Introduction

Czechoslovak history’s velvet awakening

This book is an analysis of the Holocaust’s position in Czech and Slovak historical culture during ‘the long 1990s’, a period which commenced with the radical political changes in Europe of 1989 and developed towards the Czech Republic’s and Slovakia’s entry into the European Union in 2004. In a broader perspective the book concerns the role of history during the two societies’ development from dictatorship to democracy, when both were forced to redefine themselves both internally and in relation to the wider world. It deals with questions surrounding values and expectations that were reflected at a national Slovak and Czech level, and their relation to, primarily, a supranational, European historical culture that was being created in parallel. It is precisely this European historical culture and its relation to certain selected national historical cultures that has been the focus for the project, The Holocaust and European Historical Culture, within whose frame this work has been written.1

In concrete terms, I focus on the Czech and Slovak manifestations of historical consciousness in relation to the Holocaust or Shoah: the genocide perpetrated by the Nazis against Jews and certain other ethnic/religious groups during the Second World War. This event has not been randomly selected. The Holocaust struck and deeply affected both of the countries that are at the centre of this book. At the same time the genocide against the Jews during the period of this study has attained a broader significance in terms of its European and universal symbolic value. Because the Czech Republic and Slovakia have endeavoured to become part of an international context in the post-communist era, it has been an urgent matter for them to deal with their painful history.

At the end of the Cold War, the political situation in Central Europe changed dramatically. Until 1989 Czechoslovakia was a communist state, strongly dependent on the Soviet Union. Towards the end of 1989 communist
rule was replaced by a newly born democracy during a peaceful process called the ‘Velvet Revolution’. But as early as 1 January 1993 Czechoslovakia split into two independent states: the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The Velvet Revolution culminated in a peaceful ‘velvet divorce’, which ended the velvet process and initiated a wholly new period in the development of both countries.

Even if the disintegration of the Czechoslovak state was not totally unexpected, many were surprised by the speed of the process. The radical changes affected almost all aspects of life. The old system disappeared after several decades of stagnation. The newly won freedom of the press and other forms of expression, freedom to travel, freedom of commerce and freedom to choose different political parties offered people in Czechoslovakia new possibilities, but at the same time increased competition, social stress and confrontation with the surrounding world. In such an atmosphere, old and established values were challenged and continuously redefined, while new ones were still waiting to be born or developed. Thus the Velvet Revolution was not only a political, ideological and socioeconomic revolution, but a cultural and mental one as well.

In this turbulent situation, where hopes of a brighter future were strong, history did not just become a passive remnant. While in 1990 the Slovak historian, Lubomír Lipták, described the fall of communism in Czechoslovakia in November 1989 as a radical change without precedent, as ‘a change that needed neither historical attire nor sweeping slogans’, another historian, Vilém Prečan, spoke just a few years later about ‘a surplus of history’. History had great and sometimes even decisive significance for orientating individuals and collectives in the Czech Republic and Slovakia in the direction of something perceived as a better society and a happier situation in life. Historical consciousness, which every human being develops in order to mentally be able to move between yesterday’s questions, today’s tasks and tomorrow’s promises, therefore came to function as an active and mobilising power in this transformation.

Many historical disclosures began to be served as the ‘truth’ that had at last arrived to replace the communists’ ‘lies’ and ‘fallacies’. Suddenly there was not only one, but two, three or even more ‘truths’ that conflicted with each other. They were supported by previously suppressed historical facts and, moreover, often claimed to be ‘scientifically proven’. But which historical arguments was a person to accept as his or her own, and how was that person to find a standpoint in this argumentation? Which historical events did he or she most want to forget and which, conversely, were to be highlighted? And why? Should the Holocaust belong to the first or the second category?

During the Cold War a relative silence regarding the history of the Holocaust prevailed, particularly in Eastern Europe, where the suffering of the Jews was not allowed to compete with the communists’ suffering and heroism. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Holocaust began to be held up on an increasingly broad front. The British historian, Tony Judt, enthusiastically describes the new attention paid to the Holocaust in Europe as ‘the very definition and guarantee
of the continent’s restored humanity’. The Holocaust has become a phenomenon that now reaches far beyond Europe’s borders; some researchers even talk about the Holocaust as the foundation for a new global or ‘cosmopolitan’ memory, the function of which is to create a basis for the defence of human rights. Irrespective of whether one regards these claims as exaggerated or not, it is not possible to ignore that the Holocaust in our particular era has been given emphasis, especially in Western societies, more than any other historical event. How was this emphasis concretely manifested during the intensive transformation of the two Central European states of this study?

**From Cold War to peace, from Hiroshima to Auschwitz**

Among the historical events most often noted in Czechoslovakia during the early post-communist development were the most decisive moments from the communist period: the victory of communism in 1948, the terror of the Stalin era until the mid-1950s, and the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact which halted the reform process that became known internationally as the Prague Spring of 1968. Second World War traumas can be added to these. Despite the Second World War having ended forty-five years earlier, it was only following the cessation of the Cold War that it became possible to freely discuss all its aspects. For example, in 1990 the Czechs were able to celebrate for the first time since 1948 that their part of Czechoslovakia had been liberated not only by the Red Army but also by American troops.

Discussions about pre-1945 history became in certain respects even more important than debates about the just-concluded communist epoch, particularly in debates concerning foreign policy and events and processes, such as the reunification of Germany or European integration. The period up to 1945 represented, namely, a time when Czechoslovakia, far more than later, had contacts with the well-developed democratic countries in the West, which at this stage were seen simultaneously as Czechoslovakia’s new and old allies. This did not, however, mean that the memories were only positive. Thoughts about the Munich Agreement of 1938 and the Western powers’ so-called appeasement politics, which left Czechoslovakia to Hitler, had left a bitter aftertaste for many Czechs and Slovaks. But the memory of the Second World War, the most traumatic event in twentieth-century Europe, was no longer there to serve as a cut off between separate countries and rival ideologies.

As the Swedish historian Klas-Göran Karlsson points out, the traumatic war history after the fall of the Berlin Wall has not only been the focus of national historical accounts, it is instead treated in a way which is thought to answer to ‘European’ values. The process of reconciliation between old enemies, which at one time was the basis for Western Europe’s integration, was now expanded to the other side of the former Iron Curtain. The memory of
the Second World War was put to use to avoid violent conflicts in the future, but served also as a building block for the new European identity which as early as 1992 was formally decided in the so-called Maastricht Treaty. The political will to overcome old conflicts between East and West was manifest both during the process of reuniting Germany in 1990 and at the celebrations of important, positive junctures in the Second World War, such as the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Allied invasion of Normandy in 1944 and the surrender of the Third Reich in 1945. Despite neither Germany nor Russia being invited to Normandy in 1994, and despite many Western statesmen boycotting the military parade at the celebrations in Moscow in May 1995 as a protest against Russia’s ongoing war in Chechnya, the victory over Nazism was still unanimously presented as a new springboard for Europe’s united future.

Now that the immediate threat of a global nuclear war between the world’s dominating military superpowers has disappeared, Hiroshima has lost some of its political-symbolic significance. Instead it is the Holocaust that has become the strongest symbol of absolute evil, the lowest point in history. As the Israeli Holocaust historian of Czech-Jewish descent, Yehuda Bauer, observed in 2000 at the opening ceremony of the ‘Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust’, the Holocaust has become a universal concern and one that, according to him, is politically expressed: ‘Major politicians, wrongly but characteristically, compare Saddam Hussein to Hitler, or the tragedy in Kosovo to the Holocaust’. Another proof he submitted for the increasing global significance of the Holocaust is an Auschwitz museum now being built near Hiroshima, and the fact that a department for teaching about the Holocaust has been opened at Shanghai University.

But did the Holocaust play any role whatsoever in the Czech and Slovak historical debates? Were there strong tendencies towards remembering or, perhaps, an interest in forgetting? Who wanted to remember and who wanted to forget?

The tragedy of the Czech and Slovak Jews

Before presenting my theoretical points of departure and my analytical tools, I would like to briefly discuss the course of the Holocaust in the area which after 1918 had become Czechoslovak territory and which during the Second World War was divided into two parts: the occupied Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia on the one side and the Slovak Republic on the other.

The number of Czechoslovak citizens who lost their lives during the Second World War is estimated at 360,000. Even though the old numbers from the early post-war period have been re-examined and partly modified since 1989, all kinds of evidence show that most of these victims were Jews. According to statistical records about 270,000 Czechoslovak Jews were
murdered, which means that as many as three out of four Czechoslovak victims of Second World War violence were killed in the Holocaust as a result of anti-Jewish politics. Almost 80,000 Jewish victims came from the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, i.e., the area of the Czech Lands with the exclusion of the Sudetenland, the territory annexed by Hitler’s Third Reich after the 1938 Munich Agreement. Roughly 70,000 were Jews from Slovakia. The rest of the victims came from territories that were taken away from Slovakia by Hungary shortly after the Munich Agreement: southern and eastern Slovak regions (approx. 42,000 victims) and the poorest eastern province of Ruthenia (approx. 80,000 victims). Among the victims of the Nazi genocide were also around 5,500 Czech and 2,000 Slovak gypsies.

In the Czech territory, i.e., the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, the occupying power, Germany, was responsible alone for ‘the final solution’. In Slovakia, however, the domestic regime, led by the Catholic priest, Jozef Tiso, organised the forcible measures and deportations with their own forces and in that way took over a great part of the responsibility from Germany. At the end of the war, Tiso’s Slovak regime stood among the losers, side by side with its main ally, Germany, while Bohemia and Moravia were liberated and thus situated on the winning side.

Slovakia was never forced into openly dealing with its war history on the international stage. As early as 1945, Slovakia ceased to exist as an international entity and was once again included in Czechoslovakia. The stance of the Allied great powers, in particular that of the USA, was of decisive importance. The USA never recognised Slovakia as an independent state and viewed Czechoslovakia’s exile government in London, with Edvard Beneš at its head, as the country’s sole official representative during the war. In December 1941 the USA even ignored the declaration of war by Slovakia. The reunification of the Czech and Slovak parts was part of the Beneš government’s plan to reconstruct the first Czechoslovak Republic within its pre-war borders and in this way cancel the results of the Munich Agreement with regard to constitutional law. Thus even the trial of Jozef Tiso and his close collaborators in 1947 was seen as an internal Czechoslovak matter rather than part of the international post-war judicial processes. At the end of the war Tiso fled to German Bavaria, where he was captured by American troops and shortly thereafter handed over to the Czechoslovak authorities. In April 1947 Tiso was sentenced to death in accordance with Czechoslovak law and executed just three days later. The trial was characterised by an intensive political power struggle in Slovakia and the whole of Czechoslovakia. This fact made it easier for those who wanted to interpret the sentence as a communist or Czech revenge against the man who had become the main symbol of the Slovak state.

Despite the fact that the communists could have had reason to use Tiso ideologically as a frightening example of Nazi collaboration in their historical
propaganda, they did so only to a limited degree during their time in power. They probably feared that giving too much voice to historical problems would threaten the sensitive relations between Czechs and Slovaks and increase the opposition to communism in Slovakia. Why the same regime that had defined itself as being consistently anti-Nazi and anti-fascist avoided a debate of the Holocaust is something I will discuss in more detail later, as this question is central for this study.

The organisation of this study

At the core of this study are four concrete examples of history’s position in Czech and Slovak societies where Holocaust history directly or indirectly stands at the centre. These examples are intended to reflect different attitudes to ‘the final solution’ and the memory of it among Czechs and Slovaks during the period of transition from communism to democracy. However, the study does not strive to present a complete list of all the cases touching upon the Holocaust in Czech and Slovak development after 1989. Instead, it focuses on those situations where the post-communist constructions of meaning with regard to Czech and Slovak history were confronted with the process of making sense of the Holocaust. Thus, the selected cases, over and above other situations, can be argued to reflect the essential features of Czech and Slovak historical cultures in relation to the Holocaust.

In the following part, the theoretical, conceptual and analytical starting points will be explained. Thereafter, a survey of the use of Holocaust history in Czechoslovakia between 1945 and 1989 will be presented as an empirical background description. During this period history was first and foremost decided by the dictates of communist ideology.

The subsequent four empirically orientated chapters will, from a main principle of chronology, illuminate the historical-cultural development in the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

The first of these chapters will focus on the Czech and Slovak historical debate against the background of Czechoslovakia’s division in 1990–1992. It was at this time that the first Slovak nation state or, alternatively, the German satellite of the Second World War, was primarily debated. The reason for putting focus on this particular period is that nationalistic sentiments were most strongly expressed during this time, while the old Czechoslovak communist historical narrative was being replaced by new ones.

The second empirical chapter is concerned with the Czech reaction to the American film, Schindler’s List, perhaps the most well-known and influential historical-cultural product about the Holocaust. Directed by Steven Spielberg, it portrays a former Czechoslovak citizen, the Sudeten German, Oskar Schindler, paying tribute to his heroic action in saving more than 1,000 Jewish prisoners.
Here the Czech reactions are placed in relation to the Americanisation of the Holocaust.

In the third empirical chapter another Czech debate will be analysed: the debate concerning two memorial sites, Lety and Hodonín u Kunštátu, where during the Second World War there were two concentration camps for Roma from the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia who were threatened with extermination. At these sites the Czechs, after the war, constructed a pig farm and a holiday establishment, a fact that during the 1990s drew significant attention and protests. As will be shown, the process described as the Europeanisation of the Holocaust meant that the genocide of the Jews and that of the Roma were coupled together without consideration of the differences between the two operations, a concept whose problems become evident when viewed through the lens of the Czech actions.

In the final empirical chapter the main question is how the Holocaust has been presented in a Slovak museum, which during the communist era was the most prominent museum about the Second World War in Slovakia. The establishment was later converted into the first museum in the country to also include the history of the Holocaust. It was above all this museum that was given the task of adjusting the memory of the war and the Holocaust to the needs of the new Slovakia: a Slovakia which had introduced a democratic system and strengthened its ties with the European Union and NATO. Thus the complications surrounding the Europeanisation of Slovak history and the Second World War are given particular attention in this chapter. Lastly, a concluding discussion with a summary of my findings will be presented.

**Theoretical and conceptual starting points**

The concept of historical consciousness is of fundamental theoretical significance for this book. The function of historical consciousness is to orientate people in a flow of time by relating the comprehension of their own present situation to, on the one hand, experiences and memories of the past, and on the other hand, expectations and fears in relation to the future. Historical consciousness places all human beings in a context of meaning which is greater than their own clearly defined lives. The concept is meaningful when dealing with individual as well as collective contexts of significance, but it is in the latter sense as a mental tool, which to a high degree is determined by collective experiences and memories, and which incorporates us into a collective context, that it will be used in the present work. In practice this collective context has often comprised a national unity, but in our era this is challenged by both regional and transnational unities. As has already been stated, this study highlights a European historical context of meaning that competed with or complemented the Czech and Slovak context.
It has to be mentioned, however, that the concept of historical consciousness as used here is different from the traditional usage of the term historical consciousness in the Czech and Slovak scholarly contexts. Some Czech and Slovak historians, among them, Miroslav Hroch, had used the term (historické vědomí) already during the 1960s, i.e., before the definition of historical consciousness which was established by Karl-Ernst Jeismann in 1979 and which is used here. However, they did not understand the term in the same way as Jeismann did later. According to Hroch, the term reflected the level of historical knowledge and common awareness about (especially national) history. This interpretation was questioned in 1995 by another Czech historian, Zdeněk Beneš. However, it is only now, in very recent years, that the concept of historical consciousness has been approached on a broader bases that is closer to Jeismann’s original definition.

Historical consciousness is, to a great extent, connected to different social and cultural developments in a society and a state, but it can also be triggered by various political interest groups which have the capacity and will to create meaning from the past, as well as the power and possibility to reach out to large parts of the population with their message. In such situations, historical consciousness can be transformed into an effective weapon in the struggle for political power in a country.

Hence, it may be presumed that historical consciousness is most often mobilised in times of rapid change, turbulence and crisis. It is then that our need for and interest in orientating ourselves and creating meaning in time increases. The period of Central European history examined in this book was definitely such a time.

An important aspect of the term historical consciousness is that it helps us to see that history is so much more than a subject of science and teaching. The historical dimension has links to problems concerning existence and identity, moral-judicial decisions, political and ideological questions of contention, and so much more. Those wishing to examine historical consciousness are, however, faced with the problem that the object, as such, cannot be analysed. Analyses can only be directed towards the concrete manifestations of historical consciousness, which will here be described as aspects of a historical culture. At the centre of this culture stands a historical artefact or product, which can consist of a scientific monograph or history textbook for teaching use, but which may also be a film, a monument or a debate relating to a current historical question. Such historical-cultural products will be analysed in the separate empirical chapters to follow.

A historical culture has been described as a communicative context, linked to the historical products mentioned. These can consequently be analysed in terms of sender/production, intermediary/communication and recipient/consumption. The following account will not be purely historiographical, i.e., focused on how and under which conditions historical products are depicted,
but will also show how history is communicated in the Czech Republic and Slovakia in political debates, film reviews and museum exhibitions. The question of how historical-cultural artefacts are received is difficult to assess. It is in all likelihood partly dependent on the effectiveness of the communicative process, and partly traditions and conceptions regarding historical development, which brings us back to the primary cultural question of which history a society believes to be worth saving, debating, celebrating or forgetting.

An adjacent perspective on historical culture has to do with power. The research questions that are related to power and influence are multiple: Which groups in a society have the power to choose which historical perspectives are promoted or withheld? What role does the state play as a conveyor of history? What importance do domestic actors have in highlighting and mobilising crucial questions, and to what extent is the historical-cultural debate influenced in a country of international actors, questions and trends? What power functions does history exercise in a society?

Historical culture has traditionally been framed in a national manner and has often had a strongly homeland-focused and patriotic stamp. During the communist era it had a special character particularly with regard to modern history, as ‘national values’ were coupled with a class perspective. The national framework was, even so, constantly among the decisive criteria. Books and museum exhibitions have had Czechoslovak, Czech or Slovak history as a focal point. Interpretations of historical phenomena such as war have been built around ‘national’ actors and structures even more than those of domestic political events.

Against this background it has seemed reasonable to base this book upon national historical cultures. The term ‘nationalising’ signifies in this context that a historical phenomenon is ‘written into’ a national interpretative context sanctioned by long usage and is adapted to the values seen as characterising it. This does not, however, mean that historical cultures cannot be connected to other categories than the nation and state. Among those that become visible in this book are professional groups, regions and ethnic groups. Above all, as has been mentioned, the national historical-cultural context over the past decades has been challenged by a European-wide interpretative context. In this work, the ‘Europeanisation’ of history will signify the communicative process by which a historical-culturally interesting phenomenon is placed in relation to what is perceived and portrayed as European interpretations and values.

**Historical narrative**

One method of analysing historical culture is by positioning the narrative at the centre. This will be further explained later in this introductory chapter. First, it is necessary to present an analytical framework for the narrative concept.
A narrative is always a story about something. The communicative element is prominent: there is always someone who narrates, and someone who takes in the story. A historical narrative concerns our relationship with the past; it is a presentation of how selected, mutually dependent events follow upon one another in a temporal perspective.

The narrative, which has a beginning, a middle section and a conclusion, is bound together by a plot. A plot ties together the story’s different stages and therefore contributes to creating context, wholeness and meaning around questions regarding what happened, how it happened and why it happened. A historical narrative emphasises the totality and not the separate event that stands out as important, because it is precisely the plot that decides the choice of events in different historical narratives and not the opposite. The same events can, however, be included in different historical narratives when they are presented with different plots in focus.

Notions such as goals and means, actors, intentions and motives become particularly important in a storyline of this kind, while structural, impersonal conditions end up in the background. This close link to dimensions such as identity, morality and power illustrates the narrative’s close relation to historical consciousness.

In the narrative two extreme positions are often placed against each other to create excitement and conflict, and the story frequently ends with the antagonisms being solved – or culminating. Clearly, not everything we relate can qualify as a narrative in a deeper sense. Nor can all stories be described as having the same historical significance. Some are strictly individual and particular, while others are common goods and function in a unifying or separating manner.

In historical culture, narratives are constructed, chosen and valued. In a competitive situation, some are seen as useful and important while others are not. In the historical-cultural context we often adapt our interpretation of the past and formulate our stories in connection to already formulated narratives, placing them in the more general themes that characterise them. Researchers sometimes use the term grand narratives or master narratives, which are defined as stable conveyors of meaning that ideologically and culturally support and legitimise whole institutions or societies. Attempting to find these kinds of slow-moving narratives in Czechoslovakia’s changeable history is far from unproblematic. Despite this, I will be focusing on such hegemonic narratives, which fulfil the necessary criteria more than all the others.

The use of history

Every historical culture has a procedural aspect. This concerns questions on how historical consciousness is expressed and how historical culture is created.
Historical culture is a product of individuals and collectives who actively use history. They mobilise and activate their historical consciousness and transform it into concrete texts and actions. Individuals and groups use history to satisfy different needs and interests, and to attain diverse goals.

As Klas-Göran Karlsson has shown, it is possible when considering these needs and goals, and in addition different historical and societal contexts, to distinguish between at least several different types of history usage. These include scientific, existential, moral, ideological and political use, as well as non-use.24 A typology of this kind conflicts with the traditional understanding of our attitude towards history that developed during the professionalisation of the history discipline, namely, that scientific historians are the only ‘true’ users of history, while all others more or less abuse it. However, as Friedrich Nietzsche demonstrated as early as the end of the 1800s, traditionally understood historical science cannot deal with and satisfy all the historical dimensions concerned with history as a necessity of life.25

Karlsson’s thought is that the typology can be analytically applied to different societies and ages to provide knowledge about similarities and differences in regard to the use of history. The presented uses of history comprise analytical categories or ideal types. Several of the uses can overlap and strengthen each other, which in this book is most clearly shown in the chapter on the Holocaust of the Roma, the Porrajmos. Sometimes a use of history is instead weakened by another. As the borders between these attitudes are not always exactly clear, and as different ways of using history can be combined, the typology is not intended to be used in a normative way. However, with its help it is possible to better understand the main actors’ needs and intentions.

*Existential history usage* helps its practitioners to seek answers to questions about existence and identity. It is triggered by a need to remember in order to orientate oneself in a society characterised by uncertainty and crisis, a society in the process of rapid change or under strong pressure. This use is often found in groups struggling against amnesia, unconscious forgetting, and striving for cultural homogenisation.

*Moral history usage* expresses thoughts about questions of right and wrong in history, about good and bad. History becomes a moral-political power in a time when political liberalisation or another radical change makes it possible to bring previously unnoticed or consciously suppressed historical questions into the political-cultural agenda. The main practitioners of this method, often intellectual and cultural elites, are eager for forgotten and previously denied, even banal and trivialised history to be accepted, rehabilitated and reinstated. Their goal can generally be described as settling things, with the functional state power restoring the situation that prevailed before this power’s encroachment on history.

*Political and ideological history usage* arises in connection with questions about power and legitimacy. The political use is metaphoric, analogical,
instrumental and comparative. The intention here is to invoke historical phe-
mona to support a current issue and by this means bring about a political
debate. Similarities are strongly emphasised to the detriment of differences,
which makes the relationship between then and now both simple and unprob-
lematic. The objects used in such comparisons are not selected randomly; what
is important is that they possess strong emotional, moral and political power.
The ideological use of history is connected to those systems of ideas that exploit
history in order to justify a position of power. Its main practitioners who, like
those of the political use of history are political and intellectual elites, invoke
‘historical laws’ and ‘objective needs’ in order to construct a relevant contextual
meaning which legitimises a certain power position, and which rationalises it
by portraying history in such a way that mistakes and problems on the road to
power are toned down, trivialised or ignored.

A special form of the ideological use of history is the non-use of history. This refers to the desire not to be ‘disturbed’ by history in situations where it is
deemed important to focus on the present and the future. Intentional non-use
of history thus does not comprise temporary and unintentional forgetting.
Rather, it represents a conscious tendency not to legitimise the existing society
with the aid of history or cultural heritage, or parts thereof, but instead to refer
to specific socioeconomic conditions in the present or to a bright future. The
historical dimension is deliberately ignored and suppressed.

Scientific history usage has developed around the question of what is true
or false in the interpretation of the past. It is based on a professional and
theoretical-analytical and methodological system of rules within the scientific
discipline and history as a taught subject. In contrast to the political use of
history, the scientific use consciously distances the historical dimension from
present interests and needs. The past is to be studied in itself and unique
aspects and differences, rather than similarities, between historical phenomena
are emphasised. This genetic, prospective view generally represents history as
a science.

A boundary between the scientific and the ideological use of history is
also important, though not always completely clear. In both cases interpreta-
tion and the creation of meaning play a central role, and in both cases intel-
lectual groups are the main actors. In Karlsson’s opinion the main difference
should be seen in the aims of both uses: while history as a science is normally
carried out with the intention of creating new knowledge and thereby con-
tributing to intra-scientific research development, ideological history is used to
convince and to mobilise large groups of people for the great ideological task.
Practitioners of scientific history often place emphasis on parts of the context
of historical meaning, whereas ideological practitioners tend to underline the
whole.
The Holocaust’s Americanisation and Europeanisation

It has already been stated that nationalisation and Europeanisation belong to those historical-cultural processes which since 1989 have most influenced the question of what position the Holocaust is given in the Czech and Slovak historical cultures. However, it must also be noted that the Holocaust’s Americanisation has also influenced the Holocaust debate, particularly in the Czech case.

Both the Americanisation and Europeanisation of the Holocaust became prominent and analytically relevant processes within the context of the Cold War’s end, but despite their being generally accepted as important, researchers still have problems defining what the Americanisation and Europeanisation of the Holocaust actually entail. It is particularly the Americanisation of the Holocaust, which has been developing since the 1970s, that is difficult to see as a clearly formulated narrative that might pose long-term challenges for the main Czech and Slovak historical narratives.

The Holocaust’s Americanisation can be perceived in two ways. The first concerns how the Holocaust is incorporated into the domestic American historical culture and how it finds its place in the historical consciousness of Americans, i.e., what role it is given in relation to American values and in American conceptions about the future of the USA. Researchers have pointed out that the Holocaust’s positioning in an American-meaning context can primarily be connected to leading elements in American societal life, such as multiculturalism and ethnicity, while at the same time the Holocaust’s representation in an American context is adapted to ‘traditional’ American values, such as positive and forward-orientated thinking, a striving for ‘happy endings’, a focus on strong individual heroes and the toning down of brutality, despair and a tragic view of life.27 The American historian and linguist Alvin Rosenfeld associates the Holocaust’s Americanisation with ‘a tendency to individualize, heroize, moralize, idealize and universalize’.28

The second perception in regard to the Americanisation of the Holocaust is linked to the question of whether the USA with the help of the Holocaust’s ‘American’ representation has influenced other countries and cultures both through political activities and by the distribution of popular culture produced by the American film and television industry, and American mass media with its global reach.

Both perceptions are, of course, closely connected to each other. In this study I wish to draw attention to the ‘outwardly directed’ Americanisation in relation to the Czech and Slovak historical cultures after the fall of communism. However, it must be pointed out that despite the significant influence of the USA in regard to both political and economic contacts and the export of popular culture, it is still unclear and unascertained how much and in which ways this political and cultural Americanisation of the Holocaust has
influenced the democratic process in the Eastern and Central European region since 1989.

A concrete sign of American influence is, firstly, that the term Holocaust itself initially only came to be used in Czechoslovakia at the beginning of the 1990s. Prior to this the Holocaust was denoted either with a Czech or Slovak translation of the German term ‘the final solution’ or as ‘race reprisals’ – though without information connecting these terms to the Jews. After the demise of communism the American term was finally adopted; it had been used in the USA since the end of the 1960s and particularly since 1978, when the American television series of the same name was broadcast, firstly in the USA in April 1978 and later in Western Europe.29

The formation of the President’s Commission on the Holocaust by US President James Carter in the same year can be seen as another important milestone here, since one of the most important goals of this commission was to create a new American definition and understanding of the Holocaust – even though an originally non-American phenomenon. Created at a time ‘when the Holocaust had moved not only from the periphery to the center of American Jewish consciousness, but to the center of national consciousness as well’,30 the mechanical transplantation of this definition back into the European and especially Central European context of the early post-Cold-War era was far from problem-free.31 While the first breakthrough of the parallel cultural and political interest in the Holocaust in the USA in 1978 did not affect Czechoslovakia at all, the following wave in 1993, dominated by the opening of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington D.C. and the worldwide success of the film Schindler’s List, became much more relevant, especially for the newly formed Czech Republic.

There were also political activities that can be linked to the role of the USA in NATO and to NATO’s expansion, which also came to encompass different uses of the Holocaust term. In this book I demonstrate historical-cultural manifestations of these activities in connection to the mid-1990s Czech debate on the genocide of the Roma. The political initiative on the part of the USA was, however, never as great as for example in Romania, which in 2003, less than one year before the country became a NATO member, established the American–Romanian International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania – also known as ‘The Wiesel Commission’. This Commission was initiated by then-Romanian President, Ion Iliescu, and led by American professor, Elie Wiesel, a Nobel Peace Prize winner who had himself survived the Holocaust and who moreover had his roots in Transylvania. The Commission’s two most important aims were to include the Holocaust in Romanian historical culture and, with the help of this inclusion, prove to the world at large that the new post-communist Romania respected human rights on a historical basis and was therefore developing in the right direction, as seen from a Western perspective.32
With regard to the influence of American popular culture one can, above all, discuss Steven Spielberg’s film, *Schindler’s List*, which had a special connection to the Czech Republic. This movie was not a clear guide to how the Holocaust should be written into Czech and Slovak historical narratives, a guide that could be perceived as American. In connection with *Schindler’s List*, the nationalisation of the Holocaust became more than problematic, as I will demonstrate in the chapter devoted to this subject. All this being said, *Schindler’s List* was followed in both the Czech Republic and Slovakia by a further American initiative: Steven Spielberg’s, Survivors of the Shoah Visual History Foundation. Focused on interviews with those who had survived the Holocaust, this activity also came without a clear American message, i.e. without being framed into what could be described as an American meaning.\(^{33}\)

The Holocaust’s Europeanisation can, on the other hand, be interpreted much more unequivocally. Because European institutions began to use the Holocaust to give historical legitimacy to the ongoing European integration process in the 1990s, one can first and foremost perceive the process of Europeanisation as an attempt to create a common European historical narrative, or at least a common European view of the Holocaust that would be able to compete with established national narratives and induce the EU members and candidate countries to concur. What is meant by the Holocaust’s Europeanisation is therefore a historical-cultural process stemming from the EU goal of including the Holocaust as a cultural aspect of the current process of European integration.\(^{34}\)

As previously mentioned, it was initially the Second World War and not specifically the Holocaust that was used in this process shortly after the end of the Cold War, the aim being to bridge the differences between East and West. One could not, however, speak of either a united or centralised view of the Second World War. It was only when the Holocaust had been put forth as the war’s most significant component that the Europeanisation process gained a historical foundation stone which could assist the EU in developing a cultural counterpart to the member states’ common political decisions and common European market.\(^{35}\) The Holocaust has, as one of the European institutions concluded, ‘driven the EU’s founders to build a united and peaceful Europe and thus been at the very root of the European integration project’.\(^{36}\)

The relationship between the memory of the Holocaust and respect for human rights in Europe after the Cold War began to receive attention first when the EU was set to expand eastwards while simultaneously fearing the radical growth of post-communist nationalist and religious hatred in the former Yugoslavia, which grew into the most violent conflict in Europe since the end of the Second World War. This can be illustrated by the fact that in 1995, during the first expansion after the fall of the Berlin Wall, there were no special EU demands placed upon the new member countries of Finland, Sweden and Austria. This was particularly interesting in Austria’s case, as it was
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exactly the situation regarding the memory of the Holocaust that led to the country’s international isolation both shortly prior to and soon after its attachment to the EU. In the first case, the crisis started in 1985 when former UN Secretary-General and later Austrian President, Kurt Waldheim, was disclosed as an intelligence officer of the Wehrmacht during the Second World War. At the centre of the second crises stood Jörg Haider, the leader of the extreme-right Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) party which, after its success in the 1999 parliamentary elections, became part of the Austrian coalition government in 2000.37

Shortly after the expansion from twelve to fifteen EU member states in 1995, the three aforementioned countries that interestingly enough were all neutral during the Cold War were included in ‘old Europe’. After 1995, however, there were ten more countries, eight of them post-communist, which were depicted as ‘the new Europe’ standing at the top of the EU waiting list. At a top meeting of the EU in Vienna in December 1998, during the Austrian presidency, the Holocaust was used to urge the new candidates to combat racism and tendencies towards national hate.38

Among the individual member countries that actively contributed to the process of cultural Europeanisation by political means, while using the Holocaust as the main part of the European Canon, newly ‘Europeanised’ Sweden played a specific role. After discovering how little the younger generations in this country actually knew about the Holocaust and how uncertain they were about whether or not the Holocaust had actually taken place, the Prime Minister of Sweden, Göran Persson, himself a former minister of education and as such actually partly responsible for the prevailing lack of knowledge about the Holocaust, initiated and became the driving force behind the Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research (ITF) in 1998. This organisation became an intergovernmental body with the purpose of placing political and social leaders’ support behind the need for Holocaust education, remembrance and research both nationally and internationally.39 Even though the organisation is not limited to Europe, a vast majority of today’s 28 members are European countries and EU-member states. In 2000, Sweden extended its activities by organizing the Stockholm International forum on the Holocaust, where representatives from 46 states gathered with aims similar to the goals of the Task Force. The Stockholm Declaration adopted by this forum became the foundation of the ITF.

During this meeting, EU members initiated a boycott of the new coalition government of Austria, which included Heider’s FPÖ, again with the most active participation of Göran Persson. Last but not least, Swedish EU-commissioner, Margot Wallström, while commemorating the sixtieth anniversary of the liberation of the ghetto in the Czech town of Terezín (Theresienstadt) in 2005, caused international controversy when she delivered
a speech to journalists that linked opponents of the proposal for a new EU treaty with the Nazis saying:

There are those today who want to scrap the supra-national idea. They want the EU to go back to the old purely intergovernmental way of doing things. I say those people should come to Terezín and see where that old road leads.\(^40\)

An often-forgotten detail in this context is the significance of the definition of the Holocaust as the ‘genocide of Jews, Roma and other groups’. This definition, which has in principle became the only one in the terminology of the EU, emphasises above all the similarities between the genocide of Jews, Shoah, and that of Roma, Porrajmos, at the expense of differences, while ‘other groups’ are often not even specified.\(^41\) The genealogical perspective founded upon the fight against racism in the post-war era is evident. In Western societies and historical cultures this definition of the Holocaust has not stood out as especially problematic in relation to the Europeanisation process. However, in post-communist East and Central Europe, where the situation of the Roma is far more complicated, the question has been much more difficult to handle. This is illustrated in the chapter entitled ‘Pig farm as a Porrajmos remembrance site’.

The aspiration to utilise the Holocaust as the core of a historical primary narrative about the new Europe, in other words, an EU ‘master narrative’, is problematic from the perspective of the post-communist countries for two reasons.

Firstly, one is forced to accept this main narrative in a part of the world where the memory of the Holocaust was intentionally ignored and suppressed during basically the whole post-war era by the representatives of the governing ideology. This is further complicated by the fact that the narrative’s West European main actors have little consideration for the traumatic legacy that this communist ideology, and the regimes the ideology supported, has left behind.

Secondly, a centralised initiative, governed from above, is being introduced at the same time as the post-communist countries, conversely, are attempting to rid themselves of earlier centralised thinking. As I will demonstrate, the significance of the EU’s partial victories against nationalist forces in the Czech Republic and Slovakia can be seen as problematic when changes in political attitudes – made in connection with attempts to nationalise the Holocaust – are not followed by changes in the public’s attitudes ‘from below’. An important question is, naturally, for whom the EU initiative is mainly intended: is it for the central authorities or for ‘ordinary people’? The fact that the Europeanisation of the Holocaust is primarily directed from above rather than developing more spontaneously from below gives the whole initiative a bureaucratic and formal character, as is also shown in the subsequent empirical chapters.
The Holocaust, historical cultures and research

As has already been established, this study has been written as an integral part of the Swedish project ‘The Holocaust and the European Historical Culture’, the main aim of which was to study and analyse the Holocaust’s position in the historical cultures of different European countries. The study’s theoretical framework is based upon research on historical consciousness. An important name in this context is the German historian, Jörn Rüsen, who has paved the way for understanding how historical consciousness functions and how it is expressed within a historical culture. Moreover, Rüsen has pointed to a close connection between historical consciousness and a ‘narrative competence’, which expresses ‘the ability of human consciousness to carry out procedures which make sense of the past, effecting a temporal orientation in present practical life by means of the recollection of past actuality’, and has additionally drawn attention to the principles governing historical narratives.

For research on questions regarding the Holocaust’s place in different historical cultures, Peter Novick’s study, *The Holocaust in American Life*, has been of pioneering significance. This book does not cover the whole of American society, but deals primarily with American Jews. Its strength, however, lies in showing the processual and structural aspects of the American Jewish historical culture in relation to the Holocaust, while at the same time reflecting American and international aspects surrounding the memory and use of the genocide.

Another book I would like to mention is the British historian, Tony Kushner’s, *The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination*, which concerns the victorious democratic superpowers’ reactions to the Holocaust during and after the Second World War. Kushner has shown that not only totalitarian regimes have had problems dealing with the memory of the Holocaust but also pluralist societies whose historical cultures have been dominated by liberal values. Liberalism did not in any way mean that the British and American historical cultures automatically accepted and integrated Holocaust history. The Holocaust’s true nature was seldom understood and the Jews often had to shoulder the blame for their own fate. Concrete examples of how the memory of the Nazi past, including the Holocaust, developed in parallel in totalitarian and pluralistic societies after the Second World War and up to the fall of the Berlin Wall have been analysed by the American historian Jeffrey Herf.

In relation to research on Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, this book attempts to at least partly fill a void that exists regarding historical-cultural research on the general role of history and the Holocaust’s specific role in Czech and Slovak identity construction and societal development. As far as I am aware, no similar work has been published in either the Czech or Slovak context. It has been difficult for historical-cultural studies to gain recognition at all in these two countries. There are, however, analyses lying close to certain aspects that I take up in my work.
The political scientist, Shari J. Cohen, analyses the leading Slovak elites’ relation to history, which from the perspective of this study seems very relevant. She focuses particularly on the period between 1989 and 1992 and sees Slovakia as a typical example of post-communist development in Central Europe. However, in her analysis of political culture, Cohen focuses mostly on the historical background of the elites and not their intentions and manner of using history. This explains what is, from my perspective, her very problematic sub-heading regarding an ‘absence of history in postcommunist nationalism’. Because the leading post-communist elite consisted of people who for career reasons left the communist party and who for the same reason used nationalism, this means that their opportunism was not founded upon a clearly defined ideology and therefore not on a distinct history, either. After having shown how the elites were constructed, Cohen leaves the questions unanswered: what history they construct, and why?

The Czech-English anthropologist, Ladislav Holy, carries out a more general analysis of how the Czech national identity has been constructed in a society that is in the process of transformation after communism. Despite analysing how history is perceived in Czech society – Slovak society is not examined – he sees his main task as being a cultural analyst of Czech politics. However, he does not draw attention to history’s role in the Czech national identity as a process in which different historical narratives compete with each other and where the past is brought together with the present and with dreams about the future. Holy does not, therefore, discuss history’s guiding role for the future and the concrete ways in which history is used for diverse purposes.

Both Cohen and Holy focus only on a part of the former Czechoslovakia, despite their having to relate the one national identity to the other. There is, in fact, only one study that, with the help of a comparative method, attempts to study history’s place in both Czech and Slovak post-communist development. On the other hand, this work, by the Danish Slavistics scholar, Lone Sarauw, analyses the Czech and Slovak identities only in relation to the collapse of Czechoslovakia, and only takes up the historical events and conceptions that have had an impact upon the direct relations of both countries.

There is no literature that demarcates and compares historical narratives in the Czech Republic and Slovakia after 1989. Neither does the study by Antohi et al (2007) published in English with the title Narratives Unbound. Historical Studies in Post-Communist Eastern Europe offer much help despite the inclusion of the word narrative in its title. The sections on the Czech Republic and Slovakia deal primarily with their historiography and its thematisation. However, this does indicate, mainly in the Czech chapter, how little interest in the Holocaust there is among Czech historians.

In both the Czech Republic and Slovakia, historical research still focuses on a historical development perspective. The newest book on ‘the Czech
question’ presents how the Czech identity has been perceived by leading Czech historians and intellectuals at different stages in the development of Czech history. Two comprehensive volumes of the anthology, Spor o smysl českých dějin (‘The dispute about Czech history’s meaning’), describe different Czech views on Czech history, or rather its separate building stones. These authors, however, do not pose questions with a historical-cultural orientation about the circumstances and needs that stand behind this research, or about the factors that decide the legitimacy of a meaning; neither do they analyse the extent to which the historians’ conceptions about the meaning of Czech history coincide with the needs and ideas of other societal groups. In this way the question as to whether one can really talk about one meaning as opposed to several is avoided.55

The same theoretical problems must be wrestled with regarding the recent Slovak study analysing ‘Slovak historical myths’, Mýty naše slovenské (‘Our Slovak myths’). This group of Slovak historians admit, on the one hand, the great influence of myths on Slovak society, but assert, on the other hand, that these myths are false. Compared with historical facts, the myths are dismissed as direct lies. Thus, in theory, their influence upon Slovak society, including the authors themselves, has therefore no need of scrutiny.56 Nevertheless, new interdisciplinary approaches to history are becoming more visible, especially in very recent years and among younger generations.57

In relation to the Holocaust itself, research on ‘the final solution’ in the Czech Republic and Slovakia is also dominated by a traditionalist view and conception of the historical development perspective as the only truly scientific one. A classic work in the Czech context is Miroslav Kárný’s (1991) Konečné řešení (‘The final solution’) about the genocide of the Czech Jews as part of German-occupation politics.58 This work, however, focuses primarily on German decision making in the occupied Czech territories of Bohemia and Moravia.

The Jewish minority’s situation in Bohemia and Moravia at the end of the 1930s is examined in two books published by the Jewish Museum in Prague, Židovská menšina v Československu ve 30. letech (‘The Jewish minority in Czechoslovakia during the 1930s’),59 and Židovská menšina za druhé republiky (‘The Jewish minority during the Second Republic’).60

The Aryanisation process in occupied Bohemia and Moravia is studied in a work entitled Arizace’ a arizátoři (‘The Aryanisations and those Aryanised’).61 Czech anti-Semitism during the Second World War is primarily discussed in historical works directed towards analysing Czech extreme-right movements and their activities. Within this category belong Tomáš Pasák’s study, Český fašismus 1922-1945 a kolaborace 1939-1945 (‘Czech fascism 1922–1945 and the cooperative politics 1939–1945’);62 Miroslav Gregorovič’s book, Kapitoly o českém fašismu (‘Chapters on Czech fascism’);63 and Jan Rataj’s work, O autoritativní národní stát. Ideologické proměny v druhé republice 1938-1939 (‘On the
authoritarian national state. Ideological changes in Czech politics during the Second Republic 1938–1939”). Recently a more comprehensive study in English on the genocide of Jews from Bohemia and Moravia was written by the historian, Livia Rothkirchen, who works in Israel.

Among the most important books that reconstruct the chronology of the Slovak Holocaust are Ivan Kamenec’s *Po stopách tragédie* (‘The trail of tragedy’); Ladislav Lipscher’s *Židia v slovenskom štátte* (‘The Jews in the Slovak state’); and Eduard Nižňanský’s *Nacismus, Holocaust, slovenský štát* (‘Nazism, the Holocaust and Slovak state’). The lives of the Jewish minority in the Slovak state’s initial period are studied in Eduard Nižňanský’s book, *Židovská komunita na Slovensku medzi československou parlamentnou demokraciou a slovenským štátom v stredoeurópskom kontexte* (‘The Jewish minority in Slovakia between the Czechoslovak parliamentarian democracy and the Slovak state in a Central European context’). Among the document collections dealing with the Holocaust in Slovakia are *Holokaust na Slovensku* (‘The Holocaust in Slovakia’) in seven volumes; *Vatikán a Slovenská republika (1939-1945)* (‘The Vatican and the Slovak Republic, about the relationship between the Vatican and Tiso’s regime’); and part of a collection of Tiso’s writings and speeches, *Jozef Tiso. Prejavy a články* (‘Josef Tiso, speeches and articles’). A collection of survivors’ memories from the Holocaust, *Prežili holocaust* (‘They survived the Holocaust’), which marginally concerns even the post-war period, was based on Steven Spielberg’s aforementioned witness initiative and its implementation in Slovakia. It has been published by ethnologist Peter Salner. Salner is also the author of another relevant study on the Jewish minority in Slovakia, *Židia na Slovensku medzi tradíciou a asimiláciou* (‘The Jews in Slovakia between tradition and assimilation’).

The Slovak Institute for the National Memory (Ústav pamäti národa), established in 2002 in Bratislava, was given the task by the Slovak parliament of studying the two totalitarian dictatorships that have left their imprint on the development of Slovakia and Czechoslovakia. Its aim is to ‘spread ideas about democracy and the defence of freedom against regimes like the Nazi and communist ones’, i.e., educating for democracy and not allowing dark history to be forgotten. The Institute focuses, above all, on making public the information that the Slovak and Czechoslovak secret services gathered on their citizens during the respective dictatorships. On its homepage, the Institute publishes facts about the repression of Slovak Jews during the Second World War and also offers video recordings of testimonies from those who survived the Holocaust. However, as the institute has an ideological profile, its activities reflect all the problems connected with the effort to include the Holocaust into the dominant Slovak master narratives that will be presented later.

The study of the Holocaust should also be among the tasks for the Czech Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes (Ústav pro studium totalitních
režimů), established at the beginning of 2008. The purpose of this Institute is to study both the Nazi and the communist periods, but even here the question is highly problematic. Emphasis has until now been almost exclusively placed upon the communist period.\(^75\)

The first book to analyse the Holocaust in Bohemia, Moravia and to some extent also Slovakia from another, in this case sociological, perspective was published in 2006 in the USA. Its author, the Canadian sociologist, Alena Heitlinger, who herself has roots in the Czech Republic’s Jewish minority, attempts to analyse the Czech-Jewish culture, including the memory of the Holocaust, during the communist era.\(^76\) Rather than a historical-cultural study, the book is primarily a sociological examination of a selected Jewish group of about 200 members of whom roughly half fled from communism to live abroad. Questions regarding how the Jewish identity was formed in different generations during the post-war period are studied in relation to the communist power and ideology. This leads Heitlinger to the conclusion that the possibilities for Czech Jews to freely seek their identity have become much greater since the collapse of communism. She does not, however, confront the Czech-Jewish identification process with its diverse conceptions of the Czech national identity and different interpretations of Czech history, either before or after the fall of communism. Another book which should be mentioned in this context is Eleonóra Hamar’s study, Vypálená židovství (‘Narrated Jewishness’), which presents the author’s empirical research into the narrative construction of Jewish identity among six Czech and Hungarian Jewish children of Holocaust survivors. Even though its focus is rather limited, this book is the first Czech study that deals in-depth with questions about the relationship between a specific historical narrative about the Holocaust and Jewish identity in post-war Czechoslovakia.\(^77\)

Comprehensive materials that in different ways relate to the main questions of this book have been analysed. These comprise political and media debates; popular products, such as books, television programmes and films; and the scientific works written and published after 1989. At the centre stand those contributions that have been debated on a national level and have therefore been able to influence a large number of people. This does not mean that articles or other printed works published at local or regional levels or materials intended only for a limited group of readers, for instance the ethnic press, have been ignored. However, such materials are referred to only when they have had an impact outside their original limited sphere. The local debate from Svitavy, Oskar Schindler’s hometown, is an example of this. Another is the debate surrounding the two labour camps of Lety and Hodonín, in Bohemia and Moravia, where imprisoned Roma awaited death during the war. In the analysis of the Slovak ‘Múzeum SNP’ in Banská Bystrica, all available original material, including the papers presented at various scientific conferences and publications published by the museum, has been used.
Notes

8. In 1992 the Maastricht Treaty gave European cooperation a new quality by changing the earlier European Economic Community (EEC) to the European Union (EU), namely therefore a union. In Article B it is stated that the EU in its security policy must act towards internationally strengthening the ‘European identity’.
12. All these regions except Ruthenia were returned to Czechoslovakia after the Second World War. Ruthenia, however, became part of Ukraine and the Soviet Union.
13. I use the term *gypsies* in relation to the contemporaneous context during the Second World War. The term *Roma* is, however, used in its 1990s context.
16. The question of the trial’s judicial circumstances is discussed in the book *Proces s dr. Jozefom Tisom*, which was jointly written by Tiso’s prosecutor, Anton Rašla and his lawyer, Ernest Žabkay, who were both Slovaks. Czechoslovak political circumstances are summarised by the Czech historian, Karel Kaplan in *Dva retribuční procesy. Komentované dokumenty (1946–1947)*, Prague: Ústav pro soudobé dějiny, 1992. See also: Anton Rašla and Ernest Žabkay, *Proces s dr. Jozefom Tisom*, Bratislava: Tatrapress, 1990. The literature on this subject is, however, very sparse.


34. For more on this subject, see Karlsson, ‘The Uses of History’.


37. For more on this, see Fredrik Lindström, ‘The First Victim? Austrian Historical Culture and the Memory of the Holocaust’, in Karlsson and Zander, *Post-War Battlefields*.


39. See http://www.holocausttaskforce.org/about-the-itf.html

40. For more about this case, see, for example: *The Financial Times*, 12 May 2005. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/62129ae4-c309-11d9-abf1-00000e2511c8.html#axzz1hd8dmv00


42. Two other theses were written within the project, one about Israel and the other on Ukraine: Mikael Tossavainen, *Heroes and Victims: The Holocaust in Israeli Historical Consciousness,*
Lund: Lund University, 2006; and Johan Dietsch, *Making Sense of Suffering: Holocaust and Holodomor in Ukrainian Historical Culture*, Lund: Lund University, 2006. The project's analyses have also been published in the two volumes by Karlsson and Zander, *Echos of the Holocaust* and *Post-War Battlefields*, and contributions from an international project conference are also summarised in *The Holocaust Heritage*. All these works, as with the latest book originating from the project by Kristian Gerner and Klas-Göran Karlsson, *Folkmordens historia*, Stockholm: Atlantis 2005, lie close to each other as they proceed from the same theoretical framework.


47. Ibid., 273.


52. Sarauw, *Together We Part*.

53. Antohi, Trencsényi and Apor, *Narratives Unbound*.


73. See http://www.upn.gov.sk

74. For more about ideological use of history by the Slovak Institute for the National Memory (Ústav památi národa, ÚPN) in Bratislava as well as by the similar institute, the Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes (Ústav pro studium totalitních režimů, ÚSTR) in Prague, see Tomas Sniegon, ‘Implementing Post-Communist National Memory in the Czech Republic and Slovakia: Institutes of “National Memory” in Bratislava and Prague’, in Conny Mithander, John Sundholm and Adrian Velicu, eds, *European Cultural Memory Post-89*, Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2013, 97–124. See also Peter Dinuš, *Vyrovnávanie sa s minulosťou?* Bratislava: Veda, 2010.

75. See http://ustrcr.cz/index-2html
