Chapter 1

Introduction: the migration without borders scenario

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What would happen if border controls were suppressed and people were granted the right to move freely throughout the world? This book explores the ‘migration without borders’ (MWB) scenario and investigates the ethical, human rights, economic and social implications of the free movement of people. In a globalized world in which migratory flows seem to elude the attempts of states to regulate such movements, the MWB scenario challenges conventional views on migration and fosters a critical rethinking of current policies and practices. This book is the product of a research project launched by UNESCO to better understand the theoretical issues surrounding ‘open borders’ and the regional dynamics governing the movement of people in the Americas, Europe, Africa and the Asia Pacific region. This introductory chapter reviews the main elements of the debate on free movement and summarizes the major findings of this project.

The MWB scenario is often dismissed as unrealistic. While it may indeed be an unlikely perspective for the near future, there are several arguments for going beyond a simplistic dismissal of free movement. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that ‘Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country’ (Article 13-2). Only emigration is recognized as a fundamental right, which raises the issue of the actual meaning of this right in the absence of immigration possibilities, and points to the necessity of envisaging a more comprehensive right to mobility. In today’s world, most people are free to leave their country. But only a minority of them have the right to enter another country of their choice. The
right to *emigration* remains problematic as long as major restrictions on *immigration* keep people from migrating, or even travelling, to other countries. The MWB scenario might therefore be morally desirable from a human rights perspective, in which case it would be worth promoting despite its apparent unfeasibility. Moreover, the unfeasibility of the MWB scenario is often taken for granted on the basis of fragile reasoning: one often hears, for example, that it would provoke huge migration flows, although few empirical investigations support this claim.

And of course, the future is difficult to predict. If one had told a French or a German citizen in, say, 1950, that free movement would be a reality in the European Union a few decades later, he or she may have been difficult to convince. Even in the 1980s it would have been difficult to predict that the free movement of people between Eastern and Western Europe would become normal some three decades later. Similarly, ‘open borders’ were a reality in the pre-1962 Commonwealth, within which citizens from the former British Empire had the right to move freely: people from South Asia or the Caribbean could for example move without restrictions to the United Kingdom. One also often forgets that until recently emigrating could be more difficult than immigrating: many states once prevented their citizens from leaving their country (Dowty, 1987), a practice that has decreased in the past few decades. In this regard, the world is actually progressing towards more, not less, freedom of movement.

Drawing on both a review of the literature and the contributions to this volume, the first section of this introductory chapter describes the context of the MWB debate and considers the contemporary evolutions in migration trends and border controls. The following sections investigate the MWB scenario from four different perspectives: ethics and human rights, economics, the social dimension, and practical aspects.

**Migration and border controls today**

Controlling immigration has become an important political issue. Most receiving states are strongly concerned with what they perceive as the porosity of their borders to flows of undocumented migration, and are developing new measures to police them. By envisaging a greater level of freedom in the movement of people across international borders, the MWB scenario directly challenges this trend and proposes a new vision, according to which nations should not fruitlessly – and often inefficiently – attempt to curb migration flows, but rather support them and recognize the opportunities they offer. This section examines recent developments in border controls and evaluates their efficiency, costs and advantages.
Contemporary trends in migration controls

Contemporary immigration controls are characterized by several trends. Governments are relying increasingly on new technologies to control their borders and are developing innovative measures to identify undocumented migrants once they have entered their territory, while receiving states are attempting to encourage sending and transit countries to cooperate in their fight against irregular migration. Security concerns play an important role in these developments, whose human and financial costs raise the issue whether it is possible to truly control people flows.

The borders between Western countries and less-rich countries have become increasingly fortified, and sophisticated tools are being used to control them. The most documented case is the U.S.–Mexico border, along which walls and high steel fencing have been constructed. A growing number of patrol agents rely on technologically advanced equipment that includes high-intensity lighting, body-heat- and motion-detecting sensors, and video surveillance (Nevins, 2002). A similar trend can be observed in Europe, notably around Gibraltar and the border between Spain and Morocco. New actors are involved in controlling migration – such as airline carriers, which are now required to check their passengers’ right to travel to the country of destination (Guiraudon and Joppke, 2001).

If external controls fail, governments may be successful in establishing internal measures to trace undocumented migrants after their entry. Controls on the workplace are often envisaged and sometimes practised, but yield few results: they displease employers, have high economic and political costs, and require huge efforts to be significantly implemented. Another option is to control undocumented migrants’ access to social services. Immigration status is increasingly used to restrict access to welfare provisions, but this policy meets resistance: it is questionable from a human rights perspective, as it generates even greater exclusion for migrants and contradicts the inclusive nature of the welfare system (Cohen et al., 2002). Once identified, undocumented migrants are sometimes subject to detention and expulsion. While these measures stem from the right of states to control the entry and residence of non-nationals, it is worth remembering that they have traditionally constituted responses to specific and exceptional circumstances such as armed conflicts and wars. Today, they are common practice (Schuster, 2004).

Another strategy to control migration relies on cooperation between countries. Sending states are pressured to stop outflows of undocumented migrants, while transit countries are encouraged to better control their borders. Countries such as Mexico or Morocco then become buffer zones to contain migration from Latin America or sub-Saharan Africa (Andreas and Biersteker, 2003). Development aid is sometimes conditional on sending states
cooperating in controlling migration or on their reaccepting expelled migrants, thereby establishing migration as an issue in bilateral relationships.

In recent years, security concerns have further reinforced the apparent need to control borders, as porous borders are thought to facilitate terrorist activities. In North America, even the long-neglected U.S.–Canada border has become a source of security concerns (Andreas and Biersteker, 2003). On both sides of the Atlantic, such concerns have prompted the introduction of new biometric technologies (Thomas, 2005). While security preoccupations exacerbate the pressure to control borders, it is worth remembering that immigration controls were already a hot issue before their emergence – they alone cannot explain recent trends in border controls.

The most disturbing consequence of these evolutions in migration controls is the number of people who die on their way to receiving countries. Undocumented migration has become a dangerous process: it is estimated that at least one migrant dies every day at the U.S.–Mexico border, mostly because of hypothermia, dehydration, sunstroke or drowning (Cornelius, 2001; Martin, 2003). Similar trends can be observed in Europe. Eschbach et al. (1999) estimate that at least 920 migrants died trying to reach Europe between 1993 and 1997, while NGOs have counted more than 4,000 deaths between 1992 and 2003 (Rekacewicz and Clochard, 2004). According to a 2002 statement to the UN Secretary General, over 3,000 migrants attempting to enter Europe died between 1997 and 2000, mostly when crossing the Straits of Gibraltar (Human Rights Advocates International, 2002). The tragic outcomes of undocumented migration are not confined to Western countries: the same document mentions casualties off the coasts of Australia, at the border of Mexico and Guatemala, and across the Sahara. We should keep in mind, too, that these figures are probably underestimated, as no one knows how many bodies have not been discovered.

The costs of border control measures are not only human but also financial: according to an IOM report, the twenty-five richest countries spend U.S.$25–$30 billion per year on the enforcement of immigration laws (Martin, 2003). These costs stem not only from controlling the borders, but also from the issuance of visas and residence permits; the prosecution, detention and removal of undocumented migrants; labour inspections and the implementation of sanctions on employers; the processing of asylum seekers’ claims and the resettlement of refugees; and the search for undocumented migrants. To provide a better perspective, it is tempting to juxtapose this amount of money with the sums dedicated to development: according to the World Bank’s 2004 World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2004), states spend some U.S.$60 billion on development, and it is estimated that some U.S.$30–$50 billion extra is needed to put poor countries on the path to achieve the Millennium Development Goals.
Is it possible to control migration?

The issue of migration controls has raised major debates in recent years, as states often seem unable to control their borders and, more generally, to successfully manage migration flows. The persistence of undocumented migration illustrates how even sophisticated forms of border controls do not manage to stop people from entering a country. Of course, some migrants are caught while crossing the border and some are expelled after having entered. But motivated migrants manage to escape controls: by taking more risks, by crossing at new border areas or by relying to a greater extent on professional people-smugglers. There seems to be a consensus among experts that tougher measures of migration control do not achieve their stated aims (Cornelius et al., 2004).

Several explanations have been proposed to explain the incapacity of states to control migration. Migration is now structurally embedded in the economies and societies of most countries: once both sending and receiving countries become dependent upon migration, migration is almost impossible to stop. In an era of globalization, states face the dilemma that borders must remain business-friendly and open to international trade or tourism (Andreas and Snyder, 2000). Moreover, migratory movements are self-sustaining processes (Castles, 2004): countries become connected via migrant networks that span the globe and facilitate further migration. This illustrates that migration is easy to start but difficult to stop. Finally, lobby groups can also impose domestic pressures on governments to allow migration for labour market reasons.

As the contrast between Western countries and oil-exporting states in the Middle East shows, controlling immigration is particularly difficult for liberal democracies. These are characterized by the preponderant role of the market and a respect for the fundamental rights of individuals (Hollifield, 1992). The market constantly strives for expansion, seeking new people to produce goods and services and new consumers, which quickly raises immigration as an option; as the state logic of control is challenged by market forces, this creates a tension ‘between states and markets’ (Entzinger et al., 2004; Harris, 2002). Respect for rights means that even undocumented migrants should enjoy a minimal degree of legal protection: according to the philosophy of human rights, individuals are protected on the basis of personhood, not of nationality or citizenship, and the enforcement of these rights sometimes takes place supranationally, thereby constraining governments’ autonomy (Jacobson, 1996; Sassen, 1996; Soysal, 1994). This means that civil society, human rights groups and NGOs can contest government measures, and they have sometimes opposed them in the courts: in other words, control is controlled and states are limited in their initiatives.

While unquestionable, the difficulty states have in controlling their borders should be qualified. Historically, full control has never been the norm. It is
sometimes argued that open borders were a reality in the nineteenth century. The picture of an era of laissez-faire migration policies is probably exaggerated, but it remains that states have only progressively acquired the ability and legitimacy to control individuals’ movements, a prerogative that used to be shared with other social actors such as churches or private enterprises (Torpey, 2000). From this perspective, states are now better able to control migration than ever before, and their apparent loss of control relies on the myth of a once-perfect sovereignty that never was (Joppke, 1998). Moreover, officially declared policies may differ from actual intentions: a benign neglect towards undocumented migration may, for example, fit with the interests of states or employers wishing to have access to an unorganized and irregular workforce (Freeman, 1994). The strategies that states deploy may also not always be perfectly coherent, as economic concerns may conflict with security preoccupations.

Along the same lines, it is worth noting that border controls can be more a matter of symbols than of actual results. Frontiers have always played a psychological role in the formation of national identity and authority (Anderson, 1996), and governments need to communicate to their citizens that they control the gates. This may lead to a self-perpetuating process: border controls create problems (such as smuggling or trespassing), which then call for more control (Andreas, 2000). In this respect, border controls are policies that generate visibility but few results and enable governments to develop a pro-control (or even anti-immigration) rhetoric while maintaining access to a foreign labour force. In Europe, for example, countries strongly exposed to undocumented migration (such as Italy and Spain) feel the need to show both their citizens and other EU members that they are addressing the question.

While the social and political context exacerbates the issue of border controls in developed countries, the difficulty of controlling immigration is far from an exclusively Western concern. According to a 2001 UN survey, forty-four governments – including thirty in less-developed regions – indicated that levels of immigration in their country were too high, and seventy-eight governments – including fifty-seven in less-developed regions – had policies aimed at reducing immigration levels (United Nations, 2002, pp. 17–18). This represents a sharp contrast with the situation of the 1970s, when migration was hardly a topic of concern, and illustrates the globalization of migration preoccupations, not only in Europe and North America, but also in Africa, the Asia Pacific and Latin America.

Three issues for the future of migration controls

Whether or not it is possible to successfully control migration, it remains that contemporary practices raise a number of important issues. The first lies in the coherence of migration policies: should states stick to their claimed
ambition of controlling migration perfectly, despite the factual evidence that they cannot achieve this goal? The risk is that the gap between what policymakers claim and the actual situation may render policies incoherent, especially in the eyes of the public. It may foster a belief that governments are unable or unwilling to control people flows, thus feeding anti-immigration feelings. Coherent and successful policies are needed to address public concerns over migration issues.

The second issue relates to the sustainability of migration policies. As a decrease in the number of people on the move is unlikely, we must envisage long-term answers to the challenges of migration. Contemporary policies, rather than offering a clear perspective on managing migration, seem to be lagging behind and reacting restrictively or passively to changes in migration flows. But ‘building walls is a peculiarly lonely job and an admission of the inadequacy of the system’ (Nett, 1971, p. 224), and we need to envisage viable alternatives to face future challenges.

Finally, as Catherine Wihtol de Wenden argues in Chapter 3 of this volume, the human costs of border controls raise the issue of whether such controls are compatible with the core values of the international community. To what extent can tough border-control measures coexist with the harmonious functioning of democracies? The liberal values and human rights principles that guide our societies cannot stop at their borders; they must inspire countries to behave accordingly towards outsiders arriving at their gates (Cole, 2000). The way a society handles the fate of foreigners ultimately reflects the values upon which it is based and the price – in terms of dignity and human rights – developed countries are prepared to pay to control their borders (Brochmann and Hammar, 1999; Schuster, 2004). In other words, the evolution of migration controls towards greater harshness might eventually backfire and threaten the liberal principles and freedoms that lie at the core of democratic societies.

In this context, the MWB scenario offers a coherent and morally defensible way of envisaging migration policies in the long term. It is a challenging idea that may be possible to implement only in the distant future. But given the current difficulties surrounding migration control, free movement may be a stimulating source of new solutions to existing problems.

Human rights and the ethical dimension of the MWB scenario

The ethical perspective is the most fundamental approach to the MWB scenario (Barry and Goodin, 1992; Carens, 1987; Gibney, 1988). Recent years have also witnessed a growing concern with the moral and ethical issues surrounding migration at large. While political philosophers have long ignored migration in their reflections on freedom, equality or justice, the necessity to rethink
migration from a critical and ethical standpoint and to bring values, agencies and policies together have inspired several ethical approaches to borders, migration and asylum (Cole, 2000; Dummett, 2001; Gibney, 2004; Isbister, 1996; Jordan and Düvell 2002, 2003; Miller and Hashmi, 2001; Schwartz, 1995). Bearing in mind the complexity of the arguments (analysed in greater detail by Mehmet Ugur in Chapter 4), this section reviews the major issues surrounding the human rights and ethical dimensions of the MWB scenario.

**Human rights, emigration and immigration**

As mentioned, emigration is recognized as a human right but immigration is not. There is thus a ‘fundamental contradiction between the notion that emigration is widely regarded as a matter of human rights while immigration is regarded as a matter of national sovereignty’ (Weiner, 1996, p. 171). This imbalance can be interpreted in two opposite ways. One can argue that ‘immigration and emigration are morally asymmetrical’ (Walzer, 1983, p. 40). The right to emigration is fundamental because it gives people an exit option in their relation to states and governments, thereby protecting them from authoritarian regimes. ‘The restraint of entry serves to defend the liberty and welfare, the politics and culture of a group of people committed to one another and to their common life. But the restraint of exit replaces commitment with coercion’ (p. 39). This reasoning does not imply that other states must welcome foreigners in an unlimited way: states must let their residents leave but do not have to let others in. As Dowty states:

> The right to leave does not imply the corresponding right to enter a particular country. Whatever the arguments over the authority of the state to block emigration, there is little dispute over its rights to limit immigration. The two issues are not symmetrical: departure ends an individual’s claims against a society, while entry sets such claims in motion. Control of entry is essential to the idea of sovereignty, for without it a society has no control over its basic character. (Dowty, 1987, p. 14)

By contrast, one can argue that having the right to leave one’s country is meaningless as long as one cannot enter another country. From a practical perspective, an individual wishing to leave his or her country who was authorized to do so but was not accepted by any other country would see his/her right to emigration violated:

> Logically, it is an absurdity to assert a right of emigration without a complimentary right of immigration unless there exist in fact. … a number of states which permit free entry. At present, no such state exists, and the right of emigration is not, and cannot be in these circumstances, a general human right exercisable in practice. (Dummett, 1992, p. 173)

Emigration and immigration then inextricably complement each other, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has somehow stopped half-way in
its recognition of a right to move. This complex debate is unlikely to be resolved soon and illustrates how human rights, far from being defined once and for all, must constantly be rethought and, if necessary, complemented.

Migration and inequalities between people and countries

Another way of addressing the relationship between migration and human rights is to consider the inequalities migration creates between people and countries. Mobility is a privilege that is unevenly distributed among human beings: citizens from developed countries may travel and settle down almost anywhere in the world, while their fellow human beings from less-developed countries depend upon the uncertain issuance of visas and residence permits to migrate. In this respect, citizenship is a birthright privilege that is difficult to justify (Carens, 1987).

A different kind of inequality regards qualification. Today, trained workers are looked for by states and enjoy a much greater level of mobility than their unskilled compatriots. At other times, unskilled workers were privileged, illustrating skills-based differences of treatments towards migrants. Rafael Alarcón (Chapter 12) analyses how, in the context of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), skilled workers have been granted the right to move and to accompany the free circulation of goods, services and information, whereas the numerous (and much-needed) unskilled Mexican workers in the United States are left out of these agreements. Australia, whose society is based on an openness to migrants that is still valid today, welcomes permanent settlers and students while developing a hard-line approach to asylum seekers and imposing visa requirements on virtually all non-nationals entering the country. These examples illustrate how states select desirable migrants to the detriment of ‘undesirable’ ones: their right to do so is hardly contested even if ‘the line between preferences and discrimination … is a morally thin one that is easily crossed’ (Weiner, 1996, p. 178). In other words, restrictions on mobility violate the liberal egalitarian principle according to which people should have equal opportunities.

Border controls also play a role in inequalities between countries. Migration is grounded in the disparities between nations and partly functions as a redistribution mechanism: people from poor regions move where the money is and usually, through remittances, contribute to sending it where it is needed. It is morally difficult to prevent migrants from poor countries from having access to the wealth of richer countries. If receiving states close their borders, they remain compelled to find alternative ways of achieving greater equality between countries (Barry and Goodin, 1992). As Lucas (1999) clearly outlines, this may include trade, foreign investment and development aid. The problem is that these alternatives are far from successful: states have limited influence on
foreign investments, while development aid has so far not proved efficient enough to reduce poverty. Development does not substitute for migration but tends to foster it: it leads to economic restructuring in sending countries and to rural–urban migration, creating a spirit of migration (Massey et al., 1998). Politically, developed states may be even more reluctant to freer trade in some sectors (notably agriculture), or to increased development expenses, than to migration. Migration may then not only be the most efficient way of reducing inequalities between countries but also, and contrary to widespread perceptions, the most acceptable solution.

Mehmet Ugur (Chapter 4) stresses that the key question is the level of analysis: closed borders may ensure the well-being of a nation, but what about the well-being of the world? How can one justify the priority given to a particular group to the detriment of the whole? While this can be interpreted as selfishness, it can also be understood, in a communitarian manner, as a moral imperative. In this view (best developed by Walzer, 1983), communities of people have the right to determine who is entitled to membership and to exert control over their nature and composition; this is necessary to achieve desirable goals (such as the development of a generous welfare system) and to develop the moral values that stem from involvement in a given community. States are legitimately responsible for the well-being of their citizens, and ensuring the well-being of the world implies having all states care for their own citizens, rather than letting people move wherever they want in a way that would ultimately destroy the values upon which communities are based. While this perspective rightly stresses the need to fully involve all residents in the community (which, as we will see, is not achieved in the case of many immigrant states), one can nevertheless object that the ‘threat’ represented by newcomers to community values is difficult to quantify and depends upon ideological and political factors. Moreover, while newcomers may initially threaten shared values, over time their eventual inclusion in the community is a process that may be beneficial for the community itself and for the evolution of its values: movement, rather than destroying the foundations of a community, creates a new form of community based on values of openness and justice (Carens, 1987).

Towards a right to mobility?

Nevins (2003) rightly argues that, while the human rights violations generated by border controls are usually condemned (especially by governments or NGOs), their very legitimacy is never questioned. At most, human smugglers are blamed for the deaths and poor living conditions of irregular migrants, and calls are made for only sketchily defined ‘humane’ border policies. This approach, which focuses on epiphenomena and neglects the roots of the problem, is unlikely to produce successful results. It is therefore time to push
the human rights logic one step further and to question the moral basis of restrictions on people's mobility. In Chapter 3 of this volume, Catherine Wihtol de Wenden argues that, given the crisis of migration controls and their severe human rights consequences, it has become urgent to begin debate on a comprehensive right to mobility, which would encompass both emigration and immigration and complement the existing Declaration of Human Rights (see also Pécoud and de Guchteneire 2006a).

This right stems from the increasingly global and multicultural nature of today's world: in a world of flows, mobility becomes a central resource to which all human beings should have access. Graziano Battistella (Chapter 10) adds that undocumented migration can be interpreted not only as a consequence of inadequate migration policies, but also as the expression of people's claim to their right to migrate. Mobility might then be regarded in the same way as other fundamental human prerogatives:

At some future point in world civilization, it may well be discovered that the right to free and open movement of people on the surface of the earth is fundamental to the structure of human opportunity and is therefore basic in the same sense as is free religion [and] speech. (Nett, 1971, p. 218)

A right to mobility would fit into other human rights principles. In a world of economic globalization and of gross socioeconomic inequalities, the human right to a free choice of employment (Article 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) and to an adequate standard of living (Article 25) seem hard to achieve in the absence of mobility opportunities. A right to mobility is therefore not a matter of adding a right to the existing list, it is about fostering respect for the human rights that are already acknowledged as fundamental.

The economic dimension

Along with the ethical perspective, another frequent approach to the MWB scenario is of an economic nature and reflects economists' interest in this issue. What would be the economic impact of free movement on the world economy? Conscious of the far-ranging developments of the economics of migration, this section outlines a few relevant points.

The national and international economic impact of migration

One can start to assess the economic impact of the MWB scenario by considering the current situation. Despite numerous studies on the topic, the picture remains complex. Regarding sending countries, the mainstream idea is that emigration generates remittances (which are positive but can be spent
fruitlessly), reduces tax revenues, and results in a loss of skills, even if it is sometimes argued that brain-drain could be replaced by brain-gain, whereby sending countries rely on their emigrants’ skills for their development. As for receiving societies, some studies highlight the costs of immigration and the large share of welfare benefits received by migrants (Borjas, 1999), while others – reviewed by Mehmet Ugur in Chapter 4 – show that migrants are net contributors and that receiving countries benefit from their presence. In any case, as Ugur also shows, the economic impact of migration on the well-being of a receiving country’s native residents is limited; Faini et al. (1999, p. 6) confirm that ‘immigration has played virtually no role in explaining the worsening labour market conditions of unskilled workers’ in Europe and the United States. Having said that, one should note that it is obviously difficult to extrapolate from current migration conditions to the possible economic consequences of free movement.

One can then switch the analysis from the national to the international level and evaluate the economic impact of the MWB scenario on the wealth of the world at large. According to a classic article by Hamilton and Whalley (1984), the liberalization of the world’s labour market would double the world’s GDP. More recently, Rodrik (2005) argues that the biggest gains in terms of development and poverty-reduction do not lie in the much-discussed issues surrounding free trade, but in the international movement of workers, and that even a minor liberalization in this field would massively foster the development of poor countries (see also Iregui, 2005). For these reasons, neoclassical economists sometimes advocate free movement. The Financial Times is one of the few leading newspapers in favour of this; FT’s journalist Martin Wolf recently stated that ‘controls on migration create the world’s biggest economic distortion – the discrepancy in rewards to labour’, but that ‘nobody seems to be suggesting the obvious answer: free migration’ (Wolf, 2004, p. 117). In this view, restrictions on the mobility of people, just like restrictions on the circulation of goods and capital, are economically counterproductive and should be banned in a globally integrated economy. Free migration would be the best way to achieve equality at the world level, which would then reduce the necessity to migrate:

If labour is viewed as an export, and remittances as the foreign exchange earned from the export of labour, then the opening of the borders could allow labour-surplus countries to export labour and earn remittances. In so doing, the transfer of labour from poorer to rich countries would increase the world GDP (because workers earn more) and eventually reduce migration pressure as wages tend to converge as they rise in emigration areas and fall or rise more slowly in immigration areas. (Martin, 2003, p. 88)

Clearly, as Bimal Ghosh reminds us in Chapter 5, economic theory is based on assumptions that rarely correspond to reality, and one should be prudent in interpreting these results. But it remains that, from an economic standpoint,
the MWB scenario would involve letting market forces handle the issue of inequalities between countries, with the belief that the non-intervention of states in human movement would achieve better results than their intervention. A counter-argument is that free migration would create opportunities for skilled workers in poor countries but not for their unskilled compatriots, who lack the minimal qualifications (literacy for example) to find jobs in developed countries: the MWB scenario would then hurt the interests of the poorest of the poor, which would be unfair and counterproductive from a development perspective. While this may be the case, the scale of this phenomenon remains uncertain and cannot justify closed borders (Piketty, 1997). More convincingly, one can object that the equalizing impact of free movement on wages and living standards may be achieved at an undesirably low level, and will in any case be hard to reach as ‘it would seem that social and political objections to further immigration will arise long before it reaches such a scale that it has any major impact on the labour market’ (Stalker, 2000, p. 91). The growth of inequalities between countries has historically gone hand in hand with the reduction of inequalities within countries (Giraud, 1996), and it might be difficult to win on both sides.

Globalization and the non-liberalization of migration flows

Whatever the impact of free movement on world inequalities, it remains that restrictions on migration contradict the spirit of globalization and liberalization. Indeed, ‘whereas increased trade integration at the turn of the century and in the 1960s was accompanied by increased migration, this was not so during the increased trade integration of the 1980s’ (Faini et al., 1999, p. 5); international migration is an exception in the globalization process. Borders used to stop everything – money, goods, people – but today they stop mostly people: ‘there is a growing consensus in the community of states to lift border controls for the flow of capital, information, and services and, more broadly, to further globalization. But when it comes to immigrants and refugees … the national state claims all its old splendour in asserting its sovereign right to control its borders’ (Sassen, 1996, p. 59). As Nigel Harris (Chapter 2) argues, this is paradoxical given that the internationalization of the economy creates a world labour market in which some countries tend to specialize in providing particular types of workers to the rest of the world.

The Mexico–U.S. situation is the best example of this paradox: two countries united within a free trade agreement are separated by a militarized border. But it is not the only one. In Chapter 9, Sally Peberdy and Jonathan Crush describe how, within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) – comprising Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe – agreements on free trade have been much more successful than those on free movement. In Chapter 13, Alicia Maguid reports that the initial ambitions of the Mercado Común del Sur/Mercado Comum do Sul (‘Southern Common Market’, or MERCOSUR) to facilitate the movement of people in the South American Cone have been progressively reduced and that the current focus is mostly on free trade. The European Union is the only region in the world in which free trade agreements have been coherently accompanied by a substantial degree of free movement of persons, as documented by Jan Kunz and Mari Leinonen in Chapter 7.

Comparing flows of people to flows of capital, information or commodities is, however, simplistic, as the circulation of people generates a high degree of social complexity and raises political challenges that cannot be ignored. Moreover, protectionism and state intervention are still very much present and free trade is strongly resisted, especially in vital sectors such as agriculture. In Europe, the Common Agricultural Policy imposes restrictions on the circulation of agricultural goods for the same reasons that are sometimes used to justify closed borders, namely social cohesion and national interests.

Yet, the contradiction between globalization and the non-liberalization of migration cannot be ignored. It is tellingly illustrated by the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations on the ‘temporary movement of natural persons’ (‘Mode 4’). Recognizing that trade in services needs direct physical contact between suppliers and consumers, and wishing to foster the liberalization of international trade in services, WTO members have engaged in negotiations on cross-border movement of workers. In principle, these discussions concern temporary service providers exclusively and exclude the issues surrounding permanent migration, citizenship, residence or employment. But the boundary is not clear-cut, the issue remains largely unexplored and controversial, and discussions so far have dealt mainly with the mobility of skilled professionals within multinational companies (Bhatnagar, 2004). This however shows that trade and migration are interconnected in a globalized economy, and that pressures towards liberalization may one day promote a narrowly trade-oriented version of the MWB scenario.

Limits of the economic approach

While assessing the economic impact of the MWB scenario is an essential task, one should stress that migration policies have important implications in terms of ethics, human rights and global justice, and cannot be solely guided by economic concerns. For example, family reunification is sometimes criticized for bringing in immigrants’ ‘economically useless’ relatives. Writing on U.S. immigration policy, Simon (1989, p. 337) argues that migrants should be chosen ‘more for their economic characteristics and less on the basis of family
connections'. But this would negate people’s right to live with their family, and most states authorize family reunifications (Carens, 2003).

Moreover, migration policies cannot be a benefit to all: skilled migration is good for receiving countries, but less for sending ones; family reunification is important to migrants but not always useful to receiving countries; the individual interests of migrants can create an undesirable brain-drain, and so on. It is difficult to satisfy simultaneously the citizens of both countries of destination and origin and the migrants themselves; one needs to make social and political choices:

Economic analysis raises questions regarding what welfare objectives we should assume. … Should we seek to maximise the welfare of natives alone, or does the welfare of immigrants count as well? Should we seek to maximise national economic welfare or global economic welfare? Different welfare objectives will imply different optimal policies. Although economists can tell us what policies would maximise any given welfare objective, the choice of that objective is ultimately a moral decision. (Chang, 2000, pp. 225–26)

We are again confronted by the issue of the level of analysis. Usually, a nation’s policies focus on its national interests, which, as argued above, raises moral questions. On the other hand, governments are responsible for their national interests and are expected to privilege their citizens’ well-being. But even then, the picture is complicated, as determining the national interest may prove difficult. Different social actors – employers, unions, politicians – are likely to have different views and to try to influence policy choices (Humphries, 2002). Resultant migration policies might then be beneficial only to the most influential segment of the population, thus increasing internal inequalities. Moreover, focusing on the national well-being might be counterproductive if it creates tensions and social unrest in neighbouring countries: it is, for example, in the interest of Europe and North America to have friendly neighbours in northern Africa or Mexico, and hence to welcome at least some migrants from these regions (Borjas, 1999).

The social dimension

Whereas the ethical and economic dimensions of the MWB scenario have been substantially analysed, little attention has been given to its social dimension. This probably has to do with the near-impossibility of evaluating the numerous consequences of free movement on all dimensions of social life. As we will see, it is illusory to claim that we know what would actually happen if borders were to be opened; too many factors play a role and recent history reminds us that immigration policies often have unpredictable results (Castles, 2004). This should, however, not keep us from attempting to shed light on the social impact of the MWB scenario, as, whatever its moral or economic
desirability, promoting free movement will be incomplete and unsuccessful without considering all its consequences.

**How many people would migrate?**

An often-heard argument against the MWB scenario is that it would lead to huge and unmanageable flows of migrants converging towards developed countries. The first obvious question is therefore: How many people would migrate under conditions of free movement? Contemporary policies focus on restricting people’s mobility and it is fair to assume that putting an end to them would enable more people to move. But how many? A reasonable augmentation could be manageable, but what about a massive increase? One should first dismiss the idea that all inhabitants of sending countries are eager to migrate: after all, as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) *Handbook* states, ‘it may be assumed that, unless he seeks adventure or just wishes to see the world, a person would not normally abandon his home and country without some compelling reason’ (UNHCR, 1979, Chapter 1, Article 39).

The history of the European Union – reviewed in this volume by Jan Kunz and Mari Leinonen (Chapter 7) – provides helpful indications here. Each step of its enlargement has been accompanied by ungrounded fears of massive migration flows. Today, many EU countries impose temporary restrictions on the mobility of people from most of the ten new EU members, but studies converge to show that substantial East–West migration flows are unlikely. In the future, the issue of Turkey’s admission may raise the same issues, but, as Teitelbaum and Martin (2003) argue, it is impossible to make credible predictions on how many Turkish workers would leave their country, as this depends upon the evolutions of both the Turkish and the European economies.

One should further recall that migration flows and the legal conditions of migration are not always related. People reluctant to take the risk of migrating irregularly might be incited to do so legally under the MWB scenario, but, as mentioned above, restrictive policies do not keep people from trying to migrate clandestinely, and the MWB scenario would therefore have little impact on the numerous migrants who would leave their country no matter whether it were authorized or not: it would only reduce the dangers they are exposed to. Moreover, restrictions on mobility limit migrants’ freedom to circulate, thus leading to a higher rate of permanent settlement. In this respect, the MWB scenario would enable more migrants to return, temporarily or not, which might to some extent counterbalance the increase in the number of people wishing to leave their country. Mexican migration to the United States illustrates these two points: migrants keep trying to cross the border until they succeed and, given the difficulty of doing so, tend to remain on a more permanent basis in the country (Cornelius, 2001).
The MWB scenario: welfare and social cohesion

Migration is often perceived as a threat to social cohesion, and it is therefore important to address the possible impact of the MWB scenario on the functioning of receiving societies. A major issue here regards the welfare state: as Milton Friedman once observed, ‘it’s just obvious that you can’t have free immigration and a welfare state’ (quoted by Raico, 1998, p. 135). As Han Entzinger (Chapter 6) argues, the core problem lies in the contradictory logic of welfare schemes and free migration; the MWB scenario is about openness and circulation whereas welfare systems are based on closure: people make a long-term commitment to a community and enjoy its protection. Putting aside the financial impact of increased migration on Western welfare systems, the risk is that free movement jeopardizes the sense of common national identity and solidarity that incites people to take part in welfare schemes. Jan Kunz and Mari Leinonen (Chapter 7) thus conclude that the MWB scenario is incompatible with collective welfare systems and would imply their privatization.

This is a real problem, not only because welfare states are hard-won and socially valuable achievements, but also because incorporating migrants would precisely require strong welfare systems. The MWB scenario challenges the viability of welfare states, but simultaneously demands efficient welfare mechanisms to make sure that the arrival of newcomers in receiving societies does not create situations of social vulnerability. This is also why, as mentioned earlier, welfare arguments are used – notably by communitarians – to advocate restrictions on migration. Another position is illustrated by Carens (1988), who acknowledges with regret the undesirable impact of free movement on welfare, but nevertheless believes that inequalities between countries are morally even more undesirable, and that welfare schemes must be sacrificed to people’s freedom and to world justice.

This pessimism should be qualified. It is, for example, often claimed that migration would counterbalance the ageing of Western populations (United Nations, 2000). Welfare-based arguments may then also militate for more migration. In this respect, Iregui (2005) shows that the costs of skilled migration in terms of brain-drain may exceed welfare gains, but that this effect disappears if one allows both skilled and unskilled migration. As Han Entzinger notes (Chapter 6), states should then invest in migrants’ linguistic and professional skills, thereby increasing their integration and the size of the workforce. Moreover, as Geddes (2003) argues, migration is far from being the main challenge to welfare states: other factors – labour-market situation, demographic trends or political decisions – play a much greater role. At a more immediate level, free movement would improve the well-being of undocumented migrants, whose status is a serious source of vulnerability; it would also reduce the size of shadow economies, thereby increasing employers’ and workers’ contributions to welfare schemes.
Another question regards the incorporation of migrants in receiving societies under conditions of free movement. Again, migrants are often blamed for their reluctance to ‘integrate’ and are accused of threatening the socio-cultural foundations of the countries in which they live. In particular, the MWB scenario is sometimes dismissed for its consequences in terms of racism and xenophobia. Free migration, it is argued, would increase the number of migrants and the tensions between them and the native population, notably concerning the labour market. This would lead to anti-immigration mobilization and foster populist and extreme-right political formations (Castles, 2004, p. 873). Walzer (1983) similarly argues that, if states do not control migration, people will reject foreigners by themselves through potentially violent methods.

But the correlation between xenophobia and the number of immigrants is not straightforward: very few migrants may sometimes cause disproportionate hostile reactions in regions not used to immigration. More fundamentally, border controls indirectly feed racism: they fuel the idea that foreigners and foreign-looking people are undesirable, thus casting doubts on the right of documented and naturalized migrants to live in receiving societies (Hayter, 2000). Ultimately, this reinforces internal boundaries along ethnic lines, jeopardizing migrants’ access to decent living conditions and challenging social cohesion (Fassin et al., 1997; Wihtol de Wenden, 1999). As Dummett (2001) argues, Western public opinion has been subject to restrictive discourses on the need to close borders for decades, which can only support anti-immigrant feelings; any change in migration policies will imply stopping untruthful propaganda against immigrants and re-educating the electorates. The connection between the MWB scenario and racism is therefore equivocal.

The MWB scenario: democracy and citizenship

Closely related to the issues of welfare and integration are the issues of rights, citizenship and participation in the public sphere. In principle, access to citizenship rights depends upon nationality, thereby excluding migrants. In practice however, non-nationals enjoy certain rights. Human rights, for instance, are based on personhood rather than nationality, and protect both nationals and migrants. Migrants participate in unions, in the education system, in welfare schemes, have rights protecting their situation in the labour market, and sometimes even vote in local elections, thus illustrating how residency – and not only nationality – determines access to rights (Jacobson, 1996; Soysal, 1994). Hammar (1990) has coined the term ‘denizen’ to describe this intermediary status, in which migrants are not total foreigners, but not full citizens either. The MWB scenario would exacerbate this question, as it would enable people to move freely from one country to another, so raising the
question of their status at the different steps of their peregrinations. Even under conditions of unrestricted mobility, people would probably choose to settle down in a given country and become citizens, but we nevertheless need to envisage situations in which nations are home to a large number of non-nationals on the move.

What seems obvious is that all people residing in a given country should have the same access to a minimal set of rights, including civil rights and social rights to education, health services and housing. This corresponds to a basic ethical principle and to the idea that all human beings should have access to fundamental rights, a notion that lies at the heart of the United Nations International Convention on Migrants’ Rights (Pécoud and de Guchteneire, 2006b). This is also necessary to avoid the creation of an underprivileged sub-sector of the population subject to exploitation and misery, which is contrary to the national interest of states as such rightless migrant workers would create downward pressure on the well-being of the whole population. But what about access to unemployment benefits, political rights or cultural recognition? Unrestricted mobility would challenge the traditional distribution of these rights.

The same applies to migrants’ participation in public affairs. It is easy to understand that two extreme situations should be avoided. In the first, non-nationals would have no access to political rights. Migrants would then live in a country without having any influence on its functioning, and would need to follow laws and obey governments over which they have no control. In immigration states with tight naturalization policies, this situation is already frequent; in Michael Walzer’s terms, such states are ‘like a family with live-in servants’ (1983, p. 52), an unjust situation that excludes migrants and confines them to second-class status. At the other extreme would be the situation in which all migrants could have full citizenship rights. Even recent newcomers would then have the same influence over public affairs as nationals, a situation that may ultimately threaten the principles of democratic institutions: it seems illogical and unfair to grant people who have just arrived in a country the same rights enjoyed by nationals and long-term residents who share a strong commitment to the country in which they live. In other words, mobility is a challenge for democracy and we need to find ways to reconcile freedom of movement with the functioning of democratic institutions.

A first answer to these challenges is to decouple citizenship and nationality. As Castles and Davidson (2000) make clear, the classic form of citizenship, according to which membership and rights are based upon nationality, is inadequate in a world characterized by globalization and mobility. It creates situations in which people have no membership at all: they live in countries in which they have few rights, while being kept from participating in the life of the societies they come from. Citizenship should then be based upon residence on a state’s territory. Following the same reasoning, Chemillier-Gendreau (2002)
argues that, as long as rights are granted by states on the basis of nationality, situations of injustice will arise, because states can always be tempted to deny these rights to people under their authority, either by refusing naturalization or by (more rarely) depriving their citizens of their nationality. She then calls for a global citizenship in which people would enjoy rights irrespective of their nationality, solely on the basis of their being human beings.

The problem that remains is to decide when and to whom to grant rights. It would be absurd to expect states to grant citizenship rights to all foreigners entering their territory (such as tourists, students or business travellers). A creative solution to these issues is to unpack citizenship and consider that its different components (especially political, civil, social, family and cultural rights) can be distributed in a differentiated way. This approach avoids the binary logic of exclusion, in which people have either all possible rights or none at all. Migrants could then initially receive a first set of rights (civil rights and fundamental social rights). Only later would they receive, in a step-by-step fashion, full welfare rights or political rights. Such a system would ensure that migrants are not ‘rightless’ (as undocumented migrants tend to be), while enabling high mobility and addressing the fears of nationals and long-term residents who are reluctant to share their privileges with newcomers. According to Han Entzinger (Chapter 6), newcomers would not have to pay for the benefits to which they initially have no access, which would lower their labour costs and foster their integration in the labour market. The risk is that this system of ‘differentiated inclusion’ could transform into one of ‘differentiated exclusion’, but ‘too much mobility is simply incompatible with a sustainable framework of rights [and] thresholds are needed to ensure durable rights’ (Engelen, 2003, p. 510).

External borders and internal boundaries

Borders are only one kind of boundary. As discussed in this section, migrants are not only banned from entering a country; once they are in, they are often inhibited in their participation and incorporation in the receiving society, particularly in terms of welfare, rights and citizenship. One could therefore conceive a world of ‘open’ borders in which migrants would be free to cross borders between states, but banned from having access to the institutions of societies other than their own; the MWB scenario would then be about displacing (rather than suppressing) borders. This is particularly the case where international migration has contributed to the creation of social, ethnic or religious communities (Heisler, 2001), while at the same time restrictive migration policies have sought to reduce migrants’ access to public resources (Cohen et al., 2002). As a result, ‘bordering has become more multifaceted, taking on both geographic and non-geographic forms, of social, political, and economic characters’ (Jacobson, 2001, p. 161).
It is therefore not enough to ensure that people have the right to cross borders and to settle down wherever they wish: we must also ensure that, once in a country, they are not stopped by internal borders but are able to fully participate in its society. This is a condition for social cohesion and for human emancipation, as people excluded from the society in which they live are likely to develop resentment and frustration. As Graziano Battistella (Chapter 10), Alejandro Canales and Israel Montiel Armas (Chapter 11) argue, this notably includes socioeconomic mobility within the class stratification of receiving societies. Labour markets are frequently segmented in a way that restricts social mobility and generates internal boundaries within the workforce, often along ethnic lines. Migrants are then left to do the dirty work, in conditions characterized by precariousness, low wages and non-existent future perspectives. This reinforces their exclusion and generates a ‘ghettoization’ of the society that jeopardizes the fair distribution of its resources and opportunities among all its members.

**The practical dimension**

Discussing the different dimensions of the MWB scenario highlights our ignorance of its practical consequences: ‘nobody can claim to know in any detail what would be the consequences of a worldwide system of open borders sustained over a number of decades’ (Barry, 1992, p. 280). While there are strong moral arguments in favour of the MWB scenario, its impact on wages, welfare, racism or citizenship is uncertain. It is probably exaggerated to argue that free movement would lead to chaos, but it would also be a mistake to underestimate the problems: as Castles (2004, p. 873) puts it, ‘the elegant simplicity of the open borders slogan is deceptive, as it would create many new problems’. There is therefore a need to envisage the practical dimensions of the MWB scenario and what could be called its governance.

**The need for a multilateral approach**

A first principle of the governance of free movement lies in the cooperation among states it requires: no state can be expected to progress towards free movement if even some other states do not follow the same path. Unilateral openness is not only unlikely, it is also potentially damaging:

Any country, rich or poor, that opened its borders might soon find other states taking advantage of its beneficent policies. A neighbouring country whose elite wanted a more homogeneous society could now readily expel its minorities. A government that wanted a more egalitarian society could dump its unemployed and its poor. An authoritarian regime could rid itself of its opponents; a country could empty its jails, mental institutions, and homes for the aged. (Weiner, 1996, p. 173)
To this we should add security issues: In Chapter 5, Bimal Ghosh notes that the MWB scenario would enable not only terrorists but also all kinds of criminals to escape surveillance more easily. These dangers point to the importance of international cooperation. After all, these dreadful consequences of free movement could take place within federal states, where regions are partly responsible for welfare provisions and security, and can be prevented by interregional cooperation. Of course, such agreements are more difficult to reach at the world level, but these obstacles are not inherently insurmountable.

A second principle should be the need for supervision mechanisms to study and monitor the social transformations induced by increased freedom of movement and to enable a less-chaotic opening of the borders. Both principles - cooperation and supervision - highlight the need for multilateral agreements (or organizations) to ensure the governance of free movement in a more comprehensive way than the trade-oriented WTO negotiations mentioned above. In recent years, many voices have called for a movement towards a multilateral approach to migration, with a series of similarly named propositions: ‘New International Regime for Orderly Movements of People’ (Ghosh, 2000), ‘General Agreement on Movements of People’ (Straubhaar, 2000), ‘General Agreement on Migration and Refugee Policy’ (Harris, 1995, p. 224), ‘Global Agreement on the Movement of People’ (Veenkamp et al. 2003, p. 98), or, modelled on the WTO, a ‘World Migration Organization’ (Bhagwati, 1998, pp. 316–17, 2003). Security concerns have also fostered the search for such agreements; Koslowski (2004) speaks of a ‘General Agreement on Migration, Mobility and Security’.

Without describing in detail the nature, functioning and purposes of these approaches (they are reviewed by Bimal Ghosh in Chapter 5 and Mehmet Ugur in Chapter 4), their common point is that they all envisage a joint management of migration flows by sending and receiving states, which would avoid the pitfalls of unilateral policies while ensuring that the migration process does not harm the interests of sending and receiving states nor of migrants themselves. With respect to the MWB scenario, there are two ways to envisage the role of a multilateral approach. On the one hand, there are those who argue, as does Bimal Ghosh in Chapter 5 of this volume, that an orderly system of migration management would be fundamentally better than free movement as it would avoid the tensions and uneven benefits that characterize the MWB scenario while being much more acceptable to states. On the other hand, others see multilateral coordination as a temporary step towards free movement that would smooth the transition:

In practical terms, even if states were to agree on a universal right to move in principle, it would probably cause chaos if all borders were instantly opened. But there are many matters on which states have agreed certain rights in principle and begun to implement these rights in a limited way, by agreement among themselves. … Could there not be
similar progress towards acknowledging a human right to freedom of movement across borders? Even if the aim could not be realized at once, would it not be worthwhile to begin the process by an international agreement whereby each state party to it would accept, in addition to those it admits under its laws of refugees and other migrants, a quota of people who merely apply? (Dummett, 1992, p. 179)

The MWB scenario and the internationalization and/or liberalization of migration policies finally raise the question of the asylum system. Today, asylum seekers are the only migrants whose situation is taken care of in a partly multilateral manner, notably through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the widely ratified 1951 Geneva Convention. In principle, the distinction between asylum seekers/refugees and other kinds of migrants is clear, and most states have distinct procedures to address their situations, even if empirical evidence illustrates that the boundaries between the two are often porous. Under the MWB scenario, this distinction would become meaningless, which, as Castles (2004, p. 873) argues, is regrettable because even the currently imperfect asylum system protects many vulnerable people. By contrast, one can argue that the fight against undocumented migration incites many receiving states to treat asylum seekers as disguised economic migrants, which leads not only to endless and unmanageable procedures to ‘prove’ the existence of persecution, but also to human rights abuses and sufferings for both ‘genuine’ and ‘fake’ refugees (Barsky, 2001; Hayter, 2000). In other words, sticking to the refugee/migrant distinction may not only be unrealistic: it may also counterproductively threaten the right to asylum.

Regional approaches to free movement

Establishing a multilateral approach to migration at the world level is clearly a difficult task, and it therefore makes sense to envisage regional approaches as a preliminary step. Significant cross-border flows take place within regions, and the countries involved tend to display a greater level of socioeconomic convergence. From an economic perspective, open borders should come first and equality should follow, but in practice, gaping inequalities between states may prevent any discussion. As a matter of fact, several regions in the world have concretely discussed regional migration management, an indication that they have indirectly acknowledged the shortcomings of national approaches. Some have even considered free movement as an option, and their experiences are useful in understanding the difficulty of concretely implementing the MWB scenario.

The clearest case is of course the European Union, which has achieved free movement for EU citizens at an unprecedented scale. In Chapter 7, Jan Kunz and Mari Leinonen relate how a core ambition of the European Union has been to create opportunities for its citizens to move freely from one Member
State to another. Yet migration flows have not increased substantially, which points to the importance of internal borders (including notably administrative, financial, cultural, linguistic and mental barriers). Mobility is mostly a feature of European elites while workers and employees tend to remain in their country of origin. In the meantime, European leaders have been engaged in the closing and monitoring of the EU’s external borders, leading to what has been called ‘Fortress Europe’. In principle, these two trends (the disappearance of internal borders and the consolidation of external ones) call for a common approach to migration, but European leaders have found it extremely difficult to move forward in this field. Regardless of these obstacles, it remains that the European experience is the most comprehensive attempt to establish free movement in a large supranational space.

But other less well-known cases exist, notably in Africa. As Aderanti Adepoju (Chapter 8) and Sally Peberdy and Jonathan Crush (Chapter 9) note, the African continent is characterized by recent and porous borders, as well as by a long history of human mobility in which free movement has often been the norm. While this should in principle provide a favourable context for the MWB scenario, post-independence nation-building has been a powerful process, sometimes inspiring exacerbated nationalism or xenophobia. Yet, since the early 1990s, the continent seems to have been engaged in some efforts to promote freer movement, which used to be grounded in a pan-African ideology but is increasingly apprehended in terms of economic benefits. Continental organizations such as the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and the African Union (AU) have expressed their commitment to free movement, with the latter recently proposing the creation of an ‘African passport’ to facilitate the circulation of people throughout the continent. Efforts to go beyond national migration policies remain vague and uncertain however, as illustrated by the cases of West and southern Africa.

Aderanti Adepoju (Chapter 8) describes efforts to foster free movement and establish a ‘borderless West Africa’ within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). ECOWAS treaties aim at removing all obstacles to the circulation of goods, capital and people: an early step was to abolish visa requirements for ECOWAS citizens moving within the region, with governments agreeing to create an ECOWAS passport to facilitate internal migration. As Adepoju suggests, given the history of migration in the region, establishing open borders is more about re-creating free movement rather than shaping a new regional organization. Many obstacles remain however, and Adepoju shows that economic uncertainty and inter-state conflicts, along with the political strategies sometimes developed by ECOWAS governments, threaten the West African version of the MWB scenario by exacerbating tensions and fuelling nationalism and xenophobia, sometimes leading to the expulsion of foreigners. Sally Peberdy and Jonathan Crush (Chapter 8)
document the efforts undertaken towards free movement in the southern African region, and the obstacles they face. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) drafted a protocol on the free movement of people in 1993–1994. This was strongly opposed by the South African government, who feared the consequences of open borders on unemployment, xenophobia and irregular migration; although these arguments were contested, they were sufficient to reduce the initiative to a much less ambitious version.

In the Asia Pacific region, regional organizations have focused on migration issues concerning business and skilled migration in accordance with the promotion of free trade. Other regional initiatives have focused on the fight against irregular migration, trafficking and refugees. As Graziano Battistella (Chapter 10) writes, the prospects for progress towards the MWB scenario seem more limited in Asia than in other parts of the world. In South America, Alicia Maguid (Chapter 13) reports that free circulation of labour was initially considered as part of MERCOSUR’s ambitions to establish a common market and free trade in the South American Cone (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay). While progress has been made in the harmonization of migrants’ status in these countries, the free movement of goods and services has, as in the SADC, moved forward much faster than its counterpart in terms of human mobility. As in Europe, a felt need to fight against undocumented migration (particularly from the Andean region) has fostered a strengthening of border controls, while economic uncertainty has raised problems of racism and xenophobia. Finally, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is the most well-known example of a discontinuity between the circulation of goods and people: as Rafael Alarcón (Chapter 12) documents, it was clear from the beginning that migration would not be considered in the agreements.

These different experiences illustrate the extreme complexity of the establishment of free movement and the number of inevitable obstacles to such endeavours that exist. They also show, however, that free movement is not an absurdity that has only been considered by the Europeans: it is discussed, and even sometimes partly put into practice, in many regions of the world. The regional approach is not without critique, however. Mehmet Ugur (Chapter 4) argues that regional agreements only perpetuate world inequalities at another level; Bimal Ghosh (Chapter 5) stresses that migration always defies bounded geographical arrangements and that the different paths taken by regions in their migration management could lead to tensions: closing borders in one region may for example divert flows to other areas. This points to the necessity of envisaging a global approach to migration that would ensure that regional agreements are coherent with one another.
Conclusion

Throughout the world, states claim their will to control migration but are confronted with the extreme difficulty of developing policies that match this ambition. The number of people on the move is not going to decrease in the near future, and it will become increasingly apparent that even the most sophisticated and costly measures of control do not truly stop people. Migrants will probably remain the main victims of this unsatisfactory approach to migration, as they will be exposed to ever greater levels of risk in their cross-border movements. It is urgent to think of sustainable migration policies that will enable states to address the challenges of migration coherently.

It may seem naïve to suggest that the MWB scenario can provide answers to current problems. But it is equally naïve to assume that relatively minor arrangements of the contemporary migration system will provide long-term answers. The MWB scenario has the advantages of being ethically defendable and of usefully complementing the human right to emigration by a symmetric right to mobility. In a globalized world, movement of people is not an anomaly to be exceptionally tolerated; it is a normal process embedded in socioeconomic structures and in migrants’ transnational lives and identities. There is ample evidence that the classic migration pattern of permanent settlement does not apply to all contemporary cases of human movement, and policies should therefore take new practices of circulation into account.

The social and economic consequences of the MWB scenario remain extremely complex, however, and this review has highlighted the numerous uncertainties surrounding it. It is therefore necessary to examine both the strengths and weaknesses of this scenario, and to keep in mind that, while free movement may be a desirable option, it is also a complex goal that requires careful thinking. The MWB scenario is not a straightforward and simple measure that would eliminate all injustices at once, nor an unrealistic Utopia. It is an inspiring vision for the future of migration and a precious source of ideas to imagine fairer migration policies.

Bibliography

Introduction: the migration without borders scenario


