

Introduction

Overview of the Collection

This volume brings together a number of articles of mine on the topic of kinship, all but one of which has been published previously. Although they are divided into two groups (Parts I and II), with one exception (Ch. 8), the chapters in both parts are all concerned with changes to kinship systems. In Part I, this applies especially to transitions between different recognized terminological types, though changes to marriage practices are also taken into account, especially in Ch. 4. More particularly, the chapters in Part I are mainly concerned to track possible trajectories of change between prescriptive terminologies (those connected with cross-cousin marriage, often called 'Dravidian' [symmetric] or Kachin [asymmetric], depending on type) and those terminologies called by Robert Lowie 'lineal' and by Rodney Needham 'cognatic' (sometimes somewhat misleadingly called 'Eskimo', a category to which the English terminology is often said to belong).[1]

The chapters in Part II focus on what I have elsewhere called Crow-Omaha 'pseudo-systems' (Parkin 1997a: 109–17) in respect of both the possible derivation of such terminologies from prescriptive ones (Ch. 7) and their possible sociological correlates, especially in terms of relations between spouse-exchange groups over time (Ch. 8; this is therefore the exception I mentioned earlier, in that it is not specifically about change).[2] Chapter 9 applies the insights of Chapter 8 to marriage practices in Southeast Asia that resemble Crow-Omaha pseudo-systems in this respect but lack the associated terminologies. The Appendix provides a complete bibliography of my published works on kinship at the time of writing (autumn 2020).

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Most of the articles are reproduced here in approximately their original form, the main exception being Chapter 3, which is a partial reproduction alone. Most of the articles therefore retain their original integrity, but they have been placed in an order that tells a story, so to speak, or rather two stories, one for each part; obviously, this is also the reason for their selection. Hopefully, therefore, the volume will strike the reader not as a conventional collection of randomly or ill-connected past articles, but more as an organic whole, or two such wholes, both which say something about the way kinship systems change and their possible reasons for doing so.

Naturally, the close relationship of many of these chapters to one another means that there will inevitably be some repetition between them. While I have acted to reduce some of that repetition, in other cases I have chosen to leave it, not least because that may help reinforce the arguments I am trying to impress on the reader. While I have also tried to explain sometimes difficult points clearly, the reader will certainly benefit from having some prior technical knowledge and competence in matters relating to kinship. Consulting introductory books on kinship – especially, in this context, my own (Parkin 1997a) – may prove helpful in this regard. Diagrams of 'typical' kinship systems are also provided towards the end of this chapter.

The age of many of the sources I use should also be acknowledged. This is partly explained by the fact that up-to-date work on the more technical side of kinship studies – though now flourishing again, particularly through the Kinship Circle run at the University of California by Dwight Read and Fadwa el Guindi – fell out of favour for several decades following the criticisms of it by David Schneider and the shift away from structuralism. Thus, in very many cases, older texts are all we have in the absence of more recent research. However, my use of older sources can also be justified in the present context because my interest is precisely in how kinship systems, and especially their terminologies, change over time. Comparing sources from different periods may itself be a source of evidence for change.

Evolution, Change and History

One potential criticism of such work relates precisely to its use, now and then, of 'evolution' as both a term and a concept. In both senses, evolutionary perspectives have come to be associated closely

with nineteenth-century theories using the notion of evolution to make now unacceptable discriminations between supposedly civilized cosmopolitans in white male-dominated Europe and politically subjected 'native' populations elsewhere in the world, as well as justifying colonial rule by the former over the latter.[3] However, the functionalist doctrines of Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown, for whom evolution was simply speculative history and of no use to their more synchronic, presentist, supposedly scientific ways of doing anthropology, meant that evolution as an idea suffered an eclipse in social and cultural anthropology after the turn of the twentieth century. This revolution was not complete, as in America evolutionism survived the attacks of the Boasians on Morgan in the work of neo-evolutionists like Leslie White, Julian Steward, Robert Carneiro, Elman Service and the early Marshall Sahlins. In Oxford, the late evolutionist Robert Marett was responsible for teaching social anthropology until the arrival of the functionalist Radcliffe-Brown as the University's first professor of anthropology from 1936 to 1946, long after evolution had given way to the latter's and Malinowski's respective versions of functionalism. In the post-WWII period, moreover, evolutionary ideas were invoked in some of the work on kinship of Rodney Needham and especially N.J. Allen, originator of tetradic theory, mentioned in a number of the chapters in this collection. I myself have been profoundly influenced by the work of the latter two scholars, having been trained at Oxford at the time they were both active there.[4]

Evolutionism has also survived, of course, and without a break of the sort described above, in biological or physical anthropology. Indeed, it has quite explicitly reinvented itself in some circles, including at Oxford, as evolutionary anthropology. Whatever label one chooses, the facts and ideas of evolution are absolutely central to physical or biological anthropology, unlike social or cultural anthropology, with its more present-oriented emphasis, for which a consideration of history is not always required. However, for evolutionary anthropology and its biologically oriented predecessors, as well as for much archaeology, evolution has always been primarily a matter of transitions between different hominid species, especially after their splitting from the great apes, culminating in *homo sapiens*, the sole surviving non-ape hominid species at the present day. Even the long period of the existence of *homo sapiens* on the planet is far more than the evolutionary range my own work covers or needs to consider,

mainly because the study of kinship in the social sense of the word ultimately requires living informants who can be asked questions, not material evidence from millennia ago. I therefore find it more appropriate to ignore this earlier history and prehistory in order to think more in terms of 'cognitively modern humans' and to stress that whatever changes in kinship systems social anthropologists talk about they are restricted to the latter, contemporary phase of human history in which such humans have existed.[5] In any case, neither earlier hominid species nor early *homo sapiens* are around any longer to be asked about their kinship systems, though presumably the latter, at least, had them in something like the modern sense. While later hominid populations, like *homo sapiens*, almost certainly had some form of language, in the absence of writing they left no written records (ignoring cave paintings and the like), whether on their ideas and practices of kinship or on anything else. In fact, actual records useful to the history of kinship only go back perhaps two to two and a half thousand years at most in Europe, to Greek and Roman antiquity, and in the New World barely to the seventeenth century in Spanish dictionaries and certain other texts dating from that time. The developments discussed in this collection are therefore firmly rooted in what is very recent history in terms of geological time and not in prehistory as conventionally defined at all. They also assume that humanity is a single species with a single shared origin in Africa, not a species with multiple origins, which classic social evolutionism and more explicit right-wing political agendas have frequently argued gave rise to different races.

Such arguments as the latter are another demonstration of the continuing ability of evolutionary ideas to be diverted to political ends and of the continuing need of academia to interrogate and, where necessary, combat them. Whereas the firm rejection of evolutionism by social and cultural anthropologists like Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown was largely intellectual, for Franz Boas in America it also involved a moral rejection of evolutionism's discriminatory tendencies. Among other things, this established firmly the principle of cultural relativism, namely that any society should be examined in its own terms and not with reference to a hegemonic, standard, cosmopolitan view of humanity and human society, nor to discriminatory, often politicized agendas like those associated with classic (i.e. nineteenth-century) social evolutionism. I hereby affirm that I adhere to this principle as well, despite my occasional use of this problematic word.

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If I use 'evolution' and its derivatives at all, it is in the context of describing and trying to account for social change alone, not to predict social or cultural improvement by supposedly lower levels of humanity, much less alleged races, as in classic nineteenth-century social evolutionism.

Another objection has been raised recently by Bradley Ensor (2019;[6] 2017: 4–6), namely that studies such as mine tend to treat human populations, quite unrealistically, as bounded societies, each with its own language and culture. Furthermore, for Ensor, while those perpetuating such studies may well lack the discriminatory attitudes of nineteenth-century evolutionists, their perspectives are still what he calls 'anachronistic' and damaging to political efforts to produce a more equal and inclusive sense of humanity by sustaining a world view that tends to essentialize human populations and often treats them accordingly in discriminatory ways. In acknowledging this susceptibility, however unintended, I would agree with Ensor that social reality is more complicated than essentializing descriptions suggest, that many populations or local communities are historically of mixed origin, and that they may accordingly be culturally varied and linguistically polyglot. Indeed, this has been acknowledged for decades in anthropology, though admittedly not always problematized, at least not until the arrival of figures like Fredrik Barth and his work on the Pathan (e.g. 1969; cf. Evans-Pritchard's bland observations [1940] that many Nuer are descended from captured Dinka slaves). However, kinship terminologies are rooted in language, and almost always in one specific language, without that making it impossible for them to borrow terms from one another. I therefore suggest that the term 'speech community' might be more appropriate as a way to avoid this difficulty, though as this has admittedly been a quite recent epiphany on my part, my use of it in this volume is not at all consistent. Nonetheless, whenever the word 'society' crops up in this volume, the alternative phrase 'speech community' may actually be more appropriate.

One practice I *am* sticking to, however, is use of the equally contested term 'tribe' when writing about India, where it is an official legal and administrative designation for certain population groups (distinct from 'caste'), and is thus hard to avoid, as well as approximating to many indigenous 'tribal' identities. This is also a suitable place to point out that, within speech communities or other relevant population groups, spouse-exchange groups are not necessarily

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identifiable as something else, like a lineage or clan, though they may be territorial, like a village.[7] Frequently, however, they can only be defined in terms of themselves. The fact that kinship terminologies are linguistic is significant in another sense. Whatever objections might be raised to the treatment of kinship in evolutionary or developmental terms, there can be no doubt that languages change, including in how they form the basis of semantic classifications, and therefore that kinship terminologies do so as well. We also know this from other semantic domains, such as colour terms (Berlin and Kay 1969) and life-form terms (Brown 1984).

Technical Stuff

Throughout the volume, I distinguish emic or indigenous *kin categories* and the terms that identify them from etic or analytical *kin types*: for example, English has the term *uncle* as a native category with its own term, but this can be divided analytically into the kin types father's brother, mother's brother, and often aunt's husband (father's sister's husband, mother's sister's husband) as well. In many other speech communities, such distinctions may be emically much more crucial, such as the practice of distinguishing mother's brothers from father's brothers using different kin terms. For example, this may happen with cross-cousin marriage, where a man is expected to marry the daughter of the former, but must strictly avoid the latter, relations with whom will probably be considered incestuous; this differentiates male ego's relations with these two uncles accordingly. Thus kin types are useful if not essential in comparing different terminologies and the category-terms that inform them, but they are to be treated as analytical rather than indigenous categories.[8]

The following abbreviations are used throughout for both kin types (etic) and categories (emic), combined as necessary: F = father, M = mother, B = brother, Z = sister, S = son, D = daughter, H = husband, W = wife, ms = man-speaking, ws = woman-speaking, ss = same-sex, os = opposite-sex, e = elder, y = younger. Where any of the last six formulae occur at the end of the abbreviation, it denotes that they apply to the whole of that abbreviation and not just one of the individual kin types found within it, as would otherwise be the case. A frequently found example of these abbreviations in combination is MBD, 'mother's brother's daughter'; another example is

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FB, father's brother. As is conventional, 'ego' is used to identify the person from whose perspective a kinship system or an aspect of it is being described. 'Alter' is sometimes used to specify the individual with whom ego is in a relationship for whatever purpose – that is, ego's opposite number in the relationship.

Generations are also identified here with reference to ego's generation (sometimes called 'the level of reference', e.g. by Needham), while generations on either side of ego's are identified by '+' and a number if ascending and '–' and a number if descending: thus +2 refers to the grandparents' generation, +1 parents', –1 children's and –2 grandchildren's.[9] Sometimes the term 'genealogical level' or just 'level' may appear. While 'generation' implies similarity of age, 'genealogical level' suggests actual genealogical relations, regardless of age. This distinction takes account of the fact that, for example, ego's uncles and aunts might be younger than ego (if they were born after ego), or that a large family of siblings may encompass a larger age range than the typical generation lasting a notional 25 years or so.

The term 'classificatory' should also be noted, as it is routinely used in discussions of kinship to denote that a kin term translated with reference to the closest genealogical position to ego it covers also refers to remoter relatives who are seen as equivalent to that position by the speech community concerned. An example is when the term for FB also covers FFBS, FFFBSS etc.; another is terms for cousins like MBD (above) applying beyond the genealogically minimal first-cousin range. Genealogically speaking, invoking the classificatory idea means extending the range of genealogical connections to include remoter ancestral generations; thus, while FB is a father's brother traced back to the +1 generation, FFBS is a paternal grandfather's nephew traced right back through the +2 generation, though both FB and FFBS are +1 relatives to ego.

For diagrams, see the last section of this chapter, just before the references.

Prescription

In light of past controversies regarding the definition of prescriptive systems, mostly associated with forms of cross-cousin marriage, I should make my own position clear regarding what I mean by 'prescription', 'prescriptive' and 'prescriptive alliance.'[10] These terms all

literally suggest a situation in which all egos are expected to marry specific relatives, usually interpreted as types of cousin in the first instance. It is therefore tempting to call such marriages 'prescribed', and indeed that was the early practice of some authors dating back at least to Alfred Kroeber and Robert Lowie, both writing in 1917 (Kroeber 1917: 384; Lowie 1917: 172; cf. Needham 1973). However, given arguments that, even where such rules exist, not all egos actually follow them, the objection repeatedly surfaced that 'preference' would be a better way of describing what was at issue than 'prescription'. In any case, it was argued further the rule could not be followed one hundred per cent for practical reasons: not all male egos have MBDs, for example (an argument that depended on taking 'MBD/FZS' marriage literally as involving the minimal genealogically defined referents alone). One other aspect of this was that 'preference' and 'prescription' were opposed to one another: some societies had the former, others the latter. One authority who took this line was Maybury-Lewis, in a much cited article (1965: 225–27). Ultimately, Needham (1973), who was at the centre of a good many of these controversies, suggested that prescription is best seen as a property not of affinal alliance or marriage practices but of the kinship terminology – that is, of those terminological patterns that have equations and distinctions expressing the operation of these marriage rules. Therefore, one should speak of prescriptive kinship terminologies (or 'relationship terminologies' in Needham's language), not prescriptive alliance, although the cumbersome phrase 'relationship terminology of asymmetric prescriptive alliance' was apparently admissible (it appears often in the writings of this school, and Needham himself was certainly not consistent in his usage over time). Fundamentally, however, in the case of asymmetric prescription (i.e. between classificatory MBD and FZS), one would expect to see terminological equations and distinctions like MBD = W, MB = WF, MBS = WB, ZS = DH, MB ≠ FZH, FZ ≠ MBW, MBD ≠ FZD, WB ≠ ZH etc., underpinning a rule or norm – indeed, an ideology – that the proper form of marriage is that between classificatory MBD and FZS, not between classificatory FZD and MBS, nor marriages involving direct exchange between any two affinal alliance groups or lines (in which case one has symmetric prescription).

However, another property of prescriptive terminologies identified by Needham (1973) was their tendency to redefine kin who marry against the rules or with marriage partners with no known existing

kin ties, as if the marriage rule had been followed. That is, a prescriptive terminology imposes its own interpretation on the marriages (or affinal alliances) that do take place. In the words of Maybury-Lewis (1965: 219), 'it is characteristic of a prescriptive system that all marriages are treated as if they fall into the correct category.' Followed consistently – which, of course, it may well not be – this would produce a fit between terminology and alliances, redefined or not, regardless of actual genealogical connections, and also regardless of the known fact that marriages may well be dispersed between affinal alliance groups. This provides an answer to the demographic argument outlined in the previous paragraph: for example, it may well be the case that few egos marry their genealogical MBD or FZS, that most marry a classificatory equivalent, and that, even if they do not, their spouses will be treated as such by being redefined as such. It is also an answer to those, like Harold Scheffler and Floyd Lounsbury (1971: 220, 223), who dismissed the notion of prescriptive *systems* of alliance between social groups altogether on the grounds that too many egos break the supposed rules (though they did not question the existence of such rules as such when applied to individuals), a position that assumes that only the genealogically closest referents are married. Prescriptive systems *are* distinctive but primarily because of their kinship terminologies, which are, of course, classifications. Unlike a scientific classification, however, they impose an ultimately ideological construction ('this is how one should marry') on the facts; that is, they do not necessarily faithfully reflect the facts (here, the prior genealogical connections of marriage partners, if known) but may indeed distort them. By virtue of this redefining property, the figure for marriages defined as proper could well approach 100%.[11]

An alternative expression, associated especially with Louis Dumont, is 'positive marriage rules' – that is, rules specifying the approved kin category from which ego should take a spouse (as opposed to negative rules stating whom ego should avoid in marriage). This is certainly simpler, but it leaves tacit the question of the nature of the terminology. Nonetheless, the phrase has its uses, and I will occasionally use it in what follows. Rather more frequently, however, I use the phrases '(a)symmetric (prescriptive) system' or '(a)symmetric prescription' as the least objectionable ways of describing cases where there is both an (a)symmetric prescriptive terminology and a marriage rule that can be associated with it logically. This is not meant to imply that only the genealogically minimal prescribed ref-

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erents will be married in such cases, nor that the alliances of any one line or alliance group cannot be dispersed, nor that, in the case of asymmetric alliance, ego only has one wife-giving and one wife-taking line available for alliance purposes.

The Chapters: Summaries and Acknowledgements

Hopefully, I can mostly leave the various chapters to speak for themselves, but the brief summaries below should also be useful.

Chapter 1 was originally published in the *Journal of the Anthropological Society of Oxford Online* 4(2) (2012): 183–211. It describes the main recognized forms or types of kinship terminology and discusses how they might be related, especially in developmental or evolutionary terms. It is especially interested in the phenomenon of zero-equation terminologies and what comes next. In this connection, it also postulates that cognatic terminologies are in a sense the end point of global processes of change in terminologies, as there is no obvious way in which they can evolve further without changing into an already recognized pattern, all of which are hypothetically prior in world history terms. Changes in the version reproduced here are limited to minor revisions of wording and some additional references.

Chapter 2 was originally published in *Contributions to Indian Sociology* 24(1) (1990): 61–76. It represents a first attempt to deal with the question of differences and possible changes in kinship terminology in India involving the kinship and marriage systems of tribal populations in the centre as transitional between south and north India. South India has been known since Morgan as an archetypal example of bilateral cross-cousin marriage with 'Dravidian' or what Needham would later call 'symmetric prescriptive' terminologies. North India, by contrast, lacks both features and frowns on marriage with any cousin, cross as well as parallel (see also Ch. 5). In marrying preferably (but probably not prescriptively) into GEG categories (i.e. with siblings' spouses' siblings), marriage groups in tribal populations like the Juang exchange spouses, often quite intensively, within a generation, but forbid realliances between the same groups for the next one to three generations.[12] In respect of linking ego with alter, GEG categories are not traced through previous generations in the way that cross cousins are, although as with cross-cousin marriage

they can be seen formally as the basis of exchanges of siblings in marriage. Also, cousin specifications are not included in the GEG category as they are with prescriptive alliance but are likely to be merged with siblings and parallel cousins, as in north India. They thus have features of both south and north India, which in evolutionary terms they may link.

Thirty years after this chapter was first published, I would now take the view that while tribal societies like the Juang were fully prescriptive at one stage in history, as in south India, for status reasons they have been influenced by north Indian norms to give up cousin marriage and develop terminological features that reflect this change. This is supported by the fact that in Koraput other tribal populations, both Munda- and Dravidian-speaking, have systems of bilateral cross-cousin marriage with fairly standard symmetric prescriptive terminologies to match. In addition, as Section VI of the original article showed, we can see potential evidence of change in two tribal terminologies of Bihar.[13] More speculatively, in the course of a history now closed off to us, some of these tribal populations might have become castes and turned entirely to north Indian norms in kinship and marriage, as the Bhuiya of Odisha appear to have done or to be doing (see Ch. 5). Conversely, I would not now claim that the Juang and allied terminologies are prescriptive today in the rather decisive way I was prepared to do in the original article. I now accept that prescriptive terminologies should be defined in part by their cognate-affine equations, which the Juang etc. lack. However, the cognatic specifications in such equations might very well survive after the affinal ones have split off: for example, the equations MB = FZH and FZ = MBW might continue to exist even after the specifications EF and EM respectively have ceased to belong to them. This seems to be the case for the Juang and similar terminologies in central India, where the reduced, purely cognatic equations exist, and this was what induced me to exaggerate their prescriptive nature.

There is still a lot of uncertainty about these tribal societies, especially whether they do in fact expect their members to marry in certain ways with reference to kin categories and, if so, what the kin terms are for such preferred or possibly prescribed categories. One other caveat is that, in a brief visit to the Juang area in 1998, I and my assistants were told that cross-cousin marriage did occur and that it was more frequent than GEG marriage, though the latter also took place. This tends to conflict with McDougal's data, used in Chapter 2,

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which even in 1998 were some 35 years old. However, it does not contradict them entirely, and in any case other tribes in the area are described as having the same features that McDougal described for the Juang, though in less detail.[14]

Chapter 3 was originally published in the *Journal of the Anthropological Society of Oxford-online* 5(2) (2013): 194–206. For this volume, it has been cut, rearranged, somewhat reworded and provided with a new introduction, and the section numbers have been removed. As a result, this version omits most of the discussion of Crow-Omaha terminologies and their possible derivation from Allen's tetradic model to concentrate on the further implications of treating the intermarriage of sets of siblings within a single generation as marriage to GEG categories, as in Chapter 2 and my description of it above. As Chapter 2 focuses on India, Chapter 3 also describes possible examples of this marriage practice elsewhere in the world. In this chapter, I also stress the frequent tendency in this form of affinal alliance to intensify alliances between such sibling groups as much as possible within the same generation. This circumstance, though generally underemphasized in the literature, may itself be crucial evidence of a previous practice of cross-cousin marriage in which everyone in the society was expected to marry in the same fashion, so that all egos, at least formally speaking, repeat the marriages of the parental generation. However, the ban on renewing alliances in the immediately following generation(s) with GEG marriage ensures that this will not be possible, while at the same time dispersing the alliances of any one spouse-exchange group to other such groups over time and not just confining them to one other such group. Taken literally, the latter situation would involve a moiety system of just two affinal alliance groups in the society perpetually exchanging spouses. However, as cross-cousin marriage does not need moieties to function, assuming this situation had existed, it may have come to be seen as irksome at some point in history and to be broken down into a larger number of smaller spouse-exchange groups, allowing alliances to be dispersed. Preventing alliances from being renewed in the immediately following generation or generations would have increased this dispersal still more. In other words, this hypothetical society might have 1) started with just two moieties exchanging spouses through cross-cousin marriage, 2) abandoned moieties but retained cross-cousin marriage, and then 3) abandoned cross-cousin marriage but retained the practice of intensifying marriages between groups of

siblings within the same generation. Steps 2 and 3 would have had the effect, but not necessarily the intention, of dispersing alliances among spouse-exchange groups.

Chapter 4 was first published in Warren Shapiro (ed.), *Focality and Extension in Kinship: Essays in Memory of Harold W. Scheffler*, Acton: Australian University Press (2018). That is, it originated as a contribution to a Festschrift for Prof. Scheffler, which quickly turned into a memorial volume, as the honorand died while it was still in production. As Scheffler was insistent in denying the link between prescriptive terminologies and cross-cousin marriage, he deserves some attention here, but as its title indicates the chapter also discusses the possible reasons for societies abandoning cross-cousin marriage and the circumstances in which they might do so. Although kinship terminology is discussed, the focus is more on changes to norms and patterns of affinal alliance in this chapter. It therefore constitutes a useful continuation of the themes discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. Changes to the original version of Chapter 4 are restricted to minor alterations in wording.

Chapter 5 was first published in Maurice Godelier, Thomas Trautmann and Franklin Tjon Sie Fat (eds), *Transformations of Kinship*, Washington and London: Smithsonian Institution Press (1998). It returns the focus to South Asia and to the terminologies, first identifying one Iroquois-type terminology in the far north-west of the region, that of the linguistic isolate (i.e. unrelated language) Burushaski, and then investigating its potential as an intermediate form between the terminologies that are typical of south India (symmetric or bilateral prescriptive) and north India (a form of zero equation) respectively. It may therefore seem like an alternative or contradiction of the arguments set out in Chapter 2, but in fact Chapter 5 ends by suggesting a developmental sequence that incorporates all these terminological forms. Changes are therefore restricted to minor alterations in wording, and the first footnote in the original has been replaced. Also, the present version of this chapter ends with two paragraphs written especially for it, the abbreviations used for kin types throughout have been changed to be in line with those used in the other chapters in the present collection, and a map in the original has been deleted.

Chapter 6 was first published in the *Journal of the Anthropological Society of Oxford-online* 7(2) (2015): 205–33. It looks at Indo-European kinship terminologies in Europe primarily from a diachronic

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perspective, though it also establishes the details of a number of these terminologies synchronically. Generally, it seems that there has been a shift in patterning among these terminologies across Europe, a trend which to some extent can be seen as geographical. Thus most Slavonic and Baltic terminologies in the east have zero-equation features,[15] in some cases rather residual, while those in the west, principally Romance, Greek, Celtic and some Germanic terminologies, like English, Dutch and German, as well as Czech, are or tend to be cognatic in nature. However, there is some evidence, notably in the Baltic, German and Scandinavian terminologies, that these were also zero-equation terminologies well into historic times, having become cognatic (German) or being on the way to becoming cognatic (Scandinavian, Lithuanian) at the present day. The Latin terminology can be interpreted similarly, having zero-equation features itself, while the terminologies of its present-day daughter languages can only be described as cognatic. The basic hypothesis is that, in order for a prescriptive or post-prescriptive terminology to evolve into a cognatic one, its equations need to be broken down and re-sorted on a different basis. It is the stage of breakdown, naturally enough, that has been given the label 'zero equation'. Once this stage has been reached, the very different cognatic pattern can be arrived at, a pattern that most closely accords with the biological realities of two parents of equal status with children, the fact that grandchildren, (grand-)parents and +1 and −1 collaterals are not distinguished terminologically as to side of family, and an amorphous category of cousins similarly not distinguished either.[16]

The fact that some of these terminologies, especially in eastern Europe, are zero equation in type and therefore resemble typologically Indo-European terminologies in north India should be emphasized here, as it forms one of the key arguments of this collection. Given the shared background of membership in the same language family, one can postulate a situation in which either the two branches both evolved into a zero-equation pattern before branching off from one another or underwent a similar evolution in parallel after their separation. There is also the fact that, while prescription is not found anywhere in the Indo-European language family in terms of its own long-term genealogical heritage, some lexically Indo-European terminologies in South Asia have become prescriptive historically through a process of lexical replacement (referred to in Ch. 5). Taking the data and arguments in the two chapters together,

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therefore, one might also posit an evolutionary development within this language family from symmetric prescriptive (Dravidian) to cognatic (e.g. English, German, Romance languages) via GEG marriage (north Munda), Iroquois (Burushaski) and zero equation (e.g. north India, Baltic). In this hypothesis, the zero-equation stage would be significant in enabling terminological categories to be re-sorted into a cognatic pattern. This would be easier than positing a direct change from prescriptive to cognatic, though something very similar has been suggested for the Arctic (Ives 1998).

The original version of Chapter 6 has not been altered substantially: the original note 3, on kin term abbreviations, has been deleted as having already been given elsewhere in the present volume; the last footnote, 34 (previously 35), has been added too, and a new section on Celtic has been added immediately before the conclusion.

Chapter 7 has not been published before. It starts the second part of the book, which, as already noted, is devoted to issues surrounding Crow-Omaha systems and some marriage practices in eastern Indonesia that resemble them sociologically but lack the associated terminologies. In Chapter 7, the theme of a transition from prescriptive to non-prescriptive terminologies is retained, but in the context of the possible origin of Crow-Omaha terminologies from prescriptive ones. Two theories are discussed: the derivation of Crow-Omaha terminologies from systems of asymmetric prescriptive alliance ('Kachin type'), and their derivation from systems of symmetric prescriptive alliance ('Dravidian' type), possibly in some cases via Iroquois-type terminologies, which are symmetric like Dravidian but not prescriptive. The former hypothesis has so far proved far more popular in the literature, with specific theories being devoted to it. As well as discussing these theories, therefore, the chapter also points out the potential for the latter hypothesis as an alternative.

Chapter 8 was first published in *Structure and Dynamics: eJournal of Anthropological and Related Sciences* 11(1) (2019): 73–95. It puts forward a theory of the possible sociological correlates of Crow-Omaha terminologies in terms of the substitutability of kin in different generations in intergroup relations: i.e. it is hypothesized that those kin types that can substitute for one another in different generations are linked by vertical terminological equations of the types known as Crow-Omaha. Its contribution to the evolutionary theme, therefore, is that it suggests possible reasons for the development of Crow-Omaha terminologies out of prescriptive ones.

Chapter 9 was originally published in the *Journal of Anthropological Research* 74(2) (2018): 232–51. Building on Chapter 8, it puts forward a similar theory of substitutability in relation to certain speech communities in eastern Indonesia. However, their terminologies are not Crow-Omaha. Instead, this region is one of frequent though not uniform asymmetric prescriptive alliance, the form of alliance that is clearly the origin of these examples. This shows that substitutability of kin does not need Crow-Omaha terminologies any more than dispersed alliance does. This chapter has been changed significantly from the original published version, mainly in that the three paragraphs setting out my understanding of the terms 'prescription' and 'prescriptive' have been transferred to the present Introduction. There are also some minor changes in wording, and the abstract, key words, acknowledgements and maps in the original have been deleted.[17] This means that endnotes 1, 2, 3 and 5, as well as the unnumbered note at the start, have also been deleted, though the original endnote 4, now note 1, has been retained. A new note 2 has also been provided.

Diagrams

The diagrams or figures below are designed for consultation when reading the chapters that follow. The first two figures (0.1, 0.2) show the two main prescriptive systems: symmetric or bilateral, the prescribed cousin being a cross cousin relatable as both MBC and FZC; and asymmetric or matrilateral, the prescribed cross cousin being for male ego MBD and for female ego FZS (a patrilateral relative from her point of view, NB). The next pair of figures (0.3, 0.4) show the key Crow-Omaha features and equations. The remaining pair (0.5, 0.6) show the operation of marriages between sets of siblings within the same generation (cf. especially Chs. 2 and 3). In line with the practice of Needham and his followers, I have preferred these so-called 'matrix diagrams' to genealogical ones, as this emphasizes the status of kin terms as category words rather than genealogical positions.

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Figure 0.1. Symmetric or bilateral prescription

Lineal and parallel kin		**Cross kin**	
male	female	male	female
FF FFB MMB	MM MMZ FFZ	MF MFB FMB	FM FMZ MFZ
F FB MZH	M MZ FBW	MB FZH EF	FZ MBW EM
ego B PssGS (parallel cousin) EZH	*ego* Z PssGD (parallel cousin) EBW	PosGS (cross cousin) H ZH EB	PosGD (cross cousin) W BW EZ
Sms BS DHws EZS PosGDS	Dms BD SWws EZD PosGDD	Sws ZS DHms EBS PosGSS	Dws ZD SWms EBD PosGSD
SSms DSws BSS ZDS	SDms DDws BSD ZDD	SSws DSms BDS ZSS	SDws DDms BDD ZSD

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Figure 0.2. Asymmetric prescription (matrilateral ms, patrilateral ws)

D		B		A		C		E	
female	male	female	male	female	male	female	male	female	male
			FFZH	FFZ	FF FFB	FM FMZ MFZ	MF MFB FMB	MM MMZ	MMB
		FZHZ FFZD	FZH FFZS HF	FZ HM	F FB MZH	M MZ FBW	MB WF	MBW WM	
	HZH	FZD HZ	FZS** ZH H HB	*ego (f)* Z PssGD HBW	*ego (m)* B PssGS WZH	MBD* W BW WZ	MBS WB	WBW	
HZD FZDD	DHws HZS FZDS	ZD Dws HBD	ZS Sws DHms HBS	Dms BD SWws WZD MBDD	Sms BS WZS MBDS	SWms MBSD WBD	MBSS WBS		
DDws ZDD	DSws ZDS	DDms SDws ZSD BDD	DSms SSws ZSS BDS	SDms BSD	SSms BSS				

Note: ego's line (male and female) is *A*; *B* is the line of ego's wife-takers; *C* is the line of ego's wife-givers. Lines *D* and *E* are those of ego's wife-takers' wife-takers and wife-givers' wife-givers respectively. However, in the minimal three-line form of this system, line *D* would coincide with line *C* and line *E* with line *B*. This would logically produce equations like MMB = FFZH, MBW = FFZD, WBW = FZD and HZH = MBS. The transfer of wives is from right to left. * = prescribed spouse for male ego; ** = prescribed spouse for female ego.

Figure 0.3. Crow-type terminology

FZ	FB	*F* and M	MZ	MB
FZD, *FZS*	FBC	male ego and Z	MZC	<u>MBC</u>
FZDD, *FZDS*		<u>D and S (C)</u>		

Key equations: **FZ, FZD, FZDD** (**bold**); *F*, *FZS*, *FZDS* (*italics*); <u>C, MBC</u> (<u>underlined</u>). Other possible equations (non-diagnostic): M = MZ, F = FB and FBC = MZC (parallel cousins).

Figure 0.4. Omaha-type terminology

FZ	FB	F and *M*	MZ	**MB**
<u>FZC</u>	FBC	male ego and Z	MZC	*MBD*, **MBS**
		<u>ZC</u>		*MBSD*, **MBSS**

Key equations: **MB, MBS, MBSS** (**bold**); *M*, *MBD*, *MBSD* (*italics*); and <u>FZC, ZC</u> (<u>underlined</u>). Other possible equations (non-diagnostic): F = FB, M = MZ and FBC = MZC (parallel cousins).

Figure 0.5. GEG marriage (symmetric)

opposite-sex sibling pair A / opposite-sex sibling pair B

sister and **male ego** (sister marries ZH, ego marries ZHZ)	*ZH* and **ZHZ** (respective spouses: ego's sister and ego)

Direction of spouse transfer: symmetric

Figure 0.6. GEG marriage (asymmetric)

same-sex sibling pair A / same-sex sibling pair B

brother and **male ego**	*BW* and **BWZ**
(brother marries BW, ego marries BWZ)	(respective spouses: ego's brother and ego)

Direction of spouse transfer: asymmetric

Dedication

Lastly, I dedicate this volume to the memory of the late Dr N.J. 'Nick' Allen (1939–2020), formerly Reader in the Social Anthropology of South Asia at the University of Oxford and my own doctoral supervisor, who undertook much similar work on the theme of change in kinship terminologies that is also the focus of this collection and who inspired me, as his student, to do the same.

Notes

1. Gertrude Dole showed long ago (1972) that 'Eskimo' terminologies are varied and that they are not 'lineal' (or 'cognatic') in all genealogical levels, unlike the English terminology. Of the latter two descriptors, I prefer 'cognatic' to 'lineal' as more logical.
2. Chapter 8 therefore also incorporates time as an intrinsic factor, but here it is a matter of the perpetually repeated course of a social process, not of permanent, irreversible change to an entire kinship system.
3. Some parts of the world, such as the Americas, Australasia and Russian Siberia, could be said to have both categories of population, as they combine the well-established descendants of European-derived settler societies with increasingly marginalized native populations with much longer histories of settlement.
4. Allen, to whose memory this collection is dedicated, was my doctoral supervisor, but we kept in close touch between my subsequent graduation in 1984 and his death in early 2020. Needham's impact on me mainly came from his publications on kinship, though I had personal contact with him from time to time, mainly through the research seminars he held at All Souls College. He died in 2006.
5. This sentence requires some qualification. By 'cognitively modern humans', I certainly mean *homo sapiens*. By 'contemporary phase of history', I assume that this starts with the later Pleistocene and extends to what is rapidly becoming known, more informally, as the Anthropocene, the modern period of extensive human impact on the planet, destructive or otherwise. I am

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admittedly writing here with the benefit of only the most partial knowledge of these matters, but that is enough for my purposes. For fuller discussions of early human (including hominid and hominin) kinship, see chapters in Allen et al. (2008); for a brief overview of human evolutionary history, see Gowlett and Dunbar (2008) in the same volume.

6. Unpublished article cited with author's permission. In neither of the articles cited here does the author mention me personally.
7. An example of a village being the operational unit in affinal alliance is Kédang, on the island variously known as Lomblen or Lembata, one of the Solor Islands in eastern Indonesia (Barnes 1974).
8. Analytical and indigenous categories may, of course, sometimes be the same, as with the English term *father*.
9. One leading authority on kinship, Louis Dumont, reversed this for some reason so that he marked ascending generations with a minus sign and descending ones with a plus sign.
10. This section is taken from Parkin 2018: 233-4, the rest of which is reproduced here as Chapter 9. The present section has some minor changes in wording, the original note 3 has been deleted, and the original note 5 is now note 11 of this introduction (the next footnote).
11. One example of this is Anthony Good's study of a south Indian subcaste with *symmetric* prescription, for which he conducted a statistical survey of marriage choices (1981). He found that only 25% of marriages were with a first cross cousin but that when other qualifying alters were taken into account (second and remoter cross cousins, and others in the prescribed category for marriage) the figure rose to 95%. Good explicitly states that the Maravar terminology has the redefining property mentioned above. I know of no comparable account of a society with asymmetric prescription.
12. In the case of a delay of one generation, this could be interpreted as repeating the marriage of an FF, e.g. marriage to FMBSD, a specification that often occurs in this context worldwide. This is rare in the case of these tribal groups as far as our information goes, with only Juang *na* having this specification alongside PM and MFZ (McDougal 1964), though it is found quite frequently in other societies around the world. See also Ch. 3.
13. The references for these two examples were inadvertently omitted from the original: for the Malpahariya, see Sarkar (1937), and for the Malto or Maler, Vidyarthi (1963).
14. One other update should be mentioned: in the original article references to Parkin n.d., *The sons of man*, it should now read Parkin (1992), *The Munda of Central India*.
15. That is, a situation in which practically every close and medium-close kin type has its own term, or alternatively a composite, descriptive phrase (e.g. *morbro* for mother's brother in Swedish etc.). This links zero-equation terminologies in Europe typologically to the north Indian terminologies discussed in Chapter 5. We owe the term 'zero equation' to Allen (1989), though the principle is also known under Murdock's earlier term 'Sudanese' (1949: 224, 238–39).

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16. As already noted above, 'cognatic' use of a terminology is Needham's term, equivalent in meaning to Robert Lowie's better known and more influential 'lineal'. For Needham, a lineal terminology was one in which the terms were sorted into descent lines, as is the case with prescriptive, Iroquois and Crow-Omaha terminologies. I am not saying that the categories of relatives mentioned above cannot be further distinguished using, for example, genealogical reckoning, only that a cognatic terminology will not ordinarily distinguish them itself.
17. These were inserted into the original text at the request of the publisher; they can be dispensed with here.

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