

INTRODUCTION

COSMOPOLITAN MEMORY AND THE GREEK GENOCIDE NARRATIVE



On 11 March 2010, the Parliament of Sweden voted to endorse a motion calling for recognition of the “1915 genocide of Armenians, Assyrians/Syriacs/Chaldaeans and Pontic Greeks” as a historical fact.¹ The motion, which passed the vote by narrow majority, stirred an emotionally charged debate, with allegations on the one hand of history being politicized, and on the other hand accusations of genocide denial for the sake of good relations with Turkey, the successor state to the crumbling empire of 1915’s perpetrators. Sweden’s government, for which the Parliament’s resolution was a source of diplomatic embarrassment, maintained that history should be left to the historians, not to legislative assemblies. Those who supported the recognition of the atrocities committed against Ottoman Christians as an act of genocide argued that the historians had already established the facts. The genocide was a reality and it was now the politicians’ duty to urge Turkey to face its own history. But while the plight of the Armenians and of other Christians in Eastern Anatolia was never disputed in the debate, the Pontic (or Pontian) Greeks mentioned among the victims seemed to raise a few eyebrows. One commentator claimed that there had never been a genocide of the Greeks once inhabiting the region of Pontos in northern Turkey, and that the Swedish Parliament and certain historians had bestowed an “inaccurate historiography with legitimacy.”² Few seemed to recall ever having heard of this community and an event

that nonetheless was recognized as true. Responses to this assertion ranged from awkward uncertainty among those who had voted in favor of the resolution and outrage from Sweden's Pontian Greek community. "What makes him an expert of our history?" stated a representative of that community. "We just want recognition and in the end an apology from the Turkish people."³

This book examines the distinctive forms that collective memories take and the ways in which they find acceptance as facts, in an age of human rights and an emerging cosmopolitan culture of remembrance. More specifically, it examines how the notion of the Greek genocide has come into being, and how different forces, circumstances and debates have shaped this "memory" over the course of the past three decades. Memories do not arise from a void. Whether they stem from lived experience or are constructed for a purpose, they always reflect a certain historical, cultural and political setting. Although a configuration of recent vintage, the "Greek genocide" refers to an event, or series of events, which, known as the Asia Minor Catastrophe, had lived for more than half a century before in the collective remembrance and national imagination of Greeks. Some of the Swedish MPs might have been aware of the population exchange between Greece and Turkey in 1923, through which around 1.2 million Anatolian Greeks and 400,000 Balkan Muslims were forcibly expelled from their homelands. Perhaps they also knew that this event had been the precedent of the ethnic cleansing carried out on a much grander scale in Central and Eastern Europe during and after World War II. But what the petitioners of the motion asked for was political recognition of a new interpretation of these events, which sought to make sense of them not just within the context of a national past, or Greek-Turkish relations, but within a broader framework of crimes against humanity. According to the advocates of this interpretation, the catastrophe of the Greek inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire must not be understood in isolation from but rather as a parallel to the (internationally much better known) Armenian genocide.

In order to understand why this redefinition of national experience, or collective remembrance, came about, we need to consider the intricate set of processes that is globalization and its impact on local contexts. The preoccupation of Swedish politicians with the tragic fate of the Ottoman Empire's Christian minorities nearly a century ago signals the coming of transnational history-cultural concerns into a society unaffected by (and largely unaware of) the historical event in question. These concerns are the outcome of intertwined and mutually reinforcing processes—globalization, transnational and institutionalized remembrance of the Holocaust as a new form of "cosmopolitan memory," and

growing attention to human rights issues—which all gained momentum at the end of the Cold War.⁴ While it is all too easy to assume that state boundaries erode as the result of the nation state’s decline, or that all aspects of human life necessarily mirror the economic transactions that take place on a global level, there is much to be said for the observation that transnational migration, new technologies and other processes influence how a growing number of people around the world perceive themselves and others. Even those who resist globalization must find ways to come to terms with it. Its influence is, among other things, to be found in the ways in which the Holocaust has been reconfigured as a sort of “cosmopolitan” past that transcends national boundaries, as an event of European, if not global, significance. Attention to the Nazis’ destruction of European Jewry has shifted from debates about its origins and nature to a broader emphasis on its public remembrance; how it was remembered, how it should have been remembered, and, consequently, how it can and ought to be remembered in the future. This is not merely an academic debate. Films, speeches, commemorative dates, museum exhibits and other media highlight these issues. Educators look to the Holocaust to teach their students the values of democracy and tolerance, while political leaders across the Western world evoke it to reaffirm the state’s commitment to these values, using the event as a negative example to tell its citizens precisely what their society is not.

From being treated as a mere side effect of World War II, the Holocaust has taken center stage as the “absolute evil” of the modern age.⁵ This and the increasing willingness of states to admit guilt for their own part in this and other events in the past, sometimes mending wrongs by making reparations to victims of earlier state policies,⁶ have contributed to change common views about history as something that imbues the present with meaning. No longer is the progress or heroic exploits of nations the dominant sort of history from which meaningful lessons are drawn, or ideas about the human condition are nurtured, in the Western world, but more so the moral collapse that from time to time has marked the twentieth century: the two world wars, the totalitarian ideologies and the phenomenon of genocide, the “crime of all crimes” known to mankind. States are neither the only parties involved in memory politics. Public Holocaust remembrance has opened, in the words of David B. MacDonald, a window of opportunity for substate actors to draw attention to their own historical or current predicaments.⁷ Meanwhile, the human rights challenge to state sovereignty and the renewed significance of the genocide concept as perpetrators of atrocities face trial in international courts of law at the dawn of the new millennium pave the way for the, more or less, forgotten tragedies

of the past. The most notable example is the Armenian genocide, carried out by the Young Turks in the shadow of World War I, which in itself is considered by many the original disaster that spawned Europe's "dark" century, the "age of extremes," the "century of camps and genocides." As a Swedish historian has put it, the Swedish Parliament's recognition of the 1915 genocide in 2010 is "a good illustration of the force history can possess when Sweden, a country which for decades praised itself for having had no part in the great tragedies of modern European history, now has entered World War I, on the side of the victims and the injured."⁸

Purpose, Aims and Argument of the Book

It is against this backdrop that activists in Greece and the Greek diaspora set their claim for the national and international recognition of their community's experience as genocide. Though the Greek state recognizes two dates that commemorate the "genocide of the Greeks of Pontos" and the "genocide of the Greeks of Asia Minor by the Turkish state" respectively, the claim is mostly advanced by nonstate actors. Commemoration thereof is, despite the occasional lip service of political leaders and government officials in Greece, mainly the concern of dedicated individuals and nongovernmental organizations. Meanwhile, despite the predictable Turkish efforts to discredit it, Greek mainstream historians, educators and influential commentators oppose this claim as founded upon "ahistorical and anti-scientific opinion."⁹ An important objective of this book is to understand why the notion of the Greek genocide, or the Pontian and Anatolian Greek genocides, has become so contested. What are the reasons for what I call the Greek genocide narrative's impact on debates on the Greek past as well as the difficulties encountered in finding acceptance as true history and a valid "national memory"? An important analytical perspective is therefore political, which means paying attention to how the claim has been lobbied in political assemblies, as well as understanding the particular political context in which debates occur, and the cultural and historical circumstances that underpin them.

As the appearance of the Greek genocide issue in Swedish politics demonstrates, this is not a debate or a memory-political phenomenon that is confined to one national context. An important second category of analysis is transnational or comparative, which is understood as the examination of links between the Greek activists and similar memory-political initiatives among other ethnic groups. What is the

relation between the Greek genocide narrative and other histories of atrocity? Connected to this is a third category that might be called a science-sociological perspective, which analyzes the various academic responses to this claim, both in Greece and in the international community of scholars that encounter it. Finally, there is also a fourth perspective, which has to do with education and historical sense-making. How is remembrance of the Greek genocide constructed, taught and made sense of by activists, scholars, educators, and others concerned with it?

It is not entirely possible to separate one perspective from another among those mentioned here. When a politician argues that the memory of genocide is paramount to national self-understanding, and of equal significance to internationally recognized cases, such as the Holocaust, he or she is using ideas about a cosmopolitan past to make sense of a national or ethnic experience. In a similar way, historians that take part in this debate do so not strictly as scholars weighing the evidence for or against a certain interpretation of history, but also as citizens concerned with how the past is used and what lessons should be handed down to society. Nonetheless, the reader of this book may find the distinctions useful.

The debates explored here occur at a national as well as international level, and this has consequences for how remembrance of Greek suffering in Anatolia is represented, as the claims that fuel it move between different settings. In this way, this study brings attention to the making of a modern memory, in this case that of the Greek genocide, in its transition from a narrative of ethnic distinctiveness to transnational or cosmopolitan history, recognized as carrying universally valid experiences and values. A word is due about the concepts of cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitan memory. According to sociologist Ulrich Beck, cosmopolitanism refers to a process of “internal globalization” through which global concerns become part of the local (or national) experience of an increasing number of people.¹⁰ This notion has been elaborated by fellow sociologists Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, who have traced the emergence of “cosmopolitan memory” through the examination of how the Holocaust has been remembered and imbued with new meanings in different national societies. By cosmopolitanization they understand a sort of collective memory that has been “de-territorialized,” removed from its original historical and geographic context and made a universal concern for people in places far away. Remembrance of the event today known as the Holocaust is not the sole concern of Jewish victims and German perpetrators, and their descendants, as we have seen.

What was once considered local concerns can in the age of globalization thus be made global concerns, as the quest for international

recognition of atrocities so aptly illustrates. Efforts to study, recognize and teach genocide are premised on the belief that knowledge about past atrocities will prevent similar crimes from happening in the future. The rise of the transnational human rights regime, which since the end of the Cold War has grown more prominent, enables local (ethnic or national) experiences to become part of a universally shared past and thus to matter to others than those immediately involved. According to Levy and Sznajder, rather than being erased in the age of globalization, national and ethnic memories are transformed and subjected to a common patterning. “But in each case, the common elements combine with preexisting elements to form something new. In each case, the new global narrative has to be reconciled with the old national narratives, and the result is always distinctive.”¹¹

I argue that the emergence of the notion of the Greek genocide offers a case in which this interplay between the global and the local, between universalism and particularism, can be studied and better understood. Remarkably little has been written about this phenomenon among scholars of modern Greece, who, to the extent that they attend to it, tend to dismiss it as a mere expression of nationalism resting on an unsubstantiated claim that is unworthy of scholarly inquiry.¹² We know little of how the claim has been lobbied, its reception and the forces, interests and circumstances that have shaped its underpinning narrative. The quest for recognition is a dual process of nationalization and cosmopolitanization of memory, or a certain interpretation of history. This means that activists strive to convince a national audience that the experience of genocide is paramount to the community’s self-understanding and merits a special place within the nation’s canon of memories. At the same time, they strive to make sense of this perceived genocidal experience, and remembrance thereof, within a larger transnational context, with regard to audiences usually skeptical of nationalism. This is a process fraught with contradictions, which is why it is sometimes difficult to speak of one narrative of genocide, in the singular. Fierce controversies over definitions, historical interpretation and representation, and whom to include or exclude from the circle of victims divide activists among themselves and challenge the idea of a unified memory of genocide. Often, this discord results in part from exposure to the influence of cosmopolitan memory and contacts with other ethnic communities with similar agendas. The relations with similar memory-political projects offer a key toward understanding how “ethnic memories” are cosmopolitanized in a broader transnational perspective.

Historical culture in Greece—that is, the totality of discourses through which a society understands itself, the present and the future

through interpreting the past—has often been described in terms of ethnocentrism. Ever since scholars like Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos and Spyridon Zambelios stressed in the nineteenth century the continuity of Hellenic culture as a way to bridge the gap between the classical civilization admired by Philhellenes and Westernizing Greeks, and the traditions of Orthodox Byzantium, the Greek school system has stressed the unique features of the nation's historical experience. According to critics of this history education, this comes at the expense of broader European or world history perspectives, which might expand the mental horizons of students.¹³ Scholars of modern Greece have discussed the tendency toward what they call Greek exceptionalism, “an approach to Greek history focusing on its singularity that refuses to situate historical events in a broader comparative framework.”¹⁴ It is precisely this notion of exceptionalism—by no means exceptional to Greece—that makes relations to other memory communities important to study, as the idea of common fate may force Greek activists to re-conceptualize their notions of uniqueness. Sometimes this memory-work has other outcomes than what activists might have anticipated in the first place. These processes are little known and little studied. In that respect this book contributes to our understanding of a contemporary political as well as history-cultural phenomenon that is both national and transnational.

Terms and Theoretical Considerations: Genocide, Remembrance, Trauma

Before presenting the outline of this book, some recurring concepts need to be clarified. The first is that of genocide, which plays a central role in the activism and debates that are analyzed throughout the book. The term was coined by Polish-Jewish lawyer Raphael Lemkin in his work *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*, in 1944, to describe the ongoing Nazi annihilation of European Jewry, but reflected over two decades of Lemkin's thinking on the “crime of barbarity.”¹⁵ It was subsequently adopted and codified in the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948, whose Article 2 defines genocide as follows.

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

- a. Killing members of the group;
- b. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;

- c. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- d. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- e. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.¹⁶

Originally conceived of as a legal term to be used in the prosecution of individuals suspected of any of these acts, genocide has changed the way mass violence, in the past as well as in the present, is understood by scholars and laymen alike. It is, however, a concept that gives rise to inevitable controversies, political as well as academic. Its definition relies upon the intention of the perpetrator to “destroy, in whole or in part,” a certain group “as such.” It can be argued that an act of mass killing or policies that led to the mass death of a certain group was not genocide, because the perpetrators had some other “intent,” or because they intended to kill someone, but not any specified group “as such.” Another problem arises from the way in which the Soviets, contrary to Lemkin’s intentions, were able to compromise the definition by excluding political and social groups, for obvious reasons.¹⁷ Academics argue about whether the UN’s definition is too narrow, excluding virtually any atrocity that is not the Holocaust out of a misguided interpretation of the criteria and the original context in which it was conceived, or too broad, making the term vulnerable to rhetorical overuse, or as Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn put it “devoid of all cognitive content,” communicating “nothing but the author’s disapproval.”¹⁸ Others still question the term’s value as a guide to historical interpretation. “In the end,” as Timothy Snyder puts it, “historians who discuss genocide find themselves answering the question as to whether a given event qualifies, and so classifying rather than explaining.”¹⁹ Snyder may be right in that a simple classification cannot substitute for an explanation of the complexities of each case, but his own preferred term “mass killing” raises more questions than it answers. Even though it is not the purpose of this book to determine whether the violence against Ottoman Greeks was genocidal or not, it is perhaps inevitable to discuss the evidence supporting such an interpretation; something which I briefly do in Chapter 1. In any case, the disagreements and confusion surrounding the term suggests attention to how participants in debates about Greek genocide remembrance understand the concept itself.

Genocide is not a term confined to courtrooms and scholarly debates. As the case of the Holocaust’s legacies demonstrates, it also has a profound impact on what Levy and Sznaider call the modern memory-scape, meaning that it has given a name to events that many people find important and deeply meaningful to remember. This relation

between genocide and remembrance brings us to the thorny topic of collective memory, which has generated a vast literature in the humanities and the social sciences. The term collective memory was suggested by Maurice Halbwachs in his seminal work, *Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire*, in 1925, by which he understood the process in which different collectives, from groups of two individuals to groups in their thousands, come together to remember. When such people lose interest, or move away, or die, or for any other reason cease to engage in these acts of shared remembrance, the collective dissolves, and so does the collective memory that bound the individuals together.²⁰ Memory is thus a social as much as an individual process, something that continues to evolve, and is subject to changing circumstances. Often, memory is taken to be the opposite of history, understood as the scientific study of the past.²¹ Several historians have lamented the influence of the so-called memory boom, which they see as a perversion of historical knowledge in the service of identity politics, nostalgia, and other subjective truths.²² While there are differences between history—as a profession with rules about evidence, publication, and peer review—and memory as a process ungoverned by such rules, the distinction is not clear-cut. All historians are in a sense the children of their own time and place, which means that they are hardly isolated from the concerns and convictions about the past of their social settings. It is useful to keep the distinction between the historian’s work and more general “memory-work” in mind, but this should not blind us to the many overlaps that exist between the two. Jay Winter has suggested the term “historical remembrance” to overcome the binary opposition between history and memory in the analysis of how people make sense of the past. By insisting on such sense-making as acts of remembrance, he argues for avoiding “the pitfalls of referring to memory as some vague cloud which exists without agency, and to history as an objective story which exists outside of the people whose lives it describes.”²³ I agree with his critique of the concept of collective memory as vague; something that also can be said for Levy’s and Sznajder’s concept of cosmopolitan memory, which is not always clear on who it is that remembers, but which I nonetheless find useful for my analytical purposes. Memories of events exist but they do not acquire meaning before someone actively remembers them. In this study I refer to public or other forms of remembrance, and historical culture. By the latter term, I understand the set of discourses through which broader collectivities, such as national, religious or political communities, or individuals claiming to speak for such communities, make sense of themselves, their present and expectations of the future, by interpreting the past. Historical culture is the communicative context

in which history, or the narration of past events, is produced, mediated, discussed, and consumed. Dominant “grand” or “master” narratives provide a framework of interpretation through which individuals and collectivities remember, but the historical culture of any living society is also subject to change, as new political and cultural concerns, and demands from certain groups and international developments, challenge old certainties.²⁴ This suggests attention to how domestic concerns of national historical culture interact with those of other societies and a broader international community.

The concepts of genocide and memory come together in the notion of trauma, commonly understood as the (often involuntary) remembrance of dramatic events with disastrous consequences. Of specific interest to a study like this is Jeffrey C. Alexander’s notion of cultural trauma, or trauma drama. While traumas certainly haunt individuals with first-hand experience of such events, and often their immediate relations, collective traumas do not exist in and of themselves; rather than being found they are made, in response to different political, cultural and personal needs, which often change over time. Such collective trauma constructions, or cultural traumas, occur “when members of a collectivity feel they have been subjected to a horrendous event that leaves indelible marks upon their group consciousness, marking their memories forever and changing their future identity in fundamental and irrevocable ways.”²⁵ Seen from this perspective, it is important to ask why and under what circumstances such cultural traumas emerge—or fail to develop and gain a wider acceptance. Alexander argues that every trauma claim faces certain challenges, if it is to be recognized as a wound to a broader collectivity than those who experienced the injury first hand. “It begins with defining, symbolizing, and dramatizing what ‘happened’. In the course of this narration, the identity of the victims must be established, and so must the identity of the perpetrators ... Finally, a solution appropriate to these three ‘facts’ must be proposed.”²⁶ Certainly, material resources, such as media access, and demographic strength of a given “trauma community” matter, but the crucial element in the process is the making of a powerful narrative, a “cultural script” or drama, that tells the story of who did what to whom, and how society must respond if a collective identity is to be sustained. The truth of a cultural script depends, in Alexander’s view, not on its empirical accuracy, but its symbolic power and enactment, framed against the background expectations of the audiences the claim must convince. Often it is the already established cosmopolitan trauma drama of the Holocaust that provides the templates into which activists inscribe their drama. “[Turkish leader Kemal Atatürk] was the Hitler of our

peoples,” a leading Pontian Greek lobbyist states in a letter addressed to Armenian activists, calling upon them to join forces in response to the European Holocaust Remembrance Day. “The European peoples, but also the Jewish people as well as the people of Israel ... are obliged to say that Hitler was their Kemal.”²⁷

The material used for this study is texts found in books, press coverage, websites, blogs, public speeches, articles, and writings by activists and their opponents on the subject of genocide remembrance. I analyze these texts with particular attention to the ways that people interpret historical events and use them to frame their arguments, and also to the historical, political and cultural contexts in which these debates occur. All translations from the Greek and other languages are my own, unless stated otherwise.

How this Book is Structured

Apart from the introduction, this book is divided into six chapters and a concluding discussion. Chapter 1, “Ottoman Twilight: The Background in Anatolia,” describes the chain of events leading up to the compulsory population exchange between Greece and Turkey, set against the backdrop of Ottoman reform, war and collapse, and competing national aspirations. Although not a primary purpose of the study, it also discusses possible interpretations of the violence that unfolded, so as to provide the reader with a basic understanding of the often complex historical issues evoked by later activists and others struggling to make sense of this past.

Chapter 2, “‘Right to Memory’: From Catastrophe to the Politics of Identity,” examines the history of the Anatolian refugees in Greece and public remembrance of the expulsion, from the interwar years to the decade following the democratic breakthrough in 1974, and the coming of identity politics of the refugee descendants, notably the Pontian Greek community. In this chapter, I argue that the transition from the traditional authoritarian society to cultural and political pluralism had profound repercussions in national historical culture, as the dominant state narrative was challenged by alternative readings of the past. This development provides the immediate context in which a trauma narrative of Pontian Greeks as the victims of genocide emerged in the 1980s, framed as a demand for the “right to memory.”

In the following Chapter 3, “Nationalizing Genocide: The Recognition Process in Greece,” I examine the attempts to have the remembrance of this Pontian genocide, as well as a corresponding narrative about the

Catastrophe of the Greeks of Western Anatolia as genocide, acknowledged as a national trauma. Separate remembrance days of these events were established by the Hellenic Parliament between 1994 and 1998, but a thaw in Greek-Turkish relations would change the preconditions for the recognition process. The core of the chapter is an analysis of the public controversy that erupted in 2001, when predominantly left wing intellectuals called the interpretation of the Asia Minor Catastrophe into question, leading to a significant backlash for the genocide narrative. The skepticism toward this trauma claim, or rather resistance from a competing trauma narrative, is analyzed as responding to a perceived attempt to exculpate Greek right wing nationalism from the charge of having caused the Asia Minor Catastrophe, thereby reintroducing a nationalist agenda into mainstream debate and history education. The deeper causes of opposition to recognition of this tragedy as genocide, often framed as a defense of genuine collective memory and “national self-knowledge,” are found in the history of the political Left’s relation to the Asia Minor question, as well as in the scholarly ideals of the “new historians.” Both opponents to and, to some degree, supporters of the genocide narrative sought to frame their arguments in an anti-nationalist, antiestablishment discourse. Nonetheless, ethnocentrism was at the heart of these arguments, as both the former and the latter revealed little in terms of familiarity with international scholarly debates on genocide.

However, the relation between the notion of national suffering and histories of victimhood perceived as non-Greek would acquire a growing significance in debates concerning the Greek genocide(s) under the impact of official Holocaust commemoration. Chapter 4, “The Pain of Others: Empathy and the Problematic Comparison,” overlaps in some respects with the previous Chapter 3 but examines in greater depth the role played by the Holocaust and the Armenian genocide in these debates. These were not only the cases that activists of the Greek genocide narrative turned to for historical analogies or inspiration, but also histories of victimhood where Greeks had been involved as either co-victims or bystanders. Thus the pain of Others became a mirror for national concerns, making comparison an increasingly crucial part of arguments for and against the Greek genocide narrative. However, these comparisons involve their own set of ethical conundrums, which I argue might lead even well-intentioned debaters toward morally untenable positions. The official efforts to nationalize the Holocaust made it a contender for the sort of public commemoration that activists felt was being denied their own trauma, which played into the hands of right wing extremists, bent on pitting remembrance of Greek suffering against the cosmopolitan memory allegedly imposed from abroad. However, this tainted

association with xenophobia could also work as an incentive to address more universal concerns previously neglected in the trauma narrative.

Chapter 5, “Becoming Cosmopolitan? The Americanized Genocide Narrative in the Diaspora,” broadens the perspective by examining how the Greek genocide narrative plays into diaspora concerns about Greek ethnicity in the United States. Seen against the backdrop of ongoing assimilation, the genocide narrative is analyzed as responding to a need for orientation in time and a reaffirmation of a Greek identity perceived to be in peril. It pays particular attention to the role played by a successful Greek American novelist in popularizing the Pontian trauma drama, and also analyzes attempts to teach the Greek genocide narrative in an American school setting, while discussing factors involved in its international reception.

Chapter 6, “Three Genocides, One Recognition: The Christian Holocaust,” examines the politics of international academic recognition and the sometimes uneasy relationship between Greek activists and their Armenian and Assyrian counterparts. This is done through the analysis of the controversy that erupted within the International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS), in 2007, over a resolution that called upon the organization to extend its previous recognition of the Armenian genocide to the Greek and Assyrian tragedies as well. While accusing Armenian scholars and their supporters of denying victim status to the Ottoman Greeks, the advocates of the Greek genocide narrative also sought to enroll the Armenians as allies in the struggle for international recognition, by presenting the Greek, Assyrian and Armenian genocides as one, a “holocaust” targeting all Ottoman Christians. The strategy of placing one’s own community within an expanded circle of victims meant that elements in the trauma narrative that seem too ethnically peculiar came under attack from within activist circles. The consequences of the Greek genocide narrative opening toward identification with suffering Others are discussed toward the end of the chapter, before the book’s concluding part summarizes the findings of the study, and discusses the dangers involved in this sort of meaning-making memory.

Notes

1. Motion 2008/09: U332. Folkmordet 1915 på armenier, assyrier/syrianer/kaldéer och pontiska greker. http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/Forslag/Motioner/Folkmordet-1915-pa-armenier-a_GW02U332/. Last accessed 3 May 2011.
2. Ingmar Karlsson, “Folkmordet som aldrig ägde rum” [“The Genocide that Never Happened”], *Svenska Dagbladet*, 3 April, 2010.
3. http://www.svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/fortsatt-strid-om-folkmordsbeslut_4520091.svd. Last accessed 3 May 2011.

4. Daniel Levy and Natan Sznajder, *The Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age*, trans. Assenka Oksiloff (Philadelphia, 2006); Daniel Levy and Natan Sznajder, *Human Rights and Memory* (University Park, PA, 2010).
5. J.C. Alexander, "On the Social Construction of Moral Universals: The 'Holocaust' from War Crime to Trauma Drama," *European Journal of Social Theory* 5, no. 1 (February 2002): 5–85.
6. Elazar Barkan, *The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices* (New York and London, 2000); Jeffrey K. Olick, *The Politics of Regret: On Collective Memory and Historical Responsibility* (New York, 2007).
7. David B. MacDonald, *Identity Politics in the Age of Genocide: The Holocaust and Historical Representation* (London and New York, 2008).
8. Klas-Göran Karlsson, "De som är oskyldiga idag kan bli skyldiga imorgon": *Det armeniska folkmordet och dess efterbörd* ["Those Who Are Innocent Today Might Become Guilty Tomorrow": The Armenian Genocide and its Aftermath] (Stockholm, 2012), 10.
9. N. Filis, "To sch. P. D. gia ti 'genoktonia' anapempetai gia meleti" ["The Plan for Presidential Decree on the 'Genocide' is Referred Back for Examination"], *Avgi*, 25 February, 2001, 5.
10. U. Beck, "The Cosmopolitan Society and its Enemies," *Theory, Culture and Society* 19, No. 1–2 (2002): 17–44.
11. Levy and Sznajder, *Holocaust and Memory*, 3–4.
12. Among the few Greek scholars who have addressed the issue as a history-cultural problem, see, especially, Ch. Exertzoglou, "Mnimi kai genoktonia: I anagnorisi tis 'Genoktonias tou Pontiakou kai Mikrasiatikou Ellinismou' apo to Elliniko Koinovoulio" ["Memory and Genocide: The Recognition of the 'Genocide of Pontian and Asia Minor Hellenism' by the Hellenic Parliament"], *Historein* 4, 2003–2004, CD-ROM edition.
13. E. Avdela, "The Teaching of History in Greece," *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 18 (2000): 239–53. Anna Frangoudaki and Thalia Dragona, eds., *Ti ein' i patrida mas? Ethnokentrismos stin ekpaideusi* [What is our Fatherland? Ethnocentrism in Education] (Athens, 1997).
14. Loring M. Danforth and Riki Van Boeschoten, *Children of the Greek Civil War: Refugees and the Politics of Memory* (Chicago and London, 2012), 264. See also Roderick Beaton, "Introduction," in *The Making of Modern Greece: Nationalism, Romanticism and the Uses of the Past (1797-1896)*, ed. R. Beaton and D. Ricks (Farnham and London, 2009), 6. Martin Conway, "The Greek Civil War: Greek Exceptionalism, or Mirror of a European Civil War?" in *The Greek Civil War: Essays on a Conflict of Exceptionalism and Silences*, ed. P. Carabott and Th. Sfikas (Aldershot, 2004), 17–40. T. Gallant, "Greek Exceptionalism and Contemporary Historiography: New Pitfalls and Old Debates," *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 15, no. 2 (1997): 209–16.
15. Raphael Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of occupation, analysis of government, proposals for redress* (Washington, 1944).
16. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. <http://www.hrweb.org/legal/genocide.html>. Last accessed 28 November 2015.
17. Norman M. Naimark, *Stalin's Genocides* (Princeton and Oxford, 2010), 15–29.
18. Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, "Introduction," in *The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analysis and Case Studies*, ed. Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn (New Haven, CT, 1990), 3. For a discussion of the term genocide and alternative definitions, see Mark Levene, *Genocide in the Age of the Nation-State. Volume I: The Meaning of Genocide*, 2nd ed. (London and New York, 2008). Cf. Martin Shaw, *What is Genocide?* (Cambridge and Malden, 2007).

19. Timothy Snyder, *Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin*, 2nd ed. (New York, 2012), 413.
20. Maurice Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, trans. Lewis A. Coser (Chicago, 1992).
21. Pierre Nora, "General Introduction: Between Memory and History," in *Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past*, vol. 1, ed. P. Nora and L.D. Kritzman, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (New York, 1996), 1–20.
22. For a critical discussion of the memory concept's impact upon historical discourse in academia, see Kerwin Lee Klein, "On the Emergence of Memory in Historical Discourse," *Representations* 69 (2000): 127–50.
23. Jay Winter, *Remembering War: The Great War between Memory and History in the Twentieth Century* (New Haven and London, 2006), 11.
24. For a discussion of historical culture, see Klas-Göran Karlsson, "The Holocaust as a Problem of Historical Culture: Theoretical and Analytical Challenges," in *Echoes of the Holocaust: Historical Cultures in Contemporary Europe*, ed. K-G. Karlsson and U. Zander (Lund, 2003), 9–57.
25. Jeffrey C. Alexander, *Trauma: A Social Theory* (Cambridge and Malden, 2012), 6.
26. Alexander, *Trauma*, 119.
27. Michalis Charalambidis, "I 19i Maïou Imera Mnimis olon ton laon enantia sto ratsismo" ["May 19 as Memorial Day of All Peoples Against Racism"], in *Pontioi: Dikaioma sti mnimi* [Pontians: Right to memory], ed. M. Charalambidis and K. Fotiadis, 4th ed. (Athens, 2003), 143.