Chapter 7

RUSSIA AND WORLD WAR I

The Politics of Memory and Historiography, 1914–2018

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World War I in Russian Cultural Memory and Memory Politics

The memory of World War I is one of the most dynamic fields in the study of “cultural memory.” Daniel T. Orlovsky was the first to develop this theme as applied to Russia. In Russia this war is often called the “forgotten war.” The revolution and the civil war, and then World War II (the 1941–45 war was called the Great Patriotic War in the USSR), overshadowed the memory of the events of 1914–16. The memory of World War I was suppressed; many names and events were made taboo. Military cemeteries were destroyed, monuments were dismantled, and many prominent participants fell victim to Stalin’s purges. In many regards, the war was only taken into account as far as it helped explain the revolution.

However, the assertion that World War I was “disregarded” in the USSR is inaccurate and overstated. Both the policy of memory and historiography reflected features in the development of Soviet politics and education, science, and culture. And many processes that emerged during the Soviet period have their sources in the practices of 1914–17.

After the outbreak of the war in August 1914, patriotic propaganda often relied on the mobilization of historical memory. Memory of the war with Napoleon in 1812, the Patriotic War, was a pervasive element of
Russian historical consciousness. As a consequence, during the conflict, the 1914 war was often referred to as the Second and at times even as the Great Patriotic War. Early on, Russian authorities and civil society both strove to develop initiatives whose objective was to perpetuate the memory of the ongoing war. Very much as in other warring nations, exhibits of the spoils of war and war museums opened throughout the country. Architects proposed plans for new churches and memorial complexes. Considerable amounts of money were donated for these purposes.

The war influenced the development of literature, art, and philosophy, and the images and texts found at this time show the effect of this on historiography and the politics of memory. Famous writers were sent to the front as correspondents, and the war intruded into the creativity of writers and artists. The poet Nikola Gumilev, for instance, went to war as a volunteer. He published his front correspondence in one of the leading capital newspapers, and a collection of his war poetry was also published. His case was by no means exceptional.

Some Russian cultural figures, such as art critic and artist Aleksandr Benua and the writer Maxim Gor’kii, early on adopted an antiwar position. Futurist poet Vladimir Maiakovskii initially supported the war enthusiastically, then created a series of antiwar poems. However, pacifistic views could not be openly expressed due to the conditions of censorship.

This is reminiscent of the situation in the other warring countries. But in Russia there were also other features that influenced memory of the war. The hostile attitude of many intellectuals toward the tsarist government, which influenced the attitude toward the war, had an effect. The sympathies of some writers were on the side of France and Belgium; this was reflected in their creative work, but they could not support the autocratic government unreservedly.

In Russia there were no idols for youth like the British poet and volunteer Rupert Brooke, and there were no bestsellers comparable to the book by the German front writer Walter Flex. Nothing in Russia resembles the fate of the British officer and poet Siegfried Sassoon, and not one Russian poet provoked a scandal during the war on the scale caused by his criticism of war. A European sensation, the novel *Le Feu* by Henri Barbusse (1916) was quickly translated and published in Russia; however, Russian literature did not create any notable antiwar works.

The peculiarities of Russian wartime culture can be understood if one takes into account the trends and dynamics of social development during the prewar period. The multifaceted cultural schisms and the multiethnic character of the enormous empire inevitably predetermined very diverse reactions to the immense international conflict. As a consequence, a consensus about the legitimacy of the war could emerge only to a very limited
extent, and there were no symbols common to the majority of Russia’s population, even its educated part. The illiteracy of the majority of the population did also limit the popular perception of the conflict.

There existed one more factor that influenced the literary representation of the war: the realism of Leo Tolstoy set a high hurdle for a description of wars and prevented simplified understandings of the immense conflict. Several writers imitated Tolstoy; however, neither creative successes nor the recognition of readers brought up on the texts of the “Golden Age” of Russian literature awaited them on this path. The tragedy of a world war demanded new artistic methods to describe the immense catastrophe. Russian art and Russian literature displayed greater creativity when describing the 1917 revolution and the civil war than when portraying the tragic events of 1914–16.

The overthrow of the monarchy in 1917 significantly influenced the perception of the war. The Bolsheviks and other left-wing socialists condemned the “imperialist” goals of all the large warring countries. The Bolsheviks and other internationalists called for a new revolution, asserting that only this could put an end to the world war. At times this drew Bolshevik propaganda close to the ideas of pacifism, although Lenin rejected it. The fact that many military leaders ended up in the ranks of active opponents to Bolshevism influenced the memory of the war as well. However, in the 1920s there were different, opposing perceptions of World War I in the USSR. There were also elements of the patriotic discourse of 1914 that lingered on, at this time in censored texts, be it in concealed form.6

At the same time in the 1920s the romantization of the world revolution and glorification of the Red Army were combined with a repudiation of traditional patriotism. Young Communists named their children in honor of Jean Jaurès: the antimilitarism of the famous socialist even pushed his opportunism to the background in the eyes of those who favored the revolution.7 “Patriotic” and “militarist” literature was removed from Soviet libraries along with “counterrevolutionary” and religious works. Desertion from the ranks of “imperialist” armies was viewed as a “virtue” in the texts of prominent Soviet authors.8

The predominantly antiwar and antiheroic discourse in the description of the world war in the 1920s was replaced in the 1930s by a discourse centered on glorification, nationalization, and militarization. On should not underestimate, however, the extent to which in the 1920s there was room for ambiguity and even a kind of relative pluralism as various commemorative projects and initiatives came into being and were publicly discussed. A polyphony of memory was displayed in fiction and memoirs, in museum exhibitions, and in foreign literature translation projects.9
The memory of the world war had special importance for emigrants who found themselves in countries that had been allies of Russia. Emphasis on Russia’s contribution to victory and the heroism of Russian soldiers was thought to improve the status of the Russian diaspora. Associations of Russian veterans were created, memorable anniversaries celebrated, monuments unveiled, and memoirs and historical research published. In some of these texts, the civil war was described as a continuation of the world war, and the ideology of the White movement, which viewed the Bolsheviks as an instrument of the German government, was reproduced. Other veterans of both wars contrasted these conflicts: compared to the civil war the world war was a “real,” “pure” war. Both scenarios of memory promoted the cultural and psychological adaptation of the authors and their readers. However, the notable literature of the Russian emigration did not create famous literary works devoted to the world war. On the whole, the memory of World War I was clearly overshadowed by the memory of the revolution and the civil war, this generation of émigrés’ incommensurate trauma.

On the other hand, the theme of heroism was present in the Soviet discourse on the world war as well. It was closely associated with the name of Aleksey A. Brusilov, the most popular military leader, who had given his name to the celebrated offensive of the Russian army in 1916. As the place of Brusilov in Soviet memory politics is quite revealing of the way the memory of World War I was at times used by the Soviet Union, it is useful to have a look at the way the Brusilov cult evolved over the years. During the Soviet-Polish War in 1920 the Bolsheviks made use of the authority of the popular military leader, and the famous general called upon Russian patriots to support the Soviet government. Brusilov was given a position in the Red Army. The military leader’s death in 1926 demonstrated the contradictory attitude of the authorities toward World War I: The funeral was simultaneously religious and Soviet, and imperial and Soviet traditions were intertwined in the ceremony. The wreaths were decorated with ribbons of the colors of imperial orders, and Red Army soldiers mounted a guard of honor. Brusilov was buried on the grounds of a monastery; Soviet military leaders and the guard of honor remained outside the gates of the monastery. It is noteworthy that not one of the heroes of the civil war took part in the ceremony.

The military leader had instructed that his memoirs be published two or three years after his death. Although the memoirs could not be called an example of a Marxist perception of war and revolution, its text legitimized the Bolsheviks’ actions from a position of Russian patriotism. Accordingly, the memoirs were published in journals and later on in book form. In permitting their publication, the Soviet government expected to attract
the attention of a wide readership to it, including foreign readers: the book was published in the same year by a Russian émigré publishing house (in Riga) and in French and English translation. This would have been impossible without preliminary negotiations and possibly special financing.

Soon after the publication of Brusilov’s memoirs, there was a change in the political orientation that led to the general being difficult to integrate into the prevailing discourse. Already by 1930 the state publisher decided not to prepare a re-edition of the memoirs. This is explained by the growing repression of former officers who had served in the Red Army and the consolidation of Soviet control over historical science: now, deviations from the party line became dangerous, and the memory of the Bolsheviks’ “fellow travelers” seemed less desirable. Historiography and propaganda of the mid-1930s again began to appeal to Russian patriotism, but Brusilov continued to remain in oblivion for some time, with Soviet historians stressing the colossal losses that Russia suffered as a result of his offensive.13

However, the figure of Brusilov was in harmony with the goals of patriotic mobilization, and during World War II the memory of the Russian army’s most successful operation in the last war with Germany reemerged. Whereas at first the offensive of 1916 was celebrated without any mention of the general’s name, the “Brusilov Breakthrough” was later on presented as an outstanding example for Russian military leadership and heroism. On the eve of Germany’s attack on the USSR, an article devoted to the memory of the military leader appeared in the main newspaper of the Red Army.14

This conformed with the general change of tone in Soviet propaganda. The war of 1914–17/18 was no longer called “imperialist,” and on 1 August 1939, the anniversary of the beginning of the war, the military newspaper glorified the heroism the Russian soldiers exhibited between 1914 and 1917. The conclusion of the Soviet-German pact tuned down this message, but it came back to the fore again after Germany’s attack on the USSR. Wartime propaganda was keen to draw parallels between the Nazi policy and the actions of the German authorities during World War I, underscoring the importance of the Russian front between 1914 and 1917.15 In this context, the instrumentalization of Brusilov’s memory took on even greater proportions. Historical and historical propaganda works were published.16 Brusilov’s legacy was used when training officer personnel,17 and plays and novels appeared.18 The military publishing house prepared new editions of Brusilov’s memoirs (politically dubious fragments being removed from them).

The presence of Brusilov’s memory at this juncture does not mean, however, that all of a sudden Brusilov had become an uncontroversial figure. Quite to the contrary, the cult of Brusilov continued to be consid-
ered a challenge to Soviet orthodoxy, which eventually led to him being relegated to a secondary position... well behind other military leaders from the Russian past. This was of course connected with the Soviets’ ambivalent overall attitude toward World War I: to ignore Lenin, who had called for turning the “imperialist” war into a civil war, and who had considered the defeat of the Russian government the least of evils for Russian workers, was a difficult task academically, and also seemed potentially dangerous. To say the least, the glorification of a tsarist general worried some Soviet historians, and the limits of his glorification were constantly renegotiated. However, other aspects of the memory of World War I were also used for the sake of national mobilization. The new military uniform introduced in 1943, for instance, was reminiscent of the prerevolutionary one. Shoulder boards, which previously in Soviet propaganda had been a marker of the class enemy, again became signs of rank. It even became acceptable to wear tsarist-era military decorations, whose possession, just a few years earlier, would have exposed their owner to severe consequences. Photographs of brave sergeants and officers proudly wearing the awards of the two wars were printed in magazines. Cavalrymen in the picturesque uniform of Soviet Cossack regiments watered horses in German rivers, and people of the older generation could not fail to recall the military cry of 1914: “We will water the horses in the Spree!” Consequently, some aspects of the Bolshevik perception of World War I were “forgotten.” Even Mikhail Sholokhov’s classical Soviet novel And Quiet Flows the Don suffered from this: in the 1941 edition, scenes that favorably described revolutionary internationalists were simply left out—they did not suit the goals of patriotic mobilization.19

After 1945, the cult of Brusilov was at first very much in line with the propaganda goals of the Cold War: the innovative nature of Russian military thought and its presumed superiority compared to the military art of the West were stressed. Academia was to promote the glorification of Brusilov, and in 1948 the publication of a collection of documents devoted to the military leader was prepared. However, the sudden apparition of an up-to-then unknown source prevented this. After the general’s death, his widow had in fact withheld the second part of his memoirs. With the permission of the authorities, she had gone to Czechoslovakia for treatment and had not returned to the USSR. The general’s manuscripts, among them the “second part” of his memoirs, had ended up in an émigré archive in Prague, where Soviet researchers were to discover after 1945 that the general had clearly held anti-Communist views. As a consequence, it became dangerous to support the Brusilov cult. The abovementioned collection of documents was dispersed, its archive classified, and the name of Brusilov became taboo.
De-Stalinization led to a rehabilitation of Brusilov’s memory, as the image of the general was too important to abandon his use (the absence of Brusilov in propaganda and historical works had troubled many Soviet patriots). An “academic” justification also appeared; the Main Archive Directorate of the USSR carried out an expert examination “showing” that the second part of the memoirs was a forgery. The general was again included in the Soviet patriotic pantheon. A new edition of the memoirs followed, and a biography written by an eminent military historian appeared.

Fiction influenced the production of a cultural memory. Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, a former inmate of the gulag, became famous after the publication of his “camp story” in 1962. Soon, however, his works started to be prohibited, but they were read in typescript and published abroad. Solzhenitsyn felt the influence of Tolstoy and intensified some of the methods used by the great predecessor. The author refused to create a traditional romantic protagonist, but he formulated the most important ideas on Russian society during World War I with the aid of a General Staff officer, Vorotyntsev, the most active character trying to avert catastrophe. Vorotyntsev’s views (and Solzhenitsyn’s) reflect the spirit of the reforms of Pyotr Stolypin, the head of the Russian government between 1906 and 1911 (who had tried to reform the country), and were therefore diametrically opposed to Soviet orthodoxy, for which Stolypin was very much the embodiment of everything it loathed and feared in the ancien régime.

In autumn 1970 Solzhenitsyn’s August 1914, a peculiar blend of literature and historiography centered on the beginning of the war and in particular on the Russian defeat during the battle of Tannenberg, was finished, and in June 1971 the novel was already published in a Parisian publishing house. It was immediately republished and translated outside the USSR; at the same time, it provoked attacks on Solzhenitsyn in the Soviet press. However, criticism of the book on the pages of the official press provoked interest in the novel and its author. Some copies of the book managed to make their way to the USSR; in any case, typed copies of it were being handed around. August 1914 was the first of several novels that were to form the Red Wheel series, narrating—and, to be sure, interpreting from the author’s conservative point of view—World War I and the ensuing revolution as a pivotal moment of Russian history.

The KGB leadership decided to oppose the novel with a book by Nikolai N. Yakovlev. The son of a Soviet marshal, he worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but was arrested at the beginning of the 1950s. Yakovlev was rehabilitated after the death of Stalin and began to study American history in academic institutes. He was recruited by the KGB to
carry out ideological operations. The Chekists supplied him with sources not available to other researchers, and the materials were subjected to substantial distortion in the process. For example, the transcripts of the interrogations of those who had been arrested were called “memoirs” and “records of conversations.” One hundred thousand copies of Yakovlev’s book, *1 August 1914*, were published.24

The leaders of the KGB believed that the orthodox Soviet canon of historical writing would not attract readers and recommended the introduction of a conspiracy story: Yakovlev devoted attention to plots by Russian Masons and gave the tone needed for propaganda on the Masonic theme: they said the Bolsheviks were carrying out a patriotic mission, casting out of power the cosmopolitan representatives of the bourgeoisie who had “stabbed the Russian army in the back.” A national Communist myth was counterposed to Solzhenitsyn’s majestic anti-Communist patriotism.

The book became a bestseller, and the large print run quickly sold out; a second edition followed the same year again with a print run of one hundred thousand copies. However, not all the consequences of the appearance of this book could be worked out in advance. The challenge to the orthodox historiographical canon worried both supporters of orthodoxy in the Central Committee of the Communist Party and academic circles, as well as secretly liberal historians. With some effort the KGB, using its political resources, was able to prevent a negative review from being published in a prominent academic publication. The conspiratorial interpretation of the history of World War I gained additional impetus, provoking half-hidden discussions.

These reminiscences of and references to World War I in Russia during the 1970s and 1980s highlight the fact that there was indeed some public awareness as to the importance of the 1914–17 period for Russian history. That does not mean that there was anything resembling even remotely a widespread cultural memory of the war years. With official Soviet memory politics glorifying the revolution and the Red Army’s victory over Nazi Germany, there was not much room, if any, left for the pre-revolutionary imperial war of 1914–17. In this regard, the idea of World War I being Soviet Russia’s “forgotten war” seems totally justified.

With Perestroika and even more so after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the framework of memory politics and cultures changed dramatically, even if the consequences for the Russian cultural memory of World War I were limited at first. Still, the declassification of the Brusilov archival holdings in 1987 was significant. In 1989, the second part of his memoirs began to be published in *Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal* (Military Historical Journal), followed by an academic publication of the memoirs.
Readers were also given the opportunity to familiarize themselves with previously forbidden publications, some of which were now reprinted in the USSR. In 1990, Solzhenitsyn’s *August 1914* came out in the Russian market. Various editions followed. From 1993 onward, there was even an edition of the entire *Red Wheel* series in the publishing house of the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Defense, synonymous with official recognition of the series’ literary quality and interpretive value.

The conservative rehabilitation of some features of pre-revolutionary Russia that Solzhenitsyn had in mind struck a chord with many Russians, historians, civil society actors, and politicians alike, who, in the 1990s, were intent to develop a new patriotic narrative of Russian history. The Russian Orthodox Church that started to play an important role in identity and cultural politics soon after 1990 held a central position in that process. It is therefore no coincidence that the first major initiative to (re)inscribe the memory of World War I in the public sphere, the construction of the Moscow Memorial park complex of the heroes of World War I (the site had been a World War I cemetery before it was transformed into a park in the 1930s) started in 1998 with the reconstruction of a 1915-built memorial chapel that had been destroyed during the Soviet era. The re-erection of memorial plaques and different monuments nearby followed, and on 1 August 2004, the ninetieth anniversary of the beginning of the war, the Memorial Park was officially inaugurated.

In the years leading up to the centenary, the resurgence of World War I in cultural memory intensified, and there were several monuments being erected, the Brusilov monument in St. Petersburg (2007) and the Parisian monument in honor of the Russian expeditionary corps in France (2011) being but two of them. The unveiling of the latter monument—whose intention was to remind the French of the heroism of their former allies in the Entente—was timed to coincide with a visit to France by then–prime minister Vladimir Putin. In late 2012, 1 August was declared Memorial Day for the victims of World War I.

The centenary of World War I brought about an unprecedented wave of monuments being planned and erected throughout the country, making Russia without any doubt the country where the centenary-related creation of a “commemorative infrastructure” went farthest. In 2014, monuments were unveiled in Kaliningrad, Lipezk, Pskov, Rostov on the Don, Saint Petersburg, and Gussev, to cite but the most impressive ones. And in Moscow there were even two new monuments: a huge commemorative ensemble in honor of the Brusilov “Breakthrough” (*proryv*) in front of the monumental building of the Russian Ministry of Defense, located on the banks of Moskva River, and the still more important Memorial of the Heroes of the First World War as part of the Victory Park (*park*...
pobedy) on Poklonnaia Gora, one of the most emblematic memorial sites dedicated to the Russian victory of 1945. Its inauguration on 3 August 2014 by President V. V. Putin marked the high point of the Russian centenary coordinated by a steering committee presided by Sergey E. Narychkine, the then president of the Duma and the Russian Historical Society, with the Ministry of Culture and the Russian Historical Society carrying the brunt of the organizational groundwork.

What stands out on the discursive level is the heroism of the Russian simple soldier who is, the memory of Brusilov and other military leaders notwithstanding, the central figure of the commemorative discourse. The patriotic mobilization of the orthodox clergy and the Sisters of Mercy (sestrî miloserdiya) are another element found on many monuments. Their presence highlights the idea of a patriotic consensus surrounding the war and provides Russians nowadays with an example of state patriotism and sense of duty and sacrifice drawn from the Russian past.

Against this backdrop it is obvious that the memory of the Russian Revolution and, therefore, the centenary of 1917 was potentially problematic. It is by no means a coincidence that the state’s decision to create a steering committee, with once again the Russian Historical Society and the Ministry of Culture playing a pivotal role, was announced rather late (December 2016, its first meeting taking place in January 2017). In his speech on 3 August 2014, President Putin had insisted on the idea that the revolutionaries of 1917 had betrayed Russia and her war heroes, setting the tone for the commemorations to come. As a consequence, the representation of the revolutions of 1917 that dominated the official discourse was one of chaos and state dissolution, the ensuing civil war adding yet another traumatic layer to the Russian experience of these years. This does not mean, however, that the organizers didn’t attempt to develop a positive message more in line with the prevailing state-centered rhetoric. By extending the centenary of the revolution to the centenary of the end of the civil war, emphasis was put on the Russian state’s ability to recover after years of turmoil and upheaval. That idea was maybe best expressed by a project that was thought to mark the high point of the Russian Revolution’s centenary: the erection of a new monument on the Crimean Peninsula, from where what was left of General Wrangel’s army had been evacuated in November 1920. “Reconciliation” (primirenie) was meant to crystallize the message that eventually both parties of the civil war, the “Reds” and the “Whites,” embodied a form a Russian patriotism and that it is ultimately the reconciliation of the different memories of Russia’s past that lead to national unity and, consequently, a strong Russia. Although the erection of the monument has been officially announced, its realization still stands out, due to protests on the local level (in particular
in Sebastopol), where the de facto rehabilitation of the White movement did not go unchallenged.

**Russian Historiography of Russia’s Participation in World War I, 1914–90**

Research into the history of the war had already started in 1914, when academia took on the task of mobilizing the Russian Empire. Very much like their counterparts in other warring nations, Russian historians lent a helping hand to Russia’s diplomatic and propaganda efforts.

The war gave rise to a special genre of documentary publications; after the German “White Book,” other collections of documents commissioned by the other belligerents’ governments were published in order to justify their entry into the war. In this context, a Russian collection of documents came into being as well. These publications were nowhere near academic standards, the selection of documents was tendentious, and the sources were printed with the elisions not indicated. Applied “archeography” of this sort became an important aspect of the wartime propaganda effort.

The request to expose and to publish “secret treaties” was a battle cry of the Bolsheviks. Lenin repeatedly demanded the exposure of “foreign policy secrets.” By November 1917 the Bolsheviks had already begun to publish the tsarist government’s diplomatic documents in newspapers, and individual publications then followed. Soviet historians later admitted to the latter’s low scholarly quality. However, the publications became a real international sensation and had an impact on American relations with the Entente powers, as American government figures, including President Woodrow Wilson, were struck by the content of the documents. Under the influence of the Bolsheviks’ actions and Wilson’s appeals, German leftist socialists also demanded the publication of German secret documents. And in other countries, socialists, syndicalists, and pacifists demanded comparable publications. In Russia, a commission was created in the Socialist Academy of Social Sciences in the autumn of 1918 to study materials on the history of the war, and new publications were prepared. However, all such activity was halted. Possibly the Bolsheviks wanted to keep a free hand in diplomatic negotiations after the end of the world war.

Apart from the overarching question of responsibility for the war, the reflections and research on the war were at first very much limited to military aspects. In August 1918, the Red Army command created a military history commission, which included prominent generals, that began to
reflect on the war experience. Andrei M. Zaionchkovskii (1862–1926), who had commanded Russian army formations during the war, played an important role in this initiative. After 1917 he joined the Red Army and even collaborated with the Soviet special services. Zaionchkovskii published several books devoted to the world war and the preparations for it. His works were repeatedly republished, and they exerted considerable influence on Russian World War I historiography.

Another former officer of the Imperial Army whose reflections played an important role for the emerging Soviet historiography of the war was General Aleksey A. Manikovskii, the former chief of the Main Artillery Directorate. In his very detailed analysis of the Russian armament and ammunition industry during the war, he pointed to the incompetence and weakness of the top leadership of tsarist Russia and condemned the pernicious influence of industrial monopolies. Obviously, these were the themes that were demanded in the Soviet period, and it is thus not surprising that the fact-ridden publication of this well-known specialist exerted a considerable influence on subsequent historians, all the more so because there were several re-editions.

It was not before 1922 that the publication of tsarist-era diplomatic documents resumed. The editors were clearly pursuing political goals: exposure of the tsarist regime confirmed the legitimacy of the new order, and the exposure of France allowed French demands for the payment of pre-revolutionary debts to be avoided. Once again the quality of the source collections left much to be desired; it was criticized in Russian academic publications, and even Lenin assessed the publication as “slovenly.” However, the importance of the documents presented in the collection preordained the interest of foreign readers. French publicist René Marchand published a “Black Book” in French in 1922–23 based on this publication. The book was substantially expanded in comparison with the Russian edition: Marchand worked in the Soviet archives (possibly this is explained by the fact that he had collaborated with the Cheka in 1918). Then new “black books” were published by the French left-wing Librairie du travail. This could not have happened without the assistance of Soviet organizations.

Other collections of documents followed. The publications corresponded to important shifts in Soviet diplomacy, and it can be surmised with confidence that such a “publishing offensive” was a conscious decision of the Bolsheviks, even if ongoing editing projects of other countries possibly influenced the decision to publish tsarist documents as well. In 1922, the publication of a German series of documents began, which exerted an enormous influence on comparable publications in other countries and on the World War I historiography of the 1920s in general.
As Soviet publications in fact suited German diplomats striving for the revision of the Treaty of Versailles, it is unsurprising that many Russian source editions were translated and published in Germany. The fact that the appearance of a collection of Soviet documents coincided with the signing of the Treaty of Rapallo between Soviet Russia and Germany is striking. However, the circumstances in which the governments of the two countries collaborated in the matter of publishing tsarist documents require further investigation.

In any event, German-Soviet collaboration was conspicuous during the realization of another major Soviet source-editing project. In 1929, the USSR began preparing the Mezhdunarodnye otnoshenia v epokhu imperializma: dokumenty iz arkhivov tsarskogo i Vremennogo pravitel’stvu, 1878–1917 (International relations in the era of imperialism: documents from the archives of the tsarist and provisional governments, 1878–1917), an impressive collection of source material conceived to outshine equivalent publications of other countries. It was divided into three series: 1878–1903, 1903–14, and 1914–17. Unlike the foreign publications, it included papers from the Ministry of War, the Naval General Staff, and the Ministry of Finance along with documents found in the archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, even if several important documents already printed in the Soviet journal Krasnyi arkhiv (Red Archive) were absent. The first volume came out in 1931.

All volumes were translated into German as they were published. The German edition of the first volume was out on the market as early as 1931, which is indicative of a very high level of cooperation. Professor Otto Hoetzsch, the editor of the German translation, a famous academic, publicist, and chairman of the German Society for the Study of Eastern Europe, played an important role in the development of Soviet-German relations. This Soviet-German cooperation even continued after Hitler came to power.

The International Relations in the Era of Imperialism were never completed. Three volumes of the second series and ten volumes of the third series came out, the last volumes being published in 1940 (they continued to be translated and published in warring Germany). The cessation of publication was of course linked to the beginning of the war with Nazi Germany in 1941. However, the initial approach, namely complete exposure of Russian imperialism and Russia’s allies, had run counter to the designs of the leaders of Soviet foreign already since the mid-1930s. Unsurprisingly, the project was not resumed after the war.

One of the Russian historians particularly involved in the publication of tsarist source material was Mikhail N. Pokrovskii (1868–1932), editor of the aforementioned International Relations in the Era of Imperialism se-
ries. A professional historian and a social democrat since 1905, he had taken an active antiwar stance during the war years. After the Revolution, Pokrovskii participated in the publication of “secret treaties.” He became a deputy people’s commissar of enlightenment and then headed the Central Archive (the government agency to which all state archives were subordinate), the Communist Academy, and the Institute of the Red Professorate. Pokrovskii’s historiographical views changed depending on the political situation, but he remained faithful to his principles of the world war era. This was first of all a vigorous condemnation of the tsarist government and its expansionist goals, with a special emphasis on the Russian plans to seize Constantinople and the Straits. Pokrovskii considered tsarist Russia the chief culprit in the war, and his academic works and the various document editions he oversaw were to confirm this thesis. As Pokrovskii put it, “The war was directly provoked by the Russian war party.”

In spite of his high position in the 1920s, Pokrovskii did not have a monopoly on the formulation of a historiographical narrative. One of his opponents was academician Yevgeny V. Tarle (1874–1955). During the war, the latter had supported the military efforts of the Entente and cooperated in a newspaper uniting left-wing liberals and moderate socialists. His thesis of the overwhelming responsibility of Germany for the start of the war was reflected in his book *Evropa v epokhu imperializma, 1871–1919* (Europe in the era of imperialism, 1871–1919): although for Tarle both sides were eventually guilty, the temptation to begin military operations was more pronounced in Germany and Austria than among the Entente powers. He also devoted special attention to Wilhelm II, whose influence and decisions were depicted negatively, while the policy of the Entente was at times portrayed sympathetically. The book, beautifully written by an erudite historian, found many readers, and was soon followed by a second edition.

Tarle’s work provoked criticism by Pokrovskii, who characterized the book as “pseudo-Marxist” and “Ententophile” in the journal *Istorik-Markist* (Marxist Historian). At this time Tarle could still respond to Pokrovskii quite sharply in the same edition, although the editorial board characterized him as a “class enemy”; however, this did not prevent the second edition of the academician’s book from coming out.

The disagreement between Tarle and Pokrovskii was part of a broader conflict between the “Pokrovskii school” and historians who either repudiated Marxism or rejected its Soviet version. The growing administrative resources and the increasingly active police apparatus were obviously on Pokrovskii’s side. Still, Pokrovskii’s supporters continued to seek more convincing evidence to be put forward in the ongoing debate.
Nikolai P. Poletika (1896–1988), a descendant of a famous noble family and graduate of Kiev University, became an ally of Pokrovskii in this discussion. Poletika carefully studied the sources on the history of the war, primarily the official German publication of documents. Like the “revisionists” in the West, he was greatly influenced by this edition. Initially Poletika engaged in history like an amateur; however, the young researcher, who did not refrain from engaging in debates with Tarle, attracted the attention of the “Pokrovskii school.” He began to work in Leningrad University, and his books were published.44

Poletika thought that the Serbian government had been involved in preparing the murder of the heir to the Austrian throne and that Russian representatives had been aware of the plot all along. He argued that by announcing general mobilization, Russia had escalated the local Austro-Serbian conflict into a European one and asserted, “The Sarajevo murder was organized by the Entente as a concealed attack on one of the members of the Triple Alliance, Austria-Hungary, and the thesis of Germany: ‘they attacked us’ . . . was entirely correct.” From Poletika’s point of view, Germany's and Austria’s options were limited indeed, leaving them with virtually no alternative than to adopt the course they eventually adopted.45

On a sensibly different yet no less important aspect of the war from a Russian point of view, the tsar’s personal conduct during the war years, Pokrovskii and his disciples remained faithful to their viscerally negative view of the ancien régime. Pokrovskii at one point contended that the tsar had seriously considered what would have been tantamount to betraying Russia’s interests in the eyes of public opinion, that is to reach a separate understanding with Germany. It was Vladimir P. Semennikov who pursued this point of view especially actively.46 Ideas about a “tsar’s conspiracy” had arisen already during the war, and the corresponding rumors were an important part of the sociopolitical atmosphere on the eve of the monarchy’s overthrow. To confirm his thesis, Semennikov called upon a multitude of sources he found in the archives; however, the historian could not offer unambiguous proof that the draft of a separate peace represented a serious plan. As the thrust of Semennikov’s research conformed to the Soviet policy of condemning the ancien régime, the absence of unequivocal evidence did not stand in the way of its scholarly (and popular) reception.

The study of the economic aspects of the war was another area of research opened up by Pokrovskii and his school, as the enveloping Marxism insistently demanded this theme be addressed. In the process, different objectives were pursued. First of all, the study of the economy of the prewar era was to show that the war was a natural result of impe-
rialism, imperialism being considered, along the lines of Lenin's famous *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1916) as the ultimate stage of capitalism.

Secondly, research into the pre-revolutionary economy was to demonstrate Russia's "ripeness" for socialist revolution. Thirdly, the study of the economic aspects of international relations was to underline the innovative nature of Soviet historical science, which required a fundamentally new approach to the study of both domestic politics and the history of international relations. The Soviet debates about imperialism were of course linked to the overall debate about the origins of the war: within the framework of this paradigm, all the "imperialist" countries ended up guilty of causing the immense conflict to one degree or another.47

Finally, Soviet historiography could not fail to devote attention to the history of the class struggle.48 The history of the working class and the history of the Bolshevik Party were studied thoroughly, a research dynamic that was not without distorting the view of the political situation prior to 1917. Another problem arose when the names of various high-ranking party members became taboo, which could make working on or even mentioning them quite delicate, even if there was a time when scholarly activity could occupy some of those whose ideas were "deviant" from the party line. Aleksandr G. Shlyapnikov is a case in point: on the eve of the overthrow of the monarchy in 1917, he had headed the Russian Bureau of the Bolshevik Central Committee, but in 1920–21 he was one of the leaders of the "Workers' Opposition," which became an object of criticism by Lenin. Shlyapnikov switched to scholarly activity, and his multivolume publication, which combined historical research, memoirs, and the publication of sources, still retains its importance.49 But scholarly work could only be a niche of survival for so long. At the beginning of the 1930s, Shlyapnikov was subjected to party criticism and subsequently arrested and shot.

Other historians were also being persecuted. The arrest of many eminent academicians, among them Tarle, occurred in 1930. In 1931, Tarle, expelled from the Academy of Sciences, was exiled. However, by the end of 1932 the scholar was able to return to Leningrad and resume academic and teaching activity. In 1937, the record of Tarle's conviction was expunged and his status as a member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences was restored. His works on the history of international relations at the turn of the century gained a new life as they were now in line with the changed foreign policy realities.

Repression of scholars coincided with a tightening of the ideological diktat; this especially affected historical research and publications. Yet, as Tarle's case suggests, this did not turn out to be a victory for Pokrovskei,
whose views were subjected to harsh criticism soon after his death in 1932. Under the conditions of Stalin’s tightening dictatorship, accompanied by the return to some geopolitical projects of pre-revolutionary times, the anti-Entente view of the “Pokrovskii school” had dropped out of favor.

In 1938, the *Kratkii kurs* (Short course) of the history of the Bolsheviks approved by the party’s Central Committee was issued. In fact, the text had been edited by Stalin himself. In this text, wars were considered an “unavoidable concomitant of capitalism,” particularly inherent to its “highest and final” stage, imperialism, that is, monopoly capitalism. It was pointed out that the world war had long been prepared by “all the imperialist countries”: “The guilty parties were the imperialists of all countries.” At the same time, it was stressed that Russia was dependent on Britain and France, turned into a “semi-colony” of these countries.50

The *Kratkii kurs* exerted an enormous influence on historical consciousness in the USSR. Even in the period of de-Stalinization, its influence was felt in various texts. In addition, the book exerted a certain influence on anti-Communists: in polemicizing with the Soviet version of Russian history, at times they reproduced its narrative structure.

Yet, what is important here is that some positions taken in the *Short Course* and in particular the relativist blaming of all “imperialist powers” for the outbreak of the war were reexamined quite rapidly. The main responsibility for the start of the war was now more and more laid on Germany (and Austria-Hungary)—a shift of interpretation that reflected the tensions between the USSR and Nazi Germany and that strengthened the critics of the “Pokrovskii school” among Soviet historians.51

The change in political and censorship conditions also influenced the study of the history of military operations. Had it been possible, in the 1920s, to praise some innovative elements of German military thought (this positive assessment corresponded to the spirit of Soviet-German military cooperation at that time), this was not the case much longer. In the 1930s, such texts were removed from libraries, and after Hitler came to power, mention of the military capacities of the potential enemy seemed inappropriate and even dangerous. By contrast, the successful operations of the Russian army, primarily the Brusilov Offensive, were now to be put forward, even if that did not stop Soviet military historians from continuing to work and publish on the history of military operations on various fronts, with special attention devoted to the final stage of the war.53

Russian emigrants also studied the history of the world war. The Carnegie Endowment project on the social and economic history of the war was especially important in that regard. No less than twelve volumes of
this series were devoted to Russia. They were written by Russian researchers, government officials, and former officers who had become exiles. The well-received volume on the end of the Russian Empire, for instance, was written by former officer and historian Mikhail T. Florinsky. A number of books were prepared by people who had a direct relationship with the subjects they described. One of the best-known volumes of this series was prepared by General Nikolai Golovin, one of the best Russian military theorists and historians. Later on, Golovin wrote several studies devoted to individual operations of the Russian army. They were published in Russian and English.

The Russian exile historiography of World War I exerted a great influence on the foreign historiography of Russia, but it was also at least to some extent discussed in the Soviet Union. In the 1920s Soviet researchers still had an opportunity to familiarize themselves with the works of émigré historians (some of their works were republished in the USSR). In the 1930s, however, this possibility was substantially reduced, and knowledge of foreign historical literature could create problems for Soviet researchers.

At the same time, Soviet and émigré historiography shared certain common features, even if they did not cite one another. Special attention was devoted to the fact that the Russian command had taken into consideration the requests of its French allies, adopting an offensive stance against Germany in 1914, a decision that had in many ways run counter to the Russian High Command's ideas of the conflict to come. Whereas Soviet authors condemned French imperialism, for which Russian peasant soldiers served as "cannon fodder," émigré historians tended to underline the "chivalry" of Russia that had allegedly saved the ally. Both in the USSR and in exile, authors often contrasted the heroism of the soldiers and ordinary officers with the incompetent top military leadership, even if there was an overall consensus that it had been the shortage of shells and heavy artillery that were responsible for the repeated military failures.

Finally, both Soviet authors and émigré historians emphasized Brusilov's offensive as the most important aspect of the world war (although some émigrés despised the general for cooperating with the Bolsheviks, and individual Soviet authors pointed to the colossal losses and considerable desertion in the ranks of the Russian army). In many ways, Soviet and émigré historiography shared an important common source, the patriotic discourse of the war era.

During the Great Patriotic War, research was considerably reduced as historians contributed to the goals of patriotic mobilization. Evgeny Tarle's approach turned out to be totally adequate in light of the new overall situation, and he published several articles devoted to the history
of World War I. Other historians also looked into the history of World War I in order to find encouraging analogies with the ongoing conflict. Accordingly, they emphasized the 1914–18 military successes of the Russian army and its allies. Others, highlighting the atrocities committed by German and Austrian troops in Belgium and Serbia during World War I, provided eloquent illustration of the timeless and thus “innate” brutality of the invading forces.\(^{57}\) Via the publishing house of the Academy of Sciences, different brochures on World War I–related topics were printed as part of the wartime propaganda.\(^{58}\)

After World War II, Russian historiography continued to provide Soviet diplomacy with “objective” arguments as to the legitimacy of Soviet claims. In this context, the *Istoriia diplomati" (History of diplomacy), edited by Vladimir P. Potemkin, took on special importance. The first volume had already appeared in 1941. The second volume by Vladimir M. Khvostov that included an analysis of World War I was published in 1945.\(^{59}\) Khvostov’s book, which set the tone for succeeding Soviet works, confirmed the reorientation of the Soviet discourse of the late 1930s on the origins of World War I that we have seen above and that had been reinforced during the 1941–45 war: although still citing the obligatory *Kratkii kurs* with its liturgical formula of “the imperialists of all countries,” Khvostov made perfectly clear that German ruling circles bore the main responsibility for the outbreak of the war. One of the book’s paragraphs was simply called “German imperialism decides to start a war.”\(^{60}\) The book presaged not only the conclusions, but also the style of later Soviet academic works. Unlike the works of the early period, which widely used Soviet-style Marxist sociology, these texts were distinguished by dense factual description.

The approach suggested by the *Istoriia diplomati" was further developed in the books written by Filip I. Notovich, who examined Germany’s expansionist ambitions and projects in Eastern Europe during World War I. His studies contained much factual material, which allowed many aspects of the history of the war to be clarified.\(^{61}\) However, the circumstances of the immediate post-1945 period were all present in his analysis, and even Soviet authors were to admit later on that not all of Notovich’s conclusions have withstood the test of time.

The goals of postwar adjustment and the beginning of the Cold War influenced the history of international relations. Historians offered additional arguments to Soviet diplomats and propagandists. Russia now tended to be seen as the timeless and unselfish defender of the Slavic peoples.\(^{62}\) This view necessarily entailed a more sympathetic interpretation of the foreign policy goals of Imperial Russia, although the tsarist government continued to be criticized for its inability to see them through.
These interpretational shifts notwithstanding, the idea of its imperialist nature remained the centerpiece of the Soviet concept of World War I, and “bourgeois” scholars were criticized for “concealing” the imperialist nature of the war.

Arkady L. Sidorov (1900–1966), the director of the USSR Academy of Sciences’ Institute of History from 1953 to 1959, determined the nature of the research of that time to a large degree. Himself a student of Pokrovskii, he had studied the economic history of World War I for a long time. Sidorov and his students carried out research projects to study monopolistic enterprises. The research had ideological significance that negatively impacted its heuristic value: the development of monopolistic associations was to “prove” that Russia “had become ripe” for socialist reforms. However, even a historian of such a rank experienced some difficulties: his doctoral dissertation, defended in 1943, was not published in book form for a long time, for its factual material did not seem to confirm the thesis required at that time, namely that the state apparatus of tsarist Russia was subordinate to the monopolies. Sidorov also carried out important research devoted to Russia’s financial situation in the war years.

The narrow economic history and the history of international relations focused on the years 1914–17 that prevailed in the Soviet historiography of the 1950s explain why émigré historian Mikhail Florinsky was able to assert on the occasion of the re-edition of his Carnegie-funded book on the end of the Russian Empire in 1961 that the Carnegie series’ volumes on Russia remained the most important scholarly contribution to the Russian history of World War I. For him, this state of affairs was due on the one hand to Western scholars’ lack of interest in pre-revolutionary Russia and, on the other hand, to ideological and censorship restrictions rendering genuine Russian research on the topic virtually impossible. He thought that this situation would last for the foreseeable future. The prediction, however, turned out to be wrong: it was precisely at that moment that both Soviet and foreign historiography started to turn to the history of the world war with a renewed interest, although this process was inconsistent and uneven.

The most important disciplinary subfield to remain interested in World War I was the history of international relations. For sure, de-Stalinization had not all of a sudden suppressed all the different restrictions from which Soviet historians suffered. As a matter of fact, access to archival sources remained limited, and sometimes researchers did not have the right to use material they had uncovered. Despite these circumstances, honest research devoted to foreign policy did appear in the USSR. Anatoly V. Ignat’ev, Valentin A. Emets, Vyacheslav S. Vasiukov, Raphail Sh. Gan’elin and Yury A. Pisarev studied various aspects of the history of Russian
foreign policy in their works. The majority of Soviet authors now rejected the thesis of a “tsar’s conspiracy” that tried to conclude a separate peace with Germany. It is true that individual authors have asserted that “some government circles” and/or people in the tsar’s entourage, representatives of a “camarilla,” displayed interest in the prospect of a separate peace. Other debate topics were the issues of the distribution of power inside the Entente (primarily, Russia’s role in this alliance) and the differences inside it. For example, Valentin Emets asserted that the divisive tendencies in this alliance dominated the uniting ones, though his conclusions have been disputed by other historians.

At this time, some foreign books on the history of World War I were translated and published in the USSR—along with a critical commentary, of course. For example, Russian readers were given the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the books of Alan J. P. Taylor, Wolfram W. Gottlieb, and Barbara Tuchman. However, the classic works on the diplomatic history of the war were not translated—for example, those by Luigi Albertini and Pierre Renouvin. Generally speaking, innovative research offering new methodological principles of the study of the history of international relations was unlikely to be published; the same was true for works provoking broad public discussion, such as that caused by Fritz Fischer’s book on German war aims in West Germany.

It was indicative that Fischer’s book was also not translated into Russian, even though it seemed that the condemnation of German imperialism met with Soviet interpretations of the 1940s and 1950s. As a modern researcher rightly noted, Soviet historians were “Fischerites” long before Fischer’s book. However, due to censorship and other restrictions, Soviet researchers did not take part in the German and international debate around the German professor’s book. Clearly, a favorable opportunity for the reintegration of Russian historians into the international scientific community was missed here.

Interest in World War I also began to stir in military history, with a few comprehensive books coming out in the mid-1970s, some of which used new archive material. The results and main theses of these studies were sometimes at odds with established ideas of the international relations school: Comparing the military strength and potential of the two opposing blocs, military historians Ivan I. Rostunov and Aleksandr A. Strokov, for example, argued that at the beginning of 1917 there had been a clear superiority in favor of the Entente. International relations historians Vladimir Khvostov and Anatoly Ignat’ev had always upheld the idea that at that juncture neither of the blocs had achieved superiority.

A “new direction” in the study of the socioeconomic history of Russia on the eve of the revolution had great significance in the historical
debates of the 1960s. The most prominent representatives of this field worked in the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences in Moscow, and many of them were pupils of Arkady Sidorov. One of the intellectual leaders was Konstantin N. Tarnovskii (1921–87), who had, like other members of the “new direction” current, begun his academic career with the study of the history of monopolies. In the eyes of the “new direction,” however, subsequent research had demonstrated that excessive reliance on the study of “leading forms” of economic organization distorted the overall picture of Russia’s development. The term “multiformity” (mnogoukladnost’) became one of their key concepts. As a consequence, special attention was paid to pre-capitalist forms of Russia’s economic development. From the “new direction’s” point of view, the revolutionary conditions of 1917 were not so much the result of the Russian economy’s supposedly high level of development but of the contradicting dynamics that gave rise to multiformity. In the process, supporters of the “new direction” actively referred to the works of Lenin, but called for a new reading of his works. For some this was possibly just a necessary mimicry, but others genuinely expected a creative development of Marxism. The problem was that Lenin’s works contained many contradicting conclusions, and therefore it was hard to identify a winner in the “citation war” waged by the supporters and opponents of the “new direction.” Concrete research, however, tended to confirm some of the conclusion of the “new direction.” Yet it turned out that it was not the quality of the research that determined the outcome of this debate; after the events of 1968 in Czechoslovakia, various attempts to reform Marxism in the USSR were considered revisionist and therefore banished. The “new direction’s” defeat at the beginning of the 1970s was part of this process. Its supporters continued to work in elite academic institutions, but the publication of books and articles was forbidden, and research was made difficult—some doctoral candidates even had to face the impossibility to defend their dissertations. On the balance, the “new direction” nevertheless managed to create a series of important studies that were impossible to ignore even after the suppression of this intellectual trend. This also relates to works on the history of World War I. Andrey M. Anfimov, a student of Arkady Sidorov, wrote a work on the history of the peasantry, a major study that is still important to this day.

Another important research in this context was Kornely F. Shatsillo’s study on Russia’s preparations for war. He paid special attention to the development of the war industry and the financing of military programs. He was able to show in particular that the ambitious programs to develop the navy had a negative effect on the development of the army. His famous article devoted to the case of Colonel Miasoedov is often cited.
Shatsillo convincingly showed that the accusation of collaboration with the enemy that led to the officer's execution was fabricated by the headquarters of the Supreme High Command in order to distract public attention from the command's blunders. The article exerted great influence on the works of historians in Russia and abroad.77

On the whole, the defeat of the “new direction” beyond any doubt had a negative impact on Soviet historiography of World War I as research into the socioeconomic history was more and more restricted. However, important studies on Russia’s domestic policy during World War I could see the light of day.

The book by Leningrad researcher Valentin S. Diakin (1930–94), *Russkaia burzhuaziia i tsarizm v gody pervoi mirovoi voiny* (The Russian bourgeoisie and Tsarism during the First World War), is in many ways representative of the way Russian historians approached World War I in general and domestic policy issues in particular during the last decade before Perestroika. On the one hand, it was carefully researched, and it relied on a broad source base, including rich archival material.78 On the other hand, it was carefully trying to be seen as a study continuing the Soviet tradition of examining political relations using a class approach—the title of the book exemplifies this, but even more so does the wording of the introduction and conclusion and the careful selection of Lenin quotations. As a consequence, it is quite difficult to distinguish between the genuine convictions of the author and the ideological camouflage necessary to see the book through to publication. In essence, the book is devoted to the study of the conflicts in the ranks of the Russian political elite. Other researchers, for example, Mikhail F. Florinskii, who highlighted the crisis of state administration in Russia during the war era,79 and Taisia M. Kitanina, who studied the problem of food supply, followed in stride.80

Interesting works devoted to other domestic policy issues also appeared. Relying on rich source material, Stanislav V. Titiukin illuminated the attitude toward the problems of war and revolution in the ranks of the Russian socialist movement. The theme seemed quite difficult to research, for the abundance of assessments about these issues by Lenin required especially careful interpretation. However, the historian was able to show the diversity of ways in which a revolutionary character was formed among different groups of socialists, including the moderate groups that supported Russia’s military efforts.81

The publication of historical sources was an important niche for the professional activity of historians in the USSR in the era of “stagnation.” Although the publication of diplomatic documents was hampered, researchers were able to publish collections of source material that improved our understanding of economic and political history.82
One cannot fail to recognize that the study of Soviet historiography on the history of World War I is an unusually complex task for a researcher. At times even quite respected academic works repeatedly cited by Russian and foreign researchers need rechecking. Meanwhile, the presence of ideological incantations and the abundant citing of Lenin were not necessarily indicative of a low scholarly quality. Some authors genuinely tried to combine a “Leninism” understandable in their fashion with serious research, and others used it as protective camouflage. Academic creativity represented a constant game—at times quite dangerous—with the censor and the reader. The reader had to hunt for ideas in the text that had been pushed through the censorship, armed with a special code for interpreting scholarly text. When this was done, ideas important to the author were not contained in the general conclusions—they were hidden deep in the text and at times shifted to the references.

On the whole, censorship and self-censorship, and the prohibition of various taboo subjects, were asymmetrical and fluctuating: at times some aspects of World War I were “slightly opened” for research. At times (when a “definitive” conclusion was already formulated) historians only had to confirm it with new empirical material. At the same time, it is impossible not to see that during the entire Soviet period differences existed between various academic schools and institutions, which led to different interpretations of various aspects of World War I.

Russian World War I historians have worked without the necessary contact with foreign colleagues, though in this regard the era of “stagnation” was mixed: the period of “détente” led to an increase in academic contacts. Although criticism of “bourgeois historiography” was obligatory for Soviet historians, widespread criticism sometimes promoted the transfer of ideas.83

Post-Soviet Historiography of World War I, 1990–2018

The new public and academic situation after Perestroika required a historiographical reassessment. New research topics and methodologies had to be found, the discussion of “old” subjects more or less officially closed by Soviet historiography reopened. In the mid-1990s, these issues were discussed in academic journals but also in the general press. In this context, member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, Yury Pisarev, pointed out the need to study the patriotism of the war era anew; he called for intra-bloc differences to be researched. His suggestions were hotly discussed in the professional environment, and the phrases “controversial problems” and “new approaches” were constantly heard in the course of the exchange of opinions.84
Meanwhile, the abolition of censorship restrictions and free discussion, broad access to the research literature and published sources previously in-accessible to the majority of historians, the republication of many historical works and sources (including those published in exile), translations of foreign books, and the opening of many holdings in the Russian archives all promoted the development of historiography, even if there were some negative side effects at first: Some publishers and authors, trying to satisfy readers’ demands, tossed books of quite low quality on to the market. At times, the standard of editorial work was unacceptably low. For example, one provincial publisher published a translation of a classical book on the question of the outbreak of World War I by James Joll, but the book contained a large number of mistakes made by the translator.85

In the new conditions, some historians were able to formulate more openly the conclusions of their research during the Soviet period. This was the case, for example, of the well-known historian of the working class Yury I. Kir’ianov. During the Soviet era he had suffered from the defeat of the “new direction” and the ensuing restrictions. As a consequence, his book on industrial workers in Southern Russia during World War I, which still retains scholarly importance to this day, bore the imprint of the censorship restrictions of his time.86 In his new works he was able to reexamine the deductions that he was forced to draw earlier.87 He came to the conclusion that different sources show that there were practically no antiwar strikes in Russia despite repeated assertions to the contrary by Soviet historiography.

Direct contacts with foreign colleagues were also important. International conferences on the history of World War I were held in Russia—for example, the international colloquium in Saint Petersburg, which was part of a multiyear project of scholarly meetings between Russian and foreign historians, stimulated exchange with the international community.88 And there were also some editing projects that resulted from cooperation between Russian and foreign researchers. For example, the publication of a very important source, the proceedings of the Council of Ministers during the war years, was the result of a Russian-American project.89 As far as the study of the history of Russia during the world war is concerned, cooperation between Russian researchers and their foreign colleagues is at an appropriate level, with cooperation between researchers studying the events of 1917–18 being particularly significant. However, the task of integrating Russian history into the world historiography of the world war continues to be relevant, successful cooperation, for instance with the Great Britain–based large-scale publication project Russia in the Years of the World War and Revolution (1914–1922)90 or the Berlin-based 1914-1918-online: International Encyclopedia of the First World War91 not-
withstanding. And a comparison of the situation in Russia with the situation in other countries might be especially promising.92

As for Russian research on World War I, one can detect a significant intensification of research and scholarly publications after the year 2000. Before that, the foundation of the Russian Association of Historians of the First World War (1992)93 had already marked a renewal of interest in the years 1914–18; still, it took quite some time until new research projects were completed, and the corresponding results published. Slowly but certainly, a new generation of Russian World War I scholars has emerged whose representatives are engaging with new cultural history methodologies developed and applied by Western World War I historiography for quite some time already.

Moscow historian Aleksandr B. Astashov has carefully studied military censorship in the era of World War I. Handling a large quantity of archival material, he came up with important conclusions concerning different aspects of the frontline soldiers’ everyday life and their expectations and representations.94 In that regard, an important study on soldiers’ letters by Ol’ga S. Porshneva offered complementary insights.95 Working on soldiers’ letters seized by military censorship, she provided a thorough analysis of the trajectory of the soldiers’ morale throughout the war years. Both sought to reduce the historiographical gap between the Eastern and the Western Front of World War I.

Oksana S. Nagornaia is another case in point. A researcher from Cheliabinsk, she wrote a remarkable book dedicated to the Russian prisoners of war in Germany, using material she found in several Russian and German archives.96 The fact that Nagornaia broadly used the vast literature, Russian and foreign, devoted to the history of the prisoners of war, applying interesting approaches tested when analyzing other sources, is certainly one of the merits of the book that can be considered a Russian contribution to the ongoing international research on World War I prisoners of war.

Russian military history of World War I has also seen some advances, be it in a more conventional way, such as the research conducted by Yevgeny Yu. Sergeev and Arutyun A. Ulunian,97 who reconstructed the history of Russian military intelligence officers using previously classified archival material, or with a more critical approach, such as that demonstrated by Sergey G. Nelipovich, who took issues with a certain heroic vision of the Brusilov Offensive that Brusilov himself had done much to promote. Relying on various source materials, Nelipovich asserts that the enormous losses during the offensive did not lead to a significant improvement of the situation at the front, provoking a deepening of the general crisis in the country.98 The researcher made an attempt to deconstruct the myth
about Brusilov, a myth important for both Soviet and émigré historiography and the politics of memory. Not all the author’s conclusions have been substantiated to an equal degree; however, the dispute about such an important issue seems quite interesting.99

Another strand of World War I–related research worth mentioning is Russian regional history during World War I. Thanks to the works of Igor’ V. Narski, Ekaterina Yu. Semenova, and others, we know a great deal more about the way different Russian regions reacted to the war.100 The result is a more precise (yet still to be completed) picture of Russia as an empire with all its complexities and regional disparities, an aspect that has also been put forward in recent international historiography on pre-revolutionary Russia.101

Serious historical scholarship is obviously not alone on the market, and there are quite a few publications that use conspiratorial constructs of all sorts to make sense of World War I. For example, Oleg Yu. Danilov views the history of the war preparations as a gigantic plot by the British government, which supposedly aspired to destroy Germany, its most important rival, using Russia and France. In this description, when this was taking place, leading representatives of the Russian political elite acted as British agents: bribery and Masonic connections allowed London to exert its control.102

Many other conspiratorial interpretations also exist, and they have at times received wide circulation in contemporary Russian mass media. This particularity is not entirely disconnected from a certain kind of historiography: it is important to recall both the “Short Course” and the book by Nikolai N. Yakovlev, which used the conspiratorial constructs of the era of the world war and the revolution. The reaction of professional historians in this situation can be twofold. The conspiratorial constructs of early twenty-first-century historians and publicists ought to be subjected to critical analysis. On the other hand, it is also necessary to study the conspiratorial perception of the war era, continuing the research of Kornely Shatsillo. In so doing, Russian researchers enlist some approaches concerning the study of rumors that were being used by foreign colleagues as applied to the history of other countries.103

The centenary of World War I has seen Russian World War I historians engaged in many different ways. Research and publication activities of all kinds clearly intensified with a special emphasis on books and publications providing a comprehensive overview of the Russian experience during the years 1914–17. Two of the most interesting books in that respect are Aleksandr Astashov’s monography on the “Russian front,”104 where the author pushed quite far in his undertaking to touch upon nearly every aspect of soldiers’ life at the front as well as in his desire to inte-
grate recent international (mostly Anglo-Saxon) historiography on the war experience, and Vladimir P. Buldakov’s and Tat’iana G. Leont’eva’s Voina porodivshaia revoliutsia^{105} (The war that caused revolution), where the authors address and reassess many of the most important questions pertaining to World War I. Insofar as they allow the reader to access specific aspects of the war, different edited books^{106} and, more importantly, a Russian-language encyclopedia, edited on behalf of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Association of Russian World War I historians, are also quite useful.^{107}

It is important to note, however, that the historians’ involvement in the centenary went far beyond the academic business as usual. In fact, some historians were particularly active in expressing the desire to remember the “forgotten war” and were also quite explicit about the importance of remembering, first and foremost, the heroism of the Russian soldiers, thereby moving the war’s more tragic aspects to the background. Even in historical research, sometimes a naïve but dangerous desire was displayed to simply resurrect the patriotic debate of 1914 and use it as an analytical language of description. This could, at times, lead to a somewhat “celebratory” tone when it came to remembering the war’s anniversaries.

In conclusion, the trajectory of Russian historiography on World War I is quite different from other national historiographies. For example, in the 1920s the concept of class in Russia was, for obvious reasons, much more important there than anywhere else. Also, it was comparatively late, e.g. only recently, that Russian historians attempted to write the history of the war as a national history (to some degree the Soviet vision of the “imperialist war” was much more global). This is partly explained by the fact that the national history paradigm of the Great War that had been so dominant in Western historiographies for most of the twentieth century had not been adopted by Russian scholars during the Soviet era. Turning to a national narrative after the end of the Cold War can thus in part be considered as a way of catching up with Western traditions. But this is only part of the story: the desire to overcome the deep-felt identity crisis after the fall of Communism was no less important in that process. The desire to remember a “forgotten” war at state level met and still meets with popular aspirations and demands for a national memory that are part of a quest for a new Russian national identity. However, this creates a certain tension between the politics of memory and contemporary trends in the development of historical science. The fervor to deconstruct political and historical mythology conforms with the professional training of a historian for whom the most important virtue is creative criticism—criticism of a source, criticism of historical mythology, and criticism of preceding historiographical concepts. A conflict between the desire of some
authors to construct and other authors’ need for criticism is a conflict that might be manifested as a conflict of scholarly schools and generations of research; a conflict between historians of different specializations and supporters of different methods might lead to an interesting development in Russian historiography.

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Notes

1. Daniel T. Orlovsky, “Velikaia voina i rossiiskaia pamiat’,” in Rossiia i Pervaia mirovaia voina, ed. Nicolai N. Smirnov (Saint Petersburg: Dmitrii Bulanin, 1999), 49–57. In the following years, the works of Aaron Cohen and Karen Petrone that are also cited in this article were published.
2. Anatoly I. Utkin, Zabytaia tragediia: Rossiia v Pervoi mirovoi voine (Smolensk: Rusich, 2000). A film series devoted to World War II (2012, dir. V. Mikeladze) is also called Zabytaia Voina. The Moscow Publisher Iauza. Eksmo has been pursuing a book series project under a similar name.
3. See, for example, Soldatskie voennye pesni Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny 1914–1915 (Harbin, 1915).
7. One such child was the famous dissident Zhores Medvedev (born in 1925); another is Nobel Laureate Zhores Alferov (born in 1930).
9. Ibid.


15. Cohen, “‘Oh, That!’” 83.


17. F. E. Kuznetsov, *Brusilov o vospitanii i podgotovke ofitserskikh kadrov* (Moscow, 1944).


42. Evgeny V. Tarle, *Evropa v epokhu imperializma: 1871–1919* (Moscow-Leningrad: Gos. Izdat., 1927). In 1959 an Italian translation of the book came out, which was also re-published several times. On Tarle, see Boris S. Kaganovich, Evgenii Viktorovich Tarle i peterburgskaia shkola istorikov (Saint Petersburg: Bulanin, 1995).

43. See Kaganovich, Evgenii Viktorovich Tarle, 35–36.


46. Vladimir P. Semennikov, *Politika Romanovykh nakamune revolutsii (Ot Antancy k Germanii)* (Moscow: Gos. Izdat., 1926); V. P. Semennikov, *Monarkhiia pered krushe-
niem, 1914–1917: Bumagi Nikolaia II i drugie dokumenty (Moscow: Gos. Izdat., 1927); V. P. Semennikov, Romanovy i germanskie vliianiia vo vremia mirovoi voiny (Leningrad: Krasnaia Gazeta, 1929).


51. Georgy S. Isserson, Kanny mirovoi voiny (Gibel’ armii Samsonova) (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe voennoe izdatel’stvо, 1926).

52. Georgy S. Isserson, Kanny mirovoi voiny (Gibel’ armii Samsonova) (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe voennoe izdatel’stvо, 1926).


60. Ibid., 245.


64. Florinsky, End of the Russian Empire.


73. On this “new direction,” see Vladimir V. Polikarpov, Ot Tsusimy k Fevraliu: Tsarizm i voennaia promyshlennost’ v nachale XX veka (Moscow: Indrik, 2008), 11–155.


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82. Liubomir G. Beskrovnyi, ed., Zhurnaly Osoboego soveshchaniia dlia obsuzhdeniiia i ob ed-

83. Vinogradov, Burzhuaznaia istoriografia pervoi mirovoi voiny, a book on Western World 
War I-historiography, had quite an impact in that regard.

84. Yury A. Pisarev, “Novye podkhody k izucheniu pervoi mirovoi voiny,” Novaia i 
Noveishaia Istoriiia 3 (1993): 46–57; “Krugly stol’: Pervaia mirovaia voina i ee voz-
deistvie na istoriiu XX veika,” Novaia i Noveishaia Istoriiia 4–5 (1994); Kiril B. Vin-
ogradov, “Pervaia mirovaia voina: Diskussionnye problem,” Novaia i Noveishaia Istoriiia 
2 (1995); K. B. Vinogradov, “Eshche raz o novykh podkhodakh k istorii pervoi miro-

85. James Joll, Istoki pervoi mirovoi voiny (Rostov-on-Don: Feniks, 1998); concerning this 
edition, see M. V. Chukanov, “O kul’ture perevodiva zarábezhnóí istoricheskoi litera-


87. Yury I. Kir’ianov, Sotsial’no-politicheskii protest rabochikh Rossii v gody Pervoi mirovoi 
voiny (Itul’ 1914–Fevral’ 1917) (Moscow: In-t Ros. istorii RAN, 2005).

88. Smirnov, Rossiiia i pervaia mirovaia voina.

89. Sovet ministrov Rossii v gody pervoi mirovoi voiny: Bumagi L. N. Iakhontova, Zapis’ zase-

war.org.

91. 1914-1918-online: International Encyclopedia of the First World War, http://www.1914-
1918-online.net/.

92. An example of the successful inclusion of regional research in world historiography 
of World War I is the research of Peter Holquist, for example: Making War, Forging 
Revolution: Russia’s Continuum of Crisis, 1914–1921 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 2002). It is unsurprising that it has had much influence on internation-
al historiography.

93. See the association’s website, retrieved 30 August 2019 from http://rusasww1.ru/
view_cat.php?cat=54.

94. Aleksandr B. Astashov, “Voina kak kul’turnii shok: Analiz psikhopatologicheskogo 
sostoiania russkoi armii v Pervuui mirovuui voiuin,” Voennno-istoricheskaiia antropologi-
ia, ezhegodnik (2002): 268–81; A. B. Astashov, “Russkii krest’ianin na frontakh Per-
soldati i Pervaia mirovaia voina: Psikoistoricheskoe issledovanie voennogo opy-
via kul’tura na fronte v gody Pervoi mirovoi voiny,” in Massovaia kul’tura i massovoe 
soznanie: Istoriiia i sovremennost’; Sbornik statei (Moscow: RGGU, 2004), 53–74; A. B. 
Astashov, “Seksual’ni opyt russkogo soldata na Pervoi mirovoi i ego posledstviia dlia 
A. B. Astashov, “Dezertirstvo i bor’ba s nim v tsarskoi armii v gody Pervoi miro-
For criticism of some of Astashov’s positions, see Igor’ V. Narinski, “Frontovoi opyt 

95. Ol’ga S. Porshneva, Krest’iane, rabochie i soldati Rossii nakanune i v gody Pervoi Miro-
voi Voiny (Moscow: Rosspen, 2004).

96. Oksana S. Nagornaia, Drugoi voennyi opyt: russkie voennoplynnye v Germanii v period 
Pervoi mirovoi voiny (1914–1922) (Moscow: Novyy khronograf, 2010).


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