AFTER THE PINK TIDE
Egalitarianism

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Although frequently understood as having originated in the European Enlightenment and discussed as a key concept of a Western modernity, egalitarianism is conceived here as an energy underpinning most human action when confronted with forms of oppression that deny, destroy, inhibit or limit the achievement of human potential. The volumes in this series contribute to the general understanding of egalitarian processes and the barriers to their realization.

Volume 1
*After the Pink Tide: Corporate State Formation and New Egalitarianisms in Latin America*
Edited by Marina Gold and Alessandro Zagato
AFTER THE PINK TIDE
Corporate State Formation and New Egalitarianisms in Latin America

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INTRODUCTION

THE PINK TIDE
Egalitarianism and the Corporate State in Latin America

Marina Gold and Alessandro Zagato

The demise of the Pink Tide in Latin America has sparked much discussion as to whether this represents the end of leftist governmental experiments in the region and a return to what seems to be the status quo domination of right-wing conservative politics. Perhaps a more indicting implication of this debate is whether the Pink Tide represents an alternative to neoliberalism or whether it constitutes a particular typology of this system. Left-leaning scholars (Ackerman 2016; García Linera 2006; López Segrera 2016, among others) and activists counter this view by arguing that the Pink Tide has sufficiently overturned traditional structures of domination and provided many disenfranchised groups with the concrete possibility of accessing political power. While we share the perception that the Pink Tide has indeed effected long-lasting transformations in Latin American political imaginaries and opened concrete lines for change, we are here concerned with the processes of structural transformation that underpin the formation of the Pink Tide and its more recent destabilization. As a response to the excesses of neoliberalism in the region, the Pink Tide has incorporated alternative egalitarian ideologies to political power. However, it has not been able to counteract the increasing corporatization of state structures taking place in Latin America – as in Europe and North America (as well as China and Russia but in different configurations) – a process holistically affecting statehood, where neoliberalism is but one expression (as an ideology of the corporate state).

A variety of responses have emerged in Latin America to what we identify as global processes of state transformation that indicate the emergence of
new state configurations taking on corporate forms. Ethnographic studies across the region reveal the contradictions between shifting state structures and contesting and resisting egalitarian movements. As was the case with Operation Condor¹ (1968–1989), Latin America is once again a sociopolitical experiment where democratic and egalitarian processes clash with powerful and hierarchical corporate interests. We propose a re-examination of these experiments by taking as a point of departure the current apotheosis of a different configuration of statehood – the corporate state – flourishing particularly in the Global North but with its frontiers in the Global South. Latin America thus provides a propitious ground for examining the processes by which the corporate state operates, especially given the historic relation of the region to colonial and neocolonial interests. The undermining of democratic and egalitarian procedures by the corporate state has been at the core of the rise and crisis of the Pink Tide.

In order to explore these processes of transformation in ethnographic context, we ask the following questions: a) How do we understand egalitarianism? b) What do we mean by the corporate state? c) What manifestations do these take in Latin America? This book will analyse the contradictions between the corporatization of the state in Latin America and the consolidation of egalitarian movements across the continent, some within the structures of government, trying to break open the constraints of the state and seeking to build new forms of life or alternative governmental approaches.

The shifting political balance between left and right is considered through an ethnographically grounded and localized anthropological perspective of what is a regional (and in many ways global) crisis. At a time of crisis of the regular structures of political participation (political parties, elections, legal and parliamentary processes), the Latin American context reveals multiple expressions of egalitarian movements (indigenous struggles, ecological groups, new forms of feminism, students’, teachers’ and other types of social movements) that strive and sometimes momentarily manage to break through the constraining structures of state power. In fact, their emergence outside conventional political milieus and their anti-establishment tendencies are an indication of the atomization and crisis of conventional political structures, and are characteristic of the subversion of political processes to the economic concerns of the corporate state (Kapferer and Gold 2018). However, these egalitarian expressions also have the potential of being co-opted by corporate concerns and procedures. Shifts in labour and class relations and the blurring of the distinction between parliamentary right and left political positions are other indications of corporatizing state processes. The Latin American experience provides a unique opportunity to understand global processes of state transformation from the regional view of the Global South at a time when the left had managed to establish itself in regional politics.
The Pink Tide within the Neoliberal Wave

In the mid 2000s, three quarters of South America’s population (350 million people) were under leftist governments. The Pink Tide refers to a group of left-leaning non-communist governments that rose to power at the end of the 1990s and in the new millennium in Latin America (Castaneda 2006). By 2010, there were leftist governments in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela and Peru. The Pink Tide was by no means a unified block, and contested distinctions are drawn between the ‘good’ left of Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Chile – more akin to the European social democrats – and the ‘bad’ left of Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador, more authoritarian and too close to Cuba in political ideology. However, Pink Tide governments are broadly characterized by a reaction against neoliberal economic practices implemented by the Washington Consensus and shared common policies of increased social spending, nationalization of important industries, regeneration of regional trade deals and in some cases the reformulation of constitutions to create more economies of solidarity. These governments were in many ways a response to the 1998 regional recession caused by neoliberal policies of austerity implemented by the World Bank and extreme privatization, potentially explaining the vote to the left not as ideological but as rationally economic. The rise of the left coincided with the commodities boom of 2003, which provided leftist governments with resources with which to govern (petrol, gas, mining, soy) and enabled redistribution policies to be implemented (Murillo 2016), but it did not challenge the command of capital and in many ways enabled the penetration of corporatizing forces through the deepening dependence on the global market of primary goods (Webber 2016).

The rise of the left to government shifted the configuration of political scenarios in Latin America to the point that even in 2013 and 2014 when governmental politics began to shift again to the right the elected conservative governments did not win with large margins (Peru, Argentina, Brazil). These partial victories reveal the effects of leftist distributive policies and a new political scenario where the left’s access to government is now possible. However, they can be also interpreted as a symptom of the increasing indistinctness between left and right, as leftist governments in power often display policies that could well have been conceived by the right, blurring the platforms sustained by both political camps in the past.

The biggest critique levelled at the Pink Tide has been its undermining of democratic institutions through its association with large-scale corruption scandals (Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay) and the increasing subversion of the legal structures to political purposes, seen for example in the subordination of socioecological concerns to extractivist policies (discussed by Ødegaard
and Fitz-Henry and Rodriguez Quinonez this volume). While there might be little doubt that corruption thrived, the historic tensions within traditional elites underpinning corruption scandals are often overlooked, as well as the long-standing role of corruption within Latin American politics and more globally (see Gledhill and Hita this volume). The backlash of traditional power groups (the military, Catholic Church and the oligarchy) against the newly empowered sectors of society (women, the poor, ethnic minorities, indigenous people), often through corruption accusations and legal procedures (see Fitz-Henry and Rodriguez Quinonez this volume), reveals corporate interests mobilizing bureaucratic institutions to subvert political power to its economic concerns (Kapferer and Gold 2018).

Neoliberalism, against which the Pink Tide emerged, is ‘a peculiar form of reason that configures all aspects of existence in economic terms’ (Brown 2015: 17) and is embedded, we argue, within the structural dynamics of the corporate state, representing the ideological framework supporting the unregulated potential of capitalism. Neoliberalism ‘ideologically reflects and motivates the marked economization of the political and of the social (the economic as ontology)’ (Kapferer 2018: 11). Neoliberal reason penetrates statecraft and business, law, the production of knowledge (in primary and tertiary education), the reproduction of daily life through technology and so converts ‘the distinctly political character, meaning, and operation of democracy’s constituent elements into economic ones’ (Brown 2015: 17). That is, neoliberalism represents the subverting of the political by the economic, becoming ‘a dominant economistic discourse across the class and political spectrum’ (Kapferer and Gold 2017: 34), one that has the capacity to bind its critics and proponents under the terms of market logic. Thus the right/left (governmental), public/private, democratic/autocratic (and other apparent oppositions) – constituting a dialectical unity of meaning – are internal to (and become internalized into) the logic of the corporate state and get mobilized in times of crisis, subverting egalitarian ideals and democratic processes. The demise of the Pink Tide, therefore, ought to be considered as a manifestation of larger transformations of the state – a historical process long underway – and not simply as a pendular movement between left and right claims over state power, nor a response to the commodity boom of the 1990s, a much too simplistic and economistic understanding of a complex and on-going process of shifting state structures.

The Corporate State Formation

When we speak of the corporate state, we depart from older theories of state corporatism popular in the 1970s. There are certainly continuities between
early conceptualizations of the corporate state (see Thomson 1935), the state corporatism of Italian fascism and the current manifestations of the corporate state in Trump’s America, but the corporate state we refer to is a more radical state formation than a corporatism of state or the corporatization of state sectors (through privatization, for example). Some elements of state corporatism have been re-popularized: the suspicion against liberal democracy; the idea that not all citizens are equal as a positive force for economic development; the prioritization of the economy in state concerns; anti-systemic and anti-establishment reactions; the technocratization of state practices; the retreat from society; the disjunction with ‘nation’; the penetration of military law into the civic sphere and the internalization of war. However, there are new elements that have enabled an even more radical reconfiguration of state structures into what we, following Kapferer (2002, 2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2010a, 2010b 2018), identify as the corporate state. We refer to a transmogrification of the nation state (that is, the corporate state is inherent within the structures and history of the nation state) into a new assemblage of people-state relations that radically reconfigures social life (Kapferer and Gold 2017).

Since the early 1990s, renowned authors like Zygmunt Bauman (1998), Jürgen Habermas (2001), Manuel Castells (1996) and Ulrich Beck (1999), among others, have proclaimed the crisis of statehood and predicted the possible disappearance of the nation state. Since then, theories of state weakening achieved such an outstanding popularity that they almost became a cliché. Governments from the left and right adopted these theories to justify widespread privatization campaigns. In the academic field, ideas of state weakness (Friedman 2005), failed state (Buscaglia 2013), retreat of the state (Strange 1996) and demise of the state (Dasgupta 2018) are quite popular, and rather transversal in the ideological spectrum.

Recently, Alain Badiou (2015) has provocatively observed that the Marxist theme of the ‘withering away of the state’ – the idea that after the eradication of the capitalist state a stateless society would be created, defined by Marx as ‘free association’ – has now become a key tendency of globalized capitalism. Given its transnational scope, this system has no particular interest in the subsistence of territorially based national states. These conditions, Badiou argues, generate processes of ‘weakening of the state’, which he identifies as a crucial tendency today.

It is irrefutable that there are transnational economic processes and institutions like markets, large corporations and supranational poles of power that transcend state jurisdiction. However, ideas of state weakening seem to be themselves influenced by the dominant economic doctrine of neoliberalism – to the point that they corroborate a conception of global economic forces as free, detached and autonomous. However, we argue, neoliberalism
is more than an economic doctrine, as it takes on an ontological force behind the reconfiguration of state structures that gives rise to the corporate state. It also appears that ideas of ‘state weakening’ tend to identify statehood with a specific configuration or typology of the state, which is currently undermined by global tendencies but does not embody or represent statehood as such.

Statehood not only transcends concrete historical forms of the state; it also plays an active and key role in the expansion of capitalism, which, according to Polanyi (2001), is facilitated by state structures tying their logic to specific territories. For Wallerstein, a system resting on unlimited accumulation needs to be grounded in ‘structural mechanisms by which those who act with other motivations are penalized in some way, and are eventually eliminated from the social scene, whereas those who act with the appropriate motivations are rewarded’ (Wallerstein 2004: 228). Thus, global capitalism needs ‘a multiplicity of states, so that [capitalist initiative] can gain the advantages of working with states but also can circumvent states hostile to their interests in favour of states friendly to their interests’ (Wallerstein 2004: 228).

We develop the idea that, rather than weakening or disappearing, a historical transmutation of statehood is under way, albeit one that was inherent in the structures of the nation state and could result in a new paradigm of the idea of the state. In his recent work, Bruce Kapferer (2010b, 2017) and Kapferer and Bertelsen (2009) articulate the problem in terms of a transition towards a ‘corporate state’, a configuration of statehood where the economic logic becomes ‘ontologically foundational, permeating all social and political relations’ (Kapferer 2010a). In the corporate state formation, the market does not exist as a separate entity, but it becomes ‘the principle of social processes’ (Kapferer 2010a). This happens under the effect of political tendencies ‘that in themselves recognize their own constitution in the dynamics of the economy and the market. The idea of . . . corporate state . . . suggests that the market and the conceptualization of the economic are not so much re-submerged in the social and the political but become their very constitution and form’ (Kapferer 2010a). Neoliberalism is the ideology of the corporate state, which makes the economic a foundational force in the formation of social worlds.

Highlighting the increasing assimilation of the dominant economic logic by the state, ‘the influence over or capture of its political executive and controlling mechanisms by corporate interests’ (Kapferer 2017), allows us to understand the two entities as akin, somehow overlapping – and not as opposing, excluding or weakening each other.

Starting from the Mexican case, Zagato (2018) identified three main related tendencies (or symptoms) of state corporatization observable through-
out Latin America. Namely, the disintegration of a sense of collectivity and public institutionality – the disappearance of what Habermas (1991) has described as the ‘public sphere’, – an increased tendency to internal warfare, and widespread forms of dispossession related to extractivism (Zagato 2018). More concretely, in a phase of transition towards a corporate state, warfare seems to turn into a form of governance for its capacity to deeply shape realities and mould subjectivities and forms of life (see Zagato this volume). A hint of this tendency is seen in securitization policies implemented in the name of fighting terrorism. Corporatization seems to require aggressive forms of social fragmentation and the disarticulation of the state’s civil functions.

State corporatization is a global tendency. In Latin America, it has undergone a tremendous acceleration since the end of the 1980s. The ‘Washington Consensus’ promoted liberalization of the markets, economic openness and the elimination of trade barriers, reinforcing the role of market economy. Following this trend, the majority of the governments of Latin America negotiated their debt and signed asymmetrical free market treaties with the United States. Through this strategy, identified by Naomi Klein (2007) as ‘Shock Doctrine’, the United States attempted to bond Latin American societies to their economy, ensuring the free movement of capital, goods and services and the bondage of people to an indebted government through austerity policies in corporate interests. This had a decisive impact on Latin American statehood and radically shaped its societies.

Privatization and deregulation policies usually described as neoliberal are not, however, simply ‘economic’. These governmental interventions alter the structure of the state, including its territories and forms of life. For example, the free market treaty signed by Mexico involved constitutional changes in terms of land rights, which had a structural impact on territory, sovereignty and collective forms of land tenure. Such changes inaugurated the extractivist model that is currently shaping Mexican corporatization. This process has also variably affected land rights in Chile and Argentina.

State corporatization in Argentina has followed the same principle of reducing as much as possible the freedom of manoeuvre of public policies that do not pursue structural neoliberal reforms. This process covers the dictatorship phase (1976–1983) and the years between 1989 and the financial crisis of 2001, under a constitutional government. The military coup and the assassination of Allende as well as the dictatorship of Pinochet in Chile were also aimed at crushing processes of widespread politicization and the democratization of the Chilean state. This process turned Chile into an unprecedented neoliberal experiment, where state corporatization was enforced through structural adjustments that later contributed to shaping the Washington Consensus. These included the promulgation of a new constitution
facilitating denationalization and the imposition of extractivist policies and privatization (see also De la Maza Cabrera this volume). Peru under Fujimori was another instance of purposefully reformulating social and political processes through the neoliberal model under the ‘Fujimori shock’ (see Ødegaard this volume). An analysis of state corporatization in Latin America should always consider the priority that the region constitutes for the United States in military and economic terms. ‘Weakness’ and ‘strength’ are relative concepts when applied to a state like Mexico, for example, whose unconditional subordination to the will of the northern neighbour couples with solid internal military and oligarchic domination.

The emergence, since the early 2000s, of so-called progressive or Pink Tide governments in the region might be interpreted as an attempt at containing and limiting the effects of widespread state corporatization, through the introduction of egalitarian elements in the functioning of the corporate state. This was indeed a phase of egalitarian experimentalism at the level of governmental politics. As a general tendency, these governments reconfigured national economies through reforms that attempted to correct the negative effects of the markets, redistributing national wealth and retaking control of strategic economic sectors. This allowed them to redirect funds towards internal social policies that contributed to alleviate poverty and marginality. In Argentina, for example, following the crisis of 2001, some workers’ movements took over the factories in an attempt to re-create labour relations in more egalitarian ways, away from patronage government policies and as an alternative to the docile neoliberal subject (Monteagudo 2008).

Since 2014, the fall of the prices of oil and other commodities has had a negative impact on the Latin American region. Its consequences have been particularly deleterious for Pink Tide governments and their social policies that depend on the sale of those natural resources. This crisis has amplified many of the critiques that were already targeting these experiences – predominantly on what concerns their reliance on extractivism as the base of national wealth. The main critique is that they failed to eradicate a persisting neocolonial model of exportation of raw materials and that there was no real attempt to radically question or dismantle the model that they were declaring to oppose (see particularly Oikonomakis this volume).

Referring to his government’s experience in Bolivia, Alvaro García Linera (2006) summarizes the model as follows: ‘A strong state that regulates the expansion of the industrial economy, extracting its surpluses and transferring them to the community in order to promote forms of self-organization and a typical Andean and Amazonian trading model.’ He adds that ‘Andean-Amazonian capitalism is the way that ... better adapts to our reality, improving the possibilities of labour and community emancipation in
the medium term. This is why we conceive it as a temporary and transitory mechanism.’

On the one hand, the pervasiveness of this mechanism is still to be empirically demonstrated. Not just because structural change in a (single) national economic paradigm is something very complicated – even when one of the pillars of governability, the high international prices of commodities, comes down – but also because the social and ecological effects of extraction are frequently irreversible, to the extent that critical points of view consider extractivism as an authentic ‘war against the people’.

On the other hand, the use of the economic surplus by these governments to improve the living conditions of the population brought objective improvements and opened the possibility for the development of forms of egalitarian political and social organization. For instance, the Venezuelan comunas are radical popular experiments, in many cases independent from the state apparatus, and are meant to persist even in the case of governmental change (Ciccariello-Maher 2016). In Cuba, the increase of self-employment and cooperative ventures has also served as experiments (even while state-sanctioned) for new configurations of labour and class relations at times of severe crisis, and in often contradictory ways as egalitarian movements contesting the accumulation of resources in the hands of the state or other powerful groups (see Gold this volume).

Progressive governments of the Pink Tide could not, we argue, overcome corporatization. They merely implemented policies to limit privatization and partially redistribute national income. They introduced egalitarian elements into the structure of the state, which was however almost entirely preserved. Through access to political structures, the new right-wing parties are rapidly dismantling the social politics and the processes of regional integration that their predecessors initiated. However, an indication of the pervasiveness of the corporate state is the blurring of distinctions between governmental right and left as the interests of capital take over political ideologies. This is evident in Argentinean politics, as the Peronists – transmogrified into Kirchneristas – became a vehicle for state power but along their history have represented both social programmes and austerity measures. Early 2018 protests organized by the Venezuelan right appropriated forms of action, slogans and symbols that are typical of the left (particularly of the anti-globalization movement), projecting a very ambiguous image of themselves in appealing to ‘freedom’ and ‘human rights’.

However, crucially, the sharpest critiques to the ‘Pink Tide model’ did not come from right-wing formations but from new egalitarian tendencies embodied in groups (frequently of an indigenous background, or other minorities), who are producing different forms of collectives – that is, forms of life that go beyond corporatization because they are totally incompatible
with the state form. This is important, as it might represent a more radical response to the spread of neoliberalism, which has penetrated left and right political ideologies and amalgamated political differences under economic models of management.

The Contradictions of Egalitarianism

Latin America has undergone an intense period of crisis and transformation since the 1990s, which has seen the rise and apparent demise of what looked like alternatives to the global neoliberal model. Indigenous movements, cooperative ventures and state-led redistribution practices have represented reactions against global elites and corporate interests. Nevertheless, Latin American societies remain profoundly hierarchical (along class and race), as egalitarian movements have not completely broken up class stratification and oligarchic groups. One must not – particularly in the Latin American context – confuse egalitarianism with equality or sameness.5 Alexis de Tocqueville’s (2003 [1835]) wishful critical conception of American democracy as guaranteeing equality of conditions does not apply to the rest of the continent. Egalitarianism as we understand it does not refer to economic or political equality nor does it stand in a dualist opposition to hierarchy, as De Tocqueville perceived.

We understand egalitarianism as the inner logic of a particular ideological form that manifests in modern issues, including nationalism (Kapferer 2012), but is also present in other movements of rupture, such as indigenous movements, anti-establishment social movements, or labour protests, for example. Kapferer does not position egalitarianism above hierarchy or vice versa; he understands hierarchy as a potentiality of egalitarianism and not a transformation of it. Dumont conceives of hierarchy as the social obverse (and underlying force) of egalitarian individualism, which he understands as the atomistic reverse of the same coin (Dumont 1992: 85). That is, egalitarianism and hierarchy define and produce each other. As a reaction to Rousseau, who saw the individual as the basic element of all value, existing prior to social relations (Rousseau 1762), Dumont instead understands value not as absolute but as given by the relation: the whole is the structure of that relation, and it grants the parts their value. Different structures are determined by their own hierarchies of value. It is the relationship between power and values or ideology that determines these structures (Dumont 1977). Hierarchy, crucially, is not understood by Dumont as power, rank or stratification but rather as a value relation within a totality (Kapferer 2010a). These hierarchical value relations encompass their own opposition, which is overcome in their very encompassment. Therefore, the totality must be in constant
redefinition, given that it is redefined in the process of encompassment of difference. Beyond what critique might be levelled at Dumont, we rescue the importance of the relational conception of egalitarianism to hierarchy,\textsuperscript{7} which in Latin America is crucial to understand race, class, labour and ethnic relations, in the contradictions between western egalitarian values and the different hierarchies within the American continent. The relationship between the hierarchical force of state structures and the rupturing intentions of egalitarian social movements is a key analytical focus of this collection. This crucial historical moment is witnessing the radical reconfiguration of global structures of power – which we understand in terms of corporatization. Furthermore, we warn that while egalitarianism holds a liberating promise, it can also have dehumanizing potentiality, as Rousseau had envisioned (1762).

In western history, nationalism has proven as an instance where the destructive potential of egalitarianism is realized, through particular conceptions of nation, state and person. It is important to note that the idea of the destructiveness of nationalism comes from a very western, particularly European, perspective. Nationalism in Latin America has arguably also manifested regenerating potentials: pan-Americanism, Bolivarianism and some forms of Andean nationalism. Simultaneously, however, the egalitarian potential of nationalism has also resulted in exclusionary hierarchies along class, ethnicity and political lines in the multiple military regimes that have harnessed nationalist passions.

A foundational characteristic of Euro-American egalitarian ideology is the conception of the individual as of fundamental value: autonomous and free, self-determining and a moral unit (Kapferer 2012: 15). This dates back to Hobbes and Rousseau’s explorations of the nature of the individual in relation to the state. For Rousseau, the individual was a moral ideal that was to be realized as individuals freely subjecting themselves to the common good, making the political the emancipatory force of egalitarianism. Natural man, by contrast, was undifferentiated, free in an equal sense but unable to fully develop its potential (Dumont 1992: 87). The individual is at the centre of the social construction in the western egalitarian sense, and there is a constant concern that the individual not be consumed by the totality, which would cause it to lose its identity. There is indeed an unresolved friction between the ideas of freedom (more linked to the individual dimension) and equality (which necessarily anchors on collective grounds) – and which ‘fraternity’ attempts to somehow smoothen in the French Revolutionary motto.

Dumont’s analysis of the development of the ideology of individualism in the west in \textit{Essays on Individualism} (1992) and in \textit{From Mandeville to Marx} (1977) reflects the historic developments that turned the medieval holistic man slowly into the ideal of the individual as imbued with value and at the
core of modern conceptions of the human in the west. Through Dumont’s historic analysis, it is possible to see that egalitarianism is not so much a set of principles in themselves – these have changed throughout history as has the conception of individualism – but more specifically a reaction against confining orders, such as the Church, the state, colonial structures and aristocratic hierarchies (Dumont 1992).

The different conceptions of the self, emerging within national spaces, represent an affront to the individual of Euro-American egalitarian traditions. However, paradoxically, they are also intrinsic in the reproduction of that individual, which needs an ‘other’ against which to conceptualize the self. This is also the case with Marxism, the last great occidental egalitarian ideology, where individuality is subsumed into the idea of class (and class develops its subjectivity in contradiction to another class), and where the realization of egalitarianism consists in the eradication of class division. Importantly, while egalitarianism in Latin America has been influenced by western philosophical thought, it does not share to the same extent the profoundly individualistic sense of the Euro-American tradition, especially in contexts or movements shaped by indigenous cosmologies that privilege the collective over the individual.

In general, due to the weight of processes like colonialism, and the perpetuation of a regime of coloniality in the independent states, egalitarian thought and practices in Latin America have been shaped by peculiarities (and complexities) that are not always contemplated by occidental (universalist) traditions. Conventional conceptions of class and nation are frequently reductive when applied to the concrete social historical contexts of this region.

Latin American Egalitarian Thought

An obvious observation – but an important one nonetheless – is that egalitarian ideologies do not have the same content or intensity throughout the region. A distinction can be made between countries that were more rapidly industrialized and received large European immigration in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and Cuba) and those in which less European immigration and a more rural and indigenous population delayed the formation of a working class consciousness, as the proletariat was conformed by displaced indigenous people, craftsmen and farmers (Bolivia, Peru, Central America). Therefore, indigeneity, race and class radically determined egalitarian thought and struggles throughout the continent.
Early expressions of egalitarian movements in Latin America date back to indigenous forms of resistance to colonization and then to the struggle for liberation under colonial rule – a struggle to which many contemporary indigenous movements still relate. Later movements more directly linked with occidental ideologies that emerged, like the mutualist societies created in Mexico in 1872 (el Gran Círculo de Obreros) and Peru in 1884 (La Unión Universal), which emerged even before syndicates. When these emerged, the anarchic branches within them rapidly gained traction: Federación Obrera Regional Argentina (FORA) in 1904, Federación Obrera Regional Uruguaya (FORU) in 1905, Federación Obrera Regional Brasileña (FORBE) in 1906 and la Casa del Obrero Mundial in Mexico in 1912 (Vilaboy and Chaves 2011). By the early twentieth century, the first socialist syndicates and political parties appeared (as early as 1896 in Argentina and 1906 in Chile). Juan B. Justo, the leader of the Argentinean socialist party, would become an influential forger of Latin American critical thought.

The Mexican Revolution of 1910, with its agrarian, indigenous and anti-imperialist profile, and its leader Emiliano Zapata, became central to most revolutionary struggles throughout the continent, even when its indigenous character was not always completely embraced. The Peruvian Marxist José Carlos Mariátegui tried to fuse indigenous struggle with Marxist ideas in an attempt to produce an autochthonous critical thought. The influence of the Russian Revolution was strong in the Latin American left, and the ideological divisions that plagued the European struggle also crossed the Atlantic. Nicaraguan Augusto César Sandino, for example, contested the mandates of the Third International as not appropriate for the Latin American realities. Divisions between socialist and newly emerging communist parties were common in the 1930s (in Brazil, Cuba and Chile, for example), giving rise to a strong anti-imperialist character of egalitarian struggles in Latin America. Amongst the leading thinkers and militants that contributed to the formation of Latin American (Marxist-influenced) revolutionary ideologies are the Peruvian Mariátegui, the Argentinean Aníbal Ponce, the Ecuadorian Manuel Agustín Aguirre and the Cuban Julio Antonio Mella. These men, amongst others, aimed to unpack the structures that framed the life and history of Latin American peoples across the continent, not only in industrialized urban centres of the Southern Cone but also in rural, peasant and indigenous communities in the Caribbean.

The history of peasant and workers’ struggles materialized in the 60s and 70s into the Cuban Revolution (1959), the Sandinista Revolution (1979) in Nicaragua, the democratic election of Salvador Allende in Chile in 1970 and the short-lived revolution in Granada under Maurice Bishop. These different concretizations of egalitarian ideologies provided for Latin America the
hope that an alternative was possible – even while none of these instances represented absolute egalitarian possibilities for everybody involved. They were, however, experiments in emancipation that pushed existing political structures to the limits. The ideological propositions of the various Latin American thinkers that shaped the independence struggles of the nineteenth century and the workers and peasant struggles of the twentieth century have been taken up again in the twenty-first century by governments aiming to implement an alternative to neoliberalism. Herein lies the complication that seems to have plagued the Pink Tide governments in the last decade. The egalitarian dynamic of movements and ideas that contests the hegemonic structures and hierarchies can achieve its opposite potential (a totalitarian effect) when institutionalized in governing elites – regardless of left or right inclination. Egalitarian processes emerge as responses against different hierarchical orderings and result in the break up, even if momentarily, of those ordering structures. This did not stop egalitarian passions from taking on destructive expressions themselves, like in the Europe of the Reformation (Cohn 2004 [1957]) and in the Reign of Terror after the French Revolution (Marx 1995 [1858]). Both Cohn and Marx consider the ambiguous power of moments of crisis within which egalitarian forces break through the established structures of power.

Egalitarianism is, therefore, an ideology that determines the constitution of the person in its relationship to the state and the nation. However, it is simultaneously a dynamic of power. It describes a set of relations and ideas that define reality and are in a relation to a hierarchy of values. Equality is but one expression of egalitarianism as an ideological element, as are the French Revolution’s tenants of fraternity and liberty, today expressed in the notion of freedom, the concept of which can radically vary. However, more recently, egalitarianism in the west has increasingly represented economic equality of opportunity. These are values that become ingrained in the definition of the human in western societies, strongly embedded in education systems, nationalist ideology and political and normative structures, such as human rights legislation. However, there is another element to egalitarianism that is more dynamic and perhaps emerges from its original intention as a response to totalizing powers. It is the latter that can shed light on the recent transformations in Latin America, the issue on which this collection aims to focus.

The Contributors’ Arguments

The contributors to this volume consider the different responses to the further encroachment of neoliberalism, only partially regulated by the Pink
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Tide. By looking at the relations between local communities and the state, these different case studies reveal the contradictions in the dynamics between egalitarian processes and the increasing power of the corporate state. Contributors discuss within their geographic location – but considering the larger regional geopolitical orders – the apparent demise of the Pink Tide as a moment of intensifying contradictions.

The chapters that compose this collection are grouped by common themes into three different sections. The first section deals with processes of corporatization related to extraction and shaped by heterogeneous political trajectories like in Mexico, Brazil and Bolivia. These contributions represent large countries with economies based on the extraction of primary resources and dependent on the global cost of commodities. They are, however, three very different national contexts, with differing colonial histories and dissimilar configurations of population. They also represent three very different settings within corporate state dynamics, as Brazil has shifted to the far right, and Bolivia is an iconic representative of the Pink Tide. However, their extractivist economies generate ripe conditions for the expansion of the corporate state, albeit to varying degrees and through multiple manifestations.

The second section focuses on states working ‘in the name of the common good’, considering contexts where egalitarian struggles aim to guarantee common goods against the privatizing tendencies of corporate states like Ecuador, Chile and Venezuela. The focus in this section is not only on state dynamics but also on other egalitarian movements that are not always within the main state spheres. The three very different contexts (Chile, Ecuador and Venezuela) show how corporate state dynamics operate in right and left-wing contexts alike. Delving into development discourse, democratic ideologies and expectations on the state, these three chapters represent how the corporate state can work against the common good by subverting democratic practices in the interest of capital.

Finally, the third section focuses on forms of social organization in the margins of the corporate state. It aims to consider the multiple expressions of social and not necessarily political organization, whose existence develops alongside the corporate state but also clashes with its general tendencies. By focusing on the cases of Cuba and Peru, this section contemplates how different social structures can also act as reservoirs for corporate logics as well as a source for their contestation. These sections represent one of many possible underpinning threads that connect the different contributions, which together offer a snapshot of a crucial historic period on the brink of transformation. While the situation that is described in these chapters has already changed, this does not invalidate the observations of the underlying dynamics that these authors consider. This is particularly significant for the cases of
Brazil and Venezuela, which have undergone the most radical changes since the authors’ contributions, but the sharp analysis of Angosto-Ferrández and of Gledhill and Hita is still relevant to understand the current situation.

The different authors identify particular elements of the proliferation of the corporate state in leftist governments (like Cuba and Venezuela), the more moderate left of Brazil, Ecuador and Bolivia and the right-wing governments of Chile, Mexico and Peru. They capture emerging tensions between the still powerful governing elites and the ever disenfranchised marginal populations (indigenous people, rural villages, urban poor, precarious labour, workers movements, women, etc.) in concrete ethnographic studies of the lives and struggles of ordinary people and their claims on local and national authorities to deliver their promise of emancipation.

However, despite the section groupings, the chapters in this book correlate in different ways, and common arguments are often identified by the authors in each chapter. In Peru, the development of entrepreneurial activities by indigenous people in the margins of state-sanctioned activities represents the making of a subjectivity that is not quite neoliberal, not quite traditional and supported by the resurgence of social networks and socialities of the Peruvian Andes, contesting state hierarchies (see Ødegaard). In a similar contradictory process, Cuban self-employed ventures (both cooperatives and activities in the home, influenced by matrilineal and matrifocal ties) can contest state centralization while potentially becoming corporate groups themselves, susceptible to corporatizing influences from émigré Cubans, NGOs and financial organizations providing credit, redefining revolutionary subjectivity (see Gold). From a contrasting perspective – thus one that illustrates the contradictions embedded in the processes underpinning state corporatization – Angosto-Ferrández considers the expectations of a social subject that demands the state to resist corporatizing processes and remain the representative of a collective subject against the exploitations of neoliberal political disorder.

Taking a more general perspective, Oikonomakis presents an analysis of the MAS (Movimiento al Socialismo) and its initially egalitarian process that managed to (at least temporarily) overturn the hierarchies of class and political power, even if it was then once again co-opted by the dynamics of the corporate state and subverted to the interests of economic elites. The situation in Ecuador is in some ways comparable to that of Bolivia, in that the current moment is revealing that the initial processes of subversion produced by Correa and his twenty-first century socialism have now been tamed by the interests of corporate elites. The case study of Ecuador Estrategico developed by Fitz-Henry and Rodriguez Quinonez reveals the contradictions between egalitarian movements and their potential to be co-opted by hierarchical powers – in this case of development discourse, legal procedures
and centralizing government organizations. De la Maza Cabrera presents an interesting contrast, given the Chilean historical association with neoliberalism, where she analyses the demands of the Mapuche indigenous community and its interconnections with environmental discourses and the co-option of these discourses by governing and economic elites in order to enable further penetration of neoliberal policies in the name of the common good. Gledhill and Hita’s analysis of the Brazilian 2016 coup captures the effect on democratic processes as corporate interests undermine political structures to the detriment of social interests. In Mexico, corporatization is tightly related to the praxis of internal warfare, which facilitates the implementation of structural reforms, dispossession of communal lands and goods, social fragmentation and the formation of a disenfranchised, vulnerable and fully exploitable workforce.

Despite the different perspectives from which the contributions to this volume are tackling issues of egalitarianism and state corporatization in the Latin American continent, the historical and global nature of some of the described processes provide a point of convergence and a possible connection with similar studies to be developed in other regions. The particularity of the Latin American context has to do with the wave of left-wing governments that have shaped the region, the processes of change and political debate they made possible, and the current return of their conservative opponents into governmental positions. We are concerned with ‘corporatization’, the processes of structural transformation that underpin both the formation of the Pink Tide and its more recent destabilization – a process that goes beyond the alternation between left and right claims over state power. We argue that the nature of corporatization has to do with the process by which economic logic becomes ontologically foundational of social relations. This is particularly evident in a context and a time where the left has managed to establish itself in regional politics, sometimes with a strong anti-neoliberal discourse, but has failed to subvert the main tendencies brought about by corporatization and its neoliberal ideology.

Egalitarian claims and movements have developed alongside – both within and outside – these structural processes of transformation. We consider egalitarian tendencies as highly unstable and haphazard instances that might have, from time to time, an impact on hierarchical structures, managing to reshape or temporarily suspend them.

The egalitarian instances brought about by Pink Tide governments have definitely produced changes in how the field of the ‘possible’ might be perceived by subordinate groups (even those who were critical towards progressive governments) and in their ‘empowerment’ within society. Such egalitarian energies will persist and shape the actions of antagonist groups and movements in the coming future.
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NOTES

1. Operation Condor, a result of the Cold War, was an agreement established in the 1970s until the late 1980s between the different military governments in South America (Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador) and the United States, prepared by the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) to suppress the emergence of leftist governments in the region (such as Salvador Allende’s government in Chile).

2. The public sphere does not correspond to the national sphere (or the sense of nation – nationalism), which tends to persist and even grow in the current phase as a spectacular and false opposition to corporatization (See Zagato’s chapter in this volume).

3. Between January 2011 and October 2015, the fall of the prices of raw materials and energy (oil, gas and carbon) was close to 50 per cent. Countries exporting hydrocarbons and metals like Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela Chile and Peru were particularly affected.

4. These are not really ‘new’ and do not respond to traditional divisions between Right and Left, as the current political landscape is characterized by the collapse in these
distinctions and a tendency towards a moderate, but weakened, coalition that underlines the capacity of the political to enact significant and long-term changes.

5. Studies of egalitarianism based on Norwegian society (Bendixsen, Bente Bringslid and Vike 2018; Gullestad 2002) imply that it is a tendency to conceptualize people as the same and thus inherently establish exclusions based on different markers (ethnic, class, racial).

6. The notion of value is intended here anthropologically, rather than economically.

7. This has also been stressed by Turner in his analysis of the dialectical relation between structure and communitas (Turner 1969).

8. Perhaps an interesting comparison is that between the North American conception of freedom of the individual and a Swiss understanding of liberty as a political communion, whereby citizens find their liberty in their compromise to their local community. See, for example, Frenkel (1993) for the Swiss context and Patterson (1991) for the context of freedom in the United States.

REFERENCES


CHAPTER 1

STATE CORPORATIZATION AND WARFARE IN MEXICO

Alessandro Zagato

Introduction

This chapter investigates state corporatization in Mexico. It does so with a particular concern with the praxis of war/warfare, which I present as a key feature of current trends in the evolution of statehood and its logics of domination. The prominence of warfare is particularly evident in a country like Mexico, where the nexus of power is being shaped by fluid and mutating assemblages of conventional state agencies, organized crime and private enterprises and corporations – crystallizing in real war machines operating on (and ruthlessly transforming) the national territory.

This research develops work published in 2018 (Zagato 2018), where, starting from the analysis of a case of extreme violence – the Ayotzinapa mass murder and kidnapping – I highlight how Mexico has been experiencing, since 2006, a situation of internal war. In this chapter, I argue that such a situation directly relates to processes of ‘state corporatization’ as they have been described by Kapferer (2010, 2017a) and Kapferer and Gold (2017, 2018).

On 1 July 2018, the country elected a new president in the middle of one of the most violent periods in its recent history, with more than 200,000 people murdered during the previous twelve years, which is more than those who died in the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq over the same time period. According to the Secretary of Public Security, more than 35,000 people are currently reported missing, with independent NGO data reaching 100,000. These enormous figures still fail to account for the amount of brutality af-
flicting Mexican society, the trauma suffered by countless communities from Sonora to Chiapas and the magnitude of the social transformation underway.

A context of rampant and diffused militarization and violence is pushing people into a culture of aggression, fear and isolation, generating disorientation and social meltdown. In the military domain, each operation is open-ended and comes backed with intelligence and psychological warfare. ‘Military operations are truly a manner of speaking,’ highlight the Invisible Committee as they quote General Vincent Desportes, ‘hence every major operation is above all a communication operation whose every act, even a minor act, speaks louder than words’ (Invisible Committee 2015). Waging war today is ‘first and foremost to manage perceptions, the perceptions of the set of actors whether close by or far away, direct or indirect’ (ibid.). Mexican sociologist Alejandro Saldaña has described this governmental strategy as ‘institutional production of fear’ (Saldaña 2018; my translation). However, the horizon that I am attempting to describe here goes well beyond the control of collective feelings.

Over the last decade, an unprecedented acceleration in the process of decomposition of the nation state’s institutionality, model of society and related forms of life has taken place in Mexico. In this context, I have highlighted how dispersed ‘clusters of power’ are taking shape at different scales, convoked by the array of economic opportunities made available nationally by broad governmental reforms (Zagato 2018). Such reforms include, for example, those to the Energy sector, approved by the Senate of the Republic on 11 December 2013 (with the aggregate laws of hydrocarbons, the electric industry, geothermal energy and mining, among others). Articles 25, 27 and 28 of the Mexican Constitution have been modified, and the energy sector was opened up to the initiative of private international enterprises. With the reform, the extraction and exploitation of hydrocarbons, mining and the public service of energy provision are viewed as activities of primary strategic and social interest as well as a matter of public security. Thus, the legislation prioritizes such projects over any other activity involving the use of the surface or the subsoil of any given piece of land or territory. This facilitates processes of dispossession of communal or private land to the benefit of national and international corporate powers.

These rearrangements respond to a new cycle of capitalist expansion and accumulation grounded in structural reforms and extraction. Endemic corruption, violence and destruction assist the implementation of these developments, especially when they meet popular resistance (Zagato 2018). Taking advantage of a situation of social, political and institutional meltdown, corporate powers are implementing their plans based on explicit neoliberal ideological grounds.
Structural economic developments go together with what we could define as a subjective restructuring of society. Indeed, as Kapferer and Gold (2017: 34) highlight, ‘in the apotheosis of the corporate state’, neoliberalism tends to be imposed as ‘a theory of society’ and therefore ‘as the dominant economistic discourse across the class and political spectrum’, a performative discourse indeed, aimed at constructing its own subject. The neoliberal prescription of the domination of the economic over the political (social, national and so on) becomes a state’s ontological principle. Moreover, the idea that the economic and the market are independent and determining fields is transmogrified into processes that are prior to all else. In this, the economic inhabits all modes of existence so that even if they are not conceived as overtly economic actions or institutions (e.g., love, friendship, family interaction, political practice, etc.), they teleologically exemplify an economic logic or principle. In other words, what are notions born in an era of the independent recognition of the economy ideologically lose such historical connection and become profound universal ontological principles to which all can be reduced and justified. (Kapferer 2010: 127)

In the opening session of the 81st Bank Convention held by the Bank of Mexico, Marcos Martínez, the current president of the Association of Mexican Banks, defines the country’s current economic and political approach:

Mexico is today more solid and more productive thanks to the vision embodied in the delicate political decision that conducted the renewal of the institutional bases of our country. Thanks to the most ambitious agenda of structural reforms in the recent history of our nation, today we are one of the most important destinations for private investment. In the energy sector, for example, investment commitments are already higher than 200 billion dollars, just considering what remains of President Peña’s term – imagine what will come next. (Mexican Government 2018, my translation)

In the meantime, according to an article in La Jornada (2015), ‘In the last 10 years, foreign and domestic mining companies have obtained 774 tons and 667 kilograms of gold from the national subsoil. During three centuries of colony, New Spain mining extracted 190 tons of gold.’ The concept of ‘neocolonialism’, used by many scholars and analysts to identify the current phase of capitalist/imperialist expansion in Latin America, is certainly appropriate but also incomplete when it comes to analysing ongoing structural trends.

I interpret widespread warfare, fragmentation and the destruction of previously established forms of life as necessary steps towards a full corporatization of the Mexican (in this case) state. Indeed, the concept of ‘state corporatization’, as it is developed in Kapferer (2017a), points to a process of ‘removing the constraints that the nation state placed on many of the po-
tentials of capital’. Such operation is taking place with varying intensities, on a global scale. It involves ‘radical changes or transformations’ of ‘the bureaucratic, institutional and socio-political relational order of the nation-state . . . including the values that are integral to it’ (Kapferer 2017a). Corporatization is therefore a tendency that implies a highly destructive, protracted course of action – an assault on institutions, places and aspects of human life that needs to be eradicated or transformed.

Referring to such tendencies in the United States, Noam Chomsky (2018) recently argued that while the media and public attention are concentrated on Trump – the spectacular performer and ‘showman’ – the ‘wrecking crew’ is working in the background. These are the cabinet personnel writing executive orders and systematically dismantling every aspect of government that works for the benefit of the population, including workers’ rights, environmental pollution and rules for protecting consumers and so on. All these efforts, claims Chomsky, are fanatically devoted to enriching and empowering their actual constituency, which is super wealth and corporate power.

In Mexico, long-established forms of social/institutional cohesiveness are being forcibly replaced by anarchic arbitrariness, fomented by aleatory power alliances, violence and widespread corruption. As I will highlight, the violent consolidation of the Mexican corporate state implies the repression of egalitarian tendencies, laws and institutions shaping (or even just attempting to shape) Mexican society. Brutal repressive and counter-insurgent operations like Ayotzinapa 2014 (Zagato 2018) or Nochixtlán 2016 (Zagato 2016) are representative of the Mexican corporate state’s approach to dissidence. The social space of debate, interaction and collaboration described by Habermas (1991) as the ‘public sphere’ is violently suppressed and replaced by chaotic warfare.

One could argue that corporatization is producing a ‘disjunction between state and nation’ (Quadrelli 2018), a historical rupture between these two instances. Corporate power does not operate in the interests of a nation(al population); its logic and orientation is transnational. The principle of nation (its relevance, production and reproduction) becomes a residual aspect that serves to justify the existence of borders and an increasing evanescent sense of identification to a state oriented towards global dynamics and logics. Surviving public institutions need to fully assume ‘business principles of decision-making and efficiency’ (Kapferer and Gold 2018). Indeed, corporate transformation involves the ‘trimming down of bureaucratic complexity and its managerialization. Business principles of decision-making and rational efficiency are adopted even where state functions have not been actually taken over by corporate enterprise’ (ibid.).

The rise of nationalist populism in Europe and elsewhere can be interpreted as a means to face and respond to social inequity, uncertainty and
misidentification as a consequence of the suppression of the social performed by corporatization. Right-wing populism's strategy consists in constructing a fictitious enemy (migrants, the poorest and so on) against whom to direct popular anger while at the same time not giving back anything to the national ‘people’ that such a discourse claims to represent, since these ‘people’ are themselves a hologram. Indeed, populism serves to shape and produce subjectivities to the extent that it operates as ‘a mode of performative discourse that activates, creates and invents the People of which it speaks as well as the terms of its orientation’ (Kapferer 2017b), thus operating from a point of instability and potential.

Being ‘people’ means, therefore, to emphasize a difference – a negative rather than a positive connotation. It means not being a stranger, not being poor, not being a misfit (Quadrelli 2018). Populism operates thus as an engine of depoliticization, preventing the upsurge of anti-systemic, class-based movements or forms of organization.

In Mexico, through the corporate state form, capitalism intervenes on aspects of human life and the economy that it previously considered marginal. These include natural resources that have assumed economic prominence on a global scale (some in view of a future scarcity, like of water, for instance) and social groups – or forms of life – that (for reasons that go from resistance to exclusion) have managed to exist to some extent outside the logics of capital and that now need to be ‘put to work’, removed or displaced. This is the case, for example, for many native groups that populate Mexico and Latin America. In the south of Mexico, the indigenous Zapatistas argue that since the conquest the Mayan population of Chiapas has had to face constant land theft by invaders. With the imposition of cachiquismo (a sort of feudal mode of land tenure), indigenous people were forced to abandon fertile flatlands and find shelter and agricultural land in inhospitable places like jungles and mountain areas, living in isolation. Now, due to their rich subsoil, vegetation and biodiversity, those remote areas have become highly profitable, with catastrophic consequences for those who inhabit them, including displacement, destruction or radical transformation of their living environment, labour reconfiguration, communitarian divisions and violence.

Recently, the Zapatistas have also highlighted that from a state-political point of view the wave of reaction that the progressive governmental experiment known as the Pink Tide is suffering throughout the Latin American continent shows that not even a reformist, modestly egalitarian, redistributive and moderately anti-imperialistic and national-statist attitude can be accepted by corporate powers. Leaders like Lula (for example) are being punished for taking action to restrain the unlimited craving of the corporate state, which does not admit forms of egalitarian moderation, contrary, perhaps, to the nation state (see Gledhill and Hita this volume).
However, it is not always just the ‘right-wing opposition’ who is pushing for a corporatizing agenda. There are cases where ‘progressive governments’ themselves are acting as violent corporatizing agents, illustrating how this is a historical and thus transversal process concerning the very nature of statehood – a non-reversible tendency. In Nicaragua, for instance, corporatization led to what Raúl Zibechi (2018) has described as the ‘privatization of the Sandinista Front’, a paradoxical expression if we consider the revolutionary history of that organization. However, Nicaragua’s political elites have enforced a regime operating against ordinary people and in favour of corporate forms of concentration of wealth and power. The subordination of the country to the global logic of capital has deepened dramatically, based on the exploitation of available natural resources and cheap labour. To comply with its own agenda, the current regime needs to eradicate social opposition and resistance – and Ortega’s regime does so by exercising strict social control and repression (Zibechi 2018).

In Mexico, two of the main constraints to corporate and neoliberal expansion are the reforms in education and land that the Mexican Revolution (1910–20) brought about and that governments, one after the other, are vigorously trying to obliterate. In particular, this is a country with more than half of its territory (106 million hectares) managed by almost six million peasants under the collective legal forms of ‘Ejidos’ and ‘Agrarian Communities’. These socialconfigurations are part of the massive process of redistribution of land triggered by the Revolution. Most of these rural collectivities still identify with the revolutionary process, which motivates them to keep defending those lands from the predatory aggression of corporate power. Moreover, 60 per cent of national forests are actually part of ejidos and agrarian communities, who have played a key role in the preservation of ecosystems and biodiversity. Not only have these social realities become completely irrelevant to corporate logics, the land they occupy is often packed with the type of resources that national and international capital craves. The disarticulation of these collective forms of life passes through military and legal aggression. Previously structured, cohesive and organized societies are being dissolved into a plebeian mass of generalized cheap (sometimes free) workers and offered to corporate initiative.1

Focusing on the military aspect of corporatization, in this chapter I analyse the transformation of war as a process organic to the transformation of the state (corporatization). Mexico is a representative case but definitely part of a global tendency. Corporatization is a process that requires structural adjustments. However, it is also based on the transformation of the forms of life shaping a particular community/society. I argue that the implementation of internal warfare is an effective and quick way to achieve the required human profile – besides reshaping hierarchies and disarticulating resistance.
Mutated forms of life are the necessary condition for the transformation of the labour force, increasingly subjugated to a condition of servile and forced labour. Massive migration processes from countries or regions affected by wars and crises are functional to the formation of such disenfranchised, fragmented, vulnerable and fully exploitable workers. Cases like Syria and Libya (where slavery is de facto being re instituted) are representative in this sense. What is viewed by many ‘as chaos and ineptitude is instrumental to corporate state formation, thoroughly beneficial to fractions of the bourgeoisie who are part of the new elites of the corporate rich’ (Kapferer and Gold 2018).

The tight relation between war and labour was highlighted by Marx (2005 [1858]) in the Grundrisse, where he argues that ‘War developed earlier than peace; the way in which certain economic relations such as wage labour, machinery etc. develop earlier, owing to war and in the armies etc., than in the interior of bourgeois society. The relation of productive force and relations of exchange are also especially vivid in the army.’ Today’s armed conflicts are producing highly exploitable forms of life. For example, the militarized frontier between Mexico and the United States actually functions as a rights dispossession machine, producing a labour force subject to clandestine and exploitable conditions.

To be such, global capitalism cannot do anything else but, in tendency, deal with an undifferentiated, malleable, flexible and constantly blackmailed work force (Quadrelli 2010). The corporate state form responds to this necessity of producing the producers. The Mexican maquiladoras, the intensive lemon and avocado plantations (Fuentes-Diaz 2015) and poppy crops directly controlled by organized crime, among other examples, trace the general lines of current production relationships; they constitute a model for the current phase of capitalist accumulation. Not surprisingly, Mexico is the country in Latin America with the largest number of people in conditions of modern slavery, understood as forced labour (Walk Free Foundation 2018).

I base my arguments on extensive fieldwork conducted in Mexico over the last five years. Moreover, I rely on the analysis of current policy trends embraced by the Mexican government. I am particularly interested in structural reforms facilitating the activity of national and international corporations on the territory, as well as in (tightly related) legislations concerning the management and structure of the armed forces, the conduction of specific military operations on the national territory and so on. In this sense, the idea that I am trying to illustrate is that, internationally, war is getting through a process of internalization, which is functional to the transformation of statehood. In this chapter, I am taking into consideration the recently approved Internal Security Law, which epitomizes ongoing tendencies and provides the President of the Republic and the Federal Army with unprecedented legal power and freedom to decide on internal military intervention.
This Law, I argue, legalizes and validates a process of internal militarization that has shaped Mexican society over the last decade, producing a situation of chaos and uncontrolled violence.

The Transformation of War

One could argue that we are experiencing a generalization of the possibility of war. Not only are wars and warfare spreading internationally at an accelerated path and intensity. The diffusion of a warfare imaginary through the media and public discourse and the generalization of a feeling of constant war-threat are increasingly shaping societies, even those that used to perceive themselves as immune and war as an ‘outside’, which has been the subjective perception of western societies since the end of World War II. Additionally, it is becoming increasingly clear that warfare constitutes the soul and essence of the current regime, where commercial, bureaucratic and military means coexist and merge into what we could define as real, transversal war machines.

War – its form, conduct and aims – is radically changing from the paradigm that shaped most of the twentieth century. That was a model based on the existence of a ‘cohesive’ state-national apparatus. War was meant to take place outside the national frontiers, since the consistency and stability of a state was inseparable from an undisputed condition of internal peace. Even in the case of a state of occupation or the loss of national territory, a rigid distinction between the inside and the outside – between ‘we’ and ‘them’ – needed to be maintained as the grounds for internal political and military legitimacy.

In that context, the national working classes played a crucial role as a supply of soldiers (mass military lever) and workers (factories – agricultural industry) necessary to the conduct and sustainability of war. This configuration reflects the idea of industrial war, which presupposes a specific type of technological/infrastructural development and a specific labour model. Industrial war envisages the complete and coordinated mobilization and subordination of resources, including politics and the social structures, to the cause of war against an external enemy. A country can react against the enemy’s attack until it preserves the moral energies and integrity to sustain its will to fight back. It is therefore necessary to produce intolerable conditions for the adversary. A quick and effective strategy is to directly intervene against the disarmed populations of the cities and against the big industrial districts. In this context, the air forces have the explicit task of turning war into a catastrophe, in order to push the victims to seek refuge into peace. It is the terrorist logic implicit in the carpet-bombing tactic.
Thus, this model is based on the structured organization and control of the national population – especially the working classes – and in the hegemony of the nation state as a configuration of statehood, shaping the economic logic. The eventual collapse of this structure could threaten state-national cohesiveness to the point of bringing about internal (civil or revolutionary) war. Social politics were aimed at maintaining a healthy and productive labour force and at averting the prospect of internal conflict. There is indeed a tight connection between industrial war and the welfare state, since they ‘can be fruitfully understood as aspects of a tendency to state capitalism which prevailed in the first half of the twentieth century . . . resting on the capacity of individual states to manage their own segments of the world economy’ (Adams 1988: 27). This tendency was offset ‘by a countervailing tendency to internationalization’ (ibid.). Even though social policy relates to the supply of efficient labour power and it depends in part on working-class pressure for adequate living standards, ‘national efficiency’ and social solidarity become key to a successful imperialism in the context of a world economy of competing state capitalisms, where states are the organizers and defenders of national economic development. ‘The working class became a national resource, to be educated, kept in health, and adequately maintained if productivity and military capacity were to match international levels’ (Harman 1984 in Adams 1988: 35).

Today’s tendency is instead for war to be conducted, with different intensities, both internally and externally to the national territory – increasingly against a state’s own population. If in the corporate state form there is no longer an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’ because these two dimensions live simultaneously side by side in every context, an ‘inclusive’ policy by a state towards its own people has become unnecessary (Quadrelli 2010). In this sense, corporatization means withdrawal of the state from society and extreme reduction or elimination of social spending – that is, no interest in the ‘nation’. From the economistic point of view of the corporate state, the inside-outside dualism is no longer relevant. There is instead a transversal battlefield of economic competition where the degrees and modalities of the same conflict are played out.

According to Emilio Quadrelli (2018), the current state form tends to exclude the ‘people’ from the state framework, rather than bringing them in. Such a tendency condenses the entire eclipse of the Welfare State. State and war continue to exist in dialectical unity. However, this dialectic is shifting the focus from a ‘state of war’ typical of the twentieth century’s inter-imperialist conflict to a ‘state in war’. This war has no more boundaries because, in the first instance, it is a war that must be fought against the masses (Quadrelli 2018).
Louis A. DiMarco, lieutenant colonel of the US Army and teacher at the Army Command and Staff, argues that today ‘One-third of the global urban population lives in poverty and disease-ridden urban ghettos. This environment is characterized by crime, disease, and political unrest. Warfare is conducted in response to politics; politics is the interaction of citizens in society’ (DiMarco 2014: 213). According to this prominent exponent of North American war theory, social interaction constitutes today a main enemy for Empire. This implies that any possible situation of peace is necessarily one of social fragmentation. He adds that today’s warfare ‘requires much more than sophisticated conventional military capability. Hybrid combat also requires military capabilities not normally necessary for conventional combat. These include special operations capabilities, civil affairs expertise, sophisticated intelligence gathering focused on the human terrain of the urban environment, and close coordination between military and political policy’ (Di Marco 2014: 212). Such new necessities inform the Internal Security Law, which I will discuss in the next section.

The actors of the type of conflict described by DiMarco are multiple, and they operate at different scales. The act of war against the population transcends national borders. It is frequently sustained or managed bilaterally – as, for example, in the case of the Mexican ‘war on drugs’ jointly conducted by Mexico and the United States. Those two armies are not fighting against each other or against a third regular army. The spectre of the ‘drug trade’, their enemy, is diluted in the population itself, which becomes the real target of military operations. ‘War on terrorism’ constitutes a very similar device. In both cases, the state perpetrates a strategy of internal warfare and reconfiguration, based on the existence of a threat that is at the same time ambiguous and boundless.

Military action is increasingly carried out by private or semi-private paramilitary forces operating semi-independently from official armies. Terrorist and narco groups are in charge of specific military operations. In many regions, they overlap with the official authority. This ambivalent and dispersed way of operating militarily is coextensive to the process of corporatization. The necessity of carrying out both formal and informal activities, ‘legal and illegal’ (breaking rules and damaging state and non-state institutions), demands more flexible apparatuses and professional figures. The interaction between formal and informal armed groups is fluid like the economic interests to which these bodies respond. Such networks are constantly evolving, and they are not exempt from sudden ruptures and transformations. Entire sections of the police and the army can eventually turn into mercenary forces (or the opposite way around) and establish new complex forms of cooperation with the state apparatus. Considering Althusser’s argument that
'the distinction between the public and the private is a distinction internal to bourgeois law and valid in the (subordinate) domains in which bourgeois law exercises its “authority”;’ and considering that the state’s domain ‘escapes it because the latter is “above the law”: the State, which is the State of the ruling class, is neither public nor private; on the contrary, it is the precondition for any distinction between public and private’ (Althusser 1970: 12), one could argue that with corporatization the state suddenly operates (even militarily) in a way that tends to go (empirically) beyond this distinction.

Para-militarization and ‘dispersion’ turn warfare into a semi-independent process, an automatism that tends to affect and mobilize specific populations, whereby operations are decided and organized by power lobbies with a high degree of autonomy. The aims of such wars are intrinsic to the process of corporatization. They capture territories and situations not yet submitted to the logics of capital, contexts where resources are available and where resistance is opposed; they perform the destruction of no longer necessary or tolerable forms of institutionality and the transformation of forms of life and labour. Kapferer and Gold (2018) argue that ‘Participatory capitalism’ – and I would add participatory warfare – ‘substitutes participatory democracy’. In their perspective, corporatization ‘is both a restructuring of the governing process of the erstwhile nation state in accordance with structural dynamics most apparent among contemporary corporate conglomerates, and a process of social transformation whereby the structure of social relations, of society itself, is re-constituted, potentially down to the very existential nature of human being’ (Kapferer and Gold 2018).

The Mexican Corporate State’s Militarization and the New Internal Security Law

While 2017 broke many records in terms of violence, the presence and intrusion of the army into the political and social life of the country reached unprecedented levels, settling a hard blow to an already decrepit democratic life and national sovereignty. The Mexican elites are surreptitiously fostering a process of ‘legalization’ and legitimation of internal warfare, whose implications are difficult to foresee in the long term.

In Mexico, federal executive powers have traditionally resorted to the armed forces as an instrument to control organized crime and drug trafficking. Their function in terms of internal security was always circumscribed to drug seizure, the search of clandestine plantations and airports, surveillance of borders and so on (Maldonado Aranda 2009). However, the genesis of the current escalation dates back to 2006, when, from the very beginning of his mandate, President Felipe Calderón started the infamous War on Drugs,
purportedly aimed at fighting organized crime and the drug trade. With this strategy, the armed forces were involved in direct military confrontation with organized crime groups. They also carried out a number of activities (like autonomous criminal investigations, detentions and assassinations) that are unconstitutional and lack an established protocol for the use of military force in civil operations (Fondevila and Mejía 2014: 82). Calderón’s term started with accusations of electoral fraud, widespread social mobilizations and even the self-nomination of the losing candidate, Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador (‘AMLO’), as the legitimate president. In such conjuncture, the strategy adopted by the government to allegedly face organized crime and extreme social instability lead to a state of exception, of sorts, that broke with the constitutional guarantees of the nation state (Fondevila and Mejía 2014: 83). Such conjuncture was the beginning of what one could describe as an acceleration of the corporatization process in Mexico.

Since the beginning of the War on Drugs, the government has adamantly maintained that the militarization of public security would be a temporary measure, an urgent national security operation in defence of a threatened state – and functional to the ‘depuration’ and professionalization of obsolete police forces. However, soon it originated multiple complaints, denunciations and reports of illegal detentions, raids without judicial order, roadblocks, enforced disappearances, torture, homicides, violent confrontations in urban areas etc.

One should consider that armies exist to be employed in wars. The formation of their personnel is not necessarily consistent with the respect for human and civil rights. Their intervention in civil operations bears the danger of excesses of violence and abuse of power – and therefore it tends to be restricted and highly regulated. However, in the Mexican case, the deployment of the army against drug trade came unrestricted, with no regulatory framework. After twelve years, violence has spiralled out of control. The recent introduction of a new Internal Security Law suggests that there is no end in sight to this situation.

The Internal Security Law, approved on 30 November 2017 by the Chamber of Deputies, establishes a procedure by which the President of the Republic can directly order the intervention of the army and the navy in any part of the country, so long as he identifies ‘threats to internal security’ that federal or local police forces are incapable of handling. Typically, to initiate this process, he first needs to consult the National Security Council and determine the nature of the intervention. Within seventy-two hours, he needs to issue a ‘Declaration of Security Protection’, which requires approval by the National Security Council. The Ministry of the Interior must notify the Bicameral Commission of National Security and the National Commission of Human Rights before making the Declaration official. However, ‘in cases
where those threats put in danger people’s integrity or the functioning of the main governing institutions, the President of the Republic ‘under his own strict responsibility’ can order the immediate intervention of the armed forces. This clause confers exceptional powers to the president, opening the doors to unilateral decision making and facilitating abuses of power. This regulation circumvents Article 29 of the Constitution, which obligates the president to obtain authorization from the Congress before implementing any suspension of constitutional guarantees and drastically limits the time extension of such operations.

The law also establishes that the federal and armed forces will undertake intelligence activities in matters of ‘internal security’ based on their areas of specialization and with no restrictions on the legal methods they can use for gathering information. In a country where military power already enjoys exceptional independence from other state apparatuses and has a strong influence on governmental decision making, the army becomes de facto in charge of the internal order. It turns into a legitimate and autonomous political force capable of intervening unilaterally at almost any time, with the freedom to persecute political opposition and social movements. It becomes free to constantly produce and reproduce a situation of warfare – the only situation it is supposed to deal with.

After more than a decade of military presence in the streets, central power felt that a regulatory framework was needed. This decision was also due to popular and international pressure on the government to find a solution and normalize a controversial and somehow embarrassing situation. Indeed, at federal level, there is no law that regulates the use of force. Consequently, the Mexican Army lacks legal parameters to guide the use of force in its function of maintaining internal security (Fondevila and Mejía 2014: 92). However, the Internal Security Law does not establish clear limits to the ongoing ‘exceptional’ tendency. On the contrary, it normalizes a situation of widespread low-intensity warfare through an unconstitutional approach based on very general and vague ideas such as ‘containing risks and threats’ and ‘democratic governability’.

The law consolidates and expands a logic of state and military intervention into civil matters. This initiative could eventually increase military presence in the streets, with implications including systematic human rights violations and heavy limitations on the right to congregate and freely circulate in public spaces. The act of replacing the public ministry in the investigation of crimes committed by civilians paves the way towards a generalized espionage system with no limits or forms of democratic control and accountability. Information collected by the army is indeed considered national security material and is therefore impossible to investigate. The army can
also be involved in situations concerning, for example, the implementation of structural reforms (like the energy sector reforms), which were declared as activities of a primary strategic and social interest as well as a matter of public security – formalizing in this way the participation of the army in corporate expropriation.

Also remarkable are the consequences in terms of national sovereignty, given the tight operational ties existing between the Mexican Armed Forces and the Army of the United States. With President Vicente Fox (2000–2006), Mexico was integrated into the United States Northern Command. Many Mexican Army leaders and cadets are trained in the United States and operate under its direct influence. Even leaders of narco cartels like the Zetas were trained in the United States as counter-insurgency forces. After breaking with the regular army, they established complex new pathways of cooperation with the Mexican state. Their practices include seizure of communal land and resources and the production of fear and hopelessness in society, to the advantage of corporate profit making (Zagato 2018). They became part and parcel of the corporate state project, reflecting its composition and sharing its scopes and aims, especially in terms of the implementation of what I previously defined as a war against the people, and in line with the perspectives of North American military theorists like Louis DiMarco (2014).

With the security law, through a self-justifying act of power supported by no valid or rational argument, the leading national parties are fully embracing and legalizing the military option. Mexico is consolidating an internal constitutional transformation, which is roughly transferring portions of power from the civil to the military sphere. Since it cedes to the government an unprecedented capacity to impose a heavy hand, this law is setting a juridical foundation for coming forms of repression. This is also a sign of transformation of a state unwilling to maintaining control and ‘security’ under civil and democratic conditions, and which finds it more convenient to rule in a situation of chaos, widespread violence and impunity, and where the value of human life stands at its historical lowest point. The presence on the national territory of authentic extermination camps is symptomatic of the ongoing normalization of brutality and violence. In many cases, the state itself acts as the administrator of mass graves, which are created by the prosecutor’s office outside any international or even national legal standard. Thousands of human bodies with no associated investigation folder, without a necropsy, with signs of torture, with tied hands, blindfolded, with their clothes on, thrown like garbage (Dayán 2017).

In just nine years, between 2007 and 2016, 1,075 clandestine graves were found in Mexico, with a total of 2,024 bodies. Several decades after the so-
called ‘dirty war’ (against social and revolutionary movements of the 1960s and 1970s), the clandestine burial of people perpetrated by state and non-state actors is a practice that is recurrent but with a new correlation of actors and contexts. According to a study of the Universidad Iberoamericana and the CMDPDH⁴ (2017), two patterns of behaviour can be observed: on one hand, the constant presence of graves in certain municipalities – with peaks in particular years; on the other hand, the presence of a high number of graves in states affected by exceptional violence in a specific year (CMD-PDH 2017). The above-mentioned study argues that today this practice has the objective of ‘eliminating’ the bodies of previously disappeared people. But it does so leaving visible signs of the violence exerted on them. The aim is to generate terror, achieve control and display the situation of generalized impunity shaping Mexico.

In the transversal battlefield produced by contemporary wars, national and private armies are jointly employed to fight entire populations rather than other armies. The distinction between military targets and the civilian population increasingly blurs, and warfare is normalized, becoming part of people’s day-to-day lived experience. I suggest that this constant level of (internal) warfare is functional to the current phase of state corporatization, since it facilitates structural reconfiguration and corporate intervention into specific territories and regions.

As Alain Badiou argued some years ago, ‘[T]he objective of . . . military intervention is to create plebeian masses everywhere deprived of any capacity of collective cohesion’ (in Pozzana and Russo 2005: 208). Indeed the hegemonic economization and profit rationality require violent fragmenting and atomizing processes and ‘the dislocation and disarticulation of the state’s civil functions . . . [T]he present military campaigns are only the first steps in a plan to fully militarize the state’ (Pozzana and Russo 2005: 208). In this sense, the new Internal Security Law is compatible with the current non-democratic landscape shaped by aggressive forms of corporatization and the propagation of warfare.

In a recent development, the Internal Security Law was declared unconstitutional by two federal judges, one in Mexico City and the other in the state of Guanajuato. They consider that the implication of the armed forces in tasks of public and internal security involves threats to the exercise of the fundamental rights of the people. They also denounced military actions in public security because it may lead to offenses of impossible reparation against members of society.

Despite such an important institutional response to the implementation of the Law, the tendencies prefigured by the Internal Security Law are meant to be implemented one way or another, as I will highlight in the next section.
The Election of Lopez Obrador and Consequences in Terms of Internal Security

The July 2018 elections in Mexico were unique. For the first time, they involved the designation of presidential and congressional seats as well as the appointment of mayors and state governors for the entire Federal Republic. Amidst this massive political process – with almost 90 million of potential voters involved – Lopez Obrador was elected president, with 54 per cent of the share. The victory confirmed figures forecasted since the beginning of the electoral campaign. This was Lopez Obrador’s third attempt. The previous two were disrupted by irregularities and fraud. His party, MORENA, and the coalition that supported him, won the majority of seats in both chambers as well as in the main national constituencies, including Mexico City. On Sunday night, a wave of euphoria flooded the streets of a country exhausted after twelve years of the ‘war on drugs’ strategy, widespread violence and brutality, and poverty levels hovering at 50 per cent. Over the previous six years, the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) had deepened an unprecedented social, political and economic crisis. Amidst this catastrophic situation, a large sector of the Mexican people perceived the triumph of Lopez Obrador (and the defeat of PRI) as a change of course and reason to hope for a better future. This was a victory made possible by the organization of broad sectors of the working classes and the incessant struggle of historically insubordinate groups and communities throughout the country. The figure of Lopez Obrador was able to ride (and make use of) such a widespread dissent in the electoral process.

However, it would be misleading to understand the new leadership in a radical leftist or even anti-establishment perspective – which is how some national and international media are depicting them. Lopez Obrador and MORENA reiterated the neoliberal nature of their plans throughout the entire electoral campaign. They never stopped guaranteeing loyalty to neighbouring countries and international corporations with large economic interests in Mexico. They pledged that no current main economic or infrastructural development would be touched – not even the contested energy reforms. In other words, AMLO has promised adherence to the current state project and that he will work to protect its continuity. It is crucial not to confuse his ‘anti-corruption’ (and anti-‘mafia with power’) discourse with ‘anti-capitalism’. Perhaps, his commitment to fighting widespread illegality will have a positive impact on the functioning of certain public and private institutions – and maybe contribute to alleviating violence – but it will not stop corporate aggression on communities and territories. The entering government will perhaps apply a number of palliative measures and offer some ‘fresh air’ – ‘breath’ (as the Zapatistas put it) – to a suffocating society. How-
ever, AMLO’s victory will not change power and class relations in Mexico, especially for indigenous and peasant groups, who are suffering processes of predatory dispossession, displacement and the destruction of their forms of life, labour and sociality. Such groups will need to continue to resist and build forms of political and social autonomy at a distance from the state and the dominant economic system.

Since December 2017 (when he still was in the electoral campaign), AMLO has assured that there is no need to fear the recent approval of the Internal Security Law, since it operates no change in the Constitution for the fact that the President is the supreme commander of the armed forces – and, he said (in a populist way), ‘I will never order a repression against the people’, emphasizing the legitimacy of his subjective will as the (eventual) ruling person over structural concerns. He also assured that, after reaching the Presidency, he would not delegate the responsibility of fighting insecurity and said that every day ‘at six in the morning’ he will hold meetings with the Secretaries of Defence, the Navy and with the attorney general. As a president, he said, ‘I’m going to take command. This is established by the constitution, so nobody should be afraid of the reform that was recently introduced.’ He added that ‘without the Army or the Navy, we cannot face the problem of insecurity’ (El Financiero 2017). Lopez Obrador’s discourse does not differ substantially from Felipe Calderón’s (and later Peña Nieto’s) justification of the ‘war on drugs’ and the employment of the army in internal security tasks – based on the inefficiency of the police forces, who ‘are not prepared to do what soldiers and marines do’, and on the exceptionality (and reversibility) of the situation. This approach marks a continuity rather than a rupture with the previous administrations. It somehow confirms the historicity and therefore the necessity of the processes we are analysing.

Raúl Ramírez Baena, executive director of the Citizen Commission for Human Rights of the Northwest, stressed that the attitude of the newly elected president ‘is touching extremely sensitive fibres, especially for victims of human rights violations committed by the Army and the Navy’. The activist recalled that more than 99 per cent of the atrocities committed by military elements in the framework of the ‘war on drugs’ were left in impunity. Therefore it is urgent to have a plan for the gradual withdrawal of the military to their bases. Otherwise, ‘the panorama of abuses and violations could continue or even worsen’ (La Jornada 2018).

Corporatization is a historical process that in the field of the state leaves little room for alternatives. The contradictions produced by this process tend to exacerbate both in contexts where neoliberalism is left free to unleash its forces without limitations – as for example in Mexico, where warfare shapes economic and social relations – and in countries where critical governments
have been trying to implement palliative policies to moderate the effects of neoliberalism.

Moreover, the action of freeing the forces of capital from the restrictions of the nation state involves different practices and strategies depending on the contexts in which it is carried out. Nevertheless, these trajectories are not linear or even free from internal frictions. In Mexico, for example, militarization and widespread violence are facilitating (as I highlighted) counter-insurgency and processes of corporate appropriation of public or communal territories and resources. However, structural violence is at the same time affecting and discouraging national and international investors in other key economic sectors (like tourism). International businesspersons consulted by the World Economic Forum place Mexico among the seven countries that generate the most costs to investors to face crime and violence. The economic impact of violence in Mexico in 2017 amounted to 4.72 billion pesos (249,000 million dollars), equivalent to 21 per cent of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP). Problems related to public insecurity have remained one of the two most recurrent obstacles to growth and expansion. Looking at the current process of ‘pacification’ of Colombia, the feeling is that chaotic violence and warfare can represent a phase of rupture and a prelude to a subsequent phase of normalization of social relations, under new corporate logics, and a necessary stabilization of markets and business relations.

For now, in this chapter, starting from the concept of state corporatization, I have limited myself to analysing some of the key trends in Mexico. In particular, I highlighted how in the current phase, corporatization tightly relates to the practice of warfare, which I present as a key feature of current trends in the evolution of statehood. The prominence of warfare is particularly evident in a country like Mexico, where over the last decade an unprecedented acceleration in the process of decomposition of the nation state’s institutionality and society has taken place. Today, the nexus of power is being shaped by fluid and mutating assemblages of conventional state agencies, organized crime, and private enterprises and corporations crystallizing in war machines operating on the national territory. I argued that corporatization is producing a historical disjunction between state and nation. Not only does corporate power not operate in the interest of the national population, but its logic and orientation is transnational. The current logic of domination aims at subjugating parts of the population to a condition of servile and forced labour. Massive migration processes from countries or regions affected by wars and crises are functional to the formation of a disenfranchised, fragmented, vulnerable and fully exploitable labour force. To support my arguments, I took into consideration the recently approved Internal Security Law, which epitomizes ongoing tendencies and provides the President of the Republic and the Federal Army with unprecedented legal power.
and freedom to decide on internal military intervention. This Law, I argue, legalizes and validates processes of internal and dispersed militarization that shaped Mexican society over the last decade.

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**NOTES**

1. See, for example, my analysis of such processes in the state of Guerrero (Zagato 2018).
2. See, for example, the case of Ayotzinapa.

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CHAPTER 2

POLITICAL PARTIES, BIG BUSINESS,
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND
THE ‘VOICE OF THE PEOPLE’
Views from Above and Below on the Crisis
Created by the 2016 Coup in Brazil

John Gledhill and Maria Gabriela Hita

In 2016, the Brazilian congress voted to impeach the country’s first female president, Dilma Rousseff of the Workers’ Party (PT). The removal of the PT from power through a ‘constitutional’ coup d’état might seem puzzling. Having abandoned socialism for neoliberalized social democracy and class conciliation, the PT had become the ‘acceptable face’ of the Latin American Pink Tide in Washington and provided generous subsidies to Brazilian capitalists. In this chapter, we will examine specifically Brazilian dimensions of the fall of the PT and the political polarization that has resulted from the coup. Yet Brazilian experience also mirrors broader global trends.

The relative harmony that briefly existed in the twentieth century between capitalism and inclusive democracy in the North Atlantic world is being replaced everywhere by increasingly authoritarian combinations of financialized corporate capitalism and neoliberal modes of governing society. Elites are uncompromising in the sacrifices that they demand from working people in order to satisfy the ‘economic imperatives’ of a capitalist accumulation process that produces ever greater wealth inequalities and diminishing prospects for intergenerational social mobility. Yet even the poor and destitute are conscripted into participating in contemporary market society (Kapferer and Gold 2018: 43). The techniques developed to defend this new
order erode social bonds and solidarity and promote individualistic transformations of personhood and identity that serve a capitalist logic (Dardot and Laval 2014: 325). Yet they were embraced by centre-left social democratic parties throughout the world.

The failure of these parties to provide satisfying responses to the social consequences of labour market restructuring and deindustrialization has created a generalized crisis of liberal representative democracy. But democratic life has also been undermined from above, by elites and corporate think tanks arguing that effective capitalist management of the economy becomes impossible within inclusive democracies that give serious representation to the interests of the working masses and subaltern groups such as indigenous people.

As Wolfgang Streeck (2016) argues, authoritarian neoliberalism seems incapable of preventing the global capitalist system from succumbing to its contradictions, but the consequences are likely to be messy, since contemporary movements of the Left have found it difficult to define a coherent radical alternative and been pushed onto the political defensive. Latin America manifests many forms of grass-roots resistance to capitalist ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Harvey 2007) in both rural and urban areas. Yet the lesson from Brazil is that even if political ‘turns to the left’ do not necessarily empower such resistance, ‘turns to the right’ prove very much worse. After 2016, Brazilian democracy fell into a deep crisis that was inflected by conditions rooted in the country’s particular history, but there is a more than a passing similarity between the Brazilian crisis and the crisis of liberal democracy in Euro-Atlantic states, as diagnosed by Wendy Brown (2009) and other authors already mentioned.

**A Long Cycle of Coups and the Fall of the PT**

In many ways, Rousseff’s ouster is another episode in a long historical cycle of interruptions of democracy engineered by an oligarchy determined to defend its preferred economic model and privileges of wealth and racially encoded status. The 1964 coup against João Goulart was followed by two decades of military dictatorship, whereas the 2016 coup was engineered through ‘lawfare’ against the PT and the judicialization of politics (Comaroff and Comaroff 2007). In 2016, there was no immediate threat of military intervention, although the military did subsequently re-emerge as a political actor in a lower profile manner. Nevertheless, the role of the congress and right-wing media in undermining a democratically elected president closely replicated events leading up to the 1964 coup and also the moves to unseat Goulart’s mentor, populist president Getúlio Vargas, in 1954. Vargas
responded to the incipient coup by committing suicide, leaving a ‘testament letter to the Brazilian people’ that ensured his passage from life to myth and bought Brazil another decade of civilian rule before Goulart’s plans to embark on the radical reforms in the countryside that Vargas had avoided provoked another round of elite rebellion.

Brazilian society today is very different from that of the days of Vargas and Goulart, but the ghosts of populism past still haunt the present. One of the main objectives of the 2016 coup was to end the guarantees provided to labour by Vargas’s 1943 Consolidation of Labour Laws (CLT), which big business decried as an anachronism limiting Brazilian competitiveness in the global economy. New legislation allowed unrestricted subcontracting and outsourcing, even of teachers in public schools. The permitted length of the working day and number of working days allowed without rest days was increased. The aim was to replace workers enjoying state benefits and protection with cheaper, more precariously employed substitutes, reducing their costs further by relaxing health and safety regulations. Extreme even in terms of the ‘new normal’ of precarization that now exists throughout the capitalist world economy, it is tempting to see Brazil’s ‘labour reform’ as a reflection of employer attitudes towards labour rooted in a slave mode of production not legally abolished until 1888. In the case of rural workers, the powerful agribusiness lobby in congress secured particularly regressive changes in employment conditions under a post-coup regime that relaxed vigilance of modern slavery as well as environmental conservation safeguards.

The Vargas era is also a point of reference in criticisms of the post-coup regime’s reckless abandonment of national resource sovereignty and its willingness to sell off national assets to foreign capital at knock-down prices. On both labour rights and the virtues of economic nationalism, PT governments identified themselves with the tradition of Vargas and his followers in contrasting their policies with those of the neoliberal administrations that preceded them between 1995 and 2002 under Fernando Henrique Cardoso, whose Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB) remained the PT’s main rival in subsequent contests for the presidency. The coup’s new rules on outsourcing were based on draft legislation from the Cardoso era that the incoming PT administration persuaded congress to put on ice.

Dilma Rousseff was the chosen successor of the first PT president to be elected, Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva. These two figures could hardly be more different in terms of social profile. Lula was born in north-east Brazil into a poor family, whose members joined the stream of migrants heading south to seek a livelihood in the industrial hub of São Paulo when the future president was seven years old. Lula began his working life as a child, selling on the street to support a mother abandoned by her husband. His only formal edu-
cational qualification is his certificate as a lathe operator. He became a leading figure in the militant independent trade union movement that emerged in the ABC industrial region of São Paulo under military rule, which formed the ‘popular’ base of the new Worker’s Party of which he was a founding member.

Dilma Rousseff was the university-educated daughter of a prosperous immigrant businessman from Bulgaria. She joined the urban guerrilla movement against the military dictatorship as a student and was captured and tortured. Her career prior to assuming the presidency had followed a technocratic path, and she never displayed much relish for the kind of political deal-making at which Lula proved exceptionally adept. Dilma won public respect for taking a tough stand on corruption and facilitating rather than impeding the work of federal police and public prosecutors in investigating it, even when it was disadvantageous to her own party. But many PT supporters came to criticize what they saw as her deficit of political skills.

Lula gained office, on his fourth attempt, in 2002, in a run-off against the PSDB’s José Serra in which he secured almost 53 million votes. Although Lula gained more votes from organized labour than his opponent, his victory was based on socially liberal middle-class voters opting for the PT, since he failed to secure a majority amongst the working poor of the urban slums (called favelas in Rio de Janeiro), and the rural poor in the north-east (Singer 2009). This pattern changed when Lula was re-elected for a second term in 2006 by over 58 million electors, securing a landslide win of over 60 per cent of the vote in the second round against the PSDB’s Geraldo Alckmin. By this stage, increased economic growth resulting from the global commodities boom had enabled the Lula government to stabilize prices, increase minimum wages, create many new formal sector jobs and introduce schemes that gave poorer citizens credit to improve consumption standards. Singer argues that this was more important than the Bolsa Familia conditional cash transfer programme in enabling Lula to win huge majorities amongst the poor in the north-east in 2006 because poor working families had become convinced that a PT government could redistribute resources to them without wrecking the economy.

Lula now became ‘popular’ for the same reasons that Vargas became ‘popular’, as head of a government that delivered improvements to the lives of the very poor and social mobility to working- and lower middle-class families that enjoyed higher incomes. Yet Lula’s humble origins gave him an even stronger appeal to lower-class Brazilians than Vargas, a member of the landowning classes. Elite Brazilians, including former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso, proved unable to disguise their class prejudices against a figure they deemed unfit to occupy the highest office of state. Yet even if the economic boom that fuelled Lula’s rising popularity was built on fragile
foundations, this ‘uneducated’ president became a respected international statesman who raised his country’s profile on the world stage. The coup regime rapidly squandered this asset as well as the reduction of income inequality secured by the PT governments.

However, as Lula himself came to recognize after the coup, PT governments did not transform the durable class divide reproduced by intergenerational transmission of wealth and cultural capital, despite affirmative action policies in higher education designed to counter disadvantages linked to race as well as family income. After his second defeat by Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Lula had insisted that the PT abandon its earlier commitments to socialism, provoking a split that led to the founding of the Socialism and Liberty Party (PSOL). He continued to emphasize his personal affinity with ‘the people’ (o povo) and promised to create a more egalitarian society from which hunger, poverty and illiteracy would be banished forever. Yet in the 2002 presidential campaign, Lula sought to reassure ‘the markets’ and established economic oligarchy by promising to preserve the neoliberal ‘sound economic management’ of Cardoso. As president, he put international investment banker Henrique Meirelles in charge of the Central Bank. Meirelles later became finance minister in the government imposed by the coup, pushing through a fiscal austerity package that froze public spending for twenty years, a move with drastic implications for public education and an already overstretched universal public health system. Meirelles also pushed for an equally socially regressive ‘reform’ of the state pension system, although that measure’s unpopularity with voters forced the regime to put it on hold until after the October 2018 elections.

Critics inside his own movement accused Lula of turning PT politics into a neopopulist ‘Lulism’ based on his personal charisma and Faustian bargains with the established political class and Brazilian capitalism, which would eventually prove the party’s undoing. Although they were not exactly wrong about the long-term outcome, this diagnosis was superficial, since it failed to address more fundamental contradictions that emerged within the PT as a whole from the moment that the party started winning municipal elections. But before turning to that, we will explore the mechanics of the coup process, since that reveals why PT rule was vulnerable to threats arising from the unreformed deep structures of social and political power.

Corruption, Lawfare and the Judicialization of Brazilian Politics

Dilma Rousseff was elected in 2010 with over 56 per cent of the vote, easily defeating the PSDB candidate in the second round, who was once again José Serra. Yet with clouds of recession gathering as the commodity boom
ended, her majority was reduced to 51.4 per cent of the vote in a tightly fought re-election campaign in 2014 against the PSDB’s Aécio Neves. Many of the more than 54 million voters who continued to prefer the PT were disappointed when the new Rousseff administration partly capitulated to the demands for fiscal austerity that had been made by her rival during the election campaign. As the coup process unfolded, a deepening association of the PT with corruption further eroded grass-roots support for the party amongst poorer citizens who had previously voted for it.

The PT’s claims to be different from other political parties had been battered during the first Lula administration as a result of a scandal over ‘little monthly payments’ paid to deputies in congress to buy their support for government legislation, the mensalão. The first Lula administration allocated ministries to minor parties with which the PT had some ideological affinity, leaving it little alternative but to offer such material inducements to less comfortable bedfellows. Yet disillusion over the mensalão was concentrated amongst the middle class voters in the south of Brazil, who had backed the PT in 2002, a loss more than compensated for by increased support from the poor in the north-east. However, as Rousseff took office for the second time, an even more devastating corruption scandal was emerging as a result of the Operation Carwash (Lava Jato) investigation being carried out under the direction of Federal Judge Sergio Moro in Curitiba. This centred on bribes paid to politicians by major construction and engineering companies in return for favours delivered in securing contracts with the national oil company Petrobras and other government entities. Most prominent amongst these companies was Odebrecht, founded and headquartered in Salvador, Bahia.

Odebrecht became a transnational company, and foreign politicians, including several presidents of Peru, have been charged with receiving illicit payments from its highly organized slush fund. It was clear to impartial observers that corruption at Petrobras had existed before the era of PT rule and that networks of corruption involved all the leading political parties. Yet Judge Moro’s team focused their attention on the PT and its allies and systematically diverted attention from accusations that were made at an early stage against politicians from other parties. It rapidly became clear that their priority target was former president Lula himself. In 2017, Lula was found guilty by Moro of receiving bribes from another Bahian company, OAS, in the form of an apartment, despite the fact that he had never owned or lived in it. The principal evidence in the case came from the plea bargain testimony of OAS chief executive Leo Pinheiro, who had initially exonerated Lula but was subsequently persuaded to change his story.

Moro claimed inspiration from the Italian anticorruption investigation Mani Pulite (‘Clean Hands’), arguing that since corrupt figures enjoying political power tend to be particularly adept at covering their tracks, it was nec-
essary to use plea bargains to induce partners in crime to denounce them, and legitimate to filter information to the media before the investigation was completed to increase the pressure. There is no *prima facie* case for regarding *Mani Pulite* as an unqualified success. It did destroy the traditional party system but simply ensured that more sophisticated methods of corruption would be used in future, opening the way to nine years of scandal-ridden government by Silvio Berlusconi (Vannucci 2009). Berlusconi was eventually convicted for tax fraud, although this did not end his political career; he was elected a member of the European Parliament in 2019. Yet what happened in Brazil revealed additional flaws in a justice system in which judges and members of the elite associate with the parties opposed to the PT, enjoying close ties of kinship and friendship, and are united by shared class prejudices.

As international human rights lawyer Geoffrey Robertson pointed out, the judicial process conducted by Judge Moro did not conform to European standards. Moro acted as both investigating judge, organizing the prosecution, and trial judge, reaching a verdict on the evidence and passing sentence. The three appeal court judges in Porto Alegre who unanimously confirmed Moro’s conviction of Lula for corruption and money laundering in January 2018, increasing his sentence from nine and a half years to twelve years and one month, allowed the defence team to make a case but ignored it in proceeding to read out their already prepared and coordinated judgements.

Lava Jato investigators selectively filtered accusations against the PT to a mainstream press disposed to report them as if they were already proven matters of fact, prompting Lula’s defence team to argue that their client was a victim of ‘lawfare’ based on the media spectacularization of charges without presentation of evidence. The nadir of this process was a press conference given by Lava Jato lead prosecutor Deltan Dallagnol, who used a PowerPoint graphic to illustrate how the PT had installed a regime of ‘criminal governance’ centred on ex-President Lula as ‘supreme commander’ of a ‘bribe duct’ from Petrobras but offered no proof of his accusations. The presentation also blurred the distinction that might be made between personal corruption and corruption linked to securing illegal campaign funds, routine in all major political parties.

Dilma Rousseff was not impeached by the congress for corruption but for manipulating the public accounts to make the economic outlook seem better than it was prior to the election. Such *pedaladas fiscais*, moving money from one category of public spending to another, had not attracted criticism from congress when employed by previous administrations, including those of Fernando Henrique Cardoso. In the event, Rousseff’s alleged ‘crime of responsibility’ played a relatively insignificant role in the impeachment debate. Deputies in the lower house voting for the impeachment preferred to
invoke God, the family, morality and decency, whilst more sober elements in the Senate laid the blame for economic downturn on the president’s mismanagement of the economy. Rousseff’s ouster was a political lynching.

The fact that the PT administrations had strengthened anticorruption investigations by guaranteeing the Federal Police and Public Prosecutor’s Office freedom from political interference worked to the party’s disadvantage initially because the system was biased, but the damage did spread to the entire established political class in the longer term. The impeachment process was launched in the lower house by its leader, Eduardo Cunha of the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB). Lula had decided to make the PMDB, the largest party in congress, the PT’s main coalition partner in national government after his 2006 election victory, hoping to avoid the governability problems that had produced the mensalão. The PMDB had emerged from the dictatorship with some moral authority but was subsequently converted into an electoral machine lacking a consistent ideological orientation. Dedicated to securing the spoils of office, particularly at state government level, the PMDB’s lack of competitiveness in presidential elections made doing the same at federal level through coalition an attractive strategy. Rousseff’s PMDB vice president, Michel Temer, automatically became unelected president of the country as a result of the impeachment.

Rousseff refused to block investigation of the sources of the large sums of money that Eduardo Cunha had salted away in offshore accounts, which gave him a personal motivation to seek revenge. Once he had fulfilled his role in the coup, Cunha was found guilty of corruption and gaol ed, but Michel Temer was subsequently accused of buying his silence on the sins of other leading figures of the PMDB, including himself. A growing number of members of the House and Senate from the main parties supporting the coup, the PMDB, PSDB and right-wing Democrats (DEM), became subject to corruption investigations as a result of plea bargains offered to Odebrecht executives. Another federal police investigation into corruption in the meat packing and export industry led to the head of the JBS company, Joseley Batista, seeking a plea bargain. Always assiduous in tape recording his confidential dealings with politicians, Batista discredited both the defeated PSDB candidate in the 2014 elections, Senator Aécio Neves, and substitute president Temer.

Although the Federal Police had found it impossible to ‘follow the money’ from Petrobras to Lula, in the cases of Neves and Temer they managed to film large sums of cash being carried in bags by associates of the politicians. Observing that ‘the bag says it all’, the Federal Attorney General launched two indictments against Temer, but congress voted to prevent investigations proceeding further. Deputies justified their votes as necessary for mainte-
nance of ‘economic stability’ (read as protecting the coup agenda). Temer purchased his impunity by authorizing big new public spending plans to enhance the political capital of the representatives who voted for it, hardly consistent with the claimed need for draconian fiscal austerity.

Neves was suspended from the Senate, but a supreme court judge ruled that he should resume his seat, on the grounds that the electors of Minas Gerais who had voted for him would otherwise be unrepresented. This might seem an odd decision, given that the removal of Dilma Rousseff left 54 million voters unrepresented, but it was symptomatic of bias at the highest level of the judiciary that called the reality of a separation of powers into question. There are many other examples. As she fought to defend her government, Dilma had tried to appoint Lula her chief of staff, only to have the move blocked by Gilmar Mendes, a Supreme Court judge notorious for his PSDB sympathies, after an illegally wire-tapped telephone conversation between the petistas was made public by Moro. Yet the Supreme Court had no problems when Temer chose Wellington Moreira Franco to head the General Secretariat of the Presidency, rejecting a petition by the PSOL that he be debarred on the same grounds as Lula, since accusations of corruption made against him by Odebrecht executives would no longer fall under Moro’s jurisdiction once Moreira Franco became a minister but enter the notoriously drawn out process of judgement by the Supreme Court. This exemplifies another difference between Lula’s treatment and that of politicians aligned with the coup. Cases against Lula were pursued with unusual celerity, whereas the latter could be confident that their day of judgement would not come any time soon, should it ever come at all.¹

Yet the PMDB and PSDB could not stop the public exposure of the corruption in their ranks. One of the most damaging cases was the fall of Bahian PMDB strong man Geddel Vieira Lima. Forced to resign from Temer’s cabinet for attempting to bully a fellow minister into committing an improper administrative act to benefit his personal real estate investments, Geddel was later arrested, in September 2017, after Federal Police found 51 million reais in cash stashed in suitcases and boxes in an apartment that he owned in Salvador. As the corruption scandals generalized, and the economic situation failed to improve for most Brazilians, citizens became increasingly conscious that an unelected government was writing off the debts of big companies and agribusiness to the tax and social security systems while introducing legislation to make working people pay for the crisis through lower earnings, precarization of employment and loss of public services. In December 2016, the PT suffered heavy losses in municipal elections, but as 2017 advanced, Lula declared his candidacy for re-election as president, secure in the knowledge that he was leading the polls with support from voters across the class and age spectrum.
Even after the appeal court ratified his conviction by Moro, opinion polls continued to show Lula trouncing all other likely candidates for president in the October elections. Yet his candidacy was threatened from the start by another anticorruption move that Lula had himself sponsored when in power, the ‘Clean Slate Law’ (*Lei da Ficha Limpa*). Whether that could be invoked before the nation went to the polls depended on further rulings by superior courts. The judicialization of politics, and the politicization of judges and police, had become a major problem for Brazilian democracy in the coup’s ever-expanding state of exception. Furthermore, the continuing centrality of the figure of Lula in Brazilian political life did not necessarily imply that his party or the Brazilian Left in general were guaranteed a resurgence. To see why, we need to explore deeper structural perspectives on the contradictions of PT rule.

**Critical Reflections on the PT in Power and the Broader Dilemmas Facing the Left**

Media demonization of Lula did damage his personal reputation, and it became commonplace to hear people in poor communities complaining that ‘Lula is a thief, like all the rest’. Yet the damage suffered by his party was even greater. In the 2016 municipal elections, the PT mayor of São Paulo, Fernando Haddad, considered one of the brightest lights in the younger generation of leaders, lost his campaign for re-election by a catastrophic margin to João Doria, a wealthy and flamboyant media baron who presented himself as an ‘administrator’ rather than a professional politician, even though he was the official PSDB candidate, supported by state governor Geraldo Alckmin. In Rio de Janeiro, the new mayor was Marcelo Crivella, nephew of Edir Macedo, founder of the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, of which Crivella had been a bishop. This neo-Pentecostal church has extended its reach far beyond Brazil and has considerable economic and social power within the country, owning one of the three biggest television networks. In the second round, Crivella defeated Marcelo Freixo, a candidate of the PSOL famous for campaigning against the politically connected paramilitary groups called *milicias*. The *milicias* drove drug trafficking gangs out of many favelas, only to terrorize and extort their residents. Crivella won in the favelas, and not simply because the *milicianos* told people not to vote for Freixo. Freixo’s vote, like Lula’s in 2002, principally came from the ‘progressive’ middle classes.

The PT itself was weak in Rio favelas because the federal governments of Lula and Dilma had backed the city and state governments in implementing policies that had had deeply negative impacts on the lives of many favela
residents. Deindustrialized Rio strove to reinvent itself by hosting sporting mega events and redeveloping its central zones to make them more attractive to foreign tourists and higher income residents. Depicted as sites of criminality and violence, the favelas were ‘securitized’ as a menace to other users of urban space. Since some of the space that the favelas occupied was in prime locations appropriate for redevelopment and gentrification, the new security models developed to police them also served to support the forced relocation of some residents, a process that combined ‘social cleansing’ of the poorest with opportunities for real estate developers to profit from ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Freeman and Burgos 2017).

Beginning with the 2006 Federations Cup football tournament, PT governments sent troops to reinforce state government-controlled police in ‘guaranteeing the security of visitors’, placing some favelas under a virtual state of siege. Equally significant was the continuing development of a policy of mass incarceration under the PT. Whereas Fernando Henrique Cardoso became an advocate of drug decriminalization after leaving office, under Lula and Dilma Brazil’s gaols became ever more overcrowded because poor black men and women found in possession of drugs continued to be routinely convicted of trafficking by a class and racially biased judiciary, if they were not simply left sitting in a cell waiting for their case to be heard. The prison system has not simply become an incubator of crime but the principal basis for the national expansion of organized criminal networks born within its inhuman conditions, provoking violent conflicts between them for control of both gaols themselves and the poor communities outside them that are dominated by criminal factions.

All this lies at the heart of a national public security crisis that has continued to deepen since the coup (Gledhill 2018). The PT federal government backed the PMDB-controlled state government’s strategy of implanting Pacifactory Police Units (UPPs) in Rio’s favelas, which PT state governors copied in Bahia. Any prospect of securing the consent and collaboration of favela residents had faded by the time Rio hosted the Olympic Games. The social programmes that should have complemented the new policing model failed to materialize, and the governor on whose watch they were initiated was subsequently gaoled for corruption. The bankrupt state over which his successor presided could do nothing about escalating violence between traffickers and police or increasing police corruption. This gave Temer a pretext for taking security out of the hands of the state authorities and handing over control of the police and prisons to the military, despite the fact that past use of the military had proved ineffective in suppressing crime but increased complaints from favela residents that their human rights were being violated. This unprecedented ‘intervention’ in what had been a responsibility of democratic civilian government since the dictatorship ended provided the
immediate political bonus of making it impossible for congress to vote on the unpopular pension reform because no constitutional changes could be voted through while it was in force. Yet it was preceded by a measure that reassigned the trials of soldiers accused of human rights violations from civilian juries to military courts, raising further worries about where this new process of militarization might end, especially in relation to repression of protests.

The ‘Olympic legacy’ in Rio de Janeiro thus proved negative for the PT, which had also been complicit in promoting social exclusionary patterns of neoliberal urbanism in other regions of the country. A more structural perspective on the PT’s record shows that the explanation for this goes far beyond any ‘Faustian bargain’ with capital made by Lula to further his personal ambitions.

The PT, founded in 1980, was the political fruit of a convergence between the trade union movement of São Paulo’s ABC region, whose strikes during the dictatorship were led by Lula, and left-wing intellectuals, artists and professionals. This new unionism, the base of the CUT (Single Workers’ Central), still a bastion of petismo, emerged beyond the state’s systems of control, co-optation and clientelism. The PT also enjoyed the support of other types of grass-roots movements, promising to promote broad and inclusive ‘popular participation’ in decisions about public spending and urban development. From the standpoint of the 1980s’ new social movement theory, with its exaggerated emphasis on the autonomy and internal democracy of the new movements, the novelty of the PT lay in its offer to make them partners in socially inclusive, participatory, democratic governance. Nevertheless, as Willem Assies (1999) pointed out, this perspective obscured the role of other types of actors in the PT’s development, notably sectors of the Catholic Church and segments of the middle class that had been temporarily radicalized by the suspension of their democratic rights under the dictatorship.

Many middle-class activists became disillusioned with the popular movements when the restoration of civilian government brought a return to ‘traditional’ clientelistic relations that undermined their autonomy. Furthermore, when professionals such as lawyers, architects, urbanists and social workers went back to working on the interface between the state and civil society, they began to think more in terms of ‘concrete results’ than mobilization, and their own class interests (and prejudices) began to play a stronger role in shaping their behaviour. Once the professionals started working within the framework of the neoliberal government of social problems that continued under the PT, middle-class professionals lost interest in listening to their former allies in militancy, as members of the lower classes were converted into ‘target groups’ and individual ‘clients’ of the social programmes that they designed as ‘experts’ (Assies 1999: 223). At the same time, many once radi-
cal activists became distanced from the masses in whose name they claimed to speak as spaces opened up for them within the state apparatus (Lehmann 2018).

Although Lula’s decision to move the PT from socialism to social democracy provoked ideological splits, not all the internal conflicts within the party had an ideological character. From the moment in which the PT began to win municipal elections, the party entered into the ‘normal’ logic of Brazilian political life. The motives behind many disputes were local, with questions about personalities, and alliances between different interests, organizations and movements. The conquest of power opened up new opportunities to accommodate PT militants and representatives of allied civil society organizations in government. This was essential to secure control of the government apparatus, but it also created opportunities to cultivate clientelistic relations. The transformation of the role of middle-class professionals provoked by the embrace of neoliberal techniques of governance also impacted on the forms of citizen ‘participation’ that PT administrations delivered in practice. As Albert (2016) demonstrates in an ethnographic study of the participatory institutions of the petista municipalities of the ABC region, in some contexts representatives of independent social movements and NGOs did enjoy a degree of protagonism in participatory assemblies and public consultations by virtue of playing a role in the direction of these meetings. Yet in the most important meetings, the representatives of popular organizations were obliged to sit in the seats for the general public and content themselves with directing questions to a technical team of public functionaries, who controlled the proceedings about policies that were, in fact, being made in advance at another level and according to criteria that mixed a concept of ‘social interest’ formulated from above with considerations of a more narrowly political kind.

The greater inclusion of social movements within government enmeshed these actors in the pragmatic logics of the political field, in particular the logic of winning elections, which inevitably included the less transparent side of the acquisition of campaign funding and negotiation of contracts. The effects of institutionalization went far beyond Lula’s alleged ‘personalism’. Oliveira (2006: 10–11) observed that leaders of the ‘autonomous’ trade union movement became workers’ representatives on the boards of the private pension funds, which played a major role in Brazilian finance long before 2002. During the deindustrializing years of the Cardoso administration, they became complicit in decisions on redundancies and plant closures, which had eroded the party’s base in the organized working class by the time it finally achieved national power. Furthermore, as Caldeira and Holston (2015) observe, the greater ‘participation’ of ‘civil society’ in government decisions proved a double-edged sword in the case of ‘democratic’
consultations about urban planning. Within an egalitarian frame in which every voice counted equally, representatives of property developers and the middle classes had an equal right to express their point of view. Even in the absence of political influence and bribery, a logic of treating actors differentiated by economic and social power as equals fails to guarantee that the interests of lower-class citizens will be privileged.

In addition to its efforts to improve the incomes of poor Brazilians, increase formal employment with entitlement to social security benefits, and restore expectations of social mobility extinguished under PSDB rule, the PT sought to reverse deindustrialization and promote future economic growth through infrastructure modernization. Key instruments of an economic policy whose economic nationalist orientation contrasted with that of the administration that preceded it, and was totally abandoned after the coup, were the National Development Bank (BNDES) and subsidies offered to the private sector from the public purse. Yet even industrialists in Brazil preferred the rentier profits provided by some of the highest interest rates in the world to new investment and technological innovation (Oliveira 2006: 14), finally opting to back a coup to drive down wages by precarization employment. The profound financialization of Brazilian capitalism is one of the country’s most serious problems. Although the pensions enjoyed by some privileged categories of beneficiaries, notably judges and politicians, might seem excessive, Brazil’s fiscal crisis was not the consequence of a state pension system that was overly generous to the majority of employees. Its principal cause was the enormous cost of servicing the public debt that resulted from the high interest rates underpinning extraordinary bank profits, a deeply regressive personal tax system and the unpaid taxes of the corporate sector, mostly written off since the coup.

PT governments strongly supported internationalization of some of the country’s most important corporations. These included Odebrecht and JBS, two companies that exemplify the links forged between the logics of financialization, rentier profits and corruption. The economic performance of PT-led governments proved fatally dependent on agro-exports and mining, but this dependence also made it difficult for the PT to support the radical Movement of Landless Workers (MST), just as its support for neoliberal urban development made it impossible to support the Movement of Homeless Workers (MTST). Although both these social movements opposed the coup, since its implications for them were clearly far worse than continuing PT rule, resentment over past neglect remained profound. The PT also failed to win much applause from indigenous people and environmentalists for its strong backing for the Belo Monte hydroelectric dam project. What was at the time the worst environmental disaster caused by mining in Brazilian history occurred during the Rousseff presidency.
Yet beyond the PT’s more obvious ‘pacts with capital’ lay a deeper embrace of the logic of neoliberal market society, with profound repercussions. With the laudable intention of improving their living standards, the PT promoted the extension of credit to the poorer sectors of Brazilian society. A sense of being able to participate in consumer society added to the ‘feel good’ effect of PT rule, but the economic downturn rapidly produced crises of personal debt. It also promoted the neoliberal cultural transformation towards construction of the self through consumption. This kind of individualization had negative consequences for maintaining solidarity within communities and social movements. In this, PT governments were acquiescing in processes of social change being promoted by other forces, including ever-expanding evangelical churches preaching prosperity theology and self-help, which was also part of the package promoted by neoconservative US foundations. These foundations proved active in fostering the ‘turn to the right’ throughout Latin America through organizations such as the libertarian Atlas Network.

Membership of a neo-Pentecostal church may come to substitute faith in the ability of politicians and the state to offer individuals a better future. Yet as Crivella’s victory in Rio de Janeiro demonstrated, evangelicals could compete successfully with left parties for the votes of the working poor within the political field itself. Furthermore, although it helped Lula regain ground, the discrediting of the PSDB and PMDB resulted in a situation in which the next most favoured candidate in the polls was the ultra-right, racist, sexist and homophobic former soldier Jair Bolsonaro, whose solution to the country’s problems of crime and violence was to put a gun in the hand of every ‘decent’ Brazilian. The only form of politics at which Bolsonaro is truly adept is the politics of hate.

Openly expressing his admiration for the military dictatorship, Bolsonaro, who had been a particular mediocre federal deputy for more than a quarter of a century, was not really the uncorrupted political outsider that he claimed to be, and he and his sons, also politicians, turned out to have strong personal links with Rio’s milicias. Yet his authoritarian and socially illiberal attitudes had some appeal across class boundaries, although the hard core of his support came from segments of the white middle classes resentful of the threat posed to their social privileges by the success of PT governments in improving the living standards and access to higher education of lower class people of colour.

Once Bolsonaro also declared his support for ultra-neoliberal economic policies, the damage that corruption scandals had done to the electoral prospects of the PSDB and PMDB made him an acceptable means of pushing forward the coup agenda both to Brazilian elites and to the US interests that supported their efforts to drive the PT from power. Bolsonaro chose
Paulo Guedes, a Chicago-trained economist and investment banker who had worked in Chile during the Pinochet dictatorship, as his economic advisor for the 2018 election campaign, subsequently appointing him Minister of the Economy after winning the election in the second round against Fernando Haddad, who replaced Lula once the candidacy of the ex-president, now convicted and held in solitary confinement in Curitiba, was blocked by the Superior Electoral Tribunal.

Bolsonaro won the presidency in the 2018 elections with the strong support of evangelical churches and television stations and also through the systematic diffusion of lies and ‘fake news’ via an unprecedented social media campaign, financed by Brazilian business and US ‘dark money’, which remorselessly directed a negative politics of hate towards the PT, who were accused of undermining ‘Brazilian moral values’ as well as being a ‘communist’ organization, whose economic mismanagement was responsible for all the country’s problems. Yet Bolsonaro’s win also reflected the impact of the highest rate of voter abstention since 1989. This replicated the basis for the defeats that the Left experienced in the 2016 municipal elections at the hands of Crivella in Rio de Janeiro and Doria in São Paulo. Voting is mandatory in Brazil, but it is possible to cast a null or blank vote. In both these metropoles, the number of null or blank votes exceeded those cast for the candidates who were elected. This kind of ‘antipolitical’ reaction is not unique to Brazil. The record rate of abstention in the French general election that brought Emmanuel Macron to power should be considered in any argument that liberal democracy can be rescued by looking for a fresh face supposedly representing the ‘centre’ of politics. Bolsonaro was neither a fresh face nor a centrist, but he was the beneficiary of the same kind of disillusion with established political parties. Doria, the plutocratic opportunist, was happy to endorse him in the second round even though this could be seen as a betrayal of his former political patron, defeated PSDB candidate Geraldo Alckmin.

The growth of ‘antipolitics’ is evident from our own research in a large favela with a long history of grass-roots militancy in Salvador, Bahia, presented in the next section. But before turning to that, we complete the analysis of this section by looking at how a ‘popular’ critique of the 2018 Rio de Janeiro carnival parade unsettled the coup regime by projecting an understanding of the roots of the country’s problems that is consistent with our own arguments.

Two Rio samba schools stole the show by organising parades that were immediately read as ‘political’. Beija-Flor (Hummingbird), the champions, entitled their parade ‘the forgotten children of the country that gave birth to them’, juxtaposing the corruption of elites with the violence of drug gangs, police ‘stray bullets’, mass incarceration and social exclusion, which remained the lot of the people of the favelas. Beija-Flor made the bags of
money delivered by businessmen to politicians a central motif, but its parade conformed to a reading of Brazilian history in which corruption is seen as an enduring legacy of Portuguese colonialism, making the country a Frankenstein’s monster, the first allegorical figure in the Beija-Flor parade. This reading contrasted with that of Paraíso do Tuiuti, the samba school voted carnival vice champions, whose theme ‘My God, my God, is slavery extinct?’ pointed the finger at slavery as the foundation of Brazil’s enduring social inequalities by focusing on the coup’s attack on the rights of workers.

This school savagely satirized those who had participated in the street demonstrations in favour of Rousseff’s impeachment; they were presented as being manipulated by giant hands, representing the Globo media empire and the São Paulo Federation of Industries (FIESP), creator of the symbolic yellow ducks on which other manifestoches (demonstrator puppets) were mounted. The last element in Paraíso do Tuiuti’s parade was an image of a vampire bearing a striking resemblance to Temer and wearing a presidential sash. Direct critique of the coup proved too much for Globo TV, whose commentators simply stopped commentating as the meaning of the performance unfolded, but it was to little avail, since the video immediately went viral on social networks.

A number of journalists and academics have commented on the difference between the Beija-Flor reading of the roots of Brazil’s problems and that of Paraíso do Tuiuti. The latter conforms to sociologist Jessé Souza’s insistence that we should stop trying to explain Brazil’s problems in terms of historically rooted cultures of corruption. Corruption is hardly a uniquely Brazilian vice and is associated with contemporary capitalist financialization (Souza 2017). Souza urges us to focus instead on how Brazil’s elite has replicated the logic of a slave-owning society up to the present, not only in its attitudes to labour but in its entire strategy of accumulation, characterized by a short-term rentier orientation based on plundering the population through high interest rates and liquidating natural resources without thought for the future.

A View from Below: The Political Perspectives of the ‘Popular’ Classes

We have conducted more than a decade of field research in collaboration with the leaders of Bairro da Paz, a ‘socially peripheral’ area of the city of Salvador created by land invasion whose residents now find themselves living in a principal new centre of residential and commercial expansion. Our aim here is to develop the kind of political ethnography that Pinheiro-Machado (2016) deems essential for deepening understanding of how what Brazilians call the ‘popular classes’ think and act in the context of a coup. Our analysis
rests on a wide range of observations and shared experiences; in particular, our extended case study of the community’s Permanent Forum of Entities (FPEBP), of which our research team were founding members, offering advice and logistical and technical support (Hita and Gledhill 2018).

We focus here on internal disputes between leaders of the Forum and other community organizations. We recorded the themes and political debates that emerged in the exchanges between members of a WhatsApp list created to discuss issues of interest to the Forum in 2015 and subsequently expanded by the participation of various other activists and figures from outside the community involved directly in its affairs, complemented by various interviews with these protagonists conducted at the end of 2017. We examine four different but interrelated conjunctures. The first, from March to May 2016, is when the national debate around the impeachment began. The second, between August and October 2016, started with the Senate’s confirmation of Rousseff’s impeachment and ended with heavy electoral defeats for the PT throughout the country. The third, between November 2016 and February 2017, was one in which the coup advanced its agenda on fiscal austerity and labour reform, but the country was sliding deeper into economic and political crisis. The fourth conjuncture takes us up to January 2018, which was marked by growing support for Lula’s return to the presidency in the face of escalating political polarization and moral crisis, and ending with the Porto Alegre tribunal’s ratification of Lula’s conviction by Moro. This made Lula’s imprisonment and eventual exclusion from the election possible, after the Supreme Court rejected pleas from Lula’s defence team and a ruling from the United Nations Human Rights Committee that the sentence be deferred until all appeals had been exhausted.

The objectives of the FPEBP are defined by Article 2 of its rules, revisited by its secretariat, employees of the Santa Casa de Misericordia NGO, between April and May 2016 in an effort to defend the collective against the attacks of critics, especially Bocão, volunteer anchor person of the Community Radio station, who always questioned what other community leaders did in an aggressive manner. Bocão never tired of accusing leaders of offering ‘pseudo leadership’, describing the community as a place where there were ‘many chiefs but few Indians’. He complained that when he denounced major problems reported to the Community Radio on the WhatsApp list, leaders showed little interest in resolving them, preferring to participate in meetings that never led to action and pursue their personal interests. Article 2 states that the Forum should act as an inclusive higher council for deliberation and debate on the community’s problems, diagnosing them but leaving it to the individual entities, in particular the Residents’ Council, to execute actions to solve them. Yet the principle of seeking to support the entities without competing with them in the production of concrete actions was al-
ways interpreted in different ways by different participants, particularly new members not familiar with the Forum’s rules or the history of past discussions. This inevitably produced conflicts and misunderstandings, a sensation of always starting everything again from scratch, and desires to establish new rules depending on who was participating most at a given moment.

The postures of members of the WhatsApp list remained more or less consistent during the first three conjunctures, reflecting their ideologies and political and party preferences. Nevertheless, the third conjuncture proved a watershed, after election results had shown a significant advance for the right. During the first conjuncture, discussion focused on the impeachment and produced heated and polarized positions. One side opposed the impeachment in defence of democracy and the verdict of voters in the 2014 election. Some acknowledged mistakes by the government and especially by Dilma Rousseff herself, whom they not only recognized as lacking Lula’s charisma and political skills but also felt had betrayed his legacy. Yet they contested various accusations that the other side was making against the PT, arguing that the party had provided Brazil with its best government in history, a government that looked to the interests of the poorest. On the other side were those who defended the principle that Dilma had to go, arguing that the impeachment was not a coup or attack on democracy but a constitutional act that was a legitimate response to a deepening crisis. It was clear that a majority believed most of the news that the mainstream media was propagating against the PT, which laid responsibility for corruption exclusively or principally at the door of that party.

In the first camp were Mino, leader of Apompaz, a grass-roots socio-educational NGO in the community; Bocão from the Community Radio; Dulce and Mario, important community leaders active in Catholic lay organizations; and Lia, also connected to Catholic groups and the PT’s local candidate for election as a city councillor. Those on the other side, whose opinions were regularly based on Globo’s anti-PT reporting, included the most important small businessman living in the community, Faustão, who had been very active in the Forum and Residents’ Council in earlier years, along with some participants in community groups dedicated to Afro-Brazilian music and culture. Some of the latter were followers of Salvador’s mayor, ACM Neto, who had returned control of municipal government to the political right in 2012 as a DEM candidate, although the state government remained under the control of the PT. ACM Neto astutely sought to build political support in poor communities by patronizing truly ‘popular’ black culture. The main DEM political operator in the community and candidate for city councillor was Waldemar, a native of São Paulo, who had lived in Bairro da Paz since 2012 and worked for the municipality, bringing problems reported by residents to the relevant city government departments for resolution.
Other leaders of cultural groups belonged to the ranks of the critics of impeachment but adopted a softer tone. Particularly notable was Caio, who had been co-ordinator of the Forum during one of its most active periods. Associated with militant black politics, Caio adopted more aggressive postures towards authority, including the police Community Security Base installed under Bahia’s equivalent of Rio’s UPP programme. A member of the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB) and advisor to Silvio Humberto, one of its town councillors and an important figure in the Unified Black Movement, Caio seized the opportunity to criticize the PT but without supporting the impeachment. This was also the posture of the PSB’s leader in Bahia, Senator Lidice da Mata. Rejecting the pro-impeachment stance adopted by her party nationally but without defending the record of a party that was an electoral rival, she participated in street protests convened in the name of defending democracy that identified the impeachment as a coup.

Few participants in these debates referred to these street protests, with the exception of Bocão, who constantly pointed to information that did not appear on Globo News, and Renan, who worked on family health projects and posted news reports from the New York Times that also questioned the vision offered by mainstream Brazilian media. The debates during the first conjuncture focused on whether the impeachment was correct or not, and the postures adopted were strongly polarized, reflecting the pattern in society as a whole.

In the second conjuncture, discussion of the impeachment virtually ended, and attention was focused on the coming elections. The majority believed the impeachment to be irreversible and justified by the incapacity of the PT and Rousseff to control the crisis that the country was experiencing, for which they had rightly been judged culpable. Only those who had declared themselves against the impeachment continued to defend the PT indirectly, and most of those produced arguments in favour of the type of left-wing leaderships for which people should continue to vote because they defended the interests of the kind of people who lived in the neighbourhood. In the new conjuncture, Caio aligned less ambiguously with this group. Yet anyone sympathetic to the Left was ferociously counterattacked. Those with strong partisan sympathies tried to use the WhatsApp list to make political propaganda in favour of their preferred candidates, inside and outside the neighbourhood, provoking a reaction in which the majority of participants favoured a rule prohibiting its use for party political purposes. The FPEBP’s secretariat argued that the list’s space for expression of popular perspectives on politics should focus on the common good of the neighbourhood rather than party politics, which only raised passions and produced disunity.

The results of the October 2016 local elections showed that the majority of the 7,720 registered voters of Bairro da Paz had withdrawn the sup-
port that they had previously given to the PT. In Salvador as a whole, mayor ACM Neto secured re-election with an overwhelming majority, including within the popular classes. He reversed his heavy defeat by the PT in Bairro da Paz in 2012 by securing 63 per cent of the community’s votes – 2,000 votes more than the Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB) candidate of a left coalition that included the PT. In the elections for councillors, the candidates of minor parties that the mayor brought into his coalition and provided with active personal support included the pagode singer Igor Kannário, whose songs were enormously popular amongst the youth of the urban periphery because of their constant references to the world of crime and police violence. Kannário received 150 votes in Bairro da Paz. Of the community’s own candidates, Lia of the PT secured most votes, with 328, but was only just ahead of Waldemar, the DEM candidate, with 299, and candidates from the mayor’s coalition secured over 24 per cent of the votes for councillors cast in Bairro da Paz. Yet even more voters no longer wanted to have anything to do with political parties. The number of null and blank votes amounted to almost 29 per cent.

Symptomatic of how popular anger focused on disillusion with the PT during the second conjuncture was Bocão of the Community Radio, who earned his living working as a security guard in a supermarket in a nearby middle-class neighbourhood. Having once been a PT militant himself, he continued defending Lula even after confessing his disillusion with the party, but he now began to make stronger criticisms of PT corruption. When Mino continued to defend the PT in a combative manner, this provoked escalating counterattacks from the antipetistas. They not only accused Mino of having a personal economic interest in defending his party, as an advisor to PT politician Vânia Galvão, but also attacked his socio-educational projects, which had played an important role in getting young people from Bairro da Paz access to higher education and received economic support through his political networks outside the community. Some of Mino’s critics, especially from the cultural groups patronized by ACM Neto, went so far as to seek to humiliate him personally.

Polarization on party lines was dampened a little by the debates about the divisive nature of using the WhatsApp list for electoral propaganda purposes, which continuously produced calls for the unity, tolerance and patience that would enable people to focus on what really mattered for the neighbourhood as a whole. Yet no real consensus was reached on this issue, and other contradictions emerged. Lia, the PT candidate for councillor, administered one of the community’s Catholic crèches. She was enthusiastic about the various social projects that the Community Security Base (BCS) was developing in the neighbourhood and enjoyed cordial relations with its commander. Despite the doubts expressed by some of the leaders of the
other entities that participated in the FPEBP, the commander insisted that the BCS had the right to become a member of the Forum as an entity working in the neighbourhood, in the same way as the Santa Casa or groups from the Federal University. He also participated in the WhatsApp debates, which provoked difficulties when participants complained about truculent treatment of residents by the base police and Special Patrol Group police, who periodically entered the community searching for drug traffickers.

Difficulties escalated as the Forum began to prepare a public meeting on neighbourhood security to discuss alleged abuses committed by police and agents of the municipal government’s commercial regulation department in the community. The base commander declared that this meeting was being transformed into a political act, attacking Caio in particular, in public and via the WhatsApp list, for criticizing the BCS as an institution of the repressive state without recognizing the benefits of its social programmes to the community. As tensions mounted, some new WhatsApp groups were created that excluded all ‘external entities’ and were restricted solely to residents of the neighbourhood.

When neither of the neighbourhood’s own candidates (Lia and Waldemar) were elected councillors, some participants in the original list complained that the effect of trying to suppress discussion of electoral matters had been to ensure that more residents gave their votes to candidates from outside the community. One of the outsiders, Igor Kannário, had enjoyed a special opportunity to enhance his profile inside it. In September 2016, he had been the star attraction in an event called ‘Culture of Peace’, criticized by the Residents’ Council, some Forum members and the community newspaper for having been sponsored by the Military Police through the BCS. This was certainly not all ‘new politics’. Some of the younger members of the cultural groups may not have campaigned directly for Waldemar and the DEM but they did help him to hand out T-shirts and drum up votes in return for promises to asphalt streets and attend to other infrastructure problems in more precarious areas of the community.

The Kannário show was followed by support from the BCS and municipality for their own events. It was no coincidence that new members from these groups joined the WhatsApp list before the elections, arguing that the community had to ask for more of the kinds of benefits that Kannário’s event had brought, which included some free medical attention. These young people aggressively rejected the platforms of other parties, including Caio’s insistence on the need for affirmative action to combat racial inequalities, which united this PSB militant with Mino of the PT in a further polarization of the debates. But the DEM triumph reflected the success of the Right in deploying clientelistic ways of doing politics to make the most of an electoral environment reshaped by disillusion with the PT and antipolitics.
There were still moments in which more or less the whole community managed to come together. The public meeting on security produced evidence of real problems and served as a vehicle for complaining about inadequate investigation of past human rights abuses, which included extrajudicial killings. The Forum and Residents’ Council successfully resisted the BCS commander’s demand to act as co-organizer of the event, provoking a truculent reaction in which he threatened to take action against some community leaders for disrespecting his lawful authority. Another case that produced consensus amongst members of the WhatsApp group was a demand that the construction companies responsible for building a new metro station that would affect residents of the neighbourhood should negotiate about the compensations due to the community in the form of social projects with its representatives rather than impose them without consultation. Direct action in the form of blocking the main road running past the neighbourhood into the city centre was discussed as a way of pressing this and other demands related to getting the same kinds of benefits for the community out of the restructuring of the local transport system as were planned for middle-class residential areas in the vicinity. Nevertheless, there is evidence that the presence of the BCS has become more acceptable to residents over the years and that it has produced greater fragmentation in the popular organizations of the community as the result of the emergence of new leaders more closely aligned with government as a result of the projects sponsored by the base.

The tendency in our third conjuncture was for sentiment to turn against the government installed by the coup. In different ways, and with growing critical attention to what was disseminated by mainstream media, even the most conservative participants in the WhatsApp group began to diminish their expressions of rage against PT corruption, as if they were finally becoming conscious that they had been manipulated. This seems to have been the case with small businessman Faustão, but there was also a change of posture on the part of the followers of Kannário, who slowly began to disengage from defence of the DEM. This change of attitude was driven by rejection of the coup’s retrograde legislative agenda on labour and public spending, and direct experience of rising unemployment and precarization of the jobs that remained. Growing evidence for corruption on the part of leading figures of the PMDB and PSDB also helped shift the focus of discussions towards rejection of Temer. Although some participants still refused to name the coup a coup, most who had contested the idea that the impeachment had been a coup earlier now fell silent. Some continued to express a special hatred towards the PT and insisted that its eventual return to power was unthinkable, but expressions of indignation about the corruption of all politicians became the order of the day. This strengthening of ‘antipolitics’ during
the third conjuncture did not, however, seem likely to produce a general PT recovery.

Yet as the results of interviews conducted towards the end of the fourth conjuncture demonstrated, Lula’s personal political recovery did manifest strongly in Bairro da Paz. Even some who suspected that he might actually be guilty of personal corruption now saw his return to the presidency as the best solution for the country and the poor, confident that a new Lula government would cancel the retrograde measures imposed by the coup regime. A striking result was that even some of ACM Neto’s supporters, including Waldemar, declared that they would vote for Lula in national elections, and there were tantalizing hints that some would vote for an alternative candidate nominated by Lula should he be debarred from contesting the election. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that Lula opened up a new chapter in Brazilian populism by being ‘of’ the people rather than simply managing to convince them that he could govern successfully in the interests of the less privileged. National polls at the time of these interviews showed that Lula’s support was particularly strong in the north-east, but it was not restricted to that region, as he enjoyed substantial middle-class support as well, although it was less clear to whom, if anyone, his votes would transfer were he unable to stand. Some of those interviewed in Bairro da Paz simply said that they would not vote at all if they could not vote for Lula.

Conclusions

The one thing that all Brazilians could agree upon at the start of 2018 was that their society was profoundly polarized. Although this polarization expressed itself in a politics of resentment on the part of better off Brazilians towards citizens who had achieved a modest social ascent during the years of PT rule, we have shown ethnographically that polarization, anger and hate also became manifest within relatively deprived communities. The crisis provoked by the coup revealed long-standing strands of social conservatism and support for authoritarian solutions in Brazilian society. Yet change in social values is also evident.

Some of the young people who took to the streets to demand the ouster of Dilma Rousseff combined support for unfettered free market economics with socially liberal attitudes on questions such as sexual preference. The fostering of cultures of consumption and identity politics have turned Brazil into a neoliberal market society that sometimes seems the epitome of a new social world in which the economic becomes the measure of all things, inhabited by individualized subjects who, as Dardot and Laval put it, are ‘one day invited to change cars, the next to change partners, the next
their identity, and another day their sex’ (Dardot and Laval 2014: 325). Yet since many people in poor communities like Bairro da Paz, including some PT supporters, remain socially conservative, support for the politics of Jair Bolsonaro can be found in all social classes. Bolsonaro’s proposals for solving the crisis in public security were obviously class biased, but lower-class Brazilians have shown a notorious willingness to accept repressive policing when it is directed at ‘bandits’ rather than at themselves as ‘honest workers’. This ensured some support for Bolsonaro’s ‘iron fist’ public security policies amongst (mostly male) residents of poor communities nationally, although in the 2018 elections Haddad did beat Bolsonaro in Bahia and the other states of the north-east. In terms of both repression and interventions by social workers in the lives of the poor, Brazil exemplifies the Janus face of what Wacquant calls the ‘neoliberal government of social insecurity’ (Wacquant 2009) but in doing so draws on historically rooted notions about keeping racialized lower classes in their proper place, with which members of those classes can be partially complicit.

Nevertheless, the political resurrection of former president Lula demonstrated that the lower classes have a sticking point when it comes to elite attempts to renew their exclusion from democratic political life. In dismissing ‘lulapetismo’ as ‘mere populism’ based on the manipulation of ‘ignorant nordestinos’, Brazilian elites make two mistakes. They misread the deep-seated demands for respect and equal treatment embedded in the structures of feeling of the ‘popular classes’ and the capacity for self-organization that they still possess despite the impacts of neoliberal governmentalities. They also ignore those sectors of the middle classes whose politics are not driven by resentment but by a genuine desire to create a fairer and more egalitarian society free of patriarchal violence and homophobia. Only elites have any reason to welcome the coup’s efforts to return Brazil to its former status as an agro-export and resource extraction periphery of the capitalist world economy at whatever environmental and social cost, advanced further by the Bolsonaro government giving the green light to accelerated deforestation in Amazonia and agribusiness use of ever more dangerous agro-toxins despite high existing levels of contamination of urban water supplies and other public health risks.

Where polarization and the growth of a politics of resentment and hate will eventually lead remains as uncertain in Brazil as in the rest of the world, but it would be premature to assume that the difference between ‘left’ and ‘right’ has become irrelevant under neoliberal capitalism, even if old certainties about what the Left should do have been eroded. What the Right stands for is now starkly obvious to working-class Brazilians. The Left may need to pay more attention to the communalistic transformation of social property relations, as recommended by Harvey (2012) and Dardot and Laval (2015),
and to delivering on past promises to make democracy more participatory and also rethink how state power should be deployed if it is to truly empower citizens and promote a more egalitarian society. Lula may have had little practical alternative to conciliating elites and accommodating PT rule to existing political and judicial institutions, but the unreformed nature of those institutions combined with the reproduction of existing structures of social power made even moderate social democratic government vulnerable to overthrow in Brazil. Even so, it was necessary to resort to extraordinary measures to prevent Lula returning to power in 2018.

The road ahead remains difficult. The developments that brought Bolsonaro to power have revealed the anti-democratic consequences of the failure of Brazilian democracy to bring the military to account for the crimes committed under the dictatorship and the failure to protest against the military being assigned the role of ‘guardians of order’ under the 1988 democratic constitution. Generals felt empowered to make directly political declarations without precedent since the dictatorship in the new environment created by the 2016 coup. Equally unprecedented since the dictatorship was the number of former soldiers that Bolsonaro appointed as government ministers, although this also contributed to internal conflict within the administration between the more pragmatic military figures and civilian ministers determined to pursue ultra-rightist ideological projects. As time has gone by, the ‘hidden hand’ of US foundations, think tanks, corporate interests and government in the assault on Brazilian democracy and national resource sovereignty has also become more visible and documentable, especially in relation to Operation Carwash. Judge Moro was rewarded for services rendered to the coup and Bolsonaro’s election by being appointed Justice Minister in the new government, with the promise of a Supreme Court seat to come in the future.

Nevertheless, as its true nature and the mechanisms through which it was carried out became clearer, the latest in the long cycle of Brazilian coups exposed the weaknesses not only of the Left but also of the Right and of the political forces supporting the coup that tried to represent themselves as occupying the ‘centre’ of the political field. This offers hope that the latest episode of authoritarian rule will be followed by the more profound structural reforms necessary to end the cycle for good.

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NOTES

1. Both Moreira Franco and Michel Temer were finally charged with corruption in 2019 but only after they had left office and fulfilled their roles in the coup process.
2. The 2013 street protests against rising public transport charges as well as the costs of hosting the Games in a country that needed to spend more money on public education and healthcare rattled the Rousseff administration prior to the Olympics and were generally seen as a positive awakening of young people. Less noticed at the time was the role of protestors with right-wing agendas, who joined the organized movements that demanded Rousseff’s impeachment in 2016 (Gohn 2017).
3. WhatsApp proved a crucial element in the Bolsonaro electoral campaign on social media. Bulk dissemination of messages was funded, illegally, by business interests backing Bolsonaro and ‘dark money’ originating in the United States.
4. Mayor Antônio Carlos Peixoto de Magalhães Neto is the grandson of Bahia’s most important twentieth-century politician, Antônio Carlos Magalhães, original bearer of the soubriquet ACM. ACM Grandson (Neto) has skilfully updated the right-wing populism that assisted the ‘conservative modernization’ directed by his distinguished forebear.
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CHAPTER 3

THE ELECTION OF MAS, ITS EGALITARIAN POTENTIAL AND ITS CONTRADICTIONS
Lessons from Bolivia

Leonidas Oikonomakis

Introduction

Up until a few decades ago, the indigenous Bolivians who constitute the vast majority of this landlocked country were not even allowed to walk on the cities’ sidewalks, not to mention vote. In 2005, however, the country elected its first indigenous President, Evo Morales Ayma. His government while having up to a certain extent empowered the previously excluded has done so in a ‘controlled’ manner and without disempowering the country’s economic elites. At the same time, the type of social change that has been brought about in Bolivia in the past fourteen years has not been as radical as some had hoped and others had feared. While in the cycle of protest that preceded Evo’s rise to state power several radical egalitarian and emancipatory proposals were articulated and practised in Bolivia, once Evo was elected the more radical proposals lost steam, while critics of the government were either suppressed or dismissed as ‘traitorous’.

In this chapter, I argue that despite the fact that Evo’s election was portrayed as ‘the rise of the Bolivian social movements to state power’, in fact his government ended up being one the izquierda permitida – to borrow Webber and Carr’s (2013) term – and not one of izquierda radical. In addition, again focusing on the Bolivian experience, I also question the role
of elections during cycles of protest, and I argue that they contribute decisively towards the minimization of social mobilization and its translation into – moderate – party politics, leading to the division of movements and the weakening of radical, prefigurative, egalitarian political processes. That way, they contribute to translating protest into a more controlled political process that minimizes the threat to the survival of political and economic elites and to the ‘corporate state’ that sometimes appears during cycles of protest. In such a process, what appears as ‘egalitarianism’ may also produce (or reproduce) its own hierarchies, elites and political relations.

The Country to Whose Founding the Indigenous Were Never Invited

El 22 de enero del año 2002, Evo fue expulsado del Paraíso. O sea: el diputado Morales fue echado del Parlamento. Mucho antes de la expulsión de Evo, ya los suyos, los indígenas, habían sido expulsados de la nación oficial. No eran hijos de Bolivia: eran no más que su mano de obra. Hasta hace poco más de medio siglo, los indios no podían votar ni caminar por las veredas de las ciudades. (Galeano 2006)

In the above text, Eduardo Galeano reminds us that up until half a century ago the indigenous peoples of Bolivia – the majority of its inhabitants that is – were not even allowed to walk on the cities’ sidewalks, not to mention vote in elections. In 2006, in one of those twists of history, Evo Morales, an indigenous Aymara who had been growing coca leaves, ‘the devil’s leaf’ according to Galeano, and had led the struggle of the Bolivian – and especially the Chapareño¹ – cocaleros against the uprooting of their bushes, was being sworn President of the country: not only of the indigenous, the cholos, or the blancos, but of the whole country. His election sparked hopes and fears not only in Bolivia but in the whole region and the world. An indigenous person, one of the historically most excluded, was about to take power in that landlocked, highland country. The indigenous and the poor – who in Bolivia largely coincide – were full of hope that finally justice and equality would reign in the country. It is also a fact that the emancipatory potential of a poor, indigenous person being sworn President was more than welcome but not everywhere or by everybody though.

The Bolivian economic and political elites were nervous and unsure of what would follow. Would their centuries-long privileges be questioned now that the indios had taken power? And what did that mean for other economic elites and other historically excluded populations in the region? The United States, who had long controlled the country through aid and trade, were also anxious. After all, it was the US ambassador Manuel Rocha that had warned against voting for Evo Morales in 2002, more or less comparing him to Osama Bin Laden. It backfired: the Bolivians were so fed up
The Election of MAS, Its Egalitarian Potential and Its Contradictions

with North American meddling with their country’s internal affairs that they rushed to vote for Evo. So much did Ambassador Rocha’s intervention backfire that Evo Morales joked that he would employ Rocha ‘the owner of the – Bolivian – circus’ as head of his electoral campaign (Astelarra 2014). Fourteen years have passed since Evo’s rise to state power, and though he remains popular in Bolivia, he is not as popular as he used to be. In a 2016 referendum, 51 per cent voted against a Constitutional amendment that would allow Evo Morales to be re-elected for the 4th time in the 2019 elections – almost as many as had voted him for President ten years earlier. The Constitutional Tribunal, however, had a different opinion: it considers it a constitutional right for any Bolivian citizen – including Evo – to be an electoral candidate as many times as he/she wishes, thus bypassing the result of the referendum. Evo’s vice president, Álvaro García Linera, saw no contradiction in this development, saying in an interview with El País that if we stick to the constitutional rules, Evo would have to go, but that would be political suicide, since he is ‘the personification of the unification of the people . . . something that happens every 100 or 200 years’ (Molina 2018). A recent poll, however, signalled that if the Bolivians were to be asked again, 63 per cent of them would back the referendum’s initial result: Evo would not be allowed to run for President in 2019. At the same time, it seems that Evo’s popularity is also losing ground in the four most important Bolivian cities: from 58 per cent it has dropped to 34 per cent (El Deber 2017).

While the MAS has not identified a suitable candidate that could substitute Evo Morales, they have been busy with other concerns until now, said the vice president, fourteen years after Evo was sworn President, and while he has just lost his first major political battle, it seems like a good time to look back in a critical manner and make some first evaluations of his presidency’s performance. From this author’s perspective, Evo’s governments have been neither as radical as it was feared, nor as egalitarian as it was hoped. While Evo Morales’ policies have had a redistributive character and did undeniably benefit the least privileged Bolivians, at the same time they did so without having to disempower the most privileged, thus maintaining an unequal system of power relations in the country instead of overturning it.

Riding on a Wave of Protests

The MAS (Movimiento Al Socialismo), Evo’s party, was conceived as the political instrument of the Bolivian indigenous-campesino movement led by the Chapareño cocalero movement, the Six Federations of the Tropic of Cochabamba. Elsewhere, I have described in detail how it was conceived and how the electoral route won the ideological battle within the cocalero
movement itself against other, more radical and certainly more violent options that were on the table such as *guerrilla warfare* (Oikonomakis, 2018, 2019a, 2019b; Oikonomakis and Espinoza 2014). Why a ‘political instrument’ and not a party? Moira Zuazo (2009: 38) argues that this has to do with two factors: a) the prevalent idea within the campesino-indigenous movement that ‘political parties divide us’ and b) the delegitimization of the political party as an organizational form that has its roots in Bolivia’s ‘turbulent years’ 2000–2005. It was officially approved in the Sixth Congress of the United Union Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia (CSUTCB, Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia) in 1994 and officially formed a year later in the congress on ‘Land, Territory and Political Instrument’ that took place in Santa Cruz. There, representatives of several campesino-indigenous organizations such as the CSUTCB, the Bartolina Sisa National Federation of Bolivian Peasant Women (FNMCB-BS, Federación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas Bartolina Sisa), the Syndicalist Confederation of Bolivian Colonizers (CSCB) and the Indigenous Central of the Bolivian East (CIDOB) established the Asamblea de los Pueblos (ASP), which would later become the MAS-ISP and eventually what we know today as the MAS.

It is widely believed that the most influential factor behind the birth of the MAS was the introduction of the Popular Participation Law (LPP – Ley de Participación Popular) introduced in 1994. The LPP was an opening in the Bolivian political system that would allow greater popular participation at the local administrative level, since it increased the share of the national budget destined to the country’s 311 local municipalities to 20 per cent from 10 per cent (Kohl 2003: 153). Therefore, it is considered that the LPP provided a political opening for indigenous and other local grass-roots organizations to participate in local electoral politics. This political opening is viewed as the *political opportunity* that gave birth to the political instrument of the campesino-indigenous movement of Bolivia, the MAS. Even the dates point to that direction: the MAS was established in 1995, just one year after the introduction of the LPP. However, if we take a deeper look into the internal dynamics of the campesino-indigenous movement, we will realize that the creation of the political instrument was not an instinctive reaction to the introduction of the LPP by the central government but rather a carefully planned move within the movement at least since 1984. According to Durand Ochoa (2012: 161), the decision to create a political instrument was taken by the CSUTCB in 1992, long before the introduction of the Popular Participation Law. Pablo Stefanoni (2010) also emphasizes the fact that the plan to create a political instrument was being discussed by the Bolivian campesino movement ever since at least 1988. My own research also points towards that direction: Don Filemón Escóbar and other political instructors...
such as Alex Contreras, Oscar Coca and David and Germán Choquehuanca organized more than 600 seminar workshops in the Chapare in favour of the creation of a political party already from 1984 onwards (Escóbar 2008: 201; Oikonomakis 2018) Don Filemón wrote respectively: ‘Our seminars were extended all over the map of Bolivia. The main work was to give seminars . . . We were converting the concentrations into seminars for thousands of compañeros. With this consequent and permanent work we forged the political instrument’2 (Escóbar 2008: 191–92).

In 2009, Moira Zuazo (2009) interviewed 85 MAS deputies and senators, using a structured questionnaire in which she tried to trace back the birth of the MAS. Two of them, Wilber Flores Torres and Gustavo Torrico, who were involved in the creation of the political instrument (the rest were not) mention 1992 as the year of its conception, which is before the introduction of the LPP. What is also surprising is that not a single one of the 85 of them identifies the LPP as the instigator behind the creation of the political instrument, even though some of them identify it as ‘influential’ in their personal political development. Therefore, I argue that while the LPP functioned as an additional argument in order for the cocaleros of the Six Federations of the Tropic of Cochabamba to engage with the electoral route, the ideological preparation for this development had begun long ago, and it is that preparation that facilitated the electoral strategy of the cocaleros of the Chapare, which of course also took advantage of the opportunities presented by the LPP. Eventually, thanks to the cocaleros’ electoral success in the municipal and national elections of 1995 and 1997, in the Chapare mainly, Evo Morales and the cocaleros of the Chapare managed to win the internal battle for the leadership and control of the MAS-ISP, against the other two aspiring candidates: Alejo Véliz Lazo, a Quechua ex-secretary general of the CSUTCB and first leader of the ASP, and Felipe Quispe, the mallku (leader) of the Aymaras of the Altiplano.

From 2000 onwards, Bolivia went through its turbulent years. Starting with the Cochabamba Water War, a cycle of popular mobilizations managed to topple two Presidents (in 2003 and 2005) and eventually brought Evo Morales to the Presidency. The protagonists in these mobilizations were not political parties (not even the MAS) but social movements such as the autonomous self-organized Coordinadora por la Defensa del Agua y la Vida de Cochabamba (Coordinating Body for the Defense of Water and Life), trade unions like the Bolivian Workers Central (COB, Central Obrera Boliviana) and the CSUTCB, neighbourhood assemblies such as Federación de Juntas Vecinales de El Alto (Federation of El Alto Neighbourhood Councils), and the cocaleros of the Chapare and Yungas La Paz. The aforementioned cycle of protest was instigated by the neoliberal austerity policies that were being introduced by successive governments, which included the privatization of

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water, and natural gas, as well as the banning of coca leaf growing among other things. Fernando Mayorga (2012) writes that during this period Bolivia witnessed a double crisis: a) of representative democracy and its institutional tools such as the political parties, and b) of neoliberalism as a system of economic governance.

Two counter proposals were developed and were either demanded or experimented with on behalf of the movements: participatory democracy – direct or communitarian – as far as political organization is concerned, and state economic nationalism for economic policy. We also witnessed instances of horizontal direct-democracy forms of organization as it appeared in Cochabamba, where the Water War was coordinated by the Coordinadora, who assembled in the main square of the city, and where spokespersons of the different neighbourhood assemblies gathered to discuss their strategy and future plans. Processes of a similar nature were experienced in El Alto, where the water and the gas wars were planned and fought on the squares of La Ceja and the other neighbourhoods under the communitarian organizational form of the ayllu.

These ‘wars’ were so called because what was at stake was political sovereignty regarding the ‘ownership’ and administration of natural resources, and the two sides that fought these wars were the Bolivian corporate state (Kapferer and Gold 2017) and the egalitarian forces represented by social movements. The MAS was not the protagonist in any of these instances except for the Coca War, which took place in January–February 2002, when the government decided to ban the production, sale and transportation of the coca leaf and ordered the closure of its main markets, especially the one in Sacaba, in the periphery of Cochabamba. The Cochabamba Water War was mainly fought by the Coordinadora, while the Water and Gas wars of 2005 and 2003 were mostly fought in El Alto by the Aymaras of the Altiplano. However, of the three main political proposals that emerged during those years – the autonomous self-management of the Coordinadora, the exclusionary revolutionary indigenismo of Felipe Quispe and the institutional electoral route proposed by the MAS and Evo Morales – the latter managed to gain ground, translating (Dinerstein 2014) in a way the more radical proposals into electoral politics and channelling popular discontent towards electoral participation for social change.

Central to this process was the figure of Evo Morales, the indigenous deputy who was ousted from the Parliament in 2002 accused of instigating the Coca War and for whom the American Ambassador openly advised the Bolivians not to vote, giving him even greater popularity. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to investigate how and why social mobilization in Bolivia was translated into electoral politics – I try to do that elsewhere (Oikonomakis 2018). My main argument is that despite the fact that during the protest cy-
The Election of MAS, Its Egalitarian Potential and Its Contradictions

In Bolivia there have been instances of egalitarian, directly democratic and communitarian organizational forms, they never really managed (to be fair, they may not have had the time to do so) to articulate an alternative political proposal for the country’s economic and political administration. Therefore, when elections were called, the only tangible proposal was that of the MAS: the electoral path to state power. In the lines that follow, however, I will try to evaluate whether the MAS and Evo Morales translated their electoral victories into egalitarian policies within Bolivia.

The Permitted Left and the Compensatory State

Evo Morales’ 2006 rise to the Presidential seat is the Latin American equivalent of Nelson Mandela’s 1994 Presidential election in South Africa. It has a lot to say about liberal identity politics and social justice in a capitalist economic system, as well as about social change and the electoral route towards achieving it. Just like Mandela, Evo represents the marginalized majority in a country administered by the elite minority: Mandela is black in South Africa and Evo indigenous in Bolivia. Both were discriminated against, yet both managed to reach the Presidential seat in their respective countries, and their success had a symbolic meaning as well: it was viewed both at home and abroad as an issue of social justice being done. However, Evo’s case – just like Mandela’s – offers us the opportunity to explore this extremely important question: is it enough for an indigenous person to govern an indigenous-majority country for egalitarian policies to be implemented in it? In other words, is it the identity of the mandatario that matters? Is identity politics enough when it comes to social justice? And what’s the role of social class in all this?

According to the World Bank statistics, the percentage of the Bolivian population living below the national poverty line has dropped from 59.6 per cent in 2005 to 38.6 per cent in 2015 (accessed on 11 April 2017). That is, it has dropped by 21 per cent during Morales’ administration, which is definitely not a minor feat. Official government statistics present a similar picture: poverty has fallen from 60.6 per cent in 2005 to 45 per cent in 2011, and extreme poverty from 38.2 per cent to 20.9 per cent over the same period. This is Evo Morales’ achievement and should be granted to his administration. Literacy rates have also reached 99 per cent according to UNESCO, which is also impressive. Compared to past administrations, these are major improvements; we should not forget, however, that Bolivia is a country rich in natural resources and in which around 40 per cent of the population remains under the national poverty line despite having a left-wing government and an indigenous President in office for the past fourteen years. In addi-
tion, 10 per cent of the population in 2015 still earned 45.8 times as much as the lowest 10 per cent, which means that Bolivia remains a deeply unequal country. The reason behind this is that, from this author’s point of view, though Evo’s administration did partly break with the country’s neoliberal economic policies (the privatization of natural resources, for example) it did it without materializing an anti-capitalist economy, maintaining a liberal, capitalist, (neo)extractivist (neo)developmental logic when it comes to economic and social policy. The difference is that Evo’s capitalist economy has ‘a more human face’ than his neoliberal predecessors’ and a more redistributive character.

Petras and Veltmeyer define extractivism as ‘economic development based on the extraction of natural resources such as fossil and biofuels, minerals and agro-food products extracted in a process of “large-scale investment in land acquisition”’ (Petras and Veltmeyer 2014: 18). According to them, while the Bolivian government’s share of the resource rent in the mining sector is only 6 per cent, in the hydrocarbon sector it has been increased to 50 per cent during Evo’s years (18% royalty and 32% tax rate) (Petras and Veltmeyer 2014: 28). The MAS, of course, calls this process ‘nationalization’ and celebrated it with performative ‘occupations’ of foreign companies’ drilling sites; however, the truth is that we are talking about a generous (compared to past administrations) increase in the government’s share of the profits, and certainly not of nationalization. In the same book, Petras and Veltmeyer identify three types of extractivist states: the imperial, the neoliberal and the post-neoliberal. The imperial state refers to states that actively support local companies’ national interests in their pursuit of resources to export abroad, providing them with diplomatic assistance (political pressure) when needed, in order to achieve their geopolitical targets (for example, the United States and Canada). The neoliberal state is the state that privatizes its natural resources to private companies, foreign or domestic, according to the dictates of the Washington Consensus and free market capitalism. Most of Latin America during the 1990s and early 2000s fell within this category. Because of the challenge to neoliberal policies by powerful cycles of protest that brought to power ‘progressive regimes’ in Bolivia, Venezuela, Argentina, Ecuador and other Latin American countries throughout the 2000s, however, a new type of equally extractivist state emerged: the post-neoliberal state. The authors describe the post-neoliberal state as constructed on two pillars:

- a new development paradigm based on a post-Washington Consensus on the need for inclusive development and poverty reduction (the ‘new developmentalism’) and a national development strategy (‘the new extractivism’) based on the
extraction of natural resources, their export in primary commodity form, and a policy of social inclusion in regard to the distribution of the resource rents collected in the development process. (Petras and Veltmeyer 2014: 7)

Eduardo Gudynas describes neoextractivism as a form of development based on the appropriation of nature in which ‘if indeed the state plays a more active role, and gives extractivism a greater legitimacy because it redistributes some of the surplus to the population, it still repeats the negative environmental and social impacts of the old extractivism’ (Gudynas 2010: 1). He prefers to use the term ‘compensatory state’ instead (Gudynas 2013). Jeffery Webber agrees because this conceptualization of ‘neodevelopmental states’ tends to exaggerate the increased role of the state and the diminished role of multinational capital while ‘the very reproduction of these political economies depends upon states prioritizing the maintenance and security of private property rights and juridical environments in which multinationals can profit’ (Webber 2017a: 46). Ben Dangl, discussing the Argentinean experience and the Kirchnerian compensatory state, put it more blatantly: ‘In other words Kirchner was handing out crumbs when what many demanded was revolution’ (Dangl 2010: 71).

In any case, whether we prefer the term neoextractivism, neodevelopmentalism, or compensatory state, Evo’s Bolivia is viewed by all theorists involved in the debate as the paradigmatic example. ‘One redistributive channel of rent to the poorest sectors’, notes Webber, ‘has been a series of targeted cash-transfer programs, which now reach roughly 33% of the population – Bono Juancito Pinto (funds to encourage children to attend school), Renta Dignidad (a small monthly payment to the elderly poor), and Bono Juana Azurduy (funds to improve healthcare for expectant mothers, as well as postnatal medical care)’ (Webber 2017a: 51). This type of redistributive policy, however, can hardly be described as anti-capitalist or truly egalitarian. From this author’s point of view, it is rather a very intelligent way to improve somehow the conditions of the poorest of the population, ‘securing’ in a way their future support for a regime that provided them with ‘something’ where previous administrations provided nothing, and maintaining stable economic and social conditions while following a capitalist developmental logic. This way, Evo’s administration has managed to somewhat ease the suffering of the poor without having to disempower the rich.

The answer, therefore, to whether having an indigenous president makes a difference or not, is that what matters is what a President and a government actually does, not what he/she looks like. Or, as Alejandro Almaraz ex-vice minister of lands and former national director of MAS put it in an interview with this author and Tomàs Astelarra back in 2013:
Have the landowners been displaced from power? No, very partially and secondarily. They don’t have any ministers but it turns out that the *campesina* Minister of Agriculture does what they want. It is much more comfortable [this way].

In other words, while Evo’s administration has impressive achievements to show when compared to previous neoliberal governments and this should be granted to him, we should not, however, exaggerate his egalitarian effect in Bolivian society, which, when examined critically, is neither as big as was hoped for nor as radical as it is believed to be.

**Evo and the Iron Law of Oligarchy**

Evo’s first cabinet of 2006 was something else! The Minister of Justice was an indigenous Quechua *cholita*, as were the Presidents of the two Cámaras. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Education were Aymaras. The cabinet also included those who had been involved with the social movements that had led the cycle protest that preceded the elections and had in a way ‘carried’ the MAS on their backs to the government seat: activists and spokespersons of the Cochabamba Water War, cocalero leaders, representatives of unions, neighbourhood assemblies and social organizations, and especially the organizations that had formed the MAS (the Six Federations of Coca producers of the Tropic of Cochabamba, the FNMCB-BS and the CSUTCB). Three fourths of the ministerial cabinet were men and one fourth women (4/16). There were also a number of experienced technocrats (economists, lawyers, sociologists), who were not involved with the movements but had, however, identified themselves with the MAS. They were called invitees or intellectuals, and they were offered vice-ministerial positions. The first ministerial cabinet represented the rise of the popular movements, as eleven leaders from different social organizations headed 10 of the 16 ministries. Statistically, the popular movements represented 68.75 per cent of the cabinet compared to the 31.25 per cent of the ‘invitees’.

It is of no surprise, therefore, that the political and economic elites of the country felt threatened, especially after the proclamation of the Constitutional Assembly that rewrote the country’s Constitution, in which many representatives of the popular sectors and the social movements participated actively. Allied with the MAS in the Constituent Assembly was the Unity Pact, a social movement alliance that consisted of representatives of lowland and highland indigenous-peasant popular organizations, including the Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia (Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia, CIDOB), the Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas of Qullasuyu (National Council of Ayllus and Markas of Qullasuyu, CONAMAQ),
the Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (Unified Syndical Confederation of Rural Workers of Bolivia, CSUTCB), the Confederación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas Indígenas Originarias de Bolivia ‘Bartolina Sisa’ (‘Bartolina Sisa’ National Confederation of Peasant, Indigenous, and Aboriginal Women of Bolivia, CNMIOB-BS) and the Confederación Sindical de Comunidades Interculturales de Bolivia ( Syndicalist Confederation of Intercultural Communities of Bolivia, CSCIB) (Webber 2017b: 335).

The country’s elites felt threatened and reacted. Since institutionally they were defeated and there was no candidate to counter Evo, they focused their reactionary project in the Media Luna (Pando, Beni, Santa Cruz, Tarija) autonomy issue. Institutional efforts failed: the right-wing referendum to oust the government resulted in success for Evo and his vice president (67%) and also eventually led to the removal of oppositional prefects in the departments of Cochabamba and La Paz and their replacement by pro-government ones. Ahead of total failure, the opposition opted for extra-parliamentary means of action, as Webber (2017b) also emphasizes. From September 9 to September 16 2008, a number of right-wing mobilizations took the form of marches and occupations of government offices and airports in the Media Luna departments. In Porvenir, in the region of Pando, a number of government supporters were assassinated by the right-wing opposition. That was it: the government retook Pando militarily, while a massive mobilization of peasant and indigenous organizations surrounded Santa Cruz and started participating in street battles in defence of the government. Eventually, the autonomist opposition was defeated in the streets as well.

Until 2010, the MAS had been in constant conflict with the Right but without taking any radical measures that would undermine their economic privileges. It has governed, as Webber and Carr have put it, as an izquierda permitida (permitted left): ‘The new model abandoned features of neoliberal orthodoxy but retained its core faith in the capitalist market as the principal engine of growth and industrialization. Government revenue spiked, but international reserves were accumulated at record levels, while social spending decreased as a proportion of GDP’ (Webber and Carr 2013: 169). It maintained a capitalist economic logic, managing social protest through cooptation (redistribution of income gained from increased hydrocarbon royalties) or repression (the indigenous at TIPNIS for example were called ‘counter-revolutionary’ and were accused of being funded ‘by the gringos’), and managed to control the crisis that the oppositional Right had caused in 2008 without further complications. With time, it also distanced itself from its social base. In 2007, a major cabinet replacement of the representatives of the popular movements took place: of the sixteen ministers, only seven had a social movement background (43.75 %, with 56.25 % being techno-
crats), while by 2013 only 15 per cent had a social movement background. At the same time, even in the cocalero strongholds in the Chapare people were complaining of a top-down disciplining of different opinions by the party, and the phrase *dictadura sindical* described the MAS’ attitude towards the Chapareño cocaleros. In a way, the case of the MAS once again ratified Michels’ Iron Law of Oligarchy (Michels 1999).

By 2010, when the commodity boom that allowed Bolivia’s growth (and redistributive state attitude) was over and the first signs of the financial crisis were starting to affect the country, Evo Morales’ administration changed course towards the right-wing opposition as well (and vice versa). Rubén Costas, the governor of Santa Cruz who had led the 2008 anti-government protests was now on visibly better terms with Evo Morales, while agro-business organizations that had assisted the 2008 coup effort were now having regular consultations with the President, notes Jeffery Webber (Webber 2017b: 338). Starting in 2010, it seems that a pact was made: the Right would embrace Evo’s statesmanship, and in return he would offer their agro-businesses (mainly coca, soy and quinoa) a considerable extension of their cultivated surface area that would triple their exports by 2025. This offer was accompanied by relevant infrastructural extensions and energy subsidies (ibid.: 343–44). With the pact, ‘the government of social movements’ was now entering a new phase.

**Conclusion**

This chapter tried to evaluate the MAS’ social and political performance after fourteen years in the *Palacio Quemado*, as the Bolivian Palace of Government is known. The MAS entered the *Palacio Quemado* for the first time in 2006, riding on a wave of popular protests that toppled two Presidents between 2000 and 2005 and articulated radical political proposals that evolved around: a) horizontal – or communitarian – democratic principles, and b) state ownership or social ownership of natural resources, which would reverse the until then neoliberal government policies. Evo Morales became the first indigenous President of Bolivia, while his first ministerial cabinet was characterized by the strong presence of political activists that had been involved with the popular protests. Fear and hope was the country’s (and the world’s) reaction: fear for the political and economic elites, and hope for the indigenous and the poor and marginalized. A new Constitution was negotiated, one that – theoretically at least – safeguards the rights of *Pachamama* (mother earth) and has *buen vivir* (living well) as its main principle, and an autonomist movement on behalf of the Right was successfully countered by the MAS and its social bases. The MAS did indeed negotiate new royalty
regimes with the multinationals that were exploiting the country’s hydrocarbons (it called it ‘nationalization’), and it did indeed redistribute the income it gained from this negotiation (and the commodity boom until 2010) to the least privileged Bolivians. As a result, Bolivia has experienced an impressive reduction in poverty rates and an increased GNI per capita over the past fourteen years. These are no minor feats.

However, the MAS’ performance remains far from being egalitarian and equally far from fulfilling the expectations it raised with its elections. Democratic processes within the party have actually deteriorated; the ‘process of change’ has been personified in Evo Morales himself, while a pact with the Right was negotiated after 2010. In short: the MAS did ease the misfortunes of the poor without having to disempower the rich. Bolivia remains a deeply unequal society; the country’s development model is based on the exploitation (not the protection) of nature, while dissident voices are treated as ‘counter-revolutionary’. While it is important at a symbolic level to have an indigenous person for President, what really matters is the policies he/she makes; it is important at the discursive level to have a radical rhetoric, but what matters is its materialization. Identity politics became the flagship of MAS and brought it to the government seat, but class politics are still undermining political, social and economic dynamics, regardless of how passé they may sound.

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NOTES
1. El Chapare region is the birthplace of the cocalero movement the Six Federations of the Tropic of Cochabamba, led by Evo Morales.
2. Author’s translation from Spanish.
3. The Bolivian GINI coefficient was at 42 in 1990. It reached 58.5 in 2005 and dropped to 45.8 in 2015, according to the World Bank (accessed, April 2017).
4. Interview with Alejandro Almaraz, conducted by Leonidas Oikonomakis and Tomás Astelarra in Cochabamba, September 9, 2013.
5. For a detailed analysis of the first ministerial cabinet see Oikonomakis and Espinoza (2014).
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On Sunday 4 February 2018, President Lenín Moreno continued one of Ecuador’s most prominent political rituals of recent times: the consulta popular. The popular consultation is a country-wide survey administered by the National Electoral Council (CNE) and intended to gauge the views of citizens on a range of possible constitutional amendments. It requires citizens to vote ‘yes’ or ‘no’ in response to a series of questions pertaining to key governance issues – from bureaucratic corruption to indefinite presidential terms. Consultas and referenda have been performed repeatedly over the past decade by the country’s ruling leftist party, Alianza País (AP). The survey in February 2018 was the first to be overseen by the new government – a government that although formally affiliated with AP hoped to use the survey to solidify its distance from some of the more problematic policy tenets of former president Rafael Correa.

The citizen’s revolution was a thoroughgoing project of socio-economic transformation initiated by Correa in 2007. After years of neoliberal rule that had driven the country to economic collapse in 1999, the revolution aimed to radically reorient the productive matrix of Ecuadorian society, reassert national sovereignty in the face of destabilizing foreign influences, reject unequal terms of trade with the Global North and move decisively away from the kind of reliance on oil exports that had marked some of the darkest chapters of the country’s history (Sawyer 2004). A key cornerstone of the project, as Pablo Andrade (2013) has recently noted, was the substi-
tution of ‘representative liberal democracy for a participatory democracy’ – the latter being most evidenced by direct weekly television broadcasts from the former president, significant civil society involvement in the re-writing of the 2008 constitution and repeated invitations to the Ecuadorian public to vote on key governance questions as part of constitutional referenda like that which took place in February. However, as Conaghan and De la Torre (2008) have pointed out, this sort of democracy in practice looks more like a ‘plebiscitary democracy’ than a participatory one – a form of democracy in which the primary aim is to reaffirm the government’s legitimacy through recurrent popular consultations.

For the first time since AP’s 2007 ascent to power, however, the referendum of February 2018 included questions that asked about the protection of ecosystems endangered by mining and oil exploration – extractive activities that, as many scholars have noted (Bebbington 2010; Escobar 2010; Gudynas 2009; Acosta and Martínez 2011), underwent significant intensification during the administration of Correa and proved to be considerably socially destabilizing. During the decade of Correa’s rule (2007–2017), the country opened itself to large-scale metal mining for the first time, intensified agribusiness and other large-scale industrial activity, and further deepened its engagement with oil extraction in areas of the Amazon previously free of drilling. The results of the February fourth consulta, however, seemed to suggest a promising shift away from this much-critiqued extractive development model. Two questions in particular focused on a possible slowing of the country’s hitherto aggressive investment in non-renewable resources. Despite hesitations about the carefully evasive wording of these questions, communities who had long been persecuted by Correa endorsed the results of the consulta as evidence that Lenín Moreno was no longer ignoring the voices of the opponents of extractive development. Despite Correa’s broad appeal to large segments of the working and lower-middle classes as an ostensibly ‘populist-socialist’ president committed to a wholesale rejection of what he famously termed the ‘long dark night of neoliberalism’, many opponents of his development model had experienced the ten years of the ‘citizen’s revolution’ as actively hostile to the needs of rural, campesino (peasant farmers) and indigenous communities directly affected by large-scale development projects. In fact, Correa was regularly accused by both national and international human rights groups of using egalitarian discourses of wealth redistribution and poverty reduction to criminalize defenders of ecosystems, to divide communities on the frontlines of extractive projects and to otherwise repress social protest (Becker 2013; Dávalos 2013; Martínez 2013).

If Correa had become synonymous with an oversized state bureaucracy, a highly centralized political structure, an authoritarian approach to the wielding of executive power, and an aggressive intolerance of dissent,
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Moreno and his more environmentally friendly consulta seemed to suggest a return to a softer and more centrist position. Even though he was downsizing the state bureaucracy in accord with classically neoliberal tenets and actively courting international capital investment in mining, aluminium and agro-industry – policy moves that by early 2018 were already beginning to earn him the title of ‘traitor’ among supporters of AP – Moreno presented a significantly calmer and more inclusive public persona. His ‘government for everyone’ seemed at least on the surface to pay considerably more lip service to broad-based public participation than had that of his predecessor – a transformation welcomed by large numbers of Ecuadorians who had regularly experienced their voices demeaned and dismissed by the previous administration.

Critically reflecting on this moment of transition from Correa’s strong-armed and heavily centralized state to Moreno’s more conciliatory, more explicitly participatory but also more classically neoliberal state, in this chapter we begin to take stock of the ambiguous legacies of Correa’s ‘citizen’s revolution’ in the context of intensifying extractivism throughout the country. More specifically, we look back at the regionally uneven ways in which Correa’s promises of a more socially and economically egalitarian future were imagined, implemented, justified and resisted in two historically, culturally and socio-economically distinct regions of Ecuador. Focusing on two of the country’s most important development projects – a refinery and petrochemical complex known as the Refinery of the Pacific in the western coastal province of Manabí and the Loma Larga gold mine in the southern highland province of Azuay (Figure 4.1), we illustrate how the Ecuadorian state under Correa’s leadership deployed powerfully egalitarian discourses about new forms of material redistribution that would finally and fruitfully respond to the ‘people’s interests’. After years of neoliberal rule, his self-consciously egalitarian efforts to stand up to the power of global financial elites – particularly in Washington – represented a sustained assault on entrenched political forces in the country that had broken the banking system in the late 1990s and left millions in dire and deepening poverty. At the same time, however, in sharp contrast to the powerfully nationalist, anti-imperialist discourse that characterized all of the government’s major planning documents (e.g. PNBV 2013–2017), his administration financed his ‘strategic development’ projects by drawing the country into closer and more debt-driven relationships with capital coming from the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), particularly China and Brazil. The result was a state discourse that repeatedly emphasized the need to protect the country’s national interest but a practical commitment to capitalist modernization that was always significantly oriented toward the interests of foreign investors – albeit different investors than those upon whom previ-
Figure 4.1 Map of the location of the case studies. Cartographer: Diego Andrade – Drone & Gis.
ous neoliberal administrations had relied. How were these contradictions – between material redistribution, new forms of social inclusion, deepening reliance on Chinese investment and increasingly restricted spaces for public contestation of the extractive development paradigm – experienced by those living in closest proximity to the ‘strategic projects’ that made the revolution possible?

To answer these questions, we draw on 6–9 months of ethnographic fieldwork in each location conducted in 2012–2013 and 2016 respectively. Comparing local responses to these projects, we show how communities in their direct ‘areas of influence’ understood, negotiated and challenged the vision of development propagated by the state’s central development agency, SENPLADES (the National Secretary of Planning and Development): development as compensation. Specifically, we show how these communities responded to the ‘social compensation’ that Correa made a cornerstone of his development policy, supposedly prioritizing communities in regions long neglected by the state and those suffering the direct effects of extractive activity. A central actor in both projects was Ecuador Estratégico (EE) – a public company founded by the government in 2011 and tasked with providing compensation to communities in the direct ‘areas of influence’ of strategic projects. After a toxic thirty-year history with companies like Chevron-Texaco, who had extracted oil from the country without providing any direct benefits to affected communities, EE was created with the explicit aim of avoiding some of the worst effects of the resource curse (Auty 2003). ‘Resources construct happiness’ was its animating slogan – one that appeared on banners and billboards across the country intended to showcase the infrastructural fruits of extraction. However, in the case of both the Refinery of the Pacific and the Loma Larga project, this resource-driven ‘happiness’ has yet to materialize. Instead, the story is one of growing disappointment with the ‘citizen’s revolution’ and the egalitarian dreams of AP.

Unravelling the different origins, engines and temporalities of this sense of disappointment allows us to tease out the regionally uneven ways in which Correa’s ‘twenty-first century socialism’ was experienced, embraced, challenged and, by substantial sectors of the population, ultimately rejected. Our argument is that these struggles are driven by ongoing processes of state corporatization that have significant resonances elsewhere in the hemisphere (Kapferer and Gold 2017, 2018; Zagato 2018). As the Ecuadorian state re-configured itself in alliance with Chinese capital to address historically long-standing inequalities in the world system (particularly vis-à-vis the United States) as well as to advance a powerfully materialist vision of wealth redistribution, it simultaneously diminished and exacerbated a range of interlinked inequalities, intensifying regional, class and rural/urban cleavages. By means of EE, foreign companies from Brazil, Canada and China were
provided lucrative investment opportunities that were sold to residents in the ‘areas of influence’ as evidence of the government’s commitment to social compensation and buen vivir (good or harmonious living). In Manabí, these projects were widely supported until a series of corruption scandals began to expose their underlying architecture. In Azuay, on the contrary, they were rejected right from the start because they were seen as signs of the government’s duplicity and inattention to local demands for different forms of egalitarianism, including participation in decision-making and self-defined development trajectories. Thus, while we do not see in Ecuador the ‘constant level of internal warfare’ described by Zagato in his description of processes of state corporatization in Mexico (Zagato this volume), we do see sharply intensifying struggles between competing understandings of egalitarianism, with campesino and indigenous visions of less hierarchical socio-natural relationships still being consistently sidelined in favour of the narrow egalitarianism of material redistribution. The result has been a considerably polarized political landscape.

To lay the conceptual groundwork for our case studies, we first consider Correa’s development paradigm and its articulation at the national level as part of major planning documents from SENPLADES and EE.

**Extractive Rents and Development as Compensation**

Ecuador is one of a number of countries in Latin America currently suffering from what Eduardo Gudynas has called neoextractivism – (Gudynas 2009; Gudynas and Acosta 2010) a term used to refer to the wave of large-scale natural resource exploitation that has been pursued by progressive governments throughout the region since the early 2000s. The neo- in neoextractivism is intended to underscore differences with the extractivism of previous export-oriented administrations, both nationalist and neoliberal. Unlike these predecessors, the governments of the so-called Pink Tide have worked to ensure considerably stronger state participation in the regulation and oversight of extractive projects, with the explicit aim of securing higher taxes and royalties. These funds are then earmarked for redistribution to the poorest sectors of society via direct cash transfers or investments in health, infrastructure and education. These governments – including Bolivia and Venezuela – have consistently praised extractive projects as engines of development capable of generating significant revenues for the redistribution of wealth if overseen by a robust centralized state free of the shackles of Washington Consensus orthodoxy. The aim is not, they insist, to reject extraction as a mode of development but instead to engage in ‘responsible’ extraction guided by intelligent, state-led insertion into the global market in ways that
avoid historically entrenched relationships of subservience to the policy whims of the Global North. As the PNBV 2013–2017 puts it: ‘The neoliber-
als believed in free trade, while we have sought intelligent insertion in global
markets. They demanded that political power be concentrated in the hands
of just a few, while we have imposed the people’s interest as the supreme stan-
dard’. And again, triumphantly: ‘Now social investment is a higher priority
than servicing the foreign debt’ (SENPLADES 2013).

This development strategy – explicitly driven by anti-colonial, anti-impe-
rialist and anti-Washington policy imperatives – is one that has had consid-
erable success, at least by many socio-economic measures. Indeed, though
the case is not as straightforward in Venezuela, independent economic re-
ports on Bolivia and Ecuador have confirmed that over the past decade there
has been both a substantial reduction of extreme poverty and a decline in
socio-economic inequality. According to Ecuador’s former planning and
development minister, Pabel Muñoz, between 2007 and 2014 overall pov-
erty rates in Ecuador dropped from 37.5 per cent to 25.5 per cent. Not dis-
similarly, the ECLAC (Economic Commission on Latin America and the
Caribbean) reports that Ecuador significantly reduced both poverty and
inequality during the period 2007–2014, with Ecuador assuming the lead-
ing position on both measures among its regional neighbours. According to
SENPLADES, the Gini coefficient for income declined from .55 in 2014 to
.46 in 2017. And in addition, under Correa, Ecuador had the highest public
investment rate in Latin America, at 15 per cent of the GDP.

These represent enormous social gains that we do not want to down-
play. However, particularly in the Ecuadorian case, this highly resource-de-
pendent development strategy has been implemented amidst increasingly
strong societal demands for a post-extractive economy – one that might bet-
ter incorporate more expansively egalitarian relationships with the natural
world as well as respect for processes of local decision-making. Long before
the election of Correa in 2007, indigenous and socio-environmental move-
ments had worked to extend projects of egalitarian transformation both
across species and into the future, insisting that improved poverty measures
be formulated always in relation to broader concerns with ecological justice
and intergenerational wellbeing over the longue durée. In large part because
of the work of these movements, the now widely diffused notion of buen
vivir became the conceptual cornerstone of the Ecuadorian development
model as enshrined in the 2008 national constitution. Along with four land-
mark articles that grant ‘rights’ to nature, buen vivir has animated all of the
country’s national development plans since.

Despite this explicitly post-colonial and even post-humanist rhetoric, a
decade later growing numbers of observers have pointed out that the lan-
guage of buen vivir seems to be used most frequently by the government to
both justify deepening extractivism and otherwise dismiss the concerns of indigenous and environmental organizations – practices widely experienced by these movements as ideological betrayals, appropriations and distortions of indigenous values (Escobar 2015). While Correa rejected the austere neoliberal state that had privileged international debt repayment over social welfare, he never seriously questioned the ecologically violent foundations of ‘accumulation by dispossession’, which he saw as necessary to the financing of the revolutionary project.

‘Accumulation by dispossession’, as Zagato (2018) has recently pointed out, has characterized processes of state corporatization in many parts of Latin America over the past few decades. In Ecuador, however, this state-led ‘strategic extractivism’ was repeatedly defended by the administration as a necessary intermediary step along the path toward a more genuinely post-extractive economy (Acosta and Martínez 2011; Escobar 2010). This transition is again explained in the PNBV 2013–2017, which outlines the temporary strategy to be pursued until 2030, based on:

[A] new model of accumulation, distribution and redistribution . . . that aims to turn an economy based on finite natural resources into one based on infinite resources . . . This transition means that our current dependence on extracting non-renewable natural resources will be temporary and decreasing, apace with the requirements to finance the emergence of a new, sustainable socio-economic configuration, which will assure a steady, sustainable improvement and Good Living for all Ecuadorians. (Emphasis in the original, SENPLADES 2013: 37–38)

From the perspective of SENPLADES, extraction was necessary to finance the poverty alleviation and capacity-building that would eventually allow for the creation of a sustainable ‘knowledge economy’. Anyone who suggested otherwise, as Correa repeatedly insisted, was a ‘full-belly environmentalist’, a special interest, a reactionary, or an elitist woefully blind to the urgent needs of the poor. He consistently rejected more radical visions of community self-determination because his commitment to the abolition of all privileges – in a sense, his radical economic egalitarianism – meant that he most often read critics of his regime as representative of dangerous ‘special interests’. As again outlined in the PNBV 2013–2017: ‘In an egalitarian, equitable society . . . privileges, hierarchies and forms of subordination must be eliminated; this will permit more fluidity in social relations’ (SENPLADES 2013: 22).

Despite this strong rhetoric about the importance of ‘more fluidity in social relations’, social movement efforts to push for recognition of more egalitarian social relationships – particularly relationships that transcend narrow species boundaries – were routinely mocked and discounted by Correa, who systematically prevented their uptake by the central planning and develop-
ment agencies. As Carlos de la Torre has rightly observed, the Ecuadorian administration regularly ‘undermine[d] contestation while simultaneously increasing the material inclusion of the poor and the excluded’ (2013: 29). And again, as Mudde and Kaltwasser have put it, writing about Latin American populism more generally, these are administrations that ‘increase participation by the inclusion of marginalized groups in society, but limit (the possibilities for) contestation’ (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012: 20).

As the two case studies that follow demonstrate, however, these tensions between material inclusion and discursive exclusion were very differently experienced in different parts of the country. There is no doubt that Correa’s redistributive project took the primary form of ensuring that profits from extractive projects were reinvested in highly visible ways in schools, hospitals and roads in the direct ‘areas of influence’ of those projects. However, this redistributive strategy sharply intensified core periphery dynamics within the country, creating relations of extreme dependence on the state (which mirrored those between core and peripheral countries in the world system) and actively preventing the penetration of the more expansively egalitarian visions of ‘peripheral’ communities into the decision-making ‘core’ of the central planning agencies (Andrade 2013). Attention to these regional dynamics allows us to better understand the uneven ways in which the national project of ‘egalitarian transformation’ has played out – inadvertently amplifying long-standing regional differences and coming into conflict with diverse understandings of the various dimensions and meanings of egalitarianism.

To illustrate these dynamics in greater detail, we now move to our two case studies of extractive development projects, the first the Refinery of the Pacific and the second the Loma Larga gold project.

**Refinery of the Pacific: ‘They Promised Us Houses, but We Only See Houses for the Authorities!’**

Ecuador has a long history with oil extraction – one that, despite protestations to the contrary (Davidov 2013), continued to intensify under the Correa administration, with new concessions opened in the Amazon and in indigenous territories previously free of drilling (Flora, Silva and Valdivia 2016). However, while the country has long been known for exporting oil, it has never had sufficient refining capacity to process its reserves, and as a result it has relied on imports of petrochemical products including high-octane gas, diesel, oil, alcohol and a range of plastics. It was to remedy this situation that in 2007 Correa announced plans for the largest investment project in the history of the country: the Refinery of the Pacific (RDP). The
RDP was one of the very first development projects announced by Correa after his 2006 election – the first complete petrochemical complex in the history of the country that would refine and process more than 300,000 barrels of heavy crude a day. It was, Correa frequently noted, a project critical to the economic health of the country and one that made considerable economic sense. Projected to save the government an estimated USD nine billion dollars annually as it transitioned from being an importer to an exporter of refined products, the RDP was envisioned as the most ‘emblematic’ project on the road to achieving energy sovereignty (soberanía energética).

This focus on energy sovereignty was part of a broader commitment on the part of the Correa government to reducing dependence on all kinds of imported ‘products’ – whether neoliberal economic prescriptions from Western Europe, military installations from the United States, or petrochemical products from elsewhere in the world. A key cornerstone of this focus was the building of South-South links (particularly in terms of financing) and regional political solidarity (particularly with Venezuela and Bolivia). Towards that end, the project was formally initiated via a memorandum of understanding between the Venezuelan state-owned oil company PDVSA and the Ecuadorian state-owned oil company PetroEcuador on January 7, 2008. The two joined forces in a highly visible demonstration of regional solidarity to form the RDP Eloy Alfaro in 2008 – a mixed company in which PDVSA originally held 51 per cent of the interest and PetroEcuador 49 per cent. Some six months later, the site planned for the facility was inaugurated at a groundbreaking ceremony featuring Hugo Chávez and Rafael Correa approximately 20 kilometres from the city of Manta in the western coastal province of Manabí. Despite the powerfully nationalist rationale for the project – Correa talked repeatedly about the importance of energy sovereignty for the nation that the refinery would make possible – he was always careful to position it first and foremost as a benefit to the long-neglected province of Manabí. As he explained in 2013: ‘This province, the same as the other 23, will never again be forgotten by the government of the citizen’s revolution.’ And again, in 2016, when support for the project was beginning to flag: ‘Don’t let anyone steal this historic project from you, this project that will change the reality of Manabí, and all of Ecuador . . .’

This placement of Manabí before Ecuador in Correa’s 2016 statement was not coincidental. Instead, this provincial focus was very much in line with the development strategy most clearly articulated by EE – to ensure that extractive activities within the ‘strategic’ sectors directly and immediately benefit communities in the ‘areas of influence’ of those activities. In Manabí, this commitment was felt particularly acutely, and as a result the RDP was enthusiastically welcomed – at least in the early days of the ‘citizen’s revolution’. Manabí is the eleventh poorest province in Ecuador, profoundly arid
with periodic droughts and flooding associated with El Niño and some of the worst infrastructure in the country. According to the latest Housing and Population Census, poverty rates hover around 63 per cent in rural areas and 38 per cent in urban areas. Approximately 26.8 per cent of the population receive bonos de desarrollo (conditional cash transfers). By comparison, for Azuay, the province in which the Loma Larga project is located, the poverty rate is closer to 18 per cent in rural areas and 9 per cent in urban areas (INEC 2010). It is a part of the country that has long suffered the neglect of the central state and that has felt bitterly left behind by the concentration of political and economic power in the provinces of Pichincha and Guayas, which many in Manabí accuse of monopolizing funds that they believe should be distributed to the rest of the country.

When Correa announced in 2008 that Manabí would become home to the largest investment in the country’s history, the RDP was enthusiastically welcomed. Despite a few pockets of university and NGO-led resistance concerned about the potential environmental impacts of the complex (water contamination, the interruption of migratory pathways, the potential for leakages and fires, and so forth), the majority of residents eagerly awaited the arrival of the petrochemical industries Correa promised would flourish alongside the refinery. A construction boom ensued as the city prepared to house the 22,000 labourers that the government estimated would eventually be necessary to run the facility. Apartment complexes built by local and international developers began to be built along the coast. Heavily backed by Chinese capital, the government improved roads in and out of the area – an infrastructural investment that proved an enormous source of excitement to locals, who prided themselves on now having ‘world-class’ roads. For once, it seemed to residents, Manabí was not only in the government’s sight but even central to its most foundational project of recovering national sovereignty – in this case, energy sovereignty – after decades of ‘the long neoliberal night’ (Fitz-Henry 2015).

The RDP, however, was widely accepted not just because of its symbolic centrality to Correa’s ‘citizen’s revolution’. It was also embraced for more pragmatic reasons. Because of the administration’s commitment to prioritizing communities in the ‘areas of influence’ of large extractive projects, services and investments that had never before been priorities to the central government came to the foreground (if not always to fruition). Particularly notable were the development projects overseen by EE that invested nearly a quarter of its overall national funding in Manabí between 2014–2017, spending approximately 213 million USD dollars between 2014 and 2017. According to EE, in the area of influence of the RDP alone a total of 20.1 million USD dollars on thirty projects have been spent since 2011. The most important of these have been water treatment plants and potable water proj-
ects in some of the rural areas in which they were previously lacking; the construction of houses as part of a programme called ‘Sí Mi Casa’; and rural health centres in El Aromo and Bajos de la Palma. In addition to these major investments on the part of EE, the RDP-Eloy Alfaro – like many private companies increasingly concerned with corporate social responsibility – has directly invested additional funds in organic agriculture projects for elementary school students, support for Panama hat (paja toquilla) production and the training of local agricultural professionals, further filling service provision roles long neglected by the state. By far the most important of these projects has been a 93 kilometre aqueduct that brings water from a nearby dam (La Esperanza) to the city of Manta. The aqueduct carries approximately 4,000m³ per hour, with 2,000m³ per hour being supplied to Manta and neighbouring municipalities. In a province as arid as Manabí, and as historically neglected in terms of urban water infrastructure, such projects are read by many as evidence of a dramatic shift in government policy towards attending to those provinces traditionally only attended to during election cycles.

While these projects remain critically important to maintaining the RDP’s ‘social license to operate’, ten years into the ‘citizen’s revolution’, however, local anticipation of the ‘largest investment in the country’s history’ has begun to dwindle. In 2008, Correa famously exalted the project as pivotal to the country’s ‘great leap toward industrialization’. However, by 2018, this ‘great leap’ looked more like a series of sporadic and desultory jumps. Despite continuing support for the ‘revolutionary’ project of AP (67% of the presidential vote in Manabí went to Lenín Moreno in 2017 – a percentage higher than any other province in the country), by 2018 the mood in relation to the refinery had become one of dim optimism tempered by growing frustration. There were three primary reasons for this frustration: 1) impatience with the ongoing lack of financing; 2) a sense of deepening anger about how little had been rebuilt in Manabí by EE after a devastating April 2016 earthquake; and 3) worries about corruption scandals involving the Brazilian construction company Odebrecht, which had been responsible for the building of the aqueduct. The latter in particular continues to hang over the project as more and more public officials affiliated with the Correa government are charged with accepting bribes from Odebrecht.

Despite promising talks in 2012–2013 with CNPC (the China National Petroleum Corporation) and the ICBC (Industrial and Commercial Bank of China), Ecuador has still been unable to secure sufficient investment capital for the project. To date, every potential partner has either withdrawn from the project or failed to formalize its commitment to it, largely because of the massive size of the investment required (over 15 billion USD) as well as the slump in crude oil prices that began in 2013. While Correa was much
critiqued for looking so heavily to China and other Asian economies for financing the refinery and for thereby intensifying Ecuadorian indebtedness to China (he was frequently accused of ‘mortgaging’ the country to China), in Manabí, such capital would have been warmly welcomed. Despite grumblings about a potential influx of Chinese labourers and paranoid jokes about ‘the Chinese’ more generally, most residents simply wanted the complex to be completed and the 22,000 jobs promised by Correa at the start of the ‘citizen’s revolution’ to materialize. Instead, as late as January 2018, President Moreno was still trying to consolidate financing by opening the bidding process to a wider range of investors. The terrain had been cleared and the aqueduct constructed, but none of the actual infrastructure for the facility had begun to be built. Perhaps most disappointingly to locals, only ninety people still worked on the project, with more appearing to have their contracts terminated by the day.

These facts are only the most recent in a string of accumulating disappointments. On 16 April 2016, the most devastating earthquake in almost forty years hit just off the coast of Pedernales in the northern part of Manabí. Registering 7.8 on the Richter scale, it killed 700 people and injured approximately 16,000 others, causing Correa to immediately declare a state of emergency. In Manta, large sections of the city were demolished. While many had welcomed the RDP at least in part because of the development projects of both the RDP-Eloy Alfaro and EE, in the wake of the earthquake, that sentiment began to shift because of EE’s seeming inability to respond to the magnitude of the disaster. It is the objective of EE to invest in both zones affected by natural disasters and the ‘areas of influence’ of strategic extractive projects. Although it provided more than 400 houses to some of the most affected families, many were critical about the inadequacy of the overall government response. Some three years on, much of the downtown area remains in rubble.

EE’s response to the earthquake was not the only source of local disappointment. Indeed, in the months following the earthquake, corruption scandals related to the now notorious Brazilian construction company Odebrecht began to rock the Correa administration. As was the case in numerous other Latin American countries, investigations by the Contraloría in 2017 confirmed that both the clearing of the terrain for the RDP and the building of the aqueduct were authorized via contracts with Odebrecht that included substantial irregularities. Whistleblowers from Odebrecht later revealed that the company had paid in excess of USD 30 million dollars in bribes to Ecuadorian officials for contracts for major infrastructure projects, including the RDP. To date, numerous high-ranking public officials from Correa’s government have been arrested, including most notoriously the vice president from his final term, Jorge Glas, who is currently serving a six-
year prison term for accepting 14 million USD in bribes. As this news began to circulate in Manabí, many began to talk not just about incompetence or inadequacy on the part of EE but wide-ranging corruption that had seeped into the highest levels of the administration. The penetration of foreign corporate interests into the very heart of these development projects began to cast a shadow over Correa’s frequent proclamations of commitment to national sovereignty and ‘the people’s interest’.

Despite these concerns, many residents still hope for the realization of Correa’s hyper-modernist vision of the coast as a pre-eminent industrial centre for the manufacture and export of petrochemical products. After years of neglect by the neoliberal administrations that preceded the ‘citizen’s revolution’, they remain hopeful that this ‘great leap toward industrialization’ will eventually come to pass, creating unprecedented employment opportunities for a whole generation of students who trained in petrochemical engineering. Unlike around the mining project in the southern highlands, which we will explore next, in Manabí there is no substantial resistance to the project on environmental grounds. While many recognize the environmental dangers of refining oil as well as the economic challenges of excessive dependence on fluctuating oil prices and dwindling supplies, there is little coordinated indigenous presence to spearhead a resistance movement based around broader and less extractive-focused conceptions of buen vivir. On the contrary, there remains powerful support for the transformative project initiated by Correa, who is still seen as having begun the work of levelling the playing field between provinces historically divided by enormous regional inequality. If, however, in Manabí, Correa is seen as a sort of anti-neoliberal hero who began the redistributive work long promised by previous governments but never delivered, in the southern highland province of Azuay, where the Loma Larga gold mine is planned, he looks more like a fascist dictator. It is towards this project that we now turn.

Resources that Construct Happiness? Neoextractivism in the Areas of Influence of the Loma Larga Mining Project

Ecuador has not historically been a mining country. While artisanal mining has been developed since pre-colonial times, large-scale metal mining (that is, industrial mining with daily production volumes of more than 1,000 tons) has just recently been defined as a ‘strategic sector’ for the implementation of the new model of accumulation, distribution and redistribution (SENPLADES 2013). Mining as a strategic sector is articulated to the achievement of the PNBV 2013–2017, which states that in the first stage (2016–2020) the economy of the country will be sustained principally by
extractive activities (Ministerio de Minería 2016). In line with this policy, the government has defined and supported five strategic mining projects for ‘development’, all owned by Chinese and Canadian companies: San Carlos Panantza, Mirador, Fruta del Norte, Rio Blanco and Loma Larga. Just as in Manabí there has been a growing penetration of corporate interests into the centre of ostensibly nationalist development projects associated with the RDP, so too in Azuay we are witnessing ongoing processes of state corporatization (Kapferer 2010; Kapferer and Gold 2017, 2018), whereby mining projects – highly dependent upon foreign and particularly Chinese capital – become financially central to the sociopolitical transformations promised by the ‘citizen’s revolution’. While the state has been strengthened to regain control over these ‘strategic sectors’, it has at the same time granted unprecedented resource extraction rights to foreign companies and interceded to offer convenient conditions for the extractive industry. These include enhancement of the mining sector, laws and social programmes that provide strong support in building community support for mining, legal and fiscal incentives to the industry, and operational advantages including investments in infrastructure and abundant access to water. The Ministry of Mining repeatedly emphasizes these advantages as part of its ongoing efforts to demonstrate Ecuador’s commitment to becoming ‘the new mining frontier of Latin America’ (as the country was presented in the forum ‘Mines and Money – Americas’, held in Toronto in September 2016).

Mining for development is justified through the same redistributive logic explored in the case of the RDP. Specifically, the mining law establishes that ‘60% of the royalties will be primarily invested in social projects to cover unsatisfied basic needs and productive or territorial development . . . in the areas directly affected by mining activity’. Despite these commitments to material redistribution, however, there is – and has been for many years – powerful resistance around Loma Larga to the forms, outcomes and intentions behind these ‘local’ investments.

Loma Larga is located in the southern highlands in the province of Azuay, approximately 30 kilometres south-west of the country’s third most important city, Cuenca. The Canadian company INV Metals has owned the project since 2012, when it acquired it from another Canadian company, IAMGOLD, which had held the mining concession since 1999. INV is currently preparing the feasibility study prior to signing the exploitation contract with the Ministry of Mining. The underground mine at Loma Larga will produce 3,000 tons per day of gold, silver and copper ore over the twelve years that comprise the expected life of the mine (RPA 2016). The mine will be constructed in an exceptionally sensitive ecosystem – the páramo of Kimsakocha, valued for the provision of ecosystem services and as a cultural landscape (Buytaert et al. 2006; Hofstede et al. 2014). It supplies thousands of urban and rural water
systems and sustains the agro-pastoral livelihoods of the surrounding rural parishes of the cantons of San Fernando, Girón and Cuenca.

In contrast to Manabí, Azuay’s poverty rate is 15 per cent – the second lowest in the country. Only an estimated 5.76 per cent of the population are beneficiaries of bonos de desarrollo (MIES 2017). In this southern highland province, significantly fewer people live within the ‘areas of influence’ of the project than is the case in Manabí around the RDP. Their main economic activity is agriculture and cattle breeding for dairy production. For this reason, people throughout the zone primarily identify as campesinos, and the vast majority of them strongly believe that mining is not compatible with their livelihoods. Based on years of close engagement with these wetlands, they fear for the health of the socio-ecosystem of which they are a part, the sustainability of their lifeways and the wellbeing of future generations. These concerns have fostered a close relationship between local campesinos and urban socio-environmental movements, who question the coherence of a development model based on the redistribution of extractive rents – a form of egalitarianism that is seen by many as perpetuating an inequitable distribution of the burdens and costs of resource extraction.

The mining project has been locally resisted since 2003, largely by the leaders of a community water system that supplies most households in the rural parishes of Cuenca. Open resistance has slowly diminished over time, although concerns over the impacts of mining throughout the páramo have persisted, with community members exhibiting significant levels of anguish and a sense of powerlessness. This effect is directly related to their experience of marginalization by the Correa government, which repeatedly proved itself unwilling to address local worries about how extractivism might negatively affect their lives, their children, their traditions and their futures. According to Pablo Ospina, the population’s demands for participation in environmental decision-making and broader conversations about post-extractive futures came into conflict with Correa’s highly centralized natural resource governance structure and his perspective on social protest as an attempt to challenge his authority. As explained by two citizens from Girón, criminalization of social protest increasingly led to self-censorship:

Woman 1: Almost all the communities here are against [mining], but we have gained nothing after so many demonstrations! We cannot do anything!

Woman 2: The government put in jail a woman that made signs with the finger!

W1: That is scary! Because we truly are poor mice compared to father Correa because he is from the heights doing everything.

W2: He commands alone!

W1: Then, what for? So he crushes us poor.
This vision of the ex-president as an all-commanding figure contrasts sharply with the vision of many in Manabí, for whom instead of an all-commanding dictator, Correa represented a heroic, even quasi-mythical defender of regional equality after years of neoliberal neglect. In Azuay, also unlike in Manabí, there was extensive questioning of Correa’s vision of development, which locals perceived as having been imposed rather than agreed upon in consultation with communities (as required by the constitution). The central points of contention between the communities and the government had to do with 1) the persistent lack of support for the local dairy industry; and 2) the narrow approach to ‘social redistribution’ or ‘development as compensation’ represented by EE.

The province of Azuay is the second largest breeder of dairy cattle after Manabí and the third largest producer by litre of milk (INEC 2016), but it is a sector in crisis. For years, dairy farmers have been demanding government support to solve ‘el tema lechero’ (the milk problem) through better regulation of the importation of powdered milk, enforcement of a minimum fair price per litre of milk so that producers are not forced to sell below market price, and exemption from regulations not suited to small-scale livestock farming. Nevertheless, through participant observation, we corroborated that commissions representing the dairy farmers in several meetings in Quito with the Minister of Agriculture (MAGAP) returned without definite solutions or firm commitments to satisfy the populations’ demands. Most participants argued that the development approach of the government was disengaged from, and inattentive to, local visions of development because it did not envision any financial or technical support for the cattle-breeding sector. For them, it was obvious that one of the most effective ways to promote local wellbeing (buen vivir) was to ensure their insertion into a fairer market and to support agriculture along the specific lines demanded by the area’s residents. The Correa government was not only experienced as having failed to support existing economies but it pushed forward with mining projects that many feared would irreparably damage the water supplies necessary for farming.

Despite these ongoing concerns, the mining project has continued to advance, and since 2015 a new actor has been present in the area: Ecuador Estratégico. To date, 101 projects have been carried out by EE in Azuay, which hosts two ‘strategic projects’: the Chinese-owned Río Blanco mine in nearby Molleturo and the Loma Larga mine in Kimsakocha. During the period 2012–2017, EE invested some USD 29.5 million – an amount that corresponds to only 3 per cent of the total investments of extractive rents across the country (EE 2017). During the same period, Manabí received more than USD 213 million or approximately 24 per cent of the company’s total investments. As elsewhere in Ecuador, EE’s investments for local development
have been accompanied by a strong marketing campaign that explicitly links extractive rents with improvements in local wellbeing (buen vivir). However, in Azuay, the intensity of this marketing campaign – through banners outside of schools, health centres and cyber shops built by EE that boldly declare: ‘The strategic projects transform your community!’ or ‘Mining brings education to your community’ and ‘Mining connects you’ – fostered suspicion among many that the communities were not in fact the beneficiaries of a ‘fair redistribution’ of extractive rents. In particular, there are questions about where the money has come from because the mining companies have not yet paid the anticipated royalties that are supposedly responsible for these development projects; instead, to date, royalties from other oil extractive projects in the Amazon have funded them. EE’s marketing of mining as the activity that funds these development investments is thus seen as strategically misleading in ways that it is not in Manabí. As a result, many locals increasingly perceive EE as a generator of little more than state propaganda used to promote passive acceptance of the project and to facilitate its ‘social license to operate’ in a situation in which the affected communities have never been consulted about the project.

Another worry of locals concerning the government’s development vision is the approach chosen for the redistribution of extractive rents and the costs that have figured into those calculations. If employment generated by the mine is essentially negligible given the capital but not work-intensive nature of the mining industry, the only other option for improving the conditions of local inhabitants is the redistribution of rents through social investments. In the case of Loma Larga, the most important of these projects is the Unidad Educativa del Milenio (UEM) in Victoria del Portete. UEMs are education centres built by EE with large investments in infrastructure and advanced technology. Paradoxically, a project such as this one that should have satisfied the communities was again debated and often rejected, with locals raising questions about 1) the percentage of funding used for the UEM; 2) the government’s motivations behind the funding; and 3) the state’s broader approach to education reform, which again seemed to fail to take account of local needs.

While some were supportive of the project – any improvement in education was welcomed – the amount of funding and the ulterior motives behind the building of the school were widely debated. The implementation of the UEM alone cost USD 6.8 million – already fully 45 per cent of the expected advanced royalties from the Loma Larga project. More sustained resistance – led by the former president of the Autonomous Decentralized Government (GAD) of the parish, who identifies himself as an anti-mining ‘water guardian’ – tapped into the growing sense among inhabitants that by accepting the school they would be giving their implicit consent to the
mining project, which they had been resisting since the early 2000s. They perceived the decision to build the school in Victoria del Portete to be motivated by nefarious intentions on the part of the government. Residents suggested that a legitimate, good faith project of trying to improve education in the area would have focused on building new schools in locations previously without schools and increasing quality and coverage by reinforcing the existing ones. Instead, the previous schools were simply abandoned and the students and professors transferred to a better-equipped modern building in the middle of the teaching period, without any process of transition.

Rafael Correa inaugurated the school on October 2015. The following is a fragment of his speech, which summarizes the government’s discourses on the urgent need for resources to alleviate poverty and the inevitability of resource extraction for the national good.

UEMs are needed in many territories. Why is it the priority to build it in Victoria del Portete? Because here we have an important mining project — ‘Loma Larga’ — and you will say ‘I do not like mining’. Neither do I but that is not the problem. The problem is not if we need mining or not, and of course we do need it. If our natural resources [are transformed] into colleges, into schools, into roads, into health centres, into hospitals, of course we need mining . . . There is not a disgrace anymore to live close to a strategic project, now [those people] are lucky because they know that the territories of influence of the project will be the first in receiving the benefits!

Despite these triumphant proclamations – not dissimilar to those that accompanied the groundbreaking ceremony for the RDP in 2008 – this case study has raised questions about whether economic compensations are enough to build a more ‘egalitarian’ economy. The positions of the inhabitants of the surrounding areas of the Loma Larga project have shown that these compensations are perceived very differently when people feel they are fundamentally losing their sources of subsistence and wellbeing. This influences the trade-offs they are willing to make. As one campesina summarized: ‘Even if they give us a little help for the town, if it is in exchange for life, I do not think it is fair.’ Many of the people in the ‘area of influence’ feel similarly, arguing that they would prefer to maintain their current conditions – impoverished though they may appear – rather than trying to improve their economic status through mining in the páramo. For the surrounding residents, it is not enough to simply ‘participate’ by receiving economic compensations from extractive rents (De Castro, Hogenboom and Baud 2015). More importantly, they demand participation in decision-making about the forms of development most appropriate to their region as well as access to spaces in which to voice their broader concerns about the long-term impacts of mining exploitation. To be heard, the population has increasingly relied on popular
consultations promoted by community organizations such as UNAGUA-Girón, the Union of Community Water Systems of Azuay. After seven years of struggles with the National Electoral Council (CNE) described elsewhere (Rodríguez and Loginova 2019), a referendum in Girón was conducted in the elections of March 2019 with a rotund 86 per cent of responses against mining in the hydrological system of Kimsakocha.

**What Does this Comparison Allow Us to See?**

Read together, our case studies demonstrate a highly fractured regional landscape in the face of deepening extractivism that allows us to offer a few concluding reflections about the intersection of diverse meanings, forms and practices of egalitarianism in contemporary Ecuador.

While the ostensibly ‘post-neoliberal’ state under Correa privileged one important dimension of egalitarianism – the amelioration of historically entrenched material inequalities via projects of state-led and extraction-driven redistribution – it did so by systematically rejecting other dimensions, namely the participation of affected communities in determining development projects and priorities. By prioritizing economistic forms of redistribution heavily dependent on foreign capital, it both inadvertently and quite intentionally sought to curtail the flourishing of differently egalitarian values such as autonomy, self-determination and freedom from state development imperatives. There is no doubt that this powerfully concentrated state was to some degree necessary after years of an austere, anaemic state that maintained intimate connections to the banking sector and that lacked the capacity to stand up to Washington. There is also no doubt that this robust bureaucratic state accomplished some of the most historically significant transfers of wealth in Ecuadorian history. However, this national-level commitment to egalitarian reform was very differently experienced in different parts of the country – sometimes as anything but egalitarian.

In Azuay, as we have seen, where mining is a relatively new and particularly anxiety-producing form of extraction that many fear will damage their material and cultural subsistence, the rejection of alternative forms of development by the central government was experienced as a sustained assault on practices of collective water management and local decision-making, which have long been the norm throughout the region. Unlike in Manabí, the Loma Larga project has been fiercely resisted since the beginning – even before Correa came to power; but that resistance took a more difficult turn under his government. Local responsibilities to land, water and other-than-human species meant that Correa’s heavily centralized approach to ‘development as compensation’ for large-scale extraction was experienced as brutally in-
attentive to other, less ecologically invasive forms of egalitarianism – forms of equality between human and other-than-human communities that were regularly derided by Correa as ‘infantile’. Instead of being perceived as a paternal provider (as he was in Manabí), Correa was rather seen as a semi-fascist dictator no longer concerned about ‘his children’ and even invested in mocking, vilifying and criminalizing those who dared to challenge the government’s vision of *buen vivir*.

Despite significant improvements in poverty rates throughout the country, for inhabitants of the direct area of influence of the Loma Larga project, the dimension of egalitarianism that was both most important and most entirely neglected by the state was broader participation in decision-making beyond the institutional ‘core’ and ‘semi-periphery’ of Correa’s post-neoliberal natural resource governance model – participation in deciding the most important development priorities for the region (support for dairy farmers), in determining the best way of addressing educational deficits (community schools), and in moving beyond extractivism (through eco-tourism and other non-ecologically invasive alternatives to mining). From Correa’s perspective, acknowledging these communities as equal interlocutors in a broad-ranging conversation about less ecologically and socially disruptive forms of development would have meant falling victim to the whims of ‘special interest groups’ and thus betraying the national project of post-neoliberal economic reform to which his administration had committed itself.

In other words, his commitment to something like radical material equality meant that he simply refused to attend to the needs of local communities if they challenged the extractive projects that he saw as necessary to financing his national revolution. This was because he saw himself and his administration as the only authentic voice of the Ecuadorian people as a whole.

If in Azuay the desire was for smaller-scale and more ecologically sustainable projects, in Manabí, on the contrary, the desire for large-scale development largely resonated with Correa’s modernist visions of industrial transformation. Because Manabí was on the receiving end of EE’s largest investments anywhere in the country, it saw rapid investment in a range of projects – particularly those focused on much-needed infrastructure around water – that it did not read as an unfair bribe to generate consent for the presence of the RDP. Quite the contrary. After years of neglect by the central government, the RDP was enthusiastically embraced because it represented a highly visible material investment on the part of the government in Quito unlike any they had ever seen before. Both symbolically and materially, the RDP was structured to respond to long-standing regional grievances and long-simmering wounds generated by the narrow bi-polarity of Ecuadorian political and economic power.
However, after nearly ten years of anticipation, the RDP has also come to be widely perceived as yet another project for which the community has waited and waited, only to be told that it might not materialize for lack of foreign investment – an experience that suggests to growing numbers that they are as likely to be as disappointed by the promises of AP as they were by the previous neoliberal administrations. Just as in Azuay there are questions about where the funding is coming from to support the local development projects that EE says are coming from the mining companies, so, too, in Manabí, there are growing questions about where the capital investment will eventually come from to make their industrial dreams come true. Despite significant investment on the part of EE, the visceral experience of growing dependence on the whims of Chinese investment banks and the corruption scandals that have accompanied Odebrecht have led to a kind of quiet discouragement that is further compounded by the dramatically declining number of jobs.

Nevertheless, this is a profoundly different sort of disappointment than that in Azuay. Around the Loma Larga project, there is a deep-seated and long-running rejection of the government because it has neglected to properly consult communities and failed to honour local understandings of more genuinely egalitarian relationships with a range of ecosystems. There has never been such resistance to the RDP, and there is little doubt that if it were to receive the foreign investment it requires, it would again be welcomed in Manabí, where the need for jobs for a generation of petrochemical engineers remains acutely felt. Despite growing frustration that there is never enough development, there has never been any widespread questioning of the model of development. In Manabí, Correa’s approach to something like egalitarian reform – again, his prioritization of areas long neglected by the state and outside the narrow orbit of power historically concentrated in Quito and Guayaquil – has continued to have very wide resonance.

As Moreno continues his presidency, it will be interesting to watch how these intersecting and differently egalitarian projects are transformed, particularly around the strategic projects overseen by EE, most likely generating further regional tensions and urban/rural cleavages. If his first year in office is anything to go by, he may privilege dimensions of egalitarianism long neglected by his predecessor, particularly in terms of citizen participation and intercultural dialogue. However, paradoxically, he may also represent a disappointing return to precisely the kind of austere state that created the socio-economic inequalities Correa did so much to rectify. He will likely do little to challenge the anti-democratic architecture of the extractive development model, which has for so long defined Ecuadorian politics.
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NOTES

1. Question 5 asked voters if they ‘agreed with amending the constitution to prohibit without exception metal mining in all of its stages, in protected areas, in intangible zones, and in urban centers’ and was approved by 68.62 per cent of the vote. Question 7 asked whether they agreed with ‘increasing the intangible zone in Yasuni National Park at least 50,000 hectares and reducing the area of oil exploitation from 1,030 hectares to 300 hectares’. It was approved by 67.31 per cent of the vote.


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CHAPTER 5

THE NEOLIBERAL STATE AND POST-TRANSITION DEMOCRACY IN CHILE
Local Public Action and Indigenous Political Demands

Francisca de la Maza Cabrera

Introduction

The corporatization of the state in Chile occurred under a neoliberal economic model imposed by the 1973–1990 military dictatorship, which even today still transversally affects different aspects of people’s lives. By analysing indigenous policies and indigenous tourism, this chapter examines the relationship between the corporate state and the country’s indigenous peoples in a bid to gain a deeper understanding of the different forms of expression of corporatization and the role of the market, both in public and private actions.

Indigenous peoples have historically been most disadvantaged by state actions, and this is still apparent today. State occupation of their territories, public policies and the arrival of resource-based companies mean that they have lost not only a large part of their traditional lands but also cultural and political elements. In addition, poverty rates are higher than among the non-indigenous population. According to the Chilean government’s 2017 CASEN survey, multidimensional poverty\(^1\) among indigenous peoples reached 30.2 per cent as compared to 19.7 per cent for the non-indigenous population (CASEN 2017). Similarly, the region with the highest multidimensional poverty in Chile is the Araucanía Region with 28.5 per cent, above the national average of 20.7 per cent. This region is also the heart of the Mapuche people’s historical territory, and at 34 per cent the percentage
of indigenous inhabitants is the second highest in the country, according to the 2017 National Census (INE 2018).

These indicators confirm that, despite the general economic success achieved by Chile under the neoliberal model, gaps exist and the development of some sectors of society is limited, such as the indigenous population. These figures are at odds with the numerous policies and programmes implemented in the Araucanía Region to improve the living conditions of the indigenous population since the restoration of democracy in 1990 and the introduction of an Indigenous Law in 1993. Moreover, conflicts in the Araucanía Region between Mapuche communities, resource-based companies and non-indigenous landowners have worsened, and the state has responded with policies of repression.

Based on several years of ethnographic work on the state in intercultural and indigenous contexts, this chapter seeks to illustrate how the neoliberal model and the Chilean political system can be permeated by the interests of the market and business, using the concept of the common good as opposed to the rights of individuals, indigenous peoples and the environment. We assert that the concept of the oligarchic corporate state (Kapferer 2010) can be analysed from the perspective of the state as a cultural construction (Das and Poole 2004; Gupta 2005; Hansen and Stepputat 2001; Nuijten 2003; Sharma and Gupta 2006). In this way, it is possible to study the state ethnographically, denaturalize it and show that it is not a single body but multiple, diverse and contextual; its margins are diffuse and it affects people’s everyday life far beyond its territorial jurisdiction. This helps us to understand society’s forms of containment and the role of the design and implementation of public policies and of public agents themselves.

From an ethnographic perspective and that of construction of the state, this chapter examines, in the context of a corporate state, the ways in which policy manifests itself, are geared towards indigenous peoples and, in particular, the Mapuche people of the Araucanía Region of central-southern Chile. First, it provides a brief description of the Chilean neoliberal context and its relationship with indigenous peoples before moving on to the concept of a diffuse and contained state, taking specifically ethnographic and local spheres of indigenous policy. This is followed by an analysis of the Mapuche people’s use of institutions as a channel for their demands and, finally, of indigenous tourism as an example of a specific public policy.

Chilean Neoliberal Context and Indigenous Peoples

On 11 March 2018, Sebastián Piñera assumed office as Chile’s president for the second time (his first period was between 2010 and 2014). He is a
businessman, one of the richest people in Chile and represents the political right. His election occurred in a context of political and social criticism of the centre-left coalition, the Concertación por la Democracia, which governed Chile for twenty years after the restoration of democracy in 1990 (with four consecutive presidents: Patricio Aylwin, Eduardo Frei, Ricardo Lagos and Michelle Bachelet) and for a fifth period, as the Nueva Mayoría coalition, between 2014 and 2018, under the second government of Michelle Bachelet.

The military dictatorship meant the installation, through force and political repression, of the ‘laboratory’ of the neoliberal economic model. This model comprises a set of economic, social and political measures that include the privatization of state companies, healthcare and education and a reduction in public spending, introducing the free market into various aspects of national life. This neoliberal shift, which began in 1975, foreshadowed the model’s installation in other countries such as Great Britain and the United States (Espinoza, Barozet and Méndez 2013; Gaudichaud 2016). It meant the transformation of Chilean society in favour of a market that still affects people’s daily lives today as a result of the privatization of the education, health and pension systems, the spatial segregation of poorer segments of the population from more affluent sectors and the installation of department stores, affecting small industry.

Democratic governments since 1990 have maintained the neoliberal system but sought to correct its consequences in terms of poverty and social exclusion. They incorporated new concepts such as equity and social protection, implemented assistentialist public policies and looked to labour market insertion as a means of fostering social mobility for the poorest segments (Espinoza et al. 2013; Gaudichaud 2016).

The model’s maintenance was a forced consequence of the way it had been locked in by the dictatorship and the agreements it reached with the incoming democratic government, which imposed political restrictions on the so-called post-dictatorship democratic transition. This resulted in a limited democracy, which prevented great transformations of the economic and social model established by the dictatorship.

The concept of corporate state (Kapferer 2005, 2010) is understood by the Chilean state as a significant and growing political construction that permits the creation of new configurations of power that are related to social effects, particularly in the most unprotected segments of the population, within which political-economic alliances are established transversally.

The concept of corporate state helps us to visualize the processes of restructuring the social order that allow the market to expand. This has resulted in a reordering process that obliges us to rethink the concept of the state in the context of a new economic determinism and of globalization, generating new sociopolitical forms (Kapferer 2005).
In this framework of transition from dictatorship to democracy under the neoliberal model, spaces emerged for the discussion and incorporation of recognition policies (Taylor 1993) or multicultural policies (Boccara and Bolados 2010) for the country’s indigenous peoples. This resulted in a participatory discussion of the Indigenous Law, which was finally promulgated in 1993 with various limitations compared to what had been proposed by indigenous organizations. Under this Indigenous Law N° 19.253, a number of policies targeting the indigenous population were promoted and institutionalized in the state apparatus through specific actions or transversally.

According to the 2017 National Census, 12.8 per cent of the country’s population identifies as belonging to an indigenous people (INE 2018). Out of these, 79.8 per cent are Mapuche, the largest of the nine indigenous peoples recognized in Chile. There is the issue of the so-called ‘Mapuche conflict’ in the Araucanía Region and neighbouring regions, which is due to historical territorial disputes, the presence of resource-based and, particularly, forestry companies and other projects that affect families’ daily lives.

In the early years after the restoration of democracy, the indigenous organizations that had been formed in opposition to the dictatorship (Mariman 1995) as well as other social and political organizations (such as students, shantytown dwellers and political parties) went through a period of less participatory intensity, since many of them had been very active in mobilizing against the dictatorship.

However, over the years, many factors conspired to foster the emergence of new causes of social discontent. They included the expectations of social and political transformation created by the return to democracy, mainly as regards political reparation and judgment of those involved in human rights violations. Along with this, and complementing it, there was also strong criticism of the perpetuation of the neoliberal model and the role of the market and the economy as the key factors in decision-making, often at the expense of people. As well as causing discontent and political and social frustration, this had direct consequences for different aspects of people’s daily life (for example, as regards education, pension and health systems, environmental protection and respect for indigenous rights). It was also reflected in the perpetuation of a well-off political class with its origins in the dictatorship. In some cases, its members were supporters of, or close to, the dictator; in other cases, they were opponents, but ties of economic and political power were common to all the different democratic governments, cutting across the classic left-right binomial.

From a more macro perspective, the forms of contention (Roseberry 2002) and social mobilization included the emergence of organizations opposed to the neoliberal model in, for example, the environmental and indigenous spheres (as in the case of hydroelectric plants, mining projects and
aquaculture) and among students (the second university student movement) (Rifo 2013). This led to the appearance of new leaders and organizations that became relevant in this context of demands. Some of the leaders, with their origin in the student movements of 2006 and 2010, have gone on, along with other organizations, to form the Frente Amplio, a new political coalition that brings together some of the organizations opposed to the neoliberal model and the traditional political class. This new more radical body is constituted as a political and social movement that aims to democratically change the unequal structures of power and comprises fourteen movements and parties. In the past general election, its presidential candidate came third, with a high vote, and it obtained important parliamentary representation: one senator and twenty deputies.

Opposition to some investment projects has its origin in indigenous territories whose organizations appeal to indigenous rights and are joined by environmental groups. One such emblematic case was the construction of hydroelectric dam in the Alto Bío-Bío area of central-southern Chile. The original project envisaged the construction of several dams, which would have affected not only the natural environment of the river and its basin but also the historical territory of the Mapuche-Pewenche people, involving the resettlement of some of its communities. This conflict, known as Ralco and Alto Bío-Bío, brought into play both environmental and indigenous demands and resulted in the dismissal of three Mapuche directors of the National Indigenous Development Corporation (CONADI), an institution created by the 1993 Indigenous Law to lead public policy for indigenous peoples, after they refused to approve land swaps permitted under the Indigenous Law. In 2003, under the government of Ricardo Lagos, an agreement was reached with the communities after long negotiations and pressure from the government and the company; Pewenche land was subsequently flooded and families were resettled.

There has been a sustained increase in environmental conflicts associated with indigenous peoples, including conflicts in regard to mining projects in northern Chile, such as Pascua Lama (Yañez 2005) and Pampa Colorada (Bolados 2014), and the hydroelectric plants in the south. In these, environmental or ecological movements make common cause with the indigenous population and their territorial demands.

This meeting of ecologists and indigenous peoples is interesting because this interaction of opposition movements brings conceptions of indigenous society into play in an often external and decontextualized struggle, giving rise to disputes for power, protagonism and imagery about the relationship with nature and the territory. In the case of territorial conflict and the installation of companies in indigenous territories, organizations often come under strong pressure to negotiate with business agents and state interests,
leading to fatigue and internal conflicts in the organization that can culminate in negotiations with companies. The discourse of ecological struggles is often based on essentialist narratives of indigenous life, which have more prominence than the indigenous people themselves. In these negotiation processes, mediators, usually hired by the company, or environmental leaders, with important networks of influence in both the political and business worlds, play a key role.

This opposition to the ways in which the public and private spheres operate, with policies favouring the privatization of services and social rights and the installation of resource-based companies, without taking into account living or natural conditions in the territories deepens the idea of a crisis of the resource-based or neoliberal model. However, there is another important aspect of this discussion.

A post-transition political crisis, related to corruption, which had historically been invisible, aggravated discontent with the neoliberal model. In recent years, revelations about the management of money for election campaigns or its personal use by politicians and government officials of different political colours, at different levels and in different parts of the public administration, have provided evidence of institutionalized corrupt practices. This led to a new way of problematizing the public discourse about corruption, relativizing and calling into question the picture of Chile as a non-corrupt country.

Established common practices such as the use of influence in appointments to certain positions, political contributions by companies and lobbying began to be seen as corrupt, deepening the concept of the corporate state. The concept of corruption at the state level permits closer examination of how the state itself, together with the market in a context of globalization, can generate its own mechanisms of containment, transformation and dynamism of its activities. We understand corruption as forms of political practice that are at the limit of the norms defined as institutionalized but which, nevertheless, form part of the political game of the state. These are exercised from the margins and diffuse spaces, which allow different agents with some power over their context to promote actions that benefit certain sectors, often politically. These practices, which can be termed corrupt, are subtle and hidden but are accepted by different actors. Although they are usually individual, they should be understood as an institutionalized practice that forms part of the power relations within the society (Anders and Nuijten 2007).

It follows that the role of the economy and the market has transformed the very concept of the nation-state and the public sphere, even beyond its own jurisdiction and the limits of its action. It is, therefore, key to understand that the construction of the corporate state occurs within the nation-state; it depends on local contingencies and takes different forms, but it has reduced
its presence and increased that of other actors. In light of this, it is necessary to ask whether this loss of presence and control could also be a way in which the state reformulates itself in the current neoliberal and mercantilist context. Here, this chapter takes the idea of Mosse (2004; 2005), who examines development programmes and shows how unwanted forms are also part of the machinery of development agencies. This is demonstrated, for example, by the fact that more fundamental transformations, such as those proposed by Bachelet’s second government, were limited and resisted by different sectors, including within her own coalition.

Following Kapferer (2010), it is impossible for the nation-state to be the only entity of control and social order, leading to the emergence of autonomous citizen movements that become institutionalized, in this case through parliamentary positions or positions of representation.

**Diffuse and Contained State: Construction of Chile’s Indigenous Policy**

The Indigenous Law N° 19.253 came into force in 1993, shortly after the restoration of democracy. It has limited weight because, depending on the case, other laws can take precedence. It is, in other words, a ‘second level’ law compared to others of ‘national interest’ or that appeal to the ‘common good’. This was evident in the Ralco conflict and other local projects where the opposition of indigenous communities, their demands and history were not respected on the grounds of national interest. This indicates a hierarchy within which indigenous people are subordinated. Although the law is valued as an achievement of the indigenous organizations that actively participated in efforts to restore democracy, it must be viewed in its context. One of the demands of the organizations that participated was constitutional recognition as peoples, something they have yet to obtain. One sector of Congress opposed the incorporation of the concept of people in the indigenous law (reducing it to ‘ethnic groups’) and has, indeed, resisted various attempts to give the country’s indigenous peoples constitutional recognition. This reinforces the political hierarchy of Chile’s unitary national project. Nowadays, demand for constitutional recognition goes further in that a number of sectors are claiming plurinational recognition. While, on the one hand, rights were denied at a certain historical moment, indigenous peoples have, on the other, advanced in their demands, creating a lag between legislation and demand for rights backed by international legal instruments.

Generally speaking, the policies implemented on the basis of the Indigenous Law varied over time and according to the territory of the country’s different indigenous peoples. This reflected factors that included contexts, environmental and political conflicts, negotiations and diversity in the de-
mands of the indigenous peoples themselves. In other words, despite being unidirectional, policies were developed on the basis of a relationship with the indigenous peoples (De la Maza, de Cea and Rubilar 2018). The first four Concertación governments differed in their focus but all brought both progress and setbacks. Their measures included the introduction of specific intercultural health and education programmes from 1995, the creation of different instances of dialogue and participation and, in general, the implementation of indigenous policies in the different territories of the country.

Little by little, an official discourse of recognition of the indigenous peoples was established from the restoration of democracy, influenced by the demands and political actions of the indigenous peoples themselves, who today are viewed as important actors in this process of democratization and participation (Boccara and Bolados 2010; Richards 2013), but also by sources of conflict and the possible destabilization of some territories such as the Araucanía Region and neighbouring regions, where the processes of political vindication and territorial demands are concentrated. In these areas, some sectors, which are attacked and questioned by radical Mapuche organizations, maintain that the state has lost control, making decisions that are at odds with the common good, economic development and the promotion of investments, and failing to ensure the safety of part of the population.

However, CONADI has also shown itself to be dependent on central government interests, with its directors having to accept presidential decisions without the right to dissent. Indigenous demands are becoming ever stronger. One of the issues faced by governments was the application of the anti-terrorist law to Mapuches involved in acts of protest, such as the occupation of private property and attacks on it, in the context of territorial conflicts.

The use of this law was clearly disproportionate for prosecuting crimes – mostly against property – that the Mapuche may have committed in this context. Its use intensified in 2002 when a Senate Commission declared that, as a result of the action of the Mapuche in the south of Chile, the rule of law had ceased to prevail, and called for the application of the maximum rigor of the law against the Mapuche (Aylwin 2010). Since the latter part of the second Bachelet government and now under the Piñera government, the issue of security has continued to be a key issue in addressing the conflict in the Araucanía Region and the surrounding area. In this context, the construction of indigenous policy continues its course.

Policies of recognition have been geared to the ‘development’ of indigenous peoples. They include the Orígenes Program financed by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB 2001–2012). It has had an impact on public policy by helping to establish the concept of interculturality transver-
sally across different institutions and levels, focusing on actions for indigenous people.

Anti-poverty programmes constitute a new way of disciplining and creating dependence (Foucault 1991), with their application and nature depending on the particular government in power. In the case of the indigenous population, they can inject important resources for investment and development, but as strategies they fail to take account of the political variable, resulting in policies that some authors have defined as neoliberal multiculturalism (Boccara 2007; Hale 2002; Richards 2013).

The power of the state is increasingly hidden, and the boundaries between the state and private world are ever more diffuse, since, as seen in the Chilean case, both are closely interwoven, and there is not a clear distinction between state and private actions. An important milestone occurred in 2008, when, after almost twenty years of demands, Chile ratified ILO Convention 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, positioning indigenous rights as a matter to be considered in the definition of public policies and in business expansion within indigenous territories.

After more than twenty-five years of policies for the indigenous population, a number of actors, including indigenous intellectuals, leaders and government officials had strengthened their position and were to play a key role in implementation of this policy, which reproduces the vision of a neoliberal state but also permits identification of contentious spaces.

The state’s corporatization also produced new ways in which the state attempted to control the most radical Mapuche demands. A key example of this occurred in the second half of 2017, under the second Bachelet government, when the intelligence unit of the uniformed police carried out ‘Operation Hurricane’. This consisted in the coordinated and simultaneous arrest, on 23 September 2017, of eight Mapuche community members for illicit terrorist association on the grounds of their alleged responsibility for a series of recent arson attacks in southern Chile. This included the leader of the Arauco Malleco Corporation (CAM), one of the most visible organizations associated with radical political demands. The arrest was widely reported in the media. The evidence presented included intercepted telephone calls and WhatsApp messages. A number of sectors, including business associations in the Araucanía Region, applauded the arrest. However, on 19 October the Supreme Court ordered the release of the eight accused, who had been remanded in custody for alleged terrorist offenses, because it had been discovered that the supposed evidence against them was false (Sepúlveda and González 2018). This cost the head of the police service and the director of its intelligence unit their jobs.

The operation was intended to demonstrate the state’s power to control dissidence and the radical movement, but its failure and false basis triggered
a crisis in the institutions involved and, in fact, undermined the vision of a strong and non-corrupt state. However, in recent months, the current government has maintained this national security approach, increasing the number of police specialized in combating terrorism assigned to the ‘Mapuche conflict’. Analysis of this policy clearly reveals communications and political weaknesses that make the situation worse rather than calming it.

Institutional Option for Mapuche Protest in the Araucanía Region

Historically, Mapuche leaders have opted to make their demands heard through institutional channels (Foerster and Montecino 1988). For example, the first Mapuche deputy was elected in 1924, only a few years after the end of the military occupation of the Mapuche territory and its absorption by the Chilean state. In other words, their option has been to use the system and become part of it as a means of establishing their identity seals and as a mechanism of resistance.

The Mapuche people’s strategies are diverse, ranging from the most radical to the most institutionalized, but together form an active vision of the Mapuche movement or movements.

These different strategies were seen soon after the restoration of democracy, when a number of indigenous leaders joined traditional political parties and took positions in CONADI or political posts at the regional and local levels, though some organizations refused to participate in discussion of the Indigenous Law or other bodies convened by the different Concertación governments. A milestone in the Mapuche movement of the late twentieth century occurred in 1997, when forestry trucks were burned in the Lumaco sector in the north of the Araucanía Region (Pairican 2014) in protest against forestry companies practising monoculture of pine and eucalyptus on vast tracts of land in the region (and neighbouring regions) to the detriment of the diversity of the area’s native woodland. These plantations of exotic trees successively harm the environment, directly affecting soil quality and the availability of surface and groundwater as well as creating conditions of payroll employment. The business logic and the economic ‘interests’ of the country took precedence over the agreements and projections of the indigenous policy defined after the restoration of democracy. It is in this context of forestry industry expansion that the most radical Mapuche organizations emerged, associated with recovery of their territory; Mapuche lands are small and of poor quality as a consequence of the historical process of indigenous resettlement in which the Chilean state distributed land unequally, giving priority to foreign and national colonists and confining the Mapuche to reservations.
Other Mapuche leaders and organizations have nonetheless opted for institutional channels. Over the past two decades, in a demand related to the processes of democratization and recognition policies, the Mapuche have sought spaces of power and political representation at the municipal level. Indigenous candidates have participated in municipal elections, some standing for traditional parties and others for more emerging organizations, and some have been elected as mayors and councillors. In these positions, not all focus on ethnic claims, but in one way or another, most have generated local mechanisms of Mapuche power that have been important for their continuity as local representatives (Espinoza 2017).

The Wallmapuwen Party was founded in 2005 as a political movement. This Mapuche party, which has a nationalist and regionalist stamp, seeks to use institutional channels to obtain local and regional power. However, due to the nature of the Chilean electoral system, it was only able to register as a political party in 2006, and in 2017 it did not achieve sufficient signatures to maintain its registration. It has, however, joined with other parties, whose members have obtained positions as mayors or councillors. In the 2012 election, one of its candidates was elected as mayor of a municipal district in the Araucania Region where the Mapuche language was co-officialized. This is important for indigenous demands because indigenous languages have not been recognized at the national level; with a Mapuche mayor, however, this was possible at the local level. Bureaucratic obstacles have, however, impeded the larger changes demanded by indigenous organizations, and this has caused discontent among the Mapuche with their own elected authorities. The political work of this mayor was strongly influenced by the participation of members of the Wallmapuwen Party, but some local organizations strongly questioned his management of the role of municipal officials. These factors, together with others, meant that he was not re-elected in 2016.

In this framework of indigenous institutionalization at the local level, indigenous officials play a key role as the principal implementers of public policy. In general, they have a strong sense of belonging to their people, with an important history of leadership in their communities. Many were also opponents of the military dictatorship and actively participated in organizations in support of the restoration of democracy and, therefore, identify with the governments of the centre-left coalition.

Through their role in the implementation of development programmes and the containment of resource-based projects, these officials serve as important cultural and political mediators. Trust, acceptance, support and help are crucial for advancing social relations and for the state to project a cohesive and pro-active image (De la Maza 2012). The conduct of these officials is fundamental for establishing positive relationships between both sides. However, this balance is precarious and depends on the political and
social context at the time and on the establishment of new resources or programmes that can be accessed. The role of these officials has been discussed in the framework of the focus of neoliberal multiculturalism (Boccara 2007; Hale 2002; Richards 2013) as regards their capacity for action and state control and manipulation. Ethnographic information shows that this black and white vision does not reflect the complexity of the role of the indigenous official. Spaces for state interaction are complex and are also spheres of resistance. As a result, the official’s dual role, as representative of the state and belonging to an indigenous people, generates constant tension – the management of which depends on personal experience and capabilities.

Other relevant actors include the leaders and direct participants of programmes (referred to as ‘users’ in public policy terms) or, in other words, the indigenous counterparts of public policy. Some mechanisms, such as the working or coordination groups in which the different actors involved in a programme participate, have been institutionalized while others are created or develop in response to them. Undoubtedly, the temptation for the state is to generate clientelistic and assistentialist relations of dependency, which are difficult to resist or protest against. As indicated, this is a form of developmentalist policy, but there are certainly also margins of the policy, which by means of a more assertive response is possible to negotiate, modifying these institutionalized practices.

Third actors are the consultants or persons to whom the state outsources implementation of policy in the local, regional or national space. Their role has become ever more important since the restoration of democracy in the context of an agreement-based transition and the neoliberal model, which the democratic governments sought to temper with equity. Consultancy companies manage the resources allocated to the policy, and some now employ Mapuche professionals, who can access these funds and put their own stamp on the work, which can go beyond what is strictly necessary.

State practices associated with indigenous policies have not been able to eradicate poverty in some indigenous sectors. In their programmes, they reproduce representations of the Mapuche as small subsistence producers, failing to consider that many Mapuche live in towns and cities in the south of Chile or in Santiago.

The state is viewed as an autonomous being that must negotiate in the face of conflict and with the most radical organizations and that must, therefore, recognize the indigenous people and give back what it took from them. This is embodied in mechanisms of state control through both the promotion of development programmes and security measures, which leave porous spaces where officials and other actors can resist and incorporate their own imprint.
Transferring Development to Private Entities: 
The Case of Indigenous Tourism

Tourism in indigenous territories has expanded in recent years, particularly in the case of special interest tourism, with the resulting adaptation of the territories to these new demands. This has brought different actors into play, such as private agents, who see these spaces (with their landscapes, natural resources and even their culture) as a business opportunity. The installation of tourism companies without state control and with little input from the local participation has put some sectors under great pressure.

However, under the model of multicultural or recognition policies and the transversal installation of interculturality at the level of public policy, a policy to strengthen indigenous tourism has been implemented in recent years. Today, indigenous tourism is defined by the state as tourist services offered by indigenous persons, families or organizations that incorporate part of the indigenous culture (Programa Orígenes 2003). This incorporation of indigenous culture as a tourist value is not only practised by indigenous entrepreneurs but appropriated by external agents (De la Maza 2018).

The development of tourism by Mapuche people has its origin primarily in rural tourism initiatives promoted by the state but also in other initiatives more geared towards indigenous identity promoted by non-governmental organizations. Since 2007, however, its development in the Araucanía Region has been fostered more explicitly through incentives for related studies and contributions to the development of what is referred to as Mapuche tourism (SERNATUR 2011).

The concept of the indigenous entrepreneur is key to understanding the insertion of tourism. It is resisted by more fundamentalist sectors, both Mapuche and non-Mapuche, who reject the capitalist model and refuse to use neoliberal words in the context of indigenous-related matters. Other Mapuche sectors have, however, accepted and adopted the concept as part of their ability to move forward and achieve insertion in the market like any person, albeit with respect for their identity and a different proposal.

Since 2015, this regional phenomenon has acquired relevance at the national level as an inter-ministerial concern, and the government plans to define an agenda for the development of indigenous tourism, led by the Undersecretariat for Tourism. This concern arose in 2014–15 at the beginning of the second Bachelet administration, due to a combination of situations under which the interests of certain officials coincided with those of private organizations. Officials at the Undersecretariat for Tourism and the National Tourism Service, who were sensitive to the indigenous issue and had ties with civil society actors also interested in it, were key to this process of
bringing together their personal interests and those of external agents and installing the concept of indigenous tourism as a national policy.

These officials—mediators sensitized the agents or bureaucrats to this type of indigenous tourism, proposing the preparation of studies. A private organization close to these experts was commissioned to carry them out. The initial studies revealed a need for more in-depth and applied studies, which were again tendered to the same organization. As well as being a consultancy company, this organization also acts as an operator, offering indigenous tourism experiences to overseas visitors.

In this way, state-financed studies strengthened a sector of indigenous entrepreneurs, a group that already had experience and was able to develop as a result of processes to promote leadership in indigenous tourism through training, tours and the provision of resources, which are, at the same time, the experiences that the organization will offer privately. In addition, the national institution that defines tourism policies incorporated the concept of indigenous tourism, and its officials appropriated it.

A relevant point to analyse is the fact that indigenous tourism as a public policy seems remote from the indigenous political conflict. It seems to correspond to another sphere of reality in which indigenous peoples live their ‘ancestral’ culture quietly and profoundly and about whom a narrative and tourism product are promoted to attract a special type of tourist. This tourist, interested in the indigenous culture and way of life, will approach the experience with expectations related to an imagery of the indigenous and often mediated by the tour operators that would adapt to demand. This situation of a quest for indigenous peoples, accompanied with great admiration and respect, can invisibilize their social and cultural conditions.

In the Araucanía Region, this national policy of development of indigenous tourism appears to be moving in a different direction. In contrast to the central level, the conflict and the difficulties of coexistence between Mapuche and non-Mapuche are evident there and form part of daily public life, meaning that the dynamics are totally different. One example of this involves a Mapuche official who is the regional head of tourism development at an agricultural development institution. This official’s work is carried out in a context in which indigenous tourism has grown in the region and is also geared to all the rural population, both indigenous and non-indigenous.

This indigenous official has a political and professional commitment to his people that is reflected in the particular attention he pays to indigenous tourism, fostering initiatives and focusing resources. His particular approach is not to the liking of non-indigenous entrepreneurs or other non-indigenous officials from institutions that are not particularly concerned with indigenous economic development. This has caused problems that reveal the tensions that can arise between an indigenous official, committed to
his people and in a position not exclusively related to indigenous affairs, and other non-indigenous officials not focusing on indigenous matters.

These tensions have led to rumours among other non-indigenous officials about the role of this official, along the lines of ‘you work only for indigenous people’ and ‘we (non-indigenous entrepreneurs) get less attention and resources’. The rumours put pressure on the indigenous official, who defends himself and argues that he works for all equally. Rumours can serve as a means of social control and bring to light practices that, for some agents, can be considered corrupt. However, they often reflect disputes over power and political projects within the institutions themselves.

According to a non-indigenous official, the indigenous official has focused resources on specific territories and entrepreneurs, taking advantage of his position to offer/sell privately and make a profit with these entrepreneurs. In other words, he not only gives priority to his own interests but also takes advantage of the entrepreneurs.

This indigenous official had already been stigmatized as conflictive and working mainly in the interests of indigenous people. Now, corruption is added to the charges. As in the case of any rumour, what matters more than if it is true or false is to understand the ways in which a type of state action can generate a story that discredits the role of an indigenous official. This interpretation may be based on discrimination on both sides as well as forms of resistance imposed by the indigenous official in the margins of the state or abusive practices.

Finally, a case at the municipal level reveals a third dimension. In a municipal district where Mapuche tourism had become important, the authorities decided to create a new position: head of municipal indigenous tourism. An indigenous entrepreneur, with experience in indigenous tourism, was appointed, becoming an indigenous official-expert. At the beginning, his work was well evaluated because he was someone whom ‘everyone knows’, with good relations with the district’s inhabitants. He was proactive in his work, establishing ties with the district’s indigenous tourism entrepreneurs and seeking to promote this economic, but above all, cultural activity.

A female indigenous entrepreneur from the district reports that this indigenous official had to leave his position. In a bid for funding for indigenous tourism entrepreneurs, several applied on the advice and encouragement of the indigenous official, but when the results were announced, this official, who had also participated in the bid, was declared the winner. This caused many problems and distrust because the other entrepreneurs felt he had cheated by concealing his participation from them. This caused divisions among the entrepreneurs, and the official finally had to leave his job.

The problems arose because the indigenous official did not inform the rest of the applicants that he would also participate in the bid, implying a lack of
transparency and potentially the use of inside information to the advantage of his own personal business. Transparency is a corporate mechanism that has penetrated the state apparatus. Like rumour, it serves to exercise control and, today, is a central principle of public policy under which different agents can access information and, if necessary, ‘control’ or supervise state practices. However, transparency is also subject to the agents’ role. Not everyone can access these sources of information, and this once again reproduces relationships of power, communication and access.

The indigenous official returned to being an entrepreneur. After a time, social ties between the actors were rebuilt and many have again formed partnerships. The former indigenous official is, indeed, an outstanding entrepreneur at the municipal level.

These cases of indigenous and Mapuche tourism illustrate institutionalized forms of state practice. None has operated outside the law. Many of them are judged from the perspective of non-indigenous and indigenous relations or relations between indigenous persons. The judgements are moral at different levels and depending on the case. At all levels, internal power disputes within institutions are apparent and within the community itself. The cases also illustrate the role of decision-making. Officials can focus resources on their own groups of interest, internalize concepts at a public level and generate private and personal programmes from public institutions.

In this particular analysis of indigenous tourism as public policy, the corporate state is seen in profound and complex terms. Private actors influence policy design and foster a kind of relationship with the state and with leaders of the state. In addition, regional and local officials have the power to make decisions and promote different interests through, for example, the use of rumour and access to information in their role as mediators of public policy. Under the neoliberal model, these policy margins exist and are controlled not only by the state but also by citizens and citizen-officials involved in the process.

Conclusions

This chapter sought to analyse the Chilean case from the perspective of the corporate state by identifying areas where it manifests itself with force, often in a hidden and subtle way but revealing key characteristics of the Chilean neoliberal model.

It first examined the concept of political crisis associated with the neoliberal model and the post-dictatorship political period when protest movements against the institutional framework emerged, installing a vision of the overrunning of state control in areas such as education, the environment, indigenous peoples and, recently, political corruption.
A key actor for this analysis were the indigenous peoples, particularly the Mapuche, as one of the most disadvantaged sectors of society, due to systematic state occupation of their territory and a generation of specific policies that when combined with a history of resistance and confrontation of some sectors against the state and companies reinforce the idea of instability, especially in the Araucanía Region. One of the key factors in deepening this conflict was the introduction of a resource-based economic model that permeated indigenous territories through companies that put pressure on natural resources, which directly affected the quality of life of communities.

In addition, the promotion of indigenous tourism illustrates in depth the way in which the state operates from the perspective of both public agents and indigenous organizations. Different agents, including private mediators and indigenous leaders as well as agents of the state itself, are involved in the installation of the concept of indigenous tourism. Control no longer takes only the institutionalized form of policies but also includes the margins of policies, led by officials and, often, indigenous officials with their own agendas and interests.

Finally, corporatization is seen not only in the relationships built between the state and society in general but also among indigenous groups themselves. The neoliberal model permeates the way in which citizens, as well as the state and its officials, act. The company-state transforms daily and political relations, whose limits are resisted at different times by movements that also become institutionalized. Their capacity to corporatize their actions means that the limits of resistance are diffuse.

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NOTES

1. This measures five dimensions of poverty: education, health, work and social security, housing and surroundings, and networks and social cohesion.
2. Pewenche is the name given to the indigenous inhabitants of the area’s Andes Mountains because of the central role of the pewen or araucaria in their way of life.

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'There is no government!' The taxi driver whispered it, as if talking to himself. We were stuck in La Libertador, one of the main communication arteries in Ciudad Bolívar. This road has two lanes for each direction, and traffic is generally fluid. But not that day. Ahead of us, a funeral rally blocked the way, occupying both lanes. No one used the horn to complain – no one dared. A malandro was being buried, one close to the powerful chief-in-command at Vista Alegre, the local jail. The coffin, surrounded by family and friends, was placed on top of an uncovered truck, and cars paraded slowly at its flanks and rear, marking the occasion with solemnity. While the taxi driver did not elevate the tone of his voice, you could tell something boiled inside him. ‘When someone honest dies, no one gives a damn, and look at this!’ I was upset too. I had lived long enough in Ciudad Bolívar not to be surprised by the display we came across that afternoon, but the sensation that we were obliged to pay compulsory tribute to the malandro was strong. I joined the driver in lamenting the state of affairs, but of course it did not make a difference. It took us ages to get to my place, which was right at the other side of the cemetery.

That episode took place in mid 2011, but in some respects it is far from exceptional: the expression ‘there is no government!’ is quite common in Venezuela as a form of conclusive statement. For instance, let me recall the case of another taxi ride I had taken also in Ciudad Bolívar, just a few months before the one described above. I picked that taxi close to 6PM at Paseo Orinoco, a commercial area in the city. That time of the day, when the sun

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expires, buses, vans and the so-called *perreras* were all packed,\(^2\) with kids and young men literally hanging out from them. The scene is typical, conditioned by last-chance urges. As soon as it gets dark, drivers take their vehicles (which are theirs, not ‘public’) home. No ‘public’ transport will be found until the next day. The evening I took that taxi was particularly busy. It was early December, and many people were already doing Christmas shopping. I had been lucky getting that lift, and once in the taxi I relaxed chatting away with the driver. When the conversation came to ‘there is no government!’ we had been talking about transport for a while. Initially, it was light talk spurred by the sights of packed buses and *perreras*. But what triggered the driver’s exclamation was talk about Christmas plans and intercity transport. I planned on travelling to the town of my in-laws in Sucre in a few days, and the taxi driver had relatives travelling to Valencia (Carabobo). That time of the year, bus lines and *por puesto* cars increase fares by a quarter or more over the regular price.\(^3\) They call it *aguinaldo*, as the (voluntary) Christmas gift, but it is a compulsory fee: either you pay it or you don’t get into the vehicle. ‘There is no government!’ was the taxi driver’s summary evaluation of the situation, projecting a form of indignant sympathy for those who, like his relatives or myself, had to rely on intercity transport on those days around Christmas.

The expression is no exclusive verbal patrimony of those who drive taxis. Nor is it a localism from Ciudad Bolívar. ‘There is no government!’ is uttered in any region and from people positioned quite differently in social terms. A third example registered in the country’s capital in mid 2015 further illustrates the point. It came from Toni, a man in his sixties who lives in the working class neighbourhood of Lomas de Urdaneta (Catia). These days he makes do with a pension and the stipend he gets as a member of a band of musicians hired through the Central Bank for cultural activities. Toni was hosting Marco, an old friend from Puerto Ordaz, and me for a few days. When we arrived in Caracas, Toni came to meet us at the metro station near his place, and after cheerful greetings and some shopping we headed north towards the stop where *busetas* (small urban buses) take passengers to go up Las Lomas. *Bachaqueros* were scattered along the way,\(^4\) selling products that by then were quite scarce – that is, scarce at regulated prices, for if you were willing to pay fivefold that price or more, you could get them through different channels. Marco asked Toni about the price *bachaqueros* sold the coffee there, to compare it with the prices in Puerto Ordaz. The price was very much the same, but the question led Toni to tell us about a recent episode in which police had removed a group of *bachaqueros* from the area we had just walked past, only for the *bachaqueros* to come back the next day with the same range of products. ‘There is no government, *chico*!’ Marco remarked. His quarrel was not with street vending or specifically with the *bachaqueros* we saw on the street. He was giving out about the process that the notion of
‘bachaquero’ encapsulates. For Marco, as for many others, the street vendor appeared as a weak link in a long chain of smuggling that translates in the (re)selling of products often produced in state-owned companies and sold or distributed with state sponsorship.

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In this chapter I will engage with debates on egalitarianism by discussing what the protagonists of these episodes refer to when they speak of (a missing) ‘government’. Those episodes are diverse in their constitutive elements, but they all comparably make an appeal to a public authority and reflect intersubjective conceptions of injustice. The sense of injustice runs parallel to the acknowledgement that factual powers impinge on one’s basic wellbeing. Those factual powers take different shapes, as we have seen: in (latent) coercive capacities, for instance, as elicited in the observance of respect towards participants in the funeral of the malandro; but they can also, as our last episode illustrated, manifest themselves in market mechanisms that end up excluding some people from access to basic goods or services (such as foods or transport), or making that access undignified. The experiential acknowledgment of the existence of those powers, in tandem with the sense of injustice they triggered, is what made people appeal to ‘government’.

‘Government’ here operates as a signifier in which people condense notions of justice and the aspiration that a particular form of authority can guarantee the conditions for it – at the expense of other actually existing forms. Engaging classical debates of Enlightenment political theorists, I contend that such authority is ‘the state’ and will argue that understanding people’s aspiration to recover or install it sheds light on political positioning and mobilization in a country like Venezuela. In relation to the episodes I described above, I will discuss the extent to which the emergence and shaping of the so-called Bolivarian state can be considered to be a response to people’s demands for ‘state’, tout court, particularly in the areas of security and socio-economic enfranchisement.

To ground these arguments, I will start by elaborating on the concepts of authority and the state, aiming to clarify which takes on those concepts are misguided when trying to formulate theoretically the aspirations of people who call for ‘government’ along the lines that the protagonists of the episodes I discussed do.

**Authority, Authoritarianism and the State**

The episodes I recall above have at their core an appeal to a form of authority that is reclaimed in the mediation of social relations. It is therefore a public
authority, and those who were calling for it expected that it would impose itself upon other forms of authority that effectively mediate social relations – but in a way considered unjust. Those appeals to a (strong) public authority should not be understood as calls for authoritarian government. This question begs additional commentary, given the loaded connotations that calls for authority have in political theory in general and in contemporary Venezuela in particular – where opinions about the alleged benefits of an authoritarian corrective to the current political scenario are publicly circulated by some people.

Authoritarianism has been central to political debates in Venezuela for over a century, at the very least. When the concept was not brought to the forefront, it remained as a shadow contender with which theorists wrestled when characterizing the configuration of Venezuelan society and its politics. Even when from the 1970s onwards analysts penned the theory of exceptionalism that singled out Venezuela as a unique model of democratic culture and institutionality in the continent (Ellner and Tinker-Salas 2005), the question of authoritarianism remained as an absent presence – as it were, it was the opaque background against which the new democratic institutions shined with singular, and to some extent unexpected, splendour. Venezuela was free of the military dictatorships that from the 1960s to the 1980s lacerated the peoples of many countries in the continent, and this was indeed remarkable because of the minimal signs for optimism that the first half of the century had offered.

For twenty-eight years (1908–1935), Juan Vicente Gómez had imprinted Venezuela’s oil-bound transition into modernization and developmentalism with an authoritarian bent (Tinker-Salas 2009). The only (and fleeting) interlude that during the first half of the century promised to open up national politics to democratic institutionality (the so-called ‘trienio democrático’ of 1945–1948) was cut abruptly by a coup that installed another military figure, Delgado Chalbaud, as head of government. Assassinated in 1950, his replacement was temporarily covered by Germán Suárez Flamerich, while a commanding Junta Militar paved the way for a return to an openly authoritarian regime: the (not so distant) dictatorship of Pérez Jiménez (1952–1958). Notably, Pérez Jiménez justified his disdain for pluralism and party politics by his belief in the benefits that concentration of power, in tandem with his personal efforts and guidance, would have for the progress of the country. From then on, the country entered a period of continuing, if tightly demarcated, democratic competition, but the shadows cast by the authoritarian models of the past remained too close to be ignored.

Figures such as Pérez Jiménez, and before him Gómez, had incarnated the idea that dictatorship was the only political system capable of making Venezuela flourish and of bringing forth its potential for progress. Such an idea
had been brought to its maximum organic expression by prominent intellectual Vallenilla Lanz (1870–1936), who developed it in the form of a scientific thesis in his influential ‘Cesarismo democrático’ (1991 [1919]). Vallenilla Lanz became an active supporter of Gómez’s regime on the grounds that the latter had come to meet the historical necessities of the Venezuelan society. In his view, a strong visionary leader who could impose its force upon other competing caudillos was necessary to guarantee a degree of security and cohesion in a country in which instability and fragmentation were presented as historically determined conditions, exacerbated by the independence wars and subsequent factional warfare during the early decades of the Republic. Vallenilla Lanz presented his thesis as the outcome of an ideologically neutral positivist approach that placed normative political discussion and abstracted principles of government in a secondary plane. Venezuela, as any other country, was seen as dependent on an ‘organic constitution’ that did not necessarily match the ‘paper constitutions’ sanctioned in accord with the principles of liberalism or any other political ideology. From that perspective, abstracted principles of democracy and division of powers and the like were impotent, and misguided, for the transformation of society.

Nonetheless, Vallenilla Lanz did not advocate ahistorical support for authoritarian forms of government. He saw in the latter a scientifically motivated response to specific social conditions: it was the positive organic constitution of the country that made caudillos a ‘social necessity’. In Vallenilla Lanz’s view, such a conclusion was to be actively supported by those who aspired to transform the political conditions of the country and facilitate their betterment. With adequate political intervention, Venezuela would evolve towards different organic forms that in turn would require new, more modern political institutions.

The proposals made by Vallenilla Lanz, and the premises that sustained them, had a lasting impact on Venezuelan political debates. They generated repulsion among progressive and liberal sectors of the Venezuelan society but also underpinned the views of some elites and the middle classes that were keen to stop any sign of potential alteration of the status quo – open democratic competition appeared as too much of a risk in the face of what they interpreted as the immature character of the masses. At present, the ideas that ‘Cesarismo Democrático’ articulated in scholarly form can still be identified in a variety of publicly expressed manifestations, more or less uprooted from its original theoretical terrain.

Let us recall that the governments of Hugo Chávez (1999–2013) mechanically evoked among its liberal critics the image of the authoritarian caudillo, regardless of the democratic source of his legitimacy. His military background, polarizing style and charismatic profile resuscitated among some analysts theories about the immature character of the Venezuelan democ-
racy and its people – specifically the people who had brought Chávez to the presidency with their votes and those who subsequently re-elected him three times as president. Today, and exacerbated by the profound socio-economic crisis that strikes the country, fatalist evaluations of the ‘national character’ spring up in everyday conversations, encapsulated in statements along the lines of ‘nothing will ever change in Venezuela’. This type of evaluation is, of course, contested: many people situate in structural economic factors, and primarily in the political realm (domestic and international), the source of problems to be overcome, and they give names to those they consider responsible for the current state of affairs (be they members of the Executive, opposition leaders or foreign governments interfering in national politics). Yet for fatalists and conservative ‘cesaristas’ alike, it is the unchanged organic substance of national society that is the root of the problem, and hard-line ‘cesarista’ resolutions continue to appeal to them. Sometimes those inclinations are overtly expressed in amazingly normalized calls for a coup or an external military intervention against Maduro’s government. These are made by a variety of people, ranging from right-wing politicians declaring to international media to politically disaffected youngsters sharing through twitter such opinions in a rather casual form (calls for a coup come amidst comments on the latest videos of favourite YouTubers, expressions of romantic expectation and fun memes). In the recent past – that is, in January 2019 – when Juan Guaidó (then quite an anonymous political figure) appointed himself as ‘interim’ president of Venezuela, declarations calling for foreign military intervention seem to have become even more common and normalized among radical sectors of the opposition bloc.

While those commentaries are generally made in the name of democracy and freedom, they hardly disguise conceptualizations of those terms under a ‘law and order’ frame whose realization would require mano dura (iron fist) governmental approaches,7 and not only to address crime (Antillano and Ávila 2017): at present, that frame also rests on the idea that mano dura measures would be needed to control those sectors of the popular classes that up to this day, despite the aggravation of the economic crisis that goes in tandem with the draconian sanctions that the US and a handful of governments have imposed on the country’s financial structures, remain mobilized in support of Bolivarian governments. Comments along the lines of ‘we ought to terminate chavistas’ or ‘I wish all chavistas were dead’, which can frequently be read in social media, are worryingly telling of predispositions in that respect.

It is, however, important to clearly separate that type of ‘cesarista’ proposition from the appeals to ‘government’ made by the protagonists of the episodes portrayed at the outset of this chapter. The contextualized signification of those appeals to government reveals what one could characterize
as Rousseaunean inclinations among those who made them. The ‘government’ was missed in the face of the imposition of a *malandro* order, and the ‘government’ that was found absent from the process that tips out with the street sale of products such as coffee or milk at an exorbitant price for poor citizens, is an authority people conceive as something located above them but in a way that could (and in their view should) protect them from abusive conditions. In other words, people were reclaiming the effective presence of a public authority that is conceived as superior to and more legitimate than the rest and that was also expected to have the capacity to impose itself upon others in order to prevent situations of social injustice. Such public authority is not conceived as an erosion of individual autonomies or rights but on the contrary as the guarantor of conditions for them.

Those claims thus echo what Rousseau classically described in *The Social Contract* (1762) as the public power that legitimately results from civic association. Rousseau, as concerned with the problem of political subjugation and authoritarian ruling as he was with consolidating a notion of republican liberties, put his efforts into arguing why freedom remains guaranteed, and in fact is made possible, by the voluntary concessions that people make for the creation of a political community cemented upon a general will and with organs that express such will through norms. The existence of that general will makes it possible that people remain free when *giving themselves* to the political community, and when thereby becoming subjected to the mediations of a public authority. Legitimate norms of that authority are conceived as the normative emanation of the general will, and thus, as the riddle-like expression had it: people will be obeying themselves when obeying the law.

In the dedicatory of his famous *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality Among Men* (1923 [1755]), Rousseau figuratively equated the submission to legitimate republican authority and its law to the weight produced by a ‘smooth and beneficial’ yoke. In his view, such yoke could be carried with (citizen) pride, since it was suited for those who are not willing to bear any other yoke.

Rousseau’s propositions, as we know, were developed into a form of universal abstraction consonant with the formation of an idealized political subject of Enlightened modernity, and they are debatable and revisable in many respects – not least for the way in which they contributed to facilitating the subordination of women in the political realm of modernity (Cobo 1995). Yet it is nevertheless worth reflecting on why echoes of such propositions can be found in the evaluations that people like the protagonists of my episodes make about the contemporary polity and the character and legitimacy of public authorities. These evaluations are not produced against speculative reconstructions of the human condition and the changes it may have experienced in a transition from a state of nature to a civil state; on the
contrary, they emerge as political readings of personal experience against situated historical scenarios. And what currently seems to emerge in these scenarios (and with distinctive crudity in regions like Latin America) in the absence of the ‘yoke of the state’ is not a return to an idyllic state of nature or a transition into any of those realms of freedom that, under different premises and with more or less appreciation of egalitarian ideals, utopians of all ideological leanings envisaged (from liberals to anarchists to communists).

**So What Is There When There Is No State, and Why Should People Care?**

The contention that the functioning of political institutions and systems ought to be studied beyond their formal and normative aspects has been the absorbing orientation of much political anthropology, and certainly so during the period in which the modern state develops in a frame demarcated by the normative horizons of liberal democracy and the contextual forces of global capitalism. A methodological focus on institutions and bureaucracies has been complemented, when not displaced, by studies with a poststructuralist perspective in which the state is also seen as produced through practices, imagination and affects, and through what, in very general terms, one may denominate culturally conditioned predispositions. This focus runs the risk of overlooking the analysis of the material processes that structure practices and even influence the shaping of affects and imaginations, but in turn enables the emergence of new insights into the study of state formations. One is thus invited to consider discursive elements in the formation of expectations about the state; for instance, along the lines of what Akhil Gupta proposed in his work on the Indian state (1995). The state can be approached as an imagined entity, shaped in public culture. Against this general background, we can resume the discussion of my opening ethnographic vignettes and of an expression such as ‘there is no government!’, aiming to identify discursive constructions of what the state is and can be and also shedding light on Venezuelan politics and of different positions within them.

The modern state form, detached from its Enlightened principles and unevenly developed with the expansion of capitalism, has become central to the reproduction of capital, the reinforcement of core and peripheries in the world system and the consolidation of hierarchical class-based orders inside nations. It is in that sense not surprising that antistatism has become the driving force of a variety of political groups, and also that at discursive levels ‘state’ has become a shortcut signifier to name the source of (any) social inequality. But it is also important not to overlook that much of the political mobilization that has emerged over the past three decades in Latin America (and other parts of the world) can be precisely read as a call to recover
the state, both as the apparatus that can guarantee the materialization of socio-economic rights and as that public authority that can guarantee the materialization of the common will. For these mobilized Latin Americans citizens (as for many others elsewhere), the realization is that, in the absence of the state, what appears in a world of globalized and volatile capitalism is not a realm of freedom and egalitarianism, but one shaped by the power of groups that, in service of particularistic ends, tend to augment inequalities and often directly take on some of the capacities and monopolies that political theory attributed to the state.

To reflect on these processes of reorganization of power and the mushrooming of non-state orders, looking at what happens in Venezuelan jails becomes, somewhat paradoxically, illuminating. Andrés Antillano (2017) has described what he denominates carceral self-rule: groups of organized prisoners replace the role of bureaucratic organization within prisons, in the process claiming for themselves that monopoly of legitimate violence that characterized the power of the state in the famous Webberian theorization. Prisoners’ self-rule in a space originally conceived to facilitate the exercise of strict surveillance by state agents is just a localized, but telling, expression of broader social processes in which illegal organizations aim to install sovereign control over demarcated territories, in many respects openly replicating forms of representation of state public authority and ceremony. The case of the funeral I described at the beginning contains some of its ingredients. Indeed, one could read that event as a state funeral, small scale: attendants occupied public space as only public authorities do. Yet the degree to which exercises of power like this represent a political will that, in essence, seeks to replace the (nation-)state is best illustrated by episodes in which protagonists resort to national symbols to project meaning on their actions. Let me recall one such episode I learnt about in Ciudad Bolívar’s jail, Vista Alegre.

I visited Vista Alegre jail several times during late 2006 and early 2007. A friend I have known since 2004, and who used to work for a small tourist operator in the frontier town of Santa Elena, had been indirectly embroiled in a drug smuggling case and ended up in Vista Alegre while awaiting trial. During one of my visits, I was told about a funeral that had recently taken place there. Like the one in the vignette I described earlier, it was the funeral of a malandro linked to the pran (the president-like figure of the state-like entity that is reproduced there). On that occasion, the funeral rally, on its way to the cemetery, made a stop in the adjacencies of the jail, close to the main entrance area. The pran had organized a special ceremony for his former high-ranking aid. The inmates were congregated by the pran and his aids on one of the jail’s roofed areas from where they could see the funeral attendants and, once in formation, were asked to intone the national an-
them in honour of the deceased. Before the rally departed, gun salutes were fired by members of the pran’s guard.

Vista Alegre is a typical Venezuelan jail in key respects. Inside its walls there is literally no presence of state agents – they have been expelled and are not given access unless it is specifically granted by the inmates governing body, and only under certain conditions. Self-rule is thus absolute, and a proto-state form grows in that scenario. Yet such replication of a state order and the (adapted to circumstances) adoption of its symbols and ritual forms does not only take place inside the prison, where the three elements that international law uses to define the potential for sovereign statehood are present in a manageable scale: there is a (limited and well demarcated) territory, a population and a government. It also occurs on a larger scale and often in synergies with the authorities that control rule inside prisons.

The groups that end up exercising carceral government often precede their carceral existence (Antillano 2017: 26), and other times they start an inverse sequence that connects them with the ‘outside’: that is, groups that are formed through in-prison governance experiences end up constituting the core of larger organized groups outside it. In either case, the capacities of government that those in charge of carceral self-rule exercise often go beyond the walls of prisons in a way that blurs the inside-outside boundary of these spaces. This is of course further complicated by the fact that, as John Gledhill (2015) has shown for the cases of Mexico and Brazil, the private interests of organized crime can infiltrate the state apparatus to a large extent, and also by the fact that actually existing states can facilitate the conditions for the expansion of organized crime. At any rate, what appears as a result is a social landscape of competing (if partially overlapping) sovereign orders.

Gledhill has conceptualized a model of parastate governance in Barrio da Paz, a poor neighbourhood of Bahia (Brazil), as an ‘order of crime’ (2015: 67–76). The concept is stimulating in capturing the way a local gang imposes its own norms of security under the zones it controls while in parallel replacing the (precarious) ‘order of the state’ that preceded it. In Barrio da Paz, the latter order had generated widespread animosity among residents because of the behaviour of agents in the police post that offered ‘state security’ to the community – and also because the coercive branches of the state are the only ones that gain prominence there, despite residents’ demands for enhanced access to social services and citizenship rights in general. Police acts of racism and arbitrariness were recurrent and denounced by residents, something that is even better understood in relation to broader contextual factors: the community’s lands are a tempting ground for city developers and their political allies, and the potential (city government-backed) eviction of residents has been a continuing threat.
The police post removed, a new order was imposed by a drug lord-led group that with its one ‘law of crime’ administered justice against petty delinquents and mediated in neighbourhood disputes while facilitating a smooth continuation for the business of drug-trafficking in the community. Many of the residents affected by this new order expressed their conformity with it and the opinion that it provided more safety than the order of the state under the (abusive) supervision of police forces. While not a view shared by everyone in the community, such an experience of ambivalence towards, or open preference for, an ‘order of crime’ has been identified in neighbourhoods of Venezuela that have been targeted by special police operatives in the fight against crime. Given the indiscriminate and often uncontrolled implementation of operations in poor neighbourhoods that at times murder citizens not involved in criminal activity while failing to capture those who are, some residents in these areas feel and distrust the police more than the gangs that develop among them.

The ‘orders of crime’, however, and regardless of the legitimacy they might generate in the view of those subjected to them, tend to be precarious, as much or more imperfect or flawed than ‘orders of the state’. Gledhill noted that even those who were positive about the benefits that the order of crime had initially brought to the community of Barrio da Paz in terms of safety started to question that assumption as soon as conflict re-emerged over control of drug-trafficking in the area (2015: 71–72). This phenomenon seems to be recurrent: ‘orders of crime’ are generally constituted upon foundational violence, once a particular faction forcefully imposes itself upon rival ones, and it is generally never too long before another faction tries to contest the existing order. Returning to my previous example, cyclical changes in headship of carceral self-rule illustrate it. The ruling order of Ciudad Bolívar’s jail when I visited it had resulted from the imposition of a single pran who imposed himself in an open war. It was widely seen by inmates of the time as an improvement from the pre-existing situation, when inside the jail operated little chieftaincies with various leaders in continuing tension. But factions contested power with some regularity, in rebellions that always caused casualties and punishments and that, expectedly, recurred until a replacement of the governing headship arrived. These replacements sometimes occur through a constrained attack on a pran and perhaps some of his close aids, but other times involve large-scale violent confrontations between rival groups of inmates.

One possible avenue to explain this precariousness of orders is that they most often originate to facilitate the realization of particularistic interests even when they also articulate aspects of the general will. Forms of redistribution and service provision are often undertaken in these orders too, though they tend to be limited in scope and selective in terms of the selec-
tion of beneficiaries, rather than universal: people with whom the leaders of these orders have more personal or political connection receive more benefits than the rest (e.g. Penglase 2009). Of course, the existence of those particularistic interests cannot be explained through tropes about the moral character of the subjects who articulate them (‘criminals’ are in such a light always treated as ‘naturally’ deviant subjects). In many cases, those particularistic interests are the outcome of the conditions under which those who develop these orders operate in their search for wealth and status (mainstream driving goals in our capitalist societies). With no access to productive sources or property that enables them to accumulate capital and/or obtain rent, business models and rent-seeking among people from structurally poor social sectors rapidly lead to particular niches of illegal activity – what one could call ‘blue-collar’ illegal activities, to distinguish them from the type of illegal activity that some economic and political elites cultivate (often lumped under the category of ‘corruption’), and which could be adjectivized as ‘white-collar’. So such conditions of structural exclusion are to be taken into account in analysing the emergence of these orders and the legitimacies they may generate, particularly when fluid connections and interdependence are identified between crime and state orders and the way in which they overlap in the promotion of particularistic interests. Yet, still, a lingering question remains unanswered: why in this scenario of consolidating orders of crime and the erosion of the legitimacy of the actually existing orders of the state do people keep on expressing aspirations to recover the latter (as an order in which a public authority effectively mediates social relations)? The ethnographic vignettes that opened this chapter exemplify the resilience of that aspiration among some Venezuelans, and such examples gain additional weight when read in conjunction with larger expressions of the ‘politics of state recovery’ that have received mass support in Venezuela and other parts of Latin America. Indeed, the emergence of the so-called Pink Tide can be read against a widespread citizen demand for state recovery, as is well known. And such recovery, in addition to its focus on socio-economic enfranchisement, has also found expression in the area of security policy to a considerable extent in response to citizen demands.

**State Recovery and Security**

When it comes to discussing security, the aspiration that a state authority is recovered as the public authority that prevails in the mediation of a variety of social relations is of course not a naïve belief in the ‘sweet and beneficial’ yoke of a state apparatus that, in many cases, has rather become rough and pernicious – particularly for populations that are defined as a threat to se-
curity under the paradigm of neoliberal capitalism, with ensuing insecurity co-produced by state agents and criminal organizations in more or less voluntary synergies (Gledhill 2015).

Yet in countries like Venezuela, the perception that behind growing insecurity there are groups that contest the state (as the authority that they would like to see mediating social relations) has become a source of potential legitimacy for mano dura approaches to combat crime across class lines – that is, not only as an elite-fostered political strategy. This is far from precluding increasing distrust in police forces, often as distrusted or feared as malandros by those who consider themselves to be good citizens. As a matter of fact, evidence of connections between members of police forces and criminal gangs is strong (ranging from the provision of weapons that the former guarantee to the latter or direct participation in extortion of different kinds). This question has been publicly presented by experts in security studies, revealed by regular news of arrests of police officers involved in illegal activities and also incorporated into general public knowledge. Stories about exposure to petty acts of police corruption are common in conversations at family or friends reunions, often shared in tones that combine humour and indignation. ‘Whenever I’m stopped by a police officer, the first thing I say is “how much do you want?”’ This statement, a contribution by an acquaintance I made at a small restaurant in Ciudad Bolívar’s fish market, can be used to illustrate that public lore.

Popular and government concerns with increasing erosion of trust in police forces were behind an ambitious attempt at reforming the police forces that was initiated in 2006. A National Commission for Police Reform (CONAREPOL by its Spanish acronym) was created that year, linked to the Ministry of Home Affairs and Justice (El Achkar 2010). Evaluations of its limited results have been offered by a variety of specialists and would divert us away from our current discussion; here I want to highlight how this project fits with the politics of state recovery. That Commission was precisely launched in a period in which the idea of ‘the state’ was being strongly recovered in the country, with ‘Bolivarian socialism’ already situated by Chávez’s government as a driving goal, and with the widening of redistributive policies on full display in part thanks to a favourable international economic context for oil exports. This period marked a peak in electoral results for chavismo: in December 2006, Chávez would capture nearly two thirds (62.84%) of the national vote.

I of course do not suggest that this convergence at a time of a peak in electoral results and a peak in the development of government-led policies of state recovery results from a direct relation of causality, but I do contend that it is worth consideration when trying to shed light on political process and electoral behaviour. The Venezuelan process of reform replicated to a
large extent global agendas of police reform at the time, and one of the reasons why this occurred is because police forces nowadays have gained a type of symbolic value (Antillano 2016): particularly in scenarios in which there is an increasing demand of security from all social classes, politicians and elites become interested in ‘police intervention’ as a form of increasing and managing political capital. I suggest that this ‘symbolic value’ operates also in other types of state intervention in security policy; it is generally easy to frame it discursively as responsive to the general will.

In the face of this reality and the fact that governments of different ideological leanings develop such policies, it is not simple to identify the political orientation of those who support a recovery of the state in the area of security provision. Only when complemented with analyses of the orientation of policies of state recovery in other areas, and particularly in terms of socio-economic enfranchisement, can one attempt to discern the overall political directionality of those politics of state recovery. So let me try to do so for the case of Venezuela, and more broadly against the background established by the so-called Pink Tide in Latin America.

**State Recovery and Socio-economic Enfranchisement**

The characterizations of the leftist governments that came to be identified under the ‘Pink Tide’ label are quite diverse and often diverging (Ellner 2019), but among them there is generally a common acknowledgement: they brought ‘the state back’ into the shaping of Latin American societies after the peak of the neoliberal revolution had destabilized the social contracts in most of them. In the late 1980s and 1990s, peripheral states such as the Latin American ones lost sovereignty at fast pace, privatization of public assets accelerated and, in the countries in which a welfare state had started to take shape, provision of social services fell dramatically as a result of the austerity policies that came to be imposed by supranational donors in exchange for financial support. All or most of these manifestations of neoliberal governance were affected by a reversing political impulse when the governments of the Pink Tide, and particularly those in the orbit of the so-called socialisms of the twenty-first century, came to power.

An important question tends to be overlooked in the evaluations of this process, particularly now that there seems to be a widespread consensus around the idea that the Pink Tide is over or in irreversible decline. The governments in the orbit of this Tide succeeded in giving form to a type of collective subject that, even when removed from power, remains as a realistic alternative for progressive post-neoliberal governance in the continent. These subjects, constituted as national-popular blocs, have fluctuated in size...
since their emergence, but at any rate they have electorally sustained governments even in periods of strong crisis, such as in Venezuela, and in other cases, when defeated in the ballot box, they have nevertheless showed up as a realistic contender for government. Recall that the 2015 victory of Macri in Argentina, which was rapidly used as evidence of the decline of the Pink Tide, was narrow, and also that other cases generally presented as evidence for that decline have all been tight victories of rightist forces: Evo Morales’ bloc was defeated in the Bolivian referendum for constitutional reform in February 2016 by a very thin margin, for instance. Furthermore, in yet other cases used to certify the alleged historical defeat of the Pink Tide, such as Brazil, rightist forces continue to do their best to sidestep an open electoral confrontation with leftist rivals – not only did they remove Dilma Rousseff in a parliamentary coup, but they also manoeuvred to avoid that Lula could become a presidential candidate again, eventually placing him in jail through a judicial process plagued by irregularities.

The consolidation of these blocs deserves more than superficial attention, particularly in a global conjuncture in which there is evidence of a revolt against neoliberal governance in many different countries. Because, with the exception of Latin America, where the Pink Tide succeeded in cementing this collective subject I refer to, this is a revolt in which emerging post-neoliberal collective subjects are generally taking shape under the leadership of proto-fascist parties or of anarchic extreme right-wingers (current examples in Europe are myriad, and the one in the USA is indicative of the range of forms that discontent with neoliberal business-as-usual can produce in the absence of organized progressive options).

There are at least two central questions to be considered in the consolidation of these blocs. Firstly, as collective subjects they were primarily amalgamated by demands for socio-economic enfranchisement that involved ‘state recovery’. Second, Pink Tide governments, which to differential degrees facilitated that enfranchisement, were actively supported by mass state-supporting movements – that is, the orientation of government policy was thus generative of supportive social mobilization. I have elsewhere examined and characterized the constitution of such state-supporting movements in Venezuela (Angosto-Ferrández 2015), remarking that their collective action has been channelled through the electoral arena (a space generally neglected by social movement analysts) but also through a variety of other institutional and extra-institutional channels. Those movements have been fundamentally oriented towards supporting a state structure (expression of a public authority) that could effectively guarantee socio-economic and political enfranchisement in relation to the forces that have historically ignored it or broken it up, and thus actively supported governments that facilitated that enfranchisement. They have done so under a Rousseaunean frame, as it
were, considering that in the realm of economic transactions the lack of state presence can lead to exclusion and injustice (the vignette I presented from the ‘there is no government, chico!’ lament in Catia can be read against that background).

The functioning of those state-supporting movements undermines widespread preconceptions about social movement activity, and particularly conceptions of the ‘state’ and ‘society’ as ontologically separated entities. Not only do the members of these state-supporting social movements operate on both sides of that alleged ontological divide, but their activity reveals them as drivers of a state-supporting collective action that destabilizes the often taken for granted antagonism between social movements and the state.

I suggest that when reading the support for strong intervention against perceived ‘orders of crime’ in conjunction with this other type of state-supporting mobilization, we find that the overarching spirit of such intervention is primarily shaped by concerns with justice and general will, and not with the (class-biased) punishment of the poorer sectors of society in which the implementation of those interventions have often been transformed.

Conclusion

I opened this chapter with vignettes in which a variety of people lamented that there is no government (‘state’), and I closed it recalling that much of the political mobilization that has taken place in Venezuela and other parts of Latin America over the past few decades can be read as state-supporting mobilization. In between, I discussed the social landscapes that, in this period of globalized and volatile capitalism, emerge in the absence of the state (as a public authority that can effectively mediate social relations). It is my suggestion that against this background we can learn about how people, today, pursue the constructions of conditions for egalitarianism. For a variety of reasons that include the way in which neoliberal hegemony led to a loading of key political concepts with particular (neoliberal oriented) connotations, ‘the state’ has ended up in the margins of theoretical discussions of egalitarianism – or at the front, but as the principal enemy to defeat. This is a pity, and perhaps not inconsequential. Such displacement may be conditioned by the difficulties of translating conceptually people’s evaluations of their own social environments and also by associations of ‘the state’ with its corporate and authoritarian forms, but in any case it sets rigid boundaries to our capacities to think about contemporary politics and their potential developments. Given the worrying symptoms that contemporary politics project in many parts of the world, with authoritarianism and proto-fascism re-emerging in some countries as electorally backed responses to capitalist
crisis, setting such boundaries to the analysis of political attitudes and proposals may be costly. So it might not be a bad idea to listen to people who ask for ‘more state’ in search for justice and egalitarian social conditions, as a first step towards an understanding what that means and how it can be realized.

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NOTES

1. ‘Malandro’ is a term used in Venezuela to refer generically to people involved in criminal or outlawed activities.
2. ‘Perreras’ literally translates as ‘dog transporters’. It is used to name a type of van that has been adapted by its owner to carry passengers for a fee. The name is telling of the degradation that many users of ‘public transport’ experience on a daily basis.
3. ‘Por puesto’ is the name given to cars that take passengers covering a given route (whether inside a city or between cities). They charge each passenger the same fee.
4. The term ‘bachaquero’ (a colloquial derivation from ‘bachaco’, the name given to a type of ant) is used to refer to street vendors dealing with generally black-markeeted products.
5. The so-called Fourth Republic that was born out of the agreement of Punto Fijo (1958) established from the outset ideological limits to political participation. The Communist Party was excluded from the emerging arena of electoral competition, and over the years the regime effectively turned into a bi-partisan regime imprinted by repression of minority sectors of leftist dissidence.
6. Illustratively, in the late 1920s and from exile, the leader of Acción Democrática and future president of Venezuela, Rómulo Betancourt, described Vallenilla Lanz as a ‘Tropical Machiavelli cast in toilet paper’ (Harwich Vallenilla 1991).
7. Though focused on another case (specifically, El Salvador), the work of Sonja Wolf (2017) describes compellingly how this type of approach against gang crime, which on the one hand generally receives social support, is used by the country’s elites to consolidate political power.
8. Santa Elena, located right by the border with Brazil, is the capital of Gran Sabana municipal unit, in the south of Bolívar state. Behind the case of my friend were two Spanish fake tourists who had hired a tourist service with the agency my friend worked for. Those tourists were given permission to leave their luggage in the agency office while they were (allegedly) going on another tour on Pacaraima, right at the other side of the national border. They said that once they finished that other tour they would arrange collection of the luggage, and so they did a few days later. A taxi driver came to pick up the luggage, and when he was crossing the international border...
border the luggage was inspected by Venezuelan custom agents. Eight kilograms of cocaine were found there, and both taxi driver and my friend from the tourist agency (a man in his late fifties, married and with two teenage kids) were considered potentially complicit by one attorney and became formally charged.

9. In Ciudad Bolívar, it was common knowledge that a group that specialized in robbery of cars was commanded from inside the jail of Vista Alegre, just to provide an example relevant to my discussion.

10. Gledhill notes that often older people consider that the only possible legitimate authority is that of the police and the judiciary system.

11. See comments by Andrés Antillano in this regard (Bujanda 2015).


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Historically, Cuba has been exposed to different state models. From the Spanish colonial extractivist state, Cuba became a neo-colony of the US, inextricably linked to US industrial and corporate capital. Property and resources were either owned by North American magnates or in the hands of Cuban elites that responded to US interests. After the 1959 Revolution, and particularly since the mid 1960s, Cuba became integrated into the Soviet economy and was under the influence of state corporatism of the USSR, where the Soviet Party controlled both economic and political processes. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Cuba has developed economic ventures with China, Spain, Canada and various partners within the region, such as Venezuela and Argentina. During the decade of the Pink Tide, the regional political configuration of left-leaning governments that supported alternative views to the North American neoliberal model provided a friendlier economic and ideological network for Cuba.

The recent move to the right in Latin American governments and the increasing antagonism of the Trump administration present a radical regional shift. The corporatization of the state in Latin America and elsewhere, more than an economic force, transforms personhood and reconfigures people-state relationships. In the 1960s and 1970s, the leftist projects in Latin America (the Cuban Revolution, Allende’s Chile, the Nicaraguan Sandinista Revolution) proposed alternatives to the imperial capitalist North American model. At the core of these ideologies, strongly influenced by Marxism and Anarchism, was the radical challenge to capitalist American hegemony –
an anti-colonialist agenda. After the Cold War, and particularly in the new millennium, the rise of ‘el socialismo del siglo xxi’ in Latin America saw the emergence of egalitarian ideologies that were less influenced by Soviet and Anarchist thought. A multiplicity of ‘alternatives’ to the neoliberal way emerged. Indigenous ontologies (Viveiros de Castro 1998), environmental principles (Carneiro da Cunha and De Alemida 2000) and urban social movements (Castells 2012) not only contest US hegemony; they are also incorporated into state projects, such as Bolivia, Chávez’s Venezuela and for a time in Ecuador. The content, interests and configuration of anti-colonial resistance diversified and in the process became somewhat disaggregated and atomized, to the detriment of the more international class-based struggle of the 60s and 70s (see Oikonomakis this volume for an example of this in Bolivia).

Alternative movements in Latin America – social movements – dissatisfied with centralized socialist governments must contend with a different emergent form of statehood (see Introduction) to that of the twentieth century. No longer the military regime of the 1960s and 70s, and exceeding the traditional distinctions between left and right, the state is being transmuted into a more corporate configuration: Mauricio Macri in Argentina perhaps represents this move the clearest, although Chile and Mexico are also strongly corporatized states (see Introduction and respective chapters). The apparent demise of the Pink Tide and the emergence of the corporate state with neoliberal discourse as its modus operandi are effecting change in Cuban revolutionary conceptions at a time when centralized leftist governments and colonial struggles (though still relevant) are being transformed, and class relations reconfigured. While Cuba is equally exposed to global corporatizing forces – particularly in its relation to the pharmaceutical and biotechnological industry and its close dependence on Venezuela’s oil – this takes different forms, given the centrality of the Cuban state in economic and political processes. The penetration of state-transforming corporatizing processes is perhaps most clearly seen in the tensions between emerging forms of non-state employment reconfiguring labour relations.

The corporatization of state structures in Latin America affects Cuba both through regional and international political and economic relations with other (more corporatized) states such as China or Spain, as well as through the internal transformations of state-people relations by shifting labour structures (the development of biotechnology, self-employment, tourism), the growing popularity of the internet, and transformations in the understanding of revolution. Different hierarchies of value emerge, challenging revolutionary ideologies: the atomization of the social, a reduction of the collective subject of the 1960s, a reinvigoration of the family and increased individualism. Paradoxically, while the family – a bourgeois institution par
excellence (Engels 1993 [1884]) – can have oppressive and hierarchical effects, Cuban matrifocally organized kinship structures serve to redistribute resources (particularly in times of scarcity) and are more recently being harnessed to reconfigure political and economic processes outside spaces of state control.

In this chapter, I analyse the tensions within emerging forms of labour in the process of redefining revolutionary value and reconstituting social relations. This is crucial at a time when regional state structures are being transformed and the Cuban state is undergoing its own generational shifts, with the assumption of the new president Miguel Díaz-Canel in April 2018. Tensions exist between different forms of labour: self-employment, state-centralized labour organizations (unions, state employees, taxation offices) and cooperative ventures. These tensions are not merely economic (capitalism versus communism, or the possible penetration of neoliberal policies). They bring to the fore a different crisis: one of the hierarchies of value and egalitarian processes. Self-employed ventures – their interactions with other forms of labour and their structural configuration – reveal egalitarian spaces that partially disrupt established hierarchies (centralized state structures, male-dominated activities, oligarchic groups), contesting them and momentarily subverting them. However, these spaces are also amenable to be co-opted by regional corporatizing dynamics, such as international NGO funding, microcredit financial institutions, émigré Cubans, international corporations and foreign political interests, thus becoming spaces of contestation of competing hierarchies of value. I consider the origins of Cuban egalitarian ideas and argue that other forms of egalitarian processes, not always recognized as such (matrifocality, ‘sociolismo’, self-employed ventures), are effecting social transformation and disrupting established hierarchies.

**Egalitarian Ideas in the Cuban Revolution**

Egalitarian ideology in Cuba has not only been shaped by Marxist and Soviet thought. While the initial ideologies of the guerrilleros were more strongly influenced by the experiences and ideas of the Russian Revolution, the strong anti-colonial character of the struggle demanded a Latin American perspective. Anti-colonial thinkers, such as Simón Bolívar, José Martí, José Carlos Mariátegui, Rubén Martínez Villena or Julio Antonio Mella have been cornerstones of the Cuban Revolution, and their ideas are periodically reconsidered and given a current spin (Cantón Navarro 2008; Estrade 2006; Hart Dávalos 2009a, 2009b, 2010), and their words are regularly published in official media (see for example Granma 2018). The incorporation of other
discourses after the collapse of Soviet communism has redefined egalitarian thought in a radically transformed region. The first marked shift was given by the recourse to environmental and ecological ideas, which were widely incorporated in support of urban agricultural programmes in the late 1980s and early 1990s (see Gold 2014a). This helped the Cuban revolution position itself in opposition to the increasingly evident ecologically disastrous consequences of Soviet agriculture (Doyon 2005; González 2003). Changes in emigration policies initiated in the 1990s also shifted political discourse regarding the constitution of the revolutionary person. The family replaced ‘the people’ as an undifferentiated mass, with massive implications for the scale of revolutionary action, as an activity that had the family at its core – once considered a counter-revolutionary individualist action – it would increasingly become defined as politically acceptable (see Gold 2015). In the context of a redefined revolutionary nucleus, kinship relations gained new potency to express revolutionary commitment, but the importance of kinship is not new.

Matrifocality is deeply rooted in historic processes that shaped the Caribbean (slavery and the structures of plantations, colonial settlements, racial inequalities and seasonal migration) (see Safa 2009 for an overview). Structural transformations in Cuba in the 1960s enabled the further development of matrifocal families, such as an increased participation of women in the workplace, a de-stigmatization of divorce, the levelling of inequalities (especially in terms of race and class hierarchies) and the increased role of the welfare state as basic provider. In the anthropological literature, matrifocality has been observed to contest the aggregation of male patrilineal groups into centres of control of resources (land, social capital, money). It is significant that matrifocal networks become relevant again in times of economic scarcity, when the reorganization of domestic activities for economic subsistence becomes important and at a particularly relevant moment in Cuban history when property is once more subjected to accumulation. At a time when property again obtains exchange value, the concentration of property along female lines can serve as a counter-mechanism to male-dominated activities (such as construction, mechanic cooperatives etc.) that are more lucrative than female-based activities in the home. This is particularly important when property enters the chain of value through marriage of a Cuban woman with a foreigner. In the context of regional transformations of state structures that undermine both the centralized economy of the Cuban state and effect transformations at the very level of individual life, historically relevant egalitarian forces that aim to counteract hierarchical structures (male chauvinism, centralized state power, corporatization through cooperative activities and international development funding) are revalued. Matrifocal networks contribute to the revaluing of property and the economic activ-
ities that take place in the home when labour relations are changing with the strengthening of cooperatives into (often male-dominated) corporate groups that compete with the state in the provision of services, and (crucially) do not have the public interest as central motivation.

Matrifocality in Caribbean Anthropology

The concern with matrifocality in the Caribbean is a classic anthropological interest stemming from kinship studies in African societies. Inspired by the likes of Meyer Fortes and his work in the Ashanti area of Ghana, anthropologists like Raymond Smith (1996) applied socio-spatial theories developed through the study of different African groups to understand the lifeworlds of black communities in the Caribbean. Matrifocality was observed in many parts of the Caribbean, particularly among the black and poor (often overlapping categories). Helen Safa (1998, 2005) recognized the historic roots of matrifocality, extending back to slave populations, and the impact of the separation of slave conjugal unions but not of mother-child bonds, making consanguineal bonds stronger than conjugal ones. This was also supported by interracial mixing during the colonial period, as female-headed households were often the product of consensual or visiting unions between white men and slaves or free women of colour (Safa 1998: 205). The mulatto children born of these unions were able to better incorporate themselves into white society. The dual marriage system, which only allowed legal marriage between white elites, confining the rest of the population to consensual unions, contributed to the widespread acceptance of alternative forms of domestic organization (Safa 2009: 43). Labour migrations also weakened the conjugal bond and gave pre-eminence to the mother-child tie.

Matrifocality implies two elements: local organization of the kinship group and the articulation of resources along female kin. Therefore, the organization of the household, the habitation patterns of offspring and the power to make decisions relies on the female head of the household (Miller 1988; Sollien 1965). In Cuba, it is the woman in her role of mother that lies at the centre of family relations (Härkönen 2010). This does not exclude the possibility of a male breadwinner, but his presence is more contingent. With the high index of divorce, women form more stable members of households, while men move in and out and have children scattered in different locations. In Cuba, matrifocality presents itself in contrast to the patriarchal image of the revolutionary leadership: Fidel as the ‘father’ of the revolution and the Cuban nation (Härkönen 2010: 60). The female-focused family unit – increasingly the locus of economic activities at the micro-level – stands in tension with the male-dominated political group (el pueblo). This tension did not go
unnounced by Fidel in his youth, as he initiated many programmes for the incorporation of women into the political project: the retraining of prostitutes, the implementation of child-care services to incorporate women sooner to the workforce and the creation of the Federation of Cuban Women.

Matrifocality became a topic of interest in the 1970s; in many Caribbean locations (Guyana, Puerto Rico, Dominican Republic, Cuba) it was a practice on the rise. Governments and scholars interpreted it as an indication of an aberrant practice that responded to the breakdown of the social fabric (Blackwood 2005), a traditional evolutionist view of the family identified by Engels, Marx and Lewis Henry Morgan, who saw the male-headed household as the more evolved and modern form. As matrifocality increased in many locations across the Caribbean, anthropological studies showed that it was not a symptom of crisis but had instead clear roots in slave history and was simultaneously influenced by race, class and labour relations. Matrifocality could potentially redistribute resources and challenge male-dominated land tenure systems.

In a longitudinal study of family constitutions and females in the workforce, Safa (1995, 1998, 2008, 2009) observed that the presence of matrifocality in different Caribbean locations responds to women’s increased participation in the workforce, the prevalence of consensual unions and the erosion of the status of legal marriage. In Cuba, particularly, the acceptance of divorce due to antireligious policies, the shortage of houses and the race and gender equality policies, while not completely successful, contributed to the increase of female-headed households. This gave rise to a structural tension between the hierarchical, male-dominated centralized state and the female control over the private domestic sphere.

Matrifocality is not confined to black or poor populations in Cuba, and the extended family, crucial for the sustenance of households before the Revolution, has gained renewed importance since the Special Period. Lack of available housing sees the cohabitation of three generations, useful in the rearing of children, the concentration of government-provided goods and money and the redistribution of duties. Grandmothers take care of children while mothers work, grandfathers queue at the bodega (distribution depot) for rations of rice, eggs, nappies or milk, making the maternal grandparents (particularly the grandmother) a person’s most important kin (Härkönen 2010: 62). In my fieldwork observations (2009–2016), it was common for adult unmarried daughters to live with their mothers, while unmarried sons moved in with their maternal grandmother, in the instances where she had her own house.

Matrifocal structures have remained strongly active in the reorganization of labour in times of crisis and the capitalization of the female-centred labour power into self-employed ventures. The division of labour between
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calle/casa (Pertierra 2008) – between the public and private spaces – permeates the emergence of new forms of employment, such as self-employed ventures. Ventures predominantly organized from within the household are a source of labour for women. In parallel, however, self-employed activities are also mechanisms by which men can harness what is a female space and capitalize on women’s labour for profit. Therefore, the tensions that plague gender relations within social ties are also present in the articulation of economic activities emerging after the Special Period: at once hierarchical and centralized as they are regulated by the state, while simultaneously breaking up hierarchical orders into new configurations of social, political and economic units.

Forms of Employment and Revolutionary Value

Non-state employment existed in Cuba throughout the history of the revolutionary process but was sometimes exposed to stricter control, such as in the Soviet period between the mid 1960s to the late 1970s. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, an increase in self-employed ventures (legal and illegal) represented spontaneous expressions of grass-roots subsistence mechanisms aiming to cover the gaps left by a contracting central state. The disappearance of CAME (Consejo de Ayuda Mutua Economica and COMECON, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) cost Cuba 47 per cent of its exports, its subsidies from the USSR, and a 70 per cent reduction of imports (Sacchetti 2011). The family became the central locus of production and provision, replacing the state’s incapacity to cover all the needs of daily life. People became responsible for their own subsistence, selling the subsidized products of the libretas (state ration booklet), finding ways to make a living out of tourism, provisioning from state goods, selling services not regulated by the state, and from remittances.

The first self-employed businesses started as exchange networks between the city and the country: food for consumer products (soap, shampoo, cosmetics), but in the IV Party Congress in 1991 the emergence of self-employment was officially discussed, and the constitution was changed to contemplate the possibility of some forms of private property and small businesses. There are today various types of non-state employment in Cuba that have reconfigured people-state relations within the revolutionary project. No longer the sole provider, the state is relegated to the role of supervisor as cooperatives and cuentapropistas take over many economic activities. There are legal and structural differences between the constitution of cooperatives (and there are different types of cooperatives) and other small-scale ventures, such as houses for rent and private restaurants, generically
referred to as *cuentapropistas*. There are three types of agricultural cooperatives, described by EcuRed as follows:

1) *Unidad Básica de Producción Cooperativa* (UBPC) Basic units of cooperative production: these constitute a socio-economic community where production is conducted communally and land is communally owned from state land used in usufruct. They are constituted by workers from the state sector and means of production (raw materials) must be purchased from the state. They must focus on specific crops (sugar, citruses, fruit, coffee, tobacco and animal husbandry).

2) *Cooperativas de Creditos y Servicios* (CCS) Credit and services cooperative: These are voluntary organizations of farmers who retain private ownership of their land but share common use of certain means of production (watering installations, services and credits). This organization of individual producers facilitates the provision of credits and financial assistance by the state to a communal rather than individual entity. Infrastructure (tractors and tools) and production are, however, private.

3) *Cooperativa de Producción Agropecuaria* (CPA) Agricultural production cooperative: These constitute a collective form of social property resulting from the decision of farmers to join lands and means of production in collective ownership. It is seen as an advanced and efficient socialist economic entity.

There is a fourth non-agricultural cooperative:

4) *Cooperativa no Agropecuaria* (CnoA) Non-agricultural cooperatives: These are constituted by people working as partners (*socios*) in non-agricultural activities. These emerged in 2013. Ex. Mechanics, construction workers, hospitality workers etc.

A different type of non-state employment includes that of Trabajadores por cuenta propia (TPCP workers ‘on their own account’, *cuentapropistas* for short). These are workers that may or may not be the owners of the means of production but are not subjected to a labour contract with juridical entities and do not receive a salary. This group includes craftsmen, writers, intellectuals, rental property owners, hairdressers, classic-car drivers (and a list of at least 178 activities described in resolution No. 32/2010). They must be registered and obtain a licence from the Oficina Nacional de Administración Tributaria (ONAT), pay for a monthly licence and pay taxes on their income. The numbers of CNoA have dramatically increased from 2013 (the year of their legalization) from 196 to 367 in 2015, with 192 existing in Havana. Out of the total number of CNoA, 131 of them are within the commerce and repair of personal objects; 91 in hotels and restaurants, 61 within the construction industry and 49 in the manufacturing industry (Anuario Estadístico de Cuba 2016). The reason for this increase is that CNoA offer a
tributary advantage over TPCP, as they are taxed less over their income because the government assumes that a cooperative ownership will contribute to the redistribution of earnings, while cuenta-propistas (TPCP) are assumed to benefit individuals.

These are not easy distinctions to make in practice, as CNoA are often constituted by kin, concentrating earnings in family groups, and cuenta-propistas rely on (and support) a broad network of other cuenta-propistas in what Armengol (2013) labels as competitive solidarity, which guarantees the redistribution of income from cuenta-propista ventures throughout vast networks of the informal economy: plumbers, painters, construction workers, food preparation services, car services, tourist services and other cuenta-propistas that help to ensure that paladares and casas particulares function properly (see Gold 2016 for example).

One of the most significant changes in the last decade in Cuba has been the boom of self-employment. This phenomenon has attracted much scholarly attention prompting questions regarding the possible emergence of a new middle class (Feinberg 2013), the penetration of the market into a socialist centrally planned economy (Catá Backer 2012) and the role of cuenta-propistas as a possible site for civil society in the redefinition of the state (Bye 2012). While there is validity in all these observations, these often remain at an economistic level, addressing the impacts of self-employment for the larger economic survival of the political project of the Cuban economy. However, these ventures also embed tensions that point to the contradictions permeating revolutionary values within shifting hierarchies of power.

**Self-Employment: Hierarchical and Egalitarian Tensions**

The 1990s saw the proliferation of tourism through mixed ventures between the Cuban state and Canadian and Spanish companies. Fidel Castro’s bet on biotechnology has international partners within the pharmaceutical business, and China has gained prominence within the Cuban economy, investing in biotechnology, mining and tourism. International NGOs settled in Cuba in the 90s in order to promote the growth of civil society and other developmental discourses that attract donors, and since 2011 individuals can receive bank credits. These NGOs have aimed to expand liberal values (of equality, respect for human rights, entrepreneurial ethics), thus encouraging the penetration of neoliberal ideology into internationally funded projects. However, while people have partially incorporated these in order to receive funding in environmental projects as well as health-related and religious ventures (see Gold 2014a, 2014b), these have not completely subverted revolutionary ideology. This is partially due to the close relation of
the non-governmental sphere with the Cuban state, but it also emerges as a reaction against corporatizing processes that are often associated with the antagonisms of the powerful émigré Cuban community in Miami.

Furthermore, since the new millennium, the Internet has become more accessible, and while not everybody might have access at home (although more and more people do) they can access all North American and Latin American television, news and series through a uniquely Cuban product called *el paquete* (the package). That is, Cuba has been exposed to the penetration of western-style corporatizing processes since the 90s, both from within the region as well as from European and Chinese relations.

The economic crisis and a radically transformed political situation after the fall of the Socialist Bloc disaggregated economic power beyond the purely political space of the Party or the state into other forms of association previously relevant but subjugated to the political project of the revolution for thirty years. What Cubans refer to as ‘sociolismo’ – understood by scholars as the social networks underpinning the informal economy and insufficiently glossed as nepotism – has historical roots in kinship ties and ought to be conceived as more than a response to the economic hardships of the Special Period. ‘Sociolist’ networks and matrifocal structures have the potential to experience the horizontalization of relations opposing the accumulation of resources vertically, under foreign oligarchic power (such as transnational corporations), but they also have the capacity to enable further corporatization by contesting the state and potentially accumulating resources and influence along kinship ties and in successful business groups, giving rise to local oligarchies and emerging social classes, often drawn along racial lines.

The term *sociolismo* emerged in the 1990s to refer to the ambiguous and ubiquitous type of corruption that many Cubans engage with in order to meet their daily needs. It cannot easily be divided between dichotomies of legal and illegal, moral and immoral behaviour or public and private relations, and it exceeds bureaucratic structures. *Socioismo* is on the one hand a state-based tactic of tolerating illegalities that emerge in times of economic crisis, and on the other, a network of social ties, sometimes superimposed on kinship networks and articulated in opposition to the centralization of power by the state (and other state-like institutions, such as international NGOs). Therefore *sociolismo*, which operates along ties of kinship, race and locality, is an egalitarianizing force aiming to wrest power away from the centralizing structures of the state and other hierarchical groups, like foreign companies or powerful cooperatives. Different from smaller-scale household ventures like paladares, rental properties and other gastronomic cuentapropistas, cooperatives, particularly those of construction workers, are burgeoning corporate groups that position themselves in competition with the state but rely on the private market of cuentapropistas as customers.
However, simultaneously, socialist/kinship structures have hierarchical tendencies and harness kin with a centralizing and exploitative effect.

Cooperatives, encouraged by the state already in the 80s in order to create more autonomous economic units that would nonetheless function against the accumulation of resources in the hands of possible emergent oligarchic capitalist groups – egalitarian mechanisms for the distribution of capital and power – have simultaneously enabled the emergence of more individualist projects within the revolutionary spectrum of participation. Paradoxically, while acting as centres for the accumulation of capital and power in private hands, their particular kinship-oriented structures also contest power from oligarchic groups, such as foreign investors (particularly émigré Cubans from Miami). An analysis of the interactions between cooperatives and other self-employed ventures such as *paladares* (home-run restaurants) and *casas particulares* (rental properties) – often divided along gender lines – reveals the tensions between egalitarian practices that challenge a centrally planned economy and an emerging corporate hierarchy.

Recent studies on *cuentapropistas* report gender divisions that correspond to domestic life roles: women *cuentapropistas* tend to rent out houses, mend clothes, provide make-up and hairdressing services, make jewellery and flower arrangements and prepare fast food and pastries. Men drive taxis, have craft stalls, fix home appliances and carry out other activities outside the home (Ferragut and Piza Nicolau 2016; Pañellas Álvarez and Torralbas Oslé 2016). While some argue that these divisions reproduce historic structures of domination circumscribing women to the domestic sphere (Andaya 2013), in practice, women have been attending to domestic duties throughout the Revolution, even while they received at times more support from the state in matters of child care and job opportunities. The possibility of making a profit from the domestic sphere has its economic attractiveness, especially for retired women.

The male predominance of lucrative cooperatives such as construction and agriculture needs to be situated within relations between other self-employed ventures, such as rental properties and small-scale food ventures, located in the household (e.g. *paladares*, bakeries). The female predominance of household activities means that self-employed ventures run from the private spaces of the home are often administered by women, especially when focused on food preparation. The strong interdependence between the different sectors of the emerging (legal and illegal) private economy, underlined by socialist networks, demands *cuentapropistas* to cooperate in the interests of their businesses.

However, there are tensions between different self-employed activities. While matrifocal networks strengthen the *cuentapropista* activity of rental houses and grant women access to landed property, other more profitable
self-employed ventures (e.g. construction cooperatives and paladares) tend to be male-dominated, making access to capital, contacts and much coveted construction materials more readily available. While men concentrate power and resources through cooperative activities, the centrality of matrifocal networks grants women access to capital, for which the domestic sphere and kinship relations have become key resources. The tensions played out throughout these economic activities are a symptom of the intrinsic dynamics within egalitarian and hierarchical processes, more visible in times of intensification of crisis and always constitutive of one another (see Introduction for more details).

Matrifocality, Corporatism and Cooperativism

The different sectors (agricultural, non-agricultural cooperatives, cuenta-propistas) are in constant tension. Cuentapropistas can act as control mechanisms against the increasing power of cooperatives. The organization of self-employed activities within the household strengthens the ability of matrifocal kin to counteract male control over earnings, and socialist networks that underpin all non-state and state employment provide another form of social organization that sometimes coincides with matrifocal kinship ties but at other times contests them (santería kin is an example, see Crahan 2003).

Casas particulares are usually female businesses. It is the grandmothers who run the rental houses. The daughter, married or more often divorced, and the grandchildren move in with the grandmother and rent the daughter’s house. While the daughter generally works in a state job, the grandmother manages the rental property. In some cases, it is the grandchildren that manage the business, and the mother continues to work in the state job. In cases when mothers emigrate, the grandchildren remain with the grandmother and rent their mother’s property.

This is compatible with Helen Safa’s analysis of matrifocality as a mechanism of resisting not only the dominant patriarchal culture but also the conservative Catholic traditions inherited from the colonial era, where legal marriage was a mechanism of control, a legacy of the Republic era and North American influence (Stoner 1991). The extended family was always important in Cuba before the revolution and then gained importance again in the Special Period. The high incidence of extended families cohabiting is due to the austerity of the 90s and lack of availability of housing, but consanguineal ties also determine the spatial organization of families, the economic activities in which they are involved and the relations through which they cooperate. Despite a slight predominance of households with a male head
of 53.8 per cent (ONE 2016), since 2002 non-nuclear households have increased to 32 per cent in 2008 – that is, more and more households are made up of members other than the spouses and dependents (Del Carmen Franco Suárez and Alfonso 2008).

Matrifocality remains an important aspect in the constitution of the home in Cuba, continuing the trend observed by Nancy Solien de González (1965) and Raymond Smith (1973). Solien de González argued that broader consanguineous links are as important as those of mother-son to understand kinship in Cuba. In addition, it was the women who sustained the house and the family, even if the man was recognized as the ‘head of the household’ (Smith 1973). The father tends to position himself marginally in relation to the rest of the household group and to the network of relationships and domestic activities (Smith 1996). Perttierra (2008) observed similar patterns: men tend to move more frequently, occupying the homes of their partners (and the divorce rate in Cuba in 2015 was 2.9 – i.e. 56% of all marriages end in divorce). Therefore men are less reliable resources in the social bonds necessary to maintain the home. Sons tend to move more than daughters, who usually stay in their mother’s house, even after they are married (Perttierra 2008: 748). This is clearly observed in casas particulares, when three matrilineal generations are usually grouped together in one house to be able to dispose of the other house for rent (Gold 2016).

Although the man is identified as head of the household, women articulate the mechanisms necessary for the home to function, as demonstrated by Perttierra (2008) in her study of homes in Santiago de Cuba. It is women who play the central role in the casa, and men should contribute to calle activities; for example, getting parts to fix household appliances, seeking out socios (business partner) for home improvements (such as adding a floor, window or fence). This gender orientation between the house and the street goes back to periods before the revolution, during the Spanish colonial rule among the urban mestizos (Perttierra 2008: 747). Anthropological studies of Cuba throughout history have shown that it has remained fairly stable (Lewis, Lewis and Rigdon 1977; Rosendahl 1997; Stoner 1991). While men can harness a more extensive network of socios in important male-dominated sectors such as the construction sphere, women have a stronger influence in the activities localized in the home.

The links that articulate both men and women are essential to maintaining a home. Matrifocality represents horizontal relations that oppose the accumulation of power and resources vertically in the hands of possible patriarchal and oligarchic groups. In times of change, when the state withdraws from the private space, kinship becomes relevant in articulating resources and influence. Self-employment has allowed women to obtain more independence from state employment; it provides a higher income, more
autonomous hours and less government control when granting travel authorization (without which people cannot leave the country), for example. Even while state employment can be valued for being more socially meaningful and having less responsibilities (Gordy 2015), self-employment is often sought (sometimes in parallel) as a form of income. Cooperatives and self-employed businesses are more than expressions of emerging capitalism and neoliberal entrepreneurship. Their kinship patterns indicate other mechanisms at play that go beyond market rules. At times, these networks serve to challenge established hierarchies (the Party, the state, male-dominated groups), even while their egalitarian potential can also be harnessed by hierarchical structures that co-opt sociolist networks and matrifocal economic activities for corporate interests.

**Sociolismo: A Logic of Social Relations**

The term *sociolism* is a combination of ‘partner’ and socialism; it is an ironic and critical commentary on the state’s official policy. *Socios* (business partners) solve problems of all kinds, ranging from something as innocuous as obtaining flour (an often scarce resource), photocopying a book, printing a document or sending an e-mail, if one does not have the means to, to more important issues such as arranging employment or travel documents. That is, the favours that are asked of a *socio* belong to daily life and transcendental issues alike. The sociolist network becomes a resource: in a process of delayed reciprocity, helping a *socio* sets an expectation that at some point the *socio* will repay.

*Paladares* are particularly reliant on sociolist ties because they depend on the contingency of resource availability. *Paladar* owners, who tend to be men, must have contacts in construction cooperatives (to refurbish and extend houses); in agricultural cooperatives (to obtain the best produce); in mechanical cooperatives and especially the cooperative of tourist guides (to ensure a regular clientele). In addition, they must maintain good relations with *casas particulares*, as a source of clients both foreign and Cuban with increasing purchasing power – and with neighbours, in order to avoid complaints due to potential excessive noise or increased traffic, or jealousy. Therefore, the owner of a *paladar* needs many *socios* because setting up a business in Cuba is not easy, with the state being the central provider.

In Playa, a *paladar* opened in the basement of a residential building. The basement used to be a shed where the sellers of the local agricultural market stored their products. Predicting that the neighbours would not be happy with a venture that would bring more noise to the neighbourhood, the owner organized a free dinner before the *paladar* opened. He met all the...
neighbours and by offering free meals he established personal relationships with them that would encourage them to bring complaints straight to him and not to the municipal inspectors. Paladares are still mostly family-run enterprises. In this way they have the effect of wresting economic power from the state, as it no longer is the sole provider of food, jobs and labour. The owner of the venture is the father or the mother, and the children work as waiters, cooks, suppliers, accountants etc. Thus profit remains within the family. After 2011, self-employed ventures were allowed to hire contractual labour, but employees are paid less, sometimes work without a valid contract and are therefore unprotected by the law. In this way, self-employed ventures can become corporate groups and sources of exploitation. In 2016, people demanded the state to intervene in price control of private transport cuentapropistas, who increased costs of transport when petrol became more expensive because of Venezuela’s oil crisis. In similar ways to that described by Angosto-Ferrández (this volume), people demanded the state to uphold its role of protector and redistributor in times when corporate groups are seen to conspire against the interests of the social.

Sociolism exists in both public and private spaces – that is, it occurs in self-employment as well as state work because they are mutually dependent. For example, construction cooperatives, some of the most successful, must buy their materials from state suppliers, where the items are overpriced due to state monopoly. Therefore, to make a profit, people must obtain them por la izquierda (illegally). This usually implies that a state employee who works for the state-monopolized supplier salva (saves, appropriates illegally) the materials to resell, or a member of the cooperative has a socio who works for the state construction company and through exchange of favours, money or work obtains the necessary materials. An employee of a state research centre explained they were renovating the centre’s buildings, and the work was being carried out by a state-owned construction company. As soon as the company finished building the cement fence along the perimeter, and even though the renovations were not completed, more than half the builders resigned, as once the fence was built it was no longer possible to easily take construction materials to resell or use in self-employment projects, and it was more profitable to use the time in self-employed projects.

The embezzlement of goods does not only take place between individuals and the state but also between individuals and cooperatives. The decree law number 305 ‘of non-agricultural cooperatives’ determines in Article 4 point c) that cooperatives have to be created and directed in a democratic and egalitarian way: ‘The acts that govern the economic and social life of the cooperative are analysed and decided upon in a democratic way by the partners, who participate in decision-making practices with equal rights.’ Although cooperatives are conceived as egalitarian institutions where the
profits are equally distributed, in practice these are often constituted by a person who calls himself the president – an inappropriate hierarchical title – earns more than others, and has the power to hire and fire employees. Alternatively, cooperatives are built around family units, with different members (mother, father, father-in-law, wife etc.) as associates, which then hire employees, concentrating profits within a family group. The role of paladares is particularly interesting in revealing the tensions between the domestic space and gendered labour, as these restaurants must be set up in the home. Taking over the space of the home – a woman’s domain – enables the hierarchical power of corporate groups to engulf the egalitarian potential of matrifocal networks that aim to contest the centralization of resources in the hands of a (usually male-dominated) group.

The importance of kinship networks in accruing resources and social capital in Cuba is not common to all of Latin America. A study on the articulation of the formal and informal sector in Bogotá reveals that, in the case of the construction industry, relations of kinship or camaraderie only serve to obtain the lowest paid and riskier jobs within a project (Lanzetta de Pardo et al. 1989). In Cuba, the opposite occurs; kinship relations are central to the organization of many cooperatives and paladares. The economic structures of these enterprises cannot be dissociated from the family, since the family is fundamental to the development of the activity, and the household is a central location for most of them.

The most productive socialist links are not random, nor are they purely circumscribed to business. There must be a relationship of kinship, friendship, work, school, neighbourhood, religion or in some cases gender and race for someone to demand a favour. However, socialist ties are not circumscribed to Cubans. Given the changes of 2011 that enabled the buying and selling of houses, many foreigners are buying houses in the name of Cubans. A foreigner can buy property in Cuba but is strictly curtailed by state control on the type of house and use given to it. In order to subvert these limitations, foreigners marry Cuban women (it tends to happen that a foreign man marries a Cuban woman, and less frequently the reverse) to obtain residency and be able to buy a house. This inserts foreigners into the complex kinship networks that regulate the transactions of socialism. The case of Spaniard Alberto with the Cuban Yaneli illustrates this trend.

They have known each other for many years, since Alberto travels to Cuba every European winter to take advantage of the sex tourism that flourished in the 90s. Alberto used to stay in the same private house where Yaneli cleaned. They are good friends; she is of his generation but not his sexual partner; Alberto goes to Cuba in search for younger women. After many years, and thanks to the new policies in 2011, Alberto decided to buy a house in Yaneli’s name for his personal use. They got married and made a
prenuptial contract that leaves her the house in the event of his death, and while he is in Spain she takes care of the house. For Yaneli, having Alberto as a socio is priceless: a cell phone, the excess building materials she gets when Alberto fixes his house, and she eventually gets to inherit it as her own. Yaneli has a daughter – who lived with her until she left for the US illegally in 2015 – and a son living and working in Cuba. She has her own one-room apartment and is extending it upwards with the help she receives from Alberto. Kinship networks serve as economic resources both inside Cuba and across borders.

Conclusion

The complexities of sociolist relations reveal the tensions underpinning the different modes of employment emerging in Cuba, particularly since 2011. Many elements contribute to unpacking this complexity:

1) Location and genre of the venture: a household-run activity like a rental property is dominated by women in the family, while construction or mechanic cooperatives are run outside the domestic sphere and dominated by men;

2) State-private relations: the overlapping of state and private employment becomes evident through the sociolist networks that underpin and interconnect both extremes in the complex scale of employment opportunities in Cuba.

These activities are interdependent; they generate clientele and resources for each other. While male-dominated calle activities are often more profitable and accrue more political power, they are kept in check by matrifocal kinship networks that control an important bulk of tourist activities and determine the functioning of household and family life. In a reversal of what was intended by the state, non-agricultural cooperatives have the potential to function as oligarchic corporate groups, while cuentapropistas (often demonized as individuals seeking private profit) interact with other cooperatives and counteract the hierarchies of emerging corporate groups.

These activities do not just reveal an increasing variety of employment opportunities and the – to a certain extent – disaggregation of state control over the economy. More importantly, the re-emergence of the importance of matrifocality in the contestation of male power and accumulation of control over resources reveals the endurance of certain forms of social relations even beyond the project of social engineering that state socialism represents. Another important implication of matrifocality in Cuba at this particular mo-
The intensification of transformations in the region is that different forms of power do not necessarily come from traditional political spheres (political parties and ideologies, social movements, state structures). Patterns of social organization in Cuba – and matrifocality is an egalitarian form of organization, as it contests patriarchal hierarchies – have played a key role in the reconfiguration of activities that generate value (monetary, social or political) in the process of redefining revolutionary personhood.

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**NOTES**

1. A young Cuban with informal access to the internet at home (perhaps the son or nephew of a member of the FARC, Armed Forces) downloads a collection of media tailor-made for each client and delivers it in a hard drive each week. The cost varies according to the size of the drive.
3. In March 2018, wholesale markets opened in Havana to cover the demand for bulk orders by *paladares* and other *cuentapropistas*. This new measure is intended to address complaints by the non-state employment sector that provisions are scarce and often obtained at whimsical prices.
4. In reverse cases, when Cuban men marry foreign women, the result is usually the emigration of the Cuban man, which in many cases is the intended purpose of the marriage.

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Egalitarian and Hierarchical Tensions in Cuban Self-Employed Ventures


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Peru is sometimes described as a neoliberal experiment, especially due to the reforms initiated by Alberto Fujimori in the 1990s, sharing several traits of similarity with the austerity measures later introduced in European countries due to the financial crisis. Governments after Fujimori have more or less followed in his footsteps in terms of economic policy, thus setting Peru apart from the so-called ‘Pink Tide’ in Latin America. During these decades, the numbers of Peruvians involved in informal economic activities, especially through different forms of small-scale trade, have increased. This expansion of economic activities at the margins of the formal economy is often considered a response to economic crisis and neoliberal reforms in Peru and beyond, due to privatization and reductions of public spending, unemployment and the promotion of entrepreneurship by the state and NGOs. These transformations of state structures have made vending and self-employment the only alternative for many Peruvians. In the streets and markets of Peruvian cities, the creativity and street smartness of vendors may even give an impression of successfully created ‘neoliberal subjects’, hard-working and ‘self-made’, and accommodating their own quest for a livelihood to increasing demands of growth, flow and consumption.

Yet the Peruvian vendors at the margins of the formal economy must be seen to reflect long-standing structural inequalities in Peruvian society (Ødegaard 2018). They seek to develop their economic strategizing and tactics on their own terms (Ødegaard 2018, 2008) and in ways that challenge the hierarchical and centralizing workings of the nation-state. In this chapter, I show that the importance of vending and border-trade for many Peruvi-
ans can throw light not only on the effects of neoliberal reforms or austerity policies but reflects the resurgence of social networks and socialities that are embedded in long-standing socio-spatial practices in the Peruvian Andes (see Gold, this volume, for a related argument in the case of Cuba). These networks and practices are part of Peruvian history and identity that the modernizing nation-state has seemingly left behind in the name of modernity, progress and a universalized mestizo identity. They are the networks and practices of bilingual Spanish and Quechua- or Aymara-speaking migrants who move between the highlands and coastal cities, often referred to with a negative undertone as cholos (-as). Being somewhat ambiguously positioned and envisioned in-between racialized and class-based categories such as indigenous and mestizo, rural and urban, private and public, these migrants can be seen both to convey and resist the intersections between class, race and gender in Peruvian society (Ødegaard 2010). Living the life of the urban poor, they often maintain their rural ways and relations while making a living through vending or cross-border trade. Although these vendors’ activities may appear as complicit with the state’s capitalist ethos of commodity flow and wealth accumulation, I will argue that there is a resistant and egalitarian potential to their practices, as they continually criticize and circumvent official interference and claim urban spaces from which they have been excluded. They work to redirect global commodities and wealth away from official circuits and reconfigure wealth to other socio-spatial relations of redistribution.

By focusing on these dynamics, I uncover the relationships, practices and understandings that shape vendors’ relations with the state and market structures, and how they, by redirecting commodities and wealth away from official circuits, can be seen to convert and translate wealth from one form of value accumulation to another (Ødegaard 2019; Tsing 2015). I explore also recent shifts in state and market structures, by discussing policies of regulation through formalization and free trade. First I show that the vendors’ reconfiguration and translation of wealth are embedded in a particular moral ethos of exchange and redistribution; a moral ethos that shapes their relations with the state and market structures. Second, and based on the experiences of vendors with recent changes of state and economic policy, I show how the market liberalization instigated by Peruvian governments entails a particular emphasis on the formal and the legal, a point that is often overlooked in studies of the ‘neoliberal’. My argument is that the emphasis on formality and the legal in Peruvian policymaking in recent years point to some crucial dimensions of the corporate state, regarding its instigation of market liberalization through formality and juridicalization. By juridicalization, I refer to the intervention of legal and juridical structures in the organization of political and economic life. While policies promoting for-
malization and juridicalization of economic operations are framed within a democratic and egalitarian idealism, I illustrate how they may nonetheless reinforce exclusion and dispossession. In doing so, I explore Peru’s neoliberal experiment from the perspective of those gaining a living at the margins of the formal economy; small-scale vendors and contrabandistas.

Neoliberalism, Subjectification – and the Corporate State

As noted, Peru was not part of the so-called ‘Pink Tide’ in Latin America but opted for deepening its neoliberal orientation initiated with Fujimori in the 1990s. Since then, governments have envisioned modernization and progress through an emphasis on market liberalization, and implemented tax, royalty and policy regimes accommodating for privatization and foreign investments. Alongside these developments, small-scale businesses among the poor were increasingly encouraged by the state, NGOs and commercial enterprises, through the provision of microcredit arrangements and training in marketing skills. With this expansion of neoliberal rationality, governments have aimed to instigate ‘development’ through the promotion of entrepreneurship also among the poor. Initiated during the presidency of Alejandro Toledo (2001–2006), Peru signed several free trade agreements facilitating overseas, bilateral trade, intended to eliminate trade obstacles, consolidate access to goods and services, and foster private and international investments. Inequalities have persisted during these decades, and under presidential campaigns in 2006 and 2011, Ollanta Humala built his political platform by promising a more equitable framework for distributing wealth from the country’s natural resources. Humala was thus affiliated with other ‘Pink Tide’ leaders, although his time in office (2011–2016) resulted in political continuity rather than change, as was also the case with Peru’s subsequent presidents. Due in part to the boom of primary materials from the turn of the millennium onwards, Peru has experienced significant economic growth. Hundreds of thousands Peruvians still struggle to find a way out of poverty though, often relying on precarious forms of work at the margins of the formal economy.

Issues related to neoliberalism, state and governance have represented central lines of enquiry in anthropological studies in recent decades. Many of these studies are influenced by the governmentality approach, drawing on Foucault and focusing on the techniques, technologies and discourses of neoliberal governance and its production of particular kinds of ideal subjects (Hilgers 2010). As noted by Kipnis, the governmentality approach tends to create, however, ‘a sense that neoliberal governance functions, that it has successfully produced responsible and governable but alienated subjects’
Social Banditry and the Legal in the Corporate State of Peru

(2007: 385). In other words, there is a tendency to assume that the articulation of ideal subjects results in the actual creation of these selves, while the process by which this subjectification might occur is left unexamined (see also Winkler-Reid 2017). In effect, the assumption of a ‘successful end-product’ obscures the more complex, ambiguous and particularistic aspects of processes of creating so-called ‘neoliberal subjects’ (Winkler-Reid 2017). Studies of ‘neoliberal governance’, therefore, are often restricted by an inherent methodological flaw, in that they take the ‘atomized individual’ as their conceptual and methodological point of departure (see Graeber 2001). A one-sided focus on governmentality and subjectification may even contribute to overlooking other important aspects of the neoliberal state, such as labour conditions, inequalities and accompanying changes of regulations or laws, and lead attention away from subjectivities and forms of sociality that escape, exceed or simply fall outside the techniques and technologies of ‘neoliberal rule’ – or are further externalized by such measures. Considering that vendors are only occasionally involved in state programmes (i.e. of microcredit) and let alone the fact that most of them have few years of school studies, my intention in this chapter is not to make a contribution to studies of governmentality. Rather, I seek to explore forms of sociality that have exceeded or escaped state rule but that increasingly are being externalized by state policies intended to ensure market liberalization.

Kapferer and Gold (2017) importantly discuss the ways in which neoliberalism has gained ideological force by claiming a democratic and egalitarian idealism while accommodating for policies and arrangements that undermine these values and increase social inequalities. They at the same time aim to problematize how the ongoing and worldwide crisis of exacerbated inequalities, accompanied by a failure of democratic values, is often glossed over as an ideological effect of neoliberalism. This emphasis on neoliberalism entails a risk of overlooking the role of the state in market reforms and may make the neoliberal achievement of political force through egalitarian rhetoric into a blind spot (2017: 31–32). To avoid this, they instead refer to the ‘corporate state’ to emphasize how the crisis (often explained by neoliberalism) relates to the reconfigurations and ruptures brought about by developments of the nation-state. Kapferer and Gold thus find it vital to stress the rise of the corporate state from out of, or from within, the frame of the nation-state. On the one hand, they underline how the corporate state constitutes the flinging aside of constraints that the nation-state earlier placed on many of the potentials of capital; involving the further realization of capitalist potential through radical changes or transformations of the orders and relations of the social landscape, including the values that are integral to it (2017: 31–32). Simultaneously, they emphasize that we need to pay attention to how the corporate state’s market liberalization also entails or even
requires particular forms of regulation (international trade agreements, transparency in taxation, increasing accountability etc.). While these and other regulations may serve to guide or limit capitalist extractions, they can also enable capital flows of particular kinds, or be at the service of economic and political interests that respond to transnational economic pressures, lobbies and agendas. Along these lines, I argue that the emphasis on formality and the legal in Peruvian policymaking in recent years point to some crucial dimensions of the corporate state. It shows how policies for market liberalization are developed by and through the structures of the nation-state (i.e. legal reforms, regulation), being framed within a democratic and egalitarian idealism, and promoted as an advancement of democratic freedoms but often having rather contradictory effects. I will therefore point to some of the ways in which the corporate state accommodates for market liberalization through forms of regulation and juridicalization that may appear to universalize but in practice work to differentiate and exclude. Different forms of regulation, then, may entail particular constraints for economic actors without the means, contacts or competence to use regulatory measures for their own interests. We may thus gain important insight into the development of the corporate state by considering the perspective of particular actors, such as informally working vendors, who often go beyond the radar.

The chapter builds upon several periods of fieldwork since 1997, especially the fieldwork I conducted in 2016, 2011 and 2007, when I worked with vendors and contrabandistas at marketplaces in Arequipa, combined with research visits to marketplaces in Lima. In 2007, I followed the dramatic events at the market Santa Anita in Lima, and I will briefly refer to these events to illustrate Peruvian authorities’ emphasis on formality – and some changes in the form and intensity of state interference in vending activities. In addition to research stints in Lima, I have worked with vendors and contrabandistas associated with the marketplace La Feria Altiplano² in Arequipa. Most vendors at the Feria (like at the Santa Anita market) are women and bilingual Quechua- or Aymara- and Spanish-speakers. The Feria was established after several years during which a group of vendors had occupied land in different areas of the city for purposes of vending. Since they initiated these unauthorized markets in the 1980s, the vendors were repeatedly fined or removed by the police. These difficulties resulted in the creation of an association of vendors and finally their acquisition of an area that they formally bought in 1999. While the association has acquired land titles – at least in part – and most members pay for a licence, the vendors do not pay taxes, and many also bring undocumented merchandise, or contrabando, from across the borders. The goods offered at the Feria are agricultural products, textiles and artisan crafts, pirate CDs and computer software, as well as industrial and electronic articles. Many of these goods are smuggled from Bolivia or Chile, often pro-
duced in China. Some of the *contrabandistas* have also been involved in the smuggling of fuels from Bolivia, due to lower prices there. Leaders of the Feria take responsibility for paperwork and communication with the municipality and are expected to promote the interests of members. Although some leadership positions are held by women, most are held by men, despite the fact that members are primarily women. This reflects not only the more general tendency for politically important positions in Peruvian society to be held by men but also that many of the women at this market have limited reading and writing skills – generally a requirement for leadership positions (Ødegaard 2010).

Among vendors at the Feria, the flow of money, people and commodities is considered essential for survival and for ensuring at least a basic source of income. A common saying if people are unsuccessful in business is that ‘money does not stop in my hands’. This is sometimes attributed to *brujería*, or magical acts performed to harm other people. The saying indicates that the ‘natural’ state of money is to flow, and not be accumulated, although trade is considered a way to get access to some money at least. As my friend and interlocutor Aurelia said: ‘I gain almost nothing by selling these little things, but at least there is some money circulating through my hands.’ In recent decades, vendors at the Feria have become attractive clients for loan agents, and surrounding the market, private loan agencies abound. These ventures offer vendors loans and credit, although the informal/semi-formal nature of their businesses makes such loans a risky venture. Aurelia has taken several loans both from loan agents and kin. She cannot read and write though, and often has a limited overview of how much she owes, and when payments are due. On days when a loan agent comes to approach her at her pitch, she often tries to make excuses, asking for an extension of the payment due. In contrast to kin and colleagues though, Aurelia emphasized that ‘the bank does not forgive’.

‘Cultures of Informality?’

In Peru, informal economic activities like street-peddling, vending and contraband gained increased importance with the 1980s economic downturn and became a source of livelihood especially for rising numbers of urban poor. Since the 1950s, the boost of urban migration and the land occupations that followed significantly changed Peruvian cities’ demographic set-up and aroused anxiety over delinquency and social breakdown among urban elites. Migrants from the Andes were considered ‘matter out of place’ in the perspective of the upper and middle class, and their presence disturbed the racialized spatial dichotomies of rural-urban, indigenous-mestizo. Urban
influx continued during the 1980s, also due to the war between the guerrilla movement Sendero Luminoso and the military, as thousands of people were forced to flee from rural areas to the cities. The existing labour surplus was augmented with Fujimori’s austerity measures (often referred to as the ‘Fuji-shock’) in the 1990s, further exacerbating the need for alternatives to waged labour. The economic setback was to affect Peruvian society severely, while other Latin American countries experiencing similar challenges tried to soften the negative effects of adjustments through the introduction of safety nets (Ewig 2010). In Peru, social reforms took the form of ‘liberal-informal’ regimes based on (partial or total) privatization of the financing and provision of services, as well as state-financed social programmes targeting particular segments of the population (Rousseau 2007: 97). In the shantytowns of Peruvian cities, both men and women turned to different forms of self-employment; men combining taxi driving with short-term employment in construction, and women to vending. Among my interlocutors in Arequipa’s shantytowns, many women first started their working careers as domestic servants, in textile factories or as day labourers at farms surrounding Arequipa. Later, many of them turned to vending due to low payment and often strict labour regimes in other forms of low-skilled work. Many vendors take pride in their work and in the forms of autonomy that it requires; they find creative ways to evade official interferences, although also stressing the hardships of vending. For most, vending has been and continues to be a precarious means of making ends meet; such as in the case of Aurelia. Others – especially contrabandistas – may earn more than the minimum salary, and some have managed to expand and make new investments, for instance in land, houses, buses – or even trucks for the transportation of goods. As I will illustrate, they also make ‘investments’ in relations with kin, earth beings and saints.

From the perspective of social scientists in Peru as elsewhere in Latin America, informal economic ventures and use of land have been seen to involve new claims for citizenship among the urban poor (Roberts 1995); and to represent a form of ‘insurgent citizenship’ with the potential to alter the poor’s terms and conditions for citizenship (Holston 2008). People’s initiatives at the margins of the formal economy have thus been seen as heralding a new era of contestation against the legal institutional apparatus, which has given rise to what is often referred to as ‘cultures of informality’ (Matos Mar 1984). In a study of Lima’s contraband markets, Gandolfo (2013) describes how vendors explicitly evade formality and resist attempts by state bureaucracies to draw them into regimes of regulation. Although the vendors’ resistance carries costs and risks, they nonetheless value more highly the freedom and autonomy that informality affords. This valuation of informality’s freedom and autonomy is part of many vendors’ resistance to being
low-paid workforce employees. Among vendors, there is a continual contestation and questioning of official regulations, interventions and border control regimes. They even consider these interferences to be immoral and illegitimate, and they question the right of the officials to interfere in people’s efforts to make a living (see also Ødegaard 2008, 2016). In cases when authorities interfere in vendors’ activities, there is a common phrase that vendors use with great contempt: ‘They prevent people from working.’ This phrase illustrates the value people ascribe to this kind of work independently of its degree of formalization.

For instance, regarding a fellow vendor who had her contraband goods confiscated, my interlocutor Rosaria said:

They ought not to confiscate if this is how she works. It is not that they [contrabandistas] steal or anything, since they buy with their own money. Some even with borrowed money. This is the only kind of work there is . . . As if they were the authorities? [i.e. those who confiscate goods]. And who stays with the goods? Well, they share it between themselves of course! [that is, the officials].

Even Aurelia – who is a small-scale vendor and contrabandista and generally earns very little, barely enough to feed the family – has been quite explicit in her criticism of official functionaries interfering with people’s businesses. We were discussing vendors’ protests before a contested dislocation at the Santa Anita market in Lima, which I will describe below, when she said: ‘Well, they are fighting of course. Where are they supposed to work? They say they have arms and explosives, but they have to defend themselves!’ As I will show towards the end of the chapter though, Aurelia’s critical attitude to official interferences later changed.

Most studies of vendors in the Andean countries have, however, treated these ‘cultures of informalities’ as originating from some kind of ‘empty space’, by not dealing with the moral ethos and socialities from which these forms of critique originate and evolve. For instance, and despite their strong Aymara and Quechua origins, the vendors have usually been addressed by ethnographies more interested in economic ‘informality’ in South America (Goldstein 2016) than in Amerindian worldviews. Instead, I argue that vendors’ critique of official intervention gains voice and legitimacy from their particular moral ethos of exchange and redistribution. This is not to say that the Quechua and Aymara have a moral ethos to work informally but that they conceptualize and deal with commodity flow and exchange in ways that for them legitimize economic activities independently of their informal dimensions. I suggest that we need to consider the particularities of such a moral ethos if we are to understand how informalities evolve in different contexts.

Although the extension of informal economic activities increased from the 1980s onwards, as mentioned, it is worth noting that the cross-border trad-
ing routes of contemporary vendors follow the same routes as trade during the colonial period; along the routes of mule drivers who carried goods between highland towns such as La Paz, Puno and Arequipa and towns along the Pacific coast. People’s involvement in contemporary cross-border trade thus builds on historically established trading routes, which in some cases replaced precolonial practices of barter across ecological zones (Murra 1980). The border areas where contemporary smuggling takes place are often referred to as *tierras de nadie* (no man’s land), referring to places characterized by a history of marginalization, a strong sense of local autonomy, contentious state boundaries and the ambiguous presence of state actors (see also Langer 2018). These are areas where trade is *already* institutionalized in the absence of state control, through its embeddedness in social relations and forms of circulation and exchange long established by vendors and community inhabitants. These relationships along trading routes may provide, for example, information and supply or storage of goods (see also Babb 2001; Ødegaard 2016; Seligmann 2001; Smith 1989). Especially at the border between Peru and Bolivia, this trade has historically been dominated by indigenous community members and small-scale smugglers (Langer 2018). The social and spatial embeddedness of trade is thus central to the practices of smuggling, which are based in networks of household and kinship relations that extend from rural to urban areas.

The moral ethos of vendors entails a sense of, and claim to, autonomy in dealing with commodity flow and redistribution. While vendors thus contest some of the hierarchical and centralizing workings of the nation-state, it should be noted that people in these areas have paid tribute to various authorities since the Inca empire, sometimes also taking pride in their payment of communal tribute, and continuing this practice even after its abolishment, as an act of communal identity and autonomy (Platt 1982). The moral ethos I seek to pinpoint here is therefore a question of the emphasis and value that people ascribe to material exchange; as a claim simultaneously to autonomy and interdependence. Official interference is considered illegitimate when denying or undermining such exchange.

It is worth noting that there are also long traditions in the Andes for women’s involvement in barter and trade, so trading is not necessarily something they first learn in the city, or by participating in microcredit arrangements. A central dimension of women’s involvement in trade in the Andes is the notion that women manage money and economic matters while men manage politics (Harris 2000). As indicated, the neoliberal promotion of entrepreneurship in Peru does therefore not exist in a vacuum and nor does women’s predominance in the country’s marketplaces. In the following, I describe one of my interlocutors’ translation of profit to the aim of nurture and care for her children, as well as her experience with a confiscation – and then I
unpack the moral ethos and forms of sociality that characterize the practices of vendors. As I will illustrate, this ethos of sociality and material exchange is central also to people’s relationship with the state and their critical attitudes towards intervention.

**Translation, Distribution, Socialities**

For a time from 2009 onwards, one of my interlocutors, Olinda, earned a living by bringing fuel from Bolivia, often travelling by bus and hiding her goods underneath other packages on the roof. She brought about 50 gallons at a time to sell to petrol stations in Puno, where the smuggled fuel was usually mixed with ordinary products. In order to live closer to the border and have a place for her goods, she rented a room from a relative in Yungoyo, a community close to the border. Olinda is originally from Arapa, and for several years, the couple’s three children mainly stayed behind in the village with their elderly grandmother, living under extremely poor conditions while their parents were working.

One day, just before I reached Arequipa in 2011, Olinda was caught with fuels worth 10,000 soles. All of her goods were confiscated, and she had to pay 3,000 soles to the custom officials (in bribes, not in fines) before the bus could pass. As we talked one day about the incident while sitting at her sister’s market pitch at the Feria, Olinda stressed how much she had suffered and cried after she was caught and lost her capital. She soon re-established her business through the help of her kin but decided not to include fuels. Before the confiscation, Olinda had been rather successful. Her earnings from smuggling fuels had been converted into the construction of a house in Arapa as well as education for her children. After the confiscation, however, she started to smuggle olives and clothes instead. ‘You win and you lose, but you just have to continue,’ Olinda said. This is typical for vendors’ narrations about the risks their businesses involve; stressing how they suffer when their goods are confiscated – but also how they start up anew after a short time, often still working informally, although sometimes downsizing or switching to another commodity.

Olinda’s narration indicates also how contrabandistas spend their earnings for the benefit of their family and relations. One of the key freedoms of informality, as noted by Gandolfo, is to subsume profit to particular modes of sociality. By investing in market colleagues, kin, earth beings and saints, wealthy vendors give time and money to ‘reciprocal relations and forms of consumption that limit the accumulation of wealth’ (Gandolfo 2013: 280). As I have illustrated elsewhere (Ødegaard 2008, 2016, 2019), this intense cultivation of social relationships at the margins of the formal economy car-
ries similar importance among vendors in Arequipa. They cultivate social relations assiduously through sharing and giving food and gifts, by establishing familial connections through god-parenthood and by maintaining often relatively stable relationships with customers and suppliers. These relations enable the distribution of goods beyond authorized infrastructures and institutions. Vendors simultaneously subsume the profit earned from trade to these social relations with kin and colleagues – and to the powerful landscape.

Many vendors perform offerings to the powerful earth beings, such as *apus* (mountain lords) and *pachamama* (the powerful earth), as well as saints as a way of maintaining good relations with the sources of wellbeing and wealth and to improve success in business. Such offerings characterize people’s relations with the powerful landscape in the Andes (see also Allen 1988; Canessa 2000; De la Cadena 2010; Harris 2000; Ødegaard 2008, 2016) and reflect a particular cosmology of place where earth beings are considered to have a powerful influence over the lives of humans with the potential for bringing prosperity as well as causing harm. Offerings consist of alcohol, food, llama fat, herbs or coca and are made to *pachamama* and the *apus*, or to virgins or saints considered to be particularly prosperous and powerful. Large-scale *contrabandistas* and vendors are also expected to serve as sponsors for offerings, festivals and parties, illustrating the significance of a relational understanding of wealth as being dependent on reciprocity, circulation and exchange between humans and earth beings (see also Harris 2000). Earth beings represent an extra-human prototype of ‘other’, whose power may be actualized in the form of health, income and wealth but also in the form of illness, accidents and death. Sustained by the offerings, earth beings depend on the same vital substances as humans do (alcohol, meat, fat, coca) and have similar needs and feelings. People’s relationship with these entities is continuously nurtured, as are the relations with kin and fellow vendors.

Those who bring in contraband generally self-identify as *contrabandistas*, and proudly so. They are viewed as important suppliers of merchandise, constantly travelling long distances to bring goods to market vendors. Interestingly, the truck occupies a central position among vendors in elaborations of ideas about movement, circulation and wealth. At festivals organized at the Feria, miniature trucks figure in some dances, especially one in which women swirl colourful ropes with miniature trucks fastened to the ends. These women are usually dressed in *polleras* from Puno, generally of the most recent, colourful fashion and expressive of the successful and economically powerful Andean vendor. Movement and circulation, therefore, are key elements in vendors’ notions of autonomy, productivity and success. Vendors at the market also sell miniature trucks meant for offerings that peo-
ple make in the hope of acquiring a real truck or other forms of wealth. The truck symbolizes the work of contrabandistas and the flow and circulation of goods and money that they ensure. Contrabandistas who succeed in their businesses often choose to invest precisely in a truck for the purpose of continuing the practice that allowed them to acquire the truck – transporting contraband goods.

According to the vendors I have worked with, public functionaries have typically shown a degree of tolerance for their unauthorized economic activities at marketplaces and border crossings. Contrabandistas may be said to be involved in a kind of social banditry (Hobsbawm 1969), as their claims for the right to earn a living hold a certain legitimacy. Their claims are informed by historical structural inequalities and by the recognition that there are no other jobs to get anyway. Until recently, many unauthorized markets continued for years without particular interference, and many contrabandistas have brought goods across the borders throughout their careers; on occasion, their goods have been confiscated but not frequently enough to prevent their businesses from flourishing – in many cases, due to bribery. Many vendors have thus relied on the involvement of public functionaries, who often receive bribes in return for letting people pass and keep their merchandise without interference. In this way, the relational character of trade seems to constitute a means by which state officials at different levels tap into and profit from the extralegal activities of vendors. These exchanges are called bribes (coima) and not gifts, although vendors often draw a parallel between coima and gifts and view it as lack of respect when public functionaries refuse to accept coima. Public functionaries, like the powerful surroundings and apus, must be appeased through gifts or offerings to ensure, among other things, the circulation of merchandise. Comparable strategies – gifts, offerings, bribes – are thus called for in dealings with representatives of the state as with the earth beings to ensure successful commodity flows. Central for such strategies is the exchange of material substances.

Public officials have sometimes legitimized their non-interference in the same way as the vendors themselves: there are no jobs to get anyway. The legal assessor of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Arequipa estimated that almost 90 per cent of the inhabitants in border areas are involved in contraband and provide consumer goods to the entire country: 'It is difficult to do anything, because people get angry, and will ask for an alternative, something which doesn’t exist.' The association of market vending with basic commodities, household activities and women has given market work an ambiguous status as work, and it is often not considered important enough by officials to interfere (see also Lazar 2008). In recent years, however, vendors have increasingly reported that they find it difficult to make a living.
through trade, due to stricter controls and more frequent confiscations at markets and border checkpoints. For many, these difficulties are reinforced by more explicit demands that market organizations formalize their use of land. These changes, and the difficulties that vendors and *contrabandistas* experience as a result, point to a dimension of the corporate state that might be worth exploring further. It relates to how market liberalization and the promotion of flow and citizens’ entrepreneurship is accompanied by new forms of regulation. To illustrate this, I will describe a high-profile intervention at the Santa Anita market in Lima.

**An Eviction**

Santa Anita is known as the location for some of the truly huge outdoor markets on the outskirts of Lima. Vendors established the Santa Anita market in 2003, as they organized an unauthorized occupation of land and formed an association of almost 10,000 vendors to organize their preparation and use of what had previously been a deserted area. In addition to pitches for trading, the vendors established infrastructural facilities such as paved roads, a parking lot, water supply, toilets, small shrines and even shelters for housing. They also installed electricity, despite a requirement of property titles for such installations. In 2007, four years after the formation of the market, the municipality requested that vendors formalize their use of the land – or leave, apparently because a Chilean enterprise had made an offer to buy the land. The message that the vendors had to leave resulted in several demonstrations by the Santa Anita association and were accompanied by media reports portraying the vendors as associated with chaos, illegality and crime.

When I arrived at Santa Anita, it was during intense debates and conflicts in May 2007. A few days before my visit, the vendors had received notice of removal, and I found the market almost deserted. There were no customers, and, except for the food vendors, most other vendors had removed their merchandise awaiting the formal intervention. Some vendors were standing in groups discussing the situation, and they all expressed their worries concerning the notice of removal. They said they were obliged by their leaders to organize a continual presence in the market, day and night, so as to prevent and hinder police interference. Explaining their reluctance to formally pay for and legalize their use of the land, some vendors stressed that the land was already theirs on the basis of all their work and efforts. One vendor of food explained: ‘It is we who have done all the work. God bless the person who gets up early. And now that it has been served [e.g. infrastructure established] they want us to pay.’ Likewise, another woman claimed: ‘This land has always been deserted, there was only sand here before.’ Eventually, by
the end of May 2007, the vendors were evicted. The eviction reached the headlines of most national newspapers, picturing the dramatic removal of vendors, who thus lost their investments and source of income. The removal of vendors involved no less than 3,800 police, heavily armed and wearing brand new high-tech security uniforms, helmets and equipment, sending a clear message that there would be no excuses for vendors to stay or otherwise keep their investments. The eviction by police force gave an impression of a techno-scientific state moving forward to eradicate the ‘chaotic, unruly masses’ and impose civilized, legal and formalized order. In 2012, a Chilean mall operator opened Mall Aventura Plaza Santa Anita, reflecting the growing foreign interest in Peru’s retail markets.

The case of Santa Anita may, along with similar evictions and confiscations at markets in recent years, illustrate some important dimensions of the corporate state vis-à-vis those operating at the margins of formalized circuits of wealth accumulation. It illustrates how the corporate state’s liberalization of markets works through particular regulatory and juridical structures; indicating some of the implications of such mechanisms for small-scale vendors. Through these structures, the corporate state produces its ‘other’; a criminalized other. Rather than seeing the corporate state in terms of a uniform set of policies and intentions – and as creating a uniform set of implications – it may be useful to look for the kinds of differentiation that the corporate state’s emphasis on formality and the legal may create, a point I explain in the following.

**Market Liberalization through Formality and the Legal**

A central aim for Peruvian governments since the 1990s has been to develop policies and reforms to attract international capital and accommodate the national economy for competitiveness vis-à-vis global markets. While tax relief for international investors has been one measure to this aim, it is worth noting the legal measures involved and how an increasing significance ascribed to formality and the legal is central for the liberalization of markets in Peru as elsewhere. While such emphasis on formality and the legal is often framed within a language of freedom and egalitarian liberalism (freedom of movement: equal access to markets, and equal rights to protect one’s property), I explore how it may also create a foundation for new forms of exclusion and otherness.

There is significant legal work involved in a state’s accommodation for national competitiveness vis-à-vis global markets, and worldwide, states and firms have significantly increased their expenses in different forms of ‘legal work’ in recent decades. The market’s ‘invisible hand’ is in fact heavily reli-
ant on juridical process, and hence different forms of juridical ‘labour’. The accommodation of policies for the promotion of an ‘ownership society’ in countries in the Global South is one example, and competition laws, norms and standards are another. Free trade agreements, on the other hand, are generally associated with the relaxation of regulations and norms – especially for import/export and custom requirements. From the perspective of vendors and contrabandistas, however, free trade agreements appear to entail precisely the opposite – that is, more regulation and control, especially since they often lack the competence and capital to undertake the ‘legal work’ required to maintain their businesses. So while regulation through formalization and juridicalization previously might have worked to ward off the excesses of capitalist interest, it is increasingly used to enable these excesses. In the case of Santa Anita, it enabled the expulsion and clearance of large areas of land where marginalized people had found a living.

For vendors at outdoor markets such as Santa Anita in Lima and the Feria in Arequipa, the government emphasis on formality and the legal was intensified with arrangements for the formalization of unauthorized land use initiated in the 1990s. The government of Fujimori established specific institutions for this purpose, such as COFOPRI (Commission for the Formalization of Informal Property), and succeeding governments followed up with this and similar land titling projects aiming to promote ‘development’, security for owners and a more effective land market. Governments have thus introduced policies for the formalization of unauthorized economic activities and use of land alongside the promotion of entrepreneurship. This indicates – again – how an increasing significance ascribed to formality and the legal (see Sieder et al. 2005) is central for the liberalization of markets worldwide and may entail mechanisms through which contrasts between ‘licit’ and ‘illicit’ are both intensified and continually blurred (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006).

In Peru, policies of formalization have been recommended by economists like De Soto (1989, 2001), who argued that formal ownership among the poor would promote development, by contributing to the integration of unauthorized economic activities into the economy at large. Formality is indeed part of making society legible (Scott 1998) and may represent a prerequisite for increasing tax revenues and improved welfare services. De Soto’s concern with formalization, however, appears to be related primarily to its ‘property effects’: that formalization would promote economic activities and development through the security of formal ownership. Formalization may certainly enable people to legally use and protect their resources, but the terms and conditions can nonetheless create and fuel other processes that reinforce dispossession and exclusion (Mitchell 2002). Like microcredit, policies of formalization can be seen to involve an extension of
the supposed benefits of a capitalist ethos to desperately poor and marginalized populations. These mechanisms, intended for citizens to pull themselves up by their own private bootstraps, may however result in the spread of indebtedness and deeper impoverishment (see Kapferer and Gold 2017). It is therefore worth noting how different kinds of credit arrangements, like microcredit, are accompanied by formalization and a requirement of land titles, contributing to facilitate a commodification of land that may result in its dispossession. This is because of the high cost of formalization and rising land prices; policies for formalization may indeed serve to make collectively used land accessible for corporate interest and real estate investors. Policies for formalization may hence contribute to fortifying already existing fissures along class lines (see also Larkins 2015: 156). The emphasis on formality and the legal in Peruvian policymaking thus seems to be part of a continuing expansion of a form of rationality that allows for the involvement only of specific categories of citizens.

For vendors and contrabandistas, the emphasis on formality and the legal has become evident also in other ways, such as, ironically, with Peru’s signing of free trade agreements. Peruvian governments have signed a range of free trade and trade promotion agreements during the last few years, with the US, Canada and the EU, as well as China, Japan and Korea. Accommodating for bilateral trade through tax and customs reductions, such agreements also entail other specifications of norms, standards and regulations. For instance, Peru’s trade promotion agreement with the US entailed arrangements not only for bilateral trade itself but also for the strengthening and modernization of Peru’s domestic regulations and border work. As part of the agreement, the US was to assist Peru in limiting exportation of narcotics, modernizing the equipment and procedures of the National Police and Customs Agency and strengthening the rule of law. These measures appear to have been a way for US authorities also to protect the US market, by assisting one of its trade partners to control its borders. As a result, Peruvian authorities have significantly strengthened border control functions during the last few years. Routines for the registration (and destruction) of confiscated goods have also been introduced to reduce the problem of functionaries who take confiscated goods for themselves. In addition to the strengthening of customs and tax controls at border checkpoints, control stations have been established also along the main intercity highways, before entering bigger cities such as Puno, Arequipa and Ica. In this manner, borders are actualized within regions of the country, in the form of intercity controls both for customs and taxes. Along with these initiatives, there is also increasing use of ambulatory fiscal patrols, especially in cities like Lima and Arequipa. Big black vans, with a sign saying ‘fiscalizacion’, have become a common sight in the streets, with guards on board ready to conduct controls.
As the customs and tax authorities have intensified their controls, some vendors and contrabandistas continually seek to develop new strategies for avoiding control and finding new sites to realize their businesses. Others have decided to downsize or leave their businesses altogether, due to stricter controls – and a new kind of competition. Encouraging direct import from bilateral trade partners, the free trade agreements have resulted in increased competition for those who import (informally) through neighbour countries like Bolivia or Chile. Compared to the contrabandistas’ well-established importation from neighbour countries, to import directly – i.e. from China (and formally so) – involves not only greater investment but also knowledge of formal procedures and writing. Additionally, direct imports create less need for various types of local intermediaries. Many vendors and contrabandistas find it difficult to take advantage of the agreements, leaving importers who belong to the middle or upper classes as those mainly benefiting from the agreements. More goods are also brought in via Lima since the free trade agreements, gradually reducing the advantages of bringing contraband from Bolivia and Chile. While people used to come to Arequipa – even from Lima – to buy contraband, trading activities are increasingly centred around Lima, as more goods are brought in directly and legally through the capital. Several contrabandistas also noted that official functionaries were becoming more reluctant to accept bribes in exchange for letting them keep or move on with their merchandise. María, one of the contrabandistas at the Feria, decided to take a break from contraband now that the controls have increased. She exclaimed that, ‘now they [public functionaries] do not even want to receive bribes. They do not know how to respect people.’ Others said that these days the contraband business is ‘nothing but controls’ and ‘failure’ (fracaso). As a result of intensified controls, some have formalized their businesses, like for instance my interlocutor Eufemia. After repeatedly having her goods confiscated, Eufemia invested in authorized office equipment. After formalizing, however, her earnings declined and she decided to invest in an informal mining project to compensate. This investment proved to be more hazardous than any of her previous ventures, however. As in Eufemia’s case, some contrabandistas, feeling forced to formalize in response to increased border controls, suffer a loss of income. Formalization may thus pose new and unforeseen challenges.

Conclusions

During my fieldwork in 2016, I learned not only that many contrabandistas in particular were leaving their businesses but also that there was a new and very different attitude among some of them. This was the case for my friend
Aurelia, for instance, who by this time had left her business in contraband altogether, partly because she had had her goods confiscated several times. Her critical attitude towards official interferences described above had also changed, and regarding the municipal requirements for infrastructure and formalization at the Feria, she exclaimed: ‘that’s how it is; when the authorities make requirements, we have to comply.’ Also, she was no longer directing her harsh critique against the authorities in cases when her colleagues had had their goods confiscated. She had started to participate in regular prayers in one of Arequipa’s many Pentecostal churches. In this church, Aurelia and other members spend hours on end praying not only for their loved ones but for the government of Peru, its president and all other governments and presidents of the world, as she explained to me. Aurelia no longer made offerings to the earth beings, and she followed her Pentecostal Church’s strict condemnation of such practices as heathen and sinful.

This chapter is not the right place to properly discuss the many issues that this change of my dear friend’s attitude may raise. Suffice to say that it throws light on her earlier, somewhat rebellious attitude towards the authorities, supporting my point about how vendors’ relations with the state and the market have been grounded in an Andean ethos of sociality and material exchange. Indeed, the chapter has been an attempt to analyse some continuities and shifts in vendors and contrabandistas’ relationship with state and market structures, by seeing the corporate state from the perspective of those who operate at the margins of the formal economy. A central argument is that vendors’ contestation of official interventions can be seen to gain voice and legitimacy from their ethos of sociality, exchange and redistribution. This moral ethos shapes people’s relationship with state and market structures in a way that has given legitimacy to vendors’ activities at the margins of the formal economy. Their practices can be seen to constitute a social formation of particular socio-spatial relations created through exchange and redistribution, entailing an egalitarian impulse understood in terms of the continuous questioning and challenging of state intervention. This social formation – and its entanglement with the corporate state – is different from the class-oriented mobilization of the 1970s, in Europe as well as the Americas, and is different also from the demands for racial and minority equality of the 1980s onwards, and from the anti-capitalist movements in Europe in recent years. It is characterized not by claims for cultural rights or by direct anti-capitalist sentiment, but rather by sentiments expressing certain complicity with capitalist ideology. At the same time, these vendors aim to redirect wealth away from official distribution and elite accumulation towards other forms of sociality, constantly evading and contesting state involvement. As they subsume wealth to relations and exchanges with kin, colleagues, earth beings and saints, vendors are partaking in a kind of social
banditry (Hobsbawm 1969), redistributing wealth beyond the reach of the
state. The practices of vendors therefore revolve around translating, incor-
porating and harnessing extralocal values to local ends (see e.g. Orta 2004),
by their use of global commodities for trade and distribution, offerings and
consumption; and for maintaining material exchanges. Their practices are
aimed at the integration and translation of ambivalent extralocal values, and
form part of an emphasis on harnessing value to create kinship; or familiar-
izing predation in Fausto’s terms (2007).

Meanwhile, there have been some changes to the dynamics and vitality
of vending and contraband in recent years. This, I argue, is related to the
 corporatization of the state, through an emphasis on formality and the legal.
For vendors, the intensified regulation and control entails a denial of the re-
lations and exchanges through which they previously operated, and which to
a great extent have also defined their relations with state and market struc-
tures. These alterations have led some vendors to formalize their businesses
by replacing contraband with other goods, selling services, or leaving their
businesses altogether. Somewhat ironically, the state’s instigation of market
liberalization operates through legal structures and mechanisms that often
marginalize or exclude small-scale economic actors. Therefore, central to my
argument is that the emphasis on formality and the legal in Peruvian poli-
cymaking in recent years points to juridicalization as a crucial dimension of
the corporate state; these policies are being developed by and through the
structures of the nation-state and framed within a democratic and egalitar-
ian idealism and promoted as an advancement of democratic freedoms, but
often with contradictory eff ects. Market liberalization through policies pro-
moting formality and the legal may contribute to further exclude already
marginalized populations and simultaneously entail a corporatization of
the informal – i.e. by facilitating corporate or real estate interest (see Gago
2015). Such corporatization is enabled by the expulsion and clearance of
large areas of collectively held land where marginalized groups had found
a living; or by taking over the economic niche of marginalized populations.
For instance, regulation through free trade is accommodating for the inter-
est of capital through the replacement of long-established trade networks.
Market liberalization through formalization policies and regulatory norms
thus indicates a double standard, which is supported by the legal apparatus.
My argument is therefore that we must not overlook how the emphasis on
formality and the legal is central for the corporate state’s market liberaliza-
tion. Such mechanisms and requirements even have the effect that some
people are excluded from the circuits of capital and that those excluded are
increasingly criminalized as impertinent ‘other’.
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NOTES

1. The activities of many vendors can be termed informal in the sense that they are often unauthorized and untaxed and rely on unauthorized importation of goods and use of land. That said, it should be noted that the distinction between formal and informal economies is complex and debated. This is related to the many interdependencies between informal economic activities and formal enterprises. Bigger, more established businesses often rely on smaller unauthorized operations and may also escape state regulation. It is therefore worth noting the challenges of distinguishing between formal and informal economies (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006).
2. Altiplano refers to the presence of vendors and goods from the Andean highlands.
3. Fujimori initiated a wide range of neoliberal reforms to counter hyperinflation and close a gaping government deficit; by reducing government subsidies and government employment, relaxing private sector price controls and reducing restrictions on investment, imports and capital. These reforms responded to IMF’s plan for South American economies from the 1980s (emphasizing trade liberalization, privatization, fiscal discipline, broadening of tax reforms, liberalization of foreign direct investments, property rights for the informal economy etc.), which resulted in rising prices and had significant social costs.
4. The names of my interlocutors and their villages of origin have been altered.
5. This use of miniatures is part of wider practices in the Southern Andes; las alasitas.
6. This is from an interview that took place with the legal assessor in Arequipa, in 2011.
7. After Peru entered a free trade agreement with China, China was expected to replace the US as Peru’s most important bilateral partner, a prospect that might seem ever more likely with Trump as president.
REFERENCES


The current authoritarian turn in neoliberal capitalism is providing further evidence that the dominant economic system is inseparable from the state apparatus – and, in this particular moment, from processes of state corporatization. Currently, tendencies like neoliberalism and state corporatization constitute two sides of the same coin. According to David Harvey (Jipson and Jitheesh 2019), this adherence is due to the fact that neoliberalism ‘no longer commands the consent of the mass of the population’. It has lost its legitimacy. According to this author,

neo-liberalism could not actually survive without entering into an alliance with state authoritarianism. It now is moving towards an alliance with neo-fascism, because as we see from all the protest movements around the world, everyone now sees neo-liberalism is about lining the pockets of the rich at the expense of the people.

As has been well developed by the contributors, neoliberalism is just one ideological expression of state corporatization – a process that is not limited to the economic field, having to do with the suppression of forms of egalitarianism and the subjective transformations of individuals and societies.
Since the authors of this book wrote their contributions, the situation has rapidly shifted in the Latin American continent, and some of the processes that we describe in our chapters have consolidated and deepened. Some countries are particularly representative of this evolution. In Brazil, recently elected president Jair Bolsonaro and his far right coalition are implementing an agenda that goes against any democratic principle introduced by previous governments, or conquered by popular mobilizations. Organizations like the Landless Movement (MST) that advocate for a more egalitarian and redistributive management of rural and urban land are threatened with being outlawed as ‘terrorists’. The government has also declared war on the indigenous population of this country by taking the responsibility for indigenous land demarcation away from FUNAI, the Indian Affairs Department, and passing it to the Agriculture Ministry, foreshadowing a politics of attack and dispossession on native groups in favour of international agronomic corporations. These initiatives go hand in hand with widespread militarization. A report by the newspaper **Zero Hora** of Porto Alegre assures that 100 officers occupy the upper echelons of the government, from the president and his deputy to ministers, managers and officials occupying key positions of the state apparatus. From these strategic places, they can make or veto decisions on issues that go beyond national security and intelligence (Zibechi 2019). According to Raúl Zibechi (2019), five generals of the current government of Brazil are veterans of the United Nations Mission for Stabilization in Haiti (MINUSTAH), where Brazil played a key role between 2004 and 2017. Three other high-ranking military officers served on peace missions in Bosnia and Angola, including Vice President Hamilton Mourão, who also served as a military assistant at the Brazilian embassy of Caracas. It is no coincidence that Mourão was the one who announced the exit of Maduro. Due to the country’s prominent economic position and new political alliances, the Brazilian change has effects on the entire region.

Bolsonaro’s pro-Americanism is having a decisive influence on the region’s political and power relations. In particular, there is the danger that Brazil may become the Troy horse for a Northern American intervention in Venezuela. President Donald Trump has been pushing forward this initiative with increasing zeal since Brazil’s governmental change. Although a military attack may appear like a remote possibility, the recent withdrawal of US troops from Syria suggests the opposite, even if we consider that the United States usually avoids engaging in two wars at the same time on different and distant fronts. Certainly, an intervention on Venezuela would lead to a destabilization of the entire Latin American continent. It would exacerbate transversal processes of militarization that – as we have highlighted in this book – are intrinsic to state corporatization and the current authoritarian turn. As
Zibechi (2019) argues, ‘it is evident that “democracy” is just an excuse in which nobody believes. In Venezuela geopolitical interests converge that have no relation to the left/right opposition or democracy’ – indeed processes of state corporatization tend to go beyond and invalidate this dualism.

Bolivian politics is being deeply affected by the Brazilian transition. The government (and President Evo Morales in particular) is highly concerned with re-election, and Bolsonaro’s rise is having destabilizing effects on an already complex situation. Bilateral economic relations between these two countries are vital for Bolivia, particularly in terms of gas trade. A recent diplomatic case illustrates Bolivia’s urge to normalize their relations with Brazil, despite the political differences shaping the two governments. The delivery by Bolivian authorities to the Brazilian and Italian governments – in less than 24 hours – of Cesare Battisti is a case in point. Battisti is a former member of the Armed Proletarians for Communism (PAC), a small group that operated amongst many others in Italy in the 1970s, the so-called ‘years of lead’ due to the a high level of political conflict. Battisti was subject to a life sentence in Italy for four homicides, two as material perpetrator and two as an accomplice. After spending several years in Brazil under Lula’s and Dilma’s protection, the Italian was revoked the status of political refugee by the new president Bolsonaro. This was a fundamental step for his extradition to Italy, vehemently demanded by the country’s new right-wing government. Battisti escaped to Bolivia in December 2018. Surprisingly, he was denied the request for refuge and the basic right to an extradition process in which the case could be analysed. Thus, the Bolivian president became actively involved in an operation perpetrated by the new Italo-Brazilian axis. Many media commented that Bolsonaro used the arrest of the Italian ex militant as a ‘nod to Salvini’. However, as the new Brazilian president gave his ‘gift’ to his Italian colleague, Evo Morales was looking to curry favour with ‘Brother Bolsonaro’, as he called him in his tweet of congratulations after his electoral triumph (Stefanoni 2019). This attitude produced a fracture within Morales’ government and party (MAS) bases. Indeed in the 1990s, Bolivian Vice President Álvaro García Linera had also been jailed. Although he had no murder charges, he was accused of terrorism and convicted for being an active member of the Túpac Katari Guerrilla Army. Raul García Linera, the brother of the vice president, wrote that the delivery of Battisti constitutes the first counter-revolutionary act of the government of Evo Morales.

The newly elected Mexican president Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador, pictured by the mainstream media as a ‘progressive’ alternative to the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party), is about to introduce a constitutional reform that will give life to the ‘National Guard’ (Guardia Nacional). This is a new military body controlled by the Ministry of Defense and responsible
for public security tasks such as prevention, prosecution and investigation of crimes. This reform could be a point of no return for Mexico. Its approval will represent the government’s renunciation of building civil and democratic security institutions. It will consolidate a twelve-year long process of militarization of Mexican public life, giving continuity to a strategy that has exacerbated violence and contributed to the deterioration of social life and widespread human rights violations. By giving the army unprecedented ‘civil’ powers without mechanisms of accountability or obligations of transparency, the creation of a National Guard is in line with corporate authoritarian tendencies shaping the Latin American region.

State corporatization is manifesting itself in El Salvador with the emergence of a new ambiguous electoral force that has achieved a historical rupture of the previous two-party system. Businessman Nayib Armando Bukele Ortez is the elected president after winning in the first round in February 2019 with around 53 per cent of the vote. Bukele, former mayor of San Salvador, was born in the capital of the country in 1981 and will be the youngest president in the nation’s history. He is the owner of a famous motorcycle brand distributor and manages business in advertising services. Interestingly, a team of consultants linked to the Venezuelan opposition worked in the electoral campaign of Nayib Bukele. The board was integrated by two of the most recognized pollsters in Latin America, Mitofsky and Cid Gallup, and two Spanish specialists in political marketing.

These are all symptoms of the evolution of a struggle that has taken place in recent years: ‘the fight for or against global order has become a fight for control of the global order. While right-wing politicians like Donald Trump have railed against “globalists”, they are not rejecting globalisation outright. Instead, such leaders are embracing their own, alternative globalization’ (Slobodian 2019), one that is based on a new state model.

In Cuba, a new president succeeded Raúl Castro in April 2018: Miguel Díaz Canel, the first Cuban president outside the Castro family (although he is known as Raúl Castro’s favourite disciple). Placed on him are high expectations of reform but always within the framework of the revolution. He has carried on with Raúl Castro’s economic reform process, and in 2019 there will be a referendum asking people whether they agree with the constitutional changes proposed: the recognition of private property, the restoration of the position of Prime Minister, the creation of a maximum of two consecutive five-year terms for the presidency, and which includes the banning of discrimination based on gender, ethnicity, race or disability, and the transformation of the justice system to be based on the presupposition of innocence. These changes, while seemingly positive – and indeed long awaited – open the road for the penetration of neoliberal governance into
the island, particularly in relation to the penetration and officialization of private property. Meanwhile, there are food shortages again, as Venezuela, Cuba’s main associate in the region, is in crisis. The impact of Brazil’s turn to the right will undoubtedly reach Cuba via Venezuela.

Throughout the continent, tensions between corporatizing processes and egalitarian forces are ripe. These tensions are constitutive of one another and are not at opposite ends of the political spectrum. Throughout this book, we have aimed to capture a regional historic process in which these tensions between egalitarian ideologies, movements and processes have reached a particular intensity. Through ethnographic analyses of particular instances of egalitarian processes and corporatizing dynamics, we have intended to show how the form of the state is changing in Latin America. This is part of a global transformation of the state into a corporate formation. It is not complete, and it will continue to shift.

**Final Words: An Overview of the Arguments**

We set out in the introduction to explore the contradictions of egalitarian dynamics throughout Latin America at a particular historic moment when the Pink Tide (arguably) enabled the consolidation of egalitarian ideologies within and around states. This has also been a time when, we argue, new state configurations have emerged that take on corporate forms. Therefore, we also anticipated that we understood the Pink Tide (as a particular regional expression of egalitarian processes) to be limited by, or exposed to, the increasing pervasiveness of what we call the corporate state. Overflowing the boundaries of nation states, the corporate state is instead a state dynamic of power. Corporate bodies, private companies and non-governmental organizations operating transnationally capture the apparatus of the state and give it an economic rationale. This process of increased corporatization within the region (privatization, the polarization of political parties, the reduction of barriers for the circulation of capital, extractivism, the precarization and casualization of labour) stands in tension with the egalitarian expressions enabled by the Pink Tide, such as the inclusion of indigenous communities in state matters and the claims of social movements or state-sponsored egalitarian projects. The contributors have focused on the multiple contradictions expressed by the expansion of corporatizing processes in the shadow of a region-wide movement that aimed to incorporate egalitarian policies into state projects, more or less successfully.

The tensions between state-sponsored egalitarian ideologies, social movements and the increasing power of the corporate state emerge throughout
the material covered in this book in different locations of the American continent. From the Mexican case, where low intensity warfare helps to justify the remaking and marginalization of indigenous and poor populations to the initially egalitarian MAS (Movimiento al Socialismo) and its co-optation by the corporate state, through to Cuba and Peru and the entrepreneurial activities in the margins of these states, the multiple dimensions of the Pink Tide as a potentially egalitarian process and the ever encroaching tendencies of corporate capital are revealed. The cases of Ecuador and Chile reveal particularly the rule of the law and other governmental organizations in the co-opting of egalitarian movements by corporate interests through, for instance, development and environmental discourses, legal procedures and centralizing government organizations.

In many ways, the tensions between egalitarian potentials initially embedded within the Pink Tide and the recalcitrant power of corporate capital fuel the different moments of intensification of crisis. The Brazilian case is perhaps the most illustrative case, as the trajectory of the PT, the 2016 coup, and the current succession by Bolsonaro capture the consequences of corporate interests on democratic processes. This may also be the case for Venezuela, as people’s demand for a strong state able to resist corporatizing processes and remain the representative of a collective subject against the exploitations of neoliberal political disorder is collapsing.

Corporatization is a process of structural transformation, and it both underpins the formation of the Pink Tide and undermines it. Egalitarian ideas emerged from this process of transformation and as a reaction to it. Egalitarianism is therefore a process by which hierarchical structures of power (in Latin America defined by ethnicity and class) are subverted, momentarily questioned and opened up, and potentially transformed. But for its very transformative capacity – its potentiality for ruptures – it also always has the capacity for oppression and the destructive effects of homogenization. The Pink Tide was a (not unproblematic) moment of rupture in what had been a decade of neoliberal boom. It aimed to reclaim the power of government to be the provider for the people of an alternative project. This manifested itself differently in particular locations: a welfare state, an indigenous state, a socialist state. Simultaneously, the first two decades of the twenty-first century have seen a transformation of the structures of the state in the Global North as processes of corporatization, expropriation and austerity caused increasing inequalities and the subversion of democratic processes in the interests of the logic of capital (profit, efficiency, economization etc.). Already, we are looking at a different Latin America than the one explored by the scholars in this book. The swing from right to left to right again is not unique to this historic moment, but it has manifested somewhat differently to that
in the 1960s and 1970s with the revolutions of the communist and socialist guerrilleros, therefore it required attention in order to attempt to understand the current potentials of the state for oppression and liberation, at a time when oppression comes also from corporate and non-governmental structures. We hope to contribute to the reconceptualization of the state in Latin America and propose a word of warning that corporatization is not a passing fashion easily overturned.

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**NOTES**

1. Italian right-wing Interior Ministry.
2. This is the word Bolsonaro used to describe the operation.
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William Dalrymple’s *The Anarchy* (2019) wonderfully reminds us that India, the jewel in the crown of Imperial Britain, was born in the rapacious actions of a trading corporation, the East India Company, oriented to extraction of maximum profit. Citing Edmund Burke: ‘. . . the Company would, at last, like a viper, be the destruction of the country which fostered it at its bosom’. In the virtual anarchy that the Company wrought, as Dalrymple describes, was its emergence as the colonial state, eventually to metamorphose, via reforms, resistance and the achievement of national independence, into the contemporary nation-state of the Republic of India. Presenting his key point on the joint stock company that was the EIC, Dalrymple states,

> We still talk about the British conquering India, but the phrase disguises a more sinister reality. It was not the British government that began seizing great chunks of India in the mid-eighteenth century, but a dangerously unregulated private company headquartered in one small office, five windows wide, in London, and managed in India by a violent, utterly ruthless and intermittently mentally unstable corporate predator – Clive. . . . . .

The Victorians thought the real stuff of history was the politics of the nation-state. This not the economics of corrupt corporations, they believed was the fundamental unit of study and the real driver of transformation in human affairs. (Dalrymple 2019: xxv)

What happened in India was repeated around the globe as part of the European expansion east, north, south and west. The prime instruments were not just adventurers in search of riches, but often organized in the form of joint stock companies that assumed the virtual autonomy of states (corpo-
rate republics in some current nomenclature), complete with their own administrative apparatus and instruments (police and military) for the monopolization of violent control, frequently backed by the sovereign territorial states that extended them charter. These companies (the EIC was among the most outstanding) were deterritorializing and, in effect, themselves territorially unlimited – the domains of their sovereignty constrained by the violent competition of other territorially sovereign state-backed companies or corporate republics in the regions that they entered and which were open to grab.

The broad, if arguably unexceptionable point, is that the still-dominant global form of the nation-state saw its emergence in the political-economic, social and religious transformations of Europe that were also the circumstances for the formations of capitalism, tied to the emergence of the bourgeoisie and their rule. Marx, of course, developed this understanding the most clearly, also recognizing the moral and political order of the nation-state (its liberal ideology, its ‘civilizing’ mission) that masked, as it may have tempered, the violence and oppressive, hierarchizing, suppressive and marginalizing forces at the heart of the nation-state. Thomas Hobbes wrote his highly influential conservative monarchist traditionalist treatise on the state, *Leviathan*, in reaction to what he experienced as the socially destructive and fractious individualist competitiveness of the merchant groups in London, the adventure capitalists vital to imperialist enterprise and the forming of the nation-state (see Stern 2012; Kapferer and Gold 2018; Kapferer 2019).

The nation-state is an ideological and political economic formation that has a capitalist, corporatist dynamic at its beginnings and centre, the predatory and savage dimension of such a dynamic being domesticated or subordinated (and regulated) to the legal and socio-moral political orders of the nation-state.

Much discussion on contemporary political processes, as in this volume on South and Central American states, conceive their crises as being connected to neoliberalism and resistance to it. This is sometimes treated as relatively recent, reaching a high point in the era of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, for instance, and extending from it. But, as should be clear here, what is addressed as neoliberalism has its foundation in the world of the formation of the nation-state. What is referred to in this book as the corporate state was born with the creation of the nation-state. The hollowing out of the nation-state, the feature of the current historical moment and effectively the nation-state’s reconfiguration as the corporate state, is little short of the apotheosis or full actualization of capital and its pragmatism for profit mediated through social and political formations of class and what was already immanent in the nation-state – a phenomenon that was coincident with Eu-
European and North American imperialism and the establishment of the roots of capitalism as the global energy of modernity and post-modernity.

I stress the dynamic (and especially the inner capitalist/corporate process integral to nation-state formation) as one of deterritorialization/reterritorialization, in the sense that Deleuze and Guattari (2002; also Kapferer and Taylor 2012) use the concepts. They are akin to the destructive/creative dynamic that Marx and others recognize to be distinctive of capital: its capacity to adapt and transform to shifting circumstance in the undying hunger to extract the greatest profit. Such is particularly evident at the imperial/colonial outreach that involved the radical restructuring or reformation of the sociopolitical (and ecological) terrains of the imperial intrusions. The class/ethnic/racial hierarchies (and other forms of social marginalization) in the cases presented in this volume exemplify the point. It is a dynamic of sociopolitical and cultural invention and reinvention that builds and rebuilds the social and political ground for capital. This is clear in the processes of bourgeois control and the continual struggles of bourgeois social and political fractions to reproduce their dominance through a process of changing alliances and betrayals, brilliantly discussed by Marx in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon* – the dynamic of which continues in what many see as the unfolding tragedies of Trump’s presidency and in the wranglings of the UK’s Brexit (see Kapferer 2016).

Such is also starkly apparent in the chapters of this volume.

One critical thesis of the volume concerns the recurrent pattern of hierarchical forces giving way to egalitarian energies (of sociopolitical liberation, the opening up of opportunities for the oppressed and marginalized, etc.) only for these to give way to hierarchical orders or reactive programs. A major conceptual understanding in this book relates to the fact that hierarchy and egalitarian processes are not mutually exclusive. As I think is well-recognized, paradoxically, egalitarian ideologies often embed hierarchical and exclusivist potential, often of a racist kind that present-day populism, for example, evinces throughout much of the globe. Further, egalitarian forces are premised on the imagination of hierarchy, as they are motivated, most often, by the constraining, oppressive, virtually life-extinguishing and marginalizing effects of hierarchical power.

More generally, it is the history of state formation that underpins the unity of hierarchical with egalitarian dynamics, the mutuality of their implication, in which apparent egalitarianizing developments come to function, from the perspective of the social and political order as a whole, as a means for the reproduction of that order. What can appear as revolutionary, as the American materials so tragically demonstrate, ultimately operates counteractively as a process of reassemblage and continuity. Egalitarian forces are, in the language of the kind of market logics that receive heightened value in
this era of the corporate state, little other than system ‘corrections’. They are moments of social and political re-adjustment in the re-formation of inequitable social orders.

The mutual implication of hierarchical and egalitarian dynamics in state systems, and especially those of the nation-state, have a lot to do with the historically produced structural relations of class and race dominated by the bourgeoisie, by and large the agents of capital and a class category in continual formation – a dynamic process in capital – drawing its members from all points across the social spectrum. It is largely among the bourgeoisie that discourse couched in hierarchical and egalitarian terms is the most intense (the bourgeoisie provide the bulk of conservatives and radicals, however these are defined). It is such discourse, usually of a classic or conventional left/right kind, that comprises the terms of the political alignment of fractions of the bourgeoisie in controlling the sociopolitical orders that are affected by capital, and who become willy-nilly agents in the transitions and transformations of the circumstances for the survival of capital or its expansion.

The hierarchical/egalitarian cycle might be understood as closely connected to what has been discussed, in the heyday for the European nation-state (e.g. Pareto, Mosca, Michels; see Nye 1977), as the circulation of elites, a revolving or redistribution of power among dominant groups who share similar class interests even if they have different visions of how these may be preserved.

But perhaps this cycle is approaching its limit and is at the threshold of new potential – in Max Weber’s understanding, a switching moment in history of revolutionary frustration and a deepening inequity.

The circulations of power within dominant elites (and the cross-class/race/gender relations, the shifts in relations and reassembling of power blocs promising benefit for sections of the wider frequently disadvantaged populations) facilitated the continuity of an inequitable social order despite or because of its contradictions. The circulation of elites might be conceived as a kind of political and economic redistributive dynamic that enabled particular class interests by drawing others into its web of alliance. The emergence of what is addressed in this book as the corporate state gains significance in this regard.

What is described as the corporate state, as the editors stress, involves a reconfiguration, redetermination and submission of the orders of the nation-state to the rationalism of the economic, to an economistic pragmatism that pervades most areas of sociopolitical existence. If it is an outcome of neoliberalism, the imaginary of the corporate state is its most potent manifestation. Thus what has led to the emergence of the corporate state is a desire to institutionalize neoliberal ideology against resistances generated in the contradictions and conflicts, effectively class forces, born of the capi-
talism that conditions the society of the nation-state. The ascendance of the corporate state from within the shell of the nation-state reveals itself as an attack on democratic value (frequently in its name) bearing that shade of the fascism of the recent past in cries of greater efficiency. The corporatizing of the nation-state is associated not just with privatization and outsourcing but the widespread managerialization of bureaucracy (the creation of managerial hierarchies of control relatively free of democratic contingency) and the general establishment of a productive ethos (auditing and other methods of productive control) as a vital dimension of social relations reconceived in terms of the maximization of productive effort. The impetus is against any kind of social disruption threatening a ‘harmony’ of control. The corporate state is an imagination of the sociopolitical framed largely in terms of a business model founded along the lines of rational economic individualism, whose rationality is defined by results relative to the energy expended.

Manuel DeLanda (2006, see Kapferer 2010) expresses in much of his work a philosophy appropriate to the rise of the corporate state, in addition to an appreciation of the new technologies (most specifically relating to digitalization) that have facilitated the corporate state and the societies of its control (Deleuze 1992) and surveillance (Zuboff 2019) – what may be regarded as the anti-democratic effects of the emergence of the corporate state. Such effects manifest as an attack on forms of the social that emerged in history: initially outside the history of capital, and/or which took form as resistant entities through the force of capital, as in the protests shaped in the relations of class/race/gender. What might be described as the corporatization of the social and the political has encouraged the fractionalization of contesting groups and social categories, often engaging an egalitarianizing ethos, individualist in emphasis, against their collectivist possibility (a paradox of much egalitarianism), with hierarchical effect. A radical restructuring of social and political terrains is in process. Class inequalities have intensified in corporatism (associated with post-industrialism and new innovative forms of production and marketing linked to what is often referred to as the gig economy) along with a growing incapacity of the increasingly exploited and dispossessed to resist.

What I am suggesting is that the rise of the corporate state subverts the repetitive or recurrent cycle of mutually implicated hierarchical/egalitarian processes. Hierarchical forces gain sway and egalitarian processes are relatively suppressed to build increasingly towards system-overturning revolutionary potential. Perhaps there are indications of this in recent events in Bolivia and Chile, as well as a widespread ramping up of sociopolitical violence throughout the societies concerned, as Mexico possibly illustrates.

As already indicated, the wave of populist political action that is explicitly antagonistic not just to political elites but to the established political party
systems of many nation-state orders gives a sense of growing impatience altogether with the corporatizing change in the sociopolitical orders of many nation-states. This is assuming an international dimension, even as nationalist sentiments are receiving increasing voice, the latter in certain cases being an effect of the former. Contemporary populism expresses a frustration with the democratic process that is the basis of state legitimacy. But this impatience is to a growing extent beyond the control of nation-states, whose erstwhile sovereignty has been compromised by globalizing processes that are to a major degree driven in the rise of the corporate state whose potency draws from its cross-state or internationally networked bases as much as or even more than from its supposed national home base. The nationalist turn of much populism is in many aspects a reaction to the rise of the corporate state, whose agents, even as they act within the political order of nation-states, are becoming more alienated from the populations they claim to represent.

The chapters in this volume concentrate on the sociopolitical dynamics within nation-states. But with the rise of the corporate state the forces of domination and control have slipped the domains of even limited democratic possibility. It is in the spaces outside nation-states perhaps more than within them that the forces for expanding social and political abjection, driven in new realizations of capitalist potential and more and more impervious to the human suffering that is occurring, is building. The current historical moment is sometimes referred to as the ‘post-human’. The irony of such a label should not be missed.

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