fact, the Oslo speech was built around a variety of concepts. In addition to the ‘European peace pact’ Brandt also spoke about the ‘European peace order’, a ‘European partnership for peace’ and even a possible ‘European peace alliance’ (Friedensbund). BWBS, ‘Friedenspolitik in unserer Zeit’, Brandt’s speech in Oslo, 11 Dec 1971.
133. PAAA, B21, 744, von Staden (AA) to embassies, 24 Sep 1971.
135. PAAA, B20, 1601, IIIIE1, 2 Nov 1971.
137. NARA, RG59 (1970–73), Box 1706, Vest (US NATO) to State, 22 Oct 1971.
139. PAAA, B130, 9778, Ruete (Paris) to AA, 15 Nov 1971.
141. PAAA, B150, 241, van Well (AA) to Natogerma, 3 Nov 1971.
142. PAAA, B20, 1601, Trumpf, 11 Nov 1971.
143. PAAA, B40, 184, IIA3, 2 Nov 1971.
144. PAAA, B20, 1601, Herbst, 3 Nov 1971.
147. PAAA, B150, 237, Diesel (AA) to Natogerma, 6 Sep 1971; NARA, RG 59, Box 2264, Folder 3, Vest (US NATO) to State, 8 Sep 1971.
148. NARA, RG 59, Box 1706, Vest (US NATO) to State, 7 Sep 1971.
149. NARA, RG 59, Box 1706, Rush (Bonn) to State, 16 Sep 1971. For Rogers’s instructions, see NARA, RG 59, Box 1706, Rogers (State) to Bonn, 16 Sep 1971.
150. PAAA, B150, 238, IIA3, 17 Sep 1971; AAPD 1971, doc 313, Diesel (AA) to Natogerma, 17 Sep 1971.
151. TNA, FCO 41/897, German Delegation, 21 Sep 1971; NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 2264, Folder 3, Vest (US NATO) to State, 24 Sep 1971.
152. NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 2264, Folder 3, Vest (US NATO) to State, 24 Sep 1971.
153. NARA, RG 59, Box 1706, Cash (Bonn) to State, 14 Oct 1971.
154. PAAA, B150, 238, Boss (Natogerma) to AA, 29 Sep 1971; NARA, RG 59, Box 2264, Folder 3, Vest (US NATO) to State, 29 Sep 1971.
156. NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 2264, Folder 3, Vest (US NATO) to State, 14 Oct 1971.
158. NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 1707, Vest (US NATO) to State, 12 Nov 1971.
162. PAAA, B150, 243, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 24 Nov 1971; PAAA, B150, 243, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 26 Nov 1971; NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 3148, Vest (US NATO) to State, 29 Nov 1971; TNA, FCO 41/894, Peck (UK NATO) to FCO, 29 Nov 1971.
164. PAAA, B150, 243, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 24 Nov 1971; PAAA, B150, 243, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 26 Nov 1971; NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 3148, Vest (US NATO) to State, 29 Nov 1971; TNA, FCO 41/894, Peck (UK NATO) to FCO, 29 Nov 1971.
165. PAAA, B150, 245, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 21 Dec 1971.
167. AAPD 1971, doc 422, Pauls (Washington) to AA, meeting Frank-Hillenbrand, 29 Nov 1971.
168. See Chapter 4 for the idea which the CSCE unit at the Auswärtiges Amt had briefly tossed around a year earlier, of developing a small consultation mechanism for the EPC work on the CSCE, resembling the Bonn Group.
172. Author’s interview with Klaus Blech, 20 Dec 2003.
173. PAAA, B150, 237, von Groll to Dg IIA, IIA1, 13 Sep 1971.
177. NARA, RG59 (1970–73), Box 1706, Rush (Bonn) to State, 29 Oct 1971; TNA, FCO 41/891, Bayne (Bonn) to Ramsey (FCO), 30 Oct 1971.
181. NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 1707, Rush (Bonn) to State, 16 Nov 1971.
185. PAAA, B150, 244, Blech (AA) to Natogerma, 1 Dec 1971; PAAA, B150, 244, van Well (AA) to Natogerma, 3 Dec 1971.
186. AAPD 1971, doc 426, Roth, meeting Frank-Kissinger, 1 Dec 1971.
188. PAAA, B130, 8404, cabinet meeting, 3 Nov 1971.
189. PAAA, B40, 184, IIA3, 2 Nov 1971.
191. PAAA, B150, 244, Blech (AA) to Natogerma, 3 Dec 1971. Peter Becker has also correctly identified this as an important turning point. He attributes the initiative to State Secretary Frank, who was not present in this particular meeting, which was held during Frank’s visit to Washington. Becker, Die frühe KSZE-Politik, 150–1.
192. PAAA, B150, 244, von Staden to DgIIA, IIA3, 3 Dec 1971.
193. PAAA, B28, 109306, von Groll (AA) to Natogerma, 31 Jan 1972; NARA, RG 59, Box 1707, Goodby (US NATO) to State, 1 Feb 1972.
194. NATOA, AC/119-R(72)9, 9 Feb 1972; NARA, RG 59, Box 1707, Goodby (US NATO) to State, 4 Feb 1972.
195. NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 1708, Vest (US NATO) to State, 8 Feb 1972.
196. NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 1707, Goodby (US NATO) to State, 4 Feb 1972.
197. BArch, B136, 6419, Bd. 3, Poensgen, 23 Feb 1972. For a comprehensive list of EPC working papers, see TNA, FCO 41/1053, 25 Aug 1972.
198. TNA, FCO 41/1040, Thomson (UK NATO) to Tickell (FCO), 18 Feb 1972.
199. TNA, FCO 41/1052, Braithwaite to Tickell, 1 Mar 1972.
200. TNA, FCO 41/1070, Tickell (FCO) to Audland (Bonn), 6 Mar 1972. Admittedly, the US State Department had also set up an inter-agency task force on the CSCE already in late 1971. NARA, NSC H-Files, Box H-229, Folder 4, NSDM-142, Rogers to Nixon, 22 Dec 1971.
201. TNA, FCO 41/1052, Braithwaite to Tickell, 1 Mar 1972. See also TNA, FCO 41/1041, Jackling (Bonn) to FCO, 17 Mar 1972.
202. TNA, FCO 41/1043, Braithwaite (FCO) to Humphries (Ministry of Defence), 26 Apr 1972; TNA, FCO 41/1041, Jackling (Bonn) to FCO, 17 Mar 1972.
203. Author’s interview with Braithwaite.
205. PAAA, B28, 109292, Fischer (BK-Amt) to IIA3 (AA), 29 Mar 1972.
206. BArch, B136, 6419, Bd. 3, Weinstock and Fischer to ALII, ALIV, Focke, Bahr and Ehmke, 17 Apr 1972.
207. PAAA, B28, 109292, Diesel to von Groll, 21 Mar 1972.
208. PAAA, B150, 253, Scheel to Ehmke, 25 Apr 1972.
211. AAPD 1972, doc 138, 18 May 1972. The working group was convened in September 1972, see PAAA, B150, 262, Hillger, 14 Sep 1972.
212. PAAA, B150, 254, Scheel to Ehmke, 9 May 1972.
217. ACDP, I-555, 008/1, Kliesing to Barzel, 30 May 1972. For Kliesing’s discussions about the CSCE in Washington in June 1972, see ACDP, I-555, 007/1, Kliesing, 4 July 1972. More generally, see also Clemens, Reluctant Realists.
221. PAAA, B28, 109306, von Groll (AA) to Natogerma, 30 Jan 1972; NARA, RG 59, Box 1707, Goodby (US NATO) to State, 1 Feb 1972.
222. PAAA, B28, 109306, von Groll (AA) to Natogerma, 31 Jan 1972; NARA, RG 59, Box 1707, Goodby (US NATO) to State, 1 Feb 1972.
225. NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 1709, Cash (Bonn) to State, 26 Apr 1972.
228. NATOA, C-M(72)24(Revised), Volume One, Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 16 May 1972.
229. PAAA, B150, 254, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 12 May 1972; NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 1709, Vest (USNATO) to State, 12 May 1972. See also AAPD 1972, doc 133, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 12 May 1972; NATOA, PO/72/331, 19 May 1972.
231. PAAA, B150, 256, Bazing to Dg II A, von Diesel, 12 June 1972.
232. NARA, RG 59, Box 1710, Kennedy (US NATO) to State, 7 July 1972.
233. AAPD 1972, doc 201, van Well (AA) to Sonnenhof (Ankara) and von Mirbach (Ottawa), 12 July 1972; NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 1710, Hillenbrand (Bonn) to State, 17 July 1972.
234. BArch, B136, 6419 (3), Trumpf, 14 Jan 1972.
235. AAPD 1972, doc 42, Boss (Natogerma) to AA, 22 Feb 1972. One of Kissinger’s aides later complained to the author that the increased EPC coordination made the Europeans extremely inflexible. ‘It was a cumbersome business. Sometimes it felt that it was easier to negotiate with the Soviets.’ Author’s interview with Helmut Sonnenfeldt, 22 Mar 2005.
237. Author’s interview with Jacques Andreani, 7 June 2004.
239. PAAA, B28, 109307, Diesel to von Staden, 28 Mar 1972.
240. PAAA, B21, 746, von Groll to IIA1, IA7, 24 July 1972.
246. PAAA, B150, 254, Scheel to Ehmke, 9 May 1972, Anlage I.
247. BArch, B136, 6419, Bd. 3, von Groll, 15 May 1972; PAAA, B130, 8405, cabinet meeting, 16 May 1972. See also Haftendorn, Sicherheit und Entspannung, 437–9; Müller, Politik und Bürokratie, 300.
249. AAPD 1972, doc 133, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 12 May 1972.
253. NARA, RG 59, Box 3149, Rogers (Bonn) to State, 30 May 1972; TNA, FCO 41/969, Jackling (Bonn) to FCO, 30 May 1972.
258. AAPD 1972, doc 189, Roth to van Well, Frank, 27 June 1972.
261. PAAA, B40, 184, IIA3, 29 Nov 1971.
262. PAAA, B150, 244, IIA3, 13 Dec 1971; PAAA, B1, 516, IIA3, 10 Jan 1972.
263. NARA, RG 59, Box 1707, Rush (Bonn) to State, 22 Jan 1972.
264. PAAA, B28, 109307, Diesel to von Staden, 6 Jan 1972.
266. TNA, FCO 41/1052, Allan (Luxembourg) to FCO, 29 Feb 1972; PAAA, B21, 744, CSCE (72) 6 P.
267. NATOA, AC/119-R(72)9, 9 Feb 1972; NARA, RG 59, Box 1707, Goodby (US NATO) to State, 4 Feb 1972.
268. NARA, RG 59, Box 1708, Cash (Bonn) to State, 9 Mar 1972.
271. TNA, FCO 41/1039, Hibbert (Bonn) to Brimelow (FCO), 7 Feb 1972.
272. TNA, FCO 41/1070, Hibbert (Bonn) to Wiggion (FCO), 5 Apr 1972.
273. TNA, FCO 41/1043, Hibbert (Bonn) to Tickell (FCO), 17 Apr 1972.
274. EA 5/1972, Paul Frank, ‘Zielsetzungen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Rahmen europäischer Sicherheitsverhandlungen’; see also TNA, FCO 41/1043, Hibbert (Bonn) to Tickell (FCO), 18 Apr 1972.
275. PAAA, B150, 251, IIA4, von Staden to Frank, 16 Mar 1972.
278. PAAA, B28, 109307, Diesel to von Staden, 28 Mar 1972; TNA, FCO 41/1056, CSCE (72) 22 P, 28 Mar 1972.
280. NARA, RG 59, Box 1708, Earle (US NATO) to State, 31 Mar 1972; TNA, FCO 28/1679, Thomson (UK NATO) to Hibbert (Bonn), 30 Mar 1972; TNA, FCO 41/1042, Thomson (UK NATO) to FCO, 5 Apr 1972; TNA, FCO 41/1042, Thomson (UK NATO) to FCO, 8 Apr 1972.
281. TNA, FCO 28/1679, Staples (UK NATO) to Fall (FCO), 30 Mar 1972.
284. TNA, FCO 28/1679, Thomson (UK NATO) to Hibbert (Bonn), 30 Mar 1972; TNA, FCO 28/1679, Tickell (FCO) to Hibbert (Bonn), 5 Apr 1972.
285. NARA, RG 59, Box 1709, Cash (Bonn) to State, 22 Apr 1972.
286. TNA, FCO 28/1679, Note by the German Delegation (NATO), 7 Apr 1972. In the German archives, the same document is in PAAA, B28, 109310. See also NARA, RG 59, Box 1709, Kennedy (US NATO) to State, 12 Apr 1972.
287. NATOA, AC/119-R(72)31, 10 April 1972.
288. PAAA, B150, 253, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 25 Apr 1972; NATOA, C-R(72)20, 12 May 1972.
289. PAAA, B150, 253, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 25 Apr 1972.
291. NARA, RG 59, Box 1709, Cash (Bonn) to State, 22 Apr 1972.
292. NARA, RG 59, Box 1709, Rogers (State) to Bonn, 27 Apr 1972.
293. NARA, RG 59, Box 1709, Cash (Bonn) to State, 4 May 1972.
297. PAAA, B150, 254, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 12 May 1972; NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 1709, Vest (US NATO) to State, 12 May 1972; See also AAPD 1972, doc 133, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 12 May 1972; NATOA, C-M(72)24(Revised), Volume One, Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 16 May 1972; NATOA, PO/72/331, Secretary General to Permanent Representatives, 19 May 1972.
298. NATOA, C-M(72)24(Revised), Volume One, Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 16 May 1972.
300. NARA, NSC Files, President’s Trip Files, Box 482, Folder 5, 18 May 1972; NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 3148, RES-34, 22 May 1972.
301. NARA, RG 59, Box 3148, Rogers (State) to US NATO, 19 May 1972; PAAA, B150, 255, Bazing to von Grll, Diesel, von Staden, 23 May 1972.
302. NARA, RG 59, Box 3149, Rogers (Bonn) to State, 30 May 1972; TNA, FCO 41/969, Jackling (Bonn) to FCO, 30 May 1972.
303. NARA, NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Box 24, Folder 2, Klein (Berlin) to State, 12 Sep 1972.
304. NATOA, C-M(72)67, Steering Brief for the Multilateral Preparatory Talks and the CSCE, 7 Nov 1972.
305. The story on the seating order is covered in the next chapter. For that, and especially for the role of language, see also Spoehr Readman, ‘National Interests’.
307. NARA, RG59 (1970–73), Box 1705, Rogers (State) to US NATO, 24 Mar 1971.
308. NARA, RG59 (1970–73), Box 1706, Rogers (State) to Bonn, 21 Apr 1971; NARA, RG59 (1970–73), Box 1706, Rush (Bonn) to State, 4 May 1971.
310. AAPD 1971, doc 211, meeting Bahr-Hillenbrand, 16 June 1971; NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 2289, Rogers (State) to Bonn, 19 June 1971.
312. PAAA, B150, 240, Blomeyer (Paris) to AA, 20 Oct 1971. Grabert was apparently not aware of the Bonn Group history of the idea, since he underlined to Schumann that Paris was the first capital to be consulted about this.
314. PAAA, B150, 241, Blech to van Well and and von Staden, 3 Nov 1971.
315. PAAA, B150, 241, von Groll to Diesel, van Well, von Staden, 8 Nov 1971. In his handwritten comments on the paper, van Well argued that the development of this idea should be put on hold until ‘our programme (Berlin, FRG-GDR, CSE) is more advanced’. If put into practice immediately, van Well went on, it would only cause ‘unnecessary turbulence’.
318. BArch, B136, 6419, Bd. 3, Dröge to GL II/1, AL II, StS, 2 Mar 1972; BArch, B136, 6419, Bd. 3, Dröge to GL II/1, AL II, StS, 10 Mar 1972. See also NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 1709, Irwin (State) to Bonn, US NATO, 7 Apr 1972.
322. NARA, RG 59, Box 1708, Irwin (State) to Bonn, US NATO, 24 Mar 1972.
323. BArch, B136, 6419, Bd. 3, Weinstock and Fischer to ALII, ALIV, Focke, Bahr and Ehmke, 17 Apr 1972.
325. PAAA, B130, 9778, von Staden to Frank, Scheel, 23 May 1972.
327. PAAA, B150, 265, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 12 Oct 1972.
331. NARA, NSC H-Files, Box H-63, Folder 1, Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, 18 Nov 1971.
333. PAAA, B150, 243, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 24 Nov 1971; PAAA, B150, 243, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 26 Nov 1971; NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 3148, Vest (US NATO) to State, 29 Nov 1971; TNA, FCO 41/894, Peck (UK NATO) to FCO, 29 Nov 1971.
335. NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 1707, Vest (US NATO) to State, 12 Jan 1972.
336. NATOA, 16-1-01/1, AC/119-R(72)4, 25 Jan 1972.
337. NATOA, AC/119-R(72)37, 20 Apr 1972.
338. TNA, FCO 41/969, Lever (UK NATO) to Braithwaite (FCO), 27 Apr 1972; TNA, FCO 41/969, Braithwaite to Tickell, 28 Apr 1972.
340. PAAA, B150, 254, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 12 May 1972; NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 1709, Vest (US NATO) to State, 12 May 1972.
341. NATOA, C-M(72)24(Revised), Volume One, Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 16 May 1972.
343. PAAA, B150, 255, Hansen to Dg I, von Staden, 30 May 1972.
344. NARA, RG 59, Box 3149, Rogers (Bonn) to State, 30 May 1972; TNA, FCO 41/969, Jackling (Bonn) to FCO, 30 May 1972.
345. PAAA, B28, 109295, Bazing, 12 June 1972.
348. PAAA, B150, 262, Hillger, 14 Sep 1972. The reference to ‘the Ten’ counts in Norway, which in the end did not join the EC.
349. PAAA, B28, 109300, von Groll to Dg21, D2, 19 Oct 1972.
350. PAAA, B150, 268, Lindemann, 20 Nov 1972; TNA, FCO 30/1254, CP(72)57(rev), 9 Nov 1972. See also Möckli, *European Foreign Policy*, 64–68.
352. PAAA, B150, 261, van Well (AA) to embassies, 17 Aug 1972.
354. PAAA, B150, 267, Boss (Natogerma) to AA, 10 Nov 1972.
355. PAAA, B150, 267, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 13 Nov 1972.
356. PAAA, B150, 267, von Staden (AA) to Helsinki, 14 Nov 1972.
357. NATOA, C-M(72)67, Steering Brief for the Multilateral Preparatory Talks and the CSCE, 7 Nov 1972.
358. NATOA, C-M(72)67, Steering Brief for the Multilateral Preparatory Talks and the CSCE, 7 Nov 1972.
359. NATOA, C-M(72)67, Steering Brief for the Multilateral Preparatory Talks and the CSCE, 7 Nov 1972.
360. PAAA, B150, 268, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 16 Nov 1972; NATOA, PO/72/423, Secretary General to Permanent Representatives, 30 Nov 1972.
361. NATOA, C-R(72)57, meeting of the Council held on 22 Nov 1972, 8 Dec 1972.
362. NATOA, PO/72/423, Secretary General to Permanent Representatives, 30 Nov 1972.
363. NATOA, C-M(72)72(Revised), Draft Declaration on Guiding Principles for Relations between the States Attending the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 30 Nov 1972.
Chapter 6

1972–75

Deutschlandpolitik at the Conference

**ILLUSTRATION 6:** Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (left) with US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in Miesbach, near Munich, on 6 July 1974.

For us the CSCE will be the foreign policy priority at least for the year 1973. We stand before the task of playing a political role at the conference. The conference alone will certainly not bring us security; NATO provides us with security. The conference will also hardly bring about more cooperation than the current situation would generate in any case. And yet, the conference holds for us the chance to emerge on a large international stage for the first time on an equal footing and with full voting rights.

– West German State Secretary Frank in an internal meeting at the Auswärtiges Amt, November 1972

It is an indispensable goal for us to achieve the insertion of the comma.

– West German talking points regarding ‘peaceful change’, 21 February 1975

When the multilateral preparatory talks (MPT) were opened in November 1972, none of the participants seated in the Dipoli conference hall in Espoo, on the outskirts of the Finnish capital Helsinki, can have foreseen how long a road they had just embarked on. The Dipoli talks alone lasted from 22 November 1972 to 8 June 1973. Divided into four intense and at times difficult rounds, these preparatory talks ultimately led to an agreement on the agenda, structure and rules of procedure for the actual conference. This final product of the MPT, the twenty-page Helsinki Final Recommendations, or the ‘Blue Book’, turned out to be of essential importance during the CSCE that followed. Everything that was included in the recommendations had to be addressed, nothing that was excluded could be addressed. All agenda items were attached to committees or sub-committees with specific terms of reference – the texts of which had been furiously fought over during the months in Dipoli. According to the agreed three-stage conference model, the Blue Book was endorsed and approved by the Foreign Ministers in Stage I of the CSCE, held in Helsinki from 3 to 7 July 1973. The second stage was to be held in Geneva, the third and concluding stage again in Helsinki.

In the organisational structure it set out for the second stage of the conference, the Blue Book followed the notorious idea of ‘baskets’ developed during the MPT. For Basket I, dealing with questions relating to security in Europe, there was Committee I and two subcommittees, addressing the list of principles governing relations between states and confidence-building measures, respectively. For Basket II, dealing with cooperation in the fields of economy, science and technology, and the environment, there was Committee II and five separate subcommittees. For Basket III, dealing with cooperation in humanitarian and other fields, there was Committee III and four subcommittees, including one on human contacts. The question concerning the follow-up to the conference, referred to as Basket IV, received its own working group. With the addition of the general
Coordinating Committee, a special working body dealing with the Swiss proposal on the peaceful settlement of disputes, a working group on the Mediterranean and a few other administrative bodies, the total number of organisational elements for Stage II was a staggering twenty-one.\(^4\)

Small wonder, then, that by comparison with the already burdensome Dipoli talks, Stage II of the CSCE turned out to be of an entirely different magnitude still. Following the framework of committees and subcommittees set out in the Blue Book, the over 400 delegates who gathered in Geneva on 18 September 1973 to open the second stage of the CSCE were in the end stuck there in frustratingly cumbersome negotiations for almost two years, until 21 July 1975. During the five rounds of Stage II, there were altogether 2341 official meetings, with countless additional informal meetings in various formations.\(^5\) Just one example are the constant caucuses of the Nine in Geneva, often decisive for the development of Western positions. Since the conference did not have a secretariat of its own, there is no central archival record of it. The Prague office of the OSCE holds all the official documents submitted and registered at the committee meetings, but no records of the meetings as such were kept. However, the paper trail in individual countries is breathtaking. In the German archives, there are altogether 1168 official reports sent by the FRG delegation from Geneva during Stage II. When one combines the German records with similar reports from other relevant archives, the result is an extremely dense narrative documenting, for most of the time, very little movement. During the weeks and months in Geneva, the pace in the negotiations was often invisible to the bare eye. Accordingly, public interest in the CSCE in the West, not particularly high to begin with, soon faded.

Whereas time in Geneva often seemed to stand still, the international Western framework surrounding the CSCE underwent dramatic changes in the years 1973–75. The cohesion of the transatlantic alliance was shaken by a series of events, arguably kicked off by Kissinger’s controversial ‘Year of Europe’ speech in April 1973, leading to a considerable amount of energy being spent on the drafting of a new Atlantic Charter. The energy crisis and the escalating situation in the Middle East further contributed to tensions in the transatlantic relationship. Meanwhile, European foreign-policy coordination was intensified, not least due to the declared goal of a European Union by the year 1980. In terms of personalities, there was a complete change in leadership in all the most important Western capitals – over a period of less than five months in 1974, Pompidou died, Brandt and Nixon resigned and Heath lost an election. Hence, none of the signatories of the CSCE Final Act in August 1975 on behalf of France, the FRG, the US and the UK – Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Helmut Schmidt, Gerald Ford and Harold Wilson, respectively – had been in office when the Geneva negotiations began.
The true heroes of the CSCE process were, without doubt, the mid-level civil servants doing the invisible legwork in the committees and subcommittees in Geneva. For most of the time, these CSCE specialists were able to operate with a fairly high degree of independence, often even writing their own instructions. Yet there were also moments when decisive turning points in the CSCE required interventions from high politics. In retrospect, these intersections give a fascinating picture of the importance attached to the subject matter at the time. What kinds of CSCE issues did the Foreign Ministers and Heads of Government get involved with during the conference? In this final chapter, instead of presenting a comprehensive chronological narrative of all the twists and turns in the various conference phases, I will focus only on a select few cases showing where the primary national interests of the FRG lay in the CSCE. Each of these cases, in its own way, highlights the critical link between the conference and West German Deutschlandpolitik. The first of them is the bizarre story of the seating order in Dipoli.

Alphabet Diplomacy in Dipoli

In the afternoon of 22 November 1972, the delegates of the thirty-four states participating in the MPT – Monaco only joined later to round up the number of CSCE participants to thirty-five – were in for a surprise. Arriving for the opening session of the MPT at the Dipoli conference centre, they found that the delegations were seated around the table according to the French alphabet. Although French was one of the official languages of the conference, up until that moment the Finnish hosts had consistently used English, and the English alphabetical order, in the preparations during the past months. Correspondingly, also the official list of participants, printed in the week leading to the opening of the MPT, listed the delegations along the English alphabet.

Yet at the very last minute – quite literally, since the organising committee was engaged in the endeavour for most of the night between 21 and 22 November – the Finns had gone through the trouble of reshuffling the seating order and printing new name cards of the delegations in French. In the end, this hasty procedural rearrangement proved to be permanent. As one can see in those memorable images of Helmut Schmidt and Erich Honecker sitting next to each other before the signing of the CSCE Final Act in the summer of 1975, the French alphabet prevailed all the way through the conference. But why did this sudden change on the eve of the MPT come about? At first sight the incident, in spite of its peculiarity, hardly seems to merit further investigation. Yet, given a closer look, the
story behind the linguistic switch from English to French actually is a case in point about the overriding importance of Deutschlandpolitik for West German CSCE policy.

For as the representatives of the FRG saw the situation, the placement of delegations in Dipoli was anything but a trivial detail. It was directly connected with the omnipresent German question. As early as March 1972, the Auswärtiges Amt stressed to the Finnish Government that regardless of the language used in the CSCE context, the Federal Republic wanted its delegation to be listed and seated under the letter referring to the national element in its name, whether D for ‘Deutschland’, A for ‘Allemagne’ or G for ‘Germany’. The Finns, in response, suggested using English and placing both German states under G, with the labels ‘Germany, Federal Republic’ and ‘Germany, Democratic Republic’. This suited the Auswärtiges Amt, which considered the case to be settled once and for all.6

Therefore the astonishment in Bonn was all the greater when, half a year later, in October 1972, the Finns suddenly hinted that they would be seating the Federal Republic under F and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) under G.7 This was obviously unacceptable to the Auswärtiges Amt, since the arrangement would have left the GDR to appear as the representative of Germany, whereas the defining characteristic of the FRG would have been its form of government, the federal republic. Consequently, the Auswärtiges Amt instructed the West German mission in Helsinki to object to this strongly, arguing that it was common international practice to allow each country to decide for itself the name it wanted to be called.8 The first priority was to be placed under G, preferably as ‘Federal Republic of Germany’, but if necessary, ‘Germany, Federal Republic of’ was also acceptable.9 But the Finns remained adamant. In spite of repeated requests from the Federal Republic during the weeks preceding the opening of the MPT, the Finns refused to place both German states under the letter G.10

This left the West German decision-makers in a difficult position. As we have seen in the preceding chapters, one of the key principles of the Federal Republic’s policy during the CSCE preparations had been to avoid open disagreements, between East and West as well as within the West. This was considered even more important when it came to the German question. From the Bonn perspective, the ‘German quarrels’ had to be kept out of the multilateral conference, at almost any cost. This was also evident in the row over the Dipoli seating order. While instructing the head of the mission in Helsinki to continue to press for a solution on West German terms, von Staden added that ‘our paramount interest is to avoid controversy in this question’.11
Indeed, although the seating order was a fundamental question of principle to the Federal Republic, all by itself it did not really have anything to bargain with. Threatening with unilateral withdrawal from the conference over such an apparently trivial matter was hardly an option, since it could easily have led to the failure of the whole conference, with the FRG left to blame for it. Fear of renewed isolation, diluting the recent gains in the freedom of foreign-policy manoeuvre, was constantly present in West German considerations.

Unwilling to act alone, the Federal Republic decided to turn to its Western allies for help. On 20 November, only two days before the MPT were scheduled to begin, Scheel raised the subject at the ministerial meeting of the EC in The Hague. Scheel’s colleagues unanimously pledged to support the FRG in its insistence to be seated under G. At a North Atlantic Council meeting in Brussels on the following day, the remaining NATO allies, equally unanimously, were also brought on board.

Now, with the backing of its allies secured, the FRG could afford to raise the stakes. On 21 November, the Auswärtiges Amt informed Soviet and Finnish representatives in Bonn as well as the Finnish Government in Helsinki of the new, firmer line, authorised by Foreign Minister Scheel. The delegation of the Federal Republic would refuse to take part in the MPT the following day unless its requests on the seating order were met. The Finns were left in no doubt that all of the FRG’s allies were behind this position. At the end of the day, then, the Finns had no choice but to succumb to this West German ultimatum. Bonn’s gamble, only made possible by multilateral Western backing, paid off.

The subsequent switch from English to French was purely cosmetic, a face-saving measure of the Finnish hosts. Contrary to what John Maresca has suggested, I have not found any evidence supporting the idea that it would have been the West Germans themselves who demanded the use of French. The Finnish officials involved have in retrospect taken full and appropriate credit for the decision to choose French. Somewhat curiously, however, they have argued that this was the only way to meet the demands of the Federal Republic. From a purely technical point of view, it seems, the original idea of ‘Germany, Federal Republic’ and ‘Germany, Democratic Republic’ would have served the same purpose just as well.

But what truly mattered was that the West Germans got their way, getting themselves seated according to the national element of the name of the country. The fact that the two German delegations ended up sitting next to each other was merely a by-product of this achievement. With the choice of French, this simultaneously put the two German states at the top of the list, under A (‘Allemagne, République Fédérale d’’ and ‘Allemande, République Démocratique’).
This seating arrangement, symbolising the inner-German rapprochement, naturally produced wonderful photo opportunities over the course of the conference. For the purposes of this book, however, the story behind the small-scale alphabetical diplomacy in November 1972 is also an illuminating example of two broader characteristics of the conference negotiations in the following years. First of all, the row over the seating order in the MPT is a symbol of the central importance of the inner-German relationship to the whole CSCE process – and vice versa. Second, it gives an idea of the way in which the FRG depended on building alliances, whether they were institutionalised such as the EPC or NATO or less formal ad hoc alliances, often with one or all of the Bonn Group powers.

In this particular case, the Federal Republic was able to combine the two elements favourably. Faced with a problem directly connected with both the inner-German relationship and the CSCE, the FRG made efficient use of multilateral means to pursue its national interests. Frank told the head of the Finnish trade mission in Bonn a few days after the start of the MPT that he had seldom seen the European partners so united behind the Federal Republic. But as Frank’s statement suggests, this was clearly a special case. Whereas the seating order was a high-ranking question of national interest for the FRG, the Allies had no fundamental issues involved and could thus easily support Bonn. In more controversial questions, however, taking the lead in the Alliance could be more challenging. Moreover, with the opening of the multilateral conference, the playing field had become wider, now also including all Warsaw Pact countries as well as the neutral and non-aligned states. Navigating in this environment was not always easy, as is well illustrated by the case concerning the possibility of peaceful change of frontiers.

**Peaceful Change, Act 1: Defending the Moscow Treaty**

The question regarding the inviolability of frontiers as opposed to the possibility of changing them by peaceful means turned out to be one of the key battlefields in Geneva. This was hardly surprising, given the fundamental interests at stake. On the one hand, the main motive of the Soviet Union to initiate the CSCE in the first place had been to confirm the status quo, the postwar borders in Europe, that is. On the other hand, safeguarding the option of peaceful change of frontiers was the most important cornerstone of West German *Deutschlandpolitik*, given the Federal Republic’s central political aim of creating ‘a state of peace in Europe in which the German people can regain its unity in free self-determination’. As has been shown in the previous chapter, the FRG first introduced the concept of peaceful
change to the Western CSCE preparations as early as February 1972. A collision between the two approaches was thus unavoidable, sooner or later.

What is surprising, however, is the way in which the dominant focus on peaceful change completely overshadowed all other elements of Basket I in West German thinking. Naturally, on the working level the FRG engaged actively in all efforts of the Nine and NATO, contributing to the preparation of joint positions. Thus, the main successes for the Nine in Basket I, the inclusion of human rights and fundamental freedoms on the one hand, self-determination of peoples on the other hand, in the list of ten principles as individual items were major breakthroughs for the FRG, as well. The FRG also wanted to build some kind of bridge between political and military security, and was therefore keen on pushing the adoption of the confidence-building measures such as advance notification of manoeuvres and troop movements. Yet these issues were at no point in time pursued with anything close to the same vigour as details relating to peaceful change. The latter were the ‘special preoccupations of the Germans’, as the head of the UK delegation observed at the end of the MPT.19

As soon as the Dipoli talks got started, the threat of a stalemate on the issue of inviolability of borders became apparent. The Soviet Union was pushing for a separate principle of inviolability of frontiers as the most prominent result of the conference. Interested as he was in a rapid conclusion of the preparatory talks, leading quickly to a prestigious CSCE summit, Brezhnev attempted to resolve this on the highest level. Brezhnev’s message to Brandt, signalling some Soviet flexibility in the labelling of agenda items in return for Western concessions on the list of principles was conveyed through Bahr’s back channel connections in mid-January 1973. Similar messages had also been sent to Nixon and Pompidou.20 Reporting from Helsinki, the head of the West German MPT delegation, Guido Brunner, was afraid that a ‘renegotiation of the Moscow Treaty’ was looming.21

In Bonn, the legal experts of the Auswärtiges Amt were equally worried. An independent reference to the inviolability of borders in the CSCE could dangerously be interpreted as excluding the possibility of ‘peaceful change’.22 In late January von Staden laid out the main arguments of the FRG: inviolability of borders had to be subordinate to a more general principle of refraining from the use of force, otherwise the CSCE could jeopardise the carefully constructed modus vivendi architecture of the bilateral Ostpolitik treaties.23 Accordingly, in early February 1973, the West German representatives in NATO firmly underlined the importance of dealing with ‘inviolability of borders’ together with other ‘principles of relations between states’, and more particularly in direct connection with the principle of non-use of force.24
Finding common ground with the Allies in a question this sensitive was crucial to the FRG, because acting alone could become problematic. The West German delegation had already experienced this in late January, when Brunner stood out in Dipoli, being the only Western delegate publicly opposing a selective Soviet proposal on the contents of the declaration of principles. A series of Soviet complaints about Brunner’s behaviour followed in February, from Falin in Bonn as well as from Gromyko in Moscow. In the Soviet view the West German delegation had challenged the inviolability of borders despite the agreement reached on it in the Moscow Treaty.

The West Germans saw this differently. It was the Soviet Union that tried to reinterpret the Moscow Treaty in the multilateral framework. Both Frank and Bahr stressed to their Soviet counterparts that the FRG was not willing to violate any borders but neither would it accept attempts to depart from the *modus vivendi* nature of the Moscow Treaty. Soviet efforts to feed in formulations that the FRG had rejected in 1970 were apparent in texts it circulated in Dipoli, with absolutely irreversible positions on territorial integrity and inviolability of borders.

At first Bahr, always the maverick, would have been prepared to provoke a conflict over the borders issue in the conference. If necessary, such a minor crisis could then be defused at the highest level between the FRG and the Soviet Union – a slightly more flexible West German approach to this question could be used as tit-for-tat in exchange for Soviet influence on the GDR in the inner-German problems regarding humanitarian issues.

However, the more careful Auswärtiges Amt line prevailed. The Soviet efforts had to be stopped, but the means for achieving this needed to be found in the multilateral toolbox. In early February 1973, the Auswärtiges Amt ruled that a direct bilateral West German-Soviet confrontation in Basket I, concerning the principles, had to be avoided. In the future the FRG needed to coordinate its positions better with the Allies, always making sure that in the particular question of borders the main burden should not fall on the FRG. Support was promptly sought, in the Bonn Group, in NATO and in the EPC. Cleverly, the West Germans employed differentiated tactics and argumentation in each framework.

In order to mobilise the Bonn Group, the FRG argued that anything hinting at a use of the CSCE framework as a substitute for a post-war peace treaty with Germany would also impede the interests of the Three Powers. Here a suitable point of reference was a resolution of the UN General Assembly on friendly relations between states from October 1970, that is, from after the Moscow Treaty. The FRG argued in the Bonn Group that a declaration of the CSCE should not go beyond what was agreed at the UN, neither in easing the use of violence to change borders nor in restrict-
ing the possibility of peaceful change.\textsuperscript{31} In the EPC, on the other hand, the West German argument of choice was the political finality of the European Community, since the pursued European Union could also amount to border changes.\textsuperscript{32}

The EPC, then again, was increasingly seen as the most promising route to influence decision making in NATO. The efforts to find a more discreet link between the principles of ‘inviolability of frontiers’ and ‘refraining from the use of force’ were first discussed in the EPC \textit{sous-comité}. When this line was presented to the NATO allies, the positive response surprised the West Germans.\textsuperscript{33} At the end of February, Diesel declared in a handwritten note to State Secretary Frank that in the CSCE context the EPC was already de facto able to ‘pre-programme’ (\textit{vorprogrammieren}) the NATO positions.\textsuperscript{34}

Regardless of the tactical approach applied, the key West German goal remained the same: to avoid a reinterpretation of the Moscow Treaty, to keep open the possibility of peaceful change and not to contradict the \textit{Deutschlandpolitik} goals. This line was confirmed between Brandt and Scheel in mid-February 1973 and again in a cabinet meeting on 25 April.\textsuperscript{35} The CSCE and the Moscow Treaty had to be kept at a distance. As the West Germans saw it, a simple multilateralisation of the bilateral treaties without the multilateralisation of the indirect reservations concerning those treaties (in particular the letter on German unity) was not acceptable.\textsuperscript{36}

Before the start of the fourth round of the Dipoli talks, the declaration of principles continued to be the main bone of contention between East and West. For the FRG, the inherent link between refraining from the use of force and the inviolability of frontiers was crucial. In his handwritten instructions, State Secretary Frank stressed that the Allies should be left in no doubt about the primary importance of this matter. The FRG could only support a declaration of principles if the idea behind the letter on German unity – peaceful change – was anchored into the document in some way.\textsuperscript{37}

Bahr conveyed this view to Kissinger in Washington in late April, stressing that compromises on the issue of borders that might be acceptable to some Allies would be detrimental to the FRG, since they would hollow out the Moscow Treaty and even the Basic Treaty. The borders issue was an absolute priority for Bonn – if an agreement corresponding to the basis of the Moscow Treaty was not reached, the FRG would not participate in the CSCE at all. Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt gave assurances of full support for the West German position. In the question concerning frontiers the FRG should be the one to decide what was acceptable to the West. Kissinger even went as far as to ask the FRG to inform the US delegation in Helsinki on this, since the White House could not keep track of
all the manoeuvres going on in the MPT. This US support was repeated two days later in the Nixon-Brandt meeting in Washington.

For the time being, however, the Soviet Union could not be persuaded in this matter. In mid-April 1973, Brezhnev had again approached Brandt, Nixon and Pompidou to call for a rapid conclusion of the MPT, a brief committee stage over the summer and a concluding summit in the autumn. At the same time he accused the West of intentional procrastination, in particular with respect to the inviolability of borders. In his response to Brezhnev, Brandt declared that the Federal Government wanted to see the close connection between renunciation of force and inviolability of borders, as had been apparent in the Moscow Treaty, also reflected in the CSCE declaration on principles. The possibility for peaceful change or even abolition of borders needed to stay open. But as Kissinger reported from his discussions with Brezhnev in Moscow in early May, the Soviet leader had categorically rejected a connection between the two principles.

In the end, the Dipoli talks ended in a draw on this particular question. There is no explicit reference to any kind of possibility of peaceful change of frontiers in the Blue Book. Instead, the Helsinki Final Recommendations list the inviolability of frontiers as one of the principles to be addressed in Basket I, directly after the principle of refraining from the threat or use of force. This had been the lowest common denominator acceptable to the FRG, since this could be interpreted as implying at least some kind of connection between the two.

The list of principles itself was conclusive after being set in the Blue Book. But the Helsinki Final Recommendations left the more precise contents of each principle undefined. It was in this context that the debate about peaceful change really began. The FRG insisted on including a reference to peaceful change in one of the ten principles in the declaration of Basket I. Already in his speech at Stage I of the CSCE in Helsinki, Foreign Minister Scheel had raised the issue, stressing that the principles to be agreed on in the CSCE would ‘leave untouched the possibility of frontiers being changed by peaceful means and by mutual agreement’. True to form, Scheel also quoted the formulation of the letter on German unity: ‘the political aim of the Federal Republic of Germany to help create a state of peace in Europe in which the German nation can regain its unity in free self-determination’. At least the French had been informed well in advance about Scheel’s intention to make this reference.

As so often before, the FRG wanted to reach its goals in Europe’s name. Already prior to the convocation of Stage II in Geneva, France had begun to draft its own proposal for a declaration of principles. Alarmed by a possible departure from a common position, the West Germans were able to convince the French of the advantages of a joint approach. France and the
FRG agreed that in the opening weeks of the Geneva negotiations the FRG would at first deliver its ‘explanatory’ document on non-use of force, territorial integrity and inviolability of borders, to be followed by the French proposal for a declaration of principles – all closely coordinated, first with the Nine, then in NATO. In this coordination, the FRG was also able to improve the French proposal to better meet its needs. When this first Western draft of the ‘decalogue’ of principles was tabled on 19 October 1973, the reference to peaceful change appeared under the principle of inviolability of frontiers. At the same time, however, almost all Allies in the Nine and Fifteen considered the explanatory document of the FRG on non-use of force, territorial integrity and inviolability of borders to be too rigorous and maximal as an opening move.

Nonetheless, the West Germans continued to anchor their essential position as a European one. The FRG had been the initiator of a new EPC paper on objectives and strategies of the Nine at the CSCE which was prepared during the early autumn of 1973. This joint effort of the EPC sous-comité and ad hoc group was presented to the political committee and approved by the Foreign Ministers in November. Reading the document, the German impact can easily be detected – essential FRG interests are well represented in it. In the document, the Nine clearly stated that their main goal in all Basket I principles with a territorial aspect was to defend the possibility of a peaceful change of frontiers.

At the same time as the FRG was working to guarantee Allied support in the negotiations in Geneva, it had no qualms about discussing the peaceful change issue bilaterally with the Soviet Union. During Scheel’s visit to Moscow in November 1973 he gave assurances to Gromyko that the FRG was prepared to address the question of inviolability of borders in Geneva in the same spirit as had been the case in Moscow in 1970. There it had been clear that the possibility of peaceful change did not contradict the principle of inviolability. The Soviets, on their behalf, continued to complain to Brandt and high-level officials in Bonn that the West German delegation in Geneva was attacking the inviolability of borders which had been agreed in the Moscow Treaty.

The Soviet complaints were tactical in nature, for on the ground in Geneva, there had been no major confrontations. In fact, there the situation remained more or less unchanged until the spring of 1974. The principle of inviolability of borders as such was not controversial, but there was no progress towards agreeing on a suitable reference in the final document to the possibility of peaceful change, neither in Geneva nor in the correspondence between Brandt and Brezhnev. With the FRG taking its turn as the rotating EC president for the first six months of 1974, the Nine naturally...
held on to the agreed strategy, stressing the need to keep the option of peaceful change explicitly open.\(^{52}\)

By March 1974 the delegations in Geneva had finally managed to formulate a text draft for the principle of inviolability of frontiers. Brunner wrote an upbeat report, arguing that the danger of a reinterpretation of the Moscow Treaty seemed to be over. The version also suited the FRG because it contained a bracketed sentence referring to peaceful change, although the final placement of this sentence was still open to discussion.\(^{53}\) At the meeting of the Federal Security Council on 3 April, Brandt confirmed that there were positive signals regarding peaceful change, both from Geneva and from Kissinger’s recent trip to Moscow.\(^{54}\) Yet this positive feeling was premature.

**Peaceful Change, Act 2: Enter Genscher**

5 April 1974 was a crucial date for West German CSCE policy. In spite of continued efforts to coordinate positions with the NATO and EPC allies, the FRG was suddenly isolated in the subcommittee focusing on principles. Having been unable to agree on a final text on inviolability of frontiers with a reference to peaceful change, the subcommittee, under increasing pressure to achieve tangible results, now separated the two. While registering the new text on inviolability, the subcommittee also presented, on a separate piece of paper, a formulation to be later placed in ‘one of the principles’:

> The participating states consider that their borders can be changed only in accordance with international law through peaceful means and by agreement.\(^{55}\)

This formulation had been acceptable to the FRG in the French draft, when it was connected to the principle of inviolability of frontiers. Yet ‘floating’ alone, it was extremely problematic. Now that the eventual placement of the sentence was left open, it seemed to allow for peaceful change ‘only in accordance with international law’, thus making international law an additional condition for peaceful change rather than peaceful change an inherent consequence of international law. The only positive aspect from the West German perspective was that this marked the first time that the Soviet Union had agreed to an explicit reference to peaceful change in a negotiated text.\(^{56}\) To underline its reservations, the FRG registered a disclaimer in Geneva, stating that the final formulation of the peaceful change clause depended on its placement.\(^{57}\)

What followed from this decision of the subcommittee in Geneva on 5 April 1974 was a truly peculiar battle that in all lasted for eleven months.
The minuscule details of this one ‘floating sentence’ on peaceful change were vigorously debated and negotiated, not only by the CSCE delegation in Geneva or by legal experts in Bonn, but also in a series of high-level meetings of foreign ministers and heads of government. The option of peaceful change was an essential national interest of the FRG. Now it was at stake, and it was fought for with the weapons of language and grammar, of syntax and insertion of commas.

On 30 April 1974 Scheel wrote to Kissinger, stressing the primary importance of ‘peaceful change’ for the FRG. It was absolutely essential that the declaration of principles was not at odds with the goal of creating the ‘state of peace in Europe’ referred to in the letter on German unity. If the Soviet Union rejected the inclusion of the ‘floating sentence’ in the principle of inviolability, West German interests could also be met by including it in the principle of sovereign equality. This, however, would require a reformulation of the sentence from its current restrictive and negative significance into a more positive one, expressly stating that peaceful change of frontiers was possible.58

At the same time, first attempts to repair the damage were taken in the EPC framework. At a special meeting of the EPC sous-comité in Geneva the Nine confirmed their view that the logical place for peaceful change was in the principle of inviolability. This position should be defended for as long as possible, although being able to maintain it to the end was highly unlikely. Other options, such as adding it as an eleventh principle, as a general statement or as a disclaimer between the principles of inviolability and territorial integrity, were all considered unsuitable. There was no common understanding on the fall-back position – the FRG preferred including it in the first principle, that of sovereign equality.59

Above all, the FRG’s allies in the Nine were reluctant to make significant changes to the formulation of the floating sentence. They did not agree with the FRG’s fear that the formulation, if not directly linked with inviolability of frontiers, might remain too general, enabling the Soviet Union to claim that the principle of inviolability outweighed peaceful change. Although there were slightly more favourable signals from the EPC meetings later in May, the isolation of the FRG in the Nine in this issue was not completely resolved.60

Meanwhile, the resignation of Brandt and the election of Scheel as the federal president had ushered in a change in government in Bonn. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, while underscoring elements of continuity in West German foreign policy, also brought along new nuances. In the CSCE context it was actually a lot more than that, since Genscher immediately took a keen interest in the CSCE issues. His style in intervening in the CSCE was decisively more
energetic and hands-on than that of his predecessor. Moreover, then as Interior Minister responsible for the Basic Law, Genscher had in 1970 played an important role in drafting the letter on German unity. The minister, himself a native of Halle, now in the territory of the GDR, had a direct interest in safeguarding the peaceful change option. As the UK officials duly noted, in Genscher’s view the FRG delegation in Geneva had given away too much, too easily.

With Genscher at the helm of the Auswärtiges Amt, the normal EPC route was not considered sufficient in the defensive battle. In addition, a rapid involvement of the Bonn Group was necessary. West German senior officials had discussed this already in mid-May, but in early June van Well and the new state secretary, Walter Gehlhoff, decided to seek support for the West German position from the Bonn Group, with an explicit wish for the ambassadors to raise the issue at the highest levels in their capitals.

On 7 June Gehlhoff met the UK, US and French Ambassadors in Bonn and pointed out that the decisive stage in negotiating the text of the declaration on principles was at hand in Geneva. The FRG supported the results achieved so far on sovereign equality, refraining from the use of force, inviolability of frontiers and territorial integrity. Taken as such, however, they could jointly be interpreted as excluding the possibility of peaceful change. Therefore it was essential that an appropriate placement and formulation for a text on peaceful change was found. Gehlhoff argued that this was important because of the future European development, the German national option and the rights of the Three Powers. Hence it was in the common interest of the FRG and the Three, and they should coordinate their positions in the Bonn Group formation quickly and closely already prior to the next caucus meetings of the Nine and the Fifteen in Geneva, so that a new formulation could be registered before the second drafting round of the declaration. Gehlhoff stressed that this matter was of essential importance to the FRG in general and to Foreign Minister Genscher in particular. The project was to be kept strictly confidential, only between the Bonn Group members.

Gehlhoff’s appeal was well received, and an intensive session of Bonn Group consultations on aspects in the CSCE affecting Germany and Berlin was opened on 10 June. The goal was to achieve a joint Bonn Group position before the NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Ottawa a week later. The West German contribution to these talks concerned – naturally – peaceful change. As the FRG argued, the need for reformulation of the text that had been registered in Geneva on 5 April depended on its placement. The best option, inclusion of peaceful change in the principle of inviolability, would in all likelihood be blocked by the Soviet Union. An
inclusion in sovereign equality, something the Soviet Union had indicated to be a possibility, would require larger changes to the text, to which the Soviet Union would probably not agree, either. Therefore efforts should be concentrated on including it in the principle of territorial integrity. A completely separate principle on peaceful change was not included in the Helsinki recommendations and was therefore out of the question.\footnote{Genscher and van Well made this point to Kissinger in a meeting in Bavaria on 11 June.} The Bonn Group talks were brought to a successful close on 13 June. For the West Germans, this solution paid off – the FRG was to a very large extent able to get its positions accepted. The French and the US had been cooperative to begin with, but the UK was at first reluctant, arguing that the topic of peaceful change should only be dealt with locally in Geneva. The UK had grown increasingly frustrated by the promotion of West German special interests, involving ‘erratic and sudden changes of direction’, often embarrassing to their allies.\footnote{In the end, the UK resistance was also overcome. The result of the Bonn Group consultations was brought to the four Foreign Ministers, meeting for their traditional dinner (Deutschlandessen) on the margins of the NATO ministerial meeting in Ottawa. The discussion between the four Foreign Ministers was not easy, though. Here it was Kissinger, in particular, who stressed that it was a serious matter to reopen a text that had already been registered in Geneva. When Genscher referred to the West German reservations that had also been registered, Kissinger retorted that nobody had supported the FRG in this. With strong support from his French colleague, Genscher underscored the dangers of referring to ‘international law’ in the context of ‘peaceful change’ and emphasised that no government of the FRG could, even if it wanted to, sign anything if peaceful change was not clearly addressed. In Genscher’s view the Soviet Union was also completely aware of this, they simply wanted to have a third attempt to overcome these well-known reservations, after having failed at it with the Moscow Treaty and with the Berlin Agreement. Finally the three ministers agreed to support the West German view. The first choice would be to include peaceful change in the principle of inviolability, but if this was not possible, then the text should be reformulated in a positive way to suit another principle. In their joint declaration, the four Foreign Ministers declared that it was ‘necessary that the CSCE Declaration of Principles contains an appropriate passage on the peaceful change of frontiers and be such as not to affect in any way Quadripartite rights and responsibilities concerning Berlin and Germany as a whole’. The delegations of the Bonn Group countries in Geneva would be instructed accordingly.}
After the direct involvement of Genscher and the Bonn Group, the leeway the German delegation in Geneva had enjoyed was dramatically restricted in this issue. When Brunner in late June reported from his discussions with the local Bonn Group setup on their speculations about a formulation the Soviet Union might accept, the Auswärtiges Amt quickly tightened its leash. Local initiatives in informal talks in Geneva could jeopardise the valuable Bonn Group consensus. The delegation should only operate on instructions from the capital. However, Brunner’s report also raised Genscher’s interest. The minister wanted to know whether the possible compromise formulation discussed in Geneva – ‘the participating states consider that, in accordance with international law, their frontiers can be modified by peaceful means and by agreement’ – would be acceptable to the FRG. The legal experts in Bonn had no objections.

In spite of their initial arguments in Ottawa, the link between Genscher and Kissinger proved to be decisive in handling the issue of peaceful change. The Nixon-Brezhnev summit in Moscow in early July 1974 was the first turning point. Directly after Kissinger’s return from Moscow he met Genscher twice, first at the Dusseldorf airport and again a few days later, on 6 July, this time in Miesbach, close to Munich, on the eve of the football World Cup final. Briefing Genscher on his discussions in Moscow, Kissinger told him that Gromyko had, as expected, again rejected the West German wish to include peaceful change in the third principle, concerning inviolability of frontiers. However, Gromyko had signalled that the Soviet Union was prepared to have a reference to it in the first principle, that of sovereign equality. Kissinger had told him that this required a reformulation of the sentence and wrote his improvised suggestion on a piece of paper:

In accordance with international law the participating states consider that their frontiers can be changed through peaceful means and by agreement.

Kissinger had stressed to Gromyko that this was a US proposal, which still needed to be discussed with the FRG. Genscher considered this to be an important improvement, but would have wanted to see it complemented with ‘and nothing in this declaration shall affect that right’. In Kissinger’s view, however, achieving this additional formulation was very unlikely. In the end, the West German side agreed to this and hoped that Kissinger would continue to discuss the details of peaceful change bilaterally with the Soviet Union, rather than Genscher with the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn. Kissinger agreed to take the matter to Ambassador Dobrynin immediately after his return to Washington.

In effect, then, Genscher had outsourced the defence of this fundamental national interest to the US. As a result of the Miesbach meeting between Genscher and Kissinger, the FRG position was based on the formulation
the US secretary of state had spontaneously written in Moscow.⁷² Van Well informed the West German CSCE delegation about the agreed US–Soviet route. The delegation in Geneva should, meanwhile, abstain from any new initiatives in the field of peaceful change.⁷³ Meeting in Paris on 11 July 1974, the EPC political directors concurred with this procedure and contents on peaceful change.⁷⁴ Genscher also won the support of his French colleague for this method.⁷⁵ After the FRG specifically urged the US to do so, the US delegation officially registered the Kissinger formula on peaceful change on the final day before the summer recess of the Geneva negotiations, 26 July 1974.⁷⁶ But the story was not over with that, because there was as yet no official Soviet reaction.

**Peaceful Change, Act 3: Commas for the National Interest**

Already over the summer 1974, the trench lines in this legal-linguistic battle had become clear. As the legal experts of the Auswärtiges Amt summed it up, the further up in the sentence the reference to international law, the better for the FRG, the further down, the better for the Soviet Union.⁷⁷ Soviet attempts to move it further towards the full stop ensued in September. To complicate things further, there were soon not just one, but several contradictory Soviet responses making the rounds. At least in part this was due to conscious efforts to sow division in the Western ranks.

When Genscher met Gromyko in Gymnich on 15 September, the Soviet Foreign Minister avoided giving a straight response to the Kissinger formula. He acknowledged being familiar with it and pointed out that not everyone in Moscow was happy about it.⁷⁸ In the following week, during the General Assembly of the UN, when foreign ministers were gathered in New York, Gromyko referred to this discussion in his meeting with Kissinger. In a classic attempt of divide and rule, the Soviet Foreign Minister claimed to his US colleague that the West Germans referred to the formulation registered in Geneva as a US draft, signalling that the US was the only obstacle in the way of solving the peaceful change issue. In his own meeting with Kissinger, Genscher gave assurances that the West German position remained unchanged. Kissinger and Genscher agreed that the Nine would support the US-registered formulation on peaceful change. If the Soviet Union objected and requested the old formulation, the West could accept this on the condition of its inclusion in the principle on inviolability of frontiers.⁷⁹ Completing the triangle of meetings in New York, Genscher firmly underscored to Gromyko that the formulation on peaceful change was a fundamental interest of the FRG. In response, Gromyko formulated a new suggestion:
The participating states consider that their frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, only through peaceful means and by agreement.80

When Chancellor Schmidt paid a visit to Moscow in late October 1974, Brezhnev again pressed for a rapid conclusion of the CSCE. Schmidt believed that the end was near, and stressed that the FRG had only one vital interest in the CSCE: the formulation on peaceful change of frontiers needed to have the same status as other principles.81 In the simultaneous meeting of Foreign Ministers, Genscher pointed out that there were contradictory versions of the Soviet proposal making the rounds. Gromyko confirmed that the version he himself had delivered in New York was false, the correct Soviet proposal stated that frontiers could be changed ‘only in accordance with international law’. Van Well intervened and told the meeting that the Kissinger formulation registered in Geneva was the common position of the Nine and the Fifteen, not a unilateral US or West German position. The Soviets retorted that naturally everyone would follow the West Germans on this.82 Later, van Well accused the Soviets of having done all of this on purpose to isolate the FRG.83

Meanwhile the pressure on the FRG was also growing from the US side. There were repeated demands for a stronger West German ownership of the floating sentence. State Department officials pointed out that the US having presented the formulation on peaceful change, as agreed by Genscher and Kissinger, as a proposal of its own in Geneva on 26 July had been an ‘accident’. The Europeans should take responsibility of their own demands and count only on silent US support.84 During his visit to Moscow in late October 1974, Kissinger had told Brezhnev that the US could approve all solutions to the declaration of principles as long as they were acceptable to the FRG.85 The same degree of flexibility was conveyed in the Vladivostok summit between Ford and Brezhnev in late November. In the West German analysis this was further evidence of US ambiguity – Alliance solidarity was increasingly outweighed by a need to accommodate the Soviets in the CSCE in return for progress in SALT and MBFR.86

This ambiguity was finally cleared away on 6 December 1974, when Genscher discussed the CSCE with Kissinger in Washington. Kissinger, who was personally not in the least bit interested in the matter and considered its minute details ‘totally ridiculous’, declared that the US was willing to take the heat from the Soviet Union in the question of peaceful change, so that the FRG could step aside from the line of fire. In Kissinger’s view all the problems in this regard during the autumn were due to Soviet misinformation.87 The specialists of both foreign ministries were tasked to consult each other on the tactics for the final stretch.88
As a result of these US-West German consultations, which were continued in January 1975, the preferred option was the formulation registered in Geneva on 26 July 1974, but two fall-back options were formulated, each moving the attribute ‘according to international law’ a step further towards the end of the sentence. Genscher himself weighed in, emphasizing that he had serious doubts about the inclusion of the word ‘only’, also if used in the context ‘their frontiers can be changed only by peaceful means’. Hence, the West Germans were not willing to accommodate the fourth option that contained this word.89

The FRG had agreed to the US maintaining contact with the Soviet Union in this issue, but the West Germans were not consulted in advance about the US decision to suddenly deliver the first agreed fall-back option to the Soviet embassy in Washington on 21 January:

The participating states consider in accordance with international law that their frontiers can be changed through peaceful means and by agreement.90

While the Soviet response to this US proposal was pending, the FRG turned to its European allies. Having learned from the past mistake of being left isolated in Geneva in April 1974, the FRG had since then constantly made certain that it had the support of the Nine for the current formulations on peaceful change.91 In mid-February 1975, van Well told US Ambassador Hillenbrand in Bonn that if necessary, the FRG, with the support of the Nine, was prepared for a confrontation with the Soviet Union over peaceful change. The timing of this confrontation was decisive: under no circumstances should the West agree to a second reading of the declaration of principles before the issue of peaceful change was resolved.92 The same message was delivered by Blech, whom Genscher had handpicked to lead the FRG delegation in Geneva in November 1974, to a leading member of the Soviet delegation. Despite Soviet attempts to the contrary, the West Germans did not engage in bilateral negotiations with them on the text on peaceful change. Instead, Blech pointed out, the West was expecting a Soviet response to the latest US proposal.93

The response finally came from Gromyko on 17 February, when he met Kissinger in Geneva. In this meeting the Soviet Foreign Minister made yet another counter-proposal:

The participating states consider that their frontiers can be changed in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement.

Although Kissinger suspected that the placement of the reference to international law might be problematic, he promised to consult the Allies and get back to the Soviets on this suggestion. In the US analysis, the disappearance of the word ‘only’ was a major Soviet concession.94
The Auswärtiges Amt was still not completely satisfied. Although the absence of ‘only’ was a step in the right direction, the latest Soviet proposal still contained dangerous elements. For the FRG, all changes of frontiers were in accordance with international law, if they occurred by peaceful means and by agreement. There was no need for a third condition, that of being in accordance with international law. Therefore the FRG preferred a previous version where the reference to international law was further up. If that was not to be achieved, the FRG could, however, accept the Gromyko proposal with one final modification. The FRG would need to insist on the insertion of another comma, between the words ‘changed’ and ‘in accordance’. This was a formulation, when included in the first principle, covering sovereign equality, that the FRG could defend in the EPC and in NATO:

The participating states consider that their frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement.95

The West German response was delivered through bilateral US-Soviet contacts. A week later, on 1 March, it was confirmed through the same channel that the Soviet Union was willing to accept the West German version with the additional comma.96 Van Well informed his colleagues in the Nine about this on 3 March, so that an agreement could be quickly reached in NATO as well, before confirming the formulation to the Soviet Union.97 The West German delegation in Geneva was instructed accordingly on 4 March. In van Well’s view, after agreement of the NATO caucus, this new formulation in connection with Principle 1 should be registered by the US delegation on behalf of the Fifteen.98 On 10 March the Soviet Union confirmed its agreement to the same formulation in a Russian version.99 The US delegation registered the formulation officially on 17 March.

This registration finally ended the battle over peaceful change. As peculiar and petty as the details behind the development of this one sentence may seem, to the Federal Republic it was the essence of the whole CSCE. The rest of the sixty-page Final Act absolutely paled in comparison with these less than two dozen words and the two commas included. From the perspective of Bonn, the option of peaceful change was directly connected with the ‘state of peace in Europe’ the FRG wanted to create. The floating sentence, once it had found its place in the declaration of principles in the Final Act, left a small back door open for the possibility of German unification.
Basket III: Human Contacts

Basket III, with its provisions for cooperation in humanitarian fields, was another topic of particular importance to the FRG. As we have seen in preceding chapters, in the Western conference preparations the FRG had constantly defended a careful step-by-step approach. Instead of provoking conflicts with the Soviet Union and thus endangering the inclusion of humanitarian issues on the conference agenda altogether, one needed to choose a less aggressive tone. For the FRG, Basket III was not a symbolic tool to be used for propaganda purposes. On the contrary, in the inner-German context Basket III could amount to something very tangible. Avoiding controversies in this area was essential for the FRG because of the people-to-people contacts between the two German states. Finding common ground in the multilateral context might further help in facilitating these contacts on the ground. It was precisely due to these Deutschlandpolitik reasons that improving contacts between people was one of the main ideas of West German CSCE policy.

Consequently, ‘human contacts’ was the topic of the first major substantive intervention the West German delegation made early on in the MPT in Dipoli. Presenting this proposal to his fellow heads of delegation in the Dipoli plenary in February 1973, Brunner underlined that a key concept of détente was to make existing frontiers more permeable, not to set new limits to contacts, nor to get rid of any social systems. Personal contacts were one of the three pillars of détente, equally important as security and cooperation. When it came to the discussion of Basket III items in the EPC and NATO, the FRG volunteered to take a leading role in preparing the Western position on human contacts, an element of Basket III which in the West German view had received too little attention. In particular, it was the question of reunification of families that the FRG was interested in. The task of preparing this West German contribution was given to the same civil servant in the CSCE unit of the Auswärtiges Amt who had already a few years earlier developed the first operational draft on human contacts.

On 25 April 1973, at the opening session of the fourth Dipoli round, the FRG delegation appealed for much more progress in Basket III. It was precisely in this basket where the results of détente could be of their most concrete use for individual citizens. In the West German view the goal should be to achieve practical means of cross-border contacts and cooperation in spite of the different systems. In this regard the MPT produced a desired result, since the West, in no small part due to West German efforts, managed to secure a place for ‘human contacts’ as the first separate agenda item in Basket III of the Blue Book. Despite Dutch willingness to
confront the Soviet Union openly in drafting the terms of reference for Basket III, the more realistic line the FRG had called for, focusing on the achievable, prevailed in the caucuses of the Nine and NATO in Dipoli.103

As the Foreign Ministers convened in Helsinki for the opening Stage I of the CSCE in July 1973, the FRG delegation circulated two text proposals for Basket III, formulations for a resolution on reunification of families on the one hand, and on improvement of working conditions of journalists on the other.104 These two elements hence formed the basis of West German efforts in Basket III; all other issues were of secondary importance.

As soon as Stage II was opened in Geneva, the Soviet Union began to lobby for an extremely restrictive preamble for the text concerning human contacts and exchange of information. As Gromyko told Scheel in Moscow in October 1973, the Soviet Union had nothing against agreements in this field as long as they did not contradict national sovereignty, the principle of non-interference in internal affairs and the internal legislation of each country.105 This would, in effect, have made all formulations that followed null and void. Working against these attempts to neutralise the contents of Basket III was defined as one of the main goals of the Nine in the EPC document on CSCE strategy and objectives, which was drafted during the autumn of 1973.106

Regardless of Soviet stagnation in Geneva, the West Germans, for their part, were not too concerned. In mid-December 1973 van Well told the interministerial CSCE working group in Bonn that in spite of the problems encountered in Basket III so far the mere fact of the humanitarian issues being on the conference agenda had already been useful. Having a multilateral reference point made it easier to address the same topics bilaterally with the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries.107 The same realism was reflected in an internal ‘argument catalogue’ on the uses of the CSCE for the West that von Groll drafted in early 1974. For von Groll it was crystal clear that the CSCE was not going to be suitable for use as an instrument forcing the East to change its system. The West could only hope to mitigate the East–West confrontation by increased contacts.108

In its role as the rotating EC President for the first half of 1974, the FRG’s influence on Western decision making was even stronger than usually. Since the Nine had evolved to become the major Western actor in Geneva, the importance of this role had not escaped the Soviet attention either. In January 1974 Brezhnev, who was increasingly frustrated with the slow process towards a summit-level Stage III, wrote to Brandt, repeating the well known Soviet reservations on Basket III. Expansion of contacts and exchanges could only occur with respect to non-interference in internal affairs and to sovereignty, laws and customs of each country. In his response, Brandt gave assurances that the FRG was not interested in creat-
ing controversy, and that the aim of Basket III was not to touch on internal structures of participating states. Brandt also promised to instruct the West German delegation in Geneva to continue working constructively.\textsuperscript{109}

This was not enough for the Soviet Union. When Bahr visited Moscow at the end of February, Brezhnev accused the FRG of the procrastination of the Nine in Geneva. In Brezhnev’s view, not all petty things could be solved at the same time, one should focus on the big issues. Was it not enough, as a first step, to cooperate and not to wage war, the Soviet leader exclaimed. Brezhnev demanded a more active role of Chancellor Brandt in highlighting the importance of progress in the CSCE.\textsuperscript{110}

Brandt did not exactly raise his profile in CSCE issues as a result of Brezhnev’s demands. But when it came to the assessment of the importance of Basket III in general, neither Brandt nor Bahr thought too highly of it. When the CSCE was discussed in the Federal Security Council in early April, Brandt argued that the CSCE should not turn into a permanent event. Prolonging Stage II because of Basket III issues was, in Brandt’s view, useless, since there was not much meaningful to be expected from Basket III.\textsuperscript{111} In fact, already a year earlier, in May 1973, both Brandt and Bahr had pejoratively referred to the CSCE as the ‘cultural pages’ (Feuilleton), whereas MBFR was the more important and serious business.\textsuperscript{112}

In Foreign Minister Scheel’s order of priorities the CSCE in general figured higher up, but he was not prepared to go to extremes on Basket III either. The focus remained on facilitating ‘human contacts’, nothing more ambitious or provocative. As far West German objectives in Basket III were concerned, Scheel wrote to Kissinger in April 1974, it was in particular due to public opinion that there needed to be tangible results in the improvement of ‘human contacts’.\textsuperscript{113} Scheel’s successor agreed with this. In the NATO ministerial meeting in Ottawa in June 1974, the new Foreign Minister Genscher argued that in Basket III ‘we owe it to our people that we achieve improvements for individuals’.\textsuperscript{114}

Meanwhile, the FRG delegation in Geneva was growing thoroughly frustrated with Soviet intransigence in Basket III. It was unacceptable to have the left hand destroy what had just been achieved with the right hand, von Groll wrote, referring to the restrictive preamble pushed by the Warsaw Pact time and again, in effect neutralising all achievements in the operative texts.\textsuperscript{115} Speaking for the Nine, Genscher articulated this disappointment in a statement in early June 1974. The CSCE could be an important milestone in détente, but this required following the Helsinki final recommendations. The Nine had shown flexibility in the declaration of principles, therefore the Foreign Ministers of the Nine were disappointed at the lack of progress in important topics such as improvement
of human contacts and dissemination of and access to information, as well as confidence-building measures.\textsuperscript{116}

In private discussions, however, neither Genscher nor Chancellor Schmidt were too keen on all of the positions the Nine held in Geneva. For instance in early July 1974, at a high-level meeting with their Belgian counterparts, Schmidt and Genscher showed understanding for Brezhnev’s desire to conclude the CSCE rapidly. In Schmidt’s view the West should not lose further time in Geneva with unimportant problems. Instead, it should make up its mind on which issues were of absolute importance to it. ‘A change in the Soviet constitution will certainly not be achieved by wishes expressed in Basket III’, Schmidt said. Genscher concurred, arguing that the West should drop half of its demands in Basket III. One should differentiate between information and human contacts – the number of Western newspapers sold at Soviet kiosks was hardly as important as a minimum level of improvements in personal contacts, something that directly concerned the inner-German relations.\textsuperscript{117}

With the Nixon–Brezhnev summit in the summer of 1974 the pressure for concluding Stage II mounted. In their joint communiqué in early July, the US and the Soviet Union agreed on a very positive wording regarding the CSCE and favoured its final stage taking place at an early date, with the assumption that the results would permit the CSCE to be concluded at the highest level. To intensify the negotiations in Geneva accordingly, Kissinger urged the Fifteen to come up with a list of eight or ten essential points the West required for the conclusion of Stage II.\textsuperscript{118}

Meeting Kissinger directly after his return from the Moscow summit, Genscher quickly made the distinction in West German priorities clear: for the FRG, humanitarian issues were far more important than exchange of information. Genscher and Kissinger also agreed that the preamble of Basket III could contain a reference to ‘respect for laws and regulations’, but nothing further on political, economic and cultural restrictions. Moreover, Genscher proposed that the FRG would take the initiative in defining Western essentials, first convincing the current EPC President, France, to have the Political Committee of the Nine draw up the list, then to have it delivered to the NATO Council, and finally to have the delegations of the Fifteen in Geneva instructed accordingly.\textsuperscript{119}

The paper that came out of the consultations of the Nine in early September 1974 took many West German amendments into account, and listed the following issues as particularly important in Basket III: (a) improvements in reunification of families, marriages, travel and movement of people; (b) better access to foreign news and improvement of working conditions of journalists; (c) better access to books and cultural exchange.\textsuperscript{120}
At the highest level, however, patience with the Geneva negotiations was wearing thin. When Schmidt visited Moscow in late October 1974, Brezhnev again pressed for a rapid conclusion of the CSCE. Schmidt believed that the final stretch was indeed approaching. To facilitate this, he told Brezhnev, he had instructed the FRG delegation in Geneva to act with restraint in the controversial issues in Basket III. The FRG had only one vital interest in the CSCE: the principle of peaceful change. In a confidential one-on-one discussion, Schmidt added that the excessive ambitions of individual diplomats were to blame for the current problems in Basket III. He, Schmidt, was against these artificial measures and had instructed the West German delegation not to engage in any further activities in Basket III. He promised to undertake everything to make sure that the CSCE was concluded successfully and soon.

Indeed, there was not much West German activity in Basket III to speak of during the final months of the Geneva talks. Efforts were concentrated on peaceful change and confidence-building measures. Above all, as soon as the agreement on the text concerning reunification of families was reached on 2 December 1974, the main goal of the Federal Republic had been achieved. In mid-January 1975 the Auswärtiges Amt concluded that all the humanitarian questions most important to the FRG, in particular the reunification of families, were closed in a relatively satisfying manner. Its other pet project, the facilitation of working conditions of journalists, was still an unresolved issue, but the FRG no longer saw any essential problems in Basket III. Completing the negotiations on Basket III might still be delayed due to French interests in the realm of culture, but this suited the FRG well, giving it time to concentrate on its own fundamental interests in Basket I. In their own analysis, the French had already admitted that with the West German needs satisfied, there was not much help to be expected from Bonn in pushing for further Soviet concessions in Basket III.

As Stage II in Geneva was about to be closed in July 1975, the European Council gave a declaration on the CSCE. In it, the Nine highlighted the importance of the conference results, yet regretted that not as much had been achieved in the field of freedom of movement as had been desired. For the FRG, however, the results in Basket III were completely sufficient. Its expectations had been limited to begin with. As one of the key officials in the Auswärtiges Amt formulated it in March 1975, the CSCE was not an instrument for the West to force systemic changes in the East – instead, the task of the conference could only be to agree on common rules for peaceful cooperation. For the FRG, Basket III was not about scoring propaganda victories or about high-profile human rights cases like Saharov.
and Solzhenitsyn. Instead, the FRG was interested in achieving concrete steps to improve the situation of ordinary people, above all in divided Germany. The formulation on ‘human contacts’ agreed in the multilateral context was a valuable reference point for the day-to-day bilateral relationship with the GDR.

But of course not all West German attempts to use the CSCE for Deutsch-landpolitik purposes were successful. A living proof of failures is the final brief storyline of this chapter, the stubborn effort to find a role for Berlin in the CSCE.

**Follow-up and Berlin**

Egon Bahr’s idea of using Berlin as a CSCE location, already discussed in the previous chapter, continued to resurface during the early years of the conference proper, often following the ebbs and tides of the overall political situation concerning the vulnerable situation of this city. At a meeting of the interministerial CSCE working group in Bonn in January 1973, von Staden once more referred to the idea of Berlin as a conference location. At that moment the situation, neither in terms of the Berlin question nor in terms of the negotiations in Dipoli, was not suitable for pushing this. Should the circumstances change, however, von Staden was willing to take the idea again to the Bonn Group.128

In late January, von Groll devoted an extensive memorandum to the potential role of Berlin as hosting some parts of the CSCE or its possible follow-up bodies. Weighing up the pros and cons of having one of the actual CSCE stages held in Berlin, either West Berlin or ‘greater Berlin’, von Groll came to the conclusion that in all scenarios the negative aspects seemed to outweigh the positive ones. Yet as far as having a CSCE follow-up machinery meet in West Berlin was concerned, the situation was different – von Groll saw many potential benefits in it.129 By contrast, the legal department of the Auswärtiges Amt strongly argued against the use of Berlin in this context, both as a conference location and as a seat for a follow-up body.130

The fact that this was seriously considered in Bonn at all is interesting, given that the official position of the FRG concerning the follow-up to the CSCE at the time remained unchanged: follow-up should only be discussed when the conference results were clear. However, in the event of the creation of a permanent body or committee, the Federal Government continued to maintain the option of offering Berlin as its site.131 During the spring of 1973, Bahr constantly advocated Berlin in internal discussions in Bonn, arguing that a permanent follow-up body located in Berlin would not only increase attention to the divided city but also con-
solidate US presence in Europe, due to its role as one of the Four Powers responsible for Berlin. Bahr also raised the issue in Anglo-West German consultations in early March 1973, stating that he would rather see a possible follow-up body in Berlin than in any other location. Sir Thomas Brimelow from the FCO informed Kissinger about this a few days later in Washington, noting that ‘history shows that Bahr is a persistent man when he has an idea in his head’.

In a cabinet meeting focusing on the CSCE in early June 1973, Scheel also referred to the role of Berlin. Due to difficult status issues, the FRG had refrained from offering Berlin as a location for one of the conference stages. The same reasons also posed difficulties on a potential use of Berlin as a seat for a possible follow-up body. Nonetheless, the option was still kept open.

Further testimony to this option being alive was one of the texts that the FRG submitted at Stage I in Helsinki in July 1973. The West German paper on scientific cooperation suggested creating a scientific forum – in West Berlin. This suggestion had already been agreed on in advance with the Bonn Group, thoroughly discussed in the EPC and also preliminarily consulted with the Soviets. Referring to this suggestion, Diesel and Brunner both argued that it was important to ‘get something for Berlin’ from the CSCE. Scheel’s speech in Helsinki also included a thinly veiled reference to Berlin: ‘Would it … be too much to ask whether this very Conference does not afford an opportunity to outline in one form or another Berlin’s new role as the symbol of détente in the heart of Europe?’

When Bahr visited London in late October, he told his British interlocutors that the FRG had no direct interest in establishing a CSCE follow-up body. On the other hand, it might provide opportunities to tie the US closer to Europe as well as give its possible seat, Berlin, an additional element of psychological security. In December, the interministerial CSCE group in Bonn discussed a potential Berlin seat for two bodies possibly established by the CSCE: in addition to a science forum there was now also talk about an information centre on technological cooperation. And as late as January 1974, von Groll declared it as an agreed West German position that as part of the conference follow-up the FRG would attempt to achieve such a new organisation – not a political body but a specialised agency – in West Berlin, in order to contribute to the international ‘visibility’ of the city and to counter Soviet attempts to isolate it.

On 20 November 1973 Bahr spoke in Paris about his idea, but by then the French had already decided that the West Germans should be discouraged of whatever temptations they might have regarding the institutionalisation of the CSCE in West Berlin. In early 1974, the Nine unanimously dismissed the idea of a political body with general responsibilities as a
follow-up formation. This was spelled out in the document on ‘Les suites de la CSCE’ of the sous-comité, endorsed by the Political Committee and the Foreign Ministers. Instead, it envisioned an interim period of three to four years after the conference before a reassessment of follow-up needs was to be made. In late February, Bahr wrote to Scheel to protest against these developments in the EC consultations. In Bahr’s view the establishment of a permanent CSCE follow-up body in West Berlin was in the national interest of the FRG. In his response, Scheel told Bahr that not a single Western country favoured a permanent body, and not even the East seriously demanded a permanent seat for follow-up any more. The Nine and the Fifteen had been very reluctant to discuss follow-up at all, and changing that in the current negotiating situation was very unlikely. It was not possible for the FRG to suddenly dismiss Western solidarity over this issue.

On 3 April 1974, when the CSCE was discussed in the Federal Security Council, Bahr made his final appeal for Berlin as a location for the follow-up body. In vain, since this was also the last time it was heard of. With Brandt’s resignation in early May and Bahr’s departure from the Chancellery, the main – and often the only – advocate of this idea had left the scene. There were also other reasons for the disappearance of the Berlin proposal. In late spring 1974 the situation in Berlin was extremely tense due to the West German decision to establish the federal environmental agency in West Berlin. In the Soviet view, this was a violation of the Berlin agreement. Additional problems concerning Berlin were the last thing that the new government of Schmidt and Genscher wanted. But above all, by the spring of 1974 there were no longer any prospects for gaining Allied support for a follow-up body in Berlin. The potential benefits for the situation on Berlin were clearly outweighed by the risks of insisting on the idea. Accordingly, the brainchild of Bahr was permanently forgotten.

Conclusion

Thirty-five heads of state and government were in the limelight during the hot summer days in Helsinki in July and August 1975, when the Final Act of the CSCE was signed. Yet at least among the Western leaders the enthusiasm had its limits. Few of them had been directly involved in the negotiations or even too interested in them – in Kissinger’s words, one would have had to be a Talmudic scholar to fully understand all the nuts and bolts of the text of the Final Act. Schmidt and Genscher, however, had all reason to be satisfied with the result. The fundamental West German interest, the possibility of peaceful change of frontiers, had been success-
fully defended. In this defensive battle, assertive involvement at the highest levels had been required, but these efforts had ultimately paid off.

As has been shown above, when it came to the core interests of the Federal Republic, Schmidt and Genscher did not hesitate, if necessary, to take a few steps back from the regular CSCE method of Western caucuses in the EPC and NATO frameworks. In the legal-linguistic trench war over the formulations concerning peaceful change, the CSCE specialists in Geneva and Bonn were sidelined and the key decisions were taken in the Genscher–Kissinger–Gromyko triangle.

At the same, this was only the tip of the iceberg – and the exception to the rule. The bulk of the sixty-page Final Act was the result of the expertise and perseverance of countless civil servants in the committees and subcommittees in Geneva. Here the West German role had not been as visible as one could have expected after the preparatory phases. In the vast majority of the issues covered by the Final Act, the FRG had done its homework already pre-emptively, during the run-up to the Dipoli talks. Having influenced the agenda decisively already in advance, the FRG could afford to take a slightly less outspoken role in those issues where its major priorities had already been inserted into the Western preparations. Whenever the EPC coordination ran according to Bonn’s plans, West German interests were pursued in Europe’s name. It was only in issues with direct relevance to Deutschlandpolitik that a more active approach was called for.

Notes

2. PAAA, B150, 323, van Well to Gehlhoff, Genscher, 21 Feb 1975.
4. Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations, 8 June 1973; for a helpful graph on the committee structure of Stage II, see DBPO III/II, Appendix I, 480.
5. According to Möckli, European Foreign Policy, 111.
8. PAAA, B28, 109312, von Staden (AA) to Helsinki, 9 Nov 1972.
9. PAAA, B28, 109312, von Staden (AA) to Helsinki, 10 Nov 1972.
10. For the more detailed day-to-day exchange of telegrams on this matter, see PAAA, B28, 109312; and Spohr Readman, 'National Interests'.
34. PAAA, B150, 274, Diesel to StS, 27 Feb 1973. See also Möckli, European Foreign Policy, 123–135.
40. PAAA, B150, 278, von Groll to van Well, 19 Apr 1973.
44. ADMAE, 2982, 28 May 1973.
1972–75: Deutschlandpolitik at the Conference


47. PAAA, B9, 178364, 11th meeting of the IMAG-KSZE, 17 Dec 1973.
54. PAAA, B150, 302, meeting of the BSR, 3 Apr 1974.
55. PAAA, B150, 304, von Groll (Geneva) to AA, 1 May 1974.
56. AAPD 1974, doc 102, footnote 7, CSCE/II/A/126, 5 Apr 1974; PAAA, B150, 304, Fleischhauer to 212, 8 May 1974.
59. PAAA, B150, 304, von Groll (Geneva) to AA, 1 May 1974.
60. AAPD 1974, doc 140, Fleischhauer to 212, 2 May 1974; PAAA, B150, 305, Brunner (Geneva) to AA, 24 May 1974; for a review of the developments, see also PAAA, B150, 316, German CSCE delegation to AA, 14 Nov 1974.
61. Author’s interviews with Genscher and Blech.
62. DBPO III/II, doc 86, Fall to Tickell, 17 June 1974.
70. PAAA, B150, 308, Schenk to Gehlhoff, Genscher, 1 July 1974.
73. PAAA, B150, 308, van Well to Geneva, 10 July 1974.
74. PAAA, B150, 308, Steffler to embassies, 12 July 1974.
76. AAPD 1974, doc 223, footnote 8, Brunner (Geneva) to AA, 26 July 1974. See also FRUS 1969-76, vol XXXIX, editorial note 239.
77. PAAA, B150, 308, Schenk to Gehlhoff, Genscher, 15 July 1974.
85. PAAA, B150, 316, van Well to Gehlhoff, Genscher, 18 Nov 1974.
89. PAAA, B150, 317, von Well to Gehlhoff, Genscher, 29 Nov 1974.
91. PAAA, B150, 322, van Well to Gehlhoff, Genscher, 21 Feb 1975.
92. PAAA, B150, 324, Meyer-Landrut to van Well, Gehlhoff, 21 Feb 1975.
93. PAAA, B150, 323, meeting Blech-Mendelevitsh, 12 Feb 1975.
95. PAAA, B150, 323, van Well to Gehlhoff, Genscher, 21 Feb 1975.
97. PAAA, B150, 324, Meyer-Landrut to van Well, Gehlhoff, 21 Feb 1975.
98. PAAA, B150, 324, van Well to Geneva, 21 Feb 1975.
99. PAAA, B150, 324, von Groll (Geneva) to AA, 10 Mar 1975.
100. PAAA, B28, 100001, Brunner (Helsinki) to AA, 6 Feb 1973.
101. PAAA, B150, 275, IMAG-KSZE meeting, 22 Feb 1973; see also Mayer, National Foreign Policy, 134-5.
103. PAAA, B9, 178364, IMAG-KSZE meeting, 7 Sep 1973.
108. PAAA, B9, 178364, von Groll to Dg 21, Leiter 02, 4 Jan 1974.
110. AAPD 1974, doc 64, meeting Bahr-Brezhnev, 27 Feb 1974; PAAA, B150, 299, Bahr (Moscow) to Brandt and Scheel, 28 Feb 1974.
111. PAAA, B150, 302, meeting of the BSR, 3 Apr 1974.
118. AAPD 1974, doc 197, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 4 July 1974; AAPD 1974, doc 199, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 5 July 1974; PAAA, B150, 308, Boss (Natogerma) to AA, 10 July 1974.
120. PAAA, B150, 312, van Well (Paris) to AA, 10 Sep 1974.
123. AAPD 1974, doc 351, Boss (Natogerma) to AA, 3 Dec 1974.
127. PAAA, B150, 325, Gehl to Helsinki, 19 Mar 1975.
139. PAAA, B9, 178364, IMAG-KSZE meeting, 17 Dec 1973.
140. PAAA, B9, 178364, von Groll to Dg 21, Leiter 02, 4 Jan 1974.
142. PAAA, B150, 298, von Groll (Geneva) to AA, 1 Feb 1974; PAAA, B150, 298, van Well to Frank, 4 Feb 1974.
143. PAAA, B150, 299, Bahr to Scheel, 26 Feb 1974.
145. PAAA, B150, 302, meeting of the BSR, 3 Apr 1974.
Chapter 7

CONCLUSION
Evolution Instead of Revolution

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ILLUSTRATION 7: Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (right) and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher during a Bundestag session in March 1975.

Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, B 145 Bild-00114645,
Photographer: Ludwig Wegmann.
The Federal Republic of Germany has always regarded the renunciation of the use or threat of use of force as the basis of its policy. This also applies to changes of frontiers. Frontiers are inviolable; but one must be able to change them by peaceful means and by agreement. It remains our aim to work for a state of peace in Europe in which the German nation will regain its unity through free self-determination.

– Chancellor Schmidt’s speech in Helsinki, August 1975

The Federal Government approves the results of the conference, continuing the policy of the Federal Republic to safeguard peace. This policy obliges us to promote détente. This policy obliges us to use the opportunity of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe steadfastly and without illusions for the people in divided Germany, for the people in divided Europe and for safeguarding peace on the continent.

– Foreign Minister Genscher to the Bundestag, July 1975

This book has charted the prehistory of the CSCE from the viewpoint of the Federal Republic. As outlined in the introduction, the main aim has been to analyse the role of the FRG in the intra-Western preparations of the conference, with the final chapter focusing on the practical implementation of these preparations in the conference. At the same time, an attempt has been made to participate in and contribute to broader scholarly discussions on the history of détente, of the CSCE and of West German foreign policy. This conclusion first summarises each of the preceding chapters, and then moves on to discuss wider implications of the key findings of this book for existing and future scholarship.

Chapter 2, covering the years 1966–69, focused above all on the domestic controversies in Bonn. In the Grand Coalition, foreign policy issues were increasingly contentious. All the parties represented in the Bundestag – the coalition partners CDU/CSU and SPD as well as the opposition FDP – talked about a ‘European peace order’ as a long-term goal, guiding the way forward from the impasse resulting from the anachronistic Hallstein Doctrine. As it turned out, the SPD and FDP definitions of such a peace order were converging, whereas the CDU/CSU, in particular after the Prague invasion in 1968, found less and less common ground with the Social Democrats. Well before the federal election of September 1969, then, the writing was on the wall for a Social-Liberal Coalition.

This became apparent also in the CSCE context. In the spring of 1969, after the Warsaw Pact issued its so-called Budapest Appeal for a conference, Foreign Minister Brandt began to take a more forthcoming view of the CSCE, whereas Chancellor Kiesinger maintained his sceptical attitude. Although these internal disagreements prevented the formulation of a coherent government line, the Grand Coalition years were significant for the
formation of the West German CSCE policy. Its essential characteristics were developed in Brandt’s Auswärtiges Amt. Egon Bahr was particularly active in arguing for the use of the CSCE as leverage, linking West German participation in the conference with preceding progress in bilateral Ostpolitik. On the other hand, Brandt himself showed interest in the agenda of the conference, possibly enabling gradual steps towards a European peace order.

These blueprints were to a large extent implemented immediately in the first year of the new Brandt Government, which was dominated by the negotiation of the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties. Regarding the CSCE, the ‘linkage’ approach prevailed in 1969–70. As Chapter 3 argued, the plans to link bilateral Ostpolitik with CSCE preparations materialised in the Bahr–Gromyko talks in Moscow in the spring of 1970. The strong West German commitment to support preparations for a CSCE contributed in part to the historic West German-Soviet agreement. Applied through Moscow, the linkage also seemed to have an impact on the GDR. At the same time, however, the Moscow Treaty of August 1970 was a clear watershed for this policy. The bilateral bargaining chip which could only be used once had now been spent.

Meanwhile, first studies preparing the ground for a Western CSCE position were launched in NATO. By mid-1970, these ideas for a conference agenda began to take shape, consisting of principles governing relations between states, freer movement and increased East–West cooperation, as well as military elements of security. For the FRG, the last topic was of particular importance, and the majority of West German efforts was spent on trying to ensure the inclusion of MBFR on the CSCE agenda. This focus on MBFR overshadowed other elements, but there were also first signs of a particular West German interest in freer movement as early as in the autumn of 1969. Nonetheless, the Auswärtiges Amt was somewhat slow in genuinely discovering the potential of working through multilateral fora in the Western CSCE preparations.

This transition to multilateralism in the years 1970–71 was the central theme of Chapter 4. In terms of the linkage, multilateralisation was a necessary reaction to the changed situation after the Moscow Treaty. Abandoning the idea of a link between an inner-German treaty and the CSCE, the FRG decided to turn its attention to the Berlin Agreement as an essential but only precondition for the conference. There was a discernible French influence in the arrival at this position. However, as the conclusion of the first stage of the Berlin negotiations approached in 1971 and France attempted to pave the way for a CSCE even before the final agreement, the FRG did not waver. For Bonn, the full Berlin precondition was not negotiable, and due to West German steadfastness that was also maintained as a NATO position.
From autumn 1970 onwards, there was new momentum in the multilateral CSCE preparations within the West. NATO stepped up its own efforts to outline an agenda for the CSCE. In this framework, the West German approach was at first predominantly defensive. The hard-fought bilateral achievements of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties had to be safeguarded in the multilateral setting, in particular regarding the potentially problematic repercussions of an agreement on borders. More generally, it was vital for the FRG to keep its Deutschlandpolitik options open. As before, elements of military security continued to top the West German wish list in the CSCE preparations conducted in NATO. But gradually, the FRG started to develop an interest in the cooperation aspects of the conference. This change coincided with the emergence of a completely new framework, European Political Cooperation, in the autumn of 1970. After initial hesitation, the FRG began to make full use of the EPC, alongside NATO, in its increasingly effective multilateral CSCE policy within the West. This was a result of a new level of activity in Bonn in the spring of 1971, as the Auswärtiges Amt finally began to get its act together. Now the FRG developed its step-by-step approach, arguing for the need to avoid unnecessary controversies at the beginning of East–West contacts.

As the opening of these East–West contacts drew near, the original ‘linkage’ plans began to turn against their authors. Chapter 5 argued that in 1971–72 the approaching multilateral preparatory talks of the CSCE increased pressure on the FRG to conclude the inner-German negotiations in time. The Brandt Government tied its hands conclusively in September 1971, when it decided that the Berlin Agreement was to remain the only precondition for the CSCE. An active linkage with the inner-German treaty was no longer an option. By December 1971 this was also locked in as a joint NATO position. In the summer of 1972, when the date for the MPT in Helsinki was already fixed for late November, the FRG opted to pursue a Basic Treaty with the GDR before that. In a remarkable reversal of Bahr’s initial plan, he was now himself under pressure to conclude the inner-German negotiations by a set deadline.

However, in the period covered in Chapter 5, the ‘linkage’ approach had already been completely outweighed by the conference agenda in West German deliberations. In the year leading to the Dipoli talks, the CSCE policy of the FRG turned into a multi-faceted interplay of defensive and offensive efforts in Western multilateralism. Deutschlandpolitik became the common denominator for these endeavours. Whereas the defence of the achievements of Ostpolitik was necessary in particular to keep the German question open, the emphasis on a gradual process approach, avoiding excessive polemics, was designed to alleviate the consequences
of division and to achieve small steps in the inner-German relationship. Freer movement was a case in point.

In 1971–72, the CSCE policy of the FRG was increasingly Europeanised, as the EPC proved to be a more effective forum than NATO. By late 1971, the FRG discovered an opening for a West German lead in both Western frameworks. This opportunity was seized vigorously, with an unprecedented burst of West German initiatives. In November 1971 the FRG was the first to suggest human rights as one of the principles governing relations between states, and in February 1972 the West Germans introduced the concept of peaceful change. By early 1972 the CSCE preparations in the West were dominated by West German working papers for virtually all possible agenda items. When the Federal Government approved the West German guidelines for the CSCE in May 1972, the FRG had clearly assumed the leading position within the West. Naturally, not all of the West German goals were achieved, but this lead was further consolidated in the subsequent attempts to arrive at joint Western negotiating positions for the MPT.

Finally, Chapter 6 showed how the FRG could enjoy the fruits of its extensive preparatory work with relative ease and distance during the actual conference, as far as the bulk of the CSCE topics were concerned. The Western agenda had to a large extent already been set before the start of the MPT in Dipoli, with an active West German influence. During the conference itself the FRG delegation no longer stood out due to an extraordinary amount of national contributions or registered texts submitted to the committees. Rather than being a signal of passivity or detachment, however, this only underscores the effectiveness of the European method from the West German perspective. When the coordination of the Nine worked smoothly, and as long as West German ideas were sufficiently represented through common EPC positions, this suited the FRG perfectly.

It was only when fundamental national interests were endangered that the more assertive face of West German CSCE policy was revealed. Issues with direct relevance for Deutschlandpolitik were simply too important to be left for European coordination alone. In these matters the political leadership in Bonn became directly involved in the search for the most effective means to defend West German interests. Also here, alliances and resolutions were primarily sought in the EPC and NATO frameworks. But if those were not adequate, the FRG did not hesitate to turn bilaterally to the US for assistance, as was the case with peaceful change. In the defence of Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik, form followed function.

* * *
Over the course of these chapters, this book has produced a range of new findings which are significant beyond the scope of this particular topic. The first important contribution to scholarship is simply the breadth of the body of evidence used in the research. Building on recently released documents from more than fifteen archives in eight countries, the book has been able to take an exceptionally thorough look at the multilateral European détente in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The complex interplay between NATO, EPC and the Bonn Group has not been studied in this detail before. In doing so, this book has underscored the importance of looking beyond the bipolar surface of Cold War and détente. It has also helped to highlight the interconnectedness of European integration and European détente. Nonetheless, this study has only been a first step. Further research is urgently needed to arrive at a more comprehensive understanding of the intra-Western dynamics of the Cold War.

Turning to the particular case at hand, the most obvious argument carrying the story in the book is that regardless of the original plans, West German CSCE policy soon shifted away from the approach emphasising instrumentalisation, linkages and short-term tactical considerations. Instead, the substance of the CSCE as part of a long-term strategy, based on the concept of a European peace order, overtook the earlier deliberations. This book has argued that the link between these two approaches was Deutschlandpolitik. As soon as the prospects of improving the inner-German situation within the CSCE rather than outside it were realised, the FRG, which had been the main obstacle to the CSCE, became its main proponent in the West. As soon as Deutschlandpolitik interests were involved, the political leadership in Bonn was vigilant.

The evolution from ‘linkage’ goals towards agenda concerns also highlighted the parallel nature of Ostpolitik and the CSCE, which is a further novel contribution of this book. As pointed out in the introduction, one of the few blind spots in existing scholarship on West German foreign policy has been the early interaction between bilateral and multilateral policies. This book has argued that instead of being just the multilateral corona- tion for Brandt’s bilateral achievements, the CSCE accompanied Ostpolitik throughout the period covered here. Admittedly, as has been pointed out in Chapter 3, the West Germans were also at first slow to identify all the opportunities inherent in the conference. But once the bureaucratic machinery in Bonn began to move, the CSCE turned out to be an ideal framework for pushing the limits of the sovereignty of the Federal Republic.

Regarding the West German role in the West, this book has pointed out that at first, unwillingness to offend its major allies continued to limit the FRG’s actions. The West Germans were constantly alert to their position vis-à-vis the Three Powers. Of these three, the relationship with the UK
was fairly unproblematic – in spite of the often stinging internal remarks by FCO officials about their West German colleagues, the official line in London was to follow the West German lead in the CSCE. But in a latter-day version of the Gaullism-Atlanticism dilemma, the Federal Republic often found itself in a difficult spot between the US and France. As has been shown in the preceding chapters, at the best of times this led to helpful West German mediation within the Alliance, at the worst of times to hesitation and incoherence in the West German line. Only in the case of peaceful change did the FRG choose a direct bilateral channel with the US.

With the ascendancy of the EPC, the inherent tension between Paris and Washington became even more apparent in the EPC–NATO relationship. In the beginning, the FRG was the most loyal of European NATO members, opposing any tasks for the EPC that overlapped with the topics already discussed in NATO, even seeing itself as the US’s advocate in the EPC. Over time, however, the FRG began to pursue its own interests more assertively and take the lead in the making of Western CSCE policy. Accordingly, the FRG was also prepared to risk disagreements with the major Allies in matters it considered important, such as the Berlin precondition in the case of France, and the freer movement approach in the case of the US.

The rapid West German learning process in the uses of multilateralism has been a central theme in this book. Depending on the issues involved, the FRG sought different constellations within the West. As early as in 1969, the Bonn Group was engaged as a control mechanism, filtering out problematic Deutschlandpolitik-related CSCE questions in advance. In the spring of 1972, particularly in the context of freer movement, the West Germans increasingly utilised the EPC as a clearing house to arrive at joint positions for NATO discussions. When it suited its interests, the FRG also forged ad hoc alliances, such as with the US and the UK in order to persuade Canada and Turkey to give in on the question of self-determination of peoples and human rights in 1972. With all these options to choose from, the multilateral framework broadened the West German room for manoeuvre.

Moreover, this discovery of multilateralism was a broader phenomenon, going beyond being an effective tool in individual cases. One of the essential arguments of this book has been that from the perspective of Bonn, the multilateral nature of the CSCE was valuable in itself. Well before the actual conference in 1973–75, the West Germans saw the CSCE as a means for the Federal Republic to control European détente, acting as an antidote to a potentially dangerous rise of bilateralism. As has been argued in Chapter 5, by early 1972 at the latest the FRG began actively to pursue jointly agreed negotiating positions of the West for the East–West
negotiations. Having itself already gained most of what was to be gained from its own bilateral Ostpolitik, the FRG stood only to lose if its allies were to approach the East individually. In contrast, the CSCE platform provided the FRG with its first opportunity to operate in the international sphere on an equal footing with others. Therefore it was crucial for the FRG to raise all future détente efforts to the multilateral level. Effective multilateralism helped the FRG safeguard its essential national interests and defend the accomplishments of Ostpolitik. There were also exceptions to the rule, though, as we have seen in the final chapter. When the inner-German relationship and the distant prospect of unification were somehow involved, the FRG did not hesitate to revert to bilateral arrangements if necessary.

The general multilateralisation of détente was accompanied by a particular feature of the CSCE process. Intensifying CSCE consultations in the various Western constellations saw the influence of individual officials rise to unprecedented heights. Although major policy changes still required a high-level blessing, in the CSCE context a large number of important decisions were actually taken on a fairly low level. In the EPC and in NATO, the CSCE was the playing field of a handful of foreign ministry officials. Enjoying a fairly high degree of independence, individual middle-rank officials specialising in CSCE affairs were able to punch above their weight and exert a formidable influence in Western CSCE policy formulations. This characteristic, typical of the CSCE process throughout the Geneva phase in 1973–75, has been referred to in existing literature often enough. The novel aspect of this book, however, has been to show how far advanced this ‘bureaucratisation’ of the CSCE in the West was already well before that. And in fact, as the involvement of Genscher shows, during crucial phases of the Geneva years politicians were back in the CSCE with a vengeance.

During the preparatory phases, however, direct political intervention in the work of CSCE officials was rare in all the Western countries, but nowhere was this phenomenon more apparent than in the FRG. The preceding chapters have made it clear that in Bonn, in striking contrast to the Chancellery-driven bilateral Ostpolitik, the CSCE preparations were firmly in the hands of individual diplomats in the Auswärtiges Amt. This resulted partly from the general nature of the CSCE discussion in the West, but also from the particular German circumstances. As soon as Brandt moved from the Auswärtiges Amt to the Chancellery in 1969, his interest in the substance of the CSCE began to fade. Whereas Chancellor Brandt saw concrete disarmament projects such as MBFR as the most important form of multilateral détente, he doubted whether the CSCE would amount to much more than a talking shop. In this, he was supported by Bahr, who
A State of Peace in Europe

had from the outset had a rather cynical approach to the security conference. Accordingly, the few direct interventions the Chancellery made in the CSCE policy of the FRG during the Brandt era were always either about MBFR or an instrumentalisation of the conference – Bahr’s pet project of Berlin as a CSCE host being a particularly exotic example.

Thus, it was the Auswärtiges Amt where the substantive CSCE policy was made. After a weak start in office, Foreign Minister Scheel began to make his presence felt, but his direct involvement in the specific details of the CSCE preparations was by necessity limited. Individual officials did most of the spadework. In the specific case of the CSCE, these efforts, which may have appeared minuscule to outside observers, had large-scale political ramifications. Moreover, in the small and exclusive bureaucratic circle responsible for the CSCE, the enthusiasm of certain individuals played a major role. This was witnessed by the qualitative and quantitative change in West German efforts following the entry of Götz von Groll and Jürgen Diesel to the scene in 1970–71, responsible for the CSCE and EPC, respectively. Their activity on the working level was supported further up in the chain of command in the Auswärtiges Amt, above all by Political Director Berndt von Staden and State Secretary Paul Frank.

In the previous chapters, Allied insinuations of a lack of coherence in the West German CSCE position occasionally popped up. They were not wholly unfounded, for there certainly were several curious episodes caused by solo acts without explicit instructions, most notably those of Ambassador Grewe with MBFR in March 1970 and of Bahr with the Berlin precondition in November 1971. Moreover, when clear instructions did exist, certain officials, particularly in the West German NATO mission in Brussels, made a habit of protesting against them in private conversations with Allied colleagues. There is no doubt that this criticism and gossiping, usually coming from the more conservative wing of the Auswärtiges Amt, undermined the credibility of West German policy to a certain extent. But from late 1971 onwards the sheer volume of the West German CSCE effort outweighed these credibility problems.

In the end, then, the policy conceived by the handful of officials in the Auswärtiges Amt was consistent and coherent enough to ensure a leading role for the FRG in the Western CSCE preparations. This book has argued that in 1970–72, von Groll, Diesel, von Staden and Frank, to name the key players, created a West German approach to the CSCE which bears a striking resemblance to the ideas put forward by Brandt and Bahr in 1966–69. In terms of strategy and ideology, Brandt’s earlier ideas of a European peace order were taken more or less literally on the working level, constantly affecting concrete policy decisions as a declared long-term goal. In terms of tactics and pragmatism, Bahr’s negotiating approach of engaging
the other side and hoping for small steps as a result of rapprochement, rather than presenting controversial maximal positions, became almost an article of faith for West German CSCE policy. Thus, there was both a Brandt flavour and a Bahr flavour in the mix, setting a prime example of the interaction of ideas and interests. Ironically, these influences came in with a delay, without any direct involvement from the Chancellery.

Furthermore, the fact that only a small circle of officials was truly on the inside of the CSCE preparations in the years this book mainly covers ensured the relative exclusion of the parliamentary opposition and public opinion from the equation. Pressure on the West German officials from the conservative parliamentary opposition was limited because it had its hands full with the bilateral Ostpolitik. Pressure from the left-wing and radical segments of public opinion was virtually non-existent, since the FRG was clearly engaged in détente efforts already. During the formative years of the conference, the CSCE was prepared in a niche, isolated from external influences. When the CSCE was exposed to a broader public awareness in 1973, it had already acquired a life of its own.

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Finally, there is the quintessential question about the overall nature of détente, the CSCE, and West German foreign policy. Were they in essence aimed at continuity or change? From the perspective of 1989–90 it appeared that the CSCE had been a miraculous agent for change. Since the CSCE Final Act retrospectively appeared to have made an enormous contribution to the implosion of the Warsaw Pact, to the end of the Cold War division of Europe and to German reunification, it was also seen as a colossal success for the FRG. This book has argued, however, that seen from the perspective of the 1970s the CSCE was indeed a West German success, but one of an entirely different nature.

Already before the multilateral preparatory talks of the CSCE opened in November 1972, the FRG had managed to get a firm grip on most of the central goals it had set itself in the conference. But in the short term, those goals were very cautious. Fundamental change, if any, was envisaged only as occurring in the very long term and only by consensus with the other side. The key argument of this book is therefore that during the early preparations of the CSCE, West German policy was primarily aimed at making the Cold War more bearable, not at overcoming it. Those improvements that were pursued were expected to occur within the Cold War framework.

This becomes evident with a closer look at the dual nature of West German CSCE policy. The inviolability of borders, leaving the option of
peaceful change open, as well as the refusal to engage in anything resembling a substitute peace treaty, leaving the German question open – these defensive elements kept open the possibility of change, but did not actively pursue it. In the field of cooperation, where the FRG was proactive rather than defensive, the West German initiatives focused on cautious small steps and on avoiding unnecessary disputes. Economic cooperation and an increase in personal contacts in all walks of life were seen as suitable first steps in a long-term process, leading to East–West rapprochement and small-scale practical improvements.

This West German approach, blunting the more confrontational suggestions of some Allies, was an important contribution to ensuring that the ‘softer’ elements of security and cooperation ended up on the CSCE agenda. Although precisely these elements turned out to have a subversive effect in the long run, there were no immediate revolutionary aspirations behind this strategy at the time. Engaging the East in a common process was considered to be a valuable aim in itself, but nobody could foresee where the process would lead.

None of this is to be understood as a moral verdict on West German CSCE policy. Nor is it to side with the contemporary Cold Warriors in accusations of appeasement, let alone Finlandisation. Instead, this book has aimed to put West German CSCE policy in the years 1966–75 in its historical perspective. In that era, focusing on keeping options open and on pursuing small-scale improvements was arguably the most intelligent policy option available for the FRG. But that was a far cry from actively pursuing fundamental change, from overcoming the status quo, or from striving for German unification.\(^5\)

Instead, as one of the West German diplomats told the author, the idea of a European peace order and the improvements in personal contact that were pursued in the CSCE were increasingly seen as a substitute for German reunification (\textit{Wiedervereinigungersatz}). ‘Although the idea of reunification was kept alive, there was no active policy for reunification.’\(^6\) Paul Frank, State Secretary of the \textit{Auswärtiges Amt} for most of the period covered in this book, confirmed that the main idea was to improve the situation of the people in the GDR.\(^7\) For his part, Bahr underscored that in the early 1970s nobody thought that an agreement could change the Soviet system or make democrats out of communists. What one could reasonably expect from the CSCE was just to make the East–West conflict more civilised and more manageable. ‘Helsinki was a miracle’, Bahr added.\(^8\)

Quite apparently, then, there is a pressing need for further scholarship to break free from the way in which the end of the Cold War continues to influence our perceptions of the preceding decades. This book has, for its part, hinted at a demand for further research on the history of détente, the
CSCE and West German foreign policy without prejudices based on the events of 1989–90. Without the benefit of hindsight, the seating of the two German delegations next to each other at the CSCE was not only a symbol of East–West and inner-German rapprochement. It also seemed to imply that the division of Germany and Europe was a permanent state of affairs. This was also ‘a state of peace in Europe’, but not yet the one that the FRG was pursuing.

Notes

3. Wilkens has pointed out that already during his tenure as foreign minister, Brandt understood the need to integrate West German policies into a coordinated Western approach, as a means to prevent Moscow’s attempts at selective détente. Andreas Wilkens, ‘New Ostpolitik and European Integration: Concept and Policies in the Brandt Era’, in: Ludlow (ed.), European Integration and the Cold War, 67–80, here 72.
4. For a good characterisation of the ‘charmed circle’ of EPC diplomats dealing with the CSCE, see Nuttall, European Foreign Policy, 2.
6. Author’s interview with Bräutigam.
8. Author’s interview with Bahr.
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Allardt, Helmut, 72–74, 76, 79, 119
Alphand, Hervé, 81
Austria, 27
Auswärtiges Amt (AA)
CSCE unit, 123–24, 162, 191, 233
CSCE working group, 39, 42, 90, 100, 111, 124
legal experts, 77, 219, 225, 228–29, 238
planning staff, 20, 22, 24, 41–43, 49, 90–91, 146, 162

B
Bahr Paper, 77–78, 80, 85, 97, 136, 145
Barzel, Rainer, 24, 32, 43–44, 58, 175–76
Behrends, Wolfgang, 110
Belgium, 4, 20–21, 37, 82, 88, 108, 113, 123–24, 131, 236
Birrenbach, Kurt, 44
Blech, Klaus, 149, 169, 171, 191, 231
Bonn Group, 5, 8, 26, 46, 84–86, 92, 109, 113–15, 118, 124, 128, 147, 149–51, 155, 158–59, 163, 168–72, 177, 190, 197, 218, 220, 226–28, 238–39, 251–52
quadripartite meetings of foreign ministers, 29, 70–71, 116–17, 189, 227
Boss, Walter, 26
Braithwaite, Rodric, 112, 173
Braun, Sigismund von, 146
Brezhnev Doctrine, 131, 167, 197
Brimelow, Thomas, 109, 114, 239
Brosio, Manlio, 38, 119
Brummer, Guido, 219–20, 224, 228, 233, 239
Bräutigam, Hans Otto, 86
Budapest Appeal, 5, 9, 18, 23–27, 29–34, 36–37, 39, 43–44, 46, 54, 57, 247
Bundestag, 1, 20–21, 24–26, 32, 43, 53–55, 69, 93, 114, 153, 175, 246, 247
Foreign Policy Committee, 32, 40, 73, 76, 110, 114, 117, 145, 153, 172
ratification of Eastern Treaties, 148, 152–53, 155

**C**
Canada, 27–29, 34, 37, 50, 131, 178–79, 192, 252
Carstens, Karl, 30–31, 45, 48–49
China, 24
Christian Democratic Union (CDU), 10, 18–20, 24, 27, 31–33, 41, 43–44, 53, 58, 93, 110, 114, 153, 175–76, 247
Christian Social Union (CSU), 48, 175
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)
multiple bilateral preparations, 113, 115, 144, 146–47, 156
Stage I in Helsinki, 5, 10, 213, 222, 234, 239
Stage III in Helsinki, 5, 213, 219, 234, 240–41, 247
‘tea party’ (multilateral exploratory talks), 82, 113, 124, 154
confidence-building measures, 40, 94, 121–22, 181, 197, 213, 219, 236–37
Czechoslovakia, 20, 23, 91

**D**
Dahlhoff, Günther, 169
Davignon Report, 4, 123
see also European Political Cooperation
Dean, Jonathan, 26
Debré, Michel, 29
Denmark, 21, 98, 156, 168, 188, 197
Diesel, Jürgen, 183, 221, 239, 254
Dobrynin, Anatoly, 228
Douglas-Home, Alec, 86
Dubcek, Alexander, 23
Duckwitz, Georg Ferdinand, 26, 37, 48–49, 54, 96

**E**
Ehmke, Horst, 74, 90
Enckell, Ralph, 81, 89, 147
Erlander, Tage, 31
European Communities (EC), 4, 121, 124, 134–35, 142, 155, 163–64, 196, 221
European Commission, 123, 163, 180, 196
European Council, 142, 237
European Union, 4, 214, 221
European Political Cooperation (EPC) ad hoc group, 135, 163–64, 173, 179–80, 196, 223
sous-comité on the CSCE, 132, 135, 147, 163–64, 183, 185–86, 196, 221, 223, 240

**F**
Falin, Valentin, 109, 115–16, 118–19, 143, 220
Federal Government cabinet meetings, 48–49, 149, 152, 172, 174–75, 192, 195, 221, 239
CSCE guidelines, 155, 174–75, 180, 188, 192, 195, 250
Federal Security Council (Bundessicherheitsrat), 96–97, 224, 235, 240
interministerial working group on CSCE, 135, 172, 174, 234, 238–39
Fischer, Per, 135
Focke, Katharina, 90
Ford, Gerald, 11, 214, 230
Franke, Egon, 147, 150
Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP) / Liberals, 18–19, 21, 24, 32, 42, 53–55, 58, 69, 149–50, 159, 247

G
Gehlhoff, Walter, 114, 226
participation in the CSCE and disclaimers, 36, 41–42, 55, 80, 92, 118, 121, 146, 148–49, 154–55, 157–60, 170, 197
German question, 6, 8, 22, 25–26, 32, 34–37, 40–43, 50, 57–58, 71, 92, 121, 124, 126, 169, 172, 199, 216, 249, 256
four-power rights and responsibilities concerning Berlin and Germany as a whole, 5, 11, 50–51, 118, 126, 128, 163, 170, 177–78, 227
German unification, 6, 22, 51, 162, 171, 185, 232, 253, 255–56, see also letter on German unity substitute peace treaty on Germany, 126, 128, 171–72, 174, 176, 178, 220, 255–56
Giscard d’Estaing, Valery, 214
Grabert, Horst, 191
Grewe, Wilhelm, 37, 42, 75, 96, 100, 254
Guillaume, Günter, 7

H
Hallstein Doctrine, 7, 18–19, 41, 69, 247
Harmel, Pierre, 20, 108
Harmel Report, 4, 20
Heath, Edward, 86, 93, 114, 127, 144, 180, 214
Heinemann, Gustav, 58
Helsinki Final Act, 2, 5–6, 166, 179, 199, 214–15, 232, 240–41, 255
Helsinki Final Recommendations (Blue Book), 6, 213–14, 222, 233, 235
Hillenbrand, Martin, 231
Honecker, Erich, 159, 215
human contacts, 91, 94, 213, 233–36, 238
human rights, 6, 166, 176, 178–79, 189, 219, 237, 250, 252
Hungary, 25, 33
I
Iceland, 20, 197
inviolability of frontiers, 27, 78, 126, 128, 163, 170–71, 177–78, 218–29, 247, 249, 255
Ireland, 164
Italy, 30, 37, 108, 134, 164

J
Jackling, Roger, 147
Jakobson, Max, 35

K
Karlovy Vary declaration, 20, 24–25
Kastl, Jörg, 177
Keisalo, Paavo, 35
Kekkonen, Urho, 34–35, 155–56
Klaus, Josef, 27
Kliesing, Georg, 175
Kohl, Michael, 83, 150, 160
Korhonen, Keijo, 35
Kosygin, Alexei, 72, 79
Kovalev, Andrei, 34
Krapf, Franz, 151, 168

L
letter on German unity, 7, 78, 122, 162, 171, 179, 221–22, 225–26
Luxembourg, 108
Löwenthal, Richard, 116

M
Macovescu, Gheorghe, 72, 74
Marx, Werner, 153
Mischnick, Wolfgang, 32
Moersch, Karl, 110, 114
Monaco, 215
see also Bahr Paper; letter on German unity

N
Nenni, Pietro, 30–31
Netherlands, 21, 29, 37, 43, 47, 108, 114, 164, 186, 188, 233
Nixon, Richard, 11, 45, 53, 55, 72, 144, 153, 214, 219, 222, 228, 236
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 41
Senior Political Committee (SPC), 21, 33, 37, 40, 57, 94–95, 100, 115, 121–23, 126, 130–31, 167–68, 177–79, 181, 188, 194–95, 197
Norway, 21, 47, 98, 156, 168, 197

O
Oncken, Dirk, 91–92, 162

P
Pauls, Rolf, 44
Pedini, Mario, 108
Poland, 7, 68, 70, 72–73, 88, 129, 169
Pompidou, Georges, 87, 111, 115, 144, 153, 180, 214, 219, 222
Portugal, 47, 115
Prague invasion, 23–24, 35, 46, 57, 247
principles governing relations
between states, 5–6, 97, 121,
125–26, 128–31, 136, 163, 165–68,
170, 172, 174, 176–80, 183–84, 186,
189, 193, 195, 198–99, 213, 219–27,
230–32, 235, 248, 250
public opinion, 51, 82, 91–93, 122, 176,
188, 197, 235, 255

Rapallo, 45–46
renunciation of force, 7, 19, 25, 41, 50,
72, 74, 76, 91–92, 94, 97, 121, 126,
129, 131–32, 164, 171, 181, 185,
219, 221–22, 226, 247
Rogers, William, 29, 44, 52, 111, 180,
189–90
Romania, 19, 33, 72, 74, 190
Ruete, Hans, 29–31, 35, 37–38, 42, 47,
69–70, 91, 110,
Rush, Kenneth, 68, 85

Sahm, Ulrich, 25, 28, 39, 42, 54
Salomies, Martti, 37–38
Scheel, Detlev, 47–48
Scheel Doctrine, 149
Scheel, Walter, 1, 10, 19, 21, 54, 58–59,
67, 69–73, 77–79, 84–85, 87–88, 95,
100, 108–109, 111, 115–16, 123–25,
142, 147–53, 156–58, 172, 174–75,
180–81, 189, 195, 217, 221–23, 225,
234–35, 239–40, 254
Schiller, Karl, 58
Schmidt, Helmut, 7, 10, 32, 58, 95,
127–28, 142, 180, 214–15, 225, 230,
236–37, 240–41, 246–7
Schollwer, Wolfgang, 21, 54
Schumann, Maurice, 52, 70–71, 87–88,
108, 110–111, 115–16, 150, 191
self-determination of peoples, 166,
176, 178–79, 219, 252
Social Democratic Party (SPD), 10,
18–19, 21, 24, 31–33, 53–55, 58, 69,
149, 159, 182, 191, 247
Socialist International, 39, 157
Sonnenfeldt, Helmut, 55, 151, 194, 221
Sorsa, Kalevi, 157
Soviet Union, 4–5, 7, 9–11, 19–28,
30–37, 40–43, 45–46, 50–52, 54–55,
68, 70–81, 83–85, 87–88, 91–93,
95–96, 98, 109, 111, 113–116,
118–19, 122, 126, 128–29, 131,
135, 143–45, 148, 150–53, 159, 161,
163–64, 167, 169–71, 175, 181,
184–86, 190–91, 193, 197–98,
217–20, 222–37, 239–40, 248, 256
Staden, Berndt von, 84, 88, 111, 115,
119, 126–27, 129–30, 133, 143,
147–48, 150, 153–54, 158, 163, 170,
174, 184–85, 192–93, 195–96, 216,
219, 238, 254
Stewart, Michael, 29, 52
Stopf, Willi, 19, 69, 77, 79, 183
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
(SALT), 81, 230
Strauss, Franz Josef, 48, 58, 175
Sweden, 31, 88
Switzerland, 214

Thorn, Gaston, 108
Tsarapkin, Semjon, 27–28, 30, 37, 77
Turkey, 37, 178–79, 252

Ulbricht, Walter, 45, 70
United Kingdom (UK), 5, 7, 10–11,
20, 29, 37–38, 44, 46–47, 57, 68,
70, 77, 81–82, 86, 88–89, 93, 109,
112, 114–15, 119, 127–29, 131, 147,
149–53, 155, 157, 160, 162, 166–68,
170, 173–74, 178, 184, 186, 188,
195, 214, 219, 226–27, 239, 251–52
United Nations (UN), 23, 52, 85, 120,
122, 147–48, 220, 229
United States (US), 4–5, 7, 10–11,
20–22, 25–26, 28–29, 31, 34, 37,
44–47, 50, 53, 55, 57, 68, 72, 73, 76,
81–82, 85–87, 89, 93–95, 97, 99,
110–12, 114–15, 117–19, 121, 123,
128–34, 145–47, 151–52, 155, 158,
164–66, 168, 170, 172, 179, 181,
183–84, 186–92, 194, 196, 214, 221,
227–32, 236, 239, 250, 252
V
Vest, George, 85–86, 118, 165

W
Wehner, Herbert, 21, 58, 149
Wentker, Hermann, 32
Wilson, Harold, 93, 214

Y
Yugoslavia, 19