Notwithstanding the fact that World War I was a global war, Japan’s involvement as one of the Allied powers still manages to surprise quite a few. Popular imageries of the war in the West had left little room for the non-Western theaters of war, as there continued to exist an overwhelming perception that World War I was predominantly a “European War.” Until the surge of scholarly investigations marking the centenary, this was also the dominant interpretation held in Japanese historiography, save for a minority of scholars who thought otherwise. In studies of war, there is a general tendency to privilege the military impact of war on society, especially in terms of economic and human costs. To that end, it is not surprising that World War I for Japan tended to be considered a minor war because of the negligible number of war dead it produced. Hence, the study of World War I and Japan had been largely neglected throughout the twentieth century because of imperatives felt by scholars of having to focus on the larger, and more important, agenda of understanding Japan’s role in World War II. Was this scholarly bias justified?

Notably, the 1910s was a tumultuous decade for East Asia, as major societal transformations took place that fundamentally changed the way
East Asian societies came to develop thereafter. Korea was annexed by Japan in 1910, expanding the Japanese colonial empire substantially. This was followed by the Chinese Revolution of 1911 leading to the final collapse of the Qing dynasty, which had been in power since 1644. When such tidal changes occur in societies, they are inevitably followed by a period of intense political fragility and military opportunism. Hence, East Asia lay in a state of flux, with a noticeable power vacuum created by the fall of the Qing. Japan as an aspiring imperial power vied for regional dominance, especially when the war unfolded in Europe in 1914, as the now oft-repeated phrase of Elder Statesman Inoue Kaoru went: the war was in fact a “grace from heaven” (ten’yū) for Japan because it represented a great opportunity for expansion. East Asia, therefore, was not at all the backwater to the developments in Europe. Indeed, East Asia was dynamically in motion, the only region in the world where the Western imperial powers could not take for granted their economic and military superiority. Their presence was continually challenged and checked by Japan, which had established itself as a foremost military power after the defeat of Russia in the 1904–5 war. In the region, Japan acted as a principal agency for change whether for good or bad. We need to question more critically the evident lack of connection between what was happening in East Asia (partly caused as a result of belligerent states’ activities) and the global nature of the war taking place. In other words, should we not consider major social transformations occurring in East Asia either as a byproduct of, or stimulated by, the globalized nature of total wars in the twentieth century? Of course, World War I manifested itself differently in East Asia than it did in the Western Front. Still, it would be well worthwhile to consider the impact of the war in a more holistic manner rather than in a compartmentalized fashion, in order to make connections between themes hitherto seen as discrete and unrelated.

Within Japan, too, the 1910s was a decade of social and political innovations, as well as of massive economic growth. The richness of Japanese historiography attests to the undying interests held by the historians of modern Japan to offer multilayered, highly nuanced interpretations of various aspects of contemporary Japanese society. One of the most popular areas of historical enquiry of modern Japan has been the rise of liberal democracy, known as the “Taishō democracy,” as a significant, and countervailing, political movement to challenge the bedrock of political conservatism as represented by the Japanese state.2 Coupled with this, there is a vibrant literature on the rise of feminist political consciousness through the formation of the “New Woman.” The World War I period also marked a significant shift in demography, as at least half of the Japanese population had migrated into urban centers from rural areas due to
the wartime boom necessitating a substantial increase in labor force in urban areas.

The different geopolitical context in which the events of 1914–18 took place in East Asia necessitates a different approach to the history of World War I in the region. The relative neglect of the 1914–18 period in the earlier historiography of modern Japan was partly caused by the way scholars defined the study of modern warfare. Thomas Burkman’s historiographical essay contains an outline history of Japan’s diplomatic and military participation in the war, with a helpful bibliographic discussion of the literature available primarily in the English language.¹ In recent years, the study of Japan’s involvement in the war has undergone new developments, which can be collectively called a “historiographical turn.” Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to introduce new thinking into both Western (including non-English) and Japanese-language historiographies. To our knowledge, this is the most comprehensive assessment of Japanese historiography on the 1910s available, redressing the paucity of the historiographical understanding of Japanese sources and Japanese-language historiography in the English language. The new historiographical turn in World War I studies in Japan promises new challenges and new directions for future research.

**Mentality toward World War I in Japan**

First and foremost, what is often ignored is the crucial fact that the Japanese had experienced their major modern warfare a decade earlier in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5. Granted, the Russo-Japanese War paled in comparison to the ultimate destruction, costs, and impact of World War I on European societies. Nonetheless, if one were to consider the fundamentals of how modern societies fight and respond to total wars, then the Russo-Japanese War stood as the largest war fought to date between two imperial powers. Moreover, it was not a colonial war. Hence, the Japanese had already lost their “innocence” so to speak before the advent of “August 1914” in Europe. Seeing from this light, it is not surprising that Japanese experiences during World War I turned out to be qualitatively different in many respects from other belligerent states.

For Japan, wars were fought on regular intervals since the Meiji Restoration of 1868. Before the Russo-Japanese War, Japan fought the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95 (which begets Taiwan for Japan) and the Boxer Uprising of 1900, when Japan famously or infamously sided with the Western powers against the Boxer rebels. In any case, the frequency of
warfare and accompanying social, economic, and human demands made on the Japanese people by the Meiji state meant that by the time of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904–5, a sense of war-weariness pervaded in society at large, and this contrasted sharply with the upbeat patriotism of officialdom and the profiteering commercial sector.

Let us go back to the point about the significant departure of experiences of the Japanese from the Western belligerent powers during World War I. In the 1904–5 war, Japanese society underwent the gamut of military, economic, social, and cultural experiences that became the hallmark of shared experiences of modern societies at war, albeit at a quantitatively smaller level. Hence, the Russo-Japanese War became the principal reference point for the Japanese in dealing with major issues pertaining to state-society relations in wartime societies, including the commemoration of the war dead, the linking of the military to grassroots organizations, and the emerging role of the media as the key intermediary between state and society, for instance. Also a notable feature of the Russo-Japanese War was the fact that it was a highly visualized war, through war photography, triptych brocade prints (known as the Japanese prints), picture postcards, war films, and graphic magazines, to name a few. Many iconographies of modern wars were created in 1904–5, such as the early form of trench warfare, which later became the iconic visual representation of World War I. Hence, Japanese society already possessed a rich repertoire of visual, emotive, cultural, and martial vocabulary to express a wide range of war experiences. As a seasoned belligerent, therefore, Japan approached World War I with an air of knowingness as well as some detachment. And, the people on their part were certainly not overjoyed with the prospect of yet another war.

Having said that, the Japanese military watched the war unfold in distant Europe with great interest. As this represents one of the major areas of research propelling the new historiographical turn, it suffices to note here that the Japanese were extremely keen to observe, analyze, and draw lessons from the European theaters of war. World War I stood as a laboratory of new military technology and martial ideas, in the same way that the Russo-Japanese War had been analyzed by Western military observers a decade before. Arguably, the Japanese military knew what to look for, seeing that they had been reflecting on their lessons from the Russo-Japanese War. And, with the combined experiences of having fought short military campaigns against the Germans in the East, and of having thoroughly studied the war as a belligerent-observer in Europe, the Japanese gained new insights into how to fight total war from the European experiences, putting them to “good use” and learning from their effects in the interwar period.
Studies of World War I in the Interwar Era

Before we start our historiographical journey in the interwar era, it would be helpful for us to gain an even cursory understanding of the attitudes of Japanese contemporaries toward the war. Japanese intellectuals felt that the war, even though remote and marginal to Japanese society, needed to be explained to the general public as a significant global event. Yoshino Sakuzō, one of the leaders of the “Taishō democracy,” attempted to explain the war as the outcome of a complex web of intra-European politics in his 1915 publication, Oshū dōran shiron (Historical deliberations on the European upheaval). Yoshino’s perspective underlined Japanese society’s general tendency to regard the war as a “European War.” Moreover, the Taishō liberals remained largely uncritical of Japan’s aggressive expansionistic maneuverings abroad, as exemplified by their support of the Twenty-One Demands of 1915. What characterized their attitude was the dictum, “constitutionalism inside, imperialism outside.” Notably, Ishibashi Tanzan, a progressive liberal, remained a rare exception to this norm, as he pointed out the hypocrisy of mainstream liberals such as Yoshino.

A striking feature about the first phase of writings on World War I in the immediate post-1918 period is that many appeared as “histories” rather than as political or social writings about the war. This implies that there was an awareness in Japan of the historicity of the war. There was awareness among some in Japan that its entry into war as a major Asian power had transformed the war into a truly “world war”—sekai taisen. Not surprisingly, many publishers sought to capitalize on popular interest, by hastily publishing survey “war histories” in early 1919. Those who benefitted from this publishing wave included some professional historians, such as the medievalist Hara Katsurō with his Sekai taisen-shi (A history of the World War) in 1921. Mitsukuri Genpachi’s 1918 Shigan ni eizuru sekai taisen (The World War seen from a historical viewpoint), followed one year later by his two-volume 1914nen—1918nen sekai taisen-shi (History of the world war, 1914–1918), gave a substantial analysis of the origins of the war. Indeed, many such war histories provided a descriptive outline of events (mostly military), an analysis of the origins of the war—in a sense not too dissimilar to popular writings of the war in the West. Relatively few academic histories of the war appeared in this period, mainly because of the absence of contemporary history as an established academic discipline in Japan. One common thread emerging from diverse writings of the war in this period was the heightened sense of awareness that World War I had, indeed, heralded a new epoch in the history of mankind.
Nevertheless, apart from the few exceptions mentioned above, the general trend in the 1920s was that the war became consigned largely to professional military and administrative studies. For instance, social scientists researched topics on the home front such as new welfare measures introduced in European belligerent countries and in the US during and immediately after the war. The most comprehensive study of the war was undertaken by Ishida Yasumasa, resulting in his multivolume Ōshū taisen-shi no kenkyū (Studies on the history of the European great war) (1937–40), which he wrote for the army, and which was subsequently used regularly as educational material for the military elite.15

It was the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident in September 1931 that brought about a sea change in the depictions of war in popular culture in the interwar era. However, it was the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5 rather than World War I that featured prominently in these popular cultural depictions, such as popular publications, films, and exhibitions, especially around anniversaries of the Navy Day and the Army Day, both commemorating the landmark victories of the 1904–5 campaign. What is striking about this period is that while Japanese experiences of the Russo-Japanese War became increasingly popularized and integrated into popular cultural memory, World War I became a focus of academic and professional interest by Japanese specialists in the military and related fields.16 Therefore, the two modern wars fought by Japan in the first two decades of the twentieth-century began to take on markedly different roles in post–World War I Japanese society: one used as an adhesive, and emotive, agent to integrate war and society into a coherent national narrative (1904–5 war), while the other used primarily as a repository of specialized knowledge to prepare Japan for a future total war (1914–18 war).

Post-1945 Trends

Post-1945 Japanese society produced a wealth of Japanese historiography, including those that dealt with Japan’s wartime years of 1914–18. In the main, there were three discernible, and salient, historiographical themes that emerge on the World War I period: the Marxist historiography and their treatment of World War I; the “Taishō democracy” as a historical theme; and the history of foreign policy and its treatment of World War I.

To many, the first three decades of the post-1945 era was the golden age of Marxist historiography in Japanese academia. It reclaimed World War I as a significant factor in its interpretation of prewar Japan. In their groundbreaking work of 1955, Tōyama Shigeki, Imai Seiichi, and...
Fujiwara Akira placed the 1914–18 war as the starting point for their *Shōwa-shi* (A history of the Shōwa period). As an indication of how novel it was for historians to consider World War I as a topic worthy of serious historical investigation, their inclusion of a chapter on “Japan after the First World War” in the 1959 edition became a topic of controversy in itself.¹⁷ They argued that though the war acted as an economic catalyst, “monopoly capitalism” triggered a highly aggressive imperialistic maneuvering against China. Moreover, the development of capitalism in Japan faced an impasse during the war, as demonstrated by the Rice Riots of 1918. These were central to the argument expounded by Japanese Marxist historians—either that the war acted as an economic midwife for monopoly capitalism, in helping to push industrialization to its last decisive phase through an intensive development of heavy industries during the war, or that the Russian Revolution in 1917 and the Rice Riots of 1918 indicated the beginning of the decline of monopoly capitalism. Not only that, anti-imperialist forces emerged in 1919 as represented by the March 1st Movement in Korea, and the May 4th Movement in China. Possibly the only linguistic legacy of the war still in use in public discourse to this day is the term *narikin*, the nouveau-riche, who made their fortunes from the wartime boom (1915–19). Survey histories of modern Japan written in the 1960s and 1970s often referred to the war years as the “era of the *narikin*.” Needless to say, this line of research laid an important foundation for subsequent research on the economic and social history of the 1910s and early 1920s.¹⁸ In any case, World War I, especially its last phase, came to be regarded as a turning point in the history of modern Japan, at least in Marxist historiography. The pervasive strength of the Marxist paradigm in the first three decades of the post-1945 era cannot be overemphasized, nor can their long-lasting legacy on generations of historians in postwar Japan.

Another major theme in postwar Japanese historiography concerning the treatment of World War I is the “Taishō democracy.” Strictly speaking, Taishō refers to the reign of Emperor Yoshihito, whose reign started in 1912 and ended with his death in 1926. From the 1950s, historians such as Shinobu Seizaburō started to use the term “the Taishō democracy” to refer to a larger chronological period consisting of the first three decades of the twentieth century. In the immediate aftermath of the Japanese defeat in 1945, it became important for historians and political scientists to seek a historical precedent that would legitimize the reintroduction of democracy in postwar Japan. They were particularly wary of the possible conservative backlash after the end of the Allied occupation in 1952. In some sense, this was akin to what had happened in postwar West Ger-
many, where there emerged a renewed interest in the Weimar Republic. In both societies, there was a strong urge to explain “why it all went terribly wrong” in the prewar period, ending with the catastrophic World War II. While at the same time, they sought new role models for future development of their societies. Thus, the Taishō period was emphasized for its democratic reforms and social and intellectual movements.

Nevertheless, the relationship between World War I and the Taishō democracy was tenuous to say the least, as many scholars preferred to remark somewhat tangentially that the war had brought about a change in international sentiment that fostered democratic tendencies. More than most, Mitani Taichirō situated the Taishō democracy in the global context of Wilsonian liberalism. Sometimes, historians claimed that the war had forced even the most conservative Japanese leaders to “keep up with the trends of the time” and allow limited steps toward increased popular political participation, as in the treatment of the rise of party politics with the election of Prime Minister Hara Kei in 1918. For scholars whose research focused on the “ordinary people” (minshū) at the grassroots level, their findings demonstrated how ambivalent the subcurrents of the “Taishō democracy” were and how much the lower strata of Japanese society not only accepted but at times preferred autocratic rule and aggressive imperialism abroad. More recently, Andrew Gordon’s notion of “imperial democracy” posited a new argument altogether, challenging the elite-led focus of the Taishō democracy. Others vouched for a particular “Taishō culture” when social movements and cultural dynamics challenged the state-centered approach of the late Meiji period. Even in discussions of the wartime economic boom being an important catalyst in promoting cultural development in Japanese society, the agency remained resolutely the middle classes and the elite. Ultimately, the “Taishō democracy” historiography was not without its critics. Ideals for “reform” (kaizō) from that era were fundamentally not too different from those voiced by radical “reform” bureaucrats who used “reform” to imply changes that should be made to the state, by increasing the power of the emperor and supporting aggressively expansionistic policies. In sum, however, most scholars interested in the Taishō democracy did not consider World War I as a significant factor in their analyses, almost mirroring the popularly held contemporary perception that World War I had been “a fire on the other side of the river.”

The third thematic strand is diplomatic history. Here we also see signs of conflict between two factions. Some historians wanted to prove that Japan’s aggression toward China started very early as a ruthless opportunism while European powers were preoccupied with fighting each other.
Then there were others who wanted to show that Japan was simply acting in line with the prevailing great power mentality and that the United States was similarly opportunistic in Asia-Pacific affairs. Until the 1980s, there was a contest between, on the one hand, Marxist-oriented historians and those largely interested in explaining indigenous roots of Japanese aggression from 1931 onward and, on the other hand, those who supported a supposedly more “balanced” and “non-masochistic” view of the processes that led to the end of the Japanese Empire, sometimes on a thinly disguised apologetic mission. Main topics involving World War I centered on Japan’s participation, namely Japan’s entry into the war, the Twenty-One Demands of 1915, the Ishii-Lansing Agreement of 1917, the Siberian Intervention, and the Paris Peace Conference. Another subfield of research was the “Versailles-Washington System” of the interwar period. Basically, Japan was thought to be “sandwiched” between the “Versailles System,” premised on the collective new international order of the League of Nations, and the “Washington System,” which was the de facto international order in East Asia and the Pacific based on the Washington Conferences of 1921–22. These “systems” locked Japan separately into the two new postwar international orders.

In general, most studies of the history of Japanese foreign policy of the period focused on the end of the war, with three key issues in mind: the impact of the Russian Revolution (including Japan’s involvement in the Siberian Intervention), the Paris Peace Conference, and the Washington Conferences. Marxist-oriented historians argued that the Japanese bourgeoisie and elites used the outbreak of the war in 1914 as a “grace from heaven” on the pretext of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, with a view intentionally of enlarging Japan’s sphere of influence in East Asia as seen in the Twenty-One Demands and the Siberian Intervention. On the other hand, Hosoya Chihiro’s oeuvres stand out for offering a more positivist interpretation on topics ranging from the Siberian Intervention, to the Russian Revolution, and to the “Washington System.”

Another notable work is Kitaoka Shin’ichi’s 1978 work on the Japanese army as a diplomatic actor particularly with regards to China. Japanese historians did not get to acquaint themselves with Thomas Burkman’s 1975 doctoral dissertation on the Paris Peace Conference and Japan, until his Japan and the League of Nations appeared in 2008. Frederick Dickinson’s 1999 monograph, the first book-length treatment of Japan in World War I after 1945 in English, is a well-considered political history, showing the reciprocity of foreign and domestic politics. His work is built on the rich groundwork of high politics in Japanese scholarship, focusing on the conflict between the Meiji oligarchs and a younger generation of politicians such as Katō Takaaki and Hara Takashi.
Post-1989 Developments

With the notable exception of Marxist historiography and the history of foreign relations, we have thus far argued that World War I generally did not play a major role in the periodization of Japan’s modern history. Since the 1990s, however, there emerged a new trend that recognized World War I as a backdrop that triggered a number of significant changes in Japanese society. An early glimpse of this new trend can be seen in the aforementioned Mitani’s Taishō democracy work, which he revised in 1995 in order to redress the perceived imbalance of his 1975 edition, in which he had underestimated the influence of the war of 1914–18 on Yoshino Sakuzō and other liberal intellectuals.29

Not surprisingly, military history was the field most profoundly affected by implications of World War I. Military historians felt the need to explain why the military came to dominate society and politics in the 1930s, and in so doing, the concept of “general mobilization of the nation” became a central issue.30 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, research focused on the reception of World War I by the Japanese military, as seen in Yoshida Yutaka’s work on the Imperial Army and, likewise, Saitō Seiji’s work on the navy.31 Their findings show that many of the chief architects of Japanese military strategies of World War II, such as Nagata Tetsuzan and Ishiwara Kanji, recognized the importance of integrating economics and society to fight a new type of total war. These officers participated in the public sphere and opined that the military ought to be given increased prerogative to control the economy in wartime.

In the 1990s and 2000s, further studies probed the exact nature of World War I studies made by the army and navy, suggesting that these studies affected the institutional confidence of the army in its drive to assert political power.32 Kurosawa Fumitaka’s seminal work illuminated the significance of wartime research reports (some 130 of them produced) made by Imperial Army officers and distributed widely to nonmilitary policymaking circles.33 These reports concluded the following: first, preparation for total war needed to begin during peacetime; and second, the Japanese empire had to secure sources of strategic war materiel (hence the Imperial Army’s bid for hegemony over northeast China, leading to the Manchurian Incident in September 1931). Kurono Taeru argued that the United States and China replaced Russia as the top two possible future enemies after 1918.34 Although Michael Barnhart introduced some of the aforementioned research of the 1970s and 1980s, these recent research findings remain generally unknown to the Western readership.35

Considerable interest shown by the Japanese military and civilian bureaucracy (including academics) in the organizational learning for the
preparation of total war led to the elaboration of the notional paradigm of a “second modernity” by Japanese sociologists, political scientists, and historians. “Second modernity” originated from the two terms used in Japanese for “modern” or “modernity,” namely kindai and gendai. Yasuda Hiroshi among others argued that the dramatically accelerated urban growth of the 1910s–20s resulted in a significant rise in mass production and, correspondingly, mass consumption in the United States and Japan.36 Building on this work, other scholars such as Yamanouchi Yasushi argued that results of the lessons from wartime societies of World War I can be witnessed in wartime Japanese society during World War II. For Yamanouchi, World War II was pivotal in changing a class-based society into a “system society” in the United States, Japan, and Germany.37 Hence a new term, gendai, the contemporary period as “second modernity”, was coined to connect wartime societies of World War II to their post-1945 societies, as distinct from the classical “modernity” (kindai) that saw its origins in the second half of the nineteenth century. References to the consequences of the war on social politics were made by Sheldon Garon in his seminal study of the Japanese state. Garon also argued that Japanese observations of European women’s wartime mobilization on the home front had the effect of influencing the Japanese state’s attitude toward women’s political involvement in the interwar period.38 In addition, the idea that World War I had contributed to fostering “modern culture” in Japan became commonplace.39 Therefore, World War I is claiming an increasingly central role as an important period in its own right.40 In the history of ideas, Sawada Jirō’s research on Tokutomi Sohō, a highly influential publisher and public intellectual, reveals Tokutomi’s views of the United States during the war years.41 In English-language writing, Dick Stegewerns is noteworthy for his claim that World War I signified a major turning point in Japanese political history.42 Connected with the recent rise in multidisciplinary approaches to the study of empire, economic, political, and cultural influences of the war on East Asia are becoming more evident in many recent publications.43 It has now become commonplace to situate traditional national and regional history within the broader framework of the war’s global consequences.44

Centenary Years

In the lead-up to the centenary of World War I, we witness a major historiographical leap in Japanese scholarship. In 2011, Yamamuro Shin’ichi challenged the historical profession with his *Fukugō sensō to sōryokusen no*
dansō: Nihon ni totte no dai-ichiji sekai taisen (The gap between the “composite war” and total war: The First World War for Japan), postulating the thesis that World War I represented a complex “composite war” (fukugō sensō) for Japan, combining elements of two military conflicts (as per the “German-Japanese War” and the “Siberian War”) as well as two diplomatic conflicts, one against China and another against the United States. He argues that it was this combination of the complex “composite war,” paralleled by the total war fought in Europe, that gave a particular meaning to Japan’s World War I experiences.45

Yamamuro, together with the historian of modern music Okada Akeo and the historian of modern Britain and Ireland Koseki Takashi, led a major research project, “The First World War: A Trans-Disciplinary Study,” at the Institute for Research in Humanities at Kyoto University from 2007 to 2015, holding more than one hundred seminars. Its aim was to provide a comprehensive reevaluation of the field in Japanese historiography. Of note, the project published eleven monographs in a new series, “Lectures: Thinking about the First World War,” targeting the general readership. In 2014, Iwanami Shoten published a series of four edited volumes on World War I that changed the historiographical landscape of Japanese scholarship. Dai-ichiji sekai taisen: Gendai no kiten (World War I: the origin of the contemporary period) contains: volume 1 Sekai Sensō (World War), volume 2 Sōryokusen (Total War), volume 3 Seishin no hen’yō (Mental Changes), and volume 4 Isan (Legacies). This comprehensive, and multifaceted, approach to World War I studies, so well established in Western language scholarship, is new to Japanese historiography. For historians outside of Japan, what may be of particular interest is the underlying thesis on the “second modernity,” a “late[r] modernity and its global birth process” that was galvanized by the war. In all this, Japan and its empire are linked into a complex web of interconnections and flows, of ruptures and continuities, of relativization and generalization—staking out emphatically that World War I did constitute an indivisible part of Japan’s twentieth-century history. Some of the new themes covered are Korean wartime colonial experiences (Yi); post-1918 visions in wartime society and their impact on politics (Schmidt); Japanese Red Cross nurses in Britain, France, and Russia (Araki); and experiences of Japanese military observers in Europe (Katayama).46 Yamamuro’s widely cited essay on “The First World War in East Asian History—A view from Japan” for the journal Shisō (Thought) exemplifies the fruitful approach of the research project.47 It argues that regional developments, such as the Sino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese Wars and the Xinhai Revolution of 1911–12 in China, as well as the underlying socioeconomic developments, all converged with global “shockwaves” produced by the world war and had
the effect of transforming foundationally the regional order. In turn, this transformation gave birth to a new conception of the world, as intellectuals began to debate on “reconstruction” and “reform,” which allowed for some internationalist leanings, yet at the same time projected the sense of widespread disillusionment with the Western model of modernity.

Otherwise, scholars in Japan and abroad have contributed to the historiography with some original research on Japan’s war experiences. Of particular note, Kobayashi Hiroharu’s monograph Sōryokusen to demokurashı: Dai-ichiji sekai taisen—Shiberia kanshō sensō (Total war and democracy: The First World War—The Siberian intervention war) demonstrates through a close examination of an illustrated war magazine, Ōshū sensō jikki (1914–17) that the war had been clearly categorized as a “total war” with global dimensions. He questions why the war did not lead to increased pacifism in Japan, as we see no Japanese version of Romain Rolland. His book is significant, in spite of its somewhat simplistic argument, because Kobayashi was the first to consider possible cultural influences of World War I on Japanese society.49

Japanese historians continued to produce new research in the lead-up to the centenary, with further new perspectives on the theme of Japanese experiences of the war. Nakayama Hiroaki’s interest lies with the notion of a “‘shadow’ of the war,” as reflected in Japanese literature.50 Previous to his work, Katayama Morihide was possibly the only one who had made a serious effort to examine the effects of war on Japanese literature.51 Nakayama introduces a complex idea of “influence” and literature through his examination of a wide range of genres, including writings by pundits, war correspondents, poets, and “culturologists” with their new ideas about “Japanese culture,” not to mention other modes of cultural production, such as popular oral performances like kōdan (a genre of oral storytelling), revealing popular Japanese fascination with Erich Maria Remarque’s All Quiet on the Western Front. In Nakayama’s second monograph, Senkanki no “Yoake mae”: Genshō toshite no sekai taisen (“Before the dawn” in the interwar period: World war as a phenomenon), he examined the history of Shimazaki Tōson’s key work Yoake mae (Before the Dawn), serialized between 1929 and 1935, to illustrate how modern Japanese literature had been changed by the experiences of World War I. In all, Nakayama suggests introducing the “interwar” period between the two world wars also for the study of Japanese literature.52

On the other hand, an entirely different approach was taken by a team of researchers led by Tamai Kiyoshi at Keio University. Since 2006, his team has been systematically compiling a media source collection on various “media events” in the modern history of Japan, including World War I. Although their findings show that there was a healthy public
sphere in wartime Japan, these only helped to confirm an earlier monograph study of the Japanese participation at the Paris Peace Conference by Shimazu published in 1998. Her work still stands as the only comprehensive scholarly treatment of the subject to date, as it is innovative in illuminating the intimate connections between diplomacy and national politics (including public opinion)—the two fields of historical enquiry that had hitherto been treated more often separately—in examining the racial equality proposal raised by the Japanese delegation at Paris in 1919. Moreover, the study highlights Japan’s role in highlighting “racial equality” as a universal principle of justice in twentieth-century international relations.

The centenary also brought major revisions for rather classical topics associated with Japan during World War I. Naraoka Sôchi, a leading scholar in the field, published a major monograph on the Twenty-One Demands, which had been presented by the Japanese government to China in the spring of 1915. His work enhances our understanding of the political history of the Twenty-One Demands, especially in probing further the infamous “Fifth Group” of the Demands. By drawing on an immense body of hitherto untapped Japanese and British sources, Naraoka offers a more nuanced understanding of the Japanese goals and tactics during the negotiations: he situates the run-up to the Twenty-One Demands in the larger diplomatic and national political context. In so doing, he reconsiders the dynamics of public opinion as well as the mentalities and practices of those involved.

Similarly, Kubota Yûji, in his monograph on Taichū shakkan no seiji keizaishi: “Kaihatsu” kara 21kajo yōkyû e (A political-economic history of the loans to China: From “development” to the 21 Demands) situates the Nishihara Loans of 1917 in the larger context of the history of Japan’s loans to China in the first decades of the twentieth century. The Nishihara Loans had long been described by Marxist scholars as locus classicus for the aggressively expansionist consequences of monopolistic capitalism of the war years. Kubota provides a balanced analysis of two major forces: on the one hand, how political actors differed in their approach on the economic policy toward China; on the other hand, how they added complexity by demonstrating how indivisible the business world had been to the political decision to extend the loans, through a detailed study of the powerful business networks represented by the Tokyo and Osaka Chambers of Commerce. Of note, Naraoka and Kubota both emphasize the long-term consequences of a widespread consensus among Japanese political, military, and economic elites in prioritizing the protection of the interests of the Japanese Empire especially in Northeast China.
In his *World War I and the Triumph of a New Japan, 1919–1930*, Frederick Dickinson criticizes the tendency to explain the influence of the World War I years as leaving a problematic heritage that haunted the interwar period, for instance, via the rather aggressive policy toward China and the origins of the “total war” planning. Dickinson is more interested in situating Japan in the larger picture of global modernity of the 1920s. As he stated elsewhere, he emphasized the “potential of non-Western perspectives for a new appreciation of the importance” of World War I and its global consequences in order to comprehend transnational phenomena in general. Hence, he depicts the impact of transnational developments of the 1920s, such as internationalism, new democratic tendencies, a disarmament movement, and a “culture of peace.”

In 2013, Jan Schmidt’s research demonstrated that perceptions of the war in Japanese media were much wider in scope and more profound in their implications than previously thought. The war remained a constant topic in the public sphere, albeit with its focus shifting from initial excitement over military campaigns to dealing with broader discussions on effects of mobilization on wartime societies. Thus, the war was not only “consumed” as a remote media event, but its long duration also led to the opening up of a discursive space where ideas about visions of Japan’s future were debated. What emerged was a complex discourse on “postwar” (sengo) possibilities for Japanese society. Schmidt also emphasized the long-lasting influences of the wide-ranging studies on the war elaborated by the Japanese military, the bureaucracy, academics, and the business world on Japanese society and politics in the 1920s and 1930s.

The centenary has led to the publication of a number of edited volumes, such as Tosh Minohara, Tze-ki Hon, and Evan Dawley’s *The Decade of the Great War: Japan in the Wider World in the 1910s* (2014), Oliviero Frattolillo and Antony Best’s *Japan and the Great War* (2015), Matthias Zachmann’s *Asia after Versailles: Asian Perspectives on the Paris Peace Conference and the Interwar Order, 1919–33* (2017), and Jan Schmidt and Katja Schmidt-pott’s *The East Asian Dimension of the First World War: Global Entanglements and Japan, China and Korea, 1914–1919* (2020). All these volumes showcase a wide array of articles on the impact of the war on Japan and East Asia, and the role of the Japanese Empire in it. A major achievement is to introduce works of many East Asian scholars that have heretofore rarely been available in English. With all the new research findings, therefore, it would no longer be viable to argue that Japan was a mere bystander, whose wartime motives were predominantly ruled by economic and territorial ambitions, without understanding the significance of the war as a total war. The strengths of this new generation of scholarship lie with the ability to demonstrate the underlying plurality
of Japanese society through an examination of a wide range of attitudes toward the war, held by the Japanese, Chinese, and Koreans as political, military, bureaucratic, economic, and cultural elites, whose views were distributed via the mass media to a wider audience, including the use of visual media. It also became clear that Japanese society of the 1920s was highly pluralistic, and that many different lessons from the war were being learned and integrated into postwar society, ranging from city planning, public hygiene, military mobilization planning, and taxation. On a more macro level, societal expectations for the future and visions for a regional order had also been altered considerably through the new literature in the field.

Until the 2000s, there was very little scholarly interest outside of Germany on the experiences of the German captives in Japan during the 1914–18 years. The exception was Tomita Hiroshi’s pioneering work published in 1991 on the prisoner-of-war camp in Bandō. Tomita’s work attracted attention because it had cast the Japanese wardenship of the German POWs in 1914–18 in a positive light, contrasting sharply with the strongly negative images of the experiences from World War II. In October 2003, a new research group called the Chintaozen Doitsuheifuuryo Kenkyukai (The battle of Qingdao German prisoners of war research association), which consisted of historians mostly based in the Inland Sea area of Tokushima, Ehime, Hiroshima Prefectures, started publishing a periodical titled Chintaozen doitsuheifuuryo shuyojo kenkyuu (The battle of Qingdao German prisoner of war camps research) on the experiences of the German captives in the regionally based POW camps. The Naruto German House (Naruto Doitsu-kan) has been taking a leading role in the creation of the periodical, and its director, Tamura Ichirō, was an active member of this association. The German House contains an archive of German-Japanese relations, mostly centering on the World War I days and the Bandō POW camp situated in the present-day city of Naruto. Their research profile grew in parallel to the increasing local interest on the centenary of the Russo-Japanese War in 2005–6, when many local historians took to the task of compiling local historical records, including those of the Russian prisoners of war in the POW camps that were dotted around Japan. This periodical fast became a forum for providing a more complex understanding of the Japanese experiences of the German captives, mostly by painstakingly unearthing locally available empirical sources. Because of the importance of the German House as a focal point for German-Japan relations, the association has had an internationalist outlook from the onset, acting as a conduit for German descendants of the POWs to exchange information with the Japanese researchers. Moreover, works of German local historians have been translated into
Japanese, as well as those of international academic historians, such as Mahon Murphy’s article on the subject. The German House has also collaborated with the German Institute of Japanese Studies (DIJ) in Tokyo. The DIJ’s online resources, which is available at http://bando.dijtokyo.org/, features as its central source Die Barracke (The barrack), an in-camp publication by the captives in the most famous POW camp in the city of Naruto, Tokushima. This is a significant source that enables a comparative study of German World War I captives.

What is noteworthy about the Bandō POW camp is its surprisingly successful afterlife in popular imagination, when it was reincarnated as a commercial film, Baruto no gakuen (Ode an die Freude/The ode to joy), in 2006. In fact, most of the published works on the German captives’ experiences in Japan center on the Bandō camp. Ōtsuru Atsushi’s detailed study of the Aonohara Camp (Aichi Prefecture), offers a much-needed insight into the camp that held the largest number of Austro-Hungarians, mostly from the sunken cruiser Kaiserin Elisabeth. Takahashi Terukazu, a member of the abovementioned research association, published a full-length study of the POW camp in Marugame in 2014. Most German captives in Japan came from the German concession in Qingdao and, hence, had some prior experience of living in East Asia as colonial expatriates. No doubt, this had an impact on the mentality of the captives as their familiarity with East Asia might have made them more adaptable to being held in Japan. In her study, Shimazu notes that the experiences of German captives in Japanese POW camps offer a helpful comparative perspective on the global network of German captives during World War I. The Japanese experiences could be usefully compared with the European experiences of German captives. Moreover, the Japanese experiences of dealing with the Russian POWs in the Russo-Japanese War provides an important precursor to the captivity experiences of World War I, in so many different ways.

The field is still underdeveloped when it comes to the experiences of Japanese captivity in Germany or in other territories of the Central Powers. An exception is the recent publication by Naraoka Sōchi who offers a rare, and valuable, insight into the Japanese civilians detained in Germany in the first few months of the war until they were released to be repatriated back to Japan. Japan did not intern German and Austrian-Hungarian civilians throughout the war. His work includes the diary of a medical doctor, Uemura Hisakiyo, who had been studying in Prague but had the misfortune to make a trip to Freiburg on the eve of the war.

Having experienced the centenary of the Paris Peace Conference in 2019, our endeavor to introduce to a Western readership the key trends in the Japanese-language World War I historiography has not yet come to its...
completion. Most recently, a new transnational perspective revealed the role of a Catholic network of diplomacy at the peace conference, in which a Japanese delegate played a pivotal role, underlining a scholarly trend toward integrating Japan more centrally into global history narratives of the war and peace.\(^\text{74}\) No doubt, new research will continue to emerge on the peace conference in the near future triggered by the centenary.

**Conclusions**

Historiography is a product of its time. As we have seen from the Japanese case, the dominance of the Marxist tradition in the first three decades of the postwar Japanese intellectual establishment has influenced the postwar historiographical trajectory to a substantial degree. Having said this, we have also seen the strength of the “independents” who have relentlessly pursued empirically based research on the 1914–18 period, mostly in diplomatic history until the end of the 1980s. From the 1990s, we began to detect a general shift in the intellectual climate, including the treatment of Japan's role in World War I. These changes are no doubt reflections of complex changes affecting not only Japan (such as Emperor Showa’s death in 1989) but also international society at large (such as the demise of the Cold War).

Another point worthy of note is that the occasion of the centenary has acted as a significant “bridging” opportunity between Japanese history and Western history in Japanese academia. Symbolic of this major new trend has been the major research project of the Kyoto University under Yamamuro Shin’ichi. This is a directional change that promises to influence future thinking on global history in Japan. Moreover, this internal “globalization” of the historical profession would hopefully result in increased “internationalization” of Japanese-language historians by incorporating research findings of non-Japanese historians of Japan into their thinking, for instance.

What is striking is the new sense of urgency felt generally by scholars that World War I needs to be considered seriously as a global war. As we have seen, this is true both for Japanese historiography as well as for Western historiography. The new historiographical turn in Japan reflects the current trend in the globalization of histories. Indeed, this historiographical volume is a case in point for this new underlying trend, to be better connected with global World War I historiography. While we write new histories of the war, we must continue to push intellectual boundaries in order to come up with new methodological insights on how to write new global histories of the first truly global war.
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Notes

1. Japanese names will appear with the family name followed by the given name, unless otherwise stated in non-Japanese-language publications.
8. The term “Taishō” is a reign name given to Emperor Taishō’s reign (1912–26). Although the Taishō democracy can be interpreted very widely, in the context of intro-
ducing Yoshino's political thoughts, it can be defined as a liberal democratic movement calling for suffrage reform.

9. Yoshino Sakuzō, Ōshū dōran shiron [Historical deliberations on the European upheaval] (Tōkyō: Keisei-sha shoten, 1915). In 1916, targeting a broader readership, he published an updated and abbreviated version under the title Ōshū taisen (The European great war) (Tōkyō: Min'yūsha) that appeared in the very successful series Gendai sōsho (Contemporary library). See also Yoshino Sakuzō, Senzen no Ōshū [Prewar Europe] (Tōkyō: Bando shobō, 1917); Matsuuchi Reiō, Sekai taisen-shi [History of the Great World War] (Tōkyō: Shiseidō shoten, 1914), the latter book acknowledging that the war was indeed a "world war" and therefore of great historical importance. But these monographs were written in haste and belonged more to popular writing outside of academia.


14. With the changing international climate in the early 1930s, Kaigai Morinosuke emerged as an influential freelance diplomatic historian and editor of historical sources, including a volume on World War I, Kaigai Morinosuke, "Sekai taisen gen'in no kenkyū" [Studies of the causes for the world war] (PhD diss., Tōkyō teikoku daigaku, 1934).


20. Gordon, Labor and Imperial Democracy.


the Japanese army: Memoranda on the modernization of the army], in Tenkanki no Yōruppa to Nihon, ed. Takita Takeshi [Europe and Japan at a turning point] (Tōkyō: Nansōsha, 1997), 178–97.

34. Kurono Taeru, Teikoku kokubo hōshin no kenkyū: Rikukaigun kokubō shisō no tenkai to tokuchō [Studies on the modernization of the army: Characteristics and development of the army’s and navy’s ideas on national defense] (Tōkyō: Sōwasha, 2000).


40. Inoue Mitsusada et al., eds., Dai-ichiji sekai taisen to setō naikaku [The First World War and party cabinets] (Tōkyō: Yamakawa shuppansha, 1997).


43. Wada Haruki, ed., Higashi-Ajia kin-gendai tsushiki. 3: Sekai sensō to kaijō, 1910nen dai [A survey history of modern and contemporary East Asia, 3: World war and “reforms,” the 1920s] (Tōkyō: Iwanami shoten 2010), especially Cho Kyōn daru [Cho Kyeungdul], “Sekai sensō to kaijō, 1910nen dai” [The world war and “reforms,” the 1910s], 1–40. For the influence on the economic relations of the Japanese Empire with Southeast Asia, see Kagotani Naoto, “Dai-ichiji sekai taisen-ka no Tōnan-Ajia keizai to Nihon” [The Southeast Asian economy and Japan during the First World
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44. Yamamoto Kōtoku, “Dai-ichiji taisen-ki ni okeru kokka shisō keisei shisutemu no saihen to Hara Kei naikaku” [The Hara cabinet and the reorganization of the system of the formation of state policy ideas during the First World War], in *Nihonshi kenkyū* 554 (2010): 251–76.


48. The title could be translated as “True accounts of the European great war.” The magazine, first published biweekly, later three times per month, was a major effort by one of the major contemporary publishers, Hakubukan, which already had made a fortune out of its analogous magazines “True accounts of the Sino-Japanese War (1894–95),” “True accounts of the East Asian War (1900),” and “True accounts of the Russo-Japanese War (1904–5).”


55. Naraoka Sōchi, *Taika nijūkka no yōkū to wa nan datta no ka. Dai-ichiji sekai taisen to nitchū tairitsu no genten* [What were the 21 Demands? The First World War and the


67. There is a local archive-cum-museum called Doitsukan (Naruto German House) in
the city of Naruto, established in 1993 (the original building was opened in 1972) by Naruto City Municipal Office, Tokushima Prefecture.

68. Baruto no gakuen, (Ode an die Freude, or The Ode to Joy), dir. Deme Masanobu, Tōei Film Productions, 2006.


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