CHAPTER 2

Longing for Borders

The question we will now turn to concerns the prerequisites for, and historical understanding of, the association of the concept of Europe with cultural and political borders within Europe. What are the basic tenets of how we think about European borders, of Europe as divided by national borders and with regional hierarchies? This chapter will consider borders within Europe by turning to the concepts of nation, and of macro regions such as Central, Eastern and Southern Europe.

The significance of borders had a solid cultural foundation. Ezra Talmor has regarded it as 'a great irony that, side by side with the emergence of the idea of Europe – say around the end of the seventeenth century – many decisive factors had already led to the idea of a divided Europe'.[1] The European system of states was well underway, Christianity was further divided, and Latin had decreased in importance in favour of vernacular languages, which all implied borders. Nevertheless, the modern European concept of border emerged from the tension between cultural dividing lines and an all-embracing idea of unity, raising questions about how the drawing of borders fits with the idea of European unity. In subsequent research, the interest in territorial borders expanded together with an awareness of their complexity and a realisation that it is necessary to look at the cultural aspects of borders. Philosopher Étienne Balibar states that a territorial notion of borders in Europe only provides 'dead ends'.[2] The conclusion from previous research is that the cultural dimensions of border making are of great significance.[3]

We can make two observations at this point: first, if unity is seen as the fundamental concept, borders should not exist and ought to be eradicated;

Notes for this section begin on page 73.

This chapter is from Thinking Europe by Mats Andrén https://doi.org/10.3167/9781800735699. It is available open access under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of the University of Gothenburg. Not for resale.

second, if cultural and political borders are regarded as a given, how to manage them becomes the issue. The hypothesis of the clash of civilisations advanced by Samuel P. Huntington, who argues that future conflicts will arise from cultural and religious differences, is based on such an assumption.[4] However, there are also those who defend notions of tolerance and multiculturalism,[5] so it is not universally accepted that cultural divisions must end in clashes and conflicts.

The Border Paradox

At first, maps depicting Europe did not show many of today's European borders, with some showing no borders at all. The 1569 map by the famous Flemish cartographer Mercator shows roughly the borders of the then emerging states, which leaves the continent with only a dozen or so countries altogether. Renaissance maps that viewed Europe from a continental perspective lacked clearly defined borders for countries; rather, the images they presented suppressed division.[6] This was not because there were no boundaries. In reality, Europe in the early modern age had some five hundred political units, so even if the cartographers had wished to include them all in one map, it would simply have been too difficult.[7] Of course, some states existed, but they coexisted with a myriad of individual territories having jurisdictional independence.[8] The cartographers were simply keener on indicating regions than political borders,[9] not being that interested in the latter. Not only were there numerous independent or semi-independent units, but allegiances and loyalties were constantly changing, causing enclaves to shift from one prince to another. This situation eventually changed, and in the eighteenth century, Johann Matthias Hase, a cartographer from Wittenberg, made a remarkable rendering of European borders, displaying not only state borders, but also those between regions, provinces, duchies and principalities. He depicted Italy as one country, though divided into smaller parts in the same way that he divided France, Germany and Sweden.[10] Clearly, these maps reflected the political reality, with most states having weak administrative and political centres. Much of the centralisation of European states was accomplished by Napoleonic reformers and by those inspired by their example. Cartographers reflected public interest in another development: just as the Enlightenment was an era when the ideas of Europe and European unity proliferated, so did it also usher in growing interest in borders.

The maps of the nineteenth century give us an indication of how European borders were conceived. Several maps produced in Germany bring a new level of complexity to the notion of political borders. The Ottoman

This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of the University of Gothenburg. https://doi.org/10.3167/9781800735699. Not for resale.

Empire was always included as a European state, though with a division between Turkish Europe and Asia Minor. One map differentiates among imperial states, kingdoms, duchies/principalities, and republics.[11] The cartographers attached a certain complexity to the borders of Germany and Italy, not least because they included several political actors. Different kinds of political borders demarcated the Habsburg Empire, as it encompassed Italian provinces as well as Bohemia and the Austrian provinces that belonged to the German Federation.[12] Ironically, when Europe as a whole is viewed from far away in an American school atlas, probably from around 1827, slightly more than a dozen states are shown: Italy is represented as one state, Prussia as another, and the other German states outside the Habsburg Empire are tidily bundled into an additional single state.[13]

Strikingly, the number of countries included in the maps remained stable at around sixteen or seventeen throughout much of the century. Germany was represented at times as one country, and when both Germany and Italy finally became nation states, the number became even smaller. It was reasonable to view the European system of states as stable with its homogenisation of laws, economic relations, and administration. When the 1878 Congress of Berlin granted independence to new states in the Balkans, it also brought more states to the maps, adding a degree of stability to the region even as the Ottoman Empire was disintegrating. Furthermore, the maps show increased exchange between the states due to the new means of communication by telegraph, rail, and steamship lines.[14]

Maps of Europe from the final decades of the nineteenth century also testify to religious and national divides. A German map that proudly depicts the unified German Empire includes a supplement with one minor map dividing Europe into Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox and Islamic regions, and another dividing the continent according to twenty-five different nationalities.[15] These kinds of observations bring us closer to a true paradox: the dreams of unity in the nineteenth century were accompanied by accentuated differences, by an impulse to stress borders not only between Europe and other continents but also within Europe – for example, between states, nations and regions. These borders were both political and cultural in character. The differences between regions such as Eastern and Western Europe were highlighted as cultural markers. The national languages, customs, and cultural expressions were highlighted among nations large and small, either with or without their own state. More nations began to demand political and legal rights, and so the cultural dimensions evolved hand in hand with political ambitions and demands for institutional arrangements. When European unity, whether political or cultural, was evoked, it began to be framed by the increasing importance of borders throughout Europe. This can be deemed the border paradox of Europe.

This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of the University of Gothenburg. https://doi.org/10.3167/9781800735699. Not for resale.

Time for Nations

> Germany may be considered, from its geographical situation, as the heart of Europe, and the great association of the continent can never recover its independence but by the independence of this country. Difference of language, natural boundaries, the recollections of a common history, contribute all together to give birth to those great existences of mankind, which we call nations; certain proportions are necessary to their existence, certain qualities distinguish them; and, if Germany were united to France, the consequence would be, that France would also be united to Germany . . . the vanquished would in time modify the victor, and in the end both would be losers.[16]

These words are from the preface to *Germany* – originally published in French as *De l'Allemagne* – by the French-Swiss writer Anne Louise Germaine de Staël. In pleading for the value of nations she is a leading proponent of the nationalistic ideas that were to exert considerable influence on Europe. The book was originally published in 1810 when the German states were under French dominion. The author had already moved to Switzerland, was firmly anchored in the Enlightenment culture of pre-revolutionary Paris, and was especially influenced by her reading of Montesquieu. Later, she had a longer stay in Germany, during which she met representatives of the early Romantic movement, and made friends with August Wilhelm Schlegel. She belonged to a group of writers who were initially positively disposed towards, and took part in, the French Revolution, but who soon distanced themselves from it as it radicalised. She had previously been a republican, but later defended monarchist rule and wanted it to be deemed constitutional.

De Staël maintained that the Germans were not yet forming a nation. As long as Germans were still raising weapons against each other, they were still a nation only 'in the mind'. However, being a nation in the mind was an indispensable start from which national independence could eventually be born. To begin with, the Germans could claim the self-confidence that was part of the characters of the English, French and Spanish, a self-confidence that all of these citizens had thanks to their histories within empires. Germans would be able to see that they were, 'generally speaking, both sincere and faithful; they seldom forfeited their word, and deceit was foreign to them'; moreover, they had 'good sense and goodness of heart' and the 'power of labor and reflection'. However, it was 'imagination more than understanding that characterises the Germans', and she quotes a writer who wrote 'that the empire of the seas belonged to the English, that of the land to the French, and that of the air to the Germans'. The Germans were seen as impractical, slow, and somewhat committed to inertia, but they were also keen on music and had a good sense of poetry.[17]

It was in no way a novelty to present peculiarities of certain nationalities. In 1697, it was reported that the ballet *L'Europe galante* conceived of

This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license
thanks to the support of the University of Gothenburg. https://doi.org/10.3167/9781800735699. Not for resale.

the French as 'fickle, impulsive, dandified', the Spaniards as 'true-hearted and sentimental', and the Italians as 'jealous, subtle, hot-tempered'.[18] However, describing the diversity of Europe could sometimes come across more crassly, and Daniel Defoe's satiric rhymes were much more stirring:

> Pride, the first peer, and president of Hell,
> To his share Spain, the largest province fell. . . .
> Never was nation in the world before,
> So very rich, and yet so very poor.
>
> Lust chose the torrid zone of Italy,
> Where Blood ferments in rapes and sodomy. . . .
> Here, undisterb'd, in floods of scalding lust,
> Th' infernal king reigns with infernal gust.
>
> Drunk'nness, the darling favourite of Hell,
> Chose Germany to rule, and rules so well. . . .
> Whether by Luther, Calvin or by Rome,
> They sail for Heav'n, by wine he steers them home.
>
> Ungovern'd Passion settled first in France,
> Where mankind lives in haste and thrives by chance.
> A dancing nation, fickle and untrue.
> Have oft undone themselves, and others too:
> Prompt the infernal dictates to obey,
> And in Hell's favour, none more great then they.
>
> . . .
>
> By Zeal the Irish; and the Russ by folly;
> Fury the Dane; the Swede by Melancholy;
> By stupid Ignorance the Muscovite:
> The Chinese by a child of Hell, call'd Witt;
> Wealth makes the Persian too effeminate:
> And poverty the Tartars desperate:
> The Turks and Moors by Mah'met he subdues;
> And God has giv'n him leave to rule the Jews;
> Rage rules the Portuguese, and Fraud the Scotch;
> Revenge the Poles; and Avarice the Dutch.[19]

Even though Europeans were considered to have a great deal in common, defining their national characteristics was an established pastime. Establishing a collective European consciousness had to take into account that Europe was a continent of differences composed of various parts. The French intellectual historian Paul Hazard underscores how the European mind had changed by 1700, by which time national divisions had become part of the mental mapping. He stated that Europe was nothing but 'a jig-saw of barriers' that 'are rigidly defined' yet changing all the time.[20]

This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license
thanks to the support of the University of Gothenburg. https://doi.org/10.3167/9781800735699. Not for resale.

In works by Enlightenment philosophers and historians we can see that the concept of Europe was often professed in terms of both unity and diversity. These writers elaborated on the glories of the state system. The success of Europe, argued Adam Ferguson in Edinburgh, coincided with emulation between its states: division went hand in hand with success.[21] His colleague William Robertson commended the progress in which 'the powers of Europe had formed into one great political system', creating a united system of various kingdoms.[22] Edward Gibbons conceived of Europe as a large republic, with widespread cultivation and general happiness among its inhabitants, that stands 'above the rest of mankind' thanks to 'the system of arts and laws and manners'. In France, Antoine de Rivarol described it as 'one immense republic . . . composed of empires and kingdoms, the most formidable that has ever existed'.[23]

Madame de Staël went further than this when she indicated the need to encourage certain qualities in each particular nation. This had been done before, but her standpoint hinted at proto-Romantic thinking when she gave 'language, natural boundaries, the recollections of a common history' a central place in defining and making a nation, as well as when she turned to literature, philosophy, and religion to show the national character. We should not forget that this was written when French armies had flooded Europe and that de Staël was offering an alternative view of Europe. Her conclusion was that nations had to develop their distinctiveness if they were to be independent. If unified, she said, the nations would not make progress, but would adapt to each other and end up losing their identities. Therefore, she explicitly rejected the ideal of a common European nation.[24]

Still, de Staël's pleading for German independence did not make her an advocate of independence for every nation. Even if Europe was not considered a united entity, but rather seen as comprising multiple states, it was necessary for a nation to have 'certain proportions' and 'certain qualities' to be sovereign. This was later to become one of the more contested issues of nationalism, but throughout the century of *De l'Allemagne*, the idea that a state and a nation state had to be of ample size and contain large resources remained fundamental. Such nations would be able to accomplish greatness; they would not be victims of destiny and they could change history. Baroness de Staël considered the German nation to be fully adequate, and if it was not possible to unite all Germans, then one could at least begin with Prussia and its neighbours.[25]

Europe was not excluded from this concept of a nation. De Staël indicated that Germany was the heart of Europe: geographically it is located in a central area of the continent, and in other ways it had always been and would continue to be decisive for the rest of Europe. She claimed that the early German universities were the first of their kind, 'open to the rich and

This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license
thanks to the support of the University of Gothenburg. https://doi.org/10.3167/9781800735699. Not for resale.

the poor, to the knight, the clerk, the citizen'.[26] Among other examples, she hinted that Germans had introduced the concept of freedom to Europe, as well as the idea of showing respect for women, which was not yet common elsewhere.[27]

The Parts of the Whole

Lorenz von Stein, an ardent Hegelian pupil writing in Vienna during the mid-nineteenth century, believed that Europe was to be considered a whole consisting of states and specific regions. As a whole it was entrusted with a specific civilisational task. Its strength was the interdependence among its constituent states. In a Hegelian manner, he argued that history would now be driven by Europe, this 'wonderful continent'. In the same way as the Enlightenment philosophers before him, he defined Europe as a place of multifaceted connections among states, which had become more peaceful, with improved economic laws that allowed for greater freedom of trade. Outside Europe, there was no such mutual exchange between states, which led to stagnation, while Europe was forward thinking and full of exchange, creating mutual dependence without threatening the independence of the constituent states.[28]

Stein talked mainly about states, rather than making any real distinction between states and nations, as this was of no interest to him. One should also consider that the concept of the nation was becoming controversial in his day, especially as there were no homogeneous nations, and the states were still mostly multinational. In those years, the new national affiliations were rarely presented as being opposed to a European affiliation, as they encapsulated both universalism and particularism. As European nations, they were supposed to represent something universal as well as something particular. It was essential for progressives discussing nations that they were parts of a whole. This was true for many of the revolutionaries of 1848, such as Mazzini, who considered the demand for nationality 'not as a mere tribute to local pride or local rights, but as a question of European division of labour'.[29] This was also true for Stein who, as a spokesperson for the government of Vienna, was one of Mazzini's opponents; even so, he argued that Europe, on the one hand, was a shared organism with a common future, but on the other, it consisted of independent bodies. He believed that Europe had accomplished a long-lasting period of peace thanks to the congress system, and that it had a common cause in protecting itself from external challenges and attacks, citing threats from Russia and the Ottoman Empire. Stein claimed that Europe was becoming more united; this did not hinder each nation's individual development, as it was important for the nations and

This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of the University of Gothenburg. https://doi.org/10.3167/9781800735699. Not for resale.

various parts of Europe to develop in their own ways, to contribute to the good of Europe as a whole.[30]

The concept of Europe was increasingly associated not only with multiple states but also with multiple nations. It has never been easy to establish the exact meaning of 'nation'. In the legacy of the French Revolution and Enlightenment philosophers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, a nation was recognised as a community of citizens with constitutional rights given by the state, the sovereignty of the people being based on political democracy. From German Romanticism, the idea spread that a nation had something to do with language, common cultural traditions, and shared origins, emphasising its most basic characteristics. The Romantics often turned to Johann Gottfried Herder, who stands out as a major philosopher of the concept of national borders in symbiosis with culture. Herder's idea was that national borders originated from autochthonous cultures – for example, German culture, which was the product of history – strengthened by the creation of national languages.[31] National cultures were to be preserved. Herder mainly focused on German culture, but his ideas were interpreted as vital for promoting national identity among other peoples as well, especially those who did not have their own states, such as Poles, Hungarians, Czechs, Slovaks and Italians.[32]

Current historical research on nations and nationalism has gone in two directions. Researchers who see nationalism as an outcome of modern society look mainly to the Enlightenment and the French Revolution for its origin, focusing on the connections between the modern state, industrial society, and the creation of national identities. They argue that a common language and solidarity within a shared community facilitate both the expanding state administration and the mobility of the workforce for industrial needs. A keyword in this research stream is 'invention', the concepts of nation and nationalism being regarded as deliberate constructions with political, economic and social interests behind them.[33] Others have sought the ways in which ethnic communities can be connected to modern nationalism, studying how myths, symbols, memories and values are passed down from past communities, creating historical continuity. Likewise, they also recognise significant and obvious differences between older ethnic communities and modern nations.[34]

The parallel histories of nationalism and the concept of Europe are striking, confirming how deeply embedded they are in each other. In other words, it is hard to think about Europe without discussing nations, nationalism or nation states. The concepts of nationalism and Europe both have their beginnings in the early modern age, when European unity was first proposed. This was also a period when humanists struggled to unify the national languages, and the concept of the nation began to encompass the people of

This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license
thanks to the support of the University of Gothenburg. https://doi.org/10.3167/9781800735699. Not for resale.

a specific territory. This can be considered a kind of premodern nationalism distinct from later and more advanced concepts.[35] Early notions of the nation and Europe catered to the ruling elites, the former confirming that the nobles should decide who should be included in a nation, and the latter giving the task of creating a European federation to the monarchs. A further parallel is that both came into general use during the Enlightenment, after which they became institutionalised, with European conferences settling issues between the main European powers, and the nationalistic ambitions of the states growing through the twentieth century. A political–democratic notion of the nation began to emerge, as a community where the people possessed sovereignty through constitutional and democratic governance. The same went for the notion of a Europe of the people, as Saint-Simon and others had advocated. It was also during this time that the romantic idea of the nation became popular, which, in the aftermath of Herder, emphasised shared tradition and language. From this perspective, the nation was associated with moral greatness, and with the mission of preserving and sometimes expanding itself. At the same time, an idea of Europe began to circulate that underlined the heritage of a shared religious community and its moral magnitude. As early as the post-Napoleonic period, notions of both Europe and nation had begun to accentuate the role of a shared economy in building the community, and it was through a shared economy that a nation or Europe could emerge. Moreover, both nationalism and the concept of Europe had been the subject of institutionalisation. The institutionalisation of nationalism began to take off before the First World War, earlier than the institutionalisation of Europe as a concept; on the other hand, it can be argued that the nation states, as such, only emerged after the dismantling of Europe's colonial empires, which took place following post-war integration. To all this is added the impact of intellectuals and academically trained elites in the construction of both Europe and nations – and in the previous chapter we met an array of such philosophers, historians and novelists who wanted to link their work to politics.

It is worth noting that 'the chief architects of nations throughout European history have been scholars or scholars-cum-politicians'.[36] However, we should also pay attention to how these 'chief architects' combined pleas for their nations with the concept of Europe. There is a basic pattern in which each nation has one or more significant features that are of importance in themselves, while also adding essential aspects to Europe as a whole. In Spain, for example, religion and the monarchy were highlighted together with references to reconquering the Iberian Peninsula and the expulsion of Islam, a battle lasting many centuries in which Catholicism and the monarchs liberated Europe.[37] In Germany, Johann Gottlieb Fichte emphasised that the German nation had been historically crucial to establishing European

This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of the University of Gothenburg. https://doi.org/10.3167/9781800735699. Not for resale.

societies, and was indispensable to attaining a peaceful order.[38] Mme de Staël claimed that Germany was the native land of thought, and its writers were 'the best-informed and most reflective men in Europe'.[39] Germany was the upholder of the Reformation, which she considered the solid basis of all progress in Europe. The progress of the German nation was thus good for Europe as well.[40]

The notions of the nation and Europe are closely connected. For instance, nations can be considered parts of a single European family just as citizens of one country are considered parts of a family within a nation. The nation and Europe are also seen as complementary opposites, as when a nation is depicted in all its splendour, cultural brilliance and victorious glory, whereas Europe is respectfully described in more rational terms. European clarity and national devotion rely on each other, as do sense and sensibility.[41] An excellent illustration of this is provided by Tomáš Masaryk, a major Czech nationalist leader. On the one hand, he recalled the Enlightenment and the French Revolution as groundbreaking for Europe, as the turn to reason and the approval of human rights were central to the Czech national revival; on the other hand, the Enlightenment and the French Revolution were contrasted to Czech national tradition. Philosophical rationalism was contrasted to humanism, revolution to reform, shallow lustre to human depth, care of the soul, morality and religion: 'Those who want to think and feel Czech should be aware of the difference'.[42]

The Europe of nations could be recognised as peaceful, as by Herder who dismissed warfare as outdated, because the European future lay in trade and diligence, but it could also be recognised as an aggressive space. For example, Napoleon had stated that Europe was in need of a superior power that should dominate in order to bring more uniformity to the nations.[43] Another example is that of some German nationalists of the late nineteenth century who gladly invoked expansion towards the Black Sea. The Pan-German League proudly declared: 'An deutschen Wesen soll die Welt genesen'.[44] By then, German nationalists were continually referring to threats from neighbours. Articles in widely read family journals homed in on threats to the German language in Belgium, the Netherlands and France, and especially on intimidations of German culture in Alsace. Another article from the same year cited the feelings of hatred among the Danish people towards Germans, and the lack of respect for German culture in Denmark.[45] The idea of threats from other nations mounted after the unification of Germany, in the boom years of economic and military strength of the late nineteenth century. According to an obituary from 1876 of the Czech historian František Palacký, often called the 'father of the Czech nation', Palacký himself hated everything German, and the Czech national movement was linked to Russian interests.[46]

This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license
thanks to the support of the University of Gothenburg. https://doi.org/10.3167/9781800735699. Not for resale.

At that time, the concept of nation could entail liberation from other powers as well as the ability to demonstrate both strength and domination over others. With such national ideas, Europe was a place of internal hostilities, strife and military conflict.

Contemporary historians are careful to distinguish between states and nations. According to Charles Tilly, the actions of the former are of a military kind, while the latter present an alluring opportunity to erect more centralised states by making them more homogeneous. The great efforts made to implement unified administration and public service, law and economy, language and culture have helped to strengthen nationalism,[47] partly by shaping nations out of existing states and partly by provoking nationalism among minority cultures.

In the early twentieth century, the nation challenged the state as the basic model for organising society. This can be observed by the variety of people of differing backgrounds and contrasting political programmes who paid tribute to the advantages of adhering to a nation instead of a state. While contrasting nation and state, the German conservative Paul Lagarde criticised Bismarck's new state for being a lifeless machine that acted mechanically: its representatives lacked personality and only acted in accordance with laws, fulfilling their legal obligations with a kind of chemical purity. The nation, on the other hand, he considered a living organism with a soul of its own, having the personality and religious atmosphere of the country. He said that the nation had grown through history, and with it one could find shared values, moral well-being, and a soul.[48] As a representative of a small nation without a state of its own, Tomáš Masaryk instead depicted states as relics of an older era of autocratic rule, while nations, with their shared language and democratic governance, belonged to modern times. The message was clear: behind each and every state there should be a nation.[49] He explicitly rejected the notion that contemporary Czech nationalism needed a long history, citing a contemporary German textbook on the issue, which said 'the best one can do is to completely exclude the words "nation" and "national" from history writing as misleading' as they instead had to do 'with contemporary tendencies'.[50] Indeed, these controversies regarding the concept of nation had much in common with the two main branches of modern research on nations and nationalism. One branch recalls Masaryk in insisting that nationalism was a modern construction and even an invention not found before the eighteenth century; the other echoes Lagarde's notion of continuity from older ethnic communities to modern nationalism.[51] Indeed, the concepts of nation and nationalism were still seen as controversial in those days, just as they are in the multicultural Europe of the twenty-first century, with its increasing number of borders and bickering over the definition of each and every nationality.

This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of the University of Gothenburg. https://doi.org/10.3167/9781800735699. Not for resale.

This well-established connection between nationalism and the concept of Europe had some surprising consequences. Regarding the division between Catholicism and Protestantism, one could see the former as more often in favour of European unification thanks to the long tradition of a common Roman Catholic Church. One would assume that the Protestants, on the other hand, might be more in favour of independent states, thanks to the tradition of separate national churches. However, this was only sometimes true. One reason was that there was a strong affinity between the concepts of European unity and progress, as well as between progress and Protestantism, while Catholicism was regarded as an obstacle to development and thereby to the creation of a European federation, as noted by French historian Henri Martin in 1866.[52] Another reason was that European unity was usually not seen as an alternative to the European system of states, but rather as an extension and improvement of state cooperation. This view was upheld by the Swiss-German law professor Johann Caspar Bluntschli, who was a Protestant nationalist but argued for a European federation.[53] The more important division was the one between Eastern and Western Christianity, as the definition of Europe as a Christian civilisation did not necessarily include Russia or the Orthodox Church, and often excluded it, though it did include both Protestants and Catholics.[54]

Ways of Defining Uniqueness and Supremacy: North and South, East and West

Indeed, European borders have a bearing on nations and states outside of Europe as well. Another aspect of great importance is how regions are demarcated. In fact, in the intellectual history of Europe we find a strong inclination to divide the continent into different parts, an inclination that grew in importance in the Enlightenment. The East–West divide emerged in the early eighteenth century, and reached a first pinnacle one hundred years later. The cultural divide between North and South is older, and has been documented at least since the Renaissance. After the Reformation, the Catholic South regarded the North as saturated with the evil writings of Luther and the horrible armies of the Swedish king, while northerners viewed the South as stunted and in decay.[55]

Going back to Montesquieu, we can see a clear demonstration of the separation between regions when he defines the peoples and societies of Southern and Northern Europe as being differently shaped by the climate. Passions, for instance, are livelier and idleness more common in the people of the South, who are strongly impressed by honour, while in the North, thrift and liberty are found.[56]

This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of the University of Gothenburg. https://doi.org/10.3167/9781800735699. Not for resale.

Herder perceived the North–South divide as the most important division when he characterised the peoples of Europe. The Alps represented a fundamental dividing line and, like Montesquieu, he identified climate-driven differences. He recognised communality between the inhabitants of Northern Asia and Northern Europe, as well as an affinity between South West Asians and Southern Europeans.[57] Schlegel identified a common mode of thinking in this statement in his short-lived journal *Europa*: '[S]cientific aspirations moved to the North, while art and poetry stayed in the South'.[58] Other writers reiterated the divide, while identifying the German states as a border zone. The Northern states then included Scandinavia, Poland and Russia, while the others belonged to the South.[59] Mme de Staël found among the French, Italian, Spanish and Portuguese 'less inclination to abstract thinking than among the German nations; they are more addicted to the pleasures and the interests of the earth'.[60]

The bordering of Europe is not only about geography and space, but also about time. While geographical borders are often mentioned upfront, the temporal distinction between old and new is also significant. When Montesquieu drew the border between a thriving North and a lazy South at the Apennine Mountains, it was not only or primarily recognised as a spatial boundary, but essentially as separating the southern countries from the present. It was historical progress that gave the northern countries their prerogatives of constitutional freedoms, constitutional forms of government, and private property. When Montesquieu went to Rome, he saw its social life as underdeveloped – in the eyes of a tourist or an archaeologist, the city belonged to the past; by contrast, Europe – that is, Northern Europe – represented progress and the future. This was established and underlined by de Staël and the Romantics when they transferred the heart of progress from France to Germany.[61]

However, cultural differences between the North and the South were highlighted throughout the following decades. The people in the North continued to be considered more rational and organised, and were therefore seen as more successful and healthier, while those in the South were regarded as more relaxed and leisure-minded. Southern Europe was depicted as awash in creativity, in contrast to the barren North. Differences between the North and the South were often incorporated into national identities, as well. France, Italy and Germany are obvious examples where the southern parts of the countries were considered more backward and conservative in lifestyle and morals, while the northern parts, home to Paris, Milan and Berlin, were portrayed as vibrant and modern.

Writing in the middle of the nineteenth century, Lorenz von Stein clearly acknowledged the impact of dividing Europe into different states with different roles to play. Stein sorted these states into three groups, also

This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of the University of Gothenburg. https://doi.org/10.3167/9781800735699. Not for resale.

recognising larger regions of Europe. In Western Europe he included Spain, England and France, countries with interests that spanned the Atlantic, to the west and to the south. Great Britain dominated the European connection to the west, at the cost of the interests of Spain and France. Eastern Europe consisted of only one state, the immensely large Russia, with its mission to civilise Asia. In between was Central Europe, dividing East and West from each other yet also holding them together. Stein demanded a balance between the three parts, seen as necessary in order to secure peace and the continuation of Europe's mission to civilise the world.[62]

By the middle of the nineteenth century, people had begun to identify areas that were clearly located between the West and the East, such as Central or Middle Europe and the Baltic. A contemporary of Stein, the Riga-based writer and journalist Julius Eckardt, claimed that the Baltic provinces owed their culture to many different influences: Russian, Swedish, German, Polish and Lithuanian. Baltic culture was supposed to be a framework safeguarding against the East, established in contrast to the German, Roman and Slavic.[63]

Not until the eighteenth century was the Eastern border of Europe placed at the Ural Mountains. An early attempt – possibly the first – is mentioned in *Das nord- und ostliche Theil von Europa und Asien* (published 1730) by the Swede Philipp Johann von Strahlenberg. Returning home after thirteen years in prison, he presented what he had learnt about Russia's geography and history, its warfare, trade, and natural resources. The book is remembered for Strahlenberg's rejection of previous attempts to draw a boundary between Europe and Asia in accordance with the rivers Don, Volga and Ob. Citing climatic and geographical considerations, demonstrating differences in geology, animals and vegetation, Strahlenberg moved the border farther east, claiming that the Ural Mountains represent 'Terminus inter Europam et Asiam'. In doing this, he also extended the eastern reaches of Europe.[64]

An early mental division of Europe into East and West can be seen in travel reports describing a border that had not previously been emphasised: between Austria and Hungary, between Prussia and Russia, and between the countries west and east of the Baltic Sea. French Enlightenment authors spoke intermittently of the existence of eastern areas that were obviously European but where people lived in the most pitiful and unenlightened conditions. Voltaire, who travelled through these parts, regarded them as another Europe that was unknown to the leading European countries.[65] In Germany, Herder talked about Eastern Europe, claiming it had Oriental characteristics but was also the region of the Slavs. He posited that the Slavs would awaken from their oppression and be liberated, while he also maintained the general mental division of Europe. Eastern Europe and especially Russia had failed to introduce elements that were fundamental to the civilised parts of Europe, such as a strong civil society, a substantial bourgeoisie, and an

This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license
thanks to the support of the University of Gothenburg. https://doi.org/10.3167/9781800735699. Not for resale.

independent nobility to counteract the power of the state. To put it bluntly, the essential elements of Western development and advancement were simply lacking. This way of depicting Russia and this particular definition of Eastern Europe were introduced to a larger public as the unity between the victors from the Congress of Vienna eroded, especially in the 1830s, 1840s and 1850s when Russia was considered a more serious threat.[66] Then, the European part of Russia had often been depicted as Eastern Europe,[67] which had at that time included Finland, the Baltic countries, and a large part of Poland. M. D'Erbigny believed Russia to be 'superior to Asia and inferior to Europe', having resources and might but nevertheless 'always vanquished by the civilisation of Europe'.[68] Richard Cobden underlined the difference between the peoples of Russia and Western Europe, the former being uneducated, without ambition, and mostly interested in religion, and the latter wanting to take civilisation to further heights. Russia, he wrote, lagged behind and its people were mainly peace loving, though its autocrats looked for opportunities to expand and therefore threatened Western Europe.[69] Henri Martin was repulsed by Russia. Not only was it the main enemy striving for world power and hoping to crush the nations of Western Europe, but it was also quite a different society: Western and Eastern Europe 'have hardly any resemblance with each other and make up two very different regions – Eastern Europe, which is Russia, has much more of Asian than of European character. . .'. Here, in the West, ruled principles of individual freedom, family rights, and private property; there, in the East, was a governed despotism over individual rights, family and property. Western Europe was considered a family of nations of Aryan origins, while Eastern Europe was a society lost to the Tatars and a long tradition that spanned Attila, Genghis Khan and Timur Lenk; Peter the Great and his heirs ruled behind a mask of Europeanness in Eastern Europe. In Western Europe, one found law and order, whereas in Eastern Europe, one found uncertainty.[70]

This was a far cry from the ambitions of the Russian elite to establish Russia as a civilised, European country. Their idea was to exploit the Ural Mountains as a cultural barrier between European Russia and Asia, claiming that the western part of the empire represented European civilisation, which had obtained large colonies in the East.[71] Support for the view of Russian Europeanness was expressed by Finnish nationalists who found themselves under Russian rule. It was obvious to Zacharias Topelius that Russia, and thus also Finland, belonged to Europe. A complication was that their language was not one of the Indo-Germanic languages of Europe due to immigration by their ancestors. Topelius had no problem with finding the origin of Finnish in Russian territory. Moreover, he claimed that it was obviously not a common language that unified the Finnish and Swedish inhabitants of his country.[72] However, in Russia this view could be flipped,

This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of the University of Gothenburg. https://doi.org/10.3167/9781800735699. Not for resale.

as Nikolaj Danilevsky did in *Russia and Europe*, published in 1869, which was probably the only work that attempted a systematic presentation of the theories of pan-Slavism. As far as Danilevsky was concerned, the Slavs were separate from Europe and would only create a civilisation that was radically different. This was expressed in a historical–philosophical theory of how civilisations replaced themselves. European civilisation was the tenth and the most advanced civilisation, but it was also on the way out; Russia was to be the eleventh. Danilevsky claimed that a future Slav civilisation could develop a universal humanity hitherto unknown. While Greek civilisation had been political, Roman cultural, and European both, Slav civilisation was to encompass these spheres, but add to them religion. Danilevsky's book represented a movement that favoured tsarist rule and religious orthodoxy: the first pan-Slavic committee was founded in Moscow in 1858, followed by other Russian cities, and supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Orthodox Church. For the pan-Slavists, the enemies were always the Turks and sometimes the Germans. They expected backing among Czech, Polish and Baltic Slavs for the Russian liberation of these areas. They turned to the Balkans and sought support from their Orthodox Slavs, offering Russian support for their liberation from the Turks. Consequently, they objected to the definition of Eastern Europe as half-barbaric or uncivilised.[73]

As Eastern Europe rose to prominence, the notion of Western Europe became more popular. It has been argued that the perception of 'East' was long of greater importance than that of 'West'. For example, when works by Orientalists and fiction writers were published in the nineteenth century, a distinction between the East and Europe was often seen as essential. At least from the beginning of the twentieth century, the idea of the West had become more prominent and had begun to be seen as essential. This was because the idea of the West had gained several associations that had previously been reserved for a more general European idea. The Western parts of Europe were thereafter increasingly seen as parts of a culture shared with North America.[74] However, the use of the concept in a binary way was established from the very beginning, even though the usage differed slightly depending on the context. Early on, geographers used the terms Eastern and Western Europe, and this binary was well established by the middle of the nineteenth century.[75] Starting from the 1850s, we can already find evidence that these notions had been set in motion. When discussing the German question, Gustav Diezel spoke of 'die Westen' and 'die westeuropäische Civilisation' in contrast to Russia, but without using the words 'Eastern Europe'.[76] In writing of the consequences of the Crimean War, Richard Cobden frequently mentioned Western Europe. Interestingly, he spoke of an eastern question but did not use the concept of Eastern Europe.[77]

This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of the University of Gothenburg. https://doi.org/10.3167/9781800735699. Not for resale.

Oswald Spengler took this to a new level when he claimed that one could no longer use the word 'Europe'. He declared that, although it could be used as a geographical term, it was not applicable when considering historical or political matters. For instance, ancient Greece could not be divided into a European and an Asian part, as that would make Homer and Pythagoras Asian, and Russia could not be culturally defined as European, although that was geographically correct. Therefore, it was not viable to create a historical content for the concept of Europe; it was more relevant to speak of East and West.[78]

What They Talk About, When They Talk About Central Europe

Demarcations between regions became popular and turned out to be useful, not only when describing and defining areas, but also when making statements about social conditions and what policy was desirable, or when envisioning potential new regimes. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the region south of the Finnish Sea had been named the Baltic, and Baltic languages were recognised. Scandinavists were advocating the unification of the Danish, Norwegian and Swedish peoples. Geographers had recognised the Balkan Peninsula, and the Balkans would soon be considered a region. The Mediterranean meant both the sea as well as the surrounding region.[79] A close reading of texts mentioning the notion of Central Europe – or 'Mitteleuropa' as it was mainly called in the Austrian and German discourses – reveals how such a concept can be used to describe much more than a simple geographical region, and should be regarded as a social act aimed at achieving specific goals. The concept of Central Europe demarcates an area shared by Eastern and Western Europe, and defined as exhibiting both distinct features and ones viewed as essentially European. The concept of Central Europe differs in one fundamental way from that of Eastern Europe: the former is rooted mainly in that area, and it does not imply that the region is less European than the neighbouring Western Europe.[80]

The discourse of Central Europe began amidst the events of the fateful year of 1848. There are earlier geographical works distinguishing Central Europe as a region in addition to Northern and Southern or Eastern and Western Europe.[81] This was well clarified in previous research, while the impact of the events of 1848 has been largely forgotten.[82] However, the first evidence of the noun 'Mitteleuropa' used as a political concept is from discussions in the Frankfurt Parliament on 24 July 1848. As such, it had almost never been used before, and this occasion was its true birthplace and origin. It was first launched in order to describe the emerging empire of Germany,

This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of the University of Gothenburg. https://doi.org/10.3167/9781800735699. Not for resale.

supplemented with western Slavs and Hungarians in order to gather a population and resources large enough to match, on the one hand, Russia, and on the other, the Romance peoples.[83] By tracing the development of this concept, it is possible to see it becoming a viable and useful notion for examining different groups and separate interests.

'Mitteleuropa' was used regularly in the 1850s. The notion outlined an area that spanned several states, and was characterised by progressive civilisation and a high level of culture and knowledge. It mediated the different parts of Europe and connected its western parts with the Orient. 'Mitteleuropa' brought together and set up an 'imagined community' (cf. Benedict Anderson) to which a common language was not fundamental, as in the contemporary nationalism, but that was marked by a quest for military strength to withstand the expanding Russian Empire and a free trade area that would make it possible to compete with the growing economies of Britain and France. 'Mitteleuropa' was less a legacy of Herder's national cultures and more a mode of economic thinking and an outcome of the model established in the Congress of Vienna regarding balance in international relations. The best-known of those members of the Frankfurt Parliament who spread the concept was Carl von Bruck, who soon became the Austrian minister of trade, and later of finance. It was during his period in office that trade tariffs were abolished within the Habsburg Empire, to increase trade and lead to various sorts of progress. He appointed counsellors with similar economic views, positive towards Central Europe.[84] One of them wrote that 'the customs union is a forerunner of another mightier, self-conscious, active and living unit'.[85] In addition to this, the chancellors Ludwig von Pfordten of Bavaria and Julius Fröbel of Saxony pleaded for a recognised 'Mitteleuropa', demanding a federation of the German states and Austria that would include Hungary and the Slavic parts of the Habsburg Empire. We can observe a decisive launching of the notion.[86]

This 'Mitteleuropa' would both unite the Germans and welcome the different nationalities within the Habsburg Empire. Fröbel had great hopes, making two trips to Vienna where he met influential people and gained support from government representatives. In September 1848 he wrote the following in a pamphlet:

> I regard our history to be so closely connected with the western Slavs, southern Slavs, Magyars and Vlachs, that we should not wish to dissolve this connection. A large democratic federation, where we unify with said peoples, and whose capital is Vienna, seems to me to be the only reasonable plan for the political configuration of 'Mitteleuropa'.[87]

An eagerness for political modernisation permeates the proposals. Bruck wanted constitutional governance, proving the close connection between these proposals and the liberals. Another Austrian minister, Gustav Höfken,

This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of the University of Gothenburg. https://doi.org/10.3167/9781800735699. Not for resale.

dreamed of a democratic and republican federation, as it would further 'all spiritual flowering, material wealth, humanity and civilisation in general'.[88]

'Mitteleuropa' not only conjured up new divisions within Europe, but it also played a part in Austrian efforts to withstand Prussia, giving Austria an upper hand in the question of Germany. At the same time, it promised economic wealth to all of the German states. Both politically and economically, it represented a modern project. Nation states were sometimes seen as passé and limited, while multinational states belonged to the future.[89] All of the states would benefit from improved finances if only one army was necessary. Austria could take advantage of skilled labour from the other German states, which, in turn, could make use of Austria's vast natural resources. Austria would have better access to markets and, together with the German states, could help to spread German culture and civilise the countries farther east.[90]

The discourse on 'Mitteleuropa' often addressed the German question. Höfken wrote that the establishment of Mitteleuropa could help Germany to overcome its divisions and once more become a mighty power. The ultimate objective behind the union was to raise the German nation to a 'higher existence'.[91]

Even though the Austrian government's use of 'Mitteleuropa' included the Slavic peoples of the Habsburg Empire, it was not in the minds of Bruck, Höfken or the others to limit the dominance of the Austro-Germans within the Habsburg Empire. However, the discourse also included attempts to define a 'Mitteleuropa with a stronger position for the non-German nations of the Habsburg Empire. After the Hungarian revolt was defeated, Lajos Kossuth introduced the idea of a Donau Federation, where the Hungarians were united with the Romanians and Austro-Slavs.[92] Other uses of 'Mitteleuropa' maintained Czech nationalism against the German-dominated Austrian state and German nationalism in Bohemia. These were not prominent issues but of minor importance. They consisted of ill-conceived plans with no government backing. However, they were presented by leaders of the nationalist movement and, as such, became significant. They further illustrated the manifold and partly conflicting implications of addressing a larger part of Europe that encompassed several nations. They stood out as examples of the contestability of the meanings assigned to the concepts defining the divides through Europe.

In 1849, František Palacký used the Czech expression 'střední Europy' (Central Europe) to define an area where language had become the main characteristic of nationalism, claiming Herderian views so typical of nationalists in Central Europe. For communities, Palacký continued, language was as important as religion had been previously, and the divides between the Austrian nationalities threatened war if the principle of equality of nations

This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of the University of Gothenburg. https://doi.org/10.3167/9781800735699. Not for resale.

and languages failed to be accepted in the empire.[93] In an article published in December 1849, Karel Havlíček criticises 'Mitteleuropa' as built upon the political interests of German nationalism. He presents an alternative for a new Austria ('Novo-Rakouska'), constitutionally governed on the basis of Slavic nations and fully separate from Germany.[94] Six months later he himself recognised a 'Mitteleuropa' that comprised the Slavic nations of the Austrian Empire in addition to the Austro-Germans and the Hungarians. He reasoned that the Slavic nations of Austria were weak and needed to be united – the empire needed a more solid foundation. Havlíček saw 'Střední Europy' or 'Mitteleuropa' as a new Austria where Slavic nations would have freedom and national rights equal to those of the Germans. He foresaw a future inside Austria with its firm protection against tsarist autocrats and Russian expansionism.[95]

This way of redefining the concept was never established as an alternative to the Austro-German 'Mitteleuropa'. It was too strongly associated with the 'Mitteleuropa' visions of the Austrian government to be reconciled with Austro-Slavic notions. In Prussia, 'Mitteleuropa' was also intertwined with the interests of the Austrian government and considered an economic threat to the Northern German states, which, with their underdeveloped industry, would suffer in the common market.[96] The notion was further considered a political threat. When Bismarck was envoy of the German Bundestag in the 1850s, he wrote reports to the Prussian chancellor in which he frequently expressed his suspicions of Austria and its efforts to connect with the southern German states by setting up a Central European empire.[97] Constantin Franz, a Prussian writer with conservative beliefs, posited that 'Mitteleuropa' was only a guise for Austrian aspirations to take leadership in all German lands: 'Mitteleuropa' was nothing but an extended Habsburg Empire, a federation led by Austria, which entailed nothing but a Greater Austria.[98]

Visions of a common market and economic union of both empires were kept alive, partly by Austrian politicians, and as late as 1879, a proposal was discussed by both the Austrian and Hungarian governments. It was mainly Austrian and Hungarian economists who conveyed the idea to new generations, and the notion regained prominence starting in the 1880s. Several chambers of commerce in Austro-Hungarian (as the empire was often called after autonomy was granted to Hungary in 1866) cities spoke in favour of a union resembling 'Mitteleuropa'. It was called for in a German economic journal, and addressed by the scientific society for Austrian economists at a meeting in 1900. In the new century, societies were founded to advance economic cooperation in 'Mitteleuropa'. Some wanted cooperation to be confined to promoting economic interests, while others wanted a common market and some even a political union.[99]

This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license
thanks to the support of the University of Gothenburg. https://doi.org/10.3167/9781800735699. Not for resale.

In addition, there were hopes for a 'Mitteleuropa' among some Germans, though they were mostly conservative thinkers opposed to the Germany that Bismarck had created in 1871 and continued to lead for many years. Paul Lagarde picked up the theme in his reflections on the state of art from the 1880s, and Ottomar Schuchardt returned to it in his main work two decades later. They pleaded for a nationalism that recognised a need for Germans to colonise Hungary and the western Slavic lands, believing that the agrarian sectors were of primary and industry of secondary importance, and that the German nation was under threat. Lagarde warned against the Russians, and Schuchardt against the Czechs, Hungarians and Italians in Austria who hated German culture and were forcing back the Germans. Bismarck was criticised for having excluded Austria and having created an overly Prussian bureaucracy and a state that only promoted egoism and materialism.[100]

Lagarde wanted Germany and Austria to form a shared state called 'Mitteleuropa'. This would open up new territories for German settlers who wished to cultivate land, and it would impede the spiritual depletion characterising Bismarck's Germany.[101] Schuchard wanted a federal 'Mitteleuropa' comprising states and nations that upheld German culture; it would include both the Baltic countries with their German populations, as well as Switzerland, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries. He also believed that Finland should be liberated from the grip of the Russians. He referred to a favourite quotation of the Swedish King Oscar II, who said: 'My heart is French, but my reason is German'.[102] The federation, he stipulated, should be organised with one army, one common spoken language, and one single economic market. The leaders of the states should form an assembly in charge of foreign policy, administration, finances, the army, the navy and the colonies. It would be complemented with a people's assembly possessing limited power.[103]

The notion of 'Mitteleuropa' spread farther as cartographers, geographers and historians made use of it. The first maps that presented 'Mitteleuropa' were published in the smaller German states after the uprisings of 1848: in Baden a geographical map, in Würtenberg a travel map, and in Frankfurt am Main a railway map. All were published in the period when these states were cultivating closer relationships with Austria and opposing Prussian dominance with intermittent hostility. Maps were published in both Austria and Prussia with variations on 'Mitteleuropa', such as 'Zentral Europa' and 'Zwischen-Europa' (Central and Middle Europe). Up to 1871, maps published in Vienna emphasised the Habsburg Empire, depicting only its territories or including some of the neighbouring states such as the Netherlands and Belgium. Prussian-made maps gave the impression that German-speaking lands were located in the middle of Europe,

This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of the University of Gothenburg. https://doi.org/10.3167/9781800735699. Not for resale.

implying that Germany was of special importance in Europe. After the 1871 unification, when relations were beginning to improve between Austria and Germany, a map made in Vienna equated 'Mitteleuropa' with 'the German sea', including all parts of Central Europe with German-speaking populations.[104]

Around 1900, the notion of 'Mitteleuropa' gained a firmer foothold among geographers, who were eager to take on the task of settling its geographical scope. In determining its characteristics and defining its borders, these geographers were making decisions touching on the contemporary question of whether Germans and Austrians belonged to the same culture. One example is the German and Austrian Alpine Club, which had several geographers as members and a name that indicated a shared culture. Geographers gained support from the German government, which prioritised the study and teaching of geography; after 1871, geography quickly became a university discipline with its own professors, and in 1881 it was even introduced in Prussian gymnasiums.[105] The textbooks, the most extensive of which had 650 pages, presented 'Mitteleuropa' as a geographical entity and professed the basic idea of German and Austrian fellowship.[106]

A whole range of arguments were marshalled. One textbook included Switzerland, Belgium and the Netherlands in 'Mitteleuropa' because of their similar physical geography. Another added the western Slavic and the Baltic peoples, because they all belonged to the German cultural sphere.[107] There were nuanced differences among the geographers as to how to define the borders of 'Mitteleuropa', as well as other significant borders. One belief was that a nation was ultimately tied to nature. A nation's lands may vary through history, but its existence should always be directly connected to the territory it possessed at the moment.[108] For some, it was possible to include cultural aspects, even though the physical prerequisites remained of greatest importance. In examining the conditions of 'Mitteleuropa', it seemed that its physical geography was manifold and rich in a variety of ways, which was not true of Eastern Europe; consequently, the political geography was characterised by a few large kingdoms in the east, while there were many smaller kingdoms in the west. Physically, 'Mitteleuropa' mostly resembled Western Europe, but it also had elements of the lowlands typical of Eastern Europe. The advantages of 'Mitteleuropa' were identified: it had the most favourable climate, with abundant rainfall, mild winters and cool summers.[109]

To sum up, different visions intensely related to different national and imperial interests obviously contributed to the concept of Central Europe. The strength of these essentially politically motivated rationales became evident in their impact on the geographical mapping of Europe.

This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license
thanks to the support of the University of Gothenburg. https://doi.org/10.3167/9781800735699. Not for resale.

Entangled Ideas: Reconciling Borders with Unity

The first chapter of this book presented material about European dreams of unity, and this chapter has outlined aspects of the borders of Europe. Now it is germane to move on to the issue of how to reconcile borders with unity. We can see that European unity is a concept complicated by its relationship to nations, states and regions, and that several ideas of unity must coexist.

To begin with, there is the unity of multinational states, empires and federations. All European states comprised populations with different languages and various historical legacies. Minorities in some states were making persistent claims for recognition. Most states in Europe had overseas colonies – Russia, for example, had expanded far into the east, and other states had expanded in one direction or another. The mightiest states – Austria, France, Great Britain and Russia – claimed to be empires. As we have already touched upon, the rising power of the United States stood out as a model of how to marry the longing for independence with the advantages of a larger federal state. In Great Britain, people discussed whether it was time to reshape British colonial rule into an imperial federation, meaning that those colonies with a high percentage of British citizens would be given self-rule.[110]

An illustrative example is that of the Habsburg Empire before its collapse at the end of the First World War. In the discourse on the Austrian idea versus the different nationalities, one can see that dreams of unity and the proposed advantages of a suprastate permeate the different nationalities, despite the nationalists' pleas. Ideas of unity were not necessarily tied up with linguistic homogeneity, as one common state can speak several languages. The linguistic map of the Habsburg dominion looks like a hastily stitched patchwork quilt. German was the most spoken language, but it was still only spoken by less than a quarter of the population, while the rest spoke Czech, Slovak, Polish, Ukrainian, Slovene, Italian, Hungarian, Romanian, Ruthenian, and so on. Faced with growing nationalisms, many people had to choose nationhood. This could be seen as a choice between different nationalities, but it could also be seen as one between the existing state and the idea of a distinct nation based on linguistic communality. The alternative was to call for an all-Austrian identity not based on a common language, but originating in a distinct idea or feeling that everybody could adapt to, that would be supranational in its character. Such an idea could be viewed as progress; the goal of the Austrian state, it was argued, should be to encourage progress with the help of a constitution and citizenship rights.[111] Or the idea could be seen as a gesture of tolerance between nationalities, classes, beliefs, and ways of thinking.[112]

This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of the University of Gothenburg. https://doi.org/10.3167/9781800735699. Not for resale.

The most distinguished text conveying a supranational idea was the 1841 pamphlet *Austria and its Future* by the official and nobleman Victor von Andrian-Werburg. His designation of freedom as the foundation of Austrian nationality included a dismissal of Slavic, Hungarian, Italian and German nationalisms, as well as a rejection of the centralist role of Austria – understandably, the author took the precaution of publishing anonymously. A spirit of freedom would spur on the quest for a common civic nationality, giving the rulers a more united and more easily governed state. The people would feel a new sense of solidarity and a respect for their fatherland, as well as a 'love of the shared freedom'. Andrian-Werburg emphasised the need for a leading idea or principle to present to the people, but saw no such idea among the officials, nor indeed in the Austrian state. He took the idea of freedom as a founding principle from Alexis de Tocqueville, whose newly published book on democracy in America cautioned as to the drawbacks of centralist rule and how it restricted individual freedom. The pamphlet's thesis on freedom of the press and judicial independence was appreciated and repeated, as was the overall notion of decentralisation.[113]

Others kept to the more common European idea of nationalities being distinguished by their languages, and rejected the existence of Austrian nationalism. Even then it was rational to advocate a common Austrian state, which, it was believed, would guarantee places for the nationalities within its borders. This line of thinking was expressed in extremely blunt terms by Czech nationalist František Palacký: if this state did not already exist, then it would have to be created.[114] The argument was that Austria existed in the interest of its nationalities. To protect itself from outside forces such as Russia and Asia, it would need to cultivate mutual respect with, and safeguard, its peoples. The argument followed Herder precisely, underlining the importance of language, as each people had a mission to develop their own distinguishing features and contribute to the development of humankind. For example, the Bohemian German Leo Thun maintained that the Czech language should not be forgotten and replaced with German, as was otherwise a common view.[115]

When the included nationalities began to see that unification would benefit them in some way, the idea of gathering multiple nationalities within the frame of one state started to gain strength. In 1907, a wide-ranging pamphlet was written by a representative of the Romanian national party who was acquainted with the heir of the Habsburg throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand. He presented a plan for a federal organisation of the empire based on ethnographic guidelines, with fifteen countries making up the Austrian federation. All would emerge as independent states, just as homogeneous as the Western European states, in hopes that this would solve many of the previous national conflicts. The plan was given some consideration in Austria,

This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of the University of Gothenburg. https://doi.org/10.3167/9781800735699. Not for resale.

not least because it was reported that Franz Ferdinand himself wanted to federalise the Habsburg lands.[116] During the last years of the Habsburg Empire, several factors favouring a multinational state were identified: the advantages of a borderless economic community (proposed by the economist Gustav Stolper); the thousand-year-old cultural unity of the Central European nations, which shared historical experiences and a regional home to a mix of nationalities (proposed by the social democratic leader Karl Renner); the interdependence of the nationalities meant that they could not develop separately, so the multinational state would be the best form of political organisation for them (proposed by the Christian socialist leader Ignaz Seipel); and only within the multinational state would it be possible to safeguard peace (proposed by Stolper and Seipel).[117]

Obviously, much support for the multinational state came from Austria itself. However, Austria-Hungary's Dual Monarchy was much admired in other countries for the way it safeguarded peace and stability within its borders by using both constitutional principles and decentralisation policies. Austria-Hungary, it was reported to the British public by a journalist in 1899, 'bears testimony to the possibility of creating an organic entity out of the most heterogeneous conglomerate of nationalities'.[118]

Apart from ideas of a multinational state, the notions of progress and modernity motivated the struggle for unity, backed by the claim that civilisation is an essential unifying force and that modern history is marked by a progression from smaller units to larger ones. The young Lord Salisbury objected to 'the splitting up of mankind into a multitude of infinitesimal governments, in accordance with their actual differences of dialect or their presumed differences of race', as it would only 'undo the work of civilisation and renounce all the benefits which the slow and painful process of consolidation has procured for mankind'. His conclusion was that 'it is the agglomeration and not the comminution of states to which civilisation is constantly tending'.[119]

At times, the uniting of Europe was seen as part of a process leading towards a higher civilisation, because it meant a 'widening of the area within which no sword shall be drawn and no shot fired saved by command of the central authority'. The state building of Germany was deemed an example for Europe to follow: many centuries of war between the different German states had come to an end; Germany was governed by a parliament that represented its entire empire; and peace reigned in all its lands between the borders of France and Russia.[120] The idea that larger units should be created at the expense of minor states was popular during the nineteenth century. Although not explicitly stated, one can infer that the relatively small states were the problem, and the larger entities were the solution. Occasionally, this position was expressed in radical terms. For instance, in

This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of the University of Gothenburg. https://doi.org/10.3167/9781800735699. Not for resale.

1846 it was predicted by a German economist and reformist that, within a hundred years, there would be only three or four states left in Europe.[121] We see the same belief expressed by the historian Heinrich Treitschke, who in 1897 concluded that there was no future for smaller states in Central Europe. In the long run, second-rate states such as Switzerland and Sweden would fade into the background; small states would not survive and the great powers of Europe would ultimately decide upon the future of the continent.[122]

Others did not hesitate to accept the legitimacy of smaller states such as Belgium, but also saw the need for cooperation and strategic action. The proposal that followed was for European states to take on federalism. For instance, a Scottish traveller wrote about 'the superiority of small independent states federally united', and claimed federalism to be a more efficient alternative than forced centralisation.[123] In the early twentieth century, the peace activist Jacques Novicow was convinced that a European federation would one day be in place, either through the deeds of statesmen or through growing consciousness among the masses of its necessity, something that should already have been apparent in the peace movement. Inspired by the ideas of Herbert Spencer and other social Darwinists, he described this federation as a progressive step towards a further association of humankind in the ongoing evolution of societies.[124] Bertha von Suttner also found support for a historical movement towards cooperation by reading Spencer and Darwin, but her favourite was Henry Thomas Buckle, who discerned a shared European civilisation, despite the differences and cleavages among the states. The progress of history was meant to inspire, wrote Suttner, as peace would necessarily follow from the development of culture.[125] In these examples, we can see 'a teleological understanding of modernity' that would become, and still remains, instrumental to the integration project of the EU.[126]

The idea of political integration was originally embedded in a context of historical philosophical concepts of drift towards larger political units. The concept of integration can be traced to late seventeenth-century mathematicians such as Sir Isaac Newton and Gottfried Leibniz, who wrote of the compilation of different parts into a larger and more complex unity. In the late nineteenth century, both the noun 'integration' and verb 'to integrate' spread to other fields of knowledge, from science to the humanities, from metallurgy to philosophy. The famous British philosopher Herbert Spencer, whose books sold a million copies during his lifetime, contributed to the popularity of integration by introducing it as one of the basic natural principles of both biology and psychology, and of the formation of society and ethics. He saw an overarching evolution that brought further integration to both nature and society. 'Political integration' was his label for the specific

This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of the University of Gothenburg. https://doi.org/10.3167/9781800735699. Not for resale.

evolution of political institutions, a concept that quickly became known in France and Germany thanks to translations and to being passed on by his disciples.[127]

In this context, integration can connote the long process unfolding over the last millennium or even the history following the break-up of the Roman Empire, during which small units were first combined to make larger ones, and later emerging European states embraced ever larger territories. Wordsworth Donisthorpe highlighted the history of the British Isles, beginning with the unification of some of the small units into the first kingdom called England in 829, continuing with the conquest of Wales, and concluding with the inclusion of Scotland and Ireland. Then he mentioned the more recent unifications of Italy and Germany, and predicted the imminent disappearance of Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark from the list of independent states. His key concept to describe this process was political integration, a process stimulated by the 'wonderful applications of steam and of electricity to the satisfaction of man's wants', by the progress of science and the spread of education to the lower classes.[128]

Spencer and his followers tended to think about society in terms of biology, even talking about it as a social organism. Donisthorpe defined the size limits of a state or political body that could be compared to a living organism, and the ability of its different parts to cooperate. Just as a human body has limits set by the ability of internal organs to work together, so it was with society. The trend towards larger states could be related to the growing ability to communicate, increasing knowledge, more widespread information, and greater concentrations of people living in urban areas: 'Hence, there has resulted a constant tendency towards increasing integration'. However, this also meant that political integration would be limited, depending on how well nations fit together: being separated by great distances, different stages of development, and diverging expectations of government could tear artificial units apart.[129] We can conclude that, from its beginning, the concept of integration was also a concept that dealt with limits and borders.

The Border Paradox of Europe: The Diversity of Unity

Europe is not only about unity; it is also about finding and constructing borders. Since the Enlightenment, there has been a far-reaching interest in defining borders, an interest that also concerns the concept of Europe. The concept of Europe is indeed embedded in discourses of divisions. These divisions are so commonly remarked upon that they seem to be autochthonous entities to which further claims and meanings are added. Contemporary

This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of the University of Gothenburg. https://doi.org/10.3167/9781800735699. Not for resale.

discussions and arguments are borrowed from history, which indicates the interconnectedness between differences and borders in the making and presentation of European unity, constituting an important part of its meaning. Borders are often presented as absolute and engraved in stone, even before further claims or doubts are weighed.

However, we should bear in mind that sometimes the concepts that define the community of a nation or region tend to hide and/or overcome potentially controversial issues. Regarding nations, class interests can be subordinated to national solidarity. Cohesion is created by avoiding the cultural boundaries of religions and languages, or by not minimising and suppressing minorities. Narratives are elaborated upon and implemented in order to forge the communal history of a nation. The concept of the region can be used to subordinate the ambitions of individual states in order to find common, supranational interests. Cultural borders can either be glossed over or made into positive features. Religious factions are hidden or, when possible, used to define the region ('Eastern Europe is Orthodox'). Linguistic borders are relegated to the back seat. Possible conflicts over borders can be suppressed, and even completely hidden.

Notes

1. Talmor, 'Reflections', 63.
2. Balibar, 'World Borders, Political Borders'; Balibar, 'Europe as Borderland'.
3. The rich research on borders includes that of geographer Henk van Houtum, who stresses the ongoing significance of cultural borders, political sociologist Chris Rumford, who emphasises the differentiating function of borders, and a wide range of research within the humanities that discusses borders in connection with identity. For an overview of earlier research on cultural borders, see Andrén and Söhrman, 'Introduction'; for a recent discussion, see Allmendinger et al., *Soft Spaces in Europe*.
4. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?'.
5. E.g., Benhabib, *The Claims of Culture*.
6. Hale, *The Civilization of Europe*, 36.
7. Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States*.
8. Elliott, 'Europe of Composite Monarchies', 51.
9. Hale, *The Civilization of Europe*, 34–35.
10. Hase, *Evropa*.
11. *Neue Wandkarte von Europa*.
12. Weiland, *Europa*.
13. Woodbridge, *School Atlas*, 289.
14. Stülpnagen and Bär, *Karte von Europa*.
15. Ibid.
16. De Staël, *Germany*, 18.
17. Ibid., 18–21, 33–36.
18. Quotation from Hazard, *Crisis of the European Mind*, 54.
19. Defoe, *The True-Born Englishman*, 11–12, partly cited in Hazard, *Crisis of the European Mind*, 54.

This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of the University of Gothenburg. https://doi.org/10.3167/9781800735699. Not for resale.

20. Hazard, *Crisis of the European Mind*, 437.
21. Verga, 'European Civilization'.
22. Robertson, *Reign of Charles V*, x.
23. Quotation from Gossman, 'The Idea of Europe', 207.
24. De Staël, *Germany*, 18–23.
25. Ibid., 18–23.
26. Ibid., 393.
27. Dainotto, *Europe (in Theory)*, 153–57.
28. Stein, *Oesterreich und der Frieden*, 2–17.
29. Mazzini, *Selected Writings*, 118.
30. Stein, *Oesterreich und der Frieden*, 1–11.
31. Herder, *Ideen* II, 259–60, 272–73, 385–92, 484–85.
32. Andrén, *Att frambringa det uthärdliga*, 85–87.
33. In this stream, seminal works by historians include: Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*; Gellner, *Encounters with Nationalism*; Anderson, *Imagined Communities*; and Hobsbawn, *Nations and Nationalism*. Central texts are compiled in Hutchinson and Smith, *Nationalism*. An important contribution in the social sciences is Billig, *Banal Nationalism*.
34. Groundbreaking works in this stream include Hutchinson, *Modern Nationalism*; Smith, *Ethnic Origins of Nationalism*; and Smith, *Nations and Nationalism*.
35. Cf. Hirschi, *Origins of Nationalism*, 9, 14, 44–46.
36. Ibid., 15.
37. Ferrer y Suberana, 'La nacionalidad', 71.
38. Fichte, *Reden an die deutsche Nation*, 211–15; Thompson, 'Ideas of Europe', 38.
39. De Staël, *Germany*, 23–24.
40. Ibid., 298–307.
41. The thesis of European clarity and national devotedness is ingeniously developed in Dahlstedt and Dahlstedt, *Nationell hängivenhet*.
42. Masaryk, *Česka Otázka*, 11–12; Masaryk, *Jan Hus*, 11–14, 42–43; quotation from *Jan Hus*, 14: 'Kdo myslit a cítit chce česky, tohoto rozdíly musí si být vědom'.
43. Thompson, 'Ideas of Europe', 38–39.
44. Also cited by Emperor Wilhelm II in 1907; see Ernst, *Reden des Kaisers*, 120–22.
45. 'Anonymous article' in *Illustriertes Familien-journal*, 88–91.
46. Schütz, 'Franz Palacky', 828–30. The article ended with the quotation: 'Er hat umsonst gelebt – umsonst gewirkt' (He lived in vain – worked in vain).
47. Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States*.
48. Lagarde, *Deutsche Schriften*, 98–138.
49. Masaryk, 'Independent Bohemia', 117–19; Masaryk, 'The Problem of Small Nations', 135–38.
50. Masaryk, *Jan Hus*, 97–121. The work Masaryk cites is Lindner, *Geschichtsphilosophie*.
51. See, e.g., Hobsbawn and Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition*; Anderson, *Imagined Communities*; Smith, *Ethnic Origins of Nationalism*; Hutchinson, *Modern Nationalism*.
52. Martin, *Russland und Europe*, 289.
53. Bluntschli, 'Die Organisation'.
54. See, e.g., De Gurowski, *Russland und die Civilisation*, 2.
55. Davidson, *The Idea of North*, 38.
56. Montesquieu, *Spirit of the Laws*, 238, 355, 484.
57. Gollwitzer, *Europabild und Europagedanke*, 93–94.
58. Schlegel, 'Ueber Literatur', 77: 'das wissenschaftliche Streben zog sich nach Norden, die Kunst und Poesie blieb im Süden'.
59. Gollwitzer, *Europabild und Europagedanke*, 86–87.
60. De Staël, *Germany*, 21–22.

This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of the University of Gothenburg. https://doi.org/10.3167/9781800735699. Not for resale.

61. Dainotto, *Europe (in Theory)*, 70–80, 148–51.

62. Stein, *Oesterreich und der Frieden*, 1–11.

63. Eckardt, *Die baltischen Provinzen Russlands*, ix–x, 1–2.

64. Strahlenberg, *Das nord- und ostliche*, 10–23, 92–3, 105–9, 173–6.

65. Wolf, *Inventing Eastern Europe*. Wolf claims that Voltaire and others used the perception of a backward Eastern Europe to create their own ideas and theories about the Enlightenment. By creating an Eastern Europe, borders between civilisation and barbarism were clarified. In Eastern Europe, features of civilisation were found, more so than in Asia, but it was also partly stuck in barbarism. However, this has been questioned by later research that sees a discourse on Eastern Europe beginning in the nineteenth century. For a compilation of the critique, see Drace-Francis, 'A Provincial Imperialist'.

66. Adamovsky, 'Euro-Orientalism'.

67. E.g., von Reden, *Ost-Europa*.

68. D'Erbigny, *Future Destinies of Europe*, 136. Originally published in Brussels, it has reportedly been translated into Italian as well; see Section V.

69. Cobden, *What Next and Next?*, 19–21.

70. Martin, *Russland und Europe*, xi, xxviiff, 2, 19, 108, quotation from 19: 'haben fast keine Aehnlichkeit mit einander und bilden zwei sehr verschiedene Regionen – Ost-Europa, das heisst Russland, hat viel mehr von asiatischem als von Europäischem Character. . .'. Similar views are presented in Talbot, *Europa den Europäern*, xvi: there ruled nihilism, 'der Leugnung jedes Grundsatzes, worauf die Kultur Europas beruht' (the denial of every principle on which the culture of Europe is based).

71. Woolf, 'European World-View', 91–92.

72. Topelius, *Boken om vårt land*, 110–11 and 131–32.

73. Seton-Watson, *Decline of Imperial Russia*, 90–93; Danilevsky, *Russland und Europa*, 275–9; Topelius, *Boken om vårt land*, 110–11, 131–32.

74. GoGwilt, 'True West', 38–42.

75. E.g., Rotteck, *Europe: Vorlesungen*; Pütz, *Manual of Modern Geography*.

76. Diezel, *Frage der deutschen Zukunft*.

77. Cobden, *What Next and Next?*

78. Spengler, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, 21–22.

79. Mishkova and Trencsényi, *European Regions and Boundaries*.

80. This section draws on my extensive study in Swedish of the history of the idea of Central Europe: *Att frambringa det uthärdliga: Studier kring gränser, nationalism och individualism i Centraleuropa* [To make it bearable: Studies on borders, nationalism, and individualism in Central Europe]. Previous research on the German concept of Mitteleuropa in general includes Meyer, *Mitteleuropa in German Thought*; Droz, *L'Europe Centrale*; Agnelli, *Idea di Mitteleuropa*; and Brechtefeld, *Mitteleuropa and German Politics*.

81. E.g., Hoffmann, *Europa und seine Bewohner*. See also Adamovsky, 'Euro-Orientalism'; Schultz and Natter, 'Imagining Mitteleuropa'.

82. See, e.g., the overview in Bugge, 'The Use of the Middle'; and Rider, 'Mitteleuropa, Zentraleuropa, Mittelosteuropa'.

83. *Stenographischer Bericht*, 1113–14.

84. The most expressive of these was Gustav Höfken; see, e.g., his *Deutschlands Zoll- und Handelseinigung*, 110–15.

85. Ibid., 291: 'Der Zollverein ist Vorläufer und Vorarbeiter einer andern mächtigern, selbstgewissen, thatkräftigen und lebendigen Einheit'.

86. Fröbel, *Wien, Deutschland und Europa*, 5–13: Pfordten, 'Denkschrift', 62–63.

87. Fröbel, *Wiener Oktober-Revolution*, 7–8: 'Ich finde unsere Geschichte mit denen der Westslaven, Südslaven, Magyaren und Wallachen so eng verbunden, dass wir uns aus der Verbindung nicht sollten lösen wollen. Ein grosser demokratischer Staatenbund, in welchem

This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license
thanks to the support of the University of Gothenburg. https://doi.org/10.3167/9781800735699. Not for resale.

wir uns mit den genannten Völkern vereinen, und dessen Hauptstadt Wien ist, scheint mir der einzige vernünftige Plan für die politische Gestaltung von Mitteleuropa zu sein'.

88. Bruck, *Die Aufgabe Österreichs*, 5–6, 32–45, 61; Moering, *Entweder – oder*, 3–10, quotation from 8: 'aller geistigen Blüthen, des materiellen Wohlstandes, der Humanität und civilisation im Allgemeinen'.

89. Höfken, *Deutschlands Zoll- und Handelseinigung*, 104–11, 129–30, 280–84.

90. Bruck, *Die Aufgabe Österreichs*, 51–58, 63f, 84; Moering, *Entweder – oder*.

91. Höfken, *Deutschlands Zoll- und Handelseinigung*, 104–11, 129–30, 280–84.

92. Kühl, *Föderationspläne im Donauraum*, 18–22.

93. Palacký, *Radhost III*, 59–64.

94. Havlíček, *Politické Spisy II*, 805–10.

95. Ibid., 169–78, 187–98.

96. Hübner, *Die zolleinigung Oesterreichs*, 5–7.

97. Poschinger, *Preussen im Bundestag*, vol. I, 45–46, 103–6, and vol. III, 499.

98. Frantz, *Unsere Politik*, 14–18, 61–64.

99. Rumpler and Niedrekorn, *Der Zweibund 1879*. See also Bosc, *Zollalliancen und Zollunionen*, 237–41, 256–81, as well as Matlekovitz, *Die Zollpolitik der Monarchie*.

100. Lagarde, *Deutsche Schriften*, 98–118; Schuchardt, *Deutsche Politik der Zukunft*, 98–100, 276–88, 303, 324–30.

101. Lagarde, *Deutsche Schriften*, 90–93, 121–22, 127.

102. Schuchardt, *Deutsche Politik der Zukunft*, 374: 'Mein Herz ist farnzösisch, mein Verstand aber ist deutsch'; see also 356–80.

103. Schuchardt, *Umrisse einer Staatsverfassung*.

104. I used twenty-two maps; for full references, see Andrén, *Att frambringa*, 47–51.

105. Andrén, *Att frambringa det uthärdliga*, 51–61.

106. Schulz, 'Entwicklungsgeschichte der Pflanzdecke Mitteleuropas', 229–447; Schulz, 'Verbreitung Phanerogamen in Mitteleuropa', 269–360; Ule, 'Niederschlag in Mitteleuropa', 435–516.

107. Kirchhoff, *Schulgeographie*, 157–60; Kretschmer, *Historische Geographie von Mitteleuropa*, chapter I.

108. Kirchhoff, *Mensch und Erde*, 80–82.

109. Kretschmer, *Historische Geographie von Mitteleuropa*; see chapter I-I, and about the climate, see 131.

110. I have learnt much about British federalism from Jens Norrby – see his doctoral thesis upcoming in 2022; see Burgess, *British Tradition of Federalism*; Bosco, *The Federal Idea*.

111. Moering, *Sibyllinische Bücher*, 21–35.

112. Fröbel,'Die Österreichische Politik', 410.

113. Andrian-Werburg, *Österreich und dessen Zukunft*, 36, 147–48, 189–205.

114. Palacký, 'O poměru Čech', 11–13.

115. Thun, *Über den gegenwärtigen Stand der*, 40–85.

116. Popovici, *Gross-Österreich*, 307–10.

117. Renner, *Oesterreichs Erneuerung*; Seipel, *Nation und Staat*; Stolper, *Das Mitteleuropäische Wirtschaftsproblem*; Stolper, *Wir und Deutschland*.

118. Stead, *United States of Europe*, 37.

119. Salisbury, 'English Politics and Parties', 22.

120. Stead, *United States of Europe*, 54–58, quotation from 56.

121. List, *Gesammelte Schriften II*, 433.

122. Treitschke, *Politics*, 32–34.

123. Laing, *Notes of a Traveller*, 56–57.

124. Novicow, *Die Föderation Europas*, 659–80.

This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of the University of Gothenburg. https://doi.org/10.3167/9781800735699. Not for resale.

125. Hamann, *Bertha von Suttner*, 71, 79–85.
126. Marquand, *The End of the West*, 53.
127. Spencer, 'The Development of Political Institutions'.
128. Donisthorpe, *Individualism*, 11.
129. Ibid., 11–15, quotation from 11.

This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license
thanks to the support of the University of Gothenburg. https://doi.org/10.3167/9781800735699. Not for resale.