

Introduction

INTENT AND STRUCTURE

A Cosmopolitan Project

‘Cosmopolitanism’ has a certain momentum, in politics and academia equally: a ‘growing intellectual movement’, cross-disciplinary, con...
The worth of this book depends on the case it makes for three related notions. First, that ‘humankind’ represents a phenomenon whose universal condition and whose set of singular characteristics an anthropological science should determine to know. Second, that *Anyone* is a human actor who is to be recognized as at once universal and individual. Third, that one may conceive of a set of norms which serves as a universal ethic of polite human interaction: ‘cosmopolitan politesse’. Here is a social medium which would everywhere afford Anyone the space to live according to the fulfilment of his or her capacities to author an individual life – individual world-views, identity and life-project – and the right and encouragement so to do; the right to be universally recognized and engaged as himself or herself, and not merely as a member of a social category or class. The ‘cosmopolitan project’ of the discipline of anthropology is, then, to provide evidence for treating humankind and Anyone as ontologies, as part of the nature of human being, a focus both of scholarly concern and of moral and political effort.

The cosmopolitan project is to know Anyone in terms of a universal human nature and at the same time an individual embodiment: to do justice to his or her universal capacities as well as to their singular expression. Humankind can be defined as the objective context of individuality. Individuality owes its unique nature to its humanity: humankind is ever instantiated as individuality. The evidence a cosmopolitan anthropology would adduce concerns seeing this relation plainly so that it is not obscured or distorted by cultural prejudices, social structures or historical contingencies. A cosmopolitan anthropology works to elucidate this dialectical relation: individuality out of humanity.

‘Everyman’ and ‘Anyone’

*Everyman* was the title of a Christian morality play written in English around 1500 (and closely related to a Flemish production, *Elckerlyc*) (Cawley 1970). In an allegorical dramatization of what was taken to be a global moral struggle for humanity, the play portrays Death visiting a character called Everyman and informing him of his impending demise. The audience is then witness to Everyman’s emotional journey from despair and fear to the final resignation that is a prelude to Christian redemption. We witness, too, a social journey as the play portrays Everyman being deserted by different false friends in turn: Kindred, Cousin, Fellowship and Worldly Goods. At first Everyman finds himself able to fall back on his own resources: Knowledge, Strength, Intelligence, Beauty and Good Deeds. In
particular. Knowledge delivers the celebrated lines: ‘Everyman, I will
 go with thee, and be thy guide, / In thy most need to go by thy side’.
 Together Everyman and his resources proceed to draw up a Book of
 Accounts for his meeting with God and the adjudication of his eternal
 fate. In extremis, however, when Everyman must go to his grave,
 his resources too all but desert him: we bear witness to Everyman’s
 intellectual journey which leads him to the final realization that only
 Good Deeds can offer a faithful accompaniment to the soul. According
 to the play’s Christian doctrinalism, the universal truth which the
 audience is to appreciate, and the moral drawn, is that the human
 individual is to progress from mundane life to a divine accounting
 equipped with nothing that he has taken or received from the world,
 only what he has given.

 In terms which Hannah Arendt (1959) borrowed from Classical
 Greek philosophy, the allegory of Everyman turns on the difference
 and the tensions between zoë and bios. Zoë is bare life, a state of being
 alive common to all animals; bios is elaborated human experience,
 the bringing to zoë of consciousness and world-view. What makes a
 human life more than mere animal life, Everyman asks? Where does
 the intrinsic nature of human elaboration fundamentally lie? Not
 in kinship or friendship or property, nor even in wisdom, strength,
 intelligence or beauty. The key to a human life (bios), a humane life,
 that which fits it for a passage to heaven, is the doing of good deeds.
 The key is to recognize in human life the spiritual microcosm of
 Christian divinity.

 A more recent meditation on the tensions between zoë and bios
 comes in the work of Giorgio Agamben, in particular his celebrated
 text, Homo Sacer (Agamben 1998). Homo sacer was an obscure figure
 in the law of Ancient Rome: a person who could be legally killed
 without retribution being levied but who could not be sacrificed. In
 other words, his death was not defined as a human death: it was not
 that of a social being surrounded by safeguards, and occasioning a
 sense of loss if lost. Agamben’s argument is that the victims of the
 Nazi’s Final Solution were reduced to mere embodiments of animal life:
 on their journey to Auschwitz, the Jews, Gypsies and others had their
 social and legal humanity officially rescinded by the Nazi state. More
 generally, Agamben depicts the concentration camp – whether that of
 refugees instituted out of humanitarian motives or the death camps of
 a totalitarian regime – as the paradigmatic space of modern life. Bare
 life is a human condition which many are forced to suffer: a kind of
 naked existence beyond the securities and elaborations of social being.
 We are witness to an expanded zone of ‘irreducible indistinction’ such
 that the bare life of the concentration camp becomes the ‘hidden
 matrix’ at the centre of our world (Agamben 1998: 166). Or, in the
terms Walter Benjamin earlier made famous: ‘The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the “state of emergency” in which we live is not the exception but the rule’ (Benjamin 1969: 257).

For Everyman and Homo Sacer alike, the key question concerns what it is to be human: Where does the particular dignity of humanity reside (cf. Redfield 2005)? According to Everyman it is in the practising of Christian virtues; according to Homo Sacer it is in a socially recognized life, a life accorded the opportunity of conventional engagement with others.

‘Anyone’ is distinct from both ‘Everyman’ and ‘homo sacer’ in that it collapses the distinction between zoe and bios. The human individual does not need to be or do any particular thing – whether engage in conventional exchanges or do good in conventional ways – in order to accede to a full humanity. Being human is Anyone’s birthright. It is not the place of others to define what activities or what ideologies Anyone needs to practise in order to exhibit human dignity. Nor, indeed, can anyone else define for Anyone what dignity feels like or how it is to be interpreted; this is something that Anyone must know for himself or herself. Anyone’s humanity precisely is this capacity to feel, interpret and come to know for himself or herself. Anyone’s birthright, it might be said, is his or her futurity: the capacity to define the human in the context of his or her individual life. The tie between Anyone and humankind – microcosm to macrocosm – is immanent and irreducible.

**Singular Values**

That difference is an individual property, something that inheres ontologically in individual human embodiment and consciousness, has been the key insight I have drawn from my own ethnographic work (e.g., Rapport 1987, 1993, 1994, 2008), and which I have determined to privilege in the theoretical and analytical modelling of human social life. Cosmopolitanism is imbued with a comparable recognition of the intrinsic and irreducible individuality of human embodiment. But at the same time it trumpets the unity of humanity: all individuals can be recognized as manifestations of the same potentiality possessed by the species for self-expression and self-fulfilment. As an anthropological project, cosmopolitanism is concerned above all with this tension. What does it imply, ontologically and morally, that ‘everyone is both identical and different’ (Jackson 2008: 29)? How is it that individual human beings are irreducibly themselves and absolutely human? What are the moral implications of the fact that individuals are intrinsically different from each other
and yet absolute examples of human capacities for self-expression? Each human being is capable of making sense of self and world – and does do so – and capable of effecting a life-project that manifests a personal version of self-and-environment – and should be free to do so. ‘Cosmopolitanism’ calls on ‘anthropology’ – both were words made anew and contemporaneously by Immanuel Kant – to furnish it with data concerning both the nature of the species and the particularities of individual expression. Indeed, anthropology dwells in this tension: What is it to be human, the capabilities and liabilities of the species? And how is it to be individual human beings, construing world-views and effecting a unique being-in-the-world?

Cosmopolitanism concerns, too, a philosophy of freedom. It is to be cherished, celebrated, that humanity is as it is, that individuality is as it is. One is to nurture those general conditions in which individuals might be so emancipated as to fulfil their capacities for making sense; one is to reckon their self-expression and creativity as a right. As a philosophy of freedom, cosmopolitanism can be said to compass a very particular and apparently paradoxical ‘mathematics of value’, focused on the one. Humanity is one. And the individual is one. The latter is how the singularity of the former manifests itself. Yet each individual instantiation of the human is unique: irreducible and unrepeatable, with a consciousness capable of encompassing an infinite set of potential connections, insights and realizations.

This is what I understand to be the meaning of the Talmudic judgement which might also have served as an epigraph to this book: ‘Whoever destroys the life of a single human being – it is as if he had destroyed the entire world. And whoever preserves the life of a single human being – it is as if he had preserved the world entire’ (Jerusalem Talmud, Sanhedrin 4: 8 (37a)). Each life is absolutely valuable: to consider the masses of human population is not to discover something of greater value or an overarching entity in which the individual existence is subsumed. The human population is a conglomeration of ones, an aggregation but not an integration. Nothing has greater value than a human individual because he or she is a ‘perfect’ embodiment of the human whole.

‘No cry of torment can be greater than the cry of one person’, supposes Ludwig Wittgenstein (1980: 45) for philosophy. For the novel, Graham Greene writes similarly: ‘Suffering is not increased by numbers: one body can contain all the suffering the world can feel’ (Greene 1979: 183). And not only suffering: the same may be said for happiness or a sense of beauty or fulfilment. These are qualities that pertain to, inhere and remain in, the individual body; there is nowhere but bodies that these qualities – the qualia or experience of life – can inhere. Hence, to claim that adding bodies in a social field causes
Anyone suffering or happiness to be taken to another level is a category mistake: suffering or happiness cannot belong to a multiplicity, a society, community, culture or tradition. Individual experience represents a kind of absolute, entire in itself, whose nature does not lend itself to mathematical aggrandizement. ‘Humanity’ appears before us always and only as ‘a man’, F.R. Leavis concurs: ‘Only in living individuals is life there, and individual lives cannot be aggregated or equated or dealt with quantitatively in any way’ (Leavis 1972: 53). The difficulty of such truths for a human science and a human society – apprehending subjectivity in objective terms, making policy for individual well-being in universal terms – gives on to the anthropological work of this book.

The argument to be made is that the only fundamentally real relationship is between individual and species. Differences of cultural convention and classification, and of social structuration and affiliation – differences of community membership, of nation, ethnicity, class and religion – are epiphenomenal, symbolic and rhetorical constructions as distinct from ontologies. The individual body, its species-wide capabilities and liabilities, provides both a beginning and an end both for a human science and a liberal society: What might the individual body be able to achieve, and what is it liable to suffer from (cf. Rapport 2003: 215–39)?

A ‘cosmopolitan body’ is that which practises a particular, localized life – including joining, making and leaving local relations and communities – and yet which continually embodies global entitlements and continues to be recognized as bearing universal capacities. The cosmopolitan project is to provide space for the flourishing of individual-human capabilities and to offer succour for its potential liabilities.

**Cosmopolitanism and Liberalism**

I deem cosmopolitanism to be a species of liberal virtue. ‘The defining feature of a liberal’, according to Brian Barry, is ‘someone who holds that there are certain rights against oppression, exploitation and injury to which every single human being is entitled to lay claim; and that appeals to “cultural diversity” and pluralism under no circumstances trump the value of basic liberal rights’ (Barry 2001: 132–33).

The defining features of cosmopolitanism as a political and philosophical programme, meanwhile, are amply set out by Martha Nussbaum:

Whatever else we are bound by and pursue, we should recognize, at whatever personal or social cost, that each human being is human and
counts as the moral equal of every other ... The accident of being born a Sri Lankan, or a Jew, or a female, or an African-American, or a poor person, is just that – an accident of birth. It is not and should not be taken as a determinant of moral worth. Human personhood, by which I mean the possession of practical reason and other basic moral capacities, is the source of our moral worth, and this worth is equal ... Make liberty of choice the benchmark of any just constitutional order, and refuse to compromise this principle in favour of any particular tradition or religion. (Nussbaum 1996: 133, 136)

Nussbaum’s conclusion coincides with Barry’s: cosmopolitanism recognizes ‘every single human being’ as an instantiation of ‘human personhood’, an embodiment of human capacities, such as reason, and entitled to human respect. Cosmopolitanism regards the freedom of Anyone to choose a form of life and to form a world-view in accordance with his or her own lights as ‘the benchmark of any just constitutional order’. It comes down to a question of the relationship between culture or community or tradition, and freedom.

**Category-thinking and Politeness**

In his study of the language of the Third Reich, written as a journal following his expulsion from the position of university philologist, Victor Klemperer noted the Nazi predilection for stereotypical labels, categories and classes. This language functioned, Klemperer observed on 12 December 1940, to ‘strip everyone of their individuality, to paralyse them as personalities, to make them into unthinking and docile cattle in a herd driven and hounded in a particular direction, to turn them into atoms in a huge rolling block of stone’; “the Jew”, “the Englishman” – nothing but collectives, no individual counts’ (Klemperer 2000: 21).

Symbolic collectivization – or as one might phrase it, the predominance of thinking and acting in categorial terms – is a deindividuating and hence dehumanizing practice with potentially tragic effects. At the conclusion of what he subtitled an ‘alternative anthropology of identity’, Anthony Cohen wrote how ‘we must make deliberate efforts to acknowledge the subtleties, inflections and varieties of individual consciousness which are concealed by the categorical masks which we have invented so adeptly’ or else we ‘deny people the right to be themselves’ (Cohen 1994: 180). Lisette Josephides concurs: beyond ‘persons’, those entities denominated from outside in terms of culturally ascribed characteristics, are the ‘selves’ that universally human beings know themselves to be (Josephides 2008: 23). The way selves
practise a physical and spiritual individuality is the existential testimony anthropology should provide.

Cohen’s and Josephides’ remarks are aimed at the social analyst but they apply on a number of levels, including that of politician, policy maker and fellow-citizen. Categorial masking includes the state’s formal incorporation of its citizens as well as those citizens’ mundane dealings with one another. The language of the Third Reich was not an isolated incident, merely an extreme one. Reducing individual identities to ‘camp dust’ also characterizes Stalinism and radical Islamism at one pole to communitarianism and ‘identity politics’ at the other (Amit and Rapport 2002).

If cosmopolitanism is a philosophy of freedom, then this entails working towards the delegitimatization of category-thinking so that the individuality of Anyone is never legitimately confounded by classificatory, collective identifications or stereotypes. Public identities and affiliations are to be treated as achievements not ascriptions, seen to be voluntary and situational, and not to equate to – or subsume, or exhaust – the identity of the individual as such. No categorial placement is absolute, and rights inhere in the individual, in Anyone, not in any particular affiliation: one cherishes the human capacity to create and to go on creating self, society and world – creating ‘essence’ out of ‘existence’, as Jean-Paul Sartre (1956) phrased it – and not any particular manifestation of that capacity.

But how does one go about construing social and cultural exchange beyond the categorial? For Georg Simmel (1971), famously, society is only possible by way of typical judgements and collectivistic cultural forms. One cannot know a multitude of individuals in and as themselves and therefore one relies on formalism and standardization and the expectability these bring. In public life it is unavoidable that the particularity of individual consciousness will be represented (and misrepresented) by way of general categories and classes, of persons, relations, situations and events. In this judgement, Simmel looked back to Hegelian conclusions concerning the agonistic nature of the human condition; in particular, concerning the strictures of statecraft and the necessary distance between a normative, ‘Prussian’ public sphere and a private home of personal exceptionalism (Hegel 2008). The conclusion also looks forward to what anthropologists have described since as the ‘indifference’ of modern ‘rational’ society: the ways in which bureaucratic structures, whether of large-scale governance or merely of impersonal, non-partisan incorporation, manifest themselves inevitably in a reliance upon the stereotypical and classificatory which is indiscriminate, alienating and even inhumane (Herzfeld 1993; Gupta 1995). Seeking an end to category-thinking,
cosmopolitanism must nevertheless come to terms with the need for a 
public discursive style, of address and exchange.

In Ronald Stade’s formulation, the project is to presuppose the 
individuality of interacting citizens but not to presume an intimacy 
with them (Stade 2007). One can anticipate fellow citizens’ individual 
natures but not expect to know their private selves – to read-off 
private truths from public expressions. This is a balancing act. As a 
philosophy of freedom, cosmopolitanism seeks to dwell in the tension 
between a public respect for the individual and a public ignorance of 
what is individual. The aspiration is to a means and a mode of social 
interaction which does not massify or stereotype the members of a 
polity, such that they are overwritten and overwhelmed by a collective 
category, but enter into public space as themselves – at least, as they 
would have themselves be known and met. The public space is not 
privy to the intimacies of personal selfhood: one does not presume that 
the radical particularities of personal selfhood – the ‘gratuitousness’ 
of difference (Rapport 2008) – should or could easily translate into 
a common code of expression. Rather, one imagines the individual 
being known, ideally, as he or she determines to be known. To return 
to Cohen’s imagery, the individual in public space is known according 
to a mask that he or she fashions for themselves. The significant 
contrast, again, is achievement as against ascription.

‘Politesse’ is the term I employ to describe kinds of cosmopolitan 
‘good manners’, comprising both a polite style of general public 
exchange and an ethic of individual dignity and freedom. In a lecture 
he delivered in 1885, Henri Bergson considered the possibility of 
traversing an ‘evolutionary’ path from politeness as mere formality to 
politeness as moral instrument. Can a set of rules and of civil exchanges 
– of mere etiquette – possibly serve as a guarantee for civilized dealings 
in a society? On the face of it: no. Politeness of manners or ‘social 
politeness’, as Bergson (1972) termed it, comprising ready-made 
formulae, catchwords, formal graces and habits, are not the same 
as what might be described as ‘politeness of spirit’: the empathy and 
sympathy involved in taking on another’s point of view and imagining 
that unique life. Nor, finally, is such politeness the same as ‘politeness 
of heart’: the expectation that another is worthy of trust and will 
likely reciprocate one’s own trusting engagement. The point for 
Bergson, however, was that the three politenesses, while analytically 
distinct, were mutually implicated in practice due to the continuity or 
flow that characterizes human experience. To practise a formal, social 
politeness was to become imbued over time with a politeness of spirit 
which gave rise to a politeness of heart. It was possible for civilitude to 
emerge from etiquette, and for a civil attitude to realize a commitment 
to human dignity.
Bergson’s journey around ‘social’, ‘spiritual’ and ‘hearty’ politenesSES comprises a set of zigzags between the universal and the particular. Social politeness and politeness of heart envisage the universal: the grace with which one greets and trusts a fellow interactant as Anyone. In between the social and hearty, a politeness of spirit is disposed towards recognizing the qualities and quiddities of particular others. The point is that the journey from universal (‘social’) via particular (‘spiritual’) to universal (‘hearty’) effects a dialectic which brings the universal and particular into relationship while retaining the integrity of each polar position. It is a balancing act effected by an a priori recognition: here is the universally human, and here is the individual particular; both are centres of value, ends in themselves.

Cosmopolitan politesse I would see as that act of zigzagging between difference which does not compromise difference but yet accommodates difference (cf. Rapport 1992). It will be elaborated upon in the book as a supple and subtle social practice which opposes category-thinking in universally affording Anyone a rightful public space while recognizing the particularity of Anyone’s intrinsic difference.

**Dead Dogma?**

Politesse is a work, of imagination and transcendence: effort is always demanded if civility is not to descend to empty gesture and mere politeness. A more general warning against habituality comes from John Stuart Mill: ‘However true an opinion may be, if it is not fully, frequently and fearlessly discussed, it will be held as dead dogma, not a living truth’ (Mill 1963: 159). Truth itself can become old-fashioned and moribund – unfashionable – simply by becoming customary.

It might be questioned whether a project of humanist universalism is, in its entirety, not already dead dogma. However ambitious, necessary and new I would describe the cosmopolitan project of anthropology. I am also aware that harking back to a Western Enlightenment can be interpreted as anachronistic. This is the conclusion reached, for instance, by Alain Finkielkraut (1994) in his reflections on the question of Jewish identity in contemporary France and how the Jewish case serves as a kind of archetype. ‘Be a Jew on the inside, in private, and a man towards the outside world’, was the advice of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment philosopher Moses Mendelssohn to his diasporic fellows, on the eve of the French Revolution that for the first time would emancipate Jews en masse and grant them citizenship. Such a project of assimilation – and politesse – can now
be seen to have failed, according to Finkielkraut. Called into serious
question by the Dreyfus Affair in 1894, it was absolutely sundered by
the Holocaust. The major trauma of these events, Finkielkraut (1994: 70)
arouses, was that the Judaeophobia was directed – not, as with the
centuries of pogrom, against the ghetto and stetl – but against the
assimilated: the Jew whose power was demonstrated by his invisibility,
his proclivity to pass. ‘It is impossible to exaggerate the formidable
stature of the Jew as enemy’, Adolf Hitler proclaimed, for this enemy
is the man without qualities: at once Jew and invisible, traitorous and
conspiratorial, plotting the worldwide heartless empire of capitalism.

In short, Auschwitz makes Enlightenment notions of progress and
humanism appear absurd, irredeemably futile. Why assimilate to a
liberal Europe if it is only to end your life as a ‘free man’ in a sealed-off
train? And still, even at this distance from 1789, France has not
begun to become cosmopolitan: to eschew the vain classificatory work
that discriminates – joins and excludes – on the basis of nationality,
locality, gender, age, class, lifestyle and language. Furthermore, if the
Holocaust gave the lie to Jewish power and connectedness – ‘Unique
in 1940-1945 was the abandonment’ (Emmanuel Levinas, cited
in Finkielkraut 1994: 49) – then anti-Semitism has not been long
in renaming itself, as anti-Zionism. The state of Israel, a dwarfish
territory, is now the purported home of global power brokers, central
to a colossal clandestine organization in imperialism and neocolonialism. It is not coincidental that Theodor Herzl’s idea of Zionism
was born at the Dreyfus trial, Finkielkraut concludes: reason would
never defeat anti-Semitism, Herzl feared, assimilation would always
fail, and separation was the only solution.

Hence, Finkielkraut (1994: 82) reaches his own complex position.
One must proclaim ‘I am a Jew’ so as to ‘de-alienate’ oneself from
‘servitude’ to the imposed categories and roles (‘man’, ‘citizen’,
‘Frenchman’, ‘cosmopolitan’) of all ‘foreign powers’. In part this
entails identification with Israel, vouchsafing its rights and security,
since to identify with Israel is to transcend the discourse of the anti-
Semite of all vintages: Israel becomes an ‘inner kingdom’ for the
diasporic Jew, a source of a normalcy, a moral ease, a transcending of
the haunting terror not to stand out, and a pride.

Ironically, however, Israel also becomes a source of anxiety. The
state whose raison d’être was as eternal refuge for the Wandering Jew
finds itself in the ‘fundamental affective state [of being at] risk of
death’ (Finkielkraut 1994: 129), while the Diaspora, at least in the
West, enjoys a relative peace of mind. And the irony is instructive,
Finkielkraut finds. One proclaims ‘I am a Jew’ as part of a process
of celebrating ethnicity as an intrinsically plural and non-essentialist
phenomenon in a global public arena. One proclaims ‘I am a Jew’
Anyone and thereby lays claim to an equivocal label – at once diasporic and national – a label existing beyond the limits of category. One supports Israel, on the ‘front line’, embodiment of a millenarian Jewish destiny and a liberating vengeance, but one also distributes the ‘weight’ of Jewishness and affirms millennia of diasporic practice and civilization in which ‘Jew’ has meant more than simply one kind of citizenship among many. ‘I am a Jew’ bespeaks a precious and hard-earned refusal of definition.

Finkielkraut’s discourse has a wider resonance: it pertains not only to ‘the Jewish question’ but to the place of ‘culture’ in a contemporary world of identity politics. If humanist universalism is a conceptualization and a project irrevocably tainted – not only by anti-Semitism or anti-Zionism but also by the histories of Western imperialism and colonialism, slavery and indentured labour, capitalist exploitation and underdevelopment – then a redemption (expiation and remission, reparation and empowerment) is to be found in a rediscovery and celebratory embrace of essential cultural differences. ‘Whose “cosmos”, and which “cosmopolitics”?’; trumpets Bruno Latour: it is surely ‘impossible for us now to inherit the beautiful idea of cosmopolitanism since what we lack is just what our prestigious ancestors possessed: a cosmos’ (Latour 2004: 453). Recognition of and respect for cultural ‘otherness’ must now repudiate all claims to ‘mononaturism’: to there being one nature, one world and one humanity whose truths reason and science disclose. The ‘awesome multiplicity’ of the different perspectives revealed through ethnography mean that it is the very make-up of the cosmos that is at stake; there is no common world except one that is painstakingly negotiated and ‘composed’. Global commonality might be an ideal project in peaceableness but it must be undertaken by a ‘pluriverse’ of earthly ‘entities’ who are at present ‘owned’ and inhabited by a ‘freight of gods, attachments, and unruly cosmos [that] make it hard to get through the door into any common space’ (Latour 2004: 454–57). One must admit the common constructed or ‘cultured’ nature of the diversity of worlds of the earth’s entities before negotiations towards substantive commonalities can begin. Failing this, the ‘fundamentalism’ of scientific ‘naturalizers’ who appeal to an unconstructed ‘Nature Out There’ and that of radical Islam appealing to the revelation of the Koran and Sharia will war without end (Latour 2004: 459–60).

I find this line of argument to be invalid and unacceptable (cf. Wardle 2010). Rather than hoping to move from knowledge to morality (‘Given the nature of life on earth this is how we should behave’), Latour’s culturalist or perspectivist logic appears to endorse a reverse kind of causation (‘Given the historico-political situation
this is how we might know one another’); indeed, it collapses the distinction between knowledge and ethics. But the fact that all human knowledge is ‘constructed’ – in the sense of being made out, found out, using particular methods at particular times and places, by virtue of particular traditions of fabrication and production – does not mean that all such knowledge possesses the same factuality. The status of scientific facts is not the same as religious facts, for instance. The latter might fall into a category that Latour terms ‘constructivist’ – ‘dependent on series of [human] mediations’, ‘[apt to] fail and thus requiring careful maintenance and constant repair’ (Latour 2004: 458–59) – but the world to which science provides insight has no need of our cultural ‘life-support systems’ and their histories. We can know it, we can adapt ourselves to it, we can even know how to adapt it to our desires, partially, but there is no way in which universal realities might ‘fail’ in the way that cultural paradigms of knowing might fail. Our ‘construction’ of knowledge gives onto different kinds of facts, in short; some are aesthetic in character, matters of taste, and some are empirical in character, matters of rational discernment. And while ‘culture’ might be a name we wish to give to a sum of aesthetic judgements, ‘nature’ is a domain of universal truths.

The distinction between natural and cultural worlds is therefore fundamental, and vital to retain, as is a conceptualization that ‘science’ is not equivalent to ‘religion’, or ‘rationality’ to ‘taste’. It is in this way that one can hope for a progression in human knowledge, an improvement. As the aesthetic is distinguished from the empirical, so opinion (‘We believe the world is flat’) grades into fact (‘We know the world is round’), and the particularity of specific historico-cultural world-views gives way to an overarching accumulation of universalizable insights one might know as ‘civilized’ (Rapport 2011).

I do not accept, then, that cosmopolitanism, as a project of humanist universalism, a species of liberal virtue concerning the global freedom of Anyone, is anachronistic or moribund. The point of Mill’s warning is that a philosophy must be ‘fully, frequently and fearlessly discussed’ because it the truth. It might not do to ‘defeat the anti-liberals by repeating the good old tunes’, Keith Hart summarizes, but a valid project remains: to renew the classical liberal Enlightenment by presenting its philosophy in fresh language, as ‘an inclusive invitation to contemporary debate’ (Hart, personal communication 2009). It might not do ‘innocently’ to appeal to an Old World of Enlightenment and transcendental certainties, Natan Sznaider (2010) admits, since recent ‘memory cultures’ (including colonialism as well as the Holocaust) are so strong. But it must nevertheless be possible to imagine cosmopolitanism migrating from the domain of abstract philosophy so as to engage people in their everyday lives by inviting
them to see its universal insights and values in the contexts of their personal constructions of identity.

Nor do I trust the discourse of ethnicity and multiculturalism – however much the likes of Alain Finkielkraut are assured that notions of essentialism and homogeneity can be exploded and eschewed. The fiction of culture, once written into systems of classification and habitual practice, however strategically, is a difficult discourse to transcend. Culture is a rhetoric of constructed collective sameness and difference which, however satisfying aesthetically and sentimentally, threatens to obscure the realities of individuality and humanity. The world of culture must be inhabited ironically if it is not to deliver ‘grotesque’ performances of discrimination and confinement (Kateb 1984: 351; Amit and Rapport 2002: 92–101). I conclude that the prevalence of category-thinking in contemporary ‘identity politics’ makes the issue of universalism all the more vital. Enlightenment advances in scientific rationality and social emancipation are so precious a legacy that a cosmopolitan project of anthropology is never untimely.

‘We are all human’, Ernest Gellner exhorted not long before his death: ‘Don’t take more specific classifications seriously’ (Gellner 1993b: 3). The cosmopolitan project of anthropology provides a view beyond such classifications. Emancipating the individual and the human from symbols and structures that collectivize, homogenize and totalize, a cosmopolitan anthropology gives on to a science and a morality of Anyone.

**Envoi**

The book is divided into three main parts, each conceived of in terms of a key question. Part 1, ‘Cosmopolitanism and Cosmopolis: Definitions and Issues’, treats the question: What are the meanings of cosmopolitanism, past, present and future? Beginning with a historical overview of founding moments, I trace cosmopolitanism to a variety of contemporary voices and conceptualizations: as a kind of morality and also a normative programme, as a social condition, an orientation to the world and a kind of agency. Anthropological commentary has often remained sceptical, however. At best it would prescribe multiple cosmopolitanisms: the plurality of ways in which dialogue has been invited with worlds beyond particular cultural and communitarian boundaries. My intention in Part 1 is to show that such scepticism is misplaced. There is a viable cosmopolitan project for anthropology which involves carrying forward a Classical and Enlightenment tradition of thought. Not only should a cosmopolitan
project be described as viable in theory, it warrants, too, serious attention as a practical alternative to varieties of communitarianism such as nationalism and multiculturalism.

Part 2 of the book, “My name is Rickey Hirsch”: A Life in Six Acts, with Marginalia and a Coda’, treats the question: Is Anyone a feature of everyday social life and exchange, a real presence? I offer an ethnographic account of the life of one Rickey Hirsch, narrated in his own words, the intention being to evidence the individual consciousness that universally exists amid symbols and structures that might deal in essentialist classes and labels: the reductive machinations of category-thinking. Rickey, I say, personifies Anyone. While the particular substance of his life is his and his alone, the capacities he brings to bear as he inhabits social spaces and cultural symbologies instantiate human universals. Here is Anyone existing behind the role player, passing into, through and between communities, relationships, systems of classification and moments of interaction. In the testimony of Rickey Hirsch I wish to make Anyone visible as a concrete figure and not an abstraction: a real and constant presence.

In Part 3, ‘Anyone in Science and Society: Evidencing and Engaging’, the question becomes: How is the individuality of Anyone to be accommodated by an objective science and acknowledged by a democratic society? The issue is one of evidencing the personal in systematic terms and of engaging with the unique within a civil ethos that is universalist. The three sections comprising this part of the book have different emphases. The first uses historical case studies (in particular insights drawn from the works and lives of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche) in order to develop the notion of ‘personal truth’ and to explore how a science might treat this as evidence. The second section considers those models which are used, both in scientific hypotheses and in social policies, as prospective estimations of the human beings who will be engaged. Inevitably there is distortion between what is anticipated and the specificity of what is actually met: the radical particularity or ‘gratuitousness’ of Anyone. Interrogating those ways in which human beings are both the same and different I explore possible images (including the work of Stanley Spencer) of more ethical generalizing. The third section reflects on those norms of interaction which make for ‘polite’ or civil society. There are mannerly ways in which others are addressed that manifest and effect a recognition and an inclusion. If cosmopolitanism would recognize Anyone anywhere and everywhere, and include him or her as an equal member of a global liberal society, then interactional conventions must be in place of a special character. They would assure the individual of a space, by rights, but at the same time not classify that individual arbitrarily nor presume to know the particular qualities of their life. I compare
interactional routines in different ethnographic settings and consider the ways and extents to which a kind of ‘cosmopolitan politesse’ might be legislated for.

In setting out to address the above issues I imagine this book as complementing and extending previous publications such as the articles ‘An Outline for Cosmopolitan Study, for Reclaiming the Human through Introspection’ (Rapport 2007), ‘Apprehending Anyone: The Non-Indexical, Post-Cultural and Cosmopolitan Human Actor’ (Rapport 2010a), and ‘The Liberal Treatment of Difference: An Untimely Meditation on Culture and Civilization’ (Rapport 2011; also see Rapport 2002, 2006c, 2009a, 2010b, 2012a; Rapport and Stade 2007; Rapport and Wardle 2010). I deem the project of cosmopolitanism to be speculative as well as empirical. A ‘speculative philosophy’, Mill wrote in connexion with nineteenth-century political liberalism, is in reality not remote from the ‘business of life’ given how the ‘interests of men’ manifest themselves (Mill 1950: 39). I certainly have an ‘interest’ in cosmopolitanism: my engagement is personal as well as professional. In the integrity that I find cosmopolitanism grants to the individual human being universally, and the dignity granted to the single human life, I find a personal vision of fulfilment: cosmopolitanism offers a global liberal emancipation. An Afterword to the book reflects on my interestedness, querying the elective affinity of ‘Jewish cosmopolitanism’.