Introduction

Immigration, Transnationalism, and Development
The State of the Question

Alejandro Portes

The study of migration and development has focused traditionally on the forces driving persons from their home regions, the demographic and social consequences of their departure, and the subsequent effects of their remittances on local and national economies. The unit of analysis has normally been the individual migrant - identified by classical economics as the central decision maker in the process or the family, privileged by sociology and the “new economics” of migration - as the actual determinant of migration decisions. When aggregated, the decisions of individual actors and family units are said to have major effects on the social and economic prospects of sending regions and nations (Thomas 1973; Borjas 1990; Stark 1991; Massey et al. 1998). Similarly, the extensive debate over the incorporation of immigrants into the receiving societies has featured a range of arguments - from those that disparage the possibilities of successful integration among all or certain groups of foreigners - to alternatives that see such integration as almost inevitable (Huntington 2004b; Brimelow 1995; Zolberg 2006; Alba and Nee 1997, 2003; Morales and Giugni 2010).

Left out of the picture have been the organizational efforts of the migrants themselves and their possible bearing on sending areas, as well as on the incorporation in host societies. The individualistic focus has persisted both in critical accounts of the role of migration that regarded the
departure of migrants as another symptom of underdevelopment, and
in optimistic ones that focused on the role of migrant remittances as an
almost miraculous solution to local poverty and national underdevelop-
ment (Diaz-Briquet and Weintraub 1991; Stark 1984; De Haas 2012). The
possibility that purposefully - created organizations by expatriates could
play a significant role was almost entirely neglected in the development
literature. Similarly, conflicting accounts of sociopolitical incorporation
into host societies focused overwhelmingly on the characteristics of indi-
vidual migrants, neglecting their organizational life (Waldinger and Fitz-
gerald 2004). Only recently have empirical studies in several European
countries focused on the role of migrant associations in social and political
incorporation (Morales and Ramiro 2011; Pries and Sezgin 2012).

Alert sending country governments have begged to differ, engaging
with migrant organizations in a multiplicity of development projects and
even creating such organizations where none existed previously. Initially,
these contacts were prompted by the discovery of the volume and aggre-
gate significance of individual remittances and the interest of sending
country officials in preserving these flows. Gradually, however, it dawned
on them that the scope and importance - political and economic - of orga-
nized expatriate initiatives could go much farther than individual money
transfers (Iskander, this volume; Zhou and Lee, this volume). For coun-
tries like Mexico, Colombia, Morocco, and China, to name but a few, their
populations abroad became increasingly salient and important interlocu-
tors, both as sources of monetary and technological transfers and as po-
itical actors capable of affecting the course of events in home communi-
ties and even entire regions (Escobar, this volume; Iskander, this volume;
Goldring 2002; Saxenian 2002).

A parallel literature exploring determinants of citizenship acquisition
and political participation among immigrant groups identified ethnic as-
soiation as key mediators of these activities. Individual migrants seldom
take part in politics on their own, and those with modest levels of educa-
tion seldom begin alone the complex process of citizenship acquisition.
Instead, ethnic associations of different kinds encourage and guide this
process (Bloemraad 2006; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001; Portes
and Rumbaut 2006: chap. 5).

The history of the growth of immigrant organizations and their in-
teractions with home communities, local authorities, and national gov-
ernments is complex and varies greatly across particular communities
and countries. So are the repercussions that these interactions can have
on the prospects for sociopolitical incorporation and the development of
sending nations. An early empirical study of transnational organizations
created by Latin American immigrant communities in the United States
concluded that differences among them were so great, despite a common language and culture, that results did not provide any basis for generalization to other nationalities or their home countries (Portes, Escobar, and Walton Radford, 2007).

This realization provided the impetus, however, to extend the successful methodology employed in that original study (described in the Preface) to large Asian nationalities in the United States and, subsequently, to immigrant groups in several European countries. Applying the same methodology, the resulting network extended it to a total of eighteen immigrant nationalities in five different nations. Although the original focus was on the impact of immigrant organizations on sending countries, the actual conduct of these studies also brought to the fore their central role in the integration process in the host societies.

The successive steps of this collaborative project are described in the Preface, which also cites parallel comparative studies in Europe. As a prelude to chapters presenting the empirical results of this project, I review next the theoretical controversies in the field of immigration and development, the role of the concept of “transnationalism” in opening a path for the resolution of such controversies, and its parallel relationship to the process of incorporation into social and political life in receiving countries. While it is true that a sample of eighteen immigrant nationalities in five countries may not be enough to generalize to the universe of all such organizations, it provides a basis for advancing tentative conclusions of cross-national applicability. A common research design, employed on both sides of the Atlantic, lends authority to these findings.

**Theoretical Controversies**

**Migration and Development**

The relationship between migration and development has been viewed from diametrically opposing lenses. Scholars from sending countries in the Global South have often taken a critical stance toward such flows, viewing them both as a symptom of underdevelopment and a cause of its perpetuation. Migration is accused of depopulating entire regions, turning sending families from producers into rentiers, and allowing governments to escape their responsibilities by relying on migrant remittances. The structural importance of migration is not related, according to this view, to its capacity to change things for the better, but to its role in perpetuating systems of inequality by providing a safety valve for their consequences. Entrenched elites have taken full advantage of this option. This view has long been voiced by analysts of migration and development in
the advanced world (Reichert 1981; De Haas 2012), but it is best captured by a series of “declarations” signed by scholars from major migrant sending countries, including Mexico, Morocco, and the Philippines:

The development model adopted in the immense majority of labour exporting American countries has not generated opportunities for growth nor economic or social development. On the contrary, it has meant the emergence of regressive dynamics: unemployment and job precarization; greater social inequalities; loss of qualified workers; productive disarticulation and stagnation; inflation and greater economic dependency. As a consequence, we experience a convergence between depopulation and the abandonment of productive activities in areas of high emigration. (Declaration of Cuernavaca 20061)

The parallel literature concerning professional-level labor flows was dubbed “brain drain.” This view emphasizes how the superior economic and technological resources of rich countries penetrate weaker peripheral ones, altering their internal social order. The result is a process of “structural unbalancing” leading to several negative outcomes, including labor outflows. In the case of professional migration, the process includes several concatenated steps. Professional standards and training practices are disseminated from the core nations to the rest of the world and are readily copied by emerging countries aiming at “catching up” with the West. Young professionals trained according to these standards look for occupational opportunities that allow them to put their advanced skills to use and to develop them further. Unfortunately, such opportunities are scarce in the local economy, with the result that many experience relative deprivation. In the interim, high-tech firms and universities in the advanced world experiencing scarcities of domestic talent seek to supplement it by recruiting abroad. Naturally, the first place to look at is among the well-trained labor pools created by imported professional standards in less developed nations (Portes 1976; Portes and Celaya 2013; Zucker and Darby 2007).

The fit between the goals of young professionals experiencing relative deprivation in less developed countries and the demand for their skills abroad sets the stage for the “brain drain.” In this fashion, poorer countries end up subsidizing the high-tech labor needs of richer ones (De Haas 2012). Structural imbalancing thus ensures that the effort of emerging nations to imitate advanced ones is compromised, at every step, by the superior fit between human talent trained according to modern standards and skilled labor demand in the countries from which these standards emanate in the first place. Figure 0.1 graphically summarizes the process.
The opposite view to these negative conclusions is primarily associated with the “new economics” of migration. This school takes a positive stance toward the consequences of labor migration, emphasizing the multiplier effects of remittances and their capacity to overcome the negative consequences of imperfect or nonexistent market mechanisms at home (Stark 1984, 1991). The migrant worker functions in a sense as his family’s social security and credit cards all rolled into one. For this school, the migrant’s remittances always have positive effects in sending economies because they stimulate demand that is met by domestic production. Massey and colleagues (1987, 1998) have argued that every “migradollar” sent by Mexicans in the United States generated a $2.90 contribution to Mexico’s gross national product (GNP) in the 1990s. Supporters of this view also stress the role of social networks in maintaining continuity of cross-border labor flows and the back-and-forth movement of people and resources between places of origin and destination (Stark 1991). The positive contributions of individual and collective remittances have been documented in a number of empirical studies (Landolt 2001; Marqués and Santos 2001; Agarwala, this volume; Rodríguez, this volume).
“New economics” scholars have criticized the pessimistic views associated with the “Declaration of Cuernavaca” perspective as too narrow and too focused on immediate consequences. As Massey and colleagues (1998: 262) put it:

One important reason for the pessimism that characterizes most community studies is the lack of a good theoretical yardstick to measure the effects of migration on economic growth. Village studies universally confuse consumption with the non-productive use of remittances, ignoring the extensive and potentially large economic linkages that remittances create in local economies. They also tend to confound remittances use with the effect on remittances on family expenditures; and many studies employ a rather limited definition of “productive investments,” restricting them to investments in equipment while ignoring productive spending on livestock, schooling, housing, and land.

At the level of professional migration, the positive approach is reflected in recent results highlighting the potential contributions that highly skilled migrants can make to their sending countries in terms of business investments and technological transfers. A community of professional expatriates has the potential of having a significant impact on the scientific and technological development of their home country. In this fashion, the original “brain drain” from sending countries can be transformed into a significant “brain gain” (Saxenian 1999; Portes and Celaya 2013; Zhou and Lee, this volume). Reasons for professional expatriates to engage in these activities are straightforward: in addition to national loyalties and the weight of nostalgia, migrant professionals often have a sense of obligation to the institutions that educated them. When, on the basis of that education, they achieve wealth, security, and status abroad, it is only natural that they seek to repay the debt. Some do so through philanthropic activities; others through transferring information and technology; and still others through sponsoring the training of younger colleagues. Professionals who have become successful entrepreneurs abroad may go further and endow their alma maters or even found institutions of higher learning and research at home (Saxenian 2002; Vertovec 2004).

The recent research literature supports these conclusions. As the cases of China, India, and Israel show, the growth of sizable expatriate populations of scientists and engineers has not necessarily meant the hollowing out of these countries’ scientific and research institutions, but energized them through a dense traffic of personal contacts and ideas. Saxenian (2006), who studied these cases in detail, attributes the growth of dynamic information technology poles in cities like Bangalore in India, Shanghai in China, and Tel Aviv in Israel to the entrepreneurial initiatives of their
professionals abroad (see also Agarwala, this volume; Zhou and Lee, this volume).

How can these opposite conclusions and results be reconciled? An important difference between both positions is that while the negative school tends to emphasize the effects of permanent outflows for sending countries, the more optimistic perspective focuses on the diverse forms in which migrant communities relate back to their place of origin. Family remittances, like technological transfers and business investments, are all ways of creating a return flow of resources to the benefit of individuals and countries left behind. Put differently, while permanent out-migration may depopulate sending areas and weaken their production structures, various forms of cyclical outflows, marked by monetary and information transfers followed by the eventual return of migrants themselves, can have positive developmental effects. As studies of new technological centers created by migrant transfers show, these return activities induce development by infusing new economic and social dynamism in previously stagnant areas. At the level of less skilled labor migration, the contributions and eventual return of migrants may also mitigate the negative consequences highlighted by critics of migration.

**The Advent of Transnationalism**

The concept of transnationalism was coined to give theoretical form to the empirical observation that international migrants seldom leave behind their communities of origin, but engage instead in “multi-stranded” activities and linkages with them (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004; Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2003; Basch, Glick Schiller, and Szanton Blanc 1994). Contrary to the postulates of earlier theories of immigration that envisioned a one-way flow out of misery and want, empirical studies portrayed a very different reality. Most immigrants maintain regular contacts with family and friends left behind, and a sizable minority engages in a routine traffic of back-and-forth interaction in the pursuit of economic, political, and cultural ends (Itzigsohn 2009; Landolt 2001; Basch, Glick Schiller, and Szanton Blanc 1994).

The significance of the transnational perspective is that it highlights the circularity of migration flows and the various forms that it can assume. Hence, it provides a conceptual framework where the positive evaluations of the migration-development linkage by authors of the “new economics” school and by analysts of advanced technology transfers can fit. While, in line with the negative view of migration for development, some authors have noted several deleterious consequences of transnational activities (Glick Schiller and Fouron 1999; De Haas 2012), the empirical consensus
leans in the opposite direction. These activities have the potential to spur local, regional, and even national development insofar as they are oriented to promote the well-being of families and communities left behind (Landolt 2001; Itzigsohn et al. 1999; Zhou and Lee, this volume).

The empirical literature on the topic uncovered two additional important facts. First, developmentally relevant activities tend to be conducted by organizations, rather than individuals. Aside from family remittances and occasional gifts, most individual migrants are in no position to implement projects of real significance for their communities, much less countries of origin. Instead, they band together in a multiplicity of organizations, ranging from modest hometown associations to regional and national federations of these associations to professional and business groups (Iskander, this volume; Portes and Zhou 2012). Referred to as “globalization from below” (Guarnizo and Smith 1998), transnational organizations engage in a variety of economic, civic, and philanthropic activities in their home localities and regions, seeking to improve life conditions there. Professional and business associations can go further, transferring technological know-how and making capital investments of national relevance (Saxenian 2006; Agarwala, this volume).

Second, empirical studies have repeatedly found that it is the more educated and economically and legally secure immigrants who are most likely to lead and participate in transnational organizations (Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2003; Portes, Escobar, and Arana 2008; Pries, Halm, and Sezgin 2012). Thus, the circularity of migrant flows and transfers promoted by transnational organizations are not generally associated with short-term or temporal migration, but with better-established communities. In line with Skeldon’s (2012) argument, it is long-term rather than short-term circulatory movements that provide the more reliable pathways to migrant developmental contributions. By the same token, such contributions can be implemented even if migrants do not return permanently. This is particularly the case among professionals and entrepreneurs living abroad (Saxenian 2006; Portes and Yiu 2013; Zhou and Lee, this volume).

To summarize the discussion so far, the negative position on the effects of migration in sending countries and regions is largely based on the assumption of its permanence. More recent studies have highlighted the positive developmental impact of circular flows, primarily long-term ones, that include not only the return of migrants themselves but also the economic and knowledge transfers that they can make. The concept of “transnationalism” gives theoretical form to this dynamic process. Although the focus of this literature has been on the transnational activities of individuals, it is evident that important philanthropic and developmen-
tal contributions generally require collective efforts. The organizations that implement these efforts are led and staffed by more educated and established members of immigrant communities, a pattern common to the United States and Western Europe. The chapters that follow present a wealth of original information describing the origins, character, and impact of immigrant organizations as they affect the development prospects of sending nations.

**Assimilation and Transnationalism**

A final theoretical controversy pertains to the effect that immigrant organizations in general and those operating transnationally in particular have on the social and political incorporation of immigrants into the receiving society. In the United States, advocates of prompt assimilation have expressed fears that such activities would slow down or even derail the process. Such fears have been eloquently articulated for the case of Latin American immigrants by prominent academics such as the late Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington:

> In this new era, the single most immediate and most serious challenge to America’s traditional identity comes from the immense and continuing immigration from Latin America, especially from Mexico, and the fertility rates of these immigrants. ... The extent and nature of this immigration differ fundamentally from those of previous immigrations, and the assimilation successes of the past are unlikely to be duplicated with the contemporary flood of immigrants from Latin America. (Huntington 2004a: 31)

Findings from past research concerning participation in transnational organizations have a direct bearing on this point. As just seen, it is better established, educated, and legally secure immigrants that are more likely to participate in these activities (Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2003; Pries, Halm, and Sezgin 2012). But these are also the best candidates for citizenship acquisition and political integration, raising the likelihood that assimilation and transnationalism may not be at odds. Results from the first phase of the Comparative Immigrant Organizations Project (CIOP) reinforce this finding by showing that membership in transnational organizations is heavily skewed toward older and better educated immigrants, those with higher occupational status, and those with larger periods of residence in the country. Table 0.1 presents results of that study. Of particular interest is that significant majorities of members of these organizations have lived in the United States for ten years or more, had become US citizens, and spoke English fluently.
A subsequent survey, also conducted as part of this project, targeted directly the role of immigrant organizations in acculturation and political incorporation by asking organizational leaders directly about their views on political incorporation into the host society and for reports of their organizations’ political activities in the United States. Table 0.2 presents the distribution of responses of leaders of Colombian, Dominican, and Mexican organizations to those questions.

Table 0.2. Leaders’ Evaluations of Organizational Effects on Immigrant Political Incorporation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Colombian %</th>
<th>Dominican %</th>
<th>Mexican %</th>
<th>Total % (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. “This organization contributes to the successful integration of its members to American society.”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agrees</td>
<td>77.08</td>
<td>85.19</td>
<td>89.92</td>
<td>86.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral/unsure</td>
<td>10.42</td>
<td>9.26</td>
<td>6.98</td>
<td>7.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagrees</td>
<td>12.50</td>
<td>5.55</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>5.68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. “[Colombian/Dominican/Mexican] immigrants should acquire US citizenship as soon as possible.”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral/Unsure</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>85.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90.91</td>
<td>9.09</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96.15</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91.18</td>
<td>7.35</td>
<td>1.47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. “Participation in this organization helps its members maintain ties with their home country.”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral/Unsure</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>95.83</td>
<td>4.17</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85.19</td>
<td>5.56</td>
<td>9.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83.72</td>
<td>9.30</td>
<td>6.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84.21</td>
<td>7.69</td>
<td>8.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. “Participation in this organization retards the acquisition of US citizenship.”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral/Unsure</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>18.75</td>
<td>79.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.56</td>
<td>7.40</td>
<td>87.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>19.38</td>
<td>78.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>16.60</td>
<td>80.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. “This organization contributes to more active participation of [Colombian/Dominican/Mexican] immigrants in US politics.”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral/Unsure</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>37.50</td>
<td>18.75</td>
<td>43.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77.78</td>
<td>5.56</td>
<td>16.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66.67</td>
<td>17.83</td>
<td>15.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61.94</td>
<td>15.38</td>
<td>22.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. “It is possible to acquire US citizenship and continue being a good [Colombian/Dominican/Mexican].”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral/Unsure</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>93.75</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96.30</td>
<td>3.70</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>89.92</td>
<td>7.75</td>
<td>2.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90.28</td>
<td>8.50</td>
<td>1.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. “[Colombian/Dominican/Mexican] immigrants place their obligations toward their home country above their integration to American society.”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral/Unsure</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22.92</td>
<td>14.58</td>
<td>62.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.63</td>
<td>27.78</td>
<td>42.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.18</td>
<td>16.28</td>
<td>70.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.62</td>
<td>20.24</td>
<td>61.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. “It is possible for immigrants to integrate to American society and continue taking part in their home country politics.”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral/Unsure</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>81.25</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>12.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85.19</td>
<td>14.81</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88.37</td>
<td>5.43</td>
<td>6.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83.00</td>
<td>10.93</td>
<td>6.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N      | 50    | 56    | 133   | 239   |

*Source: CIOP second survey, reported in Portes, Escobar, and Arana (2008).*
Leaders’ evaluations were nearly unanimous in asserting that: (1) their organizations contributed to the successful incorporation of immigrants into American society; (2) they simultaneously helped immigrants maintain ties to their home countries; and (3) there was no contradiction between both aims. Most leaders could not understand that the goals of successful integration and home country loyalty would be opposites. Close to 90 percent believed that their organizations helped their members assimilate better to their new social surroundings and almost 100 percent endorsed the view that immigrants should acquire US citizenship “as soon as possible.” Ninety percent asserted that it was entirely possible for an immigrant to become a good American citizen and, at the same time, continue to be loyal to his/her country of birth.

The activities the immigrant organizations engaged in consistently supported this stance. The same survey included three indicators to gauge objective participation in American politics: (1) the existence of organizational ties with American political authorities at the local, state, and federal levels; (2) whether the organizations had taken part in civic/political campaigns or related activities in the United States; and (3) the character and number of such activities. Tables 0.3 and 0.4 present these results.

The data show that three-fourths of immigrant organizations maintain regular ties with American political authorities and that two-thirds have engaged in some form of political activism in the United States. These include one or more of the following: (a) support candidates to elective office; (b) organize political debates; (c) provide civic and political infor-

Table 0.3. Political Ties and Civic/Political Activities of Immigrant Organizations in the United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Colombian %</th>
<th>Dominican %</th>
<th>Mexican %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>40.00</td>
<td>22.73</td>
<td>15.38</td>
<td>25.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>60.00</td>
<td>77.27</td>
<td>84.62</td>
<td>75.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Organization participates in civic/political activities in the United States. |
| No          | 48.00       | 28.57       | 33.08     | 35.63  |
| Yes         | 52.00       | 71.43       | 66.92     | 64.37  |

N 50 56 133 239

Source: CIOP second survey, reported in Portes, Escobar, and Arana (2008).
mation to members of the organization; (d) disseminate civic/political information to the immigrant community as a whole; (e) participate in various civic and political campaigns. Table 0.4 shows that most immigrant organizations engage in at least one of these activities.

Results of the successive phases of the CIOP study indicate that the conflict between transnational activism and incorporation into the American political system is largely illusory. In practice, both processes tend to occur simultaneously and reinforce each other, as when experiences and skills acquired in one realm are transferred into the other. Later studies, such as the TRAMO project in Europe, supported these findings by pointing toward a paced process of social and cultural incorporation in which newly arrived immigrants struggle to find an economic niche and secure a stable legal status in the host country. It is only in later years, when these initial hurdles have been overcome, that immigrants are able to secure citizenship, engage in local politics in their adopted communities, and join transnational organizations seeking to help the places that they came from (Pries and Sezgin 2012; Escobar, this volume).

The extension of the CIOP methodology to Asian immigrant groups in the United States provided additional comparative evidence. For the most part, these results are supportive of the conclusions reached on the basis of the original Latin American samples. Chinese, Indian, and Vietnamese organizations also partake of a dual role, simultaneously promoting development programs in the home countries and the integration of immigrants into American society. Hence, just as in the case of the migration and development debate, the weight of existing evidence leans in a positive direction. Just as the individual and collective contributions of migrants can have a significant bearing on the development of sending regions and nations, the passage of time leads steadily toward social and political incorporation into the host societies. Immigrant organizations play a central role in both processes.

Table 0.4. Count of Civic/Political Activities in the United States by Nationality of Organization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>None %</th>
<th>One %</th>
<th>Two %</th>
<th>Three %</th>
<th>Four or More %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colombian</td>
<td>47.92</td>
<td>22.92</td>
<td>14.58</td>
<td>12.50</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican</td>
<td>29.63</td>
<td>9.26</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>14.82</td>
<td>24.07</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican</td>
<td>32.56</td>
<td>20.93</td>
<td>24.81</td>
<td>15.50</td>
<td>6.20</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CIOP second survey, reported in Portes, Escobar, and Arana (2008).
Enter the State

As a form of “globalization from below,” the grassroots activities of immigrants and their organizations could not but attract the attention of powerful institutions, in particular governments. First to be the object of this attention were remittances. As sending country governments realized the volume and economic importance of these transfers, they started taking steps to ensure their continuity and, if possible, their growth. International organizations, such as the World Bank, chimed in with schemes to channel migrant remittances from consumption to productive investments. Guarnizo (2003) notes the irony that the modest contributions of individual migrants to help their families survive at home become contabilized in the banking houses of world financial centers and even used as collateral for loans to sending country governments.

Immigrant organizations, including small hometown committees, then came to the attention of state officials. They did so for two reasons: First, as their civic and philanthropic projects became better known, sending country governments came to see them as potential partners, but also as forces in need of monitoring and control (Goldring 2002; Landolt 2001). Second, government officials wishing to engage with expatriate communities for various purposes realized that they could not do so individually, but only through the mediation of organizations. Consequently, leaders of such groups acquired growing importance as interlocutors of both sending and receiving states.

The entry of state agencies into the transnational field changed it profoundly. What had previously been a spontaneous collection of grassroots mobilizations and projects now became a negotiated space where expatriate organizations and government officials alternatively competed and cooperated, each seeking to extract maximum advantage from their engagement. Sending country governments came first as they became aware of the aggregate importance of migrant investments. Host country governments then jumped into the fray as they sought some sort of dialogue with their immigrant populations and as the notion of “co-development” took hold for controlling and possibly preventing future migrant flows (Morales and Giugni 2010; Cebolla Boado and López-Sala, this volume). As we shall see, the changing dynamics of this relationship evolved from a dialogue between self-initiated migrant organizations and state agencies to the gradual sponsorship and even creation of associations by their state interlocutors.

Sending States

The activities of sending states in relation to their expatriate communities and their intervention in the transnational field have taken the most varied
forms. They have been guided by goals ranging from propitiating immigrant remittances and investments to politically controlling migrants and ensuring their political loyalty. A number of sending country governments originally regarded the migrants as little more than defectors from their own national projects; only later did they come to see them as important contributors to these same projects. Mexico and China, each in its own way, traversed that path (Iskander 2010; Delano 2011; Portes and Zhou 2012). The Moroccan monarchy endeavored for many years to politically control their large expatriate population and prevent their assimilation to European host nations. Only in recent years has it adopted a more conciliatory stance, establishing a dialogue with large migrant organizations and collaborating with them in selected developmental activities (Lacroix 2005; Lacroix and Dumont, this volume).

Some governments have engaged in extensive partnerships with migrant organizations in the implementation of development projects. In Mexico, this has taken the form of the well-known Three-for-One Program in which each migrant dollar invested in a development project in Mexico is matched by a dollar each from the federal and state governments, as well as the municipality benefiting from that project. Agencies have been created at the federal and state levels to promote Three-for-One initiatives, supervise their implementation, and prevent malfeasance (Iskander, this volume; Goldring 2002). In China, state agencies at all governmental levels (qiao-ban), as well as branches of the Communist Party (qiao-lian), have also engaged in these types of collaborative ventures. Organized migrant contributions have financed everything - from modest village water projects to university buildings (Zhou and Lee, this volume; Leung 2008). Given the nature of the Communist regime, it is not surprising that migrant initiatives have been tightly controlled and monitored. There are no civil society counterparts to Chinese transnational organizations abroad; only state and party agencies exist, although both have been very active in recent years.

In some sending states, governments have in recent decades initiated greater dialogue with individual members of the diaspora, but have been less active in engaging with diaspora organizations. For example, after decades of ignoring its diaspora, the Indian Government began to initiate new policies and institutions to strengthen its bonds with its diaspora in the mid-1980s (Agarwala this volume). To date, these efforts while new and significant in their effects, have focused on attracting individual overseas Indians’ travel in and out of India, investments in property, and foreign exchange earnings. These efforts include specialized bank accounts, new visa status cards, as well as important symbolic gestures such as politicians’ personal visits to meet with the US Diaspora and an inaugural conference in India to commemorate and network with overseas Indians.
In 2005, the Indian Government created a cabinet-level Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA) in 2005, to manage and coordinate the states’ interactions with the diaspora. MOIA may be more involved in organization-level engagement in the future.

Other sending states are in no position to engage in this type of full-fledged collaborative venture (with individuals or organizations), either because of the feebleness of their resources or suspicion of the intentions of their expatriates. First-generation Vietnamese, for example, represent a case of “blocked transnationalism” because of their continuing opposition to the Hanoi regime and the refusal of the latter to allow independent migrant initiatives. The Vietnamese state has been much more proactive toward the US-born second generation, seeking to engage it in developmental projects and technology transfers in a manner similar to those implemented in China (Huynh and Yiu, this volume). Weaker states that also seek to promote the remittances and transnational development projects of their expatriates may seek to compensate for their lack of resources with symbolic gestures, such as the granting of dual citizenship and the right to vote in home country elections. This is the case of several Latin American nations, including Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and El Salvador (Escobar, this volume; Landolt 2001; Perez-Sainz and Andrade-Eekhoff 2003; Lungo and Kandel 1999).

Dual citizenship and the right to vote in home country elections are contested issues. On the positive side, they help preserve home loyalties and often encourage migrants to acquire the citizenship of the host country, since they incur no penalties in doing so (Bloemraad 2006; Escobar 2007). On the other hand, they violate the principle, enshrined in international law, that every person must have one nationality and one only. Critics in the host societies argue that dual citizenship places native citizens at a disadvantage and retards the process of political assimilation of immigrants, although, as seen previously, evidence of such slowdown is lacking. Sending country critics complain, in turn, that the expatriate vote can result in elections at the local and even at the national level being decided by people who do not live in the country and do not have to face the consequences of their choices (Freeman 1995; Hollifield 2004). For this reason, while the number of countries granting or accepting dual citizenship has grown, others have resisted doing so. Large Global South countries, such as India and China, have been, so far, the principal exceptions to the dual citizenship bandwagon.2

The different orientations and behavior of sending country governments toward their expatriates can be arranged in a typology, such as that presented in Figure 0.2. Countries included in each cell are representative of current trends, with the cautions that exceptions may exist at the sub-
national level (i.e., at the level of states, provinces, and home localities) and that there have been sudden reversals in the policies of governments toward their emigrants in the past that may recur in the future. Differences in the policies of sending states should not obscure the fact that their involvement in the transnational field highlights the developmental potential of immigrant communities and their organizational initiatives, as described previously.

Receiving States

Until recently, the research literature on immigrant transnationalism and transnational organizations focused overwhelmingly on the United States. As a consequence, discussion and analysis of the role of host states was generally absent, since the US government takes a laissez-faire attitude toward these activities and has seldom intervened, either to prevent or to support them. The situation is quite different in Western Europe, where governments have sought to actively engage with their foreign populations and to enact various policies aimed at accelerating their integration and at preventing future flows (Nijenhuis and Zoomers, this volume; Hollifield 2004; Morales and Ramiro 2011; De Haas 2012).

A good part of this effort has been guided by the concept of “co-development,” meaning a joint effort by sending and receiving states to im-

Figure 0.2. Sending Country Policies toward Immigrant Transnational Organizations: A Typology

1 National government only; state government policies vary.
2 Recent implementation of proactive policies toward expatriates or their offspring.
plement various development projects. In theory, such projects should improve the well-being of the population of sending countries and hence reduce future pressures toward out-migration. Although results of these policies have been mixed at best, the central point is that they have stimulated host countries to identify interlocutors within their immigrant communities in order to collaborate in the implementation of various programs in the sending countries. Naturally, such interlocutors have not been individuals, but organizations (Iskander 2010; Lacroix 2005).

Once identified, immigrant organizations entering into this kind of dialogue have commonly been recipients of substantial official support (Cebolla Boado and López-Sala, this volume; Pries and Sezgin 2012). This sets up peculiar dynamics in which immigrant leaders who have gained access to host state officials have seen their positions greatly strengthened: they have been able to rent offices and hire staff, present themselves as important intermediaries to their own coethnic communities, and even gain the ear of sending country authorities.

The deliberate sponsorship and even creation of transnational organizations by Western European states has received so far mixed reviews. On the one hand, this policy does strengthen certain organizational activities among immigrant communities and provides resources for the implementation of civic and philanthropic projects at home (Godin et al., this volume; Cebolla Boado and López-Sala, this volume). On the other hand, it sets up a sharp divide between organizational initiatives that succeed or fail in gaining the attention and support of government officials. In the worst-case scenario, these policies can evolve into a clientelistic situation where chosen organizations become progressively insulated and more interested in preserving their financial prerogatives than in implementing real development projects at home.

The end result may be the creation of a new bureaucratic layer of immigrant “officials” that have gained access to and interact with both sending and receiving state authorities, but whose representativeness and developmental effectiveness become increasingly questionable. Ironically, European governmental efforts to promote development in immigrants’ home countries may fail, while grassroots efforts by immigrant organizations in the United States without any US state support may prove more effective. Whether co-development projects succeed or not depends on the monitoring capacities of government officials, the values and motivations of immigrant leaders themselves, and the characteristics of specific expatriate communities.

The inclusion of European cases in the expanded CIOP study thus raises a new dimension absent from the American scene. The activities of European states do not negate earlier conclusions concerning the developmental potential of transnational organizations, but they introduce a
novel element that may strengthen that potential in some cases and derail it in others. The chapters in the second part of this book describe immigrant transnational organizations in various European countries and examine in greater detail these dynamics.

**Conclusion: An Evolving and Contested Relationship**

The debate between opponents of out-migration as a cause of depopulation and external dependency and supporters that emphasize its positive multiplier effects can be considered dated by now. While both processes take place, the debate is resolved by separating permanent from circular migration flows and, especially, by noting the long-term potential and actual contributions of transnational organizations and entrepreneurs. As shown in Figure 0.3, this distinction applies to low-skilled labor migration as well as to professional outflows.

The older debate on migration and development has been superseded, not only because of the proliferation of immigrant remittances and organized philanthropic activities, but also because the entry of governments into this field has endowed it with new energies, possibilities, and dangers. The transformation of immigrant grassroots initiatives into a series of activities channeled and sponsored by nation-states raises a series of interesting questions for the future. Among expatriate communities for whom the proactive stance of sending states is paramount—China and Mexico at the forefront—the question of how to balance the significant in-

**Figure 0.3.** Types of Migration and Their Developmental Effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Permanent</th>
<th>Circular</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low-skilled</strong></td>
<td><strong>Circular</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- Depopulation of sending areas</td>
<td>-- Investment of migrant savings in sending areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- Gradual decline in remittances as family members depart</td>
<td>-- Preservation of intact families.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- Weakening of local productive structures</td>
<td>-- Migrant remittances and savings as tools to overcome market imperfections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>High-skilled</strong></td>
<td><strong>Circular</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- Loss of national talent</td>
<td>-- Regular transfers of knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- Waste of scarce local resources in training personnel for jobs abroad</td>
<td>-- Migrant investments as triggers to creation of high-tech growth poles in home countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- Perpetuation of technological/scientific inequality with the advanced world</td>
<td>-- Reduction of technological/scientific inequalities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Effects in each cell are summaries of those described or hypothesized in the research literature. See also Portes (2009).
crease in the developmental potential of immigrant transfers and philanthropy with their increasing regulation by state agencies becomes central.

Programs like the Three-for-One Program in Mexico or those sponsored by the qiao-ban and qiao-lian in China certainly multiply the developmental impact of transnational projects, but also restrict the scope of action of immigrant organizations. In particular, the capacity of these organizations, by virtue of their being based abroad, to promote democracy-enhancing movements at home can be compromised by their co-optation by state agencies. At worst, the result may be to reinforce the power of entrenched elites at home and to prevent democratic change, precisely the fears voiced by traditional opponents of out-migration (Delgado-Wise and Cypher 2007; De Haas 2012).

Similarly, for immigrant organizations sponsored or created by host country governments, the question is how the increase in economic resources brought about by this sponsorship balances out against the subordination of immigrant priorities to those of state agencies. In particular, the transformation of grassroots organizations into a new layer of quasiofficial bureaucracy between sending and receiving countries looms as a threat to this form of sponsored transnationalism. In either case, what we are witnessing at present is a contest between popular actors who seek, through multiple initiatives, to by-pass the constraints imposed on them by dominant political and economic forces and the reaction of at least some of these forces in order to bring such initiatives under official guidance and control. The result of these encounters remains to be seen.

Thus, the resolution of older theoretical debates concerning the relationship of migration to socioeconomic development and of transnationalism to political incorporation in host countries has brought in its wake a new set of problematic issues in need of close attention. The specific experiences of immigrant nationalities and their home and host countries related in the following pages should greatly sharpen our understanding of the issues at play and extend our knowledge of these complex dynamics.

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Notes

1. Cited in Delgado-Wise and Marques Covarrubias (2007: no pp.)
2. India does grant its expatriates an Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI) identification. While this facilitates travel back and forth from the country, OCI holders have no political rights, being prevented from voting in Indian elections or holding public office (Naujoks 2013: 58). It should also be noted that a bill has been introduced to allow for dual citizenship in India, and although it has not yet been enacted, current discussions indicate that it will soon be passed into law.

References


