CHAPTER 7

Organising for Europe

During the late interwar period, quite a few novels were published representing ideas of European unification.[1] In the 1935 novel *Europa*, the British anthropologist and author Robert Briffault offered three suggestions for establishing European unity. The first was to look to the past and the Roman Catholic Church to find values around which people could unite. This option went further, actually organising Europe into one society. In the eyes of Briffault's Catholic cardinal, Christendom was the essence of Europe:

> The unescapable tradition of the European world, that world which has been carved out of the Roman Empire, is the tradition of Christendom. Do what it will, the spirit of Europe cannot escape from its source. The waters are carried through changing landscapes, but they remain the same. They are unchanging, unless European civilisation should be wiped out. . . . Of that tradition out of which the European mind has grown, the Roman Church, catholic and apostolic, is the guardian.[2]

One character in the novel, a German professor, repudiated both Christian traditions and nationalism, calling for new values:

> The disaster, which reduced Europe to a stupefied continent, similar to the stupefied countries of Catholic peasants of today . . . was renewed by the fatal monk, Luther, who not only restored the Roman Church, but what was a thousand times worse, restored Christianity at the very moment it was lying prostrate. Europe has thus been robbed of all intelligence and meaning. . . . Crazed by the neurosis called Nationalism and the paltry politics that go with it, European man has before him the gigantic task of transvaluating the values handed over to him by degenerate Christianised Rome. Not until that task shall have been accomplished will he be able to begin to be civilised, to surpass himself.[3]

Notes for this section begin on page 220.

A third view was represented by Briffault's main character, who expressed a longing for European countries to form one community, where it would be difficult to tell whether people were natives or foreigners, where there were no passports as European life had become international, where the idea of killing one another was absurd, and 'the age of wars among civilised people was past'.[4]

In Chapter 6, we read about the desire to return to tradition and to reformulate shared values. In some instances, this desire led to pleas for a shared economic and political organisation of Europe. In this chapter, we will focus on attempts to form a European society beyond economic and political borders, and how such efforts also apply divisions.

Based on the earlier chapters, we understand that the European idea took up themes such as peace, weakness, and threats from outside Europe. We can also state that the European idea could be related to conservative, liberal and socialist political ideologies alike. From the previous chapter we learned that the interwar concept of Europe was charged with notions of far-reaching crisis, decline and nihilism, as well as with the perception of a radical and destructive division of the continent into independent nation states, and that European unification was often declared the solution. The interbellum idea of European unity in some ways revisited and reinforced themes from the previous century such as peace, free trade, Europe's place in the world, and both political and cultural unity. In this chapter, we will explore how the idea of European unity stood in relation to political ideologies of the interwar period, and what happened to it during the Second World War. We will focus on Europe as practice, bringing forward calls, plans and initiatives to create a European federation from the 1920s up to 1945. Several of these plans proved influential for postwar integration, partly by inspiring key politicians and partly by offering some of the cornerstones of European thought for public consideration. These initiatives included the creation of various organisations to launch the European idea. Here we come to a significant aspect of the history of the European idea in the 1920s: Europeanists organising themselves in the interest of creating a federation. Various organisations and networks were instituted and maintained to present Europe as both a unifying and a dividing concept.

First, we will look at pamphlets and books. Second, we will turn to organisations that had unification as their main mission, especially to the Pan-European League, whose ideas can be found in their journal, *Pan-Europa*. Third, we will demonstrate how wartime visions of European unification were tied to national interests of domination as well as freedom.

A Pan-European Discussion

After the collapse of the Habsburg, Russian and Ottoman empires, Europe had more borders than ever before. Sovereignty was claimed by more nations, and multiplying. This paradoxically hollowed out the content of sovereignty, because, more than larger ones, smaller states needed trade, communication, and many other kinds of exchange with other countries. All European states were weakened after the Great War. Three mighty empires had collapsed, and even though France and Great Britain stood strong with large possessions, it was only because of the American intervention that the war had been won. In the eyes of contemporaries, it was obvious that the age of European world power had ended.[5] It was not much of a surprise, then, that considerable attention was paid to the European idea. After the Great War, dreams of a united Europe were very much alive – Perry Anderson, for example, claims to have found over six hundred contemporary publications that mentioned a united Europe.[6] Relevant books, articles and speeches were widely circulated, cited and translated into other languages, ultimately contributing to a vigorous pan-European discussion.

Among other proponents of European unification were a Russian socialist who fled the Bolshevik Revolution and became a German social democrat,[7] a French socialist and pacifist who may have coined the expression 'Europe must unite or die',[8] an Italian industrialist who was the founder of Fiat,[9] an Italian writer and monarchy-minded marquise who, in an acclaimed novel, combined free trade with free love,[10] an Italian writer and fascist who feared that both American and Russian values threatened the European mind,[11] and the leader of the exiled Italian anti-fascists Carlo Sforza, who thought that the nineteenth-century nationalities 'were only a step toward a wider European ideal', while twentieth-century nationalism had 'the traits of a religious movement'.[12] Then there was the French economist who flirted with fascism and was impressed by Hitler,[13] and a Spanish philosopher who looked for a grander project than the nationalisms that had reached and passed their zenith. Now it was only the notion of European unity that could bring about a new mission for Europeans and uphold their spirit of expansion.[14] There was also the British statesman and lord who had learned from his efforts to reorganise the British Empire,[15] and a British scholar and conservative-minded baron who pleaded without enthusiasm for the formation of a possible league of European nations. He said, 'in France, in Germany, in Spain, in Czechoslovakia, the evidence as regards not only public opinion, but also official opinion, is overwhelming for something called "The United States of Europe". Strong, however, as is the feeling behind such a conception, it is difficult to obtain any clear and precise definition of it'.[16] Indeed, the difficulties in defining such a union were plain to

see. For some, Great Britain, including all its colonies, was considered part of Europe, while others considered it a union unto itself. Russia was sometimes seen as a possible future member state, but that was difficult for most observers to imagine. Some wanted states founded by Europeans and occupied by European nations to join in a common federation, including, for example, the United States as well as the countries of South America.

Triggered by a determination to avoid new wars and by the Wilsonian declaration of a new international order, new initiatives took hold among intellectuals to establish transnational exchange. There was 'no doubt', intellectual historians Carlos Reijnen and Marleen Rensen have claimed, 'of the great extent to which the intellectual scene of interwar Europe crossed national boundaries', with many new initiatives emerging to defend and increase international cooperation in an era of proliferating borders.[17] The intellectual scene encompassed artistic movements, literary conferences, and cultural events. Many intellectuals took action to organise transnationally. Romain Rolland led the organisation Pour L'Internationale de l'Esprit from France, the PEN Club was founded, and Henri Barbusse initiated Clarté with its periodical and subgroups in many countries. T.S. Eliot published *The Criterion* and Albert Crémieux *Europe*, literary journals that were important for translating and introducing foreign authors to English and French publics, with the aim of transcending national borders. Research has described a cultural internationalism intended to foster understanding across national borders, including both bodies such as the League of Nations' Organisation of Intellectual Cooperation and amorphous activities such as the International Studies Conferences and the Council of Intellectual Workers. Two renowned conferences were 'L'avenir de la culture' in Madrid, 3–7 May 1933, and 'L'avenir de l'esprit européen' in Paris, 16–18 October 1933.[18] Carlos Reijnen and Marleen Rensen have argued plausibly for a strong connection between transnational intellectual exchange, the understanding of Europe, and the European idea.[19]

In addition, peace activists linked pacifism with the European idea. As we saw in Chapter 1, pacifists had already pursued the idea of a European federation before the war, and after the war the quest for peace had become more important than ever, in order to strengthen the European idea.[20] The early 1920s saw an increase in peace activism marked by large demonstrations against new wars and by the establishment of many new groups. The range of peace organisations was broad and included communists, right-wing groups, feminists, republicans, and religious groups. Many intellectuals joined committees, and contributed to journals such as the one published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. These groups were local and national, but many were also part of a transnational network organising exchange visits and participation in international peace meetings and

congresses. An international structure emerged, starting with the International Peace Bureau in 1891, which continued its activities alongside the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, founded in 1915. There were newcomers such as War Resisters' International founded in 1921, the Joint Peace Council founded in 1930, several Christian organisations, and the institutional body of the Peace Pledge Campaign, which succeeded in persuading hundreds of thousands of signatories to promise not to take part in any new war. Not least were the French and German groups that undertook exchanges in an effort to decrease the risk of new wars, reluctantly at the beginning and then more frequently, with visits, speaker tours and youth exchanges.[21]

The cultural unity of Europe was often highlighted in these ventures, for example, in the short-lived journal *Det nye Europa* (A New Europe) where well-known figures from Scandinavia and Germany asserted the need for a European culture and for cooperation across borders, urging all sensible Europeans to unite. The notion of a coherent European culture continued to be seen as an attractive alternative to international conflict.[22]

Leading philosophers and authors from European countries turned to the subject of cultural unity. The historian Christopher Dawson identified a cultural unity nearly a thousand years old that he prioritised over the nationalities: 'The ultimate foundation of our culture is not the national state, but the European unity'; it was important to 'develop a common European consciousness and a sense of its historic and organic unity'.[23] The Baltic German philosopher Hermann Graf von Keyserling criticised the self-presumption of contemporary nationalism that concealed that the European nations were only variations of a larger community with a single spirit at its heart. He predicted that Europeans would increasingly identify as belonging to one culture as they became more aware of their differences from both Americans and Russians. In European culture he found a spirit of individuality that emphasised individual initiatives and responsibility, resisted Russian and Soviet collectivism that left no room for the individual, and resisted America, where the individual was replaced with sameness and the 'tyranny of the majority'. For Keyserling, Europe represented the light in a dark age to come, and the hope for humankind. Thanks to their Christian heritage, Europeans possessed the ability to think logically and behave ethically, beyond all others, as proven by Europe's impressive history of scientific breakthroughs.[24] Although Europe had lost its economic power and would therefore lose its material head start, it was ahead of the rest of the world in terms of culture, spirit and psychology.

Stefan Zweig bowed down to Nietzsche, worshipping him as a prophet who had warned of nationalism and seen its dangers of egocentrism, brutality and particularism. In place of nationalists, supranational Europeans were

urged to step forward.[25] In a speech given in Florence in 1932, Zweig gave a full account of the key role played by European culture, recognising its unifying heritage passed down via the ancient Romans and the Roman Catholic Church, and by the European spirit developed by the Renaissance humanists, a spirit longing for unity. He identified a shared European way of thinking, a shared European feeling, as well as shared experiences starting in the early nineteenth century. He believed that 'Europe uniformly lives, think, feels and experiences specific conditions', which could be best expressed by philosophers, poets and novelists. He concluded his speech by telling of the paradox of contemporary Europe, where nationalism and protectionism were stronger than ever, while the consciousness of a shared economic and political destiny also remained salient. His message was that the European nations should stand united if they wished to lead the world in the future, as they had in the past, especially during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Another part of his message was not to turn to economics or politics for examples of, or the legitimisation for, European unification, but rather to look to the intellectuals and the world of learning and culture.[26]

Zweig focused on nationalism as opposed to European cultural unity. For others, the plea for European unification also related to cultural divides, emphasising the national soil of culture, in a Herderian way, and that all great artistic achievements had national roots. A gap between culture and the economy was thereby hinted at. On the one hand, the call for cultural diversity prioritised qualities that made nations somehow unique, while on the other, the call for economic unity nurtured a degree of standardisation across national borders. One needed national cultural achievements, but to do away with borders one needed economic unity. For pan-Europeanists this was not necessarily a problem. Rather, Bronislaw Huberman saw this as an opportunity, as he claimed that what made nations unique would be able to flourish even more without economic borders.[27] For Keyserling, intellectual exchange was essential to cultural achievement: the high culture of one country was always the result of influences from abroad, as exemplified by the influx of Russian intellectuals to France, the number of well-known Englishmen with some Irish or Scottish blood in their veins, and the many intellectuals around Europe who had some Jewish ancestry.[28]

Even with the issue defined in this way, one should bear in mind that transnational connections and encounters did not always transcend cultural borders. The opposite was also seen, as the transnationalism of the interbellum period had the nation as its point of departure. In many cases, the international conferences and gatherings held in the name of European unity turned out to be sites of national contestation. Many intellectuals defended their own nations and the idea, Patricia Clavin has recently argued, was

not to go beyond national borders, but to exchange among and learn about national cultures. In a recent article, Geert Somson has pointed out some truly internationalist proclamations made by scientists, but he sees them as exceptions and shows that the scientific community was not as keen on international cooperation during the interwar period. The Treaty of Versailles excluded German scientists from international fora, and the practices and requirements of the scientific work of, for example, chemists were marked by 'cognitive fragmentation'. This created a fundamental ambiguity. On the one hand, the national ideal was held up as superior to the universal, while on the other, intellectuals such as Huizinga, Valéry, Keyserling and Zweig, who all took part in intellectual exchange across national borders, advocated forming a community of the mind and of intellectuals, that would transcend political and national belligerence and set the path for the future of Europe.

Economic and Political Arguments for European Unity

The role played by America in the formation of European unity has been largely forgotten. Even before and during the Great War, the Pan-American Union had attracted considerable attention as an example to follow in gradually removing the incentives for warfare by entering into close cooperation in key areas. In the late 1920s, this model was once again recognised. All of the American republics were represented in the Washington-headquartered union, which dealt with their relations and facilitated and promoted economic, cultural and scientific exchange. The union organised congresses where controversial issues were on the agenda, and established arbitration procedures. Both Alfred Fried and the former French prime minister Édouard Herriot said that, although the focus was on economic and social but not political cooperation, the Union had, since its beginning in 1889, fostered trust and a spirit of peaceful conflict resolution. Herriot concluded that the pan-American model should be followed in the European attempt to set up a union, with regularly held conferences – a permanent organisation that could prepare meetings, as well as special bureaus that could implement decisions.[29]

When the post-Great War depression set in, Europe's economic borders became further stressed. It was at this time, if not before, that the calls for unity and forming a federation became calls for a free market and free trade. The tariff systems were considered a disadvantage for the competitiveness of European industry and, outside the government, some economists and businessmen formed groups to promote further customs unions. A cartel was formed in 1926 by steel producers from Germany, France, Belgium and Luxembourg to regulate excess production capacity. Émile

Mayrisch, director of the Luxembourg steel group ARBED, promoted understanding between France and Germany, and succeeded in involving the governments in the cartel negotiations. This cartel encouraged the idea of unity and was seen as a step towards further cooperation. If production and markets could be rationally managed, this could lead to the realisation of European unity.[30]

Calls for European cooperation were made by ministries of the main European powers. These calls included the German foreign policy of Walther Rathenau and Gustav Stresemann, who strongly favoured cooperation with Germany's neighbours, and were affirmed by the French governments of Édouard Herriot and Aristide Briand.[31] In the British governments, the calls echoed, although they were not embraced, as the unification of the British Empire was preferred.[32] The Italian prime minister Francesco Nitti was zealous for a European version of the United States that could dismantle European borders. He saw this as the only way to bring peace and renewed welfare to war-torn Europe.[33]

The idea of political unification had an interwar peak in the second half of the 1920s. It was possible to detect growing interest among socialists who took a stand against rising nationalism – 'Splitternationalismus' should be met with 'Kontinentalpolitik', according to a German socialist magazine. The socialists pleaded for closer cooperation between France and Germany, to build unity through wide-ranging cultural and economic entanglements between European nations and realise the possibility that a European federation could create an orderly and prosperous economy.[34] Political leaders publicly supported the European idea. French prime minister Édouard Herriot gave a speech in 1925 calling for a United States of Europe; British colonial secretary Leo Amery professed to a Berlin daily his belief that the borders of Europe could be dismantled and that a European federation could be created; and German foreign minister Gustav Stresemann said in a speech that he hoped for a United States of Europe.[35] In the transition from the 1920s to the 1930s, prospects for unification were taking shape, and rapid and successful negotiations were being anticipated. In September 1929, an intergovernmental conference on the unification of Europe was held with France and Germany as main participants. The French prime minister Aristide Briand, leading the Republican-Socialist Party, and Gustav Stresemann, from the liberal–conservative German People's Party, both pleaded for the cause in inaugural speeches.[36] A conference with the express purpose of beginning the process of forming a union by reducing trade tariffs was held in February and March 1930, with twenty-six European governments represented. The results were meagre, although the convention declared itself one of the first steps towards economic cooperation in Europe.[37] In May 1930, Briand and the French government circulated an appeal to the

European governments to organise a European federation/union. In this case, the focus was instead on political unification. The suggestion was to begin by cooperating more closely politically; only when the political federation was established would the nations then move on to economic unification. In this way, weak nations could continue to have the means to protect themselves, and it would be possible to build trust. In a second step, the federation would eventually move forward with measures to eliminate tariffs and other trade barriers.

Interestingly, it is possible to read Briand's memorandum from the conference as an answer to the discussions of crisis and decline, lack of shared morality, and the quest for viable values. The beginning of the first paragraph states the necessity of a treaty that would facilitate the *moral* union of Europe, confirming solidarity among its members. It ends by calling for governments to be responsible and take action 'for the good of the European community and humankind'.[38] Briand's draft stressed the need for solidarity and stability in times of danger. He hinted at the shared culture and the racial affinity of the European nations. The inclusion of morality, culture and race in this political document illustrates the entanglement of the European idea with many other aspects of the concept of Europe.

The proposal endeavoured to adapt to the international order established after the war. Under no circumstances should the union threaten the states' independence. It was to operate within the League of Nations – that is, to include only European countries that were members of the league (thus excluding Russia), following its framework for resolving international disputes and holding meetings during the league's sessions in Geneva. Although the proposal was indeed bold, it had weaknesses in mostly appealing to the goodwill of governments and limiting itself to being an extension of the nineteenth-century Congress System applied to the framework of the League of Nations.

Overall, the proposal received only half-hearted support. Neither the reviews in newspapers and periodicals nor the responses from Europe's governments were overwhelmingly positive. However, the initiative was widely discussed and met with some support, including promotion by French and German committees and adoption in Austrian and Scandinavian initiatives. A further government conference in Geneva was held in September. The leader of a large German company argued for extensive economic unification at a meeting of the German Industry Federation.[39] In Britain, the proposal was supported by Norman Angell in *Foreign Affairs* and John Maynard Keynes in *The Nation*, among others. However, the draft was eventually rejected, and when the United Kingdom voiced its objections it was politically dead. Briand himself announced his resignation as prime minister only a few months afterwards.[40]

For a short period in the late 1920s and early 1930s, the idea of economic cooperation as the salvation of Europe was discussed, often in combination with pleas for a United States of Europe, and frequently expanded outside Europe to include European colonies. Plans that incorporated the joint exploitation of Africa were frequently discussed, for instance, by advocates of the Pan-European League, and were launched by politicians from the colonial powers, including Germany and Italy, which had lost their own colonies as a result of the Great War. For a period, these plans were an issue on the political agenda and the subject of diplomacy. Related political initiatives were undertaken and networks were established, especially between France and Germany. It was argued that such a joint Eurafrican project could not only solve the economic crisis, but also unite Europe. This colonising project engendered a feeling of optimism amidst the ongoing economic crisis. At the Great Colonial Exposition that took place in Paris in 1931, general commissioner Hubert Lyautey advocated a new Holy Alliance of the colonial powers 'for the greater moral and material benefit of all'. The project was even on the agenda of French–German deliberations in 1936–37.[41]

Still, the pleas for economic measures remained largely focused on Europe and the potential of a continent-wide home market. In a 1930 speech delivered in Cologne and Barcelona, American engineer Dannie Heineman suggested that Europe would need to face the crisis using the common pillars of economic life, which included not only free competition and a common financial and banking system, but also permanent collaboration in transport and communication. Referring to how trade had fostered unity and wealth in the United States, he concluded that 'it is internal trade that cements political unity', and recommended building more roads in rural Central Europe, in particular. Heineman, as an engineer, claimed science and technology to be among the main factors that could bridge the industrial and agrarian divides of Europe. By establishing networks of communication, internal trade would increase, and electricity, the new form of energy, would benefit peasants in Eastern and Southern Europe. Overall, this would provide a solid basis for the federation that he saw as essential to Europe.[42]

Heineman was not the only one to invest hope in hands-on measures of technology and engineering. In the early 1930s, large-scale projects were proposed to address the economic crisis, inspired by Briand's initiative for a European federation. The committee of inquiry that was set up invited proposals for furthering the idea, and the International Labour Office (ILO) suggested a radical extension of infrastructure that could help to overcome divisions and mistrust. Large-scale public works would not only create jobs, but also foster a pan-European spirit. The ILO director, Albert Thomas, suggested developing waterways, electricity transmission lines, railways and especially motorways that could connect the capitals, particularly of the Central and

West European countries. Networks were set up and congresses were held with the sole purpose of gathering road planners to discuss inter-European motorways.[43] Inspired by Thomas, a retired Italian diplomat, Carlo Enrico Barduzzi, projected a huge railway venture that could connect the different parts of the continent. Europe would immediately prosper from building these railways, as it would employ millions of workers and, in the longer term, the improved transportation and communication links between the agricultural and industrial parts of Europe would create a new unity. Barduzzi argued that railways from the north to the south and from the east to the west would make Europe more prosperous and peaceful, nurture solidarity among Europeans, further economic cooperation, and support political unity. They could also bring the colonies closer to Europe, as the plan included one route extending from Paris to Istanbul, via tunnels below the Adriatic Sea and the Bosporus, and then on to New Delhi, and all the way to Saigon in French Indochina; another route would start in Lisbon and end in Odessa; and a third would extend from Antwerp to Africa, via a tunnel from Gibraltar. This grandiose draft proposal failed to gain approval from either Italian officials or international leaders, and very few major railways were built in Europe during these years. However, in addition to Baruzzi's draft, there were many other plans and proposals for railways intended to bring Central European or Latin countries closer together.[44] In Germany, the architect Herman Sörgel drafted ambitious plans to lower the Mediterranean by building dams across the Strait of Gibraltar and the Dardanelles in order to create more land and better opportunities to make inroads into the African continent. This macro-technological project was fascinating to the public, and papers reported on it across the globe. It set the stage for films and for several novels, sometimes supported by Sörgel himself.[45] Both the economic argument and the macro-technological projects became closely intertwined with the European idea and, in the case of Sörgel, with the idea of Eurafrica. These projects drew on the perception of a Europe in decline, contested from both the West and the East. Sörgel saw the threat arising from 'the probable combination of the three Americas, on the one hand, and the yellow peril that arises from the racial antipathy of India, China and Japan, on the other'.[46] As Michael Odijie has pointed out, the rumours of a 'yellow peril' eventually found their way into the European unification discourse of the interbellum.[47]

European Movements: Organising for the Sake of Unification

Contemporary observers understood that the League of Nations would not acquire the authority necessary to evoke mutual trust among the European

states, and that it exhibited 'a preference for regional agreements'.[48] Mistrust of its aim to marry the cosmopolitanism of the pre-war era to the notion of national sovereignty grew when aggressive nationalism began its advance. Even though the league presented a theoretical universalism and initiated sub-bodies with the aim of enhancing cultural exchange and cross-border understanding, it remained preferential towards national cultures, celebrating national art and folkloristic traditions. Indeed, it 'never took a precise stand against the disgraces of dictatorships', Annamaria Ducci has written.[49] Moreover, the internationalism of the League of Nations was hampered in another way. It had been created by European states and used the means of European diplomacy. The languages of the organisation were English and French. The staff was dominated by West Europeans and, more precisely, by white West European men. In a study of the league's employees, Klaas Dykmann has stressed their internationalism as expressing a 'vision of international co-operation guided by a national compass', and a European understanding of international order.[50] Ducci has remarked that the league always focused on the problems of Europe, as the guidelines for its cultural initiatives were all European. This was true of many of its initiatives regarding transnational exchange, which, in reality, were largely oriented towards Europe in service of European interests.[51] This constrained internationalism is well illustrated by one of the league's more successful organisations, called the Fédération Internationale des Unions Intellectualles in French, while its German name, Europäischer Kulturbund, indicated that its focus was on European cooperation.[52]

It was not at all clear how Europeanists should be able to recognise internationalism. For some, the unification of Europe was a sub-target on the journey towards the final objective of unifying all humankind. They found it necessary to begin with a European federation, as the national and economic conflicts on this continent were a threat to world peace.[53] Others saw the European idea as opposed to internationalism, in accordance with criticism of the emerging international order of the League of Nations. In such cases, intellectual ties to nationalism from radical right-wing groups were frequent, as we will see in the following section. Here it was clear that Europeanists represented a dividing line within the European idea, between full-blooded Eurocentrism and an internationalism that extended beyond Europe's national borders.

In the 1920s, Europeanists began to set up organisations with the aim of expanding the sense of European unity. Some aimed for economic cooperation and others for cultural exchange, some avoided politics while others reached out to politicians. French–German antipathies were high on the agenda, and improving relations between citizens and their leaders was another key issue. The heyday of these networks was the late 1920s, following

the success of the Locarno Treaty of 1925, but set against the uncertainties and struggles of the economic crisis and the rising nationalism of the early 1930s.[54] Without going into detail about the organisations that promoted such ideas, we note that there were many of them: there were nationally confined groups – like Vereeniging ter Bevordering van de oprichting der Vereenigde Staaten van Europa and Bloc d'Action Européenne – that promoted European cooperation in the Netherlands and Belgium;[55] there was also the Union Young Europe, the Institute of European Economy, and a body for European Cooperation called the Comité Fédéral de Coopération Européenne.

Some of these groups were mainly smokescreens for nationalist interests. Among the more influential was the Verband für europäischen Verständigung/Fédération pour l'Entente Europeenne, run primarily by Wilhelm Heile. He had worked closely with Friedrich Naumann, and held views of German superiority; his call for a European federation was a way to further national interests and keep the ambitions of a German-led 'Mitteleuropa' alive.[56] Some were mainly interested in free trade and common markets in Europe. Initially, we found such ambitions in the Mitteleuropäische Wirtschaftstagung, a free-trade movement that was wary of German domination. The initiative attracted mainly businessmen and politicians from the post-Habsburg states, but also included representatives from France and Great Britain. They opted for improved economic cooperation and discussed the need for a Danube federation that might include France.[57] In a similar appeal, the Comité international d'Union Douanière Europeenne/Europäische Zollverein urged all Europeans to support a shared customs union without impairing national cultures or sovereignty. This organisation was set up by a transnational group of economists and politicians from Great Britain, France, Germany, and other countries, and managed to establish groups in more than seven additional countries.[58]

Focusing on cultural exchange and unity, the Austrian-Bohemian aristocrat Karl Anton Rohan initiated the Féderation Internationale des Unions Intellectuels/Europäische Kulturbund and its journal *Europäische Revue* in 1922. It attracted conservative thinkers such as Hugo von Hofmannsthal, Carl Schmitt and Paul Valéry. Individuals joined from the Baltic states to Portugal, and established main offices in Austria, France, Germany and Italy – more than fifty local branches in all. Rohan himself was the editor of the journal *Europäische Revue*, which had a circulation of 2,500. Yearly congresses gathered three hundred members who discussed economic and cultural exchanges, while political issues were banned. Rohan's aim was to gather the spiritual aristocracy of Europe in a venture to overcome divisions of the European mind. Inspired by Nietzsche, Rohan found himself in a new era that was replacing the nineteenth century with its scientific rationalism

and materialism. He declared nationalism to be a necessity that did much good, but also said that it demanded a synthesis called Europe. Communication, trade, industrial cooperation, and rationalisation were forces that made territorial state borders obsolete. Because of this, he demanded organic thinking and organised a new aristocratic elite in order to advance a future-oriented spirit of shared European culture that was essential to unification.

From the outset, Rohan and the organisation espoused conservative standpoints and had ties to conservative and Catholic reformist movements.[59] Through the 1920s, the organisation radicalised towards the right, rejected liberalism, parliamentary democracy, internationalism, pacifism, and Briand's memorandum, and declared itself antagonistic towards that most important of Europeanist organisations, the Pan-European League. Rohan saw the future of Europe in the ideas of Italian fascism and in its successful rejection of the results of the French Revolution. Clearly, there were significant differences between Rohan's conservatism and German National Socialism. Still, the organisation collapsed after a series of internal conflicts and the Nazi takeover in Germany. He published the journal for another decade with support from the German regime, soon becoming a member of the Nazi party and declaring that his movement was closely tied to Nazism.[60] Well in line with Nazi ideology, he stated that Europe, European culture, and the white race, which were all destined to rule the world, had been subsumed under the banner of American and communist colonialising.[61]

Pierre Viénot founded the Comité franco-allemand d'information et de documentation/Deutsch-Französische Studienkomitee in 1925, with support from Émile Mayrisch, the owner and head of a large Luxembourgian steel concern. The group's programme was to organise talks and personal meetings between both French and German elites, including industrialists, bankers, university professors, and higher officials. Through its bureau in Berlin, it spread news and information about France, while its Paris bureau did the same regarding Germany. The main goal was to deconstruct what Viénot considered false images and the main reasons for the antipathy of the elites and the public towards each other. There were personal ties between Viénot's and Rohan's organisations, with overlapping memberships, and Viénot taking part in Kulturbund activities. From the beginning, Viénot partly shared Rohan's conservatism, although he never approved of Italian fascism. Although Viénot's committee clearly attracted more elites with nationalist and conservative leanings, it also appealed to liberal minds. These elites had a common understanding of European cooperation as something that could yield national advantages. When the 1920s gave way to the 1930s, the committee followed the lead of Rohan's Kulturbund and took more conservative and radical-right stands, while Viénot himself drifted into socialist views and finally left.[62]

The organisation 'A New Europe' introduced a companion journal *The New Europe* in 1924; the introduction to the first issue, written by the Dane C.F. Heerfordt, addressed the management of a future European federation. He managed to encourage intellectuals, politicians and industrialists to form national committees for the cause, and one hundred prominent Scandinavians declared their support for him. A letter that had been circulated among the representatives of various governments was used by Heerfordt to further international interest in a 'Federation of European Nations', which could guarantee a member state's security both internally and vis-à-vis foreign enemies, and facilitate economic cooperation. Heerfordt's more concrete suggestions concerned disarmament, the establishment of a federal court to resolve conflicts between the member states, a shared parliament with the member states represented in order of importance in the union, and a shared government to handle defence, foreign affairs, and financial and customs administration. Financial and customs administration would be especially appropriate to start with. Heerfordt later concentrated on obtaining French support. In appeals from 1928, Heerfordt tried to convince the French minister of foreign affairs, Aristide Briand, that it was high time for France to take political responsibility. Soon he would be heeded.[63]

It is true that many of those involved were active in more than one organisation. It is also true that there was rivalry both within these organisations and between them, as they bickered among themselves. Wilhelm Heile wanted his Verband für europäischen Verständigung to be a mass movement, just as did the leader of the Pan-European Union, Coudenhove-Kalergi. They each wanted their organisation to be the true representative of the European movement, so they sought to discredit each other.[64] Historian Guido Müller, who has specialised in the networks of the interwar period, concludes rightly that aristocrats with a conservative ideology exerted a remarkable influence on these organisations. These aristocrats were, together with intellectuals and artists, looking for ways to avoid new wars in a Europe they regarded as contested by America and Russia. Their organisations were elite groups that distrusted mass movements, and they viewed democracy with a great deal of scepticism. Müller concluded that the conservative Europeanists of the 1920s sympathised with the anti-liberal, authoritarian and fascist notions in the making in Europe. They supported tolerance and cultural understanding, but they put their trust in elite accomplishments rather than in a democratic notion of Europe.[65] Rohan and his organisation's turn towards the radical right illustrates the dividing line between those nationalists who took internationalism to be their enemy and those affiliated with international cooperation and integration. In the interwar period, the former might have called for a unity of Europe that was cultural and also included ideas of closer economic and political

cooperation, but that opposed the multilateralism of the League of Nations. Moreover, the detailed research of Müller shows how, in their early years, these organisations attracted minds with different ideologies: Rohan's Kulturbund and Viénot's Studienkomitee initially comprised socialists and liberals, whereas by 1930, both had been 'cleansed' and become exclusively radical-right organisations.

Pan-Europe

The group with the most outreach activities and most influence was the lobbying organisation for a European federation founded by the Czech count Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi, who first presented his plans in 1923. His argument was clear-cut: the new Europe that emerged after the war was anarchic in its logic, with many independent nations whose conflicts constituted a latent state of war. The alternative was to bring most of Europe together. While the European states were all busy building separate economies and investing in armies of their own, states in other parts of the world were cooperating with their neighbours. The key was thus cooperation. He became inspired by the Pan-American Union, and he named his movement Pan-Europe: 'There is still time to save Europe from this destiny. The salvation is Pan-Europe: the political and economic merger of all states from Poland to Portugal into one federation'.[66]

Once again, and significant to this period in particular, we see the claim that political unification was founded on belief in a shared cultural heritage, mainly drawing upon Christianity but mixed with a dose of individualism and rational thinking from Greek antiquity. The claim utilises the notions of reason and will: it is rational to unite, but the Europeans would have to want to do so. Coudenhove-Kalergi espoused Europe's vigour; while other cultures had declined, the Europeans had been victorious around the globe, to such a degree that Japan, Persia, Turkey, Egypt, and others were now following its example.[67]

It was typical that this call for European unity included warnings of new threats after the catastrophe of the Great War, of divisions between the European states, of the Soviet Union on Europe's eastern border, and of the rise of Bolshevism and anti-individualism in Central and Western Europe. Both Eurocentrism and colonialism were seen as playing significant roles when he declared European culture to be superior, as it had risen to world domination. It had surpassed all other cultures and was the culture of the white race. The colonies were presented as integral to the pan-European project, as objects of mutual perpetuation because they supplied Europe with raw materials.[68]

His unconcealed racism is also significant. Although the interwar period had seen many attempts to distinguish between different European races,[69] some continued to cling to the idea of a common white race, as Coudenhove-Kalergi did. For someone who considered it rational to look upon Europe as one nation, and the existing nation states as only a historical step on the road to the European nation, it was also necessary to defend the idea that all these Europeans belonged to one single race, giving rise to a common culture. Still, cultural divergences were used in the pan-European movement to support calls for unity. The United States of America was contrasted with the shattered states of Europe. America was an offspring of European culture. Due to its successful unification, the United States was now the strongest power in the world, dominating its own continent and challenging European dominance elsewhere. Asia had a culture of its own, from which Europeans could learn about ethics. Asia showed how to attain harmony and individual self-control, even though Asia lacked the energy and dynamic force of Europe. Coudenhove-Kalergi also compared Europe with Africa, from which he believed nothing could be learned. It was solely a continent of resources, an open field for plundering, which Europe urgently needed to exploit. Europe was urged to continue to embrace its global mission, using its energy to spread its technical proficiency, bring richness, and make the world a better place in which to live.[70]

He nevertheless concentrated on the development of European unification, and claimed that the peoples and states should be joined together in Pan-Europe, in defiance of chauvinism, communism, militarism, and protective tariffs. A broad and mutual patriotism among Europeans was seen as replacing nationalism. Coudenhove-Kalergi's programme declared that the time of small states and national states was over, that partnerships between states and people were to be forged. The British, Russian and Chinese kingdoms were cited as examples, alongside the Pan-American counterpart he considered under construction. If there was to be a future Europe, then it would have to be Pan-Europe, including neither Britain nor Russia, according to Coudenhove-Kalergi. Britain was large enough on its own, and his criterion for excluding Russia was its strong Asian Mongol heritage, while European culture included Christianity and the historical tradition extending back to Classical antiquity. Europe's was a rational and scientific culture; it had Christian ideas of community blended with individualism, which was not part of Russian culture.[71] He perpetuated the long-standing Western discourse that excluded Russia from Europe as Asian, or as not quite European enough.

His movement was not without success. It never did become the mass movement that its founder had hoped for, but it gained respect from intellectuals, statesmen and politicians all over Europe. He collaborated with

Heinrich Mann, who argued in 1927 that 'Pan-Europe was in the beginning the dream of a few intellectuals, but is now not far from being the practical goal of businessmen and politicians'.[72] Among the intellectual supporters were Mann's brother Thomas and nephew Klaus, Albert Einstein, Stefan Zweig, José Ortega y Gasset, Salvador de Madariaga, Fritjof Nansen, Selma Lagerlöf, Bernard Shaw and Paul Valéry. The government in Austria, led by Ignaz Seipel, made premises available for the movement in the Hofburg, the former Austrian imperial palace. Both the German foreign minister Gustav Stresemann, and the young mayor of Cologne, Konrad Adenauer, who as federal chancellor of West Germany after the Second World War took part in establishing the European Steel and Coal Community, were to attend the Pan-European League congresses. The president of Czechoslovakia Edvard Beneš, Winston Churchill, and the British colonial secretary Leo Amery were also in attendance. Among the French who had pledged their support was the young Maurice Schumann as well as the two former prime ministers, Édouard Herriot and Aristide Briand.[73] Coudenhove-Kalergi's efforts to gain provisions included engaging leading bankers and industrialists who offered financial support, underlining the elitist image of the movement.[74]

Coudenhove-Kalergi began ambitiously publishing the book *Paneuropa* in 1923, writing that it was destined to set the stage for a movement supporting a new Europe. Through the awakening of the European peoples, the political pressure for unification would become irresistible.[75] Unification was considered a necessity, he wrote in the first edition of the journal *Zeitschrift Pan-Europa*, which he initiated in 1924: 'The European issue is this: Is it possible for 25 states on the small European peninsula to live together in international anarchy, without this ending in a horrible political, economic, and cultural catastrophe?'[76] Instead of anarchy, he stressed rationality, which was a key notion for Coudenhove-Kalergi: the international and economic orders should favour planned action and cooperation – for example, building continent-wide communication systems. At times, he argued that Europe should be or become one nation, but the model he and others in the Union preferred featured a division between economics, on the one hand, and politics, on the other. The idea of unification was often spoken of in connection with economic matters, particularly the expansion of international trade, as well as with political autonomy.[77]

The model for European cooperation would initially need to be that of the American states and the Pan-American conferences. Then it would be time for a European arbitration court, even more far-reaching treaties, and a common defence to reinforce Europe's eastern borders against the Russian threat. Only after that could economic borders be relaxed in favour of a free market and a common currency. The creation of a federation based on a constitution would finally happen. Not much was actually said about the

governmental and administrative bodies or the constitution, beyond equal rights for all European languages within the union.[78]

To begin with, only Coudenhove-Kalergi wrote articles for the journal, but after a year, he began to write with a collaborator and included articles by other authors. Still, the journal was always very much the product of its editor. He stated his views on contemporary political issues, and connected them to the pressing need for European unification. He wrote an open letter to the National Assembly in Paris urging the French to see that they shared their destiny with the Germans and should strive for closer cooperation – republicans, socialists and pacifists should all form an alliance with their German counterparts. If France wanted to remain a world leader, then it would have to allow Germany to be great as well.[79] He hailed the peace movement and delivered a speech at the World Peace Congress in Berlin in 1924.[80] He criticised German nationalism for not seeing things from a European perspective, arguing that this could lead to new disasters, for both Germany and the rest of Europe.[81] He wrote an open letter to the General Secretariat of the League of Nations to argue for its decentralisation into continental blocs that could drive the creation of a European federation. Decentralisation would also make it more attractive for both the Americans and Soviets to join, the former as the leading nation of Pan-America, and the latter as it would be recognised as a separate part of the league. Both China and Japan would be recognised as separate blocs as Britain was, while Africa, Australia and parts of Asia would be included within Britain or Pan-Europe.[82]

He made suggestions for moving forward. A new convention would create a European commission for passports, removing the constraints of visas and establishing a body to which citizens could apply for a passport valid in all member states. A common anthem would be a further visible manifestation of European unity.[83] Coudenhove-Kalergi's comments and analysis always returned to the idea of a pan-European federation as a solution, often presented with enthusiastic praise for the new Europe. The same could be said of other articles from the journal. Julius Wolf, one of the main Austrian propagators of 'Mitteleuropa', declared Pan-Europe to be a good idea that ought to attract increased support. Vilma Kopp wrote that the movement was opening women's eyes to the importance of the European spirit, and she encouraged women to give it their support. Only Pan-Europe could offer the things that women were longing for – namely, peace, hope for the economy, and a spiritual basis for the struggle against social misery; therefore, Pan-Europe was their destiny.[84] Salvador de Madariaga, the Spanish diplomat and scholar, praised the richness of the European spirit and its potency in creating value in art, science and politics – the unifying of Europe was the method to perpetuate this spirit.[85]

Coudenhove-Kalergi apparently had both energy and charisma. Every now and then he was lauded for his vision and achievements in moving the organisation forward, and a young poet even paid him homage with a poem.[86] National committees were established in Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Rumania and Switzerland,[87] each with some members of prominence. In a small country such as Estonia, the committee included more than two hundred members from academia, industry and politics. Estonian dailies published over a dozen of Coudenhove-Kalergi's articles. Leaflets were translated, and one of them, *Paneuropa ABC*, was disseminated free of charge. Estonian newspapers paid significant attention to the pan-European programme in a number of articles over the years.[88] Pan-European student groups formed in Austria, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Hungary and Switzerland.[89] By the end of 1926, the journal prided itself on having offices in fourteen countries and being published in English, French, German, Czech and Greek. It advertised its activities in various countries, reviewed new books on Europe and European affairs, and featured articles by a range of authors.[90] Coudenhove-Kalergi could indeed claim success.

Over the years, Coudenhove-Kalergi made fervent efforts to mobilise politicians. He wrote letters to hundreds of publicists, premiers and ministers, professors and authors in Germany, France and Central Europe to ask whether they believed that a United States of Europe was necessary or even possible. Answers of various lengths were submitted, overwhelmingly positive, and all were published in his journal. He listed the political leaders who had declared themselves in support of the pan-European movement.[91]

In this respect, the first congress of the Pan-European Union was a huge triumph. Held in Vienna in October 1926 with two thousand participants, it included official representations from the League of Nations, Austria, Belgium, Finland, France and Greece, as well as official greetings from the Czech president Tomáš Masaryk, the German and Danish prime ministers, the French minister of war, and the British colonial secretary. The Hungarian philosopher and communist party member, Georg Lukács, gave an inaugural speech. Altogether, there were speakers from twenty-seven European states. This range of participation bore witness to the movement's strong appeal to statesmen from the main continental powers, as well as from the minor ones. The former Estonian prime minister C.R. Pusta, who saw European unity as safeguarding the future well-being, existence, and cultural development of small states, said that 'small states find an echo of solidarity in the idea of Pan-Europe'.[92]

What an event it was, renewing hopes of overcoming divides and of establishing a path to peace. Contentious issues were the threats of a new

war, minority rights, and which countries to include in an upcoming federation and European parliament. The session on the economy opened with a critique of the nation state organisation of the industrial sector, which had led to more expensive production, trade hindrances, higher living expenses, and colonial conflicts. The basic idea was clear: the European nations would need to respect one another's political independence at the same time as they transcended economic borders, preferably by creating a common trade area with a single currency.[93] In the session on culture, speakers espoused a common European spirit, either to be fostered by better educating Europe's younger generation or to be found in science or among the great Europeans of the past.[94]

On the wall outside the main venue hung large portraits: Immanuel Kant, the author of the tract on eternal peace; Napoleon, because of his strong pleas for unification; Nietzsche, who rejected small states; Jan Amos Komensky, who espoused universal education; and Abbé St. Pierre, Guiseppe Mazzini and Victor Hugo, who all supported the formation of a European federation.[95] Coudenhove-Kalergi himself assigned considerable importance to a shared cultural history. The portraits also showed that the European heritage was French and German in origin, although complemented with a Czech (who could be considered German as well) and an Italian. Moreover, the portraits illustrated the male character of the movement and the journal. The conference did discuss the importance of women to Pan-Europe, and Anita Augsburg emphasised that it was easy for women to think about and act in accordance with European unity: 'Pan-Europe is nothing alien, new . . . [women are] used to thinking and feeling internationally, to seeing the world as a whole and humankind as a unity'.[96] Still, only three women spoke at the conference. When Vilma Kopp wrote that peace was a task for women, she was one of very few women who had been published in the journal.[97]

Coudenhove-Kalergi wanted to appeal to as many groups as possible, and argued that the idea of Pan-Europe stood above political parties. This entailed not taking a stand against fascism when democracy was in peril in the early 1930s. In an article from May 1933, Coudenhove-Kalergi wrote that 'Pan-Europe is neutral in the struggle between democracy and fascism' and that 'the Pan-European movement is neither fascistic nor anti-fascistic, neither democratic nor anti-democratic'. Moreover, he added that his philosophy of governance 'never was democratic but aristocratic'. He did not support parliamentarianism, and maintained that personalities made a difference in history: strong leaders were expected to unify Europe, winning the people's support for that goal.[98] He attempted to involve Mussolini in his movement in 1923, published an article by him in 1934, and met him as late as 1936.[99] These were not just signs of

poor political judgement, but were the outcome of his fundamental political beliefs.

By 1933 the pan-European movement was waning, and so was political and public interest in both European unification and international cooperation within the League of Nations. *Pan-Europe* was publishing many fewer notifications of meetings and events in the sections on various countries. Declarations of official support and recognition were still mentioned at the conferences, but the momentum had faltered. Some of the journal's writers opposed democracy, such as Kurt Hiller, who leaned to the extreme left, and Julius Evola, who supported fascism, at the same time as other writers had ceased appearing. Once again, the content was mostly Coudenhove-Kalergi presenting his own views. His response to the political events of the day was to unify Europe, the same as always.[100]

Coudenhove-Kalergi's programme was greatly debated. Even though leading politicians supported it, the programme was never adopted by the states, with the exception of Briand's government. Some saw it as competing with the League of Nations, although Coudenhove-Kalergi denied this. In large states, the programme was seen as threatening those with grander ambitions; in small states, it was seen as offering security and peaceful cooperation, while threatening economic independence and cultural development.[101] The Pan-European League was accused of being snobbish, and indeed it was an elitist movement driven by the energy of a single person. Its leadership was autocratic and did not allow autonomous initiatives from the sections, leading to internal tension.[102] Given Coudenhove-Kalergi's heroic style of writing, it comes as no surprise that he was compared to Oswald Spengler and other representatives of the so-called conservative revolution of the era. He belonged to a group of nobles who clung to the European idea espoused by Dina Gusejnova, who also highlighted his role as an 'aristocratic radical'.[103] Clearly, Coudenhove-Kalergi did not represent a democratic worldview. In texts written before he began to promote the pan-European ideal, he dismissed the idea of universal suffrage and the parliamentary system; moreover, he espoused a neo-aristocratic principle, in which only the cultivated and wise were destined to rule.[104]

The pan-European concept and Coudenhove-Kalergi continue to fascinate scholars. In the literature, we find overly positive representations of the movement, its leader, and its core ideas. The more critical research downplays the significance and meaning of the pan-European programme for present-day European integration, solely because of Coudenhove-Kalergi's undemocratic ideas. Ulrich Wyrwa has emphasised his disregard for the harm Europe has caused throughout history, concluding that Pan-Europe is 'only possible to understand in the context of the interwar

period, and that it is hardly possible to make connections to the contemporary intellectual and political debate on Europe's present and future'.[105] In Coudenhove-Kalergi we meet a representative of a conservatism that has difficulty accepting democracy. Still, we know that socialists such as Kurt Hiller, Georg Lukács and Heinrich Mann supported him, as did the French socialist Aristide Briand, the Austrian social democrat Karl Renner, and the German social democrat Vladimir Woytinsky. In 1930, Woytinsky's book was published by Pan-Europa Verlag, in which he gave much credit to Coudenhove-Kalergi.[106] We also know that Coudenhove-Kalergi gained support from liberals such as Édouard Herriot, Salvador de Madariaga and José Ortega y Gassett, as well as from the national liberals Edvard Beneš and Tomáš Masaryk. Clearly, different political ideologies were represented among his supporters; not all of them supported democracy, but most remained democrats throughout the interbellum. Konrad Adenauer and Bruno Kreisky, two young supporters of Coudenhove-Kalergi's movement, became trustworthy post-war democratic leaders of the West German and Austrian republics while upholding the ideals of European unification. It should also be noted that his movement was condemned by German and Italian nationalists.

However, Coudenhove-Kalergi has long been criticised for his reactionary viewpoints and for building an undemocratic organisation that was both fascist and imperialistic.[107] Indeed, democracy was questioned within the Pan-European League during the congress proceedings of 1926. We can read that the issue of democracy was raised and then criticised by Kurt Hiller as something that could only work among an aristocratic elite, but that in a parliamentary system it only led to squabbling among political parties. The president of the session immediately countered that Pan-Europe would only become a reality through democratic means by the governance of the people.[108] The pan-European movement apparently involved itself in arguments about democracy, and there are good reasons to agree with Wyrwa that Coudenhove-Kalergi and his organisation were closely connected to specific political and ideological contexts. Although one should definitely be critical of Coudenhove-Kalergi's failure to dissociate himself from fascism, his importance should not be underestimated. Wyrwa cites research showing a sharp juncture in European history with the European cooperation that began at the end of the Second World War. However, this view fosters blindness to historical tradition and to the developments and even innovations that occurred regarding European integration during the interwar period. Anita Prettenthaler-Ziegerhofer has rightly stressed Coudenhove-Kalergi's significant contribution in taking the idea of unification to the governmental level.[109]

A War for the Sake of European Unity

Let us consider the European idea during the war. One might imagine that the outbreak of the Second World War would have effectively erased any inclination to unify Europe, by simply making it impossible or at least very unlikely ever to happen. But this was not the case, although changing conditions had to be accommodated. Few advocated a united Europe during the First World War, and those who did were outsiders, mainly scholars and intellectuals who denounced war. This was not so during the Second World War, however, when calls for European unity were widespread, even among statesmen. The design of a 'New Europe' was on the agenda, one that would be the result of the war. Would it be dominated by one state or organised as a union of equal partners? Should it consist of independent nation states, of partial federations (the Balkans, Central Europe, the Mediterranean, Scandinavia, Western Europe), or constitute only one unitary federation? There was talk of Europe's rebirth, reconstruction, and new beginning. Scholars of law proposed the transfer of certain rights from national sovereignty to common institutions and a higher authority. The discourse comprised political manifestos and constitutional drafts, continuing to rely on economic arguments, the conviction of a common culture, and the seriousness of the task. Many of the relevant texts were written in a strictly factual manner.[110] However, Thomas Mann's widely disseminated radio address of 29 January 1943 stands out in contrast for its remarkable rhetorical strength, and its introduction is well worth quoting. Mann endorsed the idea of unification, illustrating its broad ideological appeal as the alternative to the brutality of nationalism.

> European listeners! I speak to you as one of you; as a German who has always considered himself a European, who knew your countries and cultures, and who was deeply convinced that the political and economic conditions of Europe were outdated; this division into arbitrary border States and sovereignties that has brought about the misfortunes of the Continent. To me, and to those like me, the idea of European unity was dear and precious; it was something natural to our thought and will. It was the opposite of provincial narrowness, petty egotism, nationalist brutality and boorishness; it meant freedom, spaciousness, spirit and kindness.

In Britain, the long tradition of hesitance to join a European community is well documented.[111] In 1940, H.G. Wells declared that he belonged to 'the great English-speaking community' stretching from Asia to America, where he would take offence if called a foreigner. He found the thought of following 'the flag of my Austrian-Japanese friend [i.e. Coudenhove-Kalergi] into a federally bunched-up Europe' extremely unattractive.[112] Despite such sentiments, a sense of Europeanness blossomed when war

broke out – some say more than ever before or since. Soon after war was declared, Arnold Toynbee suggested a union between France and Great Britain, and Labour leader Clement Atlee exclaimed that a new international order was bound to endow an 'international authority superior to the individual states' and that 'Europe must federate or perish', triggering more radical socialists both inside and outside the party to take a stand for the socialist unification of Europe.[113] Beginning in February 1940, British and French civil servants started to devise plans for a union between the countries – notably involving both Jean Monnet and Arthur Salter, who would play significant roles in the post-war making of the European Community. As France was about to collapse in the summer of 1940, Winston Churchill conveyed the eagerness to keep France involved in the war by promising British citizenship to all Frenchmen, and declaring France and Britain to be one union with shared institutions.[114] The main forum for the Europeanists was the Federal Union, which had branches all over Britain where politicians and civil servants met journalists and academics. Initially, there was remarkable activity at the union, including meetings, conferences and publications.[115] When war aims were discussed, European unification was often emphasised as an alternative to the failures of the League of Nations. Rather than trying to embrace the whole world, it was deemed better to build a European federation with a democratic foundation strong enough to withstand the United States and the Soviet Union.[116] In addition, there was great interest in proposals for an Atlantic Union with the United States and a union of democratic states proposed by the American journalist Clarence K. Streit just before the war began. There was also emerging interest in a universal confederation of all the world's nations, which some regarded as inspiring the framework for the European federation.[117]

As before, intellectuals presented various political visions of European unification. Hilde Meisel's idea for the post-war world was a socialist European unity:

> European Unity – this demand is vital for political and economic, and, one might say, for moral reasons. Politically it appears to be the only practicable method of achieving security for the peoples of Europe. Economically, it opens the avenues for a beneficial co-operation that could not possibly be so close and so safe if it were subject to the changing policies of a multitude of sovereign governments. And the moral reason is that the price paid by millions in two world wars imposes the obligation on those who survive, to insist on achieving a peace which is more than a temporary makeshift for the period between the end of this and the beginning of the next world war.[118]

Hilde Meisel, who wrote under the pseudonym Hilda Monte, is not included in the narratives of the European idea, but should be remembered as

an important Europeanist at a crucial historical moment. One can easily cite three reasons for her exclusion: she died before the post-war endeavours of the European movement began and political initiatives took off; she was a woman, while history has almost always recognised only men; and her ideology was not only socialist and social democratic but also Marxist, so it did not fit well with the anti-communist notions that prevailed after the war. Yet, she represented the European idea, and her place in its history should be acknowledged.

Born into a Jewish family in Vienna in 1914, Meisel grew up in Berlin and lived in exile from 1933. She undertook several secret missions to Germany and later Nazi-occupied Europe on behalf of exiled resistance groups and the British intelligence service. She attended the London School of Economics and wrote many articles on economics, working as a journalist for the socialist and labour press. On 7 April 1945, she was shot dead at the Liechtenstein border while escaping from a secret mission in Austria. Hilde Meisel was not unique in taking a socialist approach to Europe's unification. In April 1942, groups from six countries met in London and drafted a resolution in favour of a post-war European unity that abstained from national sovereignty and the international order of power blocs, in favour of a political federation and economic unity based on a socialist organisation of the economy and social life, avoiding subjugation to the United States or the Soviet Union.[119] Of the socialist approaches to unity during the war, the plan presented in Meisel's 1943 book, *The Unity of Europe*, was the most extensive and overall one of the most developed of this period.

Like so many other proposals for European unity in the twentieth century, Meisel's used the common argument against smallness: 'all nations of Europe are too narrow to achieve economic prosperity, [or] a rational system of communications'. To this she added the argument that shared economic and foreign affairs policies would not 'reduce the variety of . . . cultural life', but rather the opposite: they might intensify it 'by establishing closer relations between different national cultures'.[120] However, smallness was not the only problem. Regarding the assessment made by Francis Delaisie in the late 1920s, she stressed the economic gap between industrialised and agrarian parts of Europe, and the need for their close collaboration: the eastern regions were in need of economic progress, which could open up new markets for Western industry. Like other economists, she emphasised the importance of bringing Europe together, invoking a notion that would shape post-war political language when she demanded the 'economic integration of Europe'. Together with smallness came 'the changing policies of a multitude of sovereign governments' that threatened the security of the peoples of Europe.[121] She reiterated the moral obligation to insist on a lasting peace after the price millions of people had paid during

two world wars. We will see these arguments repeated in various ways during the late 1940s.

Obviously, Meisel's socialist pleas for a common European plan that removed class privileges, the shackles of poverty, and social insecurity bore a Marxist stamp, featuring notions such as monopoly capitalism and the exploitation of the masses. However, her socialism came with a cautious rejection of the Soviet Union, which she regarded as a totalitarian state to be excluded from any future unified Europe. She wanted economic planning, but not coercion, socialist rule with individual and political liberties that offered greater opportunities to the individual for 'shaping his life, developing his capacities, choosing his profession and assisting in the progress of the community'.[122] Hers was a socialism that adhered to a set of common ideals vital to the post-war concept of European unification. This is especially apparent when we consider how she imagined the organisation of a European federation, emphasising that the advantage of self-governance was that 'people determine their own affairs' through their local authorities, and that a central authority would manage joint economic enterprises in transport, airlines, postal services, and the like. One might say that she was more forward thinking when she imagined a central police force and a European investment board. She definitely kept to her socialist convictions when it came to the need for a central authority to regulate labour and social services, and the need to strive for a more equitable distribution of income and consumption. However, it is worth noting that these demands were at odds with the conclusion of general progressivism, that it would take 'a considerable span of time before wage standards and social policy [are] approximately the same all over Europe'.[123]

Inter-war fascism in Austria, Germany and Italy was strongly predisposed to nationalism, in terms of both the rhetoric of special national cultures/races and political measures. Nevertheless, nation-state borders were transgressed by transnational networks and visions of a new Europe.[124] Mussolini associated European unity with a new fascist society, both of which were needed to resist the moral and cultural threat of American capitalism and Russian bolshevism. Among Italian fascists, there was no consistency as to the aims of this new society: some were traditionalists, while others looked forward to a new technological society from which a fascist Europe could emerge.[125] However, there was no doubt about the means to achieve European unity: central to the fascists' idea of creating European unity was the notion of their military might. The writer and Fascist Party member Marquis Giorgio Quartara enthusiastically declared in 1941 that the Axis powers were de facto implementing Briand's plan; whereas earlier efforts had failed, it was now thanks to the Axis that the miracle had occurred and a New Europe had been established.[126]

Consequently, this was also the central notion of the German Nazis' concept of Europe, initially quite insignificant in the official rhetoric, even though the regime embraced some Europeanists such as the Austrian Karl Anton Rohan. Hitler himself condemned the unification of European nation states, and had nothing but disdain for Coudenhove-Kalergi, as a half-breed who embraced racial diversity.[127] Yet, as Germany's forces conquered neighbouring countries, the idea of European unification played a role in German propaganda, and the linguistically useful word 'Neuropa' was willingly adopted.[128] 'The new Europe of the future will certainly bring more advantages than disadvantages to those who belong to it and benefit from it', wrote Joseph Goebbels.[129] Dutch Nazi leader Anton Mussert and the Norwegian Vidkun Quisling dreamed of a Germanic confederation in which their nations and Germany would dominate Europe: 'Europe can only unite under the protection of a leading power, and this can only be the Great German Reich, which lies at the centre of Europe', Quisling wrote, insisting that Germany needed support to achieve this goal: 'If Germany is to guarantee the unity and peace of Europe in the long term, it must rely on the superior strength of a Germanic confederation', including the Dutch and Scandinavian peoples.[130] More developed Nazi plans and arguments for European unification saw the necessity of organising Europe as a *Grossraumwirtschaft* ('large-space economy'), to include industry, agriculture and raw-material production. It would need to be designed and led by the people with the best abilities. While some of the arguments were inspired by economics and some simply repeated Nazi eugenics,[131] others invoked the unity of European artistic culture,[132] and still others identified how a sense of unity had emerged from Europe's defending itself from Asian and Islamic threats.[133] Historian Paul Herre paid homage to Adolf Hitler and gave voice to the Nazi idea of Germany's mission to shape a European order out of the variety of its peoples. Logically, there was a need to coordinate the manifold nations located within a limited area of the globe. In 'the new Europe', unification would be based on the consciousness of belonging to the same culture, and would aim to make continental Europe a world power equal to Britain. Repeating many of the nineteenth-century historical narratives of European civilisation, Herre continued by saying that some people had reached a higher cultural level than others, adding that the Germans were the core people of Europe.[134] Certainly, the Nazi concept of Europe was a simplified upscaling of the previous notion of a German-led 'Mitteleuropa', but additionally reiterating much of the conservative and nationalistic interwar rhetoric on Europe, propagated by Rohan, for instance.

Still, according to the fascists, their ideas and movement went beyond nation-state borders, and references to the concept of Europe served as a

mobilising device for their cause.[135] For some advocates of a unified Europe, fascist rule provided the means to create a unified Europe. In occupied France, under the collaborative governance of Vichy, several politicians and intellectuals supported the idea of Neuropa. Some of them had long supported economic cooperation or even a European federation, and they saw the possibility of realising their visions in the realities of victory and defeat. The professor of law Joseph Barthélemy acceded to Briand's plan in 1930, and later joined the Vichy government. The journalist Francis Delaisie, who through his writings earned himself a reputation as an economist, was a longstanding member of the Pan-European League. He took an active part in several other organisations working towards European cooperation. In 1942, he speculated that, for the European economy to recover, it would need to side with the Nazis: on the one hand, he condemned the liberal economic system for causing crises and wars; on the other, he praised the economy of the National Socialists and all it had achieved in Germany in only a few short years.[136] This was in line with the former socialist minister Marcel Déat, who created the Nazi-influenced party Rassemblement Nationale Populaire (the National Popular Rally) in 1941. The party's policy was to create a united Europe led by Germany and France.[137]

Within the resistance movement, the idea was widespread that groundwork was being laid for a new Europe. To some, the resistance movement was a forerunner of what would become a federation of nation states. In the Ventotene Manifesto from 1941, the document that launched the Movimiento Federalista Europeo, Italian adherents of the resistance had already made a future federal Europe their goal. In 1942, the French resistance movement Combat advocated a 'United States of Europe . . . on the basis of liberty, equality, fraternity, and the rule of law'. Albert Camus, who had joined the group, called for Europe to be 'the country of the spirit . . . a privileged arena where the Occident's battle with the world, with the gods and with itself has reached its peak'.[138] Taking on socialist demands for social reforms, British works on federalism, and ideas disseminated by the Federal Union, Ernesto Rossi and Altiero Spinelli considered the system of sovereign nation states to be antiquated and reactionary. Now the wish was for a United States of Europe. In 1944, a branch of the Federalist Movement was established in France. It was possible to see continuity from interwar themes of crisis and the decline of moral values, to the present strong commitment to enriching moral values and individual liberty. Members of the Federalist Movement kept to this agenda during the years immediately following the war in their articles, novels, memoirs and essays, and, according to historian James D. Wilkinson, they influenced the decolonisation, peace movement, and European integration of the 1950s. Although the influence on the 1950s integration process was

weaker than Wilkinson claimed, the federal movement certainly contributed to the history of the European idea.[139] There is no doubt that the war, and the accompanying resistance movements, pushed the European idea forward.

The war should not be considered a crisis for the idea of European unification among the major states of continental Europe. Rather, it strengthened the idea, which was now deemed a necessity, and made it clear that European unity could be organised in different ways and be built on radically different foundations. From a small-state perspective, the future European order was approached slightly differently, often taking into account the possibility of cooperation among smaller nations. Several main alternatives for this future order were on the table in Europe: a United States of the World comprising all nations on all continents; a Union of Democratic States as proposed by American journalist Lionel Curtis, with the democratic states controlling the world and letting other states join the union when they became solid democracies; regional federations, especially a United Europe based on the interwar work of the League of Nations, or a Pan-Europe in line with Coudenhove-Kalergi's suggestion; and proposals for a Europe comprising several regional federations. It was this final alternative that caught on in the neutral Swedish context, evoking great interest in the idea of Nordic heritage shared by the Scandinavian countries and Finland, and in creating a Nordic defence community and even 'The United Nordic States'.[140] Swedish social scientist Alva Myrdal expressed her country's interest in establishing a stable international order, but was more resistant to joining a unified Europe. It was in the best interests of Sweden and Scandinavia to have strong ties to the United States, Canada and Britain, while Portugal and Central Europe were less important: 'a Nordic Union is a better alternative'. She denounced any kind of isolationism, whether Swedish or Scandinavian, and advocated the 'limitation of national sovereignty in favour of supranational institutions'.[141]

Apart from the Nordic Union, there were proposals for 'Dutch–Belgian Cooperation', a 'United States of the Danube', a 'Mid-European Confederation', a 'Central European Federation', and a 'Central Eastern European Federation', all of which would promote the security and welfare of small states.[142] The notion of regional federations was affirmed by exiled governments in London through Czech–Polish, Greek–Yugoslav and Belgian–Dutch agreements. Joseph Retinger, the Polish scholar, critic and socialist, was impatiently arranging meetings between state leaders exiled in London.[143] For him, the regional blocs were only the first, albeit necessary, step towards the goal of uniting Europe. Regarding other representatives of occupied Central Europe, the Czech Beneš brothers– Edvard the president, and Vojta the historian – reissued Masaryk's proposal for a Central European

Confederation. The idea was that if several small states joined, then others would follow, and in due time the different European confederations could fuse into one. They distinguished between nationhood, to be defended, and sovereignty, which should be neither upheld rigidly nor sidestepped in a hierarchy of states, because 'the Europe of tomorrow cannot tolerate any Herrenvolk rule over non-German peoples'. In addition, the Beneš brothers offered cultural and moral arguments for the mission of the smaller nations, emphasising that they 'also had an important contribution to make to the world's culture' and had a certain moral capability that histories of oppression by mightier neighbours had taught them. The Central European states would 'resume their historic mission' to defend culture and spiritual values, and to preserve peace and friendship. It was those states that could represent the interests of all mankind, that would defend the 'highest values' of civilisation.[144] In conclusion, the combination of small-state interests and federations was supported throughout the continent, often as an alternative to an all-encompassing European Union.

As every war does, the Second World War eventually ended. This time it was obvious to everyone that the former major powers of Europe could no longer claim to be world leaders, even though France and Britain insisted that they should remain great powers. France fervently sought friendship with America, which was manifested in the summer of 1945 when de Gaulle flew to Washington and gave a speech declaring that the United States was the leading world power. In May of that same year, Churchill spoke of an iron curtain descending across Europe, hiding the true state of Communist affairs from Western Europe, and consigning the countries to the east to Soviet rule. Germany was in ruins and was keenly aware of what the Nazi government's bid for world power had wrought. Its new leaders fully accepted that Germany was no longer a main European power, let alone a world power.

This was a critical juncture in thinking about Europe. Europe accepted that its global position had declined, and that the United States and the Soviet Union were now the only real world powers. 'On the morrow of the Second World War, the dwarfing of Europe is an unmistakably accomplished fact', Arnold Toynbee wrote in 1948.[145] This diminishment was underscored by the partition between Western and Eastern Europe. The threat of Bolshevism and the potential expansion of the Soviet Union to the Atlantic coast were tangible, reinforced by the Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia. This bore out Coudenhove-Kalergi's contention that the Soviet threat was the main rationale for forging the West European states into a union.[146]

Notes

1. Spiering, 'Engineering Europe'.
2. Briffault, *Europa*, 54.
3. Ibid., 13.
4. Ibid., 100.
5. Tooze, *The Deluge*, 5–6.
6. Anderson, *The New Old World*, 495.
7. Woytinsky, *Vereinigten Staaten von Europa*.
8. Riou, *L'Europe: Ma patrie*.
9. Agnelli and Caiati, *Federazione Europea*.
10. Quartara, *Gli Stati Uniti d'europé*; Passerini, *Women and Men in Love*, 27–30.
11. Evola, 'Über voraussetzungen europäischen Einheit'.
12. Sforza, *Europe and Europeans*, 302–3.
13. Jouvenel, *Vers les Etats Unis d'Europe*.
14. Ortega y Gasset, *La rebelión de las masas*, 212–47.
15. Kerr, *Pacifism is Not Enough*.
16. Salter, *The United States of Europe*, 89–90.
17. Reijnen and Rensen, 'Introduction: European Encounters'.
18. Laqua, 'Transnational Intellectual Cooperation'; Cattani, 'Europe as a Nation?'
19. Reijnen and Rensen, 'Introduction: European Encounters'.
20. See, e.g., Montfrans, 'Pacifism and the European Idea, 161.
21. Laqua, 'Reconciliation and the Post-War Order', 212–18; Ingram, *The Politics of Dissent*.
22. 'Introduktion til den danske læseverden!'
23. Dawson, *The Making of Europe*, 20–21.
24. Keyserling, *Das Spektrum Europas*, 440–44, 472–91.
25. Zweig, *The Struggle with the Daemon*, 297, 329–31.
26. Zweig, 'Der europäische Gedanken', 316.
27. Huberman, 'Mein Weg Zu Paneuropa'.
28. Keyserling, *Das Spektrum Europas*, 469–70.
29. Fried, *Europäische Wiederherstellung*, 122–23; Fried, *Pan-Amerika*; Herriot, *Europe*, 16–19, 246–58. An indication of the further spread of the American example is provided by the Swedish social democrat Palmstierna, 'Europas förenta stater'.
30. Stirk, 'Introduction: Crisis and Continuity', 13–15. See also Müller, 'France and Germany'.
31. Krüger, 'European Ideology and European Reality'.
32. Boyce, 'British Capitalism and European Unity'.
33. Nitti, *Peaceless Europe*.
34. See the following articles in *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, 1929–1930, a leading journal for reformist German socialists: Kleineibst, 'Entscheidung über Europa'; Herrmann, 'Zum Europaproblem'; Kühnert, 'Europaproblem'; Schmidt, 'Das Herz Europas'; Stössinger, 'Kontinentalpolitik Beginn der Neuzeit'; Cohen, 'Für deutsche Europapolitik' and 'Wege nach Kontinentaleuropa'; Peus, 'Politik aus weite Sicht'; Maas, 'Briands Europainitiative'; and Kranold, 'Nun erst Kontinentalpolitik!' See also Buschak, *Vereinigten Staaten von Europa*, 83–87, 153–55.
35. Amery, Herriot and Stresemann were quoted in *Zeitschrift Pan-Europa* 3(1) (1927),35–37.
36. Reported in *Zeitschrift Pan-Europa* 5(8) (1929), 1–2.
37. Roobol, 'Aristide Briand's Plan', 32–46.
38. Briand, 'Organisation eines europäischen Bundessystems', 201: 'zum Wohl der europäischen Gemeinschaft und der Menschheit'.
39. Heilner, 'Europäische Zollunion', 11–21.

40. Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Paneuropa*, 18–25, 149–52; Briand, 'Organisation eines europäischen Bundessystems'. On Briand's memorandum, see Heater, *The Idea of European Unity*, 130–46; and Herriot, *Europe*, 83–89. Pegg, *Evolution of the European Idea*, emphasises Briand and his impact.

41. Hansen and Jonsson, *Eurafrica*, 26–31, 44–57, quotation from 55. See also Adamthwaite, *Grandeur and Misery*, 148.

42. Heineman, *Outline of a New Europe*, 35.

43. Schipper, *Driving Europe*, 83–116.

44. Anastasiadou, *Constructing Iron Europe*, 80–95.

45. Spiering, 'Engineering Europe'.

46. Sörgel, *Mittelmeer-Senkung*, 38.

47. Odijie, 'The Fear of "Yellow Peril"'.

48. Zimmern, *Europe in Convalescence*, 136.

49. Ducci, 'Europe and Artistic Patrimony'.

50. Dykmann, 'How International was the Secretariat?'

51. Ducci, 'Europe and Artistic Patrimony'.

52. Cf. Laqua, 'Reconciliation and the Post-War Order'.

53. Illustrated in Woytinsky, *Tatsachen und Zahlen Europas*, 10.

54. Müller, 'France and Germany'.

55. See Richard, 'In Search of a Suitable Europe'.

56. Conze, *Das Europa der Deutschen*, 212–13.

57. Frommelt, *Paneuropa oder Mitteleuropa*, 23–25.

58. Ibid., 18–20. The members came from Great Britain, France, Germany, Hungary, and a few other countries.

59. Müller, *Europäische Gesellschaftsbeziehungen*, 315–23.

60. Ibid., 437–56.

61. Rohan, *Schicksalsstunde Europas*, 11.

62. Müller, *Europäische Gesellschaftsbeziehungen*.

63. Heerfordt, 'Introduction'. Heerfordt published *Et nyt Europa* in 1924, which soon was available in English, French and German, and followed up with several other writings, see e.g. the telling titles *Program für die skandinavische Initiative* (1926); *Eine Hinwendung an die hiesigen Ausserordentlichen Gesandten und bevollmächtigten Minister für Belgien, Deutschland, Finland, Frankreich, Grossbritannien, Italien, die Niederlande, Polen, die Schweiz, Spanien und die Tschechoslovakei* (1926); *Adresse de l'Initiative Scandinave à monsieur Aristide Briand Ministre des Affaires étrangères de la France* (1928); *Quelques Explications et Eclaircissements spécialement adressés a monsieur Aristide Briand Ministre des Affaires étrangères de la France* (1928); and *Esquisse d'un Projet Franco-Scandinave* (1929).

64. Conze, *Das Europa der Deutschen*, 214.

65. Müller, 'France and Germany', 104–8.

66. Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Paneuropa-Union*, 25: 'Noch ist es Zeit, Europa vor diesem Schicksal zu retten. Die Rettung heisst *Paneuropa*: der politische und wirtschaftliche Zusammanschluss aller Staaten von Polen bis Portugal zu einem Staatenbunde'.

67. Ibid., 32.

68. Ibid., 32, 194–95, 284–95.

69. See, e.g., Lenz, 'Die Erblichkeit der geistigen Begabung'; Günther, *Kleine Rassenkunde Europas*.

70. Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Revolution durch Technik*, 25–31; Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Paneuropa*, 61–63.

71. Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Paneuropa*, 32–33.

72. Schonfield, 'Heinrich Mann's Political Essays'; Heinrich Mann, *Sieben Jahre*, 381: 'Paneuropa war zuerst der Traum einiger Geister, ist aber jetzt nicht mehr weit davon, das praktische Ziel von Geschäftsleuten und Machtpolitikern zu werden'.

73. Gossman, 'The Idea of Europe', 260–61.

74. Prettenthaler-Ziegerhofer, 'Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi', 98.

75. Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Paneuropa*, 5–6; Wyrwa, 'Richard Nikolaus Graf Coudenhove-Kalergi'.

76. Coudenhove-Kalergi, 'Das Pan-Europa Program', 11: 'die europäische Frage lautet: "Ist es möglich dass auf der kleinen europäischen Halbinsel 25 Staaten in internationale Anarchie nebeneinander leben, ohne dass dieser Zustand mit einer Furchtbaren politischen, wirtschaftlichen und Kulturellen Katastrophe endet?"'

77. Delaisi, 'Europa als Wirtschaftseinheit', 6–10.

78. Coudenhove-Kalergi, 'Das Pan-Europa Program', 3–9, 17.

79. Coudenhove-Kalergi, 'Offener Brief an die französische Kammer'.

80. Coudenhove-Kalergi, 'Pazifismus'; Coudenhove-Kalergi, 'Paneuropa und der Völkerbund'.

81. Coudenhove-Kalergi in *Zeitschrift Pan-Europa* 1(7–8) (1924).

82. Coudenhove-Kalergi in *Zeitschrift Pan-Europa* 2(4) (1925), 14–16.

83. Coudenhove-Kalergi, 'Europäischer Pass'; Coudenhove-Kalergi, 'Paneuropa: Hymne'.

84. Wolf, 'Europäische Sanierung'; Kopp, 'Die Frauen und Paneuropa'.

85. Madariaga, 'Europäischer Geist'.

86. Vegesack, 'Stimmen brausen': 'Stimmen brausen. Immer näher, näher./ Unaufhaltsam dröhnt der Zukunft Schritt./ Brüder, reist die Brüder mit:/ Unter diesen Sternehimmel tritt/ Frei und Aufrecht hin: der Europäer' [Voices roar. Ever nearer, nearer./ The future roars unstoppably./ Brothers, travel with the brothers:/ Step under this starry sky/ Free and upright: the European].

87. See reports in *Zeitschrift Pan-Europa* 2(10) (1925), 22–23, and in 2(11–2) (1925), 33–34.

88. Heikkilä, 'The Prons and Cons of Paneurope'.

89. See reports in *Zeitschrift Pan-Europa* 3(5) (1926), 28–30, and 3(9–10) (1926), 29.

90. See reports in *Zeitschrift Pan-Europa* 3(3) (1926), 28, and 3(9–10) (1926), 29.

91. In 1925 his list included Herriot, Briand, Painlevé, Jouvenel, Loucheur, Thomas, Caillaux, Nitti, Marx, Loebe, Koch, Simons, Seipel, Renner, Dinghofer, Sforza, Scjaloja, Skrzynski, Masaryk, Beneš and Vandervelde. See Coudenhove-Kalergi, 'Drei Jahre Paneuropa', 21. See also *Zeitschrift Pan-Europa* 2(1–3) (1925), 2(4) (1925), and the cover to 4(9) (1927).

92. 'I. Paneuropakongress', 16.

93. Ibid., 33–35.

94. Ibid., 45–51.

95. Ibid., 7–8. For Coudenhove-Kalergi's arguments for giving prominence to Kant, Napolean and Nietzsche, see *Europa Erwacht!*, 100–101, 280.

96. 'I. Paneuropakongress', *Zeitschrift Pan-Europa* 3(13–14) (1926), 53–54: 'Paneuropa ist ihr nicht Fremdes, Neuartiges; international denken, fühlen, die Welt als sein Ganzes, die Menschheit als Einheit zu sehen, ist ihr vertraut'.

97. Kopp, 'Die Frauen und Paneuropa'.

98. Coudenhove-Kalergi, 'Paneuropa und Faszismus', 129–33.

99. As Prettenthaler-Ziegerhofer argues in the very informative and otherwise dependable article, 'Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi'. See also, Benito Mussolini, 'Europäischer Völkerbund'; Wyrwa, 'Richard Nikolaus Graf Coudenhove-Kalergi', 117–19; Conze, *Das Europa der Deutschen*, 220–21.

100. *Zeitschrift Pan-Europa* (1930–1934).

101. Heikkilä, 'The Prons and Cons of Paneurope'.

102. Richard, 'Huizinga, Intellectual Cooperation'.

103. Gusejnova, 'Noble Continent?'

104. Wyrwa, 'Richard Nikolaus Graf Coudenhove-Kalergi', 117–19; Conze, *Das Europa der Deutschen*, 220–21.

105. Wyrwa, 'Richard Nikolaus Graf Coudenhove-Kalergi', 121.

106. Woytinski, *Tatsachen und Zahlen Europas*. Woytinski differed from Coudenhove-Kalergi by including Britain and Russia in the European federation.

107. Frommelt, *Paneuropa oder Mitteleuropa*, 18–20.

108. 'I. Paneuropakongress', *Zeitschrift Pan-Europa*, 49.

109. Prettenthaler-Ziegerhofer, 'Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi', 89.

110. Lipgens, *Documents on European Integration*.

111. O'Toole, *Heroic Failure*; Spiering, *A Cultural History of Euroscepticism*.

112. Wells, *New World Order*, 103–4.

113. Beloff, *The Intellectual in Politics*, 173–99; Attlee, 'The Peace We Are Striving For', 106; Ridley, *Unite or Perish*; Ridley and Edwards, *The United Socialist States of Europe*.

114. Beloff, *The Intellectual in Politics*, 173–99.

115. Pinder, 'Federal Union 1939–41', 26–34; Heffernan, *The Meanings of Europe*, 176–8; Amyne and Pinder, *Federal Union*. See also Jens Norrby's dissertation *Visions Beyond Empire: British Federalism and Post-Imperial Britain, 1884–1949*, to be presented at Gothenburg University in 2023.

116. Cole, *War Aims*.

117. Streit, *Union Now*; Wells, *New World Order*.

118. Monte, *Unity of Europe*.

119. Lipgens, *Documents on European Integration*, vols 1–2, 671–72.

120. Monte, *Unity of Europe*, 35.

121. Ibid., 27–29, 36.

122. Ibid., 38.

123. Ibid., 139–45. Quotation 139.

124. Dafinger and Pohl, *A New Nationalist Europe*.

125. Heffernan, *Meanings of Europe*, 138–41.

126. Passerini, *Women and Men in Love*, 68.

127. Rohan, *Schicksalsstunde Europas*; Mazower, *Hitler's Empire*, 557.

128. *Europa als Lebenskampfgemeinschaft*.

129. Salewski, 'Ideas of the National Socialist'; Goebbels, 'The New Europe', 108.

130. See the documents of Anton Mussert, 'The Dutch State'; and Vidkun Quisling, 'Norway and the Germanic Task', both from 1942.

131. Daitz, 'Das europäische Sittengesetz'.

132. Hotz, 'Die Einheit Europas'.

133. Maschke, 'Die Verteidigung Europas'.

134. Herre, *Deutschland und die europäische Ordnung*, 8–12, 177–85.

135. Alcalde, 'The Transnational Consensus'.

136. Delaisi, *Die Revolution der Europäischen Wirtschaft*, 12.

137. Brender, *Collaboration in Frankreich*.

138. Montfrans, 'Europe is the Country of the Spirit', 126–28.

139. Wilkinson, *Intellectual Resistance in Europe*, 173–76, 252, 276–78; Loughlin, 'French Personalist and Federalist Movements', 197; Pinder, 'Federalism in Britain and Italy', 215–16; Spinelli and Rossi, *Ventotene Manifesto*, 75–96; Pasture, *Imagining European Unity*, 158–59, stresses the Ventotene document as a socialist manifesto.

140. Degerman, *Vägar till fred*; Waern-Bugge, *Grundvalen för världens framtid*.

141. Myrdal, 'När fredens värld planeras'.

142. See Lipgens, *Documents on European Integration*, vol. 2, 373–404, 470–75, 638–40, 644–48.

143. Pieczewski, 'Retinger's Conception of European Integration'.

144. Edvard Beneš, 'Future of the Small Nations'; Vojta Beneš, 'The Mission of Small States'.

145. Toynbee, *Civilization on Trial*, 125.

146. Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Die europäische Nation*, 15, 34.