Every human society has some sort of territorial structure. … In studying political organization, we have to deal with the maintenance or establishment of social order, within a territorial framework, by the organized exercise of coercive authority through the use, or the possibility of use, of physical force.

A. R. Radcliffe-Brown (1955 [1940]: xiv)

What does the notion of territory entail for state formation? As Elden (2013) has made clear in his recent genealogy of territory, it may be seen as a spatial extension of state power. While Elden’s point is crucial, in this chapter I will entertain the idea that the colonial state form is not different in its key dynamics from later state forms, as well as certain African polities, and in this way the chapter challenges the idea of the colonial state as radically different from earlier or later state forms. While basing myself on information from Manica Province, the empirical material expands beyond these demarcations and involves also crucial elements from the greater Shona-speaking area, Southern Rhodesia and Zimbabwe, Malawi, South Africa, and other areas. Manica Province is, thus, part of a much larger political field.

Theoretically, of course, there is a long-standing interest in a territorial approach to past and present formations of state. As, for example, Foucault (2007 [2004]: 96]) argues, sovereignty is exercised on a terri-
tory and, consequently, on its inhabitants. In the characteristic manner of the Foucauldian genealogy, this notion of territory is integral to a formative triangular order that also comprises security and population—an order crucial to his overall analysis of biopower and the state form. While recognizing these Foucauldian insights, this chapter will nonetheless approach territory not merely as a static receptacle of sovereign or state power or terrain for the exercise of biopower but will also focus on its shifting and multiple aspects through the concepts of territorialization and deterritorialization. These concepts are not only meant to emphasize the physical, horizontal, and geologically bound spaces of the earth or tracts of land in a cadastral sense but also to incorporate dynamics of inscription, erasure, and interpretation onto—and into—spaces.

Specifically, I underline here the particular directionality of the territorializing dynamic inherent to state formation in what came to be Manica Province. The gradually more territorially dominant state formations simultaneously deterritorialized orientations, claims, and logics related to the traditional field, as well as undermined or incorporated rival polities. Thus, a main claim of the chapter is that the traditional field is the subject of processes of deterritorialization at historical points of state expansion.

A final point: This argument of an increasing deterritorialization of the traditional field neither forms a linear, historical argument where a territorial nation-state in a tautological fashion is simultaneously posited as the logical outcome of a unidirectional historical trajectory or being the point of departure analytically projected backward (cf. Galli 2003: 229), nor is it reducible to a critique of Portuguese colonialism in sovereign-territorial terms—although its brutality and violence is a central argument of this book as a whole. Instead what is underlined in this chapter is how various dynamics of state formation and the traditional field are embroiled in conflicts of territoriality. These conflicts continue through the precolonial and colonial periods, through the liberation war and the civil war, and, not least, in the present context of the postcolonial Mozambican state.

**Becomings of State in Manica Province**

And the closer one gets to the periphery of the system, the more subjects find themselves caught in a kind of temptation: whether to submit oneself to the signifiers, to obey the orders of the bureaucrat and follow the interpretation of the high priest—or rather
be carried off elsewhere, the beyond, on a crazy vector, a tangent of deterritorialization—to follow a line of escape, to set off as a nomad …

Gilles Deleuze (2006 [1975]: 15)

State orders in Manica Province have multiple origins—and competing perspectives also abound in the literature as well as in Honde. One type of historical perspective covering this period from the 1500s onward is what one may call a Lusocentric perspective on what was to become Mozambique. From this mainly colonial perspective, the Portuguese gradual penetration and control over territory, people, and economy is represented as inevitable and facilitated by some key transitions. First, there was the transition from being dominated by the mobile Swahili or Muslim trade caravans forming routes of extraction to a more sedentary and nodal system of Portuguese control of ports and the so-called feiras (marketplaces). A second transition in this perspective is traced via the emergence of merchant colonial capitalism in the 1800s through concession companies that led—ultimately and unavoidably—to the erection and dominance of the colonial (and, later, postcolonial) state.¹

This Lusocentric narrative is, of course, not without basis in historical fact if, for instance and in teleological fashion, projected backward in time from the height of Portuguese colonialism in the 1950s. Such a view is also concurrent with the civilizationalist and evolutionist underpinnings of late colonialism that was given a particular Portuguese intellectual flair in Lusotropicalism. This was an ideology with strong roots in the works of Gilberto Freyre (see, e.g., 1961) and politically used to disseminate a myth of the necessity and, indeed, benevolent presence of the Portuguese in its colonies.² Celebrating the gradual Portuguese control and (supposed) societal and economic development, Lusotropicalism conforms also to a particular Lusocentric articulation of the “colonial settler paradigm” of state formation. However, such a view, awarding agency and inevitability predominantly to the Portuguese, may be contested on several levels.

If starting from dominant historical discourses of Portuguese colonialism, Portuguese involvement in Mozambique was predicated upon non-Portuguese polities in early and late phases of their colonial dominance. As Newitt (1973: 38; see also Rita-Ferreira 1999) points out in relation to an analysis of trade as such, “The Portuguese did not pioneer trade on the East African coast or in the interior. The Muslims had opened all the trade routes and even established a pattern of settlement long before Vasco da Gama’s first arrival in 1498.” Further, during the
1500s, the Portuguese presence was more or less restricted to being embedded in, for example, Mwene Mutapa’s empire (Alpers 1970; Beach 1994a), where Portuguese traders were allowed to provide trade goods to the larger polity but directed through and controlled by its center. In the 1500s, the Portuguese were, in politico-administrative senses, akin to the Swahili traders who had formerly dominated trading routes. Practically, this meant that the Portuguese paid so-called curva—a type of tribute—to the Mwene Mutapa and were given ceremonial equipment (spears, shields, etc.) in return. The curva meant the Portuguese traders were required to approach the king barefoot before laying fully prostrate in his presence, and in return they were allowed very limited trading privileges. Such tribute and subordination were long-standing features of Portuguese politics toward polities other than Mwene Mutapa’s—as is exemplified by the “twenty-four parcels of cloth worth two hundred and seventy-eight xeralfins and four tangas” that were paid to the king of the Quiteve in 1612 (National Archives of Zimbabwe 1989: 265). These examples demonstrate that the integration and, sometimes, subordination of Portuguese colonial interest in polities external to its nascent colonial state were long-standing characteristics (see also Bertelsen 2015).

If starting neither from a Lusocentric perspective nor from dominant historical analyses but from the concrete context of the chiTewe-speaking inhabitants of Honde and Chimoio, its polities and practices are arguably the result of century-long processes of loss of territory, overrule, and invasion at the hands of both invading Nguni forces from the 1830s onward and, before and after, Portuguese colonial forces. Instructive in this regard is Mtetwa’s (1984) analysis of the rise and fall of what he terms the Uteve from 1480 to Nguni overrule in 1834. He traces imperial continuities between the Mwene Mutapa conquerors of the fifteenth century and the kingdom of Uteve that from that time until 1834 “occupied a significant portion of Mozambique’s coastal plain in what is now Sofala province and parts of highlands of the Manica province, as well as the adjoining eastern districts of Zimbabwe” (1984: 320). However, the Uteve polity was continually challenged by internal rivalries as well as the incessant Portuguese search for gold, their raiding armies, and their land grabbing. Mtetwa also notes what he calls “forced trade,” wherein the Portuguese gave merchandise to village chiefs who, in a thwarted version of reciprocity, needed to repay them with gold. Such forced trade shifted the focus from food production to mining with detrimental effects on political stability and social integration (1984: 331, 342). Together, these processes considerably weakened the Uteve state to such a degree that, as other Shona imperial polities did in the early 1800s, it gradually disintegrated.
The gradual disintegration of the Uteve state coincided with the rise of one of Southern Africa’s most prominent political, social, and territorial upheavals: the Nguni migrations that from the 1830s swept across Southern Africa—a composite force so considerable that it destabilized Portuguese attempts at controlling the African populations and territories (Abraham 1961: 216). These Nguni migrations were part of the dramatic political, social, and territorial reordering known as the mfecane, wherein vast groups in the short span of a few years moved northward from South African origins on journeys involving conquest, strife, and, ultimately, resettlement. The territory of what was to become Mozambique was also a repository of this influx. In detailing the Nguni migrations from what is now Maputo to the Zambezi River, Liesegang’s work (1970) shows such a pattern of gradual penetration, raiding, and settlement to conform to several distinct Nguni groups’ movements.

The arrival in Manica Province of the Nguni force led by Nxaba in the 1830s most likely centered in and around the Gorongosa region, a region that Renamo, interestingly, later also favored. The Nguni under Nxaba formed polities that enabled and enacted new systems of dominance and extraction (Newitt 1995: 260). Initially, Nxaba and his groups raided extensively and attacked Portuguese camps and settlements as well African polities and kingdoms. The already weakened Uteve kingdom, for instance, was raided at least five times between 1830 and 1833 (Liesegang 1970: 325). MacGonagle (2008) makes the important point, however, that the Nguni gradually developed into a permanent occupying and dominant force as the early Nxaba raids spearheaded the formation of more elaborate and permanent Nguni tributary states. The rise of these state formations founded on conquest and invasion profoundly changed the political and social landscape, introducing a “military aristocracy of non-producers who appropriated the surplus. Although the king and royal wives cultivated his fields, and supposedly the other Gaza Nguni likewise, much of their food seems to have come from tribute and expropriation” (Rennie 1984: 182–83).

Through forming political and military deputies with armed followings, ndunas, Nguni rule expanded to dominate vast areas. Several features of the nascent Nguni state formation make it, arguably, more developed, centralized, and brutal than the formations of the Uteve, Mwene Mutapa, and others that preceded it. For one, it was characterized by the violent enabling of systems of subservience and raiding, effecting an unprecedented extraction of surplus foods and other goods from peasants. This harsh sociopolitical system was supplemented by the use of unfree and forced labor and internal slavery. Portuguese official João J. da Silva described such a raid in 1830 (quoted in Liesegang 1970: 325):
They [Nxaba and his followers] attacked Quiteve in 1830, and, after committing all kinds of hostile actions, passed on to Manica and Changamire. They took all cattle which existed in these countries to the general deposit in Quissanga; as well as the nearly grown up boys and girls, the first as soldiers and the second as wives, killing the rest, even babies.

Enslavement—especially a strong feature of Gazaland in southern Mozambique but also widespread in Manica Province—was imperative to the formation of productive units, reproductive logics (including slave wives and children), and the slave-soldiers of the ndunas. However, with the fall of the Gaza Nguni state in the late 1890s, these slaves “were liberated from their masters to become servants or to enter the market as cheap migrant and forced chibalo labour” (Harries 1981: 329).

The Nguni polity was characterized by rigidity in the sense of regular extraction of labor. However, at the same time, ndunas were characterized by movement and unpredictability in terms of their targets, resulting in raids and, subsequently, enslaved captives. This and other features have led Rennie (1984: 185) to make the point that the ndunas were political chiefs controlling people. As such, the ndunas’ violent extraction and taxation resonate with later polities—especially the colonial state and the later Renamo movements. This resonance is not one of necessarily historical continuity in a causal sense but one of similarity in that these polities are always external—imposed from and originating from what is perceived as outside or, as de Heusch (1991) has argued, “elsewhere.”

Rennie’s argument about the externality of the Nguni state in terms of being nonterritorial and oriented around the control of people is perhaps most clearly evident in the problem of autochthony, allochthony, and sorcery—problems that troubled consecutive Nguni rulers throughout the 1800s. One facet of this is that other rulers and chiefs—also the influential Ngungunyane (1850–1906), who ruled a vast territory between 1884 to 1895 that included Honde and Chimoio—employed strict measures against suspected sorcerers (Bertelsen 2012).7 MacGonagle (2008: 50), for instance, chronicles the use of impalement of suspected sorcerers at the order of Ngungunyane, who were then left on display at the crossroads—a violent practice later to be a feature of the Mozambican civil war. The power of sorcerers—whether from rival or subordinate lineages or beyond—was seen to pose a potential threat to the king. Thus, in order to secure his rule, Ngungunyane needed to eliminate or co-opt these sorcerous threats—a dynamic intimately relating sorcery and sovereignty also to be developed in more detail in chapter 5.8 A second facet is also underlined by Rennie: despite military and political overrule, the Nguni rulers were not well integrated into what
one may call autochthony-based understandings of ritual and political power. This led to a situation of “ritual insecurity” (Rennie’s 1979: 271; 1984: 183), and numerous accounts of the feeble relations between soil, spirits, and the Nguni polities testify to this. In one such, Ngungunyane summoned Munjakanja, a rainmaker of great renown, to his court to deal with serious drought. The two previous rainmakers summoned had been killed in his court after failing to produce rain. In court, Munjakanja produced rain but it fell so heavily that Ngungunyane “had to request him to stop it” (Rennie 1979: 271). The lack of rain, plagues of drought, or destructive deluges are, of course, signs of chiefly or royal failure to acquire access to the fertility of the heavens and the soil—a failure ultimately founded in sovereign allochthony producing weak and ambivalent relations to spirits or deities.9

This sovereign barrenness, if one may use such a term, of the externally imposed rule also had its antecedent during the civil war, as we have seen. There, the Renamo-imposed replacement of régulo João ran across problems both in terms of relations to ancestral spirits and relations to rain and the fertility of the soil, as well as in other aspects. As I will further develop in the following chapter, territory, soil, and spirits are key sites of antagonism toward the Nguni state formation—initially an external state formation and approached in a similar manner as to how current and more recent state formations are also experienced in Hondo and Chimoio. Nguni subjects also had more practical ways of resisting the Nguni overlordship: people hid foodstuffs out of the sight of tax collectors, reduced their overall production, shifted household sites to less productive areas so as to escape tax collection, cultivated millet “which the Nguni do not like” (Rennie 1984: 183), or migrated to areas outside Nguni control. Together these form what we may call “lines of flight” directed against the violent, repressive, and brutal regime of Nguni domination. A central orientation of the lines of flight in this context is how these are nonconfrontational in a direct or physical sense. Crucially, by employing and tapping understandings of relations between soil, spirits, and people, such lines of flight comprise evasive maneuvers away from the repressive dynamics of the state.

This evasion or resistance, however, was not in any way composite. The Nguni state form violently “acculturated” through, for example, the forced piercing of ears of male subjects as signs of subordination. Further, it also offered possibilities for sociopolitical and economic mobility for non-Nguni that could align with ndunas (MacGonagle 2008b; Rennie 1984). Through the period between the 1820s and late 1800s, a Ngunification of features of social, political, and ritual organization and practice therefore arguably took place. On the other hand, an anal-
ysis emphasizing “Ngunification” or “acculturation” will miss significant elements of transition and continuity in forms of statehood. As Newitt (1995: 261) points out, the particular Nguni formation of a tributary state gradually developed into the concession company Companhia de Moçambique—herafter called the Companhia—from the late 1800s. Further, the Companhia’s violent techniques of capture, taxation, and forced labor exhibit similar statist dynamics as the Nguni state—the resemblance and continuation being all the more clear as the Companhia employed vast numbers of ndunas and Nguni mercenaries directly as a company police force and in campaigns of pacification. Thus, the usefulness of employing the distinctions “Nguni” or “Companhia de Moçambique”—or “Portuguese” and “indigenous” for that matter—is instructive merely to a certain point, especially in terms of sequence and periodization. Arguably, it is more rewarding to approach the noncolonial origins of Nguni domination and previous state formations in more theoretical terms exhibiting the statist dynamics identified by Deleuze and Guattari (2002 [1980]): capture of people and labor, vertical systems of tribute, and striation of space are features of both the gradual territorialization of Portuguese as well as Nguni states.

In sum, until the rise of the Companhia in the late 1800s, Honde and the wider area of Manica Province was embroiled in subsequent turbulent developments characterized by occupation, overlordship, and extraction following the waxing and waning of multiple state formations that vied for control. It is, therefore, faulty to see the last five hundred years of politico-territorial history in terms of an irreversible movement toward Portuguese control—a control that even during the twentieth century was in many respects illusory as we will also see. Further, the Uteve, the Portuguese, and the Nguni also illustrate that movements between control and conquest, between autochthony and allochthony always imply dimensions of territorialization and deterritorialization, as well as forms of contestation internal to or outside formal polities—the generation of lines of flight. State formation in this historical period must thus be seen in terms of a contested becoming and one characterized by violence—features that became even more pronounced with the emergence of the late colonial state.

**The Violent Capture of the Late Colonial State**

With the defeat of Gungunhana and with our effective and real possession of the lands, the rebellions ceased and today the peoples are perfectly pacific and obedient to
the authorities to whom they present their problems to be resolved and to whom they pay the tribute of vassalhood, through the hut tax or the mussoco [head tax].

Fernando de Sacaduro (1928a: 59)

Fernando de Sacaduro was a long-term employee of the Companhia (1891–1941)—a dominant power in Manica and parts of Sofala and by far the largest of the chartered companies in colonial Mozambique. The overlordship of private companies such as the Companhia was crucial to further Portuguese territorial control and the people inhabiting it. As Sacaduro makes clear, the defeat of Ngungunyane was crucial for the emergence of the Companhia, as British and Portuguese interests in the 1880s had clashed over the control of the Manica territories. This clash put Ngungunyane’s control under pressure, leading him to make a dramatic maneuver in 1889: he relocated with tens of thousands of followers (and captives) from Manica to the Sabi area in southern Mozambique. Ngungunyane’s departure (and imminent downfall) and the subsequent ending of rivalries between British and Portuguese interests led to the formation of the Companhia, which was also set up with British capital in 1891—a polity that was to rule until 1941 (Neil-Tomlinson 1987). As a sovereign formation in its own right, the Companhia is therefore inseparable from Mozambican colonial history.

As Sacaduro’s quote shows, hut tax as well as mussoco (head tax) were vital sources of revenue for a company founded on what one might term vassalage. So significant were taxes that in 1900 “hut tax had become the second-most important source of the company’s income” (Newitt 1995: 408). Integral to a regime of taxation was also the need to control people and capture and access their labor. While analyzing the brutal forced labor regime within the Companhia’s territory, Allina (2012) argues that the representation of the Portuguese colonial state as weak is false. Conversely, Allina thoroughly documents how, indeed, the Companhia wielded executive powers and enforced a brutal extraction of labor by violent means. Such brutal extraction of labor was, of course, legally ramified in terms of the African’s “moral obligation” to work. The labor law of 1907, for example, designated that Africans should work for 120 days of each year at the mercy of the Companhia.

Mirroring the situation under Nguni rule, also these colonial measures were met with resistance. Throughout its existence, the Companhia therefore resorted to various forms of violent capture of labor to fulfill a vast and growing local demand for cheap labor at farms owned by Germans, French, Portuguese, and others. One example from as late as 1911—twenty years after the Companhia’s inception—illustrates
this: Given the task to provide labor to Manica’s many maize farmers, the Companhia’s police and administrators continuously recruited “haphazardly” and even the company officials themselves saw this violent predation on local African households as “insane” (Allina-Pisano 2002: 183–84). Despite attempting to devise systems of labor recruitment that were predictable and effective, these violent sweeps in which company police forcibly abducted Africans persisted at least until the 1930s (Allina 2012). Later, African labor was regulated in different laws facilitating the organization of mandatory and forced labor in the decades after World War II—as noted in High Commissioner António Enes monumental report (1971 [1946]: 495–513), which details, among a range of issues, the obligation for “blacks” to work.¹³

As in Angola (see M. Harris 1958; Anderson 1962a), the forced labor regime was integral to the Portuguese colonial administration and companies ruling under and colonizing for it. The rise of the Companhia thereby also illustrates how the Portuguese colonial form gradually takes on the shape of a more pronounced territorialized state structure. Yet this emergent territorialization of the late 1800s to early 1900s did not merely impose its designs onto the social and political landscape. Virtanen’s (2005a: 369) careful study of territorial organization in the Chimanimani area of Manica Province shows this pattern: the establishment of the Companhia in 1891 there also “represented a direct continuation of the Gaza administration. Having failed to establish control over its territory during the early 1890s, the company entered into an agreement with Gungunhana [Ngungunyane], the ruler of Gaza, whereby the king would provide the company with soldiers and administrative officials in order to impose their joint authority and collect tax from the population.”

The hybrid polity of Ngungunyane’s empire and the nascent Companhia state, although short-lived, demonstrates how the perpetual nature of attaining control is integral to state formation. As illustrated by the Nguni domination of Manica Province throughout practically the whole nineteenth century, it was also a form of control the Portuguese previously largely had failed to obtain in what was later to become Mozambique. Analytically, Portuguese appropriation and redeployment of Nguni practices of violent capture, taxation, and forced labor underline continuous modes of domination and, thus, enduring aspects of state presence and formation. As Neil-Tomlinson (1987: 300), having worked on the Companhia’s formative period (1892–1910), writes, “As the mechanics of forcing labour became institutionalised and direct physical violence was replaced by the indirect implicit threat of violence, so the forms of [African] resistance changed from confrontation to evasion in
the form of hiding, movement and emigration.” Similarly, Lubkemann notes that for the Machaze area, from 1912 to 1917 the area’s number of inhabitants shrank from 26,677 to 17,535, as many “fled across the border into Rhodesia where they did not face the same demands on their labor” (Lubkemann 2000: 80). Comparable situations of flight, hiding, and evasion may also be found elsewhere in Manica Province and has also been documented for the concession company areas in Zambézia Province, Northern Mozambique (Bertelsen 2015).

Further, despite its gradual refinement in practices of domination, the colonial state administration nonetheless regularly employed violence against populations to quell resistance and to subordinate these to colonial machinations. Pélissier (2004) has chronicled the Portuguese colonial campaigns from 1844 to 1941 and quotes the governor of Beira who, in a 1917 letter, gave instructions to his military commander to use the fifteen thousand Nguni mercenary fighters at his disposal to embark on a punishing expedition after the so-called Báruè rebellion of 1917—Báruè being located just north of Chimoio and Honde (see map 2.1). The Báruè rebellion was the last of the large-scale rebellions against the Portuguese for fifty years before Frelimo initiated its military struggle in the 1960s.14 The instruction given by the governor to the military commander upon his departure underlines the correspondences of violence and capture between the colonial state and the Nguni state (quoted in Pélissier 2004: 288):

You must burn all the rebel villages destroying all the fields, confiscating all their cattle and taking as many prisoners as possible including women and children. It is indispensable that these actions be carried out as rapidly and violently as possible in order to terrorise the local population and prevent further revolts.

This violence enacted by Nguni soldiers under the Portuguese state was also noted by British officials, who recorded in 1917 that “all leaders of the rebels who are caught are beheaded and their heads given to their wives to carry home, if the wives are caught with them” (quoted in Isaacman 1976: 170). Again, the forms of violence executed by the Portuguese state in terms of beheadings, impalement, enslavement, and bodily mutilation are similar to preceding periods and, especially, the period following it—the civil war.

In Manica Province, the results of such a long-term process of violent capture and spatial reconfiguration—by no means confined to the era of the Companhia—in practical terms entailed the transfer of control of land to Portuguese and other European farmers and the subordination of African populations to their production schemes. Neves (1998)
details also how the forced labor regimes in the period after World War II period reinforced a long-term trend of evasion from repressive forces through migration. As we saw previously, from the Nguni raids to the Companhia’s wild sweeps to recruit labor, African communities met these with lines of flight, often in a very concrete sense of permanent or temporary relocation. For instance, Neves shows how in the period after World War II period the great demand for child labor on white settler farms and sugar plantations in Manica, Chimoio, and Buzi—and later for cotton producers and in the textile industry at the previously mentioned TextAfrica in Chimoio—affected African communities. One effect of such a regime was that a vast number of children were sent especially to Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) where child and juvenile labor on white farms was in demand (Neves 1998: 196–232). In the above trajectory of state power—from the Nguni state to the Companhia’s dominance—two aspects should therefore be noted.

For one, the expansion, domination, and extraction comprising key aspects of state formation is characterized by a certain wildness and unpredictability. Such colonial and colonizing madness, if one may use such a term, is evident in the sweeps and the predatory roaming of violent tax collection of subsequent assemblages of states—be they Nguni polities,
the Companhia, or later Portuguese colonial administration. For African inhabitants, these assemblages of the state kind were viewed as inimical polities of conquest ruling through “controlling people” (Rennie 1984) or as “kings from elsewhere” (de Heusch 1991; MacGonagle 2008). The assemblages of state were, in short, experienced as allochthonous and external predatory forces—a destructive expansive presence generating mass migration from Manica Province, as argued above.16 Second, such colonial wildness and gradual capture of people for work (or their flight from it) was concomitant with Portuguese reterritorialization of Nguni domains from the late 1800s onward. Increasingly, such land was controlled and developed—territorialized—by European farmers.17

The brutal regime of forced labor, tax burdens, and migration as flight undergirds how capture and evasion is central to statist dynamics. Through violent and gradual territorialization a more permanent state formation with a more pronounced vertical and arborescent structure emerges. On the other hand, the violence of the raiding of labor power by company police through, for example, the practice of capturing of so-called *recrutados* (forcibly recruited Africans) or recapturing those who had fled, so-called *evadidos*, exhibits a modality of power that is nomadic, dynamic, and rhizomic—the *war machine*. In the case of the Nguni mercenaries it comprised a machinery of violent punishment and capture deterritorializing the polity of the Báruè rebels.18 These were also, of course, features of the less territorially based polity of the Nguni state as we saw previously. Both notions of war machine and state, again, should be understood as relatively distinct modalities of power and not in institutional, formal senses. Such an understanding of state formation in Manica Province in this period to encompass both modalities of power—the rhizomic, horizontal, and deterritorializing war machine versus nascent arborescent and territorializing statist dynamics—may also be projected backward in time to at least two distinct historical periods.

The first is that of the so-called Portuguese “seaborne empire,” which comprised a system to the extent that certain nodes supported and directed the flow and accumulation of resources toward certain centers. These nodes, however, did not amount to strongholds in the territorial terms of statehood. As Young (1994: 50) has pointed out, the Portuguese empire around 1550 was a “a loose-knit mercantile state … based on domination of the Indian Ocean trading routes, and a nucleated string of outposts at key commercial intersections whose central base was Goa.”19 This “mercantile state” may be seen as a form of nodal state where territorial dimensions are yet embryonic and not fully developed—or as characterized by “gradations of sovereignty and sliding scales of differ-
entiation” (Stoler and McGranahan 2007: 9). With Deleuze and Guattari, one could say that this imperial formation had yet to unite its war machine dimension with a striating, ordering, and sedentarizing modality of power congruent with the territorial state form.

The second era was the one introduced by the scramble for Africa that inaugurated a shift in the Portuguese state's relation to its colonies. After the Berlin conference of 1884/85, territorialization was imperative as possession became key to colonial powers’ sovereign claims (Herbst 2000: 71–96). For Portugal this implied even stronger involvement of private interests. As we have seen, this initiated the era of company rule when in 1891 the territories of Manica and Sofala were granted to the Companhia. From the imperial center of Lisbon, the Companhia's abolition in 1942 was viewed as “re-incorporation” and “territorial unification” of the empire (Portuguese government 1942: 239).20 While Portugal formally unified its territory, on the ground private concessions were to a large degree continued from 1935 to 1965 (see also Neves 1998). However, whereas the fragile “territorial unification” and state formation continually had been challenged by “lines of flight” under successive state assemblages prior to the 1960s, this was more directly challenged with the appearance of guerrilla camps and “liberated zones” in the context of the liberation war fought by Frelimo from 1964 onward.

**Guerrillas and States, or the Violence of Capture (1964 to 1992)**

Africa, *this Africa*, is hostile. It stubbornly resists the penetration of the colonizer. There are excessive elements of resistance and these elements present themselves in many and varied forms.

*From article in the journal *Notícias da Beira*, 1962*²¹

With Frelimo’s first attacks on the Portuguese colonial state in 1964 in Northern Mozambique and coming across from bases within Tanzania, the guerrilla movement launched its struggle for liberation. Gradually, Frelimo managed to establish so-called liberated areas also within the Portuguese colony itself, setting up protected villages that housed the populations of such zones effectively becoming, in Michael Panzer’s term, a “proto-state” (2013).²² Specifically, in this period Frelimo oscillated between two different practices. First, it was characterized by classic guerrilla-style attacks on a state formation—moving swiftly, aiming at the small-scale military confrontations or the destruction of
infrastructure drawing on Mao’s “thousand small cuts” (Coelho 1993: 174). Second, the establishment of camps or protected villages were pivotal to not only strategies of deterritorializing the Portuguese colonial state—by perforation of its sovereign territory, so to speak; crucially, post-independence, they were also to inform the party’s politics of re-structuring the countryside. In both practices, Frelimo was dependent on the labor, food surplus, and (sometimes coerced) support of the so-called civilian population—living among, sometimes off, and frequently also supported by it.

The Portuguese colonial state’s response to Frelimo attack was four-pronged. First, the Portuguese used conventional military might in the form of regular armies and heavy equipment in large-scale operations. For instance, the so-called “Gordian Knot” operation in the province of Cabo Delgado in May and June 1970, led by the notorious General Kaulza de Arriaga, involved around 35,000 battle-ready soldiers. Also, the colonial army engaged in massive air bombing of Frelimo camps, and they sought to “open” the *mato* by using bulldozers to recapture liberated areas (Newitt 1995: 531). Such recapture was not merely of space but also, as noted previously, of people—as evident from a summing up of the Gordian Knot operation: “The result was 61 bases occupied and 165 weapons caches and hide-outs destroyed, 651 guerrillas killed, 1804 captured and 6854 peasants retrieved” (Coelho 1993: 182, italics added).

This control of people found its articulation also in a second approach, namely, the attempted insulation of the African population from the contagious and destructive influence of Frelimo guerrillas. Informed by development schemes under the reformed Portuguese Estado Novo following World War II, a deepened colonial grip on the productive, reproductive, and social practices of the African population was attempted (Sidaway 1991). Coelho (1993) describes how, in the neighboring province of Tete, the large-scale construction of *aldeamentos* (protected villages) formed part of an attempted containment of nationalist aspirations both before and during the war of liberation. In Tete Province, the Portuguese created a total of 251 *aldeamentos* between 1971 and 1974, holding a total of 286,000 people or 70 percent of the population in the province.23

However, such capture in the guise of *aldeamentos* was also related to a third Portuguese strategy, namely, attempts to encompass and redeploy elements of the traditional field against the Frelimo guerrillas—what the Portuguese and, later, Frelimo identified by using the composite term *tradição*. As we saw above, the Portuguese presence had historically in various ways been integral to traditional polities and rulers. However, as the colonial state formation settled more firmly after World War II,
it gradually subordinated especially chiefs (régulos) to colonial regimes of taxation, overseeing recruitment of forced labor, etc. During the liberation war, the chiefs and their ritual, social, and political organization was targeted especially, and Coelho (1993: 177) details how the Portuguese formed “small detachments and integrating peasants recruited by their chiefs and using traditional weaponry.” Such detachments, more than being directly militarily effective, were seen as crucial for creating allegiances between the colonial forces and villages as well as signaling the acceptance and recognition of traditional and ritual authority by the colonial state. They were also prime examples of “psychosocial action” (Coelho 1994: 74) integral to the Portuguese war machine in early phases.

Finally, both regular army platoons as well as secret police (PIDE) agents extensively utilized terror by undertaking flash attacks on villages that they sacked and burned, either killing people or abducting them to detention camps where they were interrogated as to their allegiances (Coelho 1993). The deployment of scorched-earth tactics, torture, killing, and capture of people by mobile units made up of militias, secret police, native detachments, and the like were crucial elements of Portuguese counterinsurgency against a “hostile Africa” (Reis and Oliveira 2012).

The clear similarities between the Portuguese violent mode of capture and punishment during the war of liberation and the punishing campaign in 1917 against the Báruè rebels conducted by Nguni mercenary soldiers needs little further explanation (see also Bertelsen 2011). Suffice to ascertain here that these long-term practices of territorializing colonial state dominance and, thus, deterritorializing opposing forces (from the Báruè rebellion to Frelimo guerrillas) arguably are predicated upon the capture of people, labor, and territory by overt or structural forms of violence. Put differently, the gradually more developed striation, reordering, and homogenization of the colonial state at all times was supported by a war machine deployable against opposing and disordering elements—elements often seen as integral to tradição and in this way comprising an assemblage with a deterritorializing orientation.

Escalating to a large-scale war during the early 1970s, the struggle between the colonial army and Frelimo drew vast tracts of the country into the armed conflict, as the Portuguese employed a dual strategy of torture and encapsulating rural populations into protected villages. The waging of war meant that large parts of the rural civilian population became enmeshed in the modus operandi of two opposing formations of military power—the guerrilla movement and the colonial state. With the transition to independence in 1975, the guerrilla movement moved
into the urban centers and capital, hitherto domains under the control of the colonial state, and became Mozambique’s postindependence sovereign power.

Following a few years in power, Frelimo sought to eliminate what it defined as traditional authorities and influence. Those whom Frelimo defined as régulos, or persons who controlled what might be termed ritual authority and who manipulated the cosmologies integral to the moral order of local populations, were to be denied their authority and influence as these were based on “obscurantism” (obscurantismo). Instead these positions were to be assumed by party secretaries and party groups (grupos dinamizadores) (Santos 1984). New institutional arrangements in the form of popular courts (tribunais populares) were introduced and were to replace, for example, chiefs’ courts, which were seen to have functioned in the interests of the colonial administration (Sachs and Welch 1990). The postcolonial Mozambican party-state with a strong centralist leaning had been established.

Frelimo’s radical postindependence project of state-building and societal transformation was deeply antipathetic to a considerable array of traditional agencies, and not just those obviously integral to the former colonial administration. More broadly, Frelimo’s attack on the traditional field and the construction of a state-ordered social polity conforms well with Clastres’s reading of state formation as necessarily being ethnocidal (ethnocidaire) in its unifying aspects (1974: 107). Clastres’s vision of the state is essentially one of a machinery of governance antagonistic

Illustration 2.2. The figure of Samora Machel as reproduced in the so-called Praça dos Herois (Heroes’ Square), Chimoio, 2000.
to multiplicity and oriented toward creating an order of “the One”—al-
luding to singularity, a monopoly over violence, and the figure of the
sovereign (1998 [1974]: 215–18). These dynamics of state as violently
creating oneness resonate with the rhetoric of a necessary national “eth-
nocide” by Samora Machel who shortly after became Mozambique’s first
president (Machel 1974: 39):

To unite all Mozambicans, transcending traditions and different languages,
requires that the tribe must die in our consciousness so that the nation may
be born.

Samora’s vision implemented in Frelimo’s postindependence societal
cleansing was seen as imperative to realizing Mozambique’s new polit-
ical order (Dinerman 2006: 48). Although with considerable impact
in many fields, the transformative effects of these radical visions were
nonetheless incomplete as the country became embroiled in the civil
war (1976–92) between a Frelimo-dominated state and the Renamo
guerrilla movement. As we have previously seen, Renamo also capital-
ized on popular antipathy with Frelimo’s antitraditional politics by de-
claring itself as the protector of “tradition” and waging what they called
“a war of the spirits” (guerra dos espíritos) against the Frelimo state. In
the context of war, Renamo appropriated and redefined key elements of
the traditional field. It did so by installing régulos (chiefs) in the areas it
controlled and by, effectively, recreating or reaffirming ritual authority
in its domains. However, Renamo also employed conventional military
strategies that resonated with historical experiences: its raiding and cap-
turing of rural populations, its formation of camps, and its establish-
ment of relations of tribute, taxation, and agricultural production in its
zones of control mirror features of the Nguni tributary state in addition
to the Companhia’s raids, forced labor, and abduction—as well as cer-
tain features of the colonial state. Despite its violent practices, Renamo’s
embracing of tradição and the spirits meant that in places like Honde, its
guerrillas were received by many as liberators of the tchianku wo atewe
that was attacked by Frelimo and Machel and supplanted with party
secretaries and an aldeia comunal.

Simultaneously, the FAM supplemented regular warfare with guer-
rilla tactics, crucially including the use of traditional resources as n’an-
gas (traditional healers). Such surprising similarities between Renamo
and FAM also emerge in popular experiences, as these two narratives
of former FAM fighters from Honde illustrate. During an interview in
2005 with a male nurse around forty-five years old whom I have called
Armando, a man who had served in the FAM for five years during the
civil war, he brought my attention to the fact that the FAM also needed
spiritual protection in its struggle, and in so doing effectively reterritorialized healing capacities of the traditional field into apparatuses of capture for the FAM. An excerpt from the interview may illustrate this:

B: There in the FAM, you needed to protect yourself?
A: Yes, you had to! I ate nhimo [a type of bean] to protect myself. And I always wore a black bracelet. It protected me good!
B: Were you protected in other ways?
A: Yes, we had n’angas [traditional healers]. But they were there more to control that no one ran away.
B: So, they were there to control, not protect or heal?
A: Yes, to control. If there had been no n’angas, many would have run away.

This excerpt also illustrates how there are important elements of capture in FAM that mirror Renamo practices—elements pertaining to the redeployment of traditional forces within the state’s military force, as well as a sense of being seized by an apparatus of the state that is reinforced by traditional means. A similar experience of abduction and capture was also the subject of bitter recollection by Eduardo who served in FAM from 1980 to 1986:

E: I was born on Ilha da Praia in Cape Verde. I came to Mozambique and stayed near Marromeu [Zambézia province] for thirteen years. In 1980 I went to the army.
B: But you were not Mozambican?
E: It was search and capture [busca-captura], Bjørn! I was in Messica [in Manica Province] and—BAM—the army arrived and abducted people. I said “I am from Cape Verde!” But they did not listen. From there I was sent directly to Manhiça near Maputo to an instruction camp for three months and then to the front.

Corroborated by others from Honde, both accounts underline how the traditional elements were not only the subject of attack but appropriation on the part of Frelimo and FAM—in addition to the capture of people being central also to the army’s overall war effort. To generalize from the above violent trajectories ending the Portuguese colonial domination and the violent first decades of the postindependence state, three elements stand out. First, the recurring oscillation between wild forms of capture of people—from the Nguni raids and the Companhia’s labor recruitment sweeps through Renamo’s and FAM’s practices of capture and abduction. A second recurring feature is the sustained feeding on and reordering of labor and, effectively therefore the African population’s relations with land and soil. Third, the postcolonial state, as also
seen above, related largely antagonistic to the authority, organization, and cosmology of the traditional field as such. In postcolonial Mozambique, similar elements affected the rural and urban landscape and its inhabitants.

**Communalizing the Countryside, Purging the Cities: Early Postcolonial State Formation**

The *imperial spatum* of the State and the *political extenso* of the city are not so much forms of a territorial principle as a deterritorialization that takes place on the spot when the State appropriates the territory of local groups or when the city turns its back on its hinterland.

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1994 [1991]: 86)

Frelimo’s construction of a party-state involved the reordering of Mozambique’s rural areas. In part, these state-orchestrated practices directed at space and labor mirrored the *aldeamentos* of the late Portuguese colonial state by also being constructed as bulwarks against an external threat—for the Portuguese Frelimo and for the postcolonial state Renamo. However, the postcolonial state’s scope was wider and guided by ideas beyond military concerns. Creating what it called *aldeais comunais* (communal villages) from the 1970s onward, the newly independent state attempted to reorder both relations between labor and the land by breaking up, rationalizing, and reordering land tenure systems, as well as to create territorially protective units against Renamo (see, e.g., Sidaway 1991; Coelho 1998). In ways resembling Tanzania’s villagization programs in the same period (Scott 1998), Mozambique’s *aldeias comunais* centered around collective production of crops under a novel organization provided especially by the party-state’s *grupos dinamizadores* that were supported by the party apparatus of nearby cities. Communal villages were, thus, central to aspirations for constructing a socialist society, reflected in the Frelimo Central Committee’s statement in 1976 (quoted in Egerö 1990: 77): “The communal village constitutes the spinal column of the development of the productive forces of the countryside.”

As the state formations of the Companhia and the colonial state before it, the *aldeias comunais* in Honde and Manica Province were also introduced by local state agents. However, as Clarence-Smith (1989: 7) identifies, the move to villagize and reorganize should also be seen as grounded in what he calls an “uncaptured peasantry”—a peasantry
that, Frelimo’s leadership feared, could destabilize the development of the postcolonial state.27 Many scholars have therefore interpreted villagization as driving a dangerous wedge between the Frelimo postcolonial state and the peasantry, thus paving the way for Renamo recruitment and support in their “war of the spirits.”28

These critical points resonate with experiences from Honde where one, post hoc, is hard-pressed to find anyone who would portray these collective experiments as successful or as remotely related to “development”—however one would define that. When exploring these elements in Honde, it is also evident that the modus vivendi of the late Portuguese colonial state was understood as benevolent to the relations between soil, territory, agricultural production, and people. The late tchirenge of Honde (d. 2008) expressed such a sentiment in one of many conversations I had with him. When I asked him in 2007 about relations to the Portuguese and his task of securing rain, he replied,

*T:* In their time, all was clean. At times if we suffered bad from drought, the Portuguese would call me to make rain. Afterwards everyone would give me ufu [maize flour]. We also had one régulo and two pfumos [régulo’s adjuncts]. But now people can just go and make a machamba [agricultural plot] in the cemetery! It is because of this that we have great problems with drought here.

*B:* When did these problems begin?

*T:* It all started with Frelimo. They came with people from Zambézia, from Tete and they all started giving orders around here. When the régulos left, people who were maSená [from a neighboring province] also came. And they did not know anything as they were not from here! This created great problems.

The tchirenge’s account is one coated in colonial nostalgia—one neither compatible with other accounts of domination, violence, and exploitation by the colonial regime nor his own often harsh accounts of life under the Portuguese. However, despite, or perhaps because of these limitations, the tchirenge’s projection backward of a time characterized by a productive relationship between people, land, and ancestors underlines important distinctions between the colonial and postcolonial state in rural Honde. First, it highlights that the Portuguese colonial state by its policy of indirect rule had, in one sense, successfully captured the capacities of the traditional, a seizure subsequently deployed to feed its own system of exploitation of the African population. Second, although the advent of Frelimo initially enjoyed considerable local support in Honde, it was eventually seen as utterly destructive to fertility, soil, and ancestral relations to the point that the Portuguese were grad-
ually imagined as more capable of securing these. In urban settings, the reordering of space, labor, and people followed similar but also divergent trajectories.

One of the most important changes to the territory of the cities post-independence was to minutely reinscribe its urban landscapes at a range of levels in a narrative of the epic (Bakhtin 1986)—effectively merging Frelimo’s past liberation struggle and the party-state’s ongoing fight for a socialist Mozambique. This postindependence celebration of the epicness of the liberation struggle meant the urban reinscription through renaming of large territorial entities where the capital Lourenço Marques became Maputo and Vila Pery became Chimoio. Further, new names to the bairros typically memorialized dates of heroic struggle as in Bairro 25 de Junho (Independence Day) or dates within a larger socialist cosmology as in Bairro 1 de Mayo (1 May). In addition to the painting of political murals on the inside of classrooms, such inscriptions are crucial aspects of Frelimo’s cultivation, dissemination, and mise-en-scène of the party as eternally safeguarding the past, present, and future of the nation. This cultivation is, also, in keeping with Frelimo’s appropriation and reformation of socialist state centrism as found also in Angola and Tanzania.29

The postliberation inscription of semiotics of territories and institution onto the urban landscape itself of novel cosmologies of epic proportions comprises significant aspects of state formation as well as regime signifiers.30 But such techniques of inscription are also integral to a double process of erasure and reinscription that effectively disembeds mean-

ings and memories and replaces these with insignia and semiotics of the state—an integral part of statal chronopolitics (Gonçalves 2012). These aspects of postindependence state formation at the level of territory and space underline a complexity that transcends the cadastral demarcation of borders or technologies of urban planning (cf. Sidaway and Power 1995). Arguably, these instances of deliberate changes to urban physical as well as semiotic space by local agents of the state may be analyzed as instances of the territorializing dynamics of state formation—a process that is always necessarily ongoing.

One such important yet, interestingly, incomplete change occurred during fieldwork in January 2007 in Chimoio where many people increasingly made reference to a Praça Gungunhana (Square Gungunhana), after the Nguni ruler Ngungunyane explored earlier. Querying people about this novel space, it turned out that this was the former Praça OMM (Square OMM) dedicated to Frelimo’s Women Organization (Organização da Mulher Moçambicana) that was now, apparently, being renamed.31 For Frelimo, in majority in the city council of Chimoio in 2007 as for the whole postindependence period, the shift from spatially celebrating OMM is understandable as the organization has considerably weakened (Disney 2008; Arnfred 2011). The move to include a former Nguni ruler is born out of a recent shift in national Frelimo rhetoric where Ngungunyane is increasingly reinterpreted as having fought an anticolonial struggle. In other words, in Frelimo elite circles Ngungunyane is in the process of entering the pantheon of national liberation guarded and erected by Frelimo.

Among interlocutors in Chimoio, however, the spatial reorganization of a prominent square was a popular topic. Many who were critical of the Frelimo government interpreted it in terms of the dominance of the Nguni era and southern Gaza as having found yet another expression. In the words of Afonso, an elderly Renamo veteran:

A: Frelimo would like to put the Shangaan [the dominant ethnic group in southern Mozambique and Gaza] everywhere! This is not something new.
B: But Ngungunyane—is he not from here?
A: Ah! They say that. But he is much more from the south than from the center. Samora [Machel] asked for the bones from Portugal because he died in São Tomé and Principe. The bones are there in Maputo.

For Afonso, the renaming in Chimoio was an insidious way of reasserting the southern primacy of the Shangaan group over the center, a Shangaan dominance popularly thought to be integral to Frelimo and thereby to build on the Gaza origins of Nguni polities. By recalling and celebrating the brutal rule of an invading king from the south who had
also enslaved many maTewe, maSena, and maNdau (ethnic groups that also constituted important parts of the Renamo movement [see MacGonagle 2008]), for several the dominance of the south had found yet another symbolic manifestation. The yet unfinished change of name from Praça OMM to Praça Gungunhana thus exemplifies the ways in which state formations always work semiotically toward reterritorialization and deterritorialization. Nevertheless, the renaming also evidences, as reflected by Afonso above, how state semiotics are frequently counteracted by popular practices of renaming—either by necessary shifts in the state’s own narratology, from OMM to Ngungunyane, or in alternative and oppositional understandings of reterritorialization, as in the shift being interpreted as yet another expression of attempted dominance by the south and the Shangaan (see also Werbner 1998b, 1998c).

A second key element in the postindependence urban reconfiguration was the 1983 ousting of traditional and parasitic elements from the cities in sweeping campaigns of social cleansing. The campaign, entitled Operation Production (Operação Produção, OP), entailed that urban people found to be lacking various forms of identification proving grounds for residency (as students, workers, or residents) were deemed parasitic. In vast campaigns in Mozambique’s major cities, people were apprehended in the streets, judged in “verification posts” (postos de verificação) under the popular tribunals, and frequently airlifted to agricultural “production centers” in the northern province of Niassa (Nielsen 2014). Often left with little and inadequate equipment, the predominantly rural untrained urbanites were meant to clear virgin land and support the agricultural basis of production of independent Mozambique. Some allege that as many as 50,000 people from Maputo alone were sent to Niassa (Jenkins 2006: 117) under OP, while the number for Chimoio and other cities remains uncertain.

The state-ordered capture of unproductive elements of OP mirror similar ways in which the colonial state in Manica under Companhia rule and beyond rounded up people for forced labor in broad sweeps. To recall, these were relocated to work for the state in road-building or under slave labor–like conditions on commercial farms often run by German, French, and other owners.32 OP also reproduced, with a twist, the forced ruralification of Africans under colonial rule where “an integral aspect of state ‘capture’ of urban territorial control … was the social and economic exclusion of indigenous Mozambicans (indigenos) whose legal status prevented them from purchasing [urban and rural] land” (Jenkins 2006: 110).33

However, OP did more than clear the cities of urban marginals in the sense of being a state apparatus for capturing elements of the urban
labor force that were seen to parasitically feed off the productive rural population. It also entailed a crucial dynamic of cleansing the cities of what were, to use a dominant Frelimo term, “obscurantist” and, thus, potentially subversive elements. In practical terms, Alcinda Honwana details (1996: 42) how in Maputo the Mozambican state also used OP to forcibly oust traditional authorities from the city by relocating these for work in the rural areas. However, the views on traditional healers (curandeiros), for example, underlying such eviction is contained in transcripts of court cases, some of which were reproduced in the journal Justiça Popular published by the Mozambican ministry of law. The case number 374/83 of the Tribunal Popular da Cidade de Maputo (Popular Justice Tribunal of Maputo), for instance, deals with a traditional healer who was to be forcibly sent out of Maputo, and whose case was brought before the court on the grounds that he had previously worked at TEXLOM (a factory of cloth) until 1981 (Justiça Popular 1984: 39). In their verdict, the Popular Justice Tribunal upheld the decision and their verdict is instructive in terms of expressing the state antagonism to traditional healers at the time (ibid.):

1. There is no recognition on the part of the State for the activities of curandeiros [traditional healers].
2. With Operação Produção the curandeiros are equated with unemployed and odd-job men.

With OP’s purge of traditional and contraproductive elements from the cities, the postindependence state cleansed its urban spaces of what it saw as dangerous nonmodernity, making its landscape inscribable for socialist meaning and susceptible to surveillance (Scott 1998; West 2005). Further, by reterritorializing the country in terms of relocation of people and productive forces, Frelimo somewhat unwittingly confirmed an urban bias that had hitherto only been suspected. On the other hand, the dynamics of the civil war also drove people back from rural areas toward the cities in large number. There, living in slum-like conditions in bairros, those who had relocated to the cities reterritorialized, expanded, and redefined its spaces, reestablishing firm links between the rural and the urban in the process through continuous migration between localities and households, as the rural-urban continuity of Honde and Chimio exemplifies.34

Although instances of state formations may be disruptive and not developmental, and although both the colonial and postcolonial state only penetrated the countryside to a limited extent (see also Pitcher 2002: 97), the (predominantly) violent reorganization of the rural (and urban) communities demonstrate the state order’s impact, particularly during
the period of almost consecutive warfare from 1964 to 1992. Nevertheless, the examples discussed also, and again, show similarities with long-term historical practices. As an effect, the forms of domination, the practices of capture of people and labor, and the re- and deterritorialization of the traditional field cannot, therefore, be relegated to an analysis of wartime (or Mozambican) exceptionalism. Rather, these are crucial elements of state capture and the lines of flight it foments.

**Three Captures, Arborification, and Multiple Lines of Flight**

Frelimo’s transition from a mobile, heterogeneous guerrilla movement to a sedentarized, territorial party-state also characterizes other Sub-Saharan liberation movements turned political parties in power—ZANLA of Zimbabwe and MPLA of Angola being cases in point. This gravitation toward stable, unitary, and hierarchical order may be understood in terms of *arborification*, a central statist dynamic (Deleuze and Guattari 2002 [1980]). Such arborification in the form of the joining and concerting of multiplicities (i.e. several liberation movements) to form an increasingly hierarchical, unified order can clearly be identified in Frelimo’s transition from being a political movement with guerrilla incursions into Mozambique via the setting up of camps and culminating with the territorial state formation postindependence. Historically, a dynamic of arborification also characterizes N’xaba’s transition from an orientation around raids to the development of a mature tributary state polity. A similar form of arborification also runs through the development from wild raids and labor sweeps of the early Companhia to the reordering of rural space and encapsulation of rural people in *aldeamentos* of the late colonial state. As also seen previously, these sequences of arborification constitute moments of violent becomings of statehood in Manica Province (and elsewhere in Mozambique) and are, as shown, distinguished by various forms of violent capture of people.

However, a second type of capture also stands out from the material: that of labor. Again drawing on Deleuze and Guattari (2002 [1980]: 490), when being subjected to arborification of the state form, a shift from what one may call *free action* to *work* takes place that involves the capture of the former. Using spatial and territorial conceptual language, Deleuze and Guattari describe the disciplining and transformation of this action into work as being related to an opposition between the smooth space characteristic of free action with the striated space produced by the machinations of the state.
Viewed in this perspective, the different becomings of state in Manica Province have, in all their complexity, been forcefully oriented toward striating space by making it visible, surveillable, and apt for reordering. This striation is identifiable from the early Portuguese attempts at extraction, rerouting, and integration into the imperial polities of Mwene Mutapa, as well as the later, much more pronounced attempts to reorder the space of African communities to tap their workforce and surplus through mechanisms of forced labor. The spatial aspect of striation became even more prominent in the colonial and postcolonial creation of *aldeamentos* and later *aldeais comunais*—bolstered by the Portuguese racialist legal obligations for Africans to work (Freyre 1961)—and the socialist ethos of rural production (Isaacman 1978b; Bowen 1986), respectively. Needless to say, such statist dynamics of reordering the spaces and transforming free action into work were tangible and, often, violent processes. Crucially, they dextratiorialized African communities’ and politics’ organization, extracted agricultural work, and disembedded labor from its encompassing social, political, and cosmological circumstances of production and reproduction. In short, this historical disembedding of labor through violent capture and striation of space also provides an important backdrop for understanding current visions and experiences of nebulous and dark economies.

However, a third dimension of capture—that of the traditional field—is also evident. Although the advent of the postcolonial state entailed some degree of liberation of the masses from the onslaught of repressive and racist colonialism, Frelimo’s project was considerably more ambitious on behalf of the social than that of the colonial state. To recall, the colonial state attempted to subordinate, encapsulate, and integrate traditional practices within its apparatus of governance as evidenced by the *tchirenge*’s memories of being summoned by Portuguese authorities to conjure rain, or as in the colonial state’s general politics of indirect rule wherein *régulos* were used as tax collectors or as authorities for policing. These colonial Portuguese attempts at encapsulation of the traditional field also had their precedents in, for example, Ngungunyane’s different attempts at securing rain through summoning rainmakers, as we also previously saw.

Conversely, at a national level Frelimo attempted neither to encapsulate nor to subdue but to *eradicate* this social and political system that was seen as (at least) double in its evil. For one, the traditional field was seen to reflect obscurantism and, thereby, to comprise the epitome of the irrational. Hence, on the part of Frelimo there were few approaches toward appreciating the organization of labor, production, and land tenure encompassed by traditional institutions or the social organiza-
tion of reciprocal and agricultural relations between the living and also the living and dead. Instead grupos dinamizadores spearheaded communalizing labor and land according to the common, popular good as expressed and organized by the party-state. Further, and in part contradicting the first evil, it was regarded as lacking social or other value as it had, in a sense, become “contaminated” by the Portuguese. This point was commonly expressed in terms of régulos spoken of as mere colonial pawns and not representatives of people or communities. Interestingly, in this view of colonial contamination there is a sense of the chiefs having been, perhaps, something else (genuine? nonrepressive? free?) at some point.

With the advent of the civil war and in thoroughly opaque and conflicting ways, Renamo’s attacks on the state apparatus, its war of the spirits, and its protection against Frelimo’s vicious assault on the tchianwu wo ate ve initially enjoyed some success—also in Honde. However, as Frelimo before it, the dynamic of Renamo also gradually arborified. From the outset being a classical guerrilla movement roving the mato in rhizomic fashion and evading the domains of the state (such as cities), living off the land and its people, Renamo gradually took on statist dynamics in terms of controlling and capturing labor, territory, and people in camps materializing in nascent tributary states in its zones of dominance or influence. Renamo’s gradual arborification and its capture of the traditional field were, of course, also features of the colonial state, late and early, as we saw, for example, in the Portuguese formation of chief-led detachments with traditional weaponry against Frelimo. Further, the same state capture of the actualizations of the potentialities of the traditional field was seen with Parama’s gradual integration into FAM or with the FAM traveling with n’angas so that its soldiers would not dare run away, as seen previously.

While the three instances of capture and the tendency toward arborification above have demonstrated both similarities between precolonial and colonial forms and the limits to state rule at intervals where it was challenged by what I have seen in war machine terms or as other deterritorializing forces, it is also clear that different state practices of capture and territorialization generated lines of flight. The many escaping the state’s apparatuses of capture to Southern Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and South Africa, especially following the intensification of ichibalo (forced labor) by the Companhia, exemplify such unsettling lines of flight: only between 1912 and 1917, the population decreased in Mossurize in Manica Province from 26,677 to 17,535 due to migration (Lubkemann 2000: 80). This leads Lubkemann to conclude that “it was under the Companhia’s rule that migration increasingly was developed in Machaze
as a tactic for resisting the coercive might of the colonial state” (2000: 82). This dynamic of flight and migration is central as it counteracted the frequently violent capture of the rural population through *tchibalo* in Manica Province. It also has important precedents, as we saw above, in the practices of hiding and relocation when confronted with the Nguni state's capture and taxation.

To reduce these lines of flight to merely evasive maneuvers or to label them by tropes of “resistance” in a political sense would be to underestimate the potentialities inherent to the domain of the traditional as a part of the wider social order. In circumventing, fleeing, subverting, and evading the different forms of capture and violence integral to state formations, the *virtual* potentialities of the traditional field are engaged forming specific *actual trajectories* or *lines of flight*, effectively deterritorializing processes of state ordering and capture. As Mbembe (2010: 48) has established for the African colonial encounter more generally (and resonating with the Mozambican case), “it is evident that, from beginning to end, it [the colonial encounter] was shot through with lines of flight. The colonial regime dedicated most of its energies either to attempting to control these flights, or to using them to as a constitutive dimension, even a decisive dimension, of its auto-regulation.” Further, lines of flight from the state apparatus are, as Raunig (2010: 57) reminds us, simultaneously also movement that are creative and instituting and not, therefore, necessarily only evasive. Conversely, sometimes, wide-ranging destruction may be generated, and the formation, development, and violent practices of Renamo provides, as such, an example of what Deleuze and Guattari call *lines of destruction* (2002 [1980]: 205, 229). In their action, Renamo as a nomadic guerrilla capitalized on popular opposition to Frelimo's attack on the traditional field. Concretely, Renamo developed rhizomically into an extremely violent war machine feeding on and sustained by dynamics of kinship as well as notions of the land, spirits, and ritual in a violent actualization and appropriation of potentialities of the traditional field. While unsettling profoundly the postcolonial state, Renamo also changed into a rigid, segmentary, and arborified form of tribute state in many of its areas of dominance. Deleuze and Guattari conceive of any assemblage as territorial, as noted in this chapter's epigraph. Such always ongoing but never complete territorialization or striation of space is an instance of what I have termed the perpetual *becoming* of state formation.

Beyond the continuities demonstrated in forms of capture, the lines of flight, and the processes of (de)territorialization inherent to different state forms, the material here supports one of the central arguments of this book: the contested nature of the perpetual and enduring becom-
ing of state formation in Manica Province, an argument formed especially against the Lusocentric position of Portuguese gradual control. In this chapter such state becoming has been argued in terms of territory, and it has been underlined that as a territorial assemblage, the state will necessarily aim to control and reorder the social realities it seeks to dominate and, in doing so, necessarily deterritorialize dimensions of the social—including the traditional field. However, while having sketched main trajectories of territorialisation in this chapter in terms of capture, arborification and lines of flight in general, and shown how these also involve the traditional field, I have only to a limited degree shown how these processes are understood and how their effects materialize from the point of view of the rural-urban continuum under study. This is the subject of the following chapter.

Notes

1. On the feiras, early trade and commerce, and political formations see Chanaiwa (1972) and, especially, Bhila (1982).
2. As expressed by Torres (1973), this racist vision of harmonious coexistence was disseminated regularly right until the liberation of Portugal's colonies. Freyre's vision was integral to Salazar's Fascist politics and the creation of the so-called Estado Novo (“New State”) that reordered Portuguese society—also in its colonies. For some analyses of Freyre-Salazar links, see Enders (1997), Léonard (1997), and Macagno (2002).
3. This point has also been made by Chanaiwa (1972: 431, 433), building on the rich historical and ethnographic sources collected by Theal (1964 [1898]).
4. Portuguese obsession with gold is well-documented from the 1600s onward (National Archives of Zimbabwe 1989: 361–84; see also Balsan 1970).
5. The historian David Beach (1994b: 111) has claimed that by the late 1600s the “great era of state formation” for the Shona had ended.
6. A classic argument emphasizing the European slave trade's impact on mfecane was made by Omer-Cooper (1966). This has been challenged by Eldredge (1992) who argued that internal political and social forces shaped mfecane and, thus, critiques Omer-Cooper's position as problematic as it, claims Eldredge, solely privileges European (historical) agency.
7. Ngungunyane, also spelled Gungunhana, Gungunyane, and Ngungunyana, was a key transitional figure to the late colonial period (Bertelsen 2012). See also Wheeler (1968), Isaacman and Isaacman (1977), Liesegang (1996), Inguane (2007), Garcia (2008) for succinct analyses of both his contemporary political role and also for his lasting importance in colonial and postcolonial literature, politics, and historiography.
8. Details as to how and where the witches were killed are, alas, beyond the scope of the present chapter. Suffice to say here that, as Jacobson-Widding has shown (1999: 305), orifices of the body are seen to be vital gates to self and
personhood; thus, impaling is equal to an attempt to erase, in a total sense, a person. Further, the crossroads or junction, where the witches were left, are seen as dangerous, “hot,” potent, as well as places of healing in many contexts (Gelfand 1947; Jacobson-Widding 1989).


10. The text’s original reads, “Com a batida do Gungunhana, e com a nossa posse efectiva e real das terras, cessaram todas as rebeliõe e hoje os povos encontram-se perfeitamente pacíficos e obedecendo às autoridades, a quem apresentam os seus milandos para serem resolvidos e a quem pagam o tributo de vassalagem, por meio do imposto de palhota ou de mussoco.”

11. Allina (2012), thus, explicitly critiques the presumed feeble nature of the Portuguese colonial state as argued by Duffy (1962) and the more controversial argument of underdevelopment made by Perry Anderson, contained in the quote, “Portugal, an imperial power, has the economy of an underdeveloped country” (1962a: 86). Although rewarding, this discussion on the comparative feebleness/nonfeebleness of the Portuguese colonial state largely falls outside the scope of this book and will not be addressed directly.

12. Interestingly, the colonially enforced obligation to “work” was hailed as an important element of the Companhia by the French government surveyor M. Guillaume Vasse (1907: 264).

13. The mandatory and forced labor regimes comprise particularly brutal aspects of Portuguese late colonialism and have, justly, been the subject of early critique by, for example, Marvin Harris (1958) and Perry Anderson (1962a, 1962b, 1962c). Anderson (1962b: 95), in particular, grasps the extent of violence to African communities that the forced labor entailed, citing a 1947 visitor to Angola who claims forced labor at some level is worse than slavery: “Today, the native is not bought—he is simply rented from the government, though he may have the status of a free man. His master could hardly care less if he falls ill or dies as long as he goes on working while he lives. When he becomes unable to work or when he dies the master can always ask to be supplied with another labourer. Only the dead are really exempt from forced labour.”

14. See Artur (1996) for details of the rebellion and the chief Makombe leading it.

15. The vast regional political economy of labor recruitment to Southern Rhodesia and South Africa has, of course, been analyzed extensively (see, e.g., the classic study by Wolpe 1972). Suffice to say here that such illicit recruitment in the Companhia’s territory was a recurring problem throughout its rule. Alfredo Augusto Freire D’Andrade (1906: 360; see also M. J. Murray 1995), the Companhia’s director, writes for instance of court cases against a J. A. Jackson, a former native commissioner in Southern Rhodesia, who was arrested when “crimping natives” to Southern Rhodesia.

16. See also Taussig (1987) for a compelling comparative argument on relations between wildness, colonialism and state formation.

17. Portuguese official records from 1967 show that Manica Province was a site of gross inequalities “where 451 European estateholders owned 670,000 hectares, while 135,000 Africans cultivated one-third that amount” (Isaacman 1978a: 11).
18. This aspect related to another critique of dominant colonial history arguing for *territory* being constitutive of the colonial state. Contrarily, Allina-Pisano (2002: 82; see also Allina 2012) argues that control of *labor power* is more fundamental to both workings of the colonial state as well as to its relations with its subjects.

19. The Portuguese extraction of resources and revenue under its well-cultivated self-image as an empire, rested on at least two additional factors. First, the Portuguese established their dominance in the Indian Ocean at a fortuitous time prior to the rise of the Dutch and English claims, the consolidation of the Moguls on the subcontinent, the rise of the Ottoman empire, and “the resurrection of the Persian state by the Safavids” (Young 1994: 51). Second, the very format of the empire, with the extremely limited territorially expansionist drive, implied that few resources were bound up in attempts at attaining sovereign territorial control.

20. The World War II context for this “reincorporation” is not coincidental. In Portugal at the time, the rise of the republic after the ousting of the king in 1910 led to a gradual recognition of both a need to reform state administration and to reassert control of the colonies: “Most of it was controlled directly or indirectly by foreign capital whose concessions—granting quasi-feudal rights over the population—were giving rise to abuses that were becoming increasingly embarrassing and unacceptable” (Newitt 1995: 390).


22. See especially Coelho (1989, 1993) for in-depth analyses of protected villages with an emphasis on the Tete province.

23. The figure of 70 percent may be contested, as people regularly fled from the “protection” offered by the *aldeamentos* during warfare, and the calculation also includes people living in the cities that were controlled by the Portuguese (Coelho 1993: 228ff). However, the high figure and formation of *aldeamentos* indicate both scale and direction of Portuguese attempts at “insulating the population from Frelimo propaganda” (Newitt 1995: 473).

24. For detailed reports documenting torture of political prisoners by the Portuguese colonial state in Mozambique in the period 1963 to 1974, see Edições Afrontamento (1977), Mateus (2004), or A. Magaia (2005).

25. Similar attacks on “superstition” or “colonial relics” were integral to the modernist drives of many postindependence African states, as argued by Donham’s (1999) analysis of Ethiopian “Marxist modernism,” in Sanders’s (2008: 96) description of the abolishment of chiefdoms in independent Tanzania or in Orre’s (2010) account of liberated Angola’s uneasy relationships with the *sobas* (chiefs). However, such a common postindependence policy was not universal, even among presumably politically related movements like Frelimo and Zimbabwe’s ZANLA. As Lan (1985) has thoroughly analyzed, traditional dimensions in Zimbabwe were engaged with rather than attacked both during war and later by the independent state.
26. Not all provinces were the subject of intense villagization. According to Sidaway (1991: 277), Manica Province’s number of total population “captured” by *aldeias comunais* rose from 0.09 percent in 1978 to 25.4 percent in 1982/83—being in this year the province with the third largest percentage of population in *aldeias comunais* after Cabo Delgado (87.3 percent) and Gaza (50 percent). For an interesting case study and actor-based analysis of *aldeias comunais* in Gaza and Maputo, see Casal (1996).

27. A similar position is also expressed by Sidaway (1991: 274): “In post-colonial Mozambique, the policy of concentrating the rural population into *aldeais comunais* always had political dimensions of extending state ‘control’ beyond the official aims of rural socialisation and modernisation. Frelimo sought to incorporate, or to borrow Hyden’s (1980) term ‘capture’ the peasantry within the nexus of the modern (socialist) state.”

28. For other analyses of this crucial expression, see also Cardoso (1988), Geffray and Pedersen (1988), Geffray (1990), Roesch (1992), and Bowen (2000).

29. The political aesthetics of socialist Mozambique are clearly shaped by historical trajectories of colonialism, indigenous art forms, as well as international politics, as demonstrated in Sahlström’s (1990) intriguing comparison of political posters from Ethiopia and Mozambique.

30. Elsewhere (2002, 2004) and informed by Bakhtin (1981, 1986), I have developed the argument of epicness as central to ongoing Frelimo efforts to construe itself as the collective, moral national force giving birth to the nation as well as safeguarding its continued existence against internal and external forces.

31. Although OMM’s relation to Frelimo is crucial for understanding the gendered dimension of Mozambican politics and the changing role of women from the time of the liberation struggle until today (see West 2000 for an interesting ethnographically based analysis), this falls outside the scope of this book. However, see the interesting studies made by Silva and Andrade (2000), Arthur (2004), and Arnfred (2011) of the politics of women inside and outside OMM and their ambivalent relation to Frelimo.

32. A significant number of slaves and (later) semi-free laborers were exported to Cape Verdean, South African, or Indian Ocean destinations (Capela and Medeiros 1987; Zimba et al. 2006) in addition to being part of systems of slavery internal to Southern Africa (Harries 1981).

33. Both Sidaway’s (1991: 259) and Jenkins’s (2006) analyses of Mozambican postindependence spatial organization have asserted that the Frelimo leadership of the 1970s and 1980s cannot be understood in terms of either anti- or pro-urban biases in planning, policy, and praxis as these all shifted and were, to some extent, self-contradictory. Following their argument, OP cannot unequivocally be seen to express a general antiurban stance.

34. Throughout Mozambique’s recent history and especially after the urban immigration from the 1960s on, the poor urban and peri-urban areas have represented governmental and territorial challenges for colonial and postcolonial administration (Grest 1995; Sidaway and Power 1995).

35. “It is not so much that some multiplicities are arborescent and others not, but that there is an arborification of multiplicities. That is what happens when the
black holes scattered along a rhizome begin to resonate together, or when the stems form segments that striate space in all directions, rendering it comparable, divisible, homogenous …” (Deleuze and Guattari 2002 [1980]: 506).

36. For works on Mozambican labor in Southern Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, see also Adamo, Davies and Head (1981), and Neves (1998). Labor migration to South Africa and, especially, mine workers has been epitomized by legendary anthropologist Ruth First (1983; see also Covane 2001).