Affects, Aspirations, and the Transformation of Personhood
A Case of Japanese-Pakistani Marriages through a Generational Lens

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Introduction

Drawing on longitudinal research among Japanese-Pakistani families, this chapter explores how the entanglements of affects and multifaceted aspirations shape and are shaped by their trajectories of family making. Through a generational lens, it illuminates how such entanglements entwine with children’s mobility, and how entanglements forge and transform personhood across time and space.

Scholarly works on marriage migration have documented the challenges and struggles of couples across state frontiers. In Asian contexts, a pioneering study by Constable (2005) and subsequent endeavors have documented the complex dynamics involved in migrant spouses’ socioeconomic positionings, agency, transnationalism, and citizenship. Another emerging area of research on marriage migration is the “emotional turn” (Liu-Farrer and Yeoh...
Not only has increased attention been directed to the role that emotions play in mobility across state frontiers, but the burgeoning literature has highlighted how emotions are entangled with materiality (Andrikopoulos 2019; Bloch 2011; Groes and Fernandez 2018). This advance, particularly in the context of marriages between citizens from the Global North and Global South, expands the traditional understanding of the importance of economic gains for immigrant spouses from the Global South by incorporating affect and emotion in the formation and development of intimate ties. Cole and Groes capture the complex dynamics involved in the entanglement between affects and materiality through a framework of “affective circuits.” Their term refers to social (re)formations that emerge from the myriad exchanges of goods, money, people, ideas, images, and emotions. They note that the transactions that constitute “affective circuits” often combine “material and emotive elements simultaneously such that love, obligation, and jealousy become entangled with the circulation of money, consumer goods, ideas, and information” (Cole and Groes 2016: 8).

Importantly, a wide range of actors that constitute affective circuits may also regulate and block flows of exchange, whereby migrants and their families negotiate and rework intimate ties and produce new forms of belonging and personhood (Cole and Groes 2016: 14–15). Their nuanced conceptualization of intimacy reveals the creative tension existing in kinship relationships. More recently, Andrikopoulos and Duyvendak (2020) have drawn attention not only to solidarity, reciprocity, and trust among kin but also to the exploitation and secrecy that unveil the dynamics and elasticity of kinship relations in the contexts of migration and mobility.

Building on this research, this chapter presents the complexity of Japanese-Pakistani family trajectories through an analysis of their evolving transactions across borders.1 In so doing, I consider the interconnectedness or entanglement of geographical, temporal, social, intimate, educational, and class (im)mobilities (Fresnoza-Flot and Nagasaka 2015), which may bring unintended consequences to the lives of their children.

Further, this chapter approaches the complexity of transnational family making by examining the asymmetrical power and emotional friction within the family, which are shaped by the intersection of gender, generation, and larger social forces such as global inequalities. As feminist scholars have pointed out, the family is not a unitary entity (Yuval-Davis 1997). Observing how gender and other intersecting factors shaped asymmetric power relationships within the family and beyond, migration scholars have documented diverse ways in which immigrant wives struggled and responded to the inequalities and predicament that they faced both within the family and vis-à-vis nation-states (Faier 2009; N. Suzuki 2017; Yeoh, Chee, and Vu 2013). In this chapter, I illuminate the dynamics of transnational family making by examining the asymmetrical power and emotional friction within the family, which are shaped by the intersection of gender, generation, and larger social forces such as global inequalities.
making through a generational lens by focusing on the struggles and predicaments of Japanese wives and their children. The experiences of the citizen spouses and their children in South-North marriages are under-researched except for a few studies (López 2015; N. Suzuki 2015). Through the exploration, I investigate specific ways in which gender, class, and generation interact in this type of South-North marriage. By so doing, I unveil the complex entanglements between affects, aspirations, and different forms of mobilities, through which new forms of intimate relationships and personhood emerge.

**Research Methodology and Participants**

The data used in this chapter came from two sets of interviews from my multi-sited and longitudinal research following Japanese-Pakistani couples and their children. The first set of interviews, which I started to collect in 1998, were with forty Japanese wives. I also conducted participant observation at women’s congregations at mosques and gatherings in more informal settings such as their homes. Regarding their educational backgrounds, one finished her education after secondary school at the age of fifteen, ten were high school educated, eleven continued their studies at vocational college, four at junior college [tanki daigaku], nine at university, and one completed a postgraduate degree. These data were not obtained in the remaining four cases. Twenty-eight husbands had started businesses by the early 2000s; twenty-seven were involved in used-car businesses.

The second set of interviews, conducted since 2016, involved thirty-five Japanese-Pakistani young adults between eighteen and thirty years old, of whom twenty-three were female. They came from twenty-four families, twelve of which I already knew from my previous research. In seven of the twenty-four families, couples were legally divorced in Japan, but the couple in one of the families maintained a de facto marriage while the husband married a second wife who joined him from abroad. In another family, the couple maintained their legal marriage in Japan while the husband married a second wife, who, after the wedding, continued to reside in Pakistan. In terms of nationality, the amendment of the Nationality Law in 1984 granted citizenship to children born to Japanese mothers and non-Japanese fathers. Three participants from the same family recently acquired citizenship in the UK, where they resided. The remaining thirty-two participants held Japanese nationality, twenty-two of whom have held no other nationality. Seven of the children once held Pakistani citizenship but renounced it, mainly for practical reasons—it is easier to cross national borders with a Japanese passport than a Pakistani passport.²
The children’s migratory trajectories through high school graduation varied. Nine received education through high school solely in Japan. Of the remaining twenty-six respondents, ten studied both in Japan and other countries, including Pakistan. The other sixteen were mostly educated abroad—ten in Pakistan and six in other countries. At the time of their first interviews, eighteen were based in Japan, six in Pakistan, five in the UAE, four in the UK, one in Thailand, and one in New Zealand. In many cases, their countries of residence (and those of the Japanese women married to Pakistani men) changed during my study, reflecting the transnational nature of family making. In terms of the children’s occupations, at the time of the last interviews, twenty were students, of whom fifteen were university students. Six were employed by private companies and engaged in non-manual jobs. Two were teachers, and one was a civil servant on a short-term contract. The remaining six had other occupations, including medical professions and fashion models. To maintain the anonymity of the research participants, I use pseudonyms, and some personal data have been changed.

**Japanese-Pakistani Marriages: A Union Tangled with Law, Economy, and Religion**

The number of Japanese nationals marrying foreigners rose sharply during the 1980s, and this trend continued until 2006. While this period was marked by an increase in the number of Japanese men marrying women from less economically developed countries, the same post-1980s statistics show a significant change in the patterns of Japanese women marrying foreign men (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 2020). While Americans and Koreans continue to be a large proportion of the foreign spouses of Japanese women (79.1 percent in 1980 and 50.3 percent in 2000), the range of nationalities has become more diverse, reflecting, among other factors, an increased level of intimate encounters between Japanese women and male migrants seeking economic opportunities in Japan. The Japanese economy boomed in the late 1980s, and the 1985 Plaza Accord resulted in a sharp rise in the yen, which attracted a stream of unskilled labor from the Global South to fill Japanese industry’s acute labor shortages. A significant migration trend during this period was a sharp increase in the entry of Pakistanis in the late 1980s. The then existing reciprocal visa exemption agreement between Japan and Pakistan was a major factor in this increase. Before the mutual agreement was suspended in 1989, Pakistani nationals could obtain short-term visas on entry to Japan. Pakistani migrants to Japan were predominantly male and hailed from the middle or lower-middle
classes in cities such as Karachi and Lahore. The majority entered relatively low-skilled manual labor occupations in Japan, work that they would not normally undertake in Pakistan. With a few exceptions, the Japanese government did not grant visas to what they deemed low-skilled or unskilled labor. Under such circumstances, marrying Japanese nationals offered Pakistani migrants one of the few options to continue to live and work in Japan.

Young Pakistani men, however, did not move to Japan and marry Japanese citizens purely for economic reasons. My interviews with Japanese wives indicate that their husbands had come to Japan not only to make money but also to see different worlds or to escape from marriages arranged by their families. After arriving in Japan, Pakistani men met their prospective partners in workplaces, restaurants, in the street or other public spaces, and through the personal introduction of mutual friends and acquaintances.

Interviews with wives suggest two main motives for marrying Pakistani men. First, the women saw in their prospective husbands a new type of masculinity. Many women remarked that they were attracted to their prospective husbands because they look after their families in Pakistan, not only economically but also by being emotionally involved in family relationships. They presented these women with an alternative to typical Japanese husbands, who work long hours as the breadwinners, but without being much involved in family life. Second, by marrying Pakistani husbands, they saw the possibilities of being exposed to cultures and values that were novel to them. Pakistani men’s complex motives for crossing national borders, and Japanese women’s desires for alternative forms of partnership, were among the elements that led to their decisions to marry after their intimate encounters during the late 1980s and 1990s.

Japanese women and their Pakistani husbands had to overcome multiple barriers. First, Pakistani men’s families had ambivalent attitudes toward them marrying Japanese women. On the one hand, some families opposed the marriages because, violating Pakistani norms, they were not arranged marriages. Also, families perceived Japanese women, raised in non-Islamic environments, as sexually loose, even immoral. On the other hand, sending a member of the family to the rich Global North offered an invaluable resource for the economic survival of the extended family. As a result, some families reluctantly accepted the marriage, although they were not entirely satisfied with the match. A Japanese wife, Sadia, who married in the early 1990s, shared:

When I met my husband, Shahid, I was working in the apparel industry after graduating from a vocational college. I fell in love with Shahid but was not sure if I could cope with all the problems that I would face if I
married him. My parents were extremely worried. I decided to visit his family in Pakistan on my own (as Shahid was overstaying his visa and could not leave Japan) to see if I could build a family with him. When I met my father-in-law, I asked him if he would allow our marriage. He asked me in simple English if I liked Pakistan and whether I loved his son. I said yes and he allowed us to marry. At this time, Shahid’s paternal grandfather was still alive, and he had all the power to decide who would marry whom within the family. Before Shahid left Pakistan for Japan, he had asked his grandfather if he could choose his marriage partner by himself, because he did not want his marriage arranged. His grandfather had given Shahid his permission. This is why his relatives could not object to his marriage openly, although many of them complained, asking why Shahid should marry somebody outside the family, let alone a foreign woman.

On her first visit to Pakistan, she brought jahez (dowry) in the form of money. Shahid’s parents reciprocated with gifts that filled her suitcase on her way back to Japan. Interestingly, such traditional Pakistani marital transactions did not take place among most of my sample. Aisha, another Japanese wife, remarked that her husband’s family must have been satisfied that he could get a visa to Japan by marrying her.

In many cases, Japanese wives also met with strong opposition from within their own families and friends, largely due to the negative image of “foreign workers” from other Asian countries. In the late 1980s, the number of male migrants who were apprehended for working illegally rose sharply. Pakistanis and Bangladeshis constituted a significant segment of that group. This led to a Japanese government crackdown, which has been repeated since then (E. Suzuki 2009: 80–85). The term “foreign workers” therefore conjured images of illegality in public discourse.

Pakistani migrants also suffered from racial discrimination. When I was visiting the home of a Japanese-Pakistani couple, the Japanese wife, Ameena, reported that her parents had fiercely objected to their marriage, so their marriage was almost like eloping. Their marriage had caused a serious family feud in Pakistan too as her husband had had a fiancée within his extended kin, although her husband-to-be’s parents finally agreed to their marriage. Listening to our conversation, Ameena’s husband, Naeem, added: “For us foreigners to economically survive in Japan, we have to do a dirty and physically strenuous job with lower wages than our Japanese workmates. In addition, we are discriminated against because of the color of [our] skin, while those from America and Europe are given a privileged status.” Japanese women who married Pakistani migrants therefore risked being social pariahs and experiencing downward social mobility. The couples suffered discrimination in various aspects of their lives, including
housing and work. Moreover, the opposition from wives’ natal families meant a loss of practical and moral support in overcoming the structural inequalities the couples faced early in their marriages.

State control of binational marriages affected couples’ lives adversely. Although a visa status for a foreign spouse (“Spouse or Child of Japanese National”) was created in 1982, removing the overt form of gender inequality that had existed earlier, the new legal provision had its limitations (Kobayashi 2009). For the purpose of preventing “sham marriages,” immigration policies made it increasingly difficult for those who overstayed their visas to be granted a spousal visa. Many of the women in my study recalled long and painful processes for obtaining a spousal visa for their Pakistani husbands, most of whom had overstayed and were working without permission at the time of marriage. While marriages between Japanese citizen men and women from the Global South are tolerated because they contribute to the reproduction of the nation-state in the face of a population decline, the legitimacy of citizen women marrying men from the Global South is scrutinized in a more negative light, because not only their migrant husbands but also the women and their children tended to be regarded as outside of the Japanese nation.

State regulations over binational marriages affected couples’ lives in another way. Japanese women had to become Muslim for foreign husbands to obtain a spousal visa. Couples must certify that they have been married in accordance with the laws of both countries. Pakistan, an Islamic republic, requires the submission of a religious marriage contract, nikah nama, under Muslim family laws. Prior to signing this contract, most women in my sample converted to Islam because, according to the Muslim law of Pakistan, Muslim men can only marry Muslims or “people of the Book,” meaning generally Christians and Jews. This is why at the time of conversion many Japanese wives in my sample had considered themselves “paper Muslims,” because they only converted to fulfill the legal requirements to register their marriages. At later stages of their lives, some underwent religious journeys, becoming practicing Muslims. Hence, as Fernandez (2013) points out, state intervention brought unintended consequences to the lives of binational couples.

Conversion to Islam had important implications in these women’s lives. First, their conversions helped moralize the marriages in the eyes of Pakistani families, who saw wives from non-Islamic countries as morally inferior. This meant that Japanese wives were expected by their husbands, extended kin, and the moral community formed by the Pakistani diaspora in Japan and beyond, to conform to an ideal Muslim femininity. Second, the Islamic gatherings organized in Tokyo and surrounding areas formed a network of mutual assistance among Japanese women facing similar challenges
marrying Pakistani men. Further, there was a tendency among Japanese wives who congregated at Islamic gatherings to develop their religious identities based on a discourse they identified as “true Islam.” By “true Islam,” the women meant the religious faith and practices that follow the scriptures of the Qur’an or the hadith, not blindly following the culture of Pakistan. A discourse on true Islam allowed Japanese women to contest and negotiate the ideal Muslim femininity their husbands and in-laws expected. For example, one woman told me:

Yesterday, when my husband and I were going out to see a Muslim couple, he wanted me to wear shalwar qameez (a long tunic and trousers worn in Pakistan). I refused his request, protesting that, according to the Qur’an, it is enough if I wear modest Western clothing that covers my arms and legs. My husband was not happy but could say no more.

As her narrative exemplifies, the women argued that their husbands’ expectations were based on the culture of Pakistan rather than the teachings of true Islam. Further, building an identity as Muslims enabled them to draw a boundary between themselves as “Japanese Muslims” and non-Muslim Japanese society. Thus, becoming Muslim became a resource to craft their new subjectivities after marrying Pakistani migrants in Japan.

Creating Affective Circuits across Borders

The challenges couples faced in the early stages of marriage created “affective circuits” (Cole and Groes 2016) through which money, kin, and service (such as care) are exchanged across national borders. First, some couples relocated to Pakistan so that husbands who had overstayed their visas could arrange for spousal visas from there. Second, after the husband’s legal status was stabilized, they could travel not only to Pakistan but also to other countries to expand their business opportunities. Pakistani men who married Japanese women often started their own businesses. The majority of Pakistani husbands in my sample started businesses exporting used cars to Pakistan, the UAE, Russia, Chile, and other countries. A shift from factory workers to transnational entrepreneurs was a way to overcome their marginality in the domestic labor market and continue remitting money to their extended families in Pakistan while providing for their families in Japan. The involvement of Japanese wives in newly established businesses was indispensable in several ways, including dealing with business documents in Japanese and applying for visas for husbands’ male kin to join them in Japan so that they could help the family businesses or otherwise work and send remittances to extended families in Pakistan.
Wives’ parents tended to soften attitudes as grandchildren appeared, even serving as guarantors for couples’ businesses. Sana, a woman whose husband started a business, shared that he first resisted relying on her parents’ help because he felt that it would undermine his male authority. She persuaded her husband to accept her parents’ help as it was vital for him to establish his business. To overcome structural inequality within Japan, couples had to negotiate gender ideals and power balances when they mobilized assistance from wives’ kin.

Third, care exchange across borders took place, marking an early stage in care trajectories (Kofman 2012). This took several different forms. For example, Shazia, a Japanese wife, relocated with her infant children to her husband’s extended family in Pakistan partly because she could get child-care support, whereas in Japan she had no close kin to help. In some cases, a husband’s female kin travelled to Japan to provide the short-term care couples needed, while in Japanese society it is more common that the wife’s family provides care at the time of childbirth. The Japanese women I interviewed explained that because female kin from Pakistan could cook Pakistani food for their husbands, kin visits significantly reduced the chores wives had to perform after having a new child. Interestingly, care was not always provided by women. A Pakistani man I met during my research in Pakistan recalled travelling to Japan to look after the two children of his brother and his Japanese wife, who could not care for them. He remembered being unable to turn over in bed as both children wanted to hold his hands when they slept. This suggests that the sexual division of labor can be rearranged when kin cross borders.

As wives’ parents in Japan aged, the next phase of care arrangements emerged. For example, a Japanese woman who relocated to Pakistan with her children—a move that I describe in the next section—returned to Japan for several months to care for her parents. This was only possible because she could leave her children in the care of the extended family in Pakistan (Kudo 2017). In the following sections, I investigate how the entanglements of affect and multifaceted aspirations that were observed early in marriage shifted as life cycles progressed, shaping the evolution of affective circuits across time and space.

**The Emergence of Transnationally Split Families**

When children reached school age, different circuit patterns emerged, with Japanese wives and their children migrating abroad while their Pakistani husbands remained in Japan to run businesses. Among the forty Japanese wives I interviewed, thirteen relocated to Pakistan with their children, among whom three relocated again to other countries at a later life stage.
One woman relocated from Japan to another country. In three other cases, the wives remained in Japan and sent the children to extended families in Pakistan. In the remaining twenty-three cases, families remained in Japan. The wives and children who moved to Pakistan usually joined their extended families, while those who migrated to other countries formed female-headed households. In the latter cases, destination countries included the UAE and New Zealand, where husbands had established business links to export used cars from Japan.

Multifaceted aspirations and desires triggered this type of transnationally split family. First, many of the women I interviewed emphasized that their husbands strongly wished their children to be raised in Islamic environments. What husbands meant by “Islamic education” was highly gendered, often synonymous with protecting their daughters’ sexual purity. Saki, a Japanese wife, stated that her husband once told her that he had sleepless nights fearing that his five-year-old daughter would be negatively influenced in Japan, which he saw as sexually corrupt. Behind the husbands’ strong desire to “protect their daughters” was the religio-cultural norm of parda (meaning “a curtain,” referring to the sexual segregation practiced widely in South Asia), according to which females have to be separated both physically and symbolically (by wearing a veil) from unrelated males. This gender norm is integral to the notion of family honor. The norm of parda is most strictly adhered to by the lower-middle- and middle-class families in urban Pakistan, from where many of the husbands hail, as they try to differentiate their status from the lower strata of the society by doing so. Fatima, the daughter of a Japanese-Pakistani couple, was raised in Pakistan and shared that her paternal kin regarded her as morally superior to her female cousin who had been brought up in the United States, a country they considered sexually corrupt.

Second, splitting families between Japan and Pakistan had economic implications. If Japanese wives and children lived in Pakistan, families could maximize the economic gap between the Global North and Global South, and consequently raise the living standards of the extended families. Furthermore, couples could send their children to prestigious private schools in urban Pakistan that offer English-language education. In Japan, on the other hand, international schools were too costly for many of the couples. Investing in the education of the next generation reflected the aspirations of Pakistani men and their families to achieve upward social mobility.

When Japanese mothers and children relocated to a third country, the couples could combine used-car export businesses, giving their children English-language education, and, where possible, an Islamic education. Japanese wives considered it easier to pursue their mothering roles in these
countries, which had more amenable climates and better functioning infrastructures than Pakistan. The women could also be freed from the politics of the extended families in Pakistan. However, those who relocated to the UAE, the UK, or New Zealand faced challenges, including strict immigration controls and financial strains, which could prevent families from visiting each other as frequently as they wished. They could also suffer from a lack of child-care support, and possible discrimination against Asians and/or Muslims.

Dynamics of the Power Shaping Family Trajectories

Japanese women did not always share their husbands’ desires to educate their children in Islamic environments, and it often took a long time for them to decide to relocate abroad, particularly to Pakistan, which was their most common destination. Power dynamics between couples shaped family migratory trajectories.

Most Japanese wives in my sample left their full-time jobs after they had children. Not only was this due to husbands’ cultural-religious gender norms, but the change also reflected gender norms in Japan and the marginality of married Japanese women with young children in the mainstream labor market (Tamiya 2020). Whereas many wives became involved in their husbands’ businesses, it did not necessarily empower women economically because it meant that wives would lose their economic autonomy vis-à-vis their husbands.

The second factor affecting family power dynamics was changes in a husband’s visa status in Japan. Husbands in my sample, most of whom had already overstayed their visas at the time of their marriages, relied on their Japanese wives to obtain spousal visas. Most husbands managed to obtain permanent residency, and some even achieved Japanese citizenship. With the securing of their legal status in Japan as well as a decrease in their wives’ economic power, power dynamics shifted from wives to husbands. Further, insufficient state welfare support for single mothers (Tamiya 2020) makes it difficult for women to divorce.14

Shifting power dynamics affect whether Japanese wives relocate to Pakistan. Kana, a Japanese wife who moved to Pakistan, remarked: “I came here as I had no other options.” Having lived in Pakistan before (for her husband to obtain a visa from the Japanese Embassy in Pakistan), she knew of various challenges that she would have to face, but she acceded to her husband’s strong desire to educate her children in Pakistan, mainly because she did not have sufficient economic means to support herself and her children if she were to divorce him. Her case illustrates an uneven distribution of power within the complex patterns of the power geometry of
time-space compression (Kudo 2017). While some can initiate movements across national borders, others are not “in charge” of the process, despite much physical moving (Massey 1993: 61–63).

Not only did the power balance between couples shape their migratory trajectories, but geographical mobility across borders brought a new turn in power dynamics between couples. As Ong (1999: 20–21) and Liu-Farrer (2018: 134) point out, mobility across national boundaries may confine women to caring roles, reinforcing gender norms. After relocating to Pakistan or other countries, the Japanese women’s roles became limited to caring for their families, and for children especially. The possibility of engaging in economic activities abroad was constrained by multiple factors, including women’s immigration status in the destination country, the religio-cultural practice of women’s seclusion (parda), and lack of language skills and social capital.

The position of Japanese wives within transnationally split families was, however, ambiguous, which indicates complex relationships between women’s geographical mobility and empowerment (Liu-Farrer and Yeoh 2018: 5). On the one hand, to carry out everyday tasks related to maternal roles in Pakistan, Japanese women had to rely on male kin in extended families due to the women’s seclusion, lack of linguistic skills, and knowledge about Pakistani society. Dependence on male kin further weakened their position within the household, where the power balance was already shaped by gender and seniority. On the other hand, wives could exert a degree of power because they came from the Global North. Women’s positions within the household were partly determined by how much they and their husbands had contributed to the household economy (Kudo 2017). Hiromi, a Japanese wife, returned to Japan with her children to be reunited with her husband after struggling to settle in Pakistan. Her husband was not happy about her decision but finally agreed to raise their children in Japan because, among other reasons, her income, which she would earn by working in a local supermarket, would contribute significantly to remittances to Pakistan. She stated, “My daughters and I would have been sent back to Pakistan if my husband were economically successful.” Her husband’s business had been hit hard by the stagnating economy in Japan, while living costs in Pakistan were rising sharply. Hiromi’s case illustrates the dynamics of patriarchal bargaining (Kandiyoti 1988), which shape the trajectories of transnationally split families.

Lodged in the changing power dynamics within the family, the Japanese women negotiated their and their children’s positions by employing various mothering techniques (Fresnoza-Flot 2018). Some wives distanced themselves from relatives in Pakistan after they relocated there. A Japanese
woman, Saima, who resided in Pakistan confided that she deliberately did not learn Urdu, a language her husband’s family spoke, to avoid extended family politics. Her speaking only Japanese at home also allowed her children to maintain their ability to speak Japanese. Another Japanese wife, Naira, who sent her daughters to the extended family in Pakistan, remarked that she refused expensive gifts from her husband’s kin to her daughters because she feared they might lead to expectations that they could arrange her daughters’ marriages to cousins in Pakistan. Thus, some Japanese wives tried to keep their family life intact while sometimes blocking the flow of goods between kin.

Evolving Trajectories of Transnational Families

Educational Mobility

In the cases of the transnationally split families described earlier, the next phase of migratory trajectories began when the children moved to another location for tertiary education or to start a career. This created new dynamics in family migratory trajectories.

Many who had been raised abroad wished to study in an English-speaking country such as the UK or Canada. As the children of Japanese-Pakistani marriages held Japanese nationality, it was relatively easier for them to obtain student visas to the West than it was for their Pakistani national peers. The majority, however, ended up studying at a university that offered its courses in English, either in Japan or in other non-Western countries in Southeast Asia or Eastern Europe. Some who had been raised in Pakistan or the UAE chose branches of Western universities in those countries—in many cases, this was primarily due to financial and familial circumstances. The reasons were also gendered. Asked why she chose to study in Pakistan, Saera responded that her father had given her no choice. He did not want her to live in a foreign country on her own due to gender norms, but her brothers could do so.

Further, while economic constraints were a major reason behind their return to Japan, the move could not be explained entirely by individual rational choices taken in the context of economic inequalities. Family circumstances and emotions arising from them also shaped the choices of where to study and work. Basit’s case illustrates this well. He was accepted at a university in the UK after finishing high school in Karachi. He changed his mind, however, and decided to study at a university in Japan instead. While it was partially because of the family’s financial difficulties, he made this decision also because of the emotions invoked by childhood memories of care (Cole and Groes 2016: 8). He felt deeply indebted to
his mother, who made sacrifices to raise him and his siblings in Pakistan despite difficult family politics and without much help from his father, who was mostly in Japan. He and his mother were unable to visit Japan for most of his teens largely due to family circumstances. The feelings of immobility caused frustration and resentment. Gender-based inequality within the family also influenced his decision to study in Japan because his mother and sisters could only move back to Japan if he went there. His educational mobility created a way to bring his mother and sisters back to Japan and to rebuild the family, which had been split across borders. His case suggests that holding Japanese citizenship and achieving English competency did not necessarily mean that the children headed to the West, which was the most obvious sign of upward social class mobility in postcolonial Pakistan. It exemplifies a complex entanglement between geographical (im)mobility and other forms of mobilities, such as educational and intimate.

**Divorce and Polygamy**

Over the last decade, an increase in divorce and polygamy added a new dimension to family trajectories. Overall patterns of divorce and polygamy among Muslim minorities are complex and diverse due to plural legal systems (Charsley and Liversage 2012; Qureshi 2016). The divorces and polygamy that I witnessed mainly fell into three patterns. In the first, the legally divorced couples cut their marriage ties altogether. In all such cases except for one, the Japanese wives took sole custody of their children, whereas in the other two patterns, the husbands appear to maintain, to varying degrees, their moral and economic involvement in the lives of the Japanese wives and children.

In the second pattern, Japanese-Pakistani couples were legally divorced in Japan but kept their religious marriage contracts, *nikah*. In some of those cases, the husband brought a second wife to Japan on a spousal visa, while also maintaining a de facto marriage relationship with his Japanese wife. In two cases, the second marriage occurred when the husband met another woman in a third country to which he had travelled for his used-car exporting business.

In the third pattern, the couple remained legally and religiously married in Japan but the husband took a second wife, either in Pakistan or in another country outside Japan, forming transnational polygamous families. In one case, the second wife, a Pakistani, lived in Pakistan and cared for the husband’s parents, suggesting the possibility that polygamy fills the needs of the extended family in Pakistan. Such cases indicate that polygamy occurs not necessarily as a traditional form of marriage in the sending country but
as a new marriage practice to respond to transnational contexts (Charsley and Liversage 2012).

From the perspective of Japanese wives, how they respond to their polygamous arrangements differs, depending on individual circumstances. While some wives cut de facto marital ties with husbands who took second wives, others accepted polygamy for complex reasons. Although I have not collected sufficient data to present the complexity, informal conversations that I have had with Japanese wives suggest that shifting power dynamics lie behind accepting polygamy. In addition to the stabilization of a husband’s legal status in Japan, the precarious situation of single mothers in Japan in terms of work, care, and welfare (Ezawa and Fujiwara 2005; Tamiya 2020) appear to discourage women from divorcing. Further, some women who shared their marital problems with me felt that because they had married Pakistani men, despite strong opposition from their Japanese families, the women should not rely on Japanese kin support in times of marital crisis. This sense of “self-responsibility” (jiko sekinin) can also hinder them from divorcing and reconstructing a new life in face of their husband’s polygamy.

Transformation of Personhood: Children’s Journeys

As examined above, the entanglements of different forms of mobilities shape the complex trajectories of family making. This leads to nurturing new forms of personhood among the children of Japanese-Pakistani marriages. The narrative of Hina, whose parents divorced, capture their journeys of self-making.

The Case of Hina

When I last interviewed her, Hina was in her early twenties and had lived in Japan her entire life, although she used to visit her father’s extended family in a town in Punjab during school holidays until she was in her early teens. While she did not like staying with her large extended family in Pakistan because of the lack of privacy, when she returned to her quiet house in Japan she found herself missing the noise. Also, she was attracted to the beautiful shalwar qameez that she saw and wore in Pakistan. It still influences what she chooses to wear in Japan.

Her parents divorced when she was in her late teens. Before that, her father had controlled what she could wear, and he made sure that she did not mix with boys; meanwhile, her brothers lived in a “different world,” with far greater freedom. She struggled to cope with the different cultural
practices at home and in school, where she was the only Muslim. She felt it unreasonable that her father controlled her for the sake of maintaining his honor, and that it was unfair that only girls were expected to conform to the gender norms while boys were free to do anything.

As her mother took sole custody of the children after the divorce, she was freed from her father’s control. This did not mean, however, that she departed from the world she had lived in. She experienced a sense of loss. When she saw her friend whose father was Pakistani, she understood the struggles her friend had to go through, and saw her past self in her friend. Her journey of self-searching started then. Although she used to distance herself from the Islamic values that her father had tried to impose upon her, she started to reflect on what Islam meant to her. She gradually developed her own interpretation of Islam, which became an important pillar around which to organize her life. She has never thought of marrying a Pakistani because from her experiences of her father and his friends she feels that Pakistani men would control their women. She thinks, however, she might marry a Muslim from a different ethnic background because she wants to share religious values with her husband. Her case demonstrates that reconfiguring herself as a Muslim continues after her parents’ divorce.

Discussion and Conclusion

The trajectories of family making among Japanese-Pakistani families exhibit the entanglements of different forms of mobilities, involving diverse exchanges of emotions, money, gifts, and services such as care and labor, from which complex forms of global interconnectivity emerge. These entanglements reveal that separately conceptualized mobilities—economic, care, intimate, educational, and social class—crisscross the lives of migrants and their families. Findings from my longitudinal study can be summarized in three points.

First, entangled affects and multifaceted aspirations shape and are shaped by the trajectories of family making. Intimate encounters between Pakistani men and Japanese women involve not only the men’s material aspirations, but also their desires to broaden their life-horizons, and to experience alternative forms of love outside Pakistani society. Japanese women’s hopes for alternative conjugal relationships also shape their intimate encounters. Couples’ struggles to overcome the challenges they meet early in marriage lead to a subsequent stage of geographical movements between the Global North and Global South. Formations of transnationally split families are shaped by multiple aspirations, hopes, and ambitions.
embraced by the couples and their family members. Those forces are not only economic, but social and cultural. Notably, raising children in “an Islamic environment” in Pakistan means accumulating moral currency, particularly by protecting the sexual purity of daughters. Economic gains have to be carefully blended with moral capital to maintain the status of the kin group within Pakistan and its diasporic communities, and to move upward in their cultural cosmologies (Chu 2010, quoted in Cole and Groes 2016: 25). Thus, Pakistan can be a moral magnet that draws to it child-rearing Japanese-Pakistani couples. This moral force combines with other hopes and desires to create a reverse movement by Japanese wives and their children from the Global North to the Global South. Many, however, move back again to Japan after child-rearing, suggesting a link between geographical and temporal mobilities that shapes the ongoing processes of family trajectories through the life course. Educational mobility initiated by the children is also shaped by entanglements between their multiple aspirations and emotions.

Second, as the life course progresses, affective circuits involve much wider networks of kin, creating a complex social web connecting the Global North and Global South. This complexity calls for a need to avoid methodological conjugalism, which narrowly focuses on the relationships of heterosexual and monogamous marital ties, and sees the normative forms of marriage as the natural end of a migratory path from the Global South to the Global North (Groes and Fernandez 2018: 13–14). Further, my research finds that individuals become emplaced differently in social networks of kin across borders. Family members negotiate their positions and try to control the flow of exchange as life progresses (Cole and Groes 2016: 14–15). Family members do not always share goals or aspirations. Power dynamics, shaped by structural inequalities connected to gender, nationality, and class, add to the complexity of the mechanisms through which their migratory trajectories evolve. The affective circuits expand as husbands seek business opportunities on a global scale. This, in some cases, brings new intimate encounters, resulting in divorce or polygamy, inviting a complex mix of emotions, conflicts, and desires across generations.

Third, the entanglements of different forms of mobilities create and transform personhood for the next generation. Basit’s case illustrates that his sense of obligation to his mother was nurtured through his experiences of transnationally split families where mother and children moved from the Global North to the Global South. This process forged a form of personhood, which cannot be explained as an autonomous individual pursuing his own interests. Rather, it was a “node in systems of relationships defined by mutual assistance and asymmetrical exchanges” (Cole
and Groes 2016: 11). This, in turn, triggered the next move in the family trajectory through which he, his mother, and siblings “returned” to Japan. His case demonstrates the centrality of emotions in shaping migration trajectories (Skrbiš 2008; Charsley 2013), pointing to the need to go beyond the push-pull framework, which privileges economic aspirations, and to capture complex entanglements of mobilities from an intergenerational perspective.

One final point is that Hina’s case unveils the dynamic process of self-making that accompanies the trajectory of family (un)making. Affective circuits were blocked when her mother divorced her father, resulting in a disruption in her father’s desire to raise her as an ideal Muslim woman. This does not mean, however, that her struggles to negotiate her religious self and femininity have ended. Rather, the separation from her father created an opportunity to reforge her personhood and develop a new orientation for her marriage partner. Her journey reveals the importance of bringing non-normative intimate patterns into perspectives (Constable 2018) that further our understanding of the diverse forms of entanglements from which new forms of personhood emerge. As her case shows, a “failed marriage,” an apparent disruption in affective circuits, can invigorate the flow in a creative and unexpected way through which the next generation of Japanese-Pakistani marriages continue their journeys of self-making, and navigate intimate realms on the global stage.

Acknowledgments

My foremost thanks go to the participants in my research who shared their experiences and feelings about being members of transnational families. I am also grateful to Asuncion Fresnoza-Flot and Gracia Liu-Farrer who made insightful comments on an earlier version of this chapter. This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Numbers JP23251006, JP16K03244, and JP20H05828.

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NOTES

1. In this chapter, I use the term “border” to mean geographical borders controlled by nation-states.

2. I do not know whether the remaining three of the thirty-two children with Japanese nationality had (or once had) Pakistani nationality. Japanese nationality law, in principle, prohibits dual nationalities. According to the Ministry of Justice, those with multiple nationalities are required to choose their nationality “by a certain time limit.” For details, see Ministry of Justice 2021.

3. As for the names of the Japanese women married to Pakistani migrants, they mainly used their Muslim names when interacting with each other in the networks of Japanese Muslim women. Thus, the pseudonyms I use for them in this chapter are Muslim names except for the cases in which the women used their Japanese names.

4. In Japan, international marriages constituted 0.9 percent of all marriages in 1980. This figure rose during the subsequent two decades and peaked in 2006 at 6.1 percent (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 2020). In this peak year, 80 percent of international marriages were between Japanese men and foreign women.

5. The exceptions include Japanese descendants, particularly from Brazil and Peru, and those who work on intern programs (Douglass and Roberts 2000; Shindo 2014). In December 2018, the Diet passed a bill that formally opened its doors to foreign blue-collar workers for the first time.

6. The number of residency visas issued to Pakistanis under the visa category of “Spouse or Child of Japanese National” rose from 112 in 1984 to 1,630 in 2000 (Japan Immigration Association 1985–2001). My research strongly indicates that, during the 1990s, many spousal visas were converted to permanent resident visas. In June 2020, those registered under “Spouse of Japanese National” and “Permanent Resident” visa categories accounted for 32 percent of the 18,296 Pakistani residents in Japan (Ministry of Justice 2020).

7. According to Kobayashi, before 1982, when legal provisions for spousal visas were created, a foreign husband was required to provide proof of his ability to earn enough income to support his family, even if his Japanese wife was able to do so. A foreign wife, by contrast, had little trouble gaining permission to stay in Japan as a dependent of her Japanese spouse. Behind this discriminatory requirement was the state’s gender-biased assumption that men provide for the family while women care for the family. This also implied that a foreign wife was expected to contribute to the nation through child bearing in the domestic sphere (Kobayashi 2009).

8. As marriage migration has become one of the few remaining doors for citizens of the Global South to enter the Global North, states have begun imposing stricter control on cross-border marriages (Fresnoza-Flot and Ricordeau 2017). State scrutiny and control are entwined with the idea that marriage and the family are core institutions for reproducing nation-states and good citizens (Moret, Andrkopoulos, and Dahinden 2019: 6).

9. Women from the Global South who marry Japanese men are by no means free from social stigmatization or the “international policing of women”—i.e., state
restrictions by both sending and receiving countries of marriage-migrant women (Fresnoza-Flot and Ricordeau 2017: 8–10).

10. For a discussion of complex interactions between modern state law and Islamic law in Pakistan, see Menski 1997.

11. While the majority of the women in my sample converted to Islam at the time of marriage, there were a few exceptions. One woman had already embraced Islam by the time she met her husband. Another woman came from a Christian family, but converted to Islam because she wanted to follow the same religion as her husband.

12. The hadith is the authoritative record of the Prophet Muhammad’s exemplary speeches and actions.

13. When Japanese women and their children relocated to Western countries, they mobilized the Muslim/Pakistani diasporic networks in building their lives.

14. The social security system, which presupposes male breadwinner households, has produced a high level of insecurity among unmarried and divorced mothers, who together constitute the vast majority of single mothers in Japan (Tamiya 2020). The situation of Japanese women contrasts with the cases of transnationally married Turkish women in Denmark who can sustain themselves economically after divorce because of easier access to education, the labor market, and the welfare support provided by the state (Liversage 2012: 153–55).

15. There are also cases in which the husband was already married in Pakistan when he married a Japanese woman in Japan. Some Japanese wives were aware of the fact—but others were not.

REFERENCES


