

The Refugee Outsider and the Active European Citizen

European Migration and Higher Education Policies and the Production of Belonging and Non-Belonging

PREM KUMAR RAJARAM

Thinking about access to higher education for refugees¹ allows us to examine the relationship between two policy figures often taken to be worlds apart: the refugee as outsider, subject to policies of exclusion or of very slow incremental integration, and the European ‘active citizen’ learning civic competencies to represent and foster European values (Mascherani et al. 2009; European Commission 2017). The separation of these actually deeply interconnected figures is enabled by the narrative simplification of the complex cultural and social formations ‘Europe’ and ‘Europeanness’. Whittled down by culturalist and populist rhetoric, ‘Europe’ and ‘Europeanness’ become stylised representations of complex historically contingent realities that generate and normalise policies based around insider/outsider distinctions (Hall 1996; Newman and Clarke 2009). I will show that a culturalist rhetoric about Europeanness and European values underpins European active citizenship and that it is constituted by demarcating what it is not: groups that cannot be expected to embody Europeanness and European values, including the refugee/migrant. The increasing dominance of a culturalist rhetoric about European belonging shows the centrality of racism and racialisations to the constitution of Europe (it is telling that alongside refugees and migrants, Muslim and Roma Europeans are groups subject to questioning about their belonging to Europe).

While there are many fields in which the mutual constitution (and illusion of separation) of active citizen and refugee/migrant is illustrated, I will focus on European higher education. Higher education in Europe is a privileged site for the cultivation of active citizens by en-

abling the acquisition of ‘civic competencies’ (Hoskins and Crick 2010; Biesta 2009) through curricula and through mobility across Europe. Higher education has a central role to play in cultivating a European public sphere. What has been called a ‘European way of life’ (European Parliament 2020) is fostered by active citizens and by the exclusion or marginalisation of migrants. Active citizens learn appropriate civics in university and in study-mobility programmes like Erasmus, with the focus in civics education being how to teach effective participation within an order, and not how to transform that order (Biesta 2009). For refugees, higher education is, by contrast, intended to be a tool of ‘integration’ into national social and cultural formations.

In this chapter, I will show that the European public sphere centres on a stylised cultural object, ‘Europeanness’ or ‘Europe’; the backdrop to the European public sphere is a value-based ahistorical rendition of the complex social formation ‘Europe’. This produces a system of representations (Hall 1996) which cultivates ways of seeing politics and society in terms that reinforce the ahistorical and restrictive values signified by ‘Europe’. The active citizen is a product of this system of representations, participating in and reinforcing the institutions and structures that stem from ‘Europe’ (and thus legitimising the whole arrangement). So too is the ‘refugee’ in Europe a product of this system: the European public sphere legitimises the participation of those who can feasibly be trusted to perform European values, and produces the refugee as its constitute ‘outsider’ who cannot be so trusted. The insider/outsider structure of the European polity enables a culturalisation of the ‘refugee’ as outsider, lacking in the values necessary to be trusted to participate. Higher education participates by being a key site for teaching civic competencies and enabling the mobile sociality of citizen-students; and by being used as a tool for the gradual integration of the refugee in Europe into national social and cultural formations (refugee access to the European polity is another matter altogether).

While European citizen-students are encouraged to be mobile without consideration of cost or borders – taken as a natural right that comes from being a citizen of an area of freedom and mobility – refugee students meet difficult obstacles. Mobility enables citizen-students’ participation in the European public sphere, creating an imagined geography of smooth and unfettered mobility that becomes important in framing political subjectivity. The space of freedom and mobility is fetishised, a no-disadvantage opportunity for social and economic gain, and the violent and marginalising border instruments that enable this space are invisibilised. The outcome is that important political questions of how to

live and in solidarity with whom are ignored in a politics premised on participating in pre-given institutions and structures said to embody 'European values' (Biesta 2009). Reducing citizen politics to participation in pre-given structures is an act of depoliticisation; it is an attempt at foreclosing transformative political action while ensuring the reproduction of the status quo, and the interests it serves and the inequalities it fosters.

The mobility of European students is premised on a biopolitical processing that distinguishes on the basis of the citizen/non-citizen dichotomy and, implicitly, on assessment of cultural belonging. There are cases of course where an individual or group's European citizenship does not appear commensurate with 'European culture': Roma European citizens for example are subject to forms of mobility control. Like Roma, refugees, lacking European values, cannot take part in the mobility of European students; for them, higher education is to do with integration. Citizen-students, by contrast, participate in the naturalised and depoliticised space of freedom and mobility, magically rent of the bordering mechanisms and violence that enable it. The outcome for refugees is further marginalisation; for European citizens it is the limiting of spaces for transformative politics.

To flesh out this argument about the interconnections between active citizens and refugees, this chapter proceeds in three sections. The first studies how policies to do with governing refugees come to be inflected by culturalist readings of belonging, and how their framing of issues naturalises certain responses. The second section elaborates on points in the Introduction about the culturalisation of a European public sphere and the depoliticisation of active citizens, and then studies how European refugee and migration policies emerging in this context repeat and normalise culturalist tropes about insiders and outsiders and 'European values'. The third section studies how European higher education policy and policy prescriptions cultivate depoliticised active citizens, normalising a sense of Europe as a space of shared values from which refugees must be restricted. With reference to Erasmus study programmes for citizens and refugees, I further flesh out the core argument of this chapter: that the refugee outsider and the depoliticised active European citizen are two sides of the same coin and that they are both crucial to the maintenance of a project of domination in Europe.

Governing Refugees as Outsiders

States tend to treat refugees as a distinct aspect of government, separated out from other spheres and requiring management through spe-

cific policies (Sassen 2000). Anthropologists of policy suggest that we should study the connections between framing issues and problems and the naturalisation of policies that address these (Wedel et al. 2005). European policies of fostering active citizenship and controlling migrant mobility both stem from the emotive stylised cultural object, 'Europe' and 'Europeanness'.

Newman and Clarke (2009) study the ways in which stylised cultural objects lay the basis for policies. Policies can be tinged with nationalist tropes ('Britishness' in Newman and Clarke's example), generating patterns of politics and social reproduction in their terms. These policies cultivate and produce subjectivities that are both in affinity with and in opposition to these cultural objects: in Europe, policies cultivate identities in affinity with 'Europe' (the active citizen) and in opposition to it (the migrant).

With citizens, and indeed often the European Parliament, distracted by culturalist identity games or socialising and celebrating 'Europe', technical and expert views gain precedence and undertake governance in their stead. The fact that migrants and refugees are subject to technical and pseudo-scientific surveillance to compile knowledge about human mobility and then followed up by a regulative and administrative procedure, which takes for granted migrants' non-belonging as political subjects in Europe, is a good example of the interrelations of a value-based politics, the culturalisation of the public sphere, and the rule of experts in Europe.

Policies are based on representations of complex social reality, making it meaningful in one rendition and not in others (Mitchell 2002). The technique is based on empiricism mediated with scientific abstractions, leading to local knowledge about actually existing relations being displaced (Cullather 2007) or derogated. This 'local knowledge' points to the lived reality of people, for example to the practices of transnational solidarity and new forms of community, and evasions of the state and its governing, that are part and parcel of refugee reality (Cantat 2016). These representations, when it comes to policies designed to govern displaced people, perform and produce the 'outsiderness' of refugees. Refugees are to be caught in an encompassing relationship with state authority, and the broader interests and ideologies served by these representations are concealed. The ironic centrality of refugee (and other) outsiders to the political, social, economic and cultural 'inside' is also hidden.

States typically have the responsibility for governing migration and devising policy. In Europe, there is common policing of the external bor-

der through the agency Frontex, directives on ‘asylum reception’ and ‘processing’ and common policies designed to foster ‘burden sharing’ of asylum claims. Additionally, the existence of the European Union maintains a ‘Europeanising’ framework on migration policy, providing a supra-level juridical framework which can influence how migration and refugee policies are implemented. Europe also provides a ‘value guide’, a bricolage of reference points and ‘European values’ that can guide migration policy. The bricolage is contested as much as it is revered, as which ‘European values’ should guide migration policy is argued over, particularly in recent times by the right and far right.

The idea of ‘European values’ arose as a way of cultivating ideological buy-in to the project of European union. Like other political projects, the durability of the EU project requires large-scale public buy-in, typically achievable through a sense of common value, purpose, culture and identity: in effect, establishing an idea of common cultural sensibility, backed up by institutions, the media and public discourse, to manipulate submission to the European project and make its relations of rule opaque. From the 1970s on, the Europeanising project deployed symbols about a geographically delimited history and culture that circumscribed ‘Europe’ and cultivated a value-based discourse about Europe based on commonality (Cantat 2016). Central to imaginations of ‘Europe’ is a form of magical thinking where citizens are taken to embody similar cultural values. The actual outcome is, of course, a disciplinary or pastoral process when ‘culture’ and ‘citizenship’ are not commensurate (in the case, for example, of racialised European citizens). The social formation of ‘Europe’, a historically emergent economic, social and political articulation, is taken as a stylised cultural object fostering an emotive and ahistorical connection to the value of its cultural, political and economic polity. The active citizen is a product of this imagined geography, an outcome of the system of representation that provides a specific and restricted definition of politics and political action (Hall 1996). It is not particularly difficult to see the limits of this representation, an indication perhaps that its hegemony is far from complete. For example, asking simply if actions by European citizens to help migrants in the Mediterranean reach safety would count as acts of active citizenship (the EU’s responses to such actions suggest they would not) allows us to see the fetishisation of an ahistorical sense of borders and political solidarity underpinning Europe.

European policies designed to police the mobility of refugees, including border-processing and integration policies, work from and in reference to the system of representations that emanate from ‘Europe’ and

‘Europeanness’ as stylised cultural objects. These policies normalise a way of operating towards refugees in ways that attempt to conceal the ahistorical rendition of the social and political formation ‘Europe’ that is at its core. In the next section I explore key policies to do with processing migrants at the border, making an argument that they have this culturalist trope at their centre, and that the result is a multiplication of borders based on the insider/outside trope and its encroachment onto the lives of refugees who have moved ‘inside’ Europe, for example when they seek access to higher education.

The Cultural Tropes of European Refugee and Migration Policies

A number of mainstream (a euphemism for right-wing) scholars bemoan the lack of policy cohesion on migration, refugees and asylum seeking in Europe.² For these scholars, this is particularly evident in the aftermath of what they call the 2015 ‘refugee crisis’ where, in their reading, some member states obstructed the development of common solutions. This led, they say, to a breakdown in cohesion and solidarity between EU member states because national politics got in the way of cooperation. These accounts often note that all this constitutes a threat to ‘European values’ (e.g. Mos 2020).

This is noteworthy, first of all, because of the displacement of violence that occurs: ‘crisis’ is what happens to imagined geographies and abstract values rather than to displaced peoples. The second important issue is that blaming ‘national politics’ and, by extension, nation states not adequately respectful of ‘European values’ misses an important point. ‘European values’ were actual justifications employed by those states whose policies towards displaced people were seen as obstructive to European solidarity and cohesion (Cantat 2016), in particular the Hungarian government’s appeal to a ‘Christian’ Europe requiring protection from ‘Muslim’ migrants. This amounts to a challenge from within the EU to the cultural coherence necessary for the maintenance of its hegemony.

Yilmaz (2012) argues that since about the 1980s, far right political parties and groups in Europe have gained influence in the public debate about migration, linking it to questions of cultural identity. The culturalisation of identity goes hand in hand with the weakening of class solidarity as a basis for politics, eroding workers’ rights and real wages (Kelsh and Hill 2006) and precipitated by complex changes in Europe and North America centring on legitimising a culture of competition

and entrepreneurship in place of community or class politics and protections. Indeed, much of the right-wing discourse is as misogynist as it is racist, intertwining notions of family, religion, culture and ethnicity to imagine European ‘culture’. Similarly, while culturalisation casts displaced people (and Muslims, and Roma and any number of outsiders to ‘Europe’) as external others whose entry to and belonging in Europe must be strictly regulated, the broader consequence is the culturalisation of the public sphere (Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016). This culturalisation leads to fundamental questions about belonging and solidarity in public space being resolved under the banner of large statements about who is discernible as culturally ‘European’ and who is not (Junuzi 2019). As noted earlier, a consequence of a public sphere hemmed in by ‘European values’ is the marginalisation of refugees and migrants in the public sphere except as outsiders to be excluded or warily integrated. This applies to other European ‘outsiders’; the culturally tinged public sphere privileges identity or culture-based expressions of agency but crowds out those identities or values that are said to not speak to or be not compliant with ‘European’ values.

Moving on to studying policy directed at refugees and migrants cast as outsiders, I note three characteristics of these policies: (1) making displaced people amenable to specific types of governance through forms of knowledge production focusing on surveillance and data collection; (2) the prevalence of a risk assessment framework in policy designed to govern refugee mobility; and (3) the prevalence of technical administration in the actual work of governing migrants. One consequence of these three characteristics of policy is the multiplication of the border (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013). These policies materially mark ‘refugees’, institutionalising their outsidership in documentation that they carry with them, in biometric data collection, and a host of other bureaucratic procedures. The European border stretches beyond Europe to holding centres in North Africa and elsewhere and is carried on the bodies of migrants as outsiders subject to risk assessment and technical management long after actual processing of right to entry, including when it comes to access to higher education. I look at policy at three ‘stages’ of displaced peoples’ mobility as they head towards Europe (while noting that the term ‘stages’ with its ideas of progression needs to be qualified because of the way the border shifts and multiplies impacting on temporal and spatial progression): policies designed to understand and repel mobility to Europe; policies designed to ensure coherence in the asylum procedure at the formal border; and policies of integration, specifically here policies governing access to higher ed-

ucation. There are limits to this study. I do not look in detail at the implementation of policies, including the responses and resistance by displaced peoples, and I do not have scope to focus on the full breadth of policies governing migrants and refugees in Europe.

*Understanding and Repelling Human Mobility:
Frontex's Surveillance and Risk Assessment Strategy*

Mitchell (2002) has argued that policy activity typically relies on empirical data acquisition to make complex social reality knowable as a problem of public policy. Releasing annual *Risk Analysis* digests, Frontex, the European border policing agency, borrows risk assessment methodologies (for example those to do with public health) in which the EU is well established as a risk regulator (Frontex 2020). Regine Paul notes that the risk analysis paradigm and method 'normalises migration and border crossings as scientifically assessable risks similar to health risks' (Paul 2017: 692). Frontex's science-by-association normalises assumptions about the adverse impacts of border crossings, closing space for political discussion about the borders of Europe and the types of community and politics that are privileged.

Frontex's risk analysis framework is based on a knowledge practice that makes migration a knowable phenomenon, amenable to specific types of intervention (Scheel, Ruppert and Ustek-Spilda 2019). It builds on empirical methods designed to make the mobility of displaced people visible and which bear close resemblance to colonial modes of rendering 'natives' comprehensible and visible but still exotically other (Rajaram 2017). Data is inseparable from 'migration' itself. Policy makers have no direct engagement with the human experiences of displacement and dangerous mobility to Europe; these are mediated through numbers and visual representations that lead to the abstraction called 'migration'. Even if its outcome is abstract, data collection itself is material and embodies violence of all sorts. Pollozek and Passoth (2019) studied data collection on Moria camp in 2018, taking note of how power inequalities between data collectors, including from Frontex, and people living in the camp were effective in ensuring the creation of a data infrastructure intended to regulate and surveil the mobility of migrants across Europe. Frontex's data-driven risk assessment strategy normalises a deterrence-based approach. Csernatori (2018) notes that these measures have had limited effectiveness in deterring mobility but have become normalised and entrenched, backed up by research spending by the EU on data-driven securitising measures and normalis-

ing a ‘military bias’ in border management. The military bias is premised on the idea that such mobility is criminal, justifying a proxy war against people on the move (Hintjens and Bilgic 2018). In addition to deterrence at sea, the EU has set up holding camps in Libya, brokered a deal with Turkey to hold migrants at bay, and enabled deportation to countries that are far from safe. States of exception are rife, whether in the Mediterranean or at the EU’s land borders, cultivating violence by border guards against people on the move (Isakjee et al. 2020). Data collection is not only distant, but also corporeal, with biometrics used to trace people on the move in Europe, enabling returns and restrictions on mobility.

Quite explicitly underpinning all this is Europe’s zone of free mobility for citizens. Frontex exists to ensure the coherence and sustainability of the Schengen zone.³ The abstraction of human mobility behind datasets (Scheel, Ruppert and Ustek-Spilda 2019), itself possible because of the culturalist othering of migrants, presents migration as a military issue, only to be dealt with by experts and only on the basis of abstracted data. Properly political questions about who Europeans may live with, what its borders are and what sorts of action constitute ethical or moral responses to displaced people have been placed at a remove. With Frontex and EU policies of data-driven militarisation, European citizens have ceded these political questions to expert management.

Processing People on the Move: (Re)Producing Anxiety

In addition to border cooperation, another example of policy cooperation when it comes to managing migration is the Asylum Procedures Directive (APD). The APD is notable for four features: (1) it makes no provision for making asylum claims to an EU state from outside the EU; (2) it allows for the detention of asylum seekers; (3) it fixates on identifying ‘abusive’ claims; and (4) it establishes a procedural and not a legal approach to assessing claims with little possibility of recourse to courts. No free legal assistance is provided to the asylum seeker (Schittenhelm 2018).

The APD is part of a nascent and much-argued-over Common European Asylum System (CEAS) and intends to provide directives to ensure that asylum assessments are undertaken in much the same way across EU member states. The APD explicitly directs the containment of asylum seekers ‘outside’ the territorial jurisdiction of the country, leading to the establishment of legal fictions where camps and holding zones at the border are territorially ‘outside’. Harmonisation of asylum

directives are the subject of much more anxiety than other harmonisation procedures in the EU: there is by comparison a much more detailed account of what to do, particularly in exceptional cases. The anxiety is rooted in the idea that some states may be ‘softer’ than others in granting asylum: it is not the rejections that the member states are concerned with, it is the fact that not all asylum claimants can be turned away.

The APD is a legal procedure designed to deal with the abstraction called ‘migration’ that Frontex and its datasets provide and only after the first response strategy of repelling boats has failed. Again, there are interesting overtones with colonial policies. Whereas Frontex data gathering and risk assessment are ways of knowing at a distance, the administrative procedures at the border are more nuanced categorisations of humans so that they fit within the governance strategies of states, while at the same time maintaining a sense of anxiety about the difference of the other. In effect, it is a coming together of bureaucratic processes and culturalist ideology. Like all asylum processing, what goes on at the borders of the EU is the creation of legal fictions: complex social reality is made into legally defined notions of ‘persecution’ (or not, as the case may be).

The spectre of the European area of freedom and mobility and its preferred subject, the culturally recognisable European citizen, arises yet again. The Directive of the European Parliament setting up this takes note:

A common policy on asylum, including a Common European Asylum System, is a constituent part of the European Union’s objective of establishing progressively an area of freedom, security and justice open to those who, forced by circumstances, legitimately seek protection in the Union. (European Parliament 2011)

One of the ways in which the EU legitimates itself (and justifies hierarchical and capitalist relations of rule) is with recourse to the ‘long peace’ that union has supposedly effected (Cantat 2016). Jennifer Mitzen (2018: 394) argues that ‘peace’ in Europe has been achieved by ‘rendering cooperation apolitical by focusing on functional ties’ between member states. I would add also emphasising socialisation as a means of fostering connections between European citizens. Mitzen adds also that the conflictual European past is ‘othered’.

European zones of peace and security are maintained by the delegitimation of political disagreement and by modes of stigmatisation, surveillance and securitisation at its border (Mitzen 2018). The suspicious asylum processing directive focuses energy on distinguishing

the abusive asylum seeker; an entire political and economic system is based on the identification, reproduction and management of anxiety. This anxiety is fundamental. Without it, the ontological treasure that is the EU citizen could not exist. Anxiety is reproduced, its production and management are as much a part of displaced peoples in Europe as surveillance and securitisation, and – as I will show – it continues to pop up in integration practices and policies in Europe.

With regard to higher education access, it continues to reverberate because of a fear that migrants may attend university unlawfully, or their admission will bring down educational standards. However, as I will explore in the next section, the key anxiety is caused by the way in which European policies on higher education centre on the development of active civic citizenship, in which there is no place for the refugee.

Active Citizenship, Higher Education and the Governance of Refugees as Students in Europe

In the preceding section, I have suggested that at the first two ‘stages’ of mobility (keeping in mind, again, that the term ‘stages’ is problematic) policies are framed by the abstractions of data, by a commitment to risk assessment and by the cultivation of anxiety. I have argued that the refugee as outsider is the mirror image of the depoliticised European citizen. This depoliticisation takes a number of forms, including the translation of political agency into ‘socialisation’, the delegitimising of political disagreement especially around borders and belonging, with the consequence that properly political or ethical questions are ceded to administrators or experts, and the growth of functional forms of connections in Europe in place of political and social relations. In this section, I look at higher education policy at the European scale as a key engine of this depoliticisation, and I look at the way in which those strategies of management at the so-called external borders of the EU are repeated ‘inside’ when the refugee as student is encountered.

Citizenship is normally associated with national or sub-national levels, where engagement with politics and participation in civic life appear more straightforward. At the European level, citizenship was expressed in relation to economic issues to do with employment across borders, the impacts of a single currency and so on. European socio-cultural citizenship lagged behind, creating an anxiety, by the early 2000s, about the extent to which citizens of member states also see themselves as ‘European citizens and identify with and actively support the European Union as a unit of democratic governance’ (Biesta 2009: 147).

In response, in the early 2000s the EU turned attention towards the idea of active citizenship, defined as participation in civic life. Active citizenship came to be associated with the acquisition of ‘civic competencies’, participation in pre-established fora for social activity (particularly European civil society) and connected to European policy measures in creating areas of lifelong learning and mobility for researchers and students. Biesta (2009: 150) argues that the idea of the active citizen is fostered by a ‘neoliberal’ political and economic agenda. The active citizen scurries to fill holes left by the withdrawal of state funding in key areas, while developing civic competencies intended to maintain order rather than give real and potentially transformative political education. All in all, the concept of active citizenship is a useful way of normalising capitalist accumulation under the guise of value-oriented citizenship. It is in Europe, more than elsewhere perhaps, that the fostering of active citizenship has taken root in higher education systems, and this is because of a systematic strategy by the EU to do so (European Commission 2012).

Active citizens are well informed and depoliticised. Higher education, in particular through the Erasmus mobility schemes, has become a key area for socialisation and, consequently, acquisition of ‘European values’. Higher education begets active citizenship, and the question is typically posed like this: what should we teach in order to contribute to European citizenship (as opposed to more fundamental questions like how can we teach so that our students may understand how political orders have come to be normalised?) (Biesta 2009)? Curricular change in Europe is not directed from above but is influenced by the Union’s ‘soft power’, evident in its capacity to connect participation in the labour market with the exercise of European values. A central aspect of higher education in Europe is the development of knowledge and values-based competencies, not simply jobs for a market but jobs for a market that enables the development of political, economic and ethical values (European Commission 2019).

Active citizenship is a means of ensuring social cohesion; it is functionalist, Biesta says (2009), and it has a community orientation, favouring quiet civic participation in existing institutions rather than transformative political action, with large question marks about whether disruptive expressions of civic participation (like working with migrant rescue boats in the Mediterranean) actually fit the vision of citizenship being articulated. The idea of active citizenship very much presumes service to and reproduction of an existing order but it also, Biesta continues, has an individualising trait. The active citizen, in the singular,

is to be empowered; the practice of individualising acts as a deterrent to community-based action and indeed to developing community resources that might enable active collective political action (and social change). Finally, according to Biesta, active citizenship understands democracy as consensus, as opposed to disagreement or conflict, and the active citizen takes a close interest in preserving that consensus. Biesta notes that the consequence of this is the normalisation of the boundaries of political community, and the institutions and people they include or exclude. It is important that this exclusion (and inclusion) is values-based and not politics-based. The active citizen works within and seeks to preserve a social order that is desirable because it enables active citizenship. This is a closed circle that reinforces itself. Participation is premised on active citizenship, and a type of active citizenship that reinforces the borders of the political community. If the borders of society are not political but values-based, then it militates against debate about how to expand borders and include others (Biesta 2009).

For refugees, higher education is a tool of ‘integration’, rather than active citizenship. Following the large-scale movement of people to Europe in 2015 (‘the refugee crisis’), the European Commission set up measures to foster the ‘integration’ of those who passed through asylum processing, with access to work and employment taking priority. It is notable that the focus of these measures is ‘third country nationals’, avoiding, as Dvir, Morris and Yemini (2018) note, a distinction between those who have come to Europe by more peaceful means and those who have fled conflict, evaded the EU’s militarised deterrence and come through traumatic asylum processing often in holding or detention centres. In doing so, according to Dvir et al., ‘thus the discourse around their integration is limited to the practical concerns of citizenship (as the right to work or study) and not around the political or moral means’ (2018: 213). This modality of integration neatly puts aside discussion of ‘Europe’s values’ and leaves in abeyance the question of whether migrants and refugees are to be ‘active citizens’.

The ‘integration’ of refugees and migrants in relation to higher education has two stages: enabling access to higher education, and the acquisition of European values through integration into university and society. But there are blocks to the realisation of the second goal and active citizenship does not come directly to refugees. Most obviously, participation in civic society and in the European public sphere is limited because of restrictions on refugee mobility (when travelling to other European countries for higher education, refugees are treated as third country nationals; they need a visa and have a limited right to work).

However, the acquisition of European values remains a goal of integration, the European Commission write:

This dynamic two-way process on integration means not only expecting third-country nationals to embrace EU fundamental values and learn the host language but also offering them meaningful opportunities to participate in the economy and society of the Member State where they settle. (European Commission 2016: 5; cited by Dvir, Morris and Yemini 2018: 214)

It is unclear how this is a two-way process. Indeed, the sheer number of speeches, statements, directives and policy stances outlining the scope and implementation of ‘integration’ betrays an anxiety about migrants who must be expected to ‘embrace EU fundamental values’. Following a review of Erasmus+ documents and funding schemes for university students in Europe, Dvir et al. note that funding for programmes to help refugees enter into or succeed in higher education focuses on the benefit that such integration may bring to member states. The focus is local and national, rather than European, and there is a stark difference between Erasmus+ programmes for EU citizens (and third country Schengen-visa-holding education migrants) and refugees. The former types of programme highlight mobility and the cultivation of European identity through active citizenship. Education programmes for refugees, on the other hand, identify integration as the main goal and argue its economic benefits to member states.

The focus of Erasmus programmes specifically designed for migrants and refugees is largely intended to assist acquisition of host country language and to understand the norms and requirements of European higher education systems. Such programmes are often backed up with a stated anxiety about the consequences for integration and not doing so. This is the case in the Erasmus+ Social Inclusion through Education, Training and Youth programme, which funded education programmes for displaced people that my fellow editors of this volume and I, together with other staff and faculty, developed at Central European University in 2016. In the section on providing programmes for ‘newly arrived migrants’, the call for proposals states:

Education, training and youth policies have a key role to play in fostering social inclusion, mutual understanding and respect among young people and communities. This is particularly true given the growing diversity of European societies, which can bring opportunities but, in combination with the impact of the last economic and financial crisis, can also bring significant challenges for social cohesion.

Education and training systems need to ensure equal access to high-quality education, in particular by reaching out to the most disadvantaged and integrating people with diverse backgrounds, including newly arrived migrants, into the learning environment, thereby fostering upwards social convergence.

Young people are increasingly excluded from social and civic life and some are at risk of disengagement, marginalisation and even violent radicalisation.

Associated with increased migration flows, recent studies have revealed growing tensions between different cultures and communities, including in educational settings, and involving intolerant attitudes and behaviours, bullying and violence.

The tragic terrorist attacks which occurred in Europe in 2015 reminded us of the importance of safeguarding the fundamental values stipulated in Art. 2 of the Treaty on the European Union. (Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency [EACEA] 2016: 4)

The text of this call is typical of what Dvir et al. have noted. There is first a focus on inclusion and diversity before revealing an anxiety about the need to integrate the euphemistically termed ‘newly arrived migrants’, while explicitly and jarringly referencing a fear of violent ‘radicalisation’ and ‘terrorist attacks’. Running together radicalisation, intolerance, bullying, differences in cultures and a wholly decontextualised mention of terrorist attacks places them in the same register. There is no attempt to say there is a causal connection between migration and terrorism; its mention is strange and seems out of place in the structure of the text but leaves the subject in the imagination of educators and grassroots workers, a power of suggestion that associates education for migrants with terrorism.

In our application we avoided speaking to these anxieties and fears, and wrote critically about ‘integration’, and the fact that this is possible does show that recipients of funds are able to come up with more critically minded programmes. The main indicators of progress are statistical indicators – numbers of people entered into higher education after the programme and so on. While entry to higher education here is seen by Erasmus+ as a means of alleviating ‘violent radicalisation’ or fostering ‘integration’ (and presumably preventing ‘terrorism’), it does not preclude other aspects of education.

Dvir et al. argue that these programmes emphasise ‘integration’ of migrants and do not aim to foster anything like ‘active citizenship’ for them. The Erasmus+ call referred to above has as one of its objectives ‘preventing violent radicalisation and promoting democratic values,

fundamental rights, intercultural understanding and active citizenship’ (EACEA 2016: 6), but it becomes clear that by active citizenship they mean the work of EU citizen youth volunteers engaged in migration programmes (integrating migrants is an act of active citizenship). In not providing a pathway towards ‘active citizenship’ participation at the European scale, refugees are effectively blocked from participating in the European public sphere, such as it is (Dvir, Morris and Yemini 2018).

There are, as mentioned, limits to my analysis here: people receiving funding are able to play with the conditions associated with grants and use politically creative pedagogies, within the limits of a need to demonstrate ‘integration’. There is little that we as educators can do about the restrictions on mobility for displaced peoples in the European sphere. Indeed, the education programmes for displaced people at Central European University encountered difficulties when attempting to enrol students from elsewhere in Europe. This is because host countries resisted refugee students moving to other countries for education. Once again, there are differences in the implementation: some students did find a way to avoid their host country’s ‘integration contracts’ and attend education programmes in Budapest. But these were incidental and dependent on individual capital and networks. The community imagined and performed by active EU citizens is closed, obstructing the entry of people who cannot be trusted to understand and enact European values. Dvir, Morris and Yemini (2018: 217) say that the EU ‘unintentionally’ leaves refugees in purgatory. It is more accurate to say that in the EU’s political imagination there is no space for refugees to participate in the public sphere.

The flip side to all this is that the non-challenge to the political borders of EU community (for they are indeed actually *political* borders) leads to a form of depoliticisation. The consequence is a culturalist account of the public sphere, with an emphasis on ‘EU fundamental values’. These values are under question in Europe, but not because a ‘value’-based account of the political is depoliticising and excluding, or because they should be replaced with a more political and historically accurate account of how and why ‘values’ emerge. The internal European critique about its ‘values’ arises because some EU citizens and member states say these do not represent ‘European values’ at all, being overly liberal or overly western European in their fundamentals. This feels like a dominating voice in Europe at the moment, with the rise of the far right into mainstream politics, but it would be important to remember the leftist critique of ‘European values’ which questions its

ahistorical and truncated, racist and imperialist notions of community and solidarity.

But it is the far right's critique of the EU and European values that must be dealt with. Once the shock of the far right Hungarian government's hate speech towards migrants and accompanying brutal deterrence receded after 2015, EU institutions increasingly saw Hungary as a vanguard and that their sense of a Europe needing protection from migrants was actually quite agreeable, at least in parts. The challenge to what constitutes EU values led by the European right has led to the reinforcement of values-based politics. This is evident in European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen's plans for an office to 'protect the European way of life', changed soon enough to 'promoting the European way of life', with its two key areas being, yet again, education to foster active citizens and value-driven skills, and protecting the continent from migrants with a rhetoric about an ahistorical set of values, 'the European way of life', explicit and prominent (European Parliament 2020).

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have looked at two policy figures central to the constitution of the European public sphere and an imagined European community: the refugee as outsider and the active EU citizen. I have suggested that both these figures operate in relation to a stylised cultural object, 'Europe' or 'Europeanness', that fosters a system of representations that normalise ahistorical readings of community, belonging and solidarity and their borders. A restrictive culturalism can be found at the hidden centre of European governance of both its citizens and its refugee others. Refugees are inherent outsiders; their mobility must be controlled, and they become the subject of an anxiety-ridden integration programme. On the other hand, European citizens are taught to be 'active citizens', busily participating in the European public sphere while ignoring its violent bordering mechanisms. The inequalities and elite interests that are enabled by bordering are ignored, and properly political questions about how we live and with whom are left to the rule of experts.

In the EU, higher education is central both to the making of active citizens and to the integration of migrants. These apparently different policy figures are interconnected to bleed into each other. Tropes of anxiety and of the fundamental non-belongingness of migrants to a European community are central to the boundaries of community and citizen-

ship. Rather than progressive movement towards the mythical European space of mobility and freedom, refugees continue to encounter more of the same distrust, fear and cynical politicking with their lives.

Prem Kumar Rajaram is Professor of Sociology and Social Anthropology at Central European University and Head of the OLIve unit at the same university. He works on issues to do with race, capitalism and displacement in historical and contemporary perspective.

Notes

1. The term ‘refugee’ is a legal fiction that restricts protection to those seen to have been subject to specific types of persecution; it is a term of governance and not one that conforms to the reality of ‘refugee’ mobilities. I will use the term ‘refugee’ or ‘asylum seeker’ to indicate this process of government, and I will use the term ‘migrants’ to indicate mobilities to Europe, qualifying it as needed to show ‘illegalised’ mobilities.
2. For example, Garcia-Zamor speaks straightforwardly of ‘refugee invasion’ in the journal *Public Organization Review* (2017) and repeats the claim in a book on the *Ethical Dilemmas of Migration* (2018).
3. From Frontex’s website: ‘When the “Schengen area” – a territory in which the free movement of persons – entered into force in 1995, checks at the internal borders were abolished and a single external border was created . . . In order to keep a balance between freedom and security, participating Member States agreed to introduce additional measures focusing on cooperation and coordination of the work of the police and judicial authorities. Because organized crime networks do not respect borders, this cooperation became key to safeguarding internal security’. <https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/origin-tasks/> (accessed 16 September 2020).

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