

INTRODUCTION



Several years ago, while going through the archives that the director of the French National Institute for Demographic Studies (INED), François Héran, had just opened for historical research, my attention was drawn to a thick document folded several times. I opened it carefully. Short sentences. Figures. Graphs. A large poster gradually unfolded before me. It was designed to be viewed and read from a distance, or by a small crowd, and was clearly intended for a hygiene exhibition – I would later find out it was for the one that was held in Strasbourg in 1935.

Its content, reproduced below (Figure 0.1), was surprising. Entitled ‘The Ungemach Gardens in Strasbourg’, it touted the ‘successful results’ achieved over the past eleven years by a garden city ‘built on a charming site at the outskirts of the city of Strasbourg’. The goal of this ‘creation with eugenic designs was to promote the development of valuable elements of society and to help them advance more quickly than others’, through the ‘deliberate selection of young households in good health’ who could rent a house in the city ‘at a low price while their family grew’.

These results were quantified and compared. The garden city of Ungemach had a much higher birth rate than Strasbourg and France. Infant health, measured by the mortality rate for children under two, was ‘above the average’ for the city. As they grew, the children’s height and weight exceeded those of their French and German counterparts. Living in the garden city even improved the parents: their ‘level of orderliness and cleanliness’, which a commission rated annually on a scale of one to ten, had progressed from 7.7 to 9.5 since they had moved there. The data demonstrated the success of the ambitious mission entrusted to the city: to increase ‘the number of valuable elements in the society of tomorrow’ – already quite a task – and even more, to help ‘guide human evolution towards more rapid advancement’.

I could have just scoffed or expressed outrage at this eugenic profession of faith. But for a historian, mockery mainly reflects the laziness of

the living in understanding what have become the unclear rationales of the dead. As for indignation, after ironically labelling it 'holy', Michel Foucault prophetically warned that 'experience shows that we can and should reject [its] theatrical role':¹ he thought it better to think and act. This cautionary note is all the more relevant since eugenics, from the very beginning and throughout its history, has been rebutted in other ways than hindsight claims to moral superiority.²

What bothered me about the document was, first of all, that I could not place it. What was this experiment? Why was its presentation to the general public included in the papers of one of the most diligent and creative demographers of the twentieth century, Louis Henry, who founded the discipline of historical demography in the 1950s? The interest of Alfred Sauvy, one of the great 'modernizing experts' of France during its postwar economic boom, deepened the mystery. In a letter dated 26 June 1951, the INED director assured the mayor of Strasbourg, Charles Frey (1888–1955), that his institute was following 'with great interest the results of this interesting creation with eugenic purposes'.³ Five years earlier, in July 1946, one of Sauvy's officials, Albert Michot, had submitted a flattering account of the city following a visit.⁴

This correspondence raised a new question. What did this explicit embrace of eugenics mean, six years after the end of the Second World War, in a country like France, which was thought to have remained steadfastly immune to such scientific and anti-egalitarian ideology? What light does it shed on the work of an author like Sauvy who was then in the process of choosing the title *Biologie sociale* [Social biology] for the second volume of his magnum opus, *Théorie générale de la population* [General theory of population]?⁵

These strange 'Ungemach Gardens' had cut me loose from familiar moorings: a rare occurrence in historical research on contemporary France that was unsettling... and fascinating. Initial documentary research assured me that this was more than an anecdotal curiosity. The Ungemach Gardens, a small twelve-hectare garden city located in northeast Strasbourg's Wacken neighbourhood, were an architectural pride of the city, for their green urbanism and their 140 little houses built shortly after 1920 in a nineteenth-century Alsatian style. They received sustained coverage in interwar architectural journals,⁶ and have been the subject of numerous and valuable works – research articles, theses and dissertations – by architectural and urban historians in Strasbourg and elsewhere.⁷

However, with regard to the garden city's ideology and principles that Alfred Sauvy found so appealing, historiography was mostly silent, or exclusively focused on their pronatalist aspects. They were only seriously

LES JARDINS UNGEMACH STRASBOURG

La Fondation „Les Jardins Ungemach“ est une œuvre à visées eugéniques.

Son but est de favoriser le développement des éléments précieux de la société et de leur aider à progresser plus rapidement que les autres.

Elle procède à cet effet à un choix réfléchi parmi de jeunes ménages en bonne santé et leur loue à un prix modique, pour le temps de leur épanouissement familial, une maisonnette de la cité „Les Jardins Ungemach“.

Cette cité-jardins, édifiée dans un lieu charmant aux abords de la ville de Strasbourg, a été étudiée dans ses moindres détails en vue d'offrir aux familles qui l'occupent des conditions de développement particulièrement favorables.

L'expérience des „Jardins Ungemach“ qui se poursuit depuis onze ans compte une série de résultats heureux dont les principaux sont:

I

Une natalité bien supérieure à la natalité française.

Comparaison sommaire.

Natalité de la ville de STRASBOURG	14 par mille habitants	12,014 par mille habitants
Natalité de la FRANCE	10,3	24,7
Natalité des JARDINS UNGEMACH	29	22,26

Comparaison exacte.

A STRASBOURG		
1000 Femmes mariées		
dont l'âge est compris entre 20 - 45		
dont le jour a	90 enfants	81,4 enfants
AUX JARDINS UNGEMACH		
1000 Femmes mariées		
dont l'âge est compris entre 20 - 45		
dont le jour a	128 enfants	123 enfants

II

Enfants d'une taille et d'un poids supérieurs à la moyenne.

	Moyenne de l'Europe occidentale (moyenne française)	Moyenne de l'Europe occidentale (moyenne française)	Moyenne de l'Europe occidentale (moyenne française)
	Sexe	Sexe	Sexe
POIDS	Enfants de 4 ans	14,500	14,500
	Enfants de 5 ans	14,125	13,800
	Enfants de 6 ans	14,750	13,800
	Enfants de 7 ans	15,000	13,800
TAILLE	Enfants de 4 ans	100	99
	Enfants de 5 ans	100	99
	Enfants de 6 ans	100	98
	Enfants de 7 ans	100	98

III

État de santé supérieur à celui de la moyenne.

L'état de santé de la Cité se reflète dans le tableau de mortalité de ses enfants et de ses adolescents.

Groupes d'âge	Pourcentage des décès	
	A STRASBOURG	AUX JARDINS UNGEMACH
0 - 1 an	0,000	0,000
1 - 2 ans	0,000	0,000
2 - 3 ans	0,000	0,000
3 - 4 ans	0,000	0,000
4 - 5 ans	0,000	0,000
5 - 6 ans	0,000	0,000
6 - 7 ans	0,000	0,000
7 - 8 ans	0,000	0,000
8 - 9 ans	0,000	0,000
9 - 10 ans	0,000	0,000
10 - 11 ans	0,000	0,000
11 - 12 ans	0,000	0,000
12 - 13 ans	0,000	0,000
13 - 14 ans	0,000	0,000
14 - 15 ans	0,000	0,000
15 - 16 ans	0,000	0,000
16 - 17 ans	0,000	0,000
17 - 18 ans	0,000	0,000
18 - 19 ans	0,000	0,000
19 - 20 ans	0,000	0,000
20 - 21 ans	0,000	0,000
21 - 22 ans	0,000	0,000
22 - 23 ans	0,000	0,000
23 - 24 ans	0,000	0,000
24 - 25 ans	0,000	0,000
25 - 26 ans	0,000	0,000
26 - 27 ans	0,000	0,000
27 - 28 ans	0,000	0,000
28 - 29 ans	0,000	0,000
29 - 30 ans	0,000	0,000
30 - 31 ans	0,000	0,000
31 - 32 ans	0,000	0,000
32 - 33 ans	0,000	0,000
33 - 34 ans	0,000	0,000
34 - 35 ans	0,000	0,000
35 - 36 ans	0,000	0,000
36 - 37 ans	0,000	0,000
37 - 38 ans	0,000	0,000
38 - 39 ans	0,000	0,000
39 - 40 ans	0,000	0,000
40 - 41 ans	0,000	0,000
41 - 42 ans	0,000	0,000
42 - 43 ans	0,000	0,000
43 - 44 ans	0,000	0,000
44 - 45 ans	0,000	0,000
45 - 46 ans	0,000	0,000
46 - 47 ans	0,000	0,000
47 - 48 ans	0,000	0,000
48 - 49 ans	0,000	0,000
49 - 50 ans	0,000	0,000
50 - 51 ans	0,000	0,000
51 - 52 ans	0,000	0,000
52 - 53 ans	0,000	0,000
53 - 54 ans	0,000	0,000
54 - 55 ans	0,000	0,000
55 - 56 ans	0,000	0,000
56 - 57 ans	0,000	0,000
57 - 58 ans	0,000	0,000
58 - 59 ans	0,000	0,000
59 - 60 ans	0,000	0,000
60 - 61 ans	0,000	0,000
61 - 62 ans	0,000	0,000
62 - 63 ans	0,000	0,000
63 - 64 ans	0,000	0,000
64 - 65 ans	0,000	0,000
65 - 66 ans	0,000	0,000
66 - 67 ans	0,000	0,000
67 - 68 ans	0,000	0,000
68 - 69 ans	0,000	0,000
69 - 70 ans	0,000	0,000
70 - 71 ans	0,000	0,000
71 - 72 ans	0,000	0,000
72 - 73 ans	0,000	0,000
73 - 74 ans	0,000	0,000
74 - 75 ans	0,000	0,000
75 - 76 ans	0,000	0,000
76 - 77 ans	0,000	0,000
77 - 78 ans	0,000	0,000
78 - 79 ans	0,000	0,000
79 - 80 ans	0,000	0,000
80 - 81 ans	0,000	0,000
81 - 82 ans	0,000	0,000
82 - 83 ans	0,000	0,000
83 - 84 ans	0,000	0,000
84 - 85 ans	0,000	0,000
85 - 86 ans	0,000	0,000
86 - 87 ans	0,000	0,000
87 - 88 ans	0,000	0,000
88 - 89 ans	0,000	0,000
89 - 90 ans	0,000	0,000
90 - 91 ans	0,000	0,000
91 - 92 ans	0,000	0,000
92 - 93 ans	0,000	0,000
93 - 94 ans	0,000	0,000
94 - 95 ans	0,000	0,000
95 - 96 ans	0,000	0,000
96 - 97 ans	0,000	0,000
97 - 98 ans	0,000	0,000
98 - 99 ans	0,000	0,000
99 - 100 ans	0,000	0,000

Ces moyennes s'appliquent aux années 1906 à 1908.

IV

Niveau d'ordre et de propreté supérieur au milieu habituel.

Une commission est chargée de constater le niveau d'ordre et de propreté des familles qui demeurent à l'habiter les Jardins Ungemach. Tous les ans la même commission constate le niveau d'ordre et de propreté des familles habitant la Cité. C'est cette note et la note d'ordre il y a un an qui sont les bases de la sélection.

Classification des notes	Notes attribuées l'année à la Cité	Notes attribuées l'année à la Cité
1000	9,5	9,5
1200	9,5	9,5
1400	9,5	9,5
1600	9,5	9,5
1800	9,5	9,5
2000	9,5	9,5
2200	9,5	9,5
2400	9,5	9,5
2600	9,5	9,5
2800	9,5	9,5
3000	9,5	9,5
3200	9,5	9,5
3400	9,5	9,5
3600	9,5	9,5
3800	9,5	9,5
4000	9,5	9,5
4200	9,5	9,5
4400	9,5	9,5
4600	9,5	9,5
4800	9,5	9,5
5000	9,5	9,5
5200	9,5	9,5
5400	9,5	9,5
5600	9,5	9,5
5800	9,5	9,5
6000	9,5	9,5
6200	9,5	9,5
6400	9,5	9,5
6600	9,5	9,5
6800	9,5	9,5
7000	9,5	9,5
7200	9,5	9,5
7400	9,5	9,5
7600	9,5	9,5
7800	9,5	9,5
8000	9,5	9,5
8200	9,5	9,5
8400	9,5	9,5
8600	9,5	9,5
8800	9,5	9,5
9000	9,5	9,5
9200	9,5	9,5
9400	9,5	9,5
9600	9,5	9,5
9800	9,5	9,5
10000	9,5	9,5

La note élevée le niveau d'ordre et de propreté des familles qui habitent la Cité.

En aidant les familles intéressantes à se développer plus rapidement que les autres, LES JARDINS UNGEMACH augmentent dans la société de demain le nombre des éléments précieux et contribuent par là à guider l'évolution humaine vers une ascension plus rapide.

Des renseignements détaillés sont fournis par le secrétariat des „Jardins Ungemach“, 2, rue des Iris à Strasbourg (France).

Suppl. N° 10 - 12 - 1908 - Strasbourg - 25/10/08

Figure 0.1. Performance of Ungemach Gardens (poster for the 1935 hygiene exhibition in Strasbourg). CAC 20010307 9 Louis Henry papers.

and fully considered in four pages of the seminal book by the American William H. Schneider on French interwar eugenics,⁸ as well as two university theses that tried to relate the content of the experience to its urban form.⁹ An unfortunate amnesia! From their creation in the 1920s through the 1960s, the Ungemach Gardens were nationally and internationally renowned for what they were, that is, a place where a vigorous pronatalist and eugenic policy was being pursued.

In 1925 Ungemach served as a showcase for Strasbourg during the visit of French Prime Minister Paul Painlevé. Besides the routine institutional visits it was one of the four sites selected by the Commissioner of the Republic in Strasbourg to receive him.¹⁰ Beginning in 1931, the founding journal of British eugenics, *Eugenics Review*, successively opened its columns to a presentation of the experiment and then of its 'results',¹¹ before providing a full translation of the 1935 poster.¹² Over the decade the journal included twelve additional references – articles, conference and book reviews and letters to the editor – expressing enthusiasm for this 'first practical implementation of positive eugenics', which authors and readers hoped would soon be replicated in the United Kingdom and expanded more broadly.¹³ In 1933 Paul Popenoe, a well-known popularizer of eugenics in the United States, paid a glowing tribute to Ungemach in the final edition of the most widely read textbook on the issue at the time, *Applied Eugenics*.¹⁴

Six years later, in his fiercely anti-republican pamphlet *Pleins pouvoirs* [Full powers], the famous writer Jean Giraudoux praised the 'remarkable efforts undertaken by Strasbourg' as the main exception to what he considered the unfortunate absence of 'either an empirical or theoretical state doctrine on eugenics' in France.¹⁵ In 1946 the Californian businessman Charles Matthias Goethe (1875–1966), a pioneer of nature conservation, patron of the University of Sacramento and committed eugenicist, focused on Ungemach Gardens, which he had just toured, in a book advocating for a kind of botanical eugenics.¹⁶ In the 1950s and 1960s INED requested annual population statistics from the garden city, which also received sympathetic attention from the Ministry of Public Health and Population. The experiment was started by a non-profit foundation, but the city of Strasbourg took over on 1 January 1950 and, as will be seen, continued to support it until the mid-1980s.

By staying on the scientific and political radar for so long at both the national and international levels, the Ungemach experiment, despite its small size – or thanks to it, microhistory would argue – can help to delineate a phenomenon that is extremely difficult to grasp: French eugenics in the twentieth century. Just twenty years ago, the consensus was still that apart from the initiatives of a few zealots around 1900 and the

introduction of a premarital medical examination by the Vichy regime, France had remained immune to eugenics.¹⁷ This idea of a national exception most often referred to conceptual considerations. Republicanism was seen as a safeguard against the non-egalitarian aspirations of this scientific creed.¹⁸ French scientists' embrace of neo-Lamarckism was not conducive to the acceptance of the Galtonian eugenics invented across the channel that primarily focused on hereditary transmission.¹⁹

Another factor, common to all the 'Latin' countries, was the Catholic Church's opposition, which was formalized with the publication of the papal encyclical *Casti Connubii* on 31 December 1930. Leaving aside the Gospel's laudatory account of the simple-minded, this aversion reflected one of the watchwords of political Catholicism during the interwar period: the emphasis on 'Life' with a capital L placed by pro-family associations went hand in hand with the rejection of eugenic tools such as sterilization and abortion. In England, the birthplace of eugenics, the famous Catholic author Gilbert Keith Chesterton (1874–1936) had derided eugenics as a pagan ideology based on a cult of technology and of the state, and on its supporters' impious assertion of a hierarchy of human beings.²⁰

A second explanation given for France's opposition to eugenics – an explanation mistakenly believed to automatically bolster the previous one – was the strength of pronatalism. In a country where fertility had started declining at the end of the Old Regime, that is, several decades before the rest of Europe, the conviction that the country's power depended on its number of births started to spread in the 1860s in response to the Prussian military threat. On the eve, and especially in the aftermath of the First World War, it took hold in the political and administrative spheres and translated into a fledgling demographic policy. The common sense argument was that if France was pronatalist it could not be eugenic, too hastily setting population quantity against quality.

As in many other countries,²¹ the 1980s saw the first challenges to this entrenched view. The Foucauldian exhortation to revisit the ideological genealogy and connotations of knowledge encouraged a critical reassessment of the prevailing heroic history of French public policies, especially on demographic matters. Two overlooked issues suddenly became controversial in the academic community, before being picked up by the media. Significantly, both relate to the criminal record of the Vichy regime, which was also put in the spotlight after a long period of inattention. The first concerns the policy of elimination through starvation to which the insane were allegedly subjected during the Occupation. In 1987 the physician Max Lafont denounced this 'soft extermination', tragically embodied in the figure of Camille Claudel, who starved to death in 1943 and was the hero of a 1988 movie by Bruno Nuytten.²²

The second controversy, which is not unrelated to the first, concerns the legacy of Alexis Carrel (1873–1944). This French surgeon left to pursue his career in the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century and received a Nobel Prize in 1912, making medical history with the advances he enabled in the critical area of transplants. His 1935 bestseller *Man, the Unknown*, a scientific essay on the relations between nature and society, remained a library staple for ‘men of culture’ through the 1960s and was reprinted several times until the very end of the twentieth century. But as Carrel became an icon of the French New Right in the 1970s and ‘80s, historiography started denouncing the eugenics of his sociobiological, deterministic and elitist thinking that was merciless towards the ‘weak’. Once again, the Vichy period was at the heart of the debate since the surgeon had returned to France during the Occupation and was entrusted by Marshal Pétain with the leadership of the French Foundation for the Study of Human Problems (FFEPH). This major institute for research and studies popularly known as the ‘Carrel Foundation’ primarily focused on the relations between biology, economics and social sciences.²³ And yet again there was both a historiographical and media aspect to the argument. Although some historians tried to put Carrel’s eugenics into perspective, the controversy led the Claude Bernard University in Lyon to rename its Alexis-Carrel medical school in 1996; many French streets were also renamed.²⁴

In the 2000s, the first controversy abated while the second grew. The historian Isabelle von Bueltingsloewen conducted a thorough investigation of the ‘soft extermination’ and found that the excess mortality of the insane from starvation resulted more from exacerbated conditions of undernourishment in asylums during the Occupation than from a deliberate policy, in the broader context of a breakdown in relations between the families of the insane, doctors and psychiatric institutions.²⁵ Meanwhile, evidence of Alexis Carrel’s ideology was confirmed.²⁶ While he certainly made a significant contribution to science, the doctor from Lyon was part of the generation of Anglo-American scholars who started their careers at the beginning of the twentieth century and adopted an extreme deterministic conception of the transmission of hereditary characteristics. Historian Garland E. Allen described these scholars as an ‘older style eugenics movement’, in contrast to their younger counterparts, who shared many eugenic values but started questioning hereditary determinism in the 1920s.²⁷ Another interesting point is that Carrel was also known to be a devout Catholic, challenging the notion that it is impossible to reconcile these two ideologies.²⁸

This initial double focus on the Vichy regime was only natural. It echoed the most famous and darkest aspects of the history of eugenics,

namely the way the movement unfolded in various states that practised forced sterilization in insane asylums – there was a thin line between compulsory sterilization by doctors and ‘voluntary’ sterilization consented to by patients and their family – and, of course, the mass extermination policies of Nazi Germany.²⁹ Although the great historian Paul Weindling has shown that the eugenic path does not necessarily lead to Nazism,³⁰ it is obvious that extermination ideology was closely based on eugenic arguments believed to be backed by science, and that its massive appeal resulted from the easy but devastating combination of these arguments with ways of thinking developed over what might be called the ‘racial century’ that began around 1850.³¹

Following this first critical review phase, over the past twenty years a series of works have undertaken the difficult task of extricating the vast body that eugenics represented in the twentieth century from its criminal uses. The task is difficult in several respects. First of all, other manifestations of eugenics that were retrospectively obscured are akin to a geological repository and require working through the archaeology of knowledge and policy. In an initial assessment of this extrication process made in 1998, the sinologist Frank Dikötter underscored its global nature: ‘soft approaches, which combined an emphasis on the environment with hereditarian explanations, were far more widespread than previously suspected Neo-Lamarckian notions were more important than strictly Mendelian explanations, an emphasis that supported a preventive approach to eugenics in which the environment had to be cleansed of all deleterious factors damaging racial health’ (bearing in mind that at the beginning of the twentieth century the semantic range of the word ‘race’ extended from outright racism to sanitary concerns about impacting the public health of a nation).

As there is now mounting evidence of the importance of neo-Lamarckism in such diverse countries as Russia, Brazil, China and France between the two world wars, Dikötter continues, a radical reassessment of its scientific and political meanings seems seriously overdue. A fresh historical appraisal of the available material that included countries outside Europe might reveal that the hard Mendelian eugenics familiar from studies of Britain and Germany was not a dominant approach in many developing parts of the world.³²

The Dutch historian rightly added that in order to understand the degree of support for eugenics in the interwar period, this reassessment required a shift away from simply focusing on the movement’s leaders towards studying its ‘anonymous supporters’ and its dissemination in popular culture.³³

This double change in emphasis had major implications. The idealist history of ideas created an analytical classification of the arguments involved – distinguishing between eugenics and social Darwinism for example³⁴ – that was essential but not sufficient. Eugenics is a set of ideological discourses that originated in certain elites' fear of being demographically overwhelmed by undesirable groups due to the latter's higher fertility rates. These often-repetitive discourses were dramatic and sensationalist, even by today's standards, and too easily provoke contemporary 'repulsive fascination'.³⁵ But it is harder, if one takes a step back from the tragic extremes of mass murder and forced sterilization, to pinpoint the actual role of eugenics in public and private action. The process requires carrying out the difficult task of tracing a social history of scientific and political ideas – or, to use the elegant and accurate expression of Jean-Claude Perrot, a concrete history of abstraction.³⁶ A review of the literature is not enough. The dissemination of ideas needs to be tracked, as does their appropriation by people, environments and various institutions, their reformulation following exposure to other theoretical frameworks, and especially the reality check provided by their implementation. In so doing, 'ideas' no longer remain neatly contained in analytically organized drawers, but rather reveal their infinite plasticity and their ability to produce 'rationally' improbable arrangements. They become 'malleable through time, space and the contingency of events' to the extent that 'even the most doctrinaire of ideologies still constitutes a potentially ephemeral internal coalition of ideas – its indeterminacy and pluralism cannot be overridden for too long'.³⁷

The gap between formulated thought and emerging thought – I am transposing Bruno Latour's famous dichotomy here³⁸ – certainly applies to the history of political ideas in general. However, it is a particular challenge for eugenics. Since its emergence in the first two decades of the twentieth century in the United Kingdom, eugenics took distinct paths following different timelines in various countries. But in all cases, from the outset it met strong opposition that was equal parts knee-jerk and theoretical. The aversion to eugenics, its non-egalitarianism and its coercive thrust with regard to marriage and procreation is attributable to the entrenchment of political liberalism in the anthropology of contemporary Western societies. In countries like France, the United Kingdom and the United States, eugenicists deplored and denounced the mocking of their ideal in a number of texts: 'The picture of society organized as a stud-farm arouses disgust. It is sometimes feared that the Eugenic programme would involve the destruction of normal family life and the mutual affection upon which it is based. To favour the "successful types" it may be argued, would result in the evolution of hard, unlovely characters'.³⁹

This rejection may have been beneficial for civil society, but in retrospect has proven costly for the historian: depending on the country, era, environment and terms of expression, the history of doctrinaire eugenics appears at times to be a lot of talk, and at others, deliberate concealment. The best example of the latter during Vichy is the history of the Carrel Foundation. While it was free of the constraints of publicity that a parliamentary democracy and free press ordinarily entail, the Foundation was reluctant to display the combination of eugenics and heredity in the presentation of its programmes.⁴⁰

An example of the consequent difficulty in understanding the contours of this subject is the political and scientific programme that was self-described as 'Latin eugenics' in the 1930s. This programme extended from Romania to Argentina, including France, Italy, Mexico and much of South America, and culminated in a meeting in Paris in 1937.⁴¹ It requires a shift in emphasis to more diffuse, more diverse and less sensational – but still structuring – ways of addressing the 'quality of the population'.⁴² Analysis of Latin eugenics reveals 'new' social spaces, covering health, social, demographic and other applications, where eugenics was manifested in less spectacular ways: not just doctors and geneticists but also statisticians and economists; not just eugenic societies but also those focusing on biotypology; not just sterilizations but also academic guidance, occupational health, urbanism, marriage counselling, sexual education, prenatal care, sorting of foreign and internal migrants, treatment of ethnic minorities and so on.⁴³ The difficulty here is to exhibit the subject without either hypostatizing or diluting it, to understand its coherence (in terms of doctrine as well as scholarly and expert networks) while observing its amalgamation and transformation in a vortex of racist, hygienist, nationalist, progressive, feminist and other aspirations.

In some respects, this contrast between a coercive eugenics with high visibility and a more discreet preventive eugenics recalls the opposition between 'negative' or punitive eugenics oriented towards eliminating undesirables (through murder or sterilization, as well as disincentives to marriage and procreation) and 'positive' eugenics characterized by social hygiene measures. However, one should be wary of this ideal dichotomy, which was created by a follower of Francis Galton, the man who founded eugenics in 1883, or more precisely, who thus labelled and systematized a body of doctrines that had been developing throughout the nineteenth century.⁴⁴ Be it 'positive' or 'negative', eugenics must be considered as a whole,⁴⁵ initially conceived as one of the last retaliatory responses in the (not always latent) civil war that unfolded for over a century in the aftermath of the French Revolution.⁴⁶ As a product of the growing authority of science, it represented an attempt at a reasoned argument against the

principle of equality among citizens that progressively spread in liberal democracies during the nineteenth century, a time of arduous struggle for universal male suffrage and the dismantling of legal barriers to social mobility. A case in point is the argument of the Oxford philosopher Ferdinand Schiller (1864–1937), proponent of a ‘eugenic aristocracy’:

the real argument for political equality is not that men are born equal, but that they are born so *unequal* in so many ways, and that society requires such a variety of services, that the only practicable form of political organization is to ignore their inequalities and to give votes to all, and then to trust to the intelligent few to manipulate or cajole the many into abstaining from fatal follies.⁴⁷

This served as a basis for a wide variety of ideological uses. Just as eugenics might equally well promote ‘the improvement of the quality of the population’ or condemn its ‘degeneration’, it was conducive to both creating biologically based social hierarchies and advancing social reform projects. While eugenics most often served conservative and reactionary movements seeking to ‘scientifically’ legitimize the social order, it also helped to support progressive approaches seeking to ‘improve the quality’ of dominated populations, or even to challenge the social reproduction of elites with a hierarchy based on merit and the inherent potential of individuals.

However, underlying these various appropriations is a deeper substrate that cannot be ignored: in all cases eugenics presupposes that people or groups are of different value, which is deemed measurable and, through a wide variety of means, improvable – or to the contrary, degradable to the point of violating ethical principles of preservation of life.⁴⁸ Beyond the fact that it has proven to be a protean concept across a range of historical situations, eugenics arguably did not begin as a primarily biological theory but rather as a social theory, or even, as will be seen, a moral theory based on three axioms: (1) there is a difference in the quality of human beings; (2) this difference can be measured by certain scholars and experts; (3) it is subject to change at the scale of populations.

One of the thrusts of this book will be to explore how theories and policies that implicitly or explicitly rank people came to be implemented and legitimized in a political democracy based on the principle of equality.

This process will be complicated by the difficulty of determining the boundaries of eugenics as well as a challenge that one might call civic. To treat eugenics as a subject of history precludes both simple condemnation and blind euphemization. To avoid these two pitfalls, I will follow the ‘pragmatic’ and quasi-ethnographic approach used in many contemporary social science studies, starting with microhistory. Born

of the historiography of the early modern era, microhistory has to my knowledge rarely been applied to twentieth-century mass politics, even though its recent application to the history of the Shoah has demonstrated its insightfulness.⁴⁹ Despite the rich historiographical discussion of the 1990s,⁵⁰ references to 'microhistory' and 'games of scales' are too often used to re-legitimize the monograph – a worthwhile but more restricted approach. Yet the two are quite different. Microhistory goes beyond the 'grassroots' by selecting both 'exceptional and normal' elements to observe that are often out of step with the most common social forms; understanding these elements requires and facilitates illuminating entire swathes of the society within which they operate. This constraint does not allow for the application of a preset model. In the present case it will lead me to focus more on the history of institutions and knowledge, including literature since the Ungemach Gardens project was largely written in the language of tragic theatre.

The history of the eugenic garden city (and of its creator) will be the subject of one of this book's three parts. It will to a large extent form my 'field', but not my subject: I will rather seek to build on its heuristic and one might say experimental interest. This interest does not only lie in the fact that the British followers of Galton saw the Ungemach Gardens as the first 'practical' realization of 'positive' eugenics. It also and primarily lies in a double paradox.

First, while a German- and English-speaking businessman, Alfred Dachert, developed the concept of the Ungemach Gardens in the first two decades of the twentieth century in German Alsace, the project was actually implemented in France – except during the Second World War – with the support of national and municipal public authorities. The garden city's history thus tests one of the boundaries of the history of eugenics, that is, the opposition between the 'social hygienist' Latin eugenics I briefly outlined and the more hereditarian basis of original eugenics, which took root in the United States and Northwestern Europe, spanning the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Germany and Scandinavia. There were certainly different styles of national eugenics that portrayed themselves as such and distinguished themselves or even explicitly opposed each other,⁵¹ but historiography, especially when focusing on practices, points to the limitations of the dichotomy between a preventive and environmental Latin world and a hereditarian and punitive Nordic world.⁵²

One of my goals will therefore be to figure out how the *modus operandi* of a residential area designed according to British eugenics principles was grasped, accepted and even endorsed by the French government. The issue is all the more relevant considering that the experiment began as a privately managed one in 1923, but had a long run under city

management *after* the Second World War, with the support of the state in both cases. This brings us to the second paradox of the history of the Ungemach Gardens: for the most part – forty years – it unfolded after the collapse of the Third Reich, which one would have thought had completely discredited eugenics.

My subject will gradually take form in the resolution of this double paradox. Transatlantic and Western European eugenics as well as, and perhaps especially, the expansion of public policies, the creation of social security, and more generally the conscious effort to remake society during the twentieth century, will shape this book's scope of thought. I am obviously not claiming that I will exhaustively address such broad topics. My more modest goal is to attempt to use the history of a eugenic neighbourhood in Strasbourg as a means to raise a number of issues that haunt our history and cloud our perception of the present.

Notes

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4. Albert Michot, *Rapport sur la fondation "Les Jardins Ungemach"*, à Strasbourg, Paris, INED library archives, 1946, no 3071.
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7. Jeanne Boulfroy, *Le Problème de la ville moderne: la cité jardin*, doctoral thesis supervised by Étienne de Groër, Institute of Urbanism at the University of Paris, 1940; Stéphane Jonas, 'Les Jardins Ungemach à Strasbourg: une cité-jardin d'origine nataliste (1923–1950)', in Paulette Girard and Bruno Fayolle Lussac (eds), *Cités, cités-jardins: une histoire européenne*, Talence, MSHA publications, 1996, pp. 65–85; Jonas, 'Les Jardins Ungemach: une cité-jardin patronale d'origine nataliste', in *L'Urbanisme à Strasbourg au XXe siècle. Actes des conférences organisées dans le cadre des 100 ans de la cité-jardin du Stockfeld*, City of Strasbourg, 2010, pp. 50–64. Also see this Introduction, n. 9. I was not able to review the architecture thesis of Anne Staub, *Cités-Jardins à Strasbourg*, 1976, the first part of which is devoted to Ungemach garden city.
8. William H. Schneider, *Quality and Quantity: Eugenics and the Biological Regeneration of Twentieth-Century France*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987, here pp. 124–28. Also see Jean-Noël Missa and Charles Susanne (eds), *De l'eugénisme d'État à l'eugénisme privé*, Paris and Brussels, De Boeck Université, 1999, p. 17, n. 30.

9. Catherine Lavanant, *La cité-jardin Ungemach à Strasbourg, 1923–1929*, Master's thesis in art history for the University of Strasbourg supervised by François Loyer, 1991, call number MAIT/1991/LAV at the University of Strasbourg and, more impressionistically, Gina Marie Greene in the fifth chapter of *Children in Glass Houses: Toward a Hygienic, Eugenic Architecture for Children during the Third Republic in France (1870–1940)*, doctoral thesis in architecture supervised by Edward Eigen, Princeton University, 2012.
10. Cf. ch. 1, n. 49.
11. Alfred Dachert, 'Positive Eugenics in Practice: An Account of the First Positive Eugenic Experiment', *Eugenics Review [ER]*, 23, 1, 1931, pp. 15–18; Dachert, 'Les Jardins Ungemach: Child Development', *ER*, 23, 4, 1932, p. 336; Dachert, 'Les Jardins Ungemach', *ER*, 25, 2, 1933, p. 105.
12. 'Les Jardins Ungemach', *ER*, 27, 3, 1935, pp. 230–31.
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14. Paul Popenoe and Roswell Hill Johnson, *Applied Eugenics*, New York, Macmillan, 1933 [orig. ed. 1918]. On the popularity of this book, see Will B. Provine, 'Geneticists and the Biology of Race Crossing', *Science*, 182, 4114, 1973, pp. 790–96, here p. 791.
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16. Charles M. Goethe, *War Profits... and Better Babies*, Sacramento, CA, Keystone Press, 1946.
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36. Jean-Claude Perrot, *Une histoire intellectuelle de l'économie politique, XVIIe–XVIIIe siècles*, Paris, Éds de l'EHESS, 1992.
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