In his article, “German Railroads/Jewish Souls,” Raul Hilberg asked: “How can railways be regarded as anything more than physical equipment that was used, when the time came, to transport the Jews from various cities to shooting grounds and gas chambers in Eastern Europe?”1 The railroads were a formative scholarly preoccupation for Hilberg, who trawled the archives, “pondering the special trains, the assembly of their rolling stock, their special schedules, and their financing.”2 He concluded that in the hands of bureaucrats and technocrats, the railroads metamorphosed, becoming a “live organism” that “acted in concert with Germany’s military, industry, or SS to make German history.”3 The deadly use of railways was history making for Germany, and marked “the end of the Jewish people in Europe.”4 The historian Alfred Mierzejewski has estimated that the end of the Jews was achieved in no more than 2,000 trains. The use of those 2,000 trains, supplied mainly from the Deutsche Reichsbahn (DRB), the Ostbahn (Polish railways), and other national carriers was, according to Mierzejewski, insignificant in relation to other wartime demands for rail traffic.5 The quantitative insignificance of this traffic is, however, historically unprecedented. Although trains and their wartime uses have a historical relationship before World War II, the use of trains for death camp transports was a critical enabler of the Nazis’ genocidal ambition. Without the involvement of trains, the murderous pace of killing in the camps would be undeniably diminished, as would be the number of Jewish victims who now perpetually rest in the figure of six million.

For many scholars, Nazi-organized deportations represent the power of totalitarian modernity, the comprehensive use of transport in facilitating war objectives and genocidal agendas, and highlight the depersonalization of bureaucracies through the labor of the desktop murderer, the Schreibtischtäter, exemplified by the chief architect of deportations, Adolf Eichmann. Deportations also produced a traumatic history of impact for the victims, an impact that was anticipated, if not exacerbated, by the organizers of transports without regard for the physical and psychological welfare

Notes for this chapter begin on page 54.
of the victims. The intentions of these transports were unrecorded by its organizers. Resettlement was a constructed, sanitized narrative that blended truth and fiction. In train timetables, telegrams, inventories, and other communications, Jews were referred to as Stücke, quantities to be identified, accounted for, collected and transported. An examination of victims’ testimonies of deportation cannot be studied in isolation, but is linked to the bureaucratic organization of transit as resettlement, investigating the process’s intentions, methods, and labor. For the Nazi regime, the presentation of deportation to the victims as journeys worth taking was necessary and crucial in the solicitation of ghetto residents to departure points. But the image was only moderately successful. Its credibility also depended on the victims’ hopes for resettlement as a reprieve, despite the often brutal and violent actions of SS guards and Jewish police that accompanied roundups. This incongruence of truths was not always sustainable. Why was the vision of resettlement necessary? What were its organizational features? What factors threatened the image of transports to the East as journeys of life?

This chapter briefly examines the organization and movement of deportation transports across Europe in the context of other wartime journeys and cargo carried by the DRB. I first outline how these transports were organized and recorded by bureaucrats. I then examine how resettlement was implemented with the controversial involvement of Jewish councils, who were charged with fulfilling the deportation quotas issued by the SS, and who used force and fabrication to entice victims to departure points.

Bureaucrats and railway officials were centrally involved in the implementation of deportations for the Final Solution. Hilberg argued that the Final Solution comprised a “destruction process,” which consisted of a vast network of individuals, agencies, organizations and institutions, and a “machinery of destruction” to design and administer it. The process occurred in four phases that marked transitions from social to physical death: identification as Jews through laws, decrees, race hygiene beliefs, material expropriations of Jewish property and business, concentration in larger towns and ghettos, and annihilation by disease, starvation, killing squads, and gas chambers in camps. Most historians contend that the shift in Nazi policy from localized and regional killing to European-wide genocide occurred between July and December 1941. Deportation transports represented a bridge of continuity from concentration in ghettos and Einsatzgruppen massacres to mass death in the camps. The railroads served an apprenticeship during resettlements, when trains moved Jews to ghettos between 1939 and 1941.

The section of the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA) concerned with resettlements was headed by Adolf Eichmann. Contrary to perceptions of deportations as a series of forced migrations pursued with relentless vigor, the Jews were deported in waves between 1941 and 1944, intervals
shaped by the exigencies of planning and coordinating mass murder across Europe. Coordination was dependent on the availability of carriages from the DRB and other national carriers, as well as overcoming the disruption to war traffic because of embargoes and the threat of insurgencies in ghettos and camps. Because deportation was implemented in waves, it had the compounding effect of communal traumas in ghettos, villages, towns, and transit camps, inspiring calls to mobilization and rebellion when rumors about the fate of the deported could not be refuted.

Mobile killings and deportations were dependent on war victories. On 22 June 1941, the German army launched “Operation Barbarossa” by invading the Soviet Union, an offensive that delivered an estimated 2.5 million Jews into the destructive path of the mobile Einsatzgruppen. Unlike the pursuit and massacre of Jews in the Soviet Union, industrialized murder in the camps was concentrated in a largely contained spatial nexus: the stationary yet dispersed victims became mobile yet confined in freight car transports, and the killing—previously enabled by roaming actions of the Einsatzgruppen—became largely stationary through the construction of camps. The shifting mobility of the perpetrators and increasing immobility of victims were entwined in a spatial relationship of isolation, exclusion, and forced relocation. Inspired by German success in the Soviet Union, the Nazi racial war against the Jews expanded in ambition and intention. The murderous geography was increasingly centralized in the “East”: Chelmno, Auschwitz, and the Operation Reinhard camps of Majdanek, Belzec, Sobibor, and Treblinka, and in close proximity to existing railway lines. By the time of the first deportations of German Jews to the Ostland (Kovno, Minsk, and Riga) and to Chelmno some eight years into the Nazi regime, Jews had been languishing in ghettos in occupied Poland since early 1940. Their fate was to change, irreversibly, after the Wannsee Conference of 20 January 1942.

Ministers and bureaucrats at the conference discussed details about the implementation, obstacles, and possible consequences of the Final Solution. It was not enough to transport or resettle Jews to the territory of the “East.” Lost Jewish productive labor had to be replenished, empty apartments had to be tenanted, and abandoned properties had to be confiscated. No other stage of the destruction process posed so many administrative considerations, nor was any so costly and “staggeringly complex.” Legal and practical issues surrounding deportation, such as priority areas for “liquidation” and Jews in mixed marriages, were discussed but never clearly resolved. These issues did not impede the goals of deportation in occupied and projected areas of influence, but in fact energized the commitment to existing and future “deportable” Jews.

The months between January and May 1942 witnessed the deportation of Jews from France and Lublin, and later in 1942, from the Netherlands,
Belgium, Warsaw, and Croatia. The second phase of deportation operations began in January 1943, when trains marked with “Da” (designated for special trains for Jews outside the Generalgouvernement) and “Pj” (for Polish Jews inside the Generalgouvernement) saw the transport of Jews from Theresienstadt, Bialystok, and Grodno. During 1943, in addition to Jews from Czechoslovakia, Jews from Greece and Italy were also deported. The largest remaining national group was 450,000 Hungarian Jews. The Nazis’ swift occupation of that country saw their deportation between May and August 1944 in approximately 147 trains to Auschwitz. In numerical terms, Auschwitz was the largest camp, and the most cosmopolitan. The diversity of its inmate population reflected the geographical reach of the Nazi genocide, for its deportees originated from, among others, the Wartheland region, Upper Silesia, East Prussia, the Bialystok District, Netherlands, Belgium, Slovakia, and Hungary. Treblinka was the main destination for the Jews from the Generalgouvernement ghettos, including Warsaw and Lublin, and received a large number of deportees from Greece and Yugoslavia.

Jewish deportees were not the only “freight” being transported, as the DRB maintained a range of commitments to the Nazi regime. These included the relocation of Soviet prisoners of war and civilian conscripts westward to work in Germany’s factories and fields, the transport of victims to euthanasia centers, the resettlement of 800,000 Jews and Poles into the Generalgouvernement, trains for the construction and maintenance of the camps, the transport of 900,000 foreigners to Germany for forced labor, the transport of Jews for slave labor, and the return carriage of looted property of the deported victims to enterprises and agencies in the Third Reich for use in the war. It is possible to see how the use of 2,000 Sonderzüge (special trains) for the transport of Jews to death camps was, from an operational standpoint, insignificant in the DRB’s traffic, which ran an average of 30,000 trains per day in 1941 and 1942, decreasing to about 23,000 trains daily in 1944. Yet the figures should not detract from the fatal intention of Sonderzüge. In this respect, the role of the DRB was transformative. If the advent of the railways in the nineteenth century contributed to a revolution in the bureaucratic model of organization, the DRB’s support to the Nazi regime arguably transformed the capacity of bureaucracies to achieve a racial and spatial reorganization of Europe in the twentieth century.

Administration of Resettlement

The administration of deportation as resettlement utilized the existing infrastructure of modern transit in the form of stations, timetables, luggage, and fares. The timetabling of resettlements was especially important in regulating
special trains alongside other war and civilian rail traffic, and maintaining order, flows, and rhythms at the destinations to which these trains traveled. Timetables were not only important to the Transport Ministry; they also needed to be coordinated with a particular camp’s extermination capacity.

The preparations for deportation included several stages: the procurement and dispatch of a train, scheduling, collection and assembly, stock supply, financial payment, staffing, and the compilation of deportation lists.22 Once a deportation transport was organized, the RSHA IV B4, the main office that coordinated deportations, circulated guidelines with detailed instructions on procedures to be followed. They provided railway timetables that were devised two to three months in advance and in agreement with the Transport Ministry. They also assigned a quota to each locality, and issued orders for the number of transports. The transport of Jews in Sonderzüge entailed complex procedures that utilized the existing administration and vocabulary of transit in administrative correspondence and documents: timetables, travel agencies such as the Central European Travel Bureau for booking deportees as “travelers” (Reisende),23 and the fabrication of deportation’s purpose in terms of “resettlement” (Aussiedlung), “evacuations” (Evakuierung), and destinations “to the East” (nach dem Ostem). The “East” also expanded in territory as the discourse of denial demanded. For example, the destinations of deportation transports were rerouted in language as “passed through the camps in the General Government,” rather than “special treatment,” so as to convey the impression that transports actually went to the “Russian East.”24

The description of deportees in bureaucratic communications as a “traveler” or “passenger” and the complicated fare pricing applied to transports reinforced the image of resettlement as life journeys for the deportees. Based on 1942 figures, the DRB charged the SS the following rates for the Jews as third-class passengers transported on one-way fares in freight cars: adults ten years and older cost four pfennig per track kilometer; children under ten were two pfennig per kilometer; and children under four were transported free of charge. The group fare for 400 or more persons per transport was two pfennig per person. In comparison, soldiers were charged 1.5 pfennig per kilometer for a return ticket.25 Although the DRB requested payment for the supply of trains for deportations, these funds were not always forthcoming, as Jews had to make it themselves from the sale of their confiscated property. The bill for Jewish transports was sent to the SS, the agency that requested the trains, and the fare reflected the quantity of persons booked and the distance covered.26 On some occasions, the payment of transports could not guarantee their departure, and in many cases, delays at departure and en route aggravated the conditions of transit. Cars and locomotives were scarce, lines were clogged, and bomber and partisan attacks interrupted
traffic and contributed to shortages, “yet throughout this time Jews were being sent to their deaths.”

This death traffic was implemented within the demands of wartime, a rationale that created profoundly shocking conditions for deportees, conditions concealed in documents and timetables as the number of carriages in transports, the number of “travelers,” and departure and arrival times: “To save locomotives and to reduce the total number of transports, the trains were lengthened and the cars loaded to the hilt. In the case of Jewish Sonderzüge the norm of one thousand deportees per train could be pushed to two thousand, and for shorter hauls (in Poland) to five thousand. There might have been less than two square feet per person.” The trauma of touch so commonly experienced by deportees and represented as a cattle car compression was implicit in bureaucratic documents. The overloading of trains with deportees to maximize the concession fares for the SS slowed the trains down considerably, sometimes to forty kilometers per hour, and circuitous routes to the camps were devised to avoid congestion, because “the Jews … did not have to be rushed to their destination; they were going to be killed there, not used.”

The financial administration of deportation as resettlement was essential to its effective implementation as an exercise devoid of implication or responsibility. Even though Jews were booked as travelers, they were shipped as cattle, reflected in the types of carriages used and the group fares charged. Zygmunt Bauman contends it is this purely clinical and dehumanized aspect that typifies the bureaucratic mentality: “For railway managers, the only articulation of their object is in terms of tonnes per kilometer. They do not deal with humans, sheep, or barbed wire. They only deal with cargo, and this means an entity consisting entirely of measurements and devoid of quality.” The representation of deportation as “resettlement” and its victims as “travelers” enabled genocidal traffic to pass through countries and the individual consciences of bureaucrats. The objectification of victims in Nazi discourse is a central issue for scholars in their analysis of language as an instrument of genocide. In his analysis of documents of deportation, such as timetables and correspondence between officials, Hilberg argues that four devices characterized bureaucratic language: prosaic formulations, special words, unvarnished bluntness, and roundabout phrasing. Karin Doerr asserts that “in official communication, the Nazis favoured noun phrases and the imperative and passive modes. Bureaucrats, in particular, employed German in this style and manner in order to render their statements and actions imprecise and impersonal.” Berel Lang argues that the displacement of language in genocidal facilitation saw, “the willed recreation of language entirely as an instrument or means, together with the condition presupposed by that change: the claim by political authority to
authority over social memory and history; the reconstruction of language as entirely ideological and thus as independent of facts, on the one hand, and of human agency, on the other; the assertion of political power to fill the space which is left by the denial to language of all authority of its own.”

Henry Friedlander sees distinctions in communications of the bureaucrats that were premised on concealment, and in the public language of the propagandists. This public language had two purposes: the first was to inflame, abuse, and exaggerate words to isolate social and racial others, while the second was to exalt and idolize the attainments and ambitions of the Nazis. Friedlander contends that the language work of the propagandists was atmospheric, an ideological world of language’s making, whereas the language of physical destruction was the responsibility of the bureaucrats, whose vocabulary was expansive, flexible, euphemistic, but rarely literal.

The foregoing brief overview of deportation traffic and its euphemistic recording is more than a figurative exercise. The transition to mass industrial killing was not simply a transport-and-supply issue of the DRB guaranteeing available carriages to the SS. The transition’s efficiency was premised on the ready and constant supply of victims, who had to be identified, selected, and presented as deportable. The removal of Jews from their communities was already underway in Germany during the period of legal, civic, and social expropriation of the 1930s, before their physical movement into the ghettos and the relinquishing of property and possessions. Deportation, however, demanded a more significant extraction of Jews from their ever-diminishing material, social, and financial commitments. It was a major psychological, administrative, and social exercise, and like most steps in the removal of Jews from their local communities, the Nazis forcibly implicated Jewish councils and community organizations in severing those bonds. Faced with a huge task of relocating the victims from ghettos to camps, and with an obvious labor shortage to achieve it, how were death transports presented to deportees as journeys worth taking? What was required to solicit prospective deportees’ compliance and discourage their opposition and evasion?

Preparing the Deportees

Deportations were marked by a major contradiction in representation: the benign bureaucratic record had to suppress in language its often-violent physical implementation. In the dispatch of a train, the DRB insisted that the SS and its helpers have the deportees ready at the designated loading location before the scheduled time of departure. In historiography, round-ups and liquidations prior to movement by trains belong to what Wolfgang Scheffler has called the “Forgotten Part of the Final Solution.”
Resettlement

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considers the implementation of Nazi racial policy in Poland as the failure of resettlement plans in the Soviet Union, and the manpower shortages and psychological burdens of the Einsatzgruppen to complete extermination actions against the Jewish population. Occupied Poland was, as Scheffler and other historians have noted, a contested administrative and experimental racial landscape. During the occupation, the Nazi objective was to create a biological utopia cleansed of impure races, a cleansing that had to be balanced by the use of Polish and Jewish labor for the German war economy, and resettlement plans for ethnic Germans.

Scheffler’s analysis moves beyond the larger ghettos to investigate deportation procedures in individual districts and prefectures, which “vitiates even the strictest regulations for secrecy.”37 The deportation of Jewish populations in the Generalgouvernement, for example, followed a basic and repeated scheme, in which Jewish councils participated at varying levels of assistance, such as providing a registry of Jews living in the ghettos. Starting in August 1942, resettlement operations were initiated in all districts as mass relocations from the larger ghettos, such as Lemberg, Lublin, Krakow, Warsaw, and Radom.

In the larger cities, resettlement operations entailed enormous depletions of workers from war-related industries, and populations in smaller ghettos were often transferred to larger ghettos preceding deportation to camps. The task of implementing resettlement was a coerced enterprise, with Jewish councils ordered to supply police for the roundups. Jews who resisted resettlement were often shot or sometimes interned. Roundups took place when least resistance was anticipated—late at night, or early in the morning. Before the victims were removed from their houses, the ghettos were physically blockaded and numerous units were called on as enforcers, such as security police, security service, order police, gendarmerie, SS auxiliaries, and sometimes the Polish police.38 Scheffler corroborates Hilberg’s views on the procedure of roundups: “the ghetto residents had to ‘gather’ at suitable points with a minimum of baggage” and “this procedure took place with extreme brutality. Sometimes the procedure lasted whole days. Since no water was provided for those waiting, this caused great deprivation during the hot summer days of 1942; the deportees had been driven to the loading station in a totally exhausted condition. Finally, they were cruelly packed into the freight cars, and once again neither water nor food was provided for the trip.”39

Scheffler’s description of the “extreme brutality” of the roundups is supported in deportees’ accounts of the behavior of SS, auxiliary officers, and Jewish police in occupied Poland who claimed no greater monopoly on the use of violence than other perpetrators in ghettos and transit camps. Deportees’ accounts expose the destructive impulses that accompanied violent persecutions, not only in the infliction of violence, but also in the routinization...
of dehumanization in killing sprees and sites, particularly in the smaller locations, where the principle of secrecy was absurd when reflected in the widespread labor participation in the clearing of ghettos. Scheffler contends that “any closer examination of the ghetto liquidation in all districts of the General Government reveals an abyss of brutality and cruelty that in no way fell short of the occurrences in the extermination camps.”40 Readiness of the victims could not be guaranteed, and often resulted in waves of violence while finding those Jews assigned for deportation. This violence was obscured in the word *Aktion* (action), a euphemism for physical force, violation, and murder. The *Aktionen* included roundups, theft, despoliation, and killing.41 Frequent delays in departures occurred because of *Aktionen* and non-compliant deportees, and also from scheduling deportation trains behind wartime traffic. Not all Jews were immediately deportable; however, Jews under arrest or waiting trial could not avoid deportation, unless they were already sentenced to death.42

From the Nazi perspective, the most convincing method to solicit victims’ compliance was to deny the reality of resettlement, and to include the Jewish councils in its implementation. The recruitment of Jews in the implementation of roundups was not an isolated practice, but was symptomatic of the involvement of Jewish inmates in various “gray zone” occupations or commands that included sorting deportees’ luggage after arrival at the camps, and working in Sonderkommando units in the crematoria.

The shockingly ruthless roundups and liquidations of the ghettos are often integrated into studies of the development of race and resettlement policy between 1939 and 1941 and the ghettoization of the Jews and resettlements of Poles, Sinti, and Roma, and ethnic Germans.43 Historians such as Israel Gutman have examined roundups and liquidations in relation to the mobilization of underground resistance movements in ghettos.44 In *Hitler’s Ghetto*, Gustavo Corni examines “round-ups, deportations and elimination of the ghettos” by looking at how residents perceived relocations and violence. He contends that although roundups and deportations were not completely unanticipated, the destinations largely were, with Germans attempting to disguise that reality and provide inaccurate information about the fate of deportees, who were lulled into a false sense of security. Corni surveys the proactive responses by Jews to the unexpected brutality of roundups and liquidations by finding work in factories, essential businesses, or, contentiously, in becoming a member of the Jewish police. Other responses included attempted escape from ghettos, hiding in forests, joining partisan groups, or passing as Aryans. Corni also includes fatalism, suicide, evasion, and resignation as everyday responses, and the following statement ascribes a common judgment of apathy to victim behavior: “Undoubtedly, the image of ‘sheep to the slaughter’ that is so often referred to reflects the prevailing
form of reaction. Resignation characterized those who got on the trains, possibly because they thought they were going somewhere better.” Corni’s analysis does not pay much attention to victims’ nervous anxieties that were fueled by the lack of information supplied to them about the destinations of the trains, and how physical, group powerlessness affected their responses.

Moreover, Corni minimizes the relationship of dependency and trust between ghetto residents and the Jewish councils to provide instruction about deportations, an involvement that remains highly controversial. The topic remains as divisive now as it was when Hannah Arendt described the supporting role of the Jewish leaders as “pathetic,” “sordid,” and “undoubtedly the darkest chapter of the whole dark story.” The role of Jewish councils and leaders, such as the Lodz Ghetto’s Chaim Rumkowski, in implementing deportation practices is an oft-cited example of corruption and false security. For some Jewish council leaders, the objective of cooperation was justified as an insurance policy against deportation. Although they carried out tasks and functions as ordered by Nazi authorities, such as collecting and supervising deportees at assembly points, the involvement of Jewish police, alongside leaders and members of Jewish councils, have been perceived as complicit and morally reprehensible. Wartime and postwar courts organized around the displaced council members and policemen in Germany and Italy, as well as in Israel, passed judgment on their guilt or innocence, their alleged collaboration with the Nazis, and in particular sought to understand the motives of the policemen, whose defense of obedience to orders was rejected by the courts.

Officials working for the Jewish councils gained the victims’ trust and belief in the image of safe transit. They were involved in compiling deportation lists, and providing Jewish police to conduct and supervise roundups. They maintained accurate departure addresses of the deportees, of their property, and their personal belongings. Individuals and families assigned for deportation were ordered to report at a specified location at a certain time; and once evasions increased, residents were picked up without notification. Ghetto residents were held in assembly areas, which were often market squares, hospitals, and synagogues, until the transport was fully collected and the paperwork completed. In assembly centers, prospective deportees were searched for contraband by Gestapo members. Jewish councils ensured that each deportee was equipped with blankets, washing utensils, and food. Although these provisions were often more detailed and exacting, the apparent care for deportees’ welfare aimed to reassure them that such items would be needed during their journey and after their arrival. It was precisely these instructions that enabled the deportees’ luggage to be moved directly into sorting factories in camps for redistribution and return to the Reich. In circumstances similar to the way people
settle their household affairs before leaving their residence for an indefinite period, departing residents unknowingly participated in their own expropriation. Officials from the Ministry of Finance carried out inventories of deported Jews in a procedure that testifies to what Martin Dean has called the “economic Final Solution.” Deportees had to leave their apartments in good order, pay household bills, surrender their keys, and take with them a limited quantity of personal possessions. On the day of deportation, they were taken to the station on foot or by truck, and loaded onto sealed third-class passenger (often freight) wagons.

The bureaucratic presentation of deportation as resettlement was also conveyed in instructions given to deportees in preparation for their transit. These instructions included itemized data for “voyage luggage,” change of address cards, and “letter actions.” Although these records were not representative of the range of deceptive administrative practices, they indicate the passage of Jews from ghetto inmate to “traveler.” In the instructions for transit, representatives of Jewish councils often reassured the victims of the “necessity for punctual and meticulous compliance with all instructions” and tried to minimize the “psychological burdens on the deportees,” especially when the pace of deportations from areas under German control started to increase in 1942.

One example is “Instructions of the Directorate from the Jewish Community in Berlin,” which was directed specifically to the Spicker family on 3 July 1942 on Transport No. 02019 to Theresienstadt. The following instructions indicate the anticipated problem—the packing and sorting of belongings—and its solution, which was to convince prospective deportees to participate in this process of expropriation by selecting required and treasured items for their journeys. Clothes were to be left at a nearby collection depot, and a minimal amount of luggage was permitted, such as night items, a blanket, plate, spoon, cup, and food. Keys to the apartment were to be handed over to a waiting official, as was detailed information on investments and bank accounts. A concluding sentence in the instructions to the Spicker family read: “we ask you sincerely to follow these instructions with precision and to prepare for your transport with calm and introspection.”

Another example refers to contents of “voyage luggage”—clothes, food items, blankets, and valuables—that the deportees were instructed to pack. In the document “Guidelines of February 20, 1943 issued by the Reich Security Main Office, pertaining to the ‘technical implementation’ of the deportation of Jews to Auschwitz,” notes were listed regarding journey provisions. Deportees from the territory of the Reich, Bohemia, and Moravia were advised to take the following rations for approximately five days: one suitcase or knapsack each with one pair of sturdy work boots, two pairs of socks, two shirts, two pairs of underpants, one pair of overalls, two woolen
blankets, two sets of bed linen (top and bottom sheets), one dinner pail, one drinking cup, one spoon, and one pullover.\textsuperscript{52}

The final example underscored the untrackability of deportees. Before their departure from ghettos, deportees were instructed to complete change-of-address cards, which deliberately omitted reference to the actual destination in favor of “moved—address unknown.”\textsuperscript{53} The deception was complete after arrival in the camps through the completion of a \textit{Briefaktion} (letter-action). A “letter action” referred to the act where new arrivals wrote to relatives or friends in the ghettos or cities, reassuring them about the prospects of resettlement, and attempted to quash circulating rumors about the true nature of deportation’s destinations.\textsuperscript{54} The victims’ completion of these cards and letters concluded the imaging of deportation as resettlement. These cards and letter can also be seen examples of effacement in Michel Foucault’s concept of bio-power in the transformation of human life.\textsuperscript{55}

### Managing the Resettlements: Perpetrator Traumas

Although bureaucratic language and documents contributed to the physical removal of victims, perpetrator accounts of being in intimate physical and spatial proximity to them during the transit process reinforced the sanitized image of the victims as “freight” and “travelers,” and occasionally admitted the traumatic human impact of the procedure. What was concealed in bureaucratic records as benign encounters between perpetrators and victims was often difficult to suppress in the management of logistical hiccups and resistant deportees on trains. The objectifying language of deportation as a resettlement process collided with the appearance, sound, and smell of the suffering victims. Two examples of what I call “management traumas” of deportation reflect how language was used as a rhetorical stabilizer of the problems of transit and delivery. In both examples, victims appear in perpetrator accounts to defy the image of their representation as compliant resettlers.

The first example relates to the prevention of escapes from deportation trains to Belzec. In wartime accounts, deportees who jumped from trains were referred to as “springers” and “jumpers.” “Jumping” from freight cars occurred more frequently on routes where ghettos and camps were in close proximity, when the distances were short, and the landscapes often familiar to deportees. Emanuel Ringelblum’s essay “They Escaped from the Wagons” described the profile of jumpers as “those who had experience. Young men. One [young man] escaped two times—organized eight ‘springers’—people who escaped extermination in Oswiecim by springing
out of the railroad wagons taking them there.” Steve Paulsson’s analysis of “jumping” from trains suggests that it was not an isolated phenomenon, particularly in deportations from the Warsaw Ghetto. Escape also occurred early on in the journey from locations outside of Poland en route to other destinations. On the account of the age of carriages and also due to previous attempts by deportees, the battered conditions of some freight cars made it possible to remove boards. Moreover, the wagons were equipped with small windows strung with barbed wire, which “could be removed or filed through, and anyone small and agile enough could jump out. Alternatively, the doors could be prised open. Jumping from the trains was dangerous, of course: not only physically, but because each train included one or two wagons with roof-mouthed booths, manned by guards with machine-guns.”

The prevention of “jumpers” from trains became a management issue for guards and officers. The frustration with “jumpers” was apparent in Josef Jäcklein’s report from 10 September 1942 about a Jewish deportation train from Kolomea to Belzec. Jäcklein assumed command of the train at 7:30 pm, at which time he described in characteristically sanitized language the terrible condition of the deportees as being in a “highly unsatisfactory state.” Jäcklein complained about the lack of guards on the train, with one officer to nine men in the escort unit, as reason enough to refuse command of the train, but complied in the spirit of following orders. Even before the train departed, both escort units “had their hands full” preventing Jews from escaping, compounded by darkness that concealed the sight of other carriages. Jäcklein seemed inexperienced in his allocation of the escort unit, which departed “on schedule at 20.50” with the placement of five men at the front and five men at the rear of a transport with fifty-one cars and a “total load of 8,200” Jews. Given this compression, it is no surprise that Jäcklein reported, “we had only been traveling a short time when the Jews attempted to break out of the wagons on both sides and even through the roof.”

Jäcklein’s report can be seen as a trauma testimony of managing the journey’s delivery of deportees and their assured and continuing confinement. Jäcklein was so concerned at the success of these “jumpers” that he telephoned ahead to the stationmaster at Stanislau and requested nails and boards to repair the damage to the trains to prevent further escapes. Still, Jews succeeded in attacking other parts of the train, ripping the barbed wire from the windows to such an extent that Jäcklein removed the equipment Jews were using as instruments, the very items that they were instructed to pack for their journey. Given the pounded conditions of the carriages and ferocious will of the Jews to escape, Jäcklein had the “train boarded up at each station at which it stopped, otherwise it would not
have been possible to continue the journey at all.” He also complained that the engine of the train was not strong enough to carry the weight of the deportees, which compromised the speed of the train and thus made escape more possible and “without any risk of injury” because of the slow ascent up hills. Escape attempts must have been especially frequent since the escort squad used all the ammunition and additional supplies of 200 bullets obtained from soldiers.

Jäcklein appears annoyed that the escort squad had to resort to improvised methods at deterrence such as “stones when the train was moving and fixed bayonets when the train was stationary.” Unintentionally, he provides a corroborating witness to the testimonies of deportees about the mass panic and death space of trains: “the ever-increasing panic among the Jews, caused by the intense heat, the overcrowding in the wagons … the stink of the dead bodies—when the wagons were unloaded there were about 2,000 dead in the train—made the transport almost impossible.” Jäcklein appears relieved when the train enters Belzec where he is able to transfer its unloading responsibility to the camp commandant. His trauma in managing the train journey culminates in a failure to establish the number of escapees.

As indicated from Jäcklein’s testimony, train journeys were death spaces, and those who managed to survive them were in states of shock and decline at arrival, markedly disheveled and unsettled from the disorientation, overcrowding, and stench. In the eyes of perpetrators, deportees who arrived at camps were actualizations of the anti-Semitic image of dirty Jews beyond care, and their appearance and smell were used to justify their inhumane treatment as a welcome “relief.” The description of deportees as “cargo” and “freight” continued the objectification and distancing inherent in the language of bureaucratic documentation. The fabrication of the journey’s destination as one of life was evident in the construction of artifices of stations at arrival, which was discussed in the testimony of Treblinka commandant Franz Stangl and his construction efforts there during December 1942. In his exchanges with Gitta Sereny in her book *Into that Darkness: From Mercy Killing to Mass Murder*, Stangl recalled that he ordered the construction of a fake railway station, a clock (which did not work), ticket windows, timetables and arrows indicating future connections. Stangl comments that the artifice was a mechanism of repression to avoid confronting the liquidations of the Jews. In reality, the artifice was Stangl’s way of avoiding his involvement in it:

Sereny: Would it be true to say that you got used to the liquidations?
Stangl: To tell the truth, one did become used to it.
Sereny: In days? Weeks? Months?
Stangl: Months. It was months before I could look one of them in the eye. I repressed it all by trying to create a special place: gardens, new barracks, new kitchens, new everything; barbers, tailors, shoemakers, carpenters. There were hundreds of ways to take one’s mind off it; I used them all.

Stangl’s efforts to create an image of temporary journeys and village life indicate a management trauma that varies from Jäcklein’s frustrated report on the deportation train from Kolomea to Belzec. Stangl’s management trauma returned in sense memory, revived as a visual imprint from his recollection of wartime encounters with trapped and crowded Jewish deportees. This sense memory was revived, ironically, from his own train journeys while living as a wanted war criminal in Brazil: “When I was on a trip once, years later in Brazil … my train stopped next to a slaughterhouse. The cattle in the pens, hearing the noise of the train, trotted up to the fence and stared at the train. They were very close to my window, one crowding the other, looking at me through the fence. I thought then, ‘Look at this; this reminds me of Poland; that’s just how the people looked, trustingly, just before they went into the tins.” It is this contemporary vision, rather than the procedure of mass death that led Stangl to comment, “I couldn’t eat tinned meat after that. Those big eyes … which looked at me … not knowing that in no time at all they’d all be dead.” Sereny sought clarification of his comments and his power to reverse those fatal outcomes:

Sereny: So you didn’t feel they were human beings?
Stangl: Cargo … they were cargo.
Sereny: When do you think you began to think of them as cargo? The way you spoke earlier, of the day when you first came to Treblinka, the horror you felt seeing the dead bodies everywhere—they weren’t “cargo” to you then, were they?
Stangl: I think it started the day I first saw the Totenlager in Treblinka. I remember Wirth standing there next to blue-black corpses. It had nothing to do with humanity—it couldn’t have; it was a mass—a mass of rotting flesh. Wirth said, “What shall we do with this garbage?” I think unconsciously that started me thinking of them as cargo.

Sereny: In your position, could you not have stopped the nakedness, the whips, the horror of the cattle pens?
Stangl: No, no, no. This was the system. Wirth had invented it. It worked. And because it worked, it was irreversible.

Stangl’s characterization of the Jews as “cargo” is often cited by scholars as evidence of how proximity to killing brutalized its perpetrators, how it allowed camp workers and commandants to rationalize their participation,
and continue the infliction of mass murder to the point where the perpetrators represented their actions as symptomatic of the system rather than the result of their own choices and decisions. Although deportees were forced to endure conditions of transit that made them appear to be less than human, they were not “animals” and “like cattle” of their anti-Semitic representation, but desperate, abandoned, and on the threshold of death. Stangl’s characterization of Jews as cargo is further evidence of language’s use as denial of the human and of personal responsibility. The image of “cargo,” of Jews as being locked in “cattle pens” signaled the journey’s brutal work as an invisible torturer in producing conditions of transit that allowed Stangl to view Jewish deportees as being removed from humanity, and indeed, to rationalize their killing as merciful.

As the management traumas of Jäcklein and Stangl show, a significant legacy from the implementation of deportation relates to accountability for its administrative procedures and human impacts, and how various perpetrators represented their involvement in it. The intentional denial of deportations as death journeys in bureaucratic communications produced an evidentiary quandary for historians and prosecutors involved in postwar trials of deportation’s officials and bureaucrats. Scholars have taken the Eichmann trial as a prime example of the dilemma in extracting admissions of bureaucrats’ guilt, complicity, and ideological commitment to the Final Solution. Eichmann killed from his desk, with the ink of his pen, and with indifference and detachment. His clinical perception of his role at his trial in Jerusalem seems to have laid the basis for unquestioning interpretations that have institutionalized his defense as reflective of a bureaucratic mentality. In his own analysis, he was an expert in transportation and emigration, and applied this knowledge to traffic in the East, where no Jewish expert was needed, no special directives were required, and where no privileged categories existed. Eichmann’s defense counsel suggested he was, after all, a tiny cog in the machinery of destruction and hence the destruction process. To Franz Novak, Eichmann’s Transport Officer in the RSHA, Auschwitz was not a world that starved the mind and body before killing it, but a place of motion: “For me, Auschwitz was only a train station.” Interpretations of bureaucratic work as detached and without visible physical impact on victims illuminate how the geographical and psychological distance of administrative structures creates a shield against moral feeling that spatial proximity to the victims may have challenged, and indeed did challenge, when perpetrators were directly confronted with the very people who transcended objectification: deportees embracing life and defying death.

Deportation has been analyzed as the product of the efficient and committed work of the desk murderer and his ostensibly unthinking obedience in a totalitarian complex of invisible actions with fatal outcomes. As the most
prominent representative of this group, Eichmann was not the first or the last to be subjected to interrogation, trial, and public outrage. In addition to his coordinating initiative, deportation involved ongoing and sustained commitments to moving and managing rail traffic and at camps.\textsuperscript{72}

It was in the postwar courts where the tasks of deportation received scrutiny. Henry Friedlander noted that the first trial involving a deportation commenced in 1947 and concluded in 1948 and concerned a small number of deported Jews from Württemberg.\textsuperscript{73} In his ongoing study of trial cases in postwar West and East Germany, legal historian Dick de Mildt analyzed the frequency of prosecutions against “tatnahen Täter”—individuals who had physically perpetrated killings, as well as Schreibtischtäter—higher and top-ranking representatives of the ministerial bureaucracy, industry, the Wehrmacht, judiciary, the police, and the Nazi party. In a survey that covered 1945 to 1952, de Mildt concludes that only five trials were held against twelve such perpetrators.\textsuperscript{74}

Crimes of murder and complicity in murder—key crimes as prepared by prosecution teams in the Nuremberg trials—became dominant between 1967 and 1987 in West Germany, where the percentage of trials concerning crimes against Jewish victims rose from twenty-nine to seventy-six, whereas the number of trials against Schreibtischtäter numbered only fourteen against twenty-seven defendants. Many Schreibtischtäter profited from the revision of a German law of May 1968, which saw the mitigation of penalties for complicity in murder to fifteen years, rather than a possible maximum of life sentence. For those involved in administrative crimes, such as the commission of transports, the existence of personal base motives or racial hatred was almost impossible to prove, because the bureaucratized nature of the task at hand was, more often than not, conducive to the containment or dilution of racial prejudice, rather than its expression.

Cases where sentences were passed against defendants involved in deportations include that of Karl Wolff. He was found guilty of complicity in the mass killing of Warsaw Jews by “intervening with the under-secretary of state of the Reich Ministry for transport, in order to secure the availability of deportation trains to Treblinka.”\textsuperscript{75} Sentences were also passed against defendants in the Netherlands for the arrest and deportation of local Jews to Auschwitz and Sobibor,\textsuperscript{76} against Franz Rademacher for pressuring German institutions and governments allied with Germany to shoot Jews imprisoned in Serbia, and to deport Jews from Belgium, Germany, France, Croatia, the Netherlands, and Romania to concentration camps in Poland, and to prevent their emigration to Palestine.\textsuperscript{77} Case 690 saw the defendant receive eight years for cooperation in the deportation of Jews from Thrace and Macedonia to Auschwitz and Treblinka by the dispatch of the SS-Hauptsturmführer Theodor Dannecker and Dieter Wisliceny as “Jewish specialists” to the German diplomatic corps in Sofia and Salonica.\textsuperscript{78}
Other cases included prosecutions of individuals involved in the deportation of 532 Norwegian Jews to Auschwitz,\textsuperscript{79} life imprisonment for the organization of deportation from Warsaw Ghetto to Treblinka of 230,000 Jews from July to September 1942,\textsuperscript{80} and a four-year sentence passed against the RSHA Adviser for Jewish affairs in Bucharest for his involvement in the deportation of Romanian Jews to Auschwitz.\textsuperscript{81} The geographical range of this complicity shows the dependence of the SS and DRB on foreign officials for the identification, arrest, and deportation of Jews in occupied countries and under the auspices of collaborationist regimes. The lack of success in achieving sentences for these “Administrative Crimes” underscores the frustration about the prosecution of deportation’s labor as a compartmentalized crime in an organic genocidal network.\textsuperscript{82} The frustration is especially disturbing considering the incongruity in assessing accountability for the impacts of powerful bureaucrats in contributing to the displacement and eventual deportation of millions of innocent civilians.

The pursuit of accountability for deportations has moved beyond individuals and redirected to national rail carriers. In 1999, Jean-Jacques Fraenkel lodged a lawsuit against a “collective collaborator,” the Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Français (SNCF), for its role in the deportation of the litigant’s father from France.\textsuperscript{83} Alleging that the SNCF “collaborated in the deportations without any individual or collective act of opposition” and knew of “the intolerable conditions that these people faced on the cattle cars,” the litigation was the first of its kind to prosecute a national railway for crimes against humanity.\textsuperscript{84}

In 2006, a tribunal in Toulouse, France, ordered the state and the SNCF to pay 61,000 euros to a European MP, Alain Lipietz, and his sister, as compensation for their father and uncle’s transportation to Drancy in 1944. In their ruling, the judges cited the prejudice suffered by the victims in confinement and in Drancy, and stated that transportation from the camp “amounted to an act of negligence of the state’s responsibilities” because of the knowledge that Jews from Drancy would most likely be deported to Auschwitz.\textsuperscript{85} The judges also cited the “third-class tariff” the SNCF applied to Jews even though they were transported in “cattle trucks,” a reference to the charges the SS incurred in transporting Jews. In a decision that will undoubtedly affect future claims, the conviction against the SNCF was overturned by an Administrative Appeals Court in March 2007, which argued that administrative courts did not have the jurisdiction to rule on the legal liability of the SNCF in deportations.\textsuperscript{86} These brief examples illustrate the ongoing concerns about the victims’ frustrating pursuit of accountability for deportation’s traumatic human impact.

This chapter opened with Raul Hilberg’s question about why the railroads should be understood as anything more than physical equipment
used to transport Jews. Hilberg's work, along with that of other scholars, provides a partial answer. In historical scholarship, the administration of deportations of Jews to death camps has been represented as the work of detached bureaucrats. Timetables, quotas, euphemistic language, and numbers feature in historians' analyses of the distancing mechanisms of deportation as an efficient, ordered, and committed objective of bureaucrats who were relied upon to follow procedure and resolve obstacles when they arose. These men did not kill with guns but with correspondence and signatures.

The clinical approach of detached bureaucrats is not isolated, and has continued in historians' representations. A striking example is to offer the deportation's trauma as an inventory of removals. While the repetition of deportees as numbers in train convoy totals and timetables to be shipped reminds the reader of the compression of transit, it can also have the effect of severing that compression from the human action, choices, and commitment on which it was so critically dependent. Numbers obscure the trauma of deportation as a human crime with inhumane impacts. I am interested in what victims disclose as the reason for why we should be interested in the workings of the railroads in World War II. Their transit testimony rejects deportation's efficiency as the listing of departures and arrivals on a timetable, and quotas to be shipped. These railway testimonies were about ruptures to mobility, about degradations of life, and the relentless threat of death. Their reports of journeying disclose a radical narrative of transit that un makes the modern railway experience.

Notes


9. For other national carriers and their administrative locations, see figure 4, “Railroad Structure Outside Germany,” in Hilberg, “German Railroads/Jewish Souls,” 528. Under Deutsche Reichsbahn control were the Generaldirektion der Ostbahn in Krakow in the Generalgouvernement (central Poland); the Generalverkehrsdirektion Osten in Warsaw in the occupied Soviet Union; the Hauptverkehrsdirktion in Paris (France); the Hauptverkehrsdirktion in Brussels (Belgium); the Plenipotentiary of Reichsbahn with Dutch Railways in Utrecht (the Netherlands); and the Plenipotentiary of Reichsbahn with Danish Railways in Aarhus (Denmark). The “autonomous” railroads were those of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, in Slovakia, and the Axis satellites of Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria.
10. See map two, “DRB/Ostbahn Routes and Nazi Death Camps, 1942,” in Mierzejewski, Most Valuable Asset of the Reich, 118.
13. Ibid., 355.
14. Hilberg contends that in contrast to the Reich-Protectorate area, there was no Mischling problem, no mixed marriage problem, no old Jews problem, and no war veteran problem in Poland. There were only a handful of foreign Jews in Poland, some of whom were pulled out of the ghettos at the last minute and shipped to killing centers by mistake. See Hilberg, Destruction of the European Jews, 3rd ed., vol. 2, 509. The example of the Rosenstrasse is a case in point of unwanted, high-profile negative publicity about deportations. In early 1943, German wives and their supporters mobilized and protested for a week outside a predeportation collection center in Berlin against the transport of their once-exempt Jewish husbands who numbered around 2,000. This protest was a successful intervention and demonstration of German public solidarity with the Jews that the Nazis,

16. Ibid.
20. Mierzejewski provides information on the contents of returning transports. Between January and June 1942, the camp at Chelmno sent 370 freight cars loaded with the clothes of 145,000 Jews to Germany. Odilo Globocnik, commandant of Treblinka, reported to Himmler that 100 million Reichsmark worth of valuables were shipped to Germany in 852 freight cars during *Aktion Reinhard* beginning in June 1942 until the embargo in December 1942. On 6 February 1943, Oswald Pohl sent a list to Himmler confirming that 825 freight cars with clothing, bed feathers, and rags were sent to Germany from Auschwitz and Lublin. One car contained 3,000 kilograms of women’s hair. In March 1943, Globocnik informed Himmler that during the previous three months, a further 1,000 freight cars with clothing materials valued at 13.3 million RM were sent to Germany. See Mierzejewski, *Most Valuable Asset of the Reich*, 127.
23. In the circulatory plan (*Umlaufplan*), the “travelers” included Ethnic Germans (Vd), Romanians (Rm), Poles (Po), Polish Jews (Pj), and Western Jews (Da). See Raul Hilberg, *Sources of Holocaust Research: An Analysis* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2001), 75.
27. Ibid., 532.
28. Ibid., 540.
29. Ibid., 540–41.

37. Ibid., 36.
38. Ibid., 43.
39. Ibid.
40. Scheffler, “Forgotten Part of the ‘Final Solution,’” 47.
45. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 117–18. Citing Hilberg’s The Destruction of the European Jews (1961), Arendt recalled instances that wherever the Jews did not cooperate, fled the Nazis, or went underground, the number of victims was halved. Her condemnation occupied just a few pages of the book, yet it was the most inflammatory; it saw her ostracized from the Israeli academic community, and delayed the translation of her book into Hebrew for four decades. Idith Zertal reads Arendt’s interpretation of the Jewish leadership as providing “the most profound insight into the moral collapse cause by Nazism, among the persecuted as well as the persecutors.” She also reads the behavior of Jewish councils as distinct from the behavior of “ordinary” Jews (those who were without connections or social standing) in terms of historical experiences of accommodating traumas of assimilation. Zertal claims Arendt saw Jewish council leaders as the “parvenu,” the privileged, prominent Jews who try to play by the rules of others, by the very society that brands and outcasts them, and who struggle to win special treatment for themselves and their kind. See Zertal, Israel’s Holocaust and the Politics of Nationhood, 141–45.
46. Material available refers to forty-two trials against former ghetto policemen and kapos, but includes verdicts for only twenty-seven of them. In nine of the trials, the defendants were freed or rehabilitated. In thirteen cases, the defendants were forbidden to hold any position in Jewish public life or were condemned as traitors to the Jewish people and in five cases banished from the community. See Isaiah Trunk, Judenrat: The Jewish Councils in Eastern Europe under Nazi Occupation (New York: Stein and Day, 1977), 555.
50. Hilberg, Sources of Holocaust Research, 82.
51. These instructions are echoed in other directives from the Jewish Community of Berlin to prospective emigrants to the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, who referred to the resettlement as a “voyage.” Information for “participants” in an emigration transport included advice about the surrender of personal documents such as birth and death certificates to the Jewish Community Archive, the outfit for the journey, the visibility of Jewish stars on items of clothing, and the items that should comprise luggage as a backpack, large suitcase, and hand luggage with a blanket. Certain items were reserved for the “voyage luggage” (suitcase or backpack), which was presumably loaded separately from the deportees, such as tools, razors, sewing gear, and scissors, which during the train journey may have aided escape attempts, hence the insistence that they be separate and available for easy disposal at the arrival location. Cited in Hilberg, Sources of Holocaust Research, 85.
53. To minimize inquiries concerning deported Jews, registration offices (Meldebehörden) should not enter the place of destination (Zielort) into the register, but should instead record only “moved or emigrated to unknown place” (unbekannt verzogen) or (ausgewandert). See Rürup, Topography of Terror, 226.
54. Lang, Writing and the Moral Self, 168.
58. Paulsson, Secret City, 92.
60. Ibid., 232.
61. Ibid., 233. Of note is Jäcklein’s description of the deportees as “load.” The total transport figures approximate to an excruciating 160 deportees per carriage.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid., 234.
64. Ibid., 235.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
68. Ibid., 201.
69. Ibid., 201–2.
70. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 218. In Unmasking Administrative Evil, Adams and Balfour use the bureaucratic processes of the Holocaust as the quintessential measure of evil unmasked. They assert, “the culture of technical rationality … has introduced a new and frightening form of evil that we call administrative evil. What is different about administrative evil … is that its appearance is masked. Administrative evil may be masked in many different ways, but the common characteristic is that people can engage in acts of evil without being aware that they are doing anything at all wrong.” See Unmasking Administrative Evil, xx.
71. Hans Safrian, Eichmann und seine Gehilfen (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1997), 142–43.
72. Mierzejewski looks at the attitudes of former railway employees to the killing of Jews in camps, many of whom did not request transfers for fear of jeopardizing their employment, or simply turned a blind eye. He argues that “there is no record of any member of the railway sections protesting the transports, let alone asking for a transfer. Again, fear for their jobs and the safety of their families, and the simple fact that most did not care because they were not personally involved and were caught up in their duties, explains their behavior.” See Mierzejewski, Most Valuable Asset of the Reich, 126. For an interview with a former Deutsche Reichsbahn apprentice outside the period of the Final Solution, see “Small Hills Covered with Trees,” in Dan Bar-On, Legacy of Silence: Encounters with Children of the Third Reich (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 200–217.
74. Statistics on convictions and acquittals are from the Web site Justiz und NS-Verbrechen (Nazi Crimes on Trial), coordinated by Dick de Mildt. Relevant case numbers are 022, 080, 123, 260, und 310. Available at http://www1.jur.uva.nl/junsv/JuNSVEng/JuNSV%20English%20homepage.htm.
75. De Mildt, Justiz und NS-Verbrechen, Case No. 580.
76. Ibid., Case No. 645.
77. Ibid., Case No. 673.
78. Ibid., Case No. 690.
79. Ibid., Case No. 739.
80. Ibid., Case No. 876.
81. Ibid., Case No. 876.
82. On the theme of administrative crimes, see Christopher R. Browning, “Bureaucracy and Mass Murder: The German Administrator’s Comprehension of the Final Solution,” in Comprehending the Holocaust, ed. Asher Cohem, Joav Gelber, and Charlotte Wardi (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1988), 159–177. Browning examines the bureaucratic work of Franz Rademacher (Foreign Office), Harald Turner in Serbia (military administrator of the occupied territories), and Hans Biebow (German administrator of the Lodz ghetto).
83. See “French Railway Fined for WWII Role,” Spiegel Online, June 7 2006. Available at www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,420057,00.html.