INTRODUCTION

Heritage Dynamics
Politics of Authentication, Aesthetics of Persuasion and the Cultural Production of the Real

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Fundamentally, heritage formation denotes the processes whereby, out of the sheer infinite number of things, places and practices that have been handed down from the past, a selection is made that is qualified as ‘a precious and irreplaceable resource, essential to personal and collective identity and necessary for self-respect’ (Lowenthal 2005: 81). Clearly, heritage formation is inextricably entangled with another much-noted tendency in our globalizing world: the ‘culturalization’ of politics, citizenship, economics, religion and other areas of social life, whereby ‘cultural identities’ and concomitant ‘sentiments of belonging’ are prominently brought into play in the political arena (Mazzarella 2004; Geschiere 2009; Comaroff and Comaroff 2009; Duyvendak, Hurenkamp and Tonkens 2011). Yet, what makes heritage stand out, is the self-conscious attempt of heritage makers to canonize culture, to single out, fix and define particular historical legacies as ‘essential’ and constitutive of the collective.

Due to the link between heritage production and the making of collectives, processes of heritage formation have offered scholars from a wide variety of disciplinary backgrounds an exceptionally rich field in which to conduct empirical research into such larger themes as statehood, nation-building, ethnogenesis, social memory, the culturalization of citizenship or identity politics. Unsurprisingly, many anthropologists have made themselves heard in these debates. First of all, because heritage production is a particular mode of culture-making, anthropological
insights are immediately relevant to ongoing discussions regarding its saliency and appeal in the contemporary world (see Adams 2005). In addition, anthropologists found that the thriving heritage industry offered them the possibility to ‘close the gap between anthropology and public policy’ (Hackenberg 2002: 288), and bring anthropological expertise to fields beyond academia. At the same time, anthropologists have been at the forefront of critically exploring the operation of UNESCO heritage institutions in concrete locations outside Europe, showing, on the basis of detailed ethnographic research, how discourses and policies pertaining to heritage are adopted and adapted – ‘on the ground’ (Brumann and Berliner 2016).

Our own move into the field of heritage studies was driven by somewhat different concerns. Of course, as anthropologists, we too were intrigued by the particular mode of making culture in the framework of cultural heritage, which we had encountered in the different fields where we do research (Ghana and Brazil), as well as in the Netherlands, the country where we live and work. This volume is based on a longstanding research collaboration of the contributors, who work on different regions (Brazil, Ghana, Angola, the Netherlands and South Africa) but share a strong interest in the formation of heritage in pluralistic settings, in which hegemonic modes of claiming the past are contested and coexist with alternative heritage forms.1 Our interest in the study of cultural heritage did not originate from within the field of heritage studies, but from a broader interest in understanding the ‘politics and aesthetics of world-making’ (Meyer 2015a, 2016) and the ‘cultural construction of the real’ (Van de Port 2011). We intuited that an in-depth study of concrete cases of heritage formation, and the tensions and debates they revealed, would provide us with an excellent opportunity to think through – and act upon – our growing dissatisfaction with a particular kind of constructivist argumentation that we frequently encounter in anthropological writings: the kind that presents as a conclusion its finding that the history is ‘assembled’, the community is ‘imagined’, the tradition is ‘invented’ or the identity is ‘staged’. Such conclusions, we suggest, stop at the point where the research should begin.2 For if histories, communities, traditions and identities are fabricated, how then is it that people manage to convince themselves and others that this is not the case (see also Meyer 2009; Van de Port 2004, 2012)? Before elaborating this critique, and proposing ways to move beyond the premature closure of constructivist argumentation, here is a concrete example that may illustrate the sources of our dissatisfaction.

In November 2011, in Salvador da Bahia (Brazil), we organized a roundtable discussion with ‘local stakeholders’ in heritage issues. On the stage of the auditorium of the Museu Eugênio Teixeira Leal sat representatives of Bahian quilombo communities (descendants of escaped slaves); representatives from the Pataxó, an indigenous people from southern Bahia; and a number of Brazilian anthropologists. At one point during
the discussion, the topic on the table was the ‘ethnogenesis’ of indigenous people in north-eastern Brazil. The anthropologists in our panel discussed the strategies deployed by indigenous groups to have their claims to be ‘Indians’ recognized by the state. The anthropologists had drawn attention to the recent invention by indigenous groups of practices that marked their ethnic distinctiveness as ‘Indian’, and had wondered how to evaluate the ‘authenticity’ of the identity claims made by the tribesmen. Had these groups merely ‘invented’ themselves as Indians? A young Pataxó woman in the panel – Anari Braz Bomfim, a student at the Department of Ethnic and African Studies at the Federal University of Bahia – had been listening patiently to the discussion, and at one point the moderator asked her what she thought of the issues put forward by the anthropologists. She stated: ‘Well, this issue of the Pataxó being invented or not … As far as I know, people have been inventing themselves and reinventing themselves since the beginning of times. Isn’t that what people always do? So, what exactly is the issue? Just because we have invented ourselves, can we not be real Pataxó?’ (for a full account of this event, see André Bakker in this volume).

Anari Braz Bomfim’s remark speaks directly to the issue that is at the heart of this volume. Constructivist approaches to reality urge researchers to show the made-up in the taken for granted, and many anthropologists have taken up this task and have become very skilful at it (see Clifford 1988: 277ff.). Constructivism calls for a critical engagement with cultural identities. Interlocutors’ claims that the reality of something – a tradition, an identity, a history – is given are not taken at face value, but framed in a narrative that shows how the claimant failed to recognize the constructedness in the object that was brought up for analysis. Now, we would insist that showing the made-up in the taken for granted is – and should remain – one of the major tasks of anthropologists. As Richard Handler reminds us, ‘despite the recent persuasiveness of constructivism in social science, objectivist notions of authenticity remain hegemonic in many late-capitalist institutions, such as the art market, museums and courts of law’ (2001: 964). Those with a more political inclination might add that there are simply too many fundamentalists around these days – of all backgrounds and beliefs – to give up on infusing some doubts here and there. Or that, in a world where the demand for essentializing and totalizing discourses seems to be on the rise, it still makes sense to hold up a mirror that reveals how such narratives are stitched together.

Nevertheless, we find that too often, arguments about the ways in which lifeworlds are constructed become conclusions and closures, rather than incentives to ask new questions. One alternative line of questioning – the one we will pursue in this volume – is present in the remark by that young Pataxó woman in response to a typical constructivist narrative: ‘So we have reinvented ourselves. So what?’ Clearly, the analytical deconstruction of
her identity did not exhaust its significance, or diminish the fullness of its lived reality. What she seemed to be saying was:

Yes, you can say this about my identity. But your conclusion is the product of a certain analytical procedure, one that is picking things apart, breaking up past and present, act and performance, name and substance, and so on. So yes, your statement is true within the confines of that analytical procedure. But what if I do not submit my identity to this breaking up? What if I seek to know being Pataxó differently, by keeping its fullness intact, by barring the questioning mind and allowing all that makes itself present to my conscienciousness and sensorium to simply be?

What Anari Braz Bomfim helped us to see, then, is the increasing gap between an experience-distant constructivist way of knowing and an experiential way of knowing. With characteristic sarcasm, Bruno Latour sought to expose this gap in his example of the critical sociologist studying a pilgrimage site, where a pilgrim tells him that he had travelled to the monastery because he was called by the Virgin Mary. Faced with such a remark, says Latour, the critical sociologist already knows that this is ‘of course’ not what is really going on.

How long should we resist smiling smugly, replacing at once the agency of the Virgin by the ‘obvious’ delusion of an actor ‘finding pretext’ in a religious icon to ‘hide’ one’s own decision? Critical sociologists will answer: ‘Just as far as to be polite, because it’s bad manners to sneer in the presence of the informant’. (2005: 48)

Alternatively, Latour suggests taking interlocutors – their theories, their metaphysics, their ontologies – seriously: following their modes of understanding ‘no matter what metaphysical imbroglios they lead us into’ (Latour 2005: 48). In our own way, we have tried to take this critique to heart. Incontestable research findings that the tradition is ‘invented’, the community ‘imagined’ or the identity ‘performed’ are nothing more (and nothing less) than the outcome of a particular, constructivist mode of analysis. Such outcomes are not necessarily untrue, and they may even be very close to what our interlocutors tell us (as clearly, they too may question, doubt and ‘deconstruct’ what is taken for granted in their lifeworlds). But there are many ways of knowing traditions, communities and identities, and consequently many different tales to tell about them. The tales that we want to present in this volume seek to ‘think away’ from the idea that human-made worlds are merely fabricated, and ponder the question how traditions, communities and identities come to be experienced as really real. The fact that a new generation of Pataxó reintroduced feathers and grass skirts to their wardrobes, and opted for the woods again, should not be addressed with simple dualisms of real and fake, which are too crude to govern a sophisticated analysis. The fact that many Pataxó understood that there is something to be gained by adopting that ethnic label does not reduce them
to political actors who instrumentalize ‘identity’ in the pursuit of socio-
economic struggles. The fact that the Pataxó are aware of the construct,
but take it for real nonetheless, forces us to rethink some of the dichotomies
that govern our own thinking: we would like to question the ‘factishes’ of
Western metaphysics (Latour 2010); reconsider ‘faking-it’ as the precondi-
tion of all social life (Miller 2005); and ponder such possibilities as the
‘genuinely made-up’ (Van de Port 2012) and ‘authentic fakes’ (Chidester
2005). This approach also calls for a critique of the facile assumption that
revealing the constructedness of cultural forms is the privilege of scholars,
while those living with and by these forms cannot help but take them for
real. In fact, this assumption often proves to be mistaken – as people may
be very well prepared to acknowledge the constructed nature of a cultural
(or religious) form and yet regard it as real. In this sense, fabrication does
not necessarily stand in opposition to the real but brings it about, in ways
that may go beyond the acts and intentions of the makers and users (Latour
2010: 22–23, see also Van de Port 2012; Meyer 2015b: 12).

It seems to us that our analytical toolkit is lacking when it comes to
addressing the issue of how social constructs are both fabricated and expe-
rienced as fully real. We may even be hindered here by romantic undercur-
rents in our thinking, which equate that which is made-up with that which
is false: a point we will elaborate below. One way to move forward is to
pay attention, counter-intuitively perhaps, to the experiential underpin-
nings of ‘essentialist modes of argumentation’. Essentialist arguments
are grounded in ‘a belief in the real, true essence of things, the perceived
properties that define the “whatness” of an entity’ (Fuss 1989: xi; cf. Fuchs
2001). Understandably, such essentialist claims violate anthropological
relativism and have largely been rejected in the mainstream of anthropo-
logical theory ‘as one of the besetting conceptual sins of anthropology’
(Herzfeld 1996: 188). Nonetheless, as Gerd Baumann (1999) has brilliantly
shown, essentialist modes of argumentation are at the heart of contempo-
rary ‘culture speak’, where they alternate with more deconstructivist argu-
mentations, through which people express their willingness and capacity
to relativize cultural essences that have been set in stone. Rather than shun
‘essentialism’ as a terrible mistake, it merits scholarly attention (Friedman,
in Grillo 2003: 166).

More concretely, what we propose is to focus on the materials, tech-
niques, skills, capacities and alternative imaginations that go into the
cultural production of the real – the ways in which people manage (or fail)
to convince themselves and others of the givenness of their cultural identity.
As Michael Taussig phrased it a long time ago:

(faced with) the once unsettling observation that most of what seems important
in life is made up and is neither more (nor less) than, as a certain turn of phrase
would have it, ‘a social construction’ … it seems to me that not enough surprise
has been expressed as to how we nevertheless get on with living, pretending that
we live facts, not fictions. (1993: xv)
This then, was the research agenda with which we entered the field of heritage studies. We were eager to find out what makes up the facticity of the fact. We wanted to investigate what it is that people mobilize— in themselves and in the world— to transcend the fictions. We sought to explore the resources they tap— and the faculties they engage— to make their real, real, and their certain, certain. This volume showcases the outcome of this endeavour.

Processes of heritage formation, as the detailed studies offered in the chapters show, proved to be a fruitful field in which to study such endeavours in the cultured construction of the real, for the very reason that the formation of heritage brings many of the issues discussed above to the surface. As noted above, the appeal of cultural heritage often rests on its denial of being merely made-up: on its promise to provide an essential ground to social-cultural identities. In the contemporary world, however, heritage formation takes place in pluralistic societies, where different groups seek certainty and guidance in different canons of truth, which only partly overlap and are positioned in a hegemonic order. Members of these societies may not agree what legacies of what past are to be singled out as a ‘defining feature’ of the collective, or what history was fundamental to its formation. Due to such contestations, the givenness of heritage formations is constantly questioned, as claimants seek to highlight that heritage formations are made to serve the interests of some but not of others. At the same time, there is a constant investment in the production of alternative cultural forms that are profiled as heritage, as many instances of heritage-making presented in this volume show. The puzzling fact that, notwithstanding the prominence of discourses that deconstruct heritage claims as invented, heritage formations are thriving, and embraced by many as repositories of essence and truth, calls for two concepts we would like to introduce to the study of heritage formations: ‘politics of authentication’ and ‘aesthetics of persuasion’. Taking as a starting point that authenticity is not an essence to be discovered in a particular form of cultural heritage but a quality produced in such a form, the former allows us to explore the processes through which heritage is authorized in specific power constellations. The latter seeks to help us describe how heritage is appropriated and embodied in lived experience. First, however, a brief exploration of the field of heritage studies is called for.

The ‘Heritage Buzz’: Entering the Field of Heritage Studies

The ‘sense of heritage’, says David C. Harvey, is of all times. In his intriguing article, which documents how ‘the desire to highlight the presence of the past in the present’ (2001: 319) was manifested in Medieval Europe, he reminds us that heritage formations are no novelty. Nonetheless, in many places around the globe, researchers have observed a marked acceleration of heritage production: a veritable run on the ‘heritage’ label, involving ever-new actors, and an ever-expanding network of agencies and institutions.
This has prompted some authors to speak of a ‘heritage craze’. Rather than the term ‘craze’, with its connotations of the irrational, the short-lived and the flimsy, we prefer the term ‘heritage buzz’ to refer to the booming interest in ‘heritage’; the widespread enthusiasm that the idea of ‘heritage’ garners across the globe; and the rapidly growing number of actors seeking to include new items onto the inventory lists of heritage agencies.

A brief look at these inventory lists immediately reveals the acceleration of heritage production, as they show the enormous diversity of the items that are deemed eligible for the qualification, ‘heritage’. As an initially Western notion, ‘heritage’ proved to travel well across the world with the rise of UNESCO policies to safeguard ‘world heritage’. Next to architectural treasures such as the historical town centre of Agadez in Niger and the mosque in Djenné, Mali, Bukchon Hanok village in South Korea, Borobodur on Java, Indonesia, the temples of Angkor, Cambodia, or the Rietveld Schröder House in the Netherlands, one finds ‘cultural landscapes’ such as the Sulaiman-Too Sacred Mountain in Kyrgyzstan or the Forest of the Cedars of God in Lebanon; next to rusty industrial sites that not too long ago would have been demolished without a second thought. One also finds such humble items as the deep-fried bean fritters called acaraje sold on the streets of Salvador da Bahia, Brazil (see Reinhardt in this volume), or shipwrecks off the coast of England. Under the more recent rubric of ‘intangible’ heritage one encounters the Japanese washi craftsmanship of traditional handmade paper and the Bosnian embroidery technique called zmijanje; religious rituals such as the Mevlevi Sema Ceremony in Turkey or the dancing procession of Echternach in Luxembourg; carnivales in Hungary, Bolivia and Belgium and Karabakh horse riding in Azerbaijan; the polyphonic singing of the Aka Pygmies in the Central African Republic and the Armenian wind instrument called duduk. Even ‘Viennese Coffee House Culture’ and ‘the Mediterranean diet’ have been designated as elements of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity.

All these different objects, sites and practices became ‘heritage’ through complex processes of lobbying, consultation, research, public debates, fundraising, bureaucratic procedures of institutionalization and political decision-making (and clearly, many heritage ‘candidates’ fail to be acknowledged). For a long time, heritage-making was the prerogative of the state. In the nineteenth century – where most scholars locate the beginning of heritage formation – National Museums were built across Europe and endowed with the task of assembling material evidence for a past that was suitable to the present aspirations of the nation state (Bendix, Eggert and Peselmann 2013). In the contemporary world, however, heritage agencies have appeared at all levels of institutional politics, opening up spaces way beyond the museum as prime site of heritage formation (Brosius and Polit 2011; Peterson, Gavua and Rassool 2015). The state continues to be a major actor in the discovery, excavation, research, recuperation and exhibit of heritage items, but in many countries, municipalities and provinces are
producing their own inventory lists, declaring certain objects, places and practices to be of ‘essential value’ for ‘the culture and history of the local community’. Besides state agencies, many other actors are active in the heritage field. Global agencies such as UNESCO are actively producing ‘world heritage’, in an attempt to produce a community of values that includes all of humankind and at the same time acknowledges cultural diversity. In democratic, plural societies, debates as to who is included in the selection of heritage items and who is excluded (a point we will elaborate below) have driven social movements, NGOs and lobby groups to enter the field of heritage politics questioning the legitimacy of some heritage items and developing alternative inventory lists. This also involves struggles to bring back to collective memory atrocities of the past – slave-trading, colonialism, apartheid – via memorials, commemorations, and repatriation of human remains from Western medical institutions (Balkenhol, this volume; Jethro, this volume; see also Rassool 2015). The market has discovered the popular appeal of heritage, and commercial enterprises, cultural entrepreneurs, artists, tourist agencies and media organizations are all attracted to – and active in – the heritage field, where they seek to capitalize on its values (see Jethro; Woets; De Witte; all this volume; Comaroff and Comaroff 2009; Peterson 2015: 18–29). In the religious field, certain forms and practices currently in decline have been recast as heritage, drawing yet another class of actors into this arena. Furthermore, underprivileged groups may resort to cultural heritage discourses to back their identity claims and profile their ‘culture’ for tourism (see Andre Bakker and Bruno Reinhardt, this volume). Last, but not least, universities and research institutes are fully involved in heritage production, with findings being discussed in annual conferences and published in numerous specialist journals. Year after year, a steady stream of heritage experts can be seen moving from university campuses to the labour market.

With so many different players, it comes as no surprise that heritage formation is rife with contestations (Byrne 1991). Heritage production always implies statements as to which histories matter (and which do not), as well as statements as to who pertains to the collective (and who does not):

All heritage is someone’s heritage and therefore logically not someone else’s: the original meaning of an inheritance implies the existence of disinheritance and by extension any creation of heritage from the past disinherit someone completely or partially, actively or potentially. This disinheritance may be unintentional, temporary, of trivial importance, limited in its effects and concealed; or it may be long-term, widespread, intentional, important and obvious. (Ashworth and Tunbridge 1996)

In multicultural and multireligious societies, minority groups may feel unaddressed by dominant heritage formations, and challenge the canons of cultural truth put forward by the heritage agencies of the state (see Markus Balkenhol and Ruy Blanes, this volume). The examples are
many, and there are no uniform stories to be told as to how contestations take shape and where they lead: in the Netherlands, many citizens of Afro-Caribbean descent (and others) vehemently reject as ‘racist’ the black-face figure of Zwarte Piet (Black Peet), linked to the traditional Dutch celebration of Sinterklaas (Saint Nicholas), a tradition that was recently added to the National Heritage List.\textsuperscript{14} The Arab population of Jerusalem resents Israeli excavation practices, which cast Jerusalem as ‘The City of David’ (Abu El-Haj 2001).\textsuperscript{15} In Ghana, the state policy of ‘Sankofaism’, which postulates the importance of the various local cultural and religious traditions for national heritage and identity, is heavily contested by the Pentecostal-Charismatic movement, which has become a major voice in the public sphere and questions the authority of the state in framing national cultural heritage (De Witte 2004; Meyer 2004; see also De Witte, this volume; Woets, this volume). In the Muslim world, to give another example of such religiously informed contestations, radical Islamist groups deny any value to legacies of pre-Islamic civilizations, such as the Buddha statues in the Bamyan valley in Afghanistan, demolished by the Islamist Taliban, but now being rebuilt, or to the ancient monuments in Mesopotamia and Syria.

States, in turn, may reject alternative heritage designations put forward by claimants from minority groups. Here one might think of initiatives in South Africa by the Afrikaner Weerstand Beweging, an extreme right-wing group of Afrikaans-speaking whites, to list the home of their murdered leader, Eugène Terre’Blanche, as heritage. As the volume by De Jong and Rowlands (2007) shows, ‘alternative imaginaries of memory’ in West Africa may challenge and at the same time be partly recognized by state policies. The book offers several examples highlighting the contestations imbued in the objectification and recognition of alternative heritage forms, as is the case with the heritagization of the Osun sacred grove in Osogo (Nigeria), shaped by artist Susanne Wenger (Probst 2007, 2011), or the ‘re-enchantment’ of the Senegambian Kankurang masquerade as a ‘new masterpiece of the Oral and Intangible Heritage of Humanity’ (De Jong 2007: 161).

Contestations of heritage may also concern questions regarding to whom historical legacies pertain. During the conflicts of the 1990s in Bosnia-Herzegovina, for instance, the medieval gravestones called stećci, which lay scattered over the country’s green hills, were subjected to intense nationalist contestations and political instrumentalizations by all religious-ethnic groups – Orthodox Serbs, Catholic Croats and Muslim Bosniaks – as pertaining exclusively to their history (Lovrenović 2002). In contemporary Spain, the way one chooses to narrate the famous Mesquita in Cordoba – a mosque turned into a church – or the Alhambra in Granada is ‘a deeply political act’, as it always implies statements over the historical presence of Islam in Europe (Ruggles 2011: 51; Hirschkind 2016), whereas in Belfast, Northern Ireland, attempts by the government to clear the city
of ‘sectarian’ murals, so as to be able to ‘re-imagine the community’, only revealed a multitude of agents claiming exclusive ownership as to what the murals represent (Hartnett 2011). The latter example already hints at yet another contentious dimension of heritage formation: the debates over the value of what has been called ‘undesirable heritage’ or ‘difficult heritage’, such as fascist architecture in Germany (MacDonald 2010) and Italy (Arthurs 2010); socialist architecture in post-socialist societies (Turnbridge 1984; Lizon 1996; Light 2000); or the legacies of the slave trade and colonial rule in the Global South (Henderson 2001; Daehnke 2007). Hotly debated as we write are demands to remove statues of the mining magnate, racist politician and founder of the southern African territory of Rhodesia, Cecil Rhodes, in South Africa (#RhodesMustFall) and of Confederate army general Robert E. Lee, who commanded the Virginia state forces in favour of slavery in the American civil war, in the Southern United States (#LeeMustFall).

Where such contestation of heritage formations leads differs, again, from case to case. Sometimes, heritage formations merely produce indifference, as they simply fail to have sufficient impact to stir the passions. Sometimes, public debates result in amendments made to the heritage item. Thus, in the Netherlands many now argue that the blackness of the aforementioned figure of Black Peet needs to be re-narrated as being the result of the fact that he delivers his presents via the chimney (thus undoing the racial ground of his blackness), whereas others have suggested repainting his face in all possible colours. In yet other cases, contestation leads to the destruction of cultural heritage, as witnessed during the Cultural Revolution in China; and, more recently, in the sphere of influence of the so-called Islamic State (IS), where ancient, non-Islamic or ‘pseudo-Islamic’ legacies – situated peacefully in the Muslim world for centuries – have been demolished. Time and again, Islamists explicitly made the point in mediatized performances that they did not wish to partake in the particular historical narratives these objects and sites help to produce as cherished icons of ‘world heritage’ that arguably underpin a particular Western-centred historicity. Rather they chose to destroy them in spectacularly violent iconoclastic acts. A video, brought into circulation by the IS, shows bearded men in an archaeological museum in Mosul destroying copies of ancient statues (the originals are kept in museums outside of the region, many in Europe) and of original, massive sculptures in urban space dating to Assyrian times, with sledgehammers and drills. One of the perpetrators declared that ‘these statues and idols, these artefacts, if God has ordered their removal, they became worthless to us even if they are worth billions of dollars’.16 Western commentators compared the destruction of ‘history’s treasures’ to the atrocious beheadings of living people: ‘The beheadings, this time were performed with hammer and drill, not sword or knife – for the victims were made of stone, not flesh’, as a journalist of The Economist (5 March 2015) put it.
The latter example suggests that the felt urge to destroy consecrated heritage sites is not necessarily a sign of heritage failing to speak: it may well be a sign of it speaking too successfully. The iconoclasts in Mosul and Palmyra knew perfectly well how global mainstream public opinion would respond to their actions; they intended their acts to work as a provocation (just as they perceived, conversely, the publication of offensive, blasphemous cartoons as an intentional provocation of Muslims).

This contestation raises another interesting point requiring reflection. Although different collectives may not agree on what constitutes heritage, they are all increasingly versed in its vocabularies. A concrete example from the Netherlands may clarify this point. In 2012, in the Frisian village of Burum (the Netherlands), a 225-year-old windmill called the Windlust burned to the ground. With the help of the insurance money and generous gifts by the local population, the windmill was rebuilt – an exact replica of the old mill. Many villagers expressed joy and satisfaction over the fact that the skyline of their beloved Burum was restored. The characteristic building towered over their homes again; the void in their community had been filled.

When the villagers asked the Dutch state to continue the funding that had covered the maintenance and exploitation of the windmill before the fire, however, the state institution for monuments, the Cultural Heritage Agency of the Netherlands, declined the request. Officials from the Agency argued that there ‘was nothing old about the new mill’, and they refused to recognize the reconstructed windmill as cultural heritage. Four charred beams, which had been used to mark the fire as part of the Windlust history, were ignored.

Arguments between villagers and the agency went back and forth. Villagers stated that, during its 225-year-old history, the mill had passed many renovations and interventions, pointing out that certainly not everything inside the original mill had been 225 years old. They also offered to bring back in some more of the charred leftovers of the original windmill, ‘if that is what makes the difference!’ Yet the agency did not move its position. In front of TV cameras, and fully confident in his expertise, an official stated that ‘this Windlust is a copy. It is not authentic’. In an interview, the Dutch minister of culture insisted that ‘the essence of a monument is its authenticity, and this is not authentic. What will we do when Rembrandt’s Nightwatch is destroyed by fire? We wouldn’t then call the replica the real Nightwatch, would we?’ (Volkskrant, 8 September 2014)

It was only after fierce lobbying by the villagers, all the way up to the national parliament, that the Cultural Heritage Agency found itself forced to give in, and the Windlust was declared a rijksmonument. In a jubilant tone, the local newspaper reported on the victory. ‘This struggle wasn’t about finances’, the local journalist wrote, ‘this was about recognition’ (Leeuwarder Courant 7 October 2014). The minister of culture, being a good sport, travelled to Burum to bring the news personally, and declared
that, although she still considered the Windlust to be a replica, she appreciated that, through their concerted actions, the villagers had ‘given the windmill back its soul’.

What the case brings to the fore is that the notion of heritage, in the contemporary Netherlands, is firmly established as a conceptual framework to assess, evaluate and act upon material and immaterial remnants of the past. Clearly, the concerns of the villagers and state officials differed. The villagers were driven by an ill-articulated but emotionally powerful concern to keep the Burum as they knew it intact. Having lived all of their lives under the shadow of the mill, without it, Burum was no longer Burum for them. The officials of the heritage agency argued and acted on the basis of an academic, professional and experience-distant understanding of cultural heritage as ‘historic legacy’ and ‘the Dutch landscape’.17 Both villagers and state officials, however, articulated their concerns in terms of ‘heritage’ (erfgoed). One might say that ‘heritage’ has become a discursive realm that privileges certain vocabularies and certain modes of argumentation. The Burum villagers – or at least those who took it upon themselves to fight the case – knew that they could not simply lament the loss of a skyline that made them feel at home and with which they identified. However much that sense of loss may have been what moved them into action, they were aware that they had to play another game: the game of argumentation. Stepping into the particular historical argumentation of the discourse on heritage, they produced arguments with which to persuade their opponents and the public at large: ‘from the very beginning, the Windlust was subject to innovations and renewals’. ‘It was never an object frozen in time’.

This discourse on heritage, says Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, is strongly marked by its birth in the museum (1998). She notes that heritage producers tend to extend museological values and methods – ‘collection, documentation, preservation, presentation, evaluation and interpretation’ – to living persons, their knowledge, practices, artefacts, social worlds and life spaces (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1998; see also Balkenhol, this volume). On the receiving end of heritage – the performers, ritual specialists, and artisans whose ‘cultural assets’ become heritage through this process – she notices that heritage formation changes their relation with those assets: what used to be habitual and taken-for-granted is now singled out as having special meaning, and being worthy of special attention. As in a museum, living culture is put on a pedestal, inducing the respectful demeanour demanded of the museum visitor and the care with which objects are handled by museum staff. Kirshenblatt-Gimblett points out another dimension of heritage that is reminiscent of the museum:

The power of heritage is precisely that it is curated, which is why heritage is more easily harmonized with human rights and democratic values than is culture. Hence, UNESCO stipulates that only those aspects of culture that are compatible with such values can be considered for world heritage designation. (2004: 1)
Besides the evident influences of the museum, the discourse on heritage is also deeply academic. Due to the lively exchange between academics and heritage professionals, who themselves are mostly academically trained, heritage nominations are cast in the language of scientific research. Academic standards of research such as sound methodology, accuracy of report and a stress on the facticity of findings make their appearance everywhere in processes of heritage formation. The evaluations of objects under consideration are thus given the weight of academic prestige. The bureaucratization of the process of heritage formation, with its endless paper trails, is another dimension that might be mentioned here (see Adinolfi, this volume). Heritage scholar Ciraj Rassool, however, has rightly pointed out that the relations between academia and the heritage industry are not without problems. Many academic historians, he states, sniff their nose about heritage claims with regard to the truth of the past, saying that ‘at worst, it constitutes a terrain of inaccuracy and myth-making, whose inadequacies and errors can be detected by the professional, armed with the necessary disciplinary training in the canon’ (Rassool 2001: 44). This somewhat haughty dismissal is all the more questionable in the light of the evidence of human remains in museums and medical institutions in Europe’s former imperial cities that are now being reclaimed and repatriated; this ‘bone memory’ calls for a thorough uncovering not only of the complicity of physical anthropology and archaeology in profiling of race typologies in the past, but also of the complex role of scholarly disciplines in processes of exploitation and subordination, the material traces of which are at the centre of current heritage claims (Rassool 2015).

Another prominent feature of the contemporary discourse on heritage concerns the frequent references to the notion of ‘authenticity’. As these references are immediately relevant to our investigation of how heritage formations, while clearly fabricated, are nonetheless embraced as repositories of essence and truth, they merit more extensive discussion.

Politics of Authentication

Authenticity is the sine qua non of heritage formations in our time. Both historical artefacts and immaterial historical legacies (traditions, rituals, performances, crafts) have to be ‘authenticated’ to qualify for the heritage label. Part of this authentication is realized through scientific research, which verifies whether (or to what extent) the heritage item is ‘really’ what claimants have made of it in their narrations. In these inquiries, technical, historical and anthropological knowledges are mobilized to make clear-cut distinctions between ‘factual evidence’ and ‘mere fabulation’. This was the basis on which Dutch heritage officials disclaimed the authenticity of the reconstructed Burum windmill: there was nothing old, and nothing original about it, and it was therefore not ‘authentic’. Yet, the example also showed that in the contemporary world, authentication entails much
more than an assertion of the true identity of a cultural object with scientifically appropriate evidence and methods. For the villagers were not the least disheartened by the arguments of the heritage officials, and insisted that the mill they had rebuilt was the one and only Windlust. In the end, even the minister of culture acknowledged that, through their concerted actions, the villagers had given this replica its ‘soul’. The particular mode of authentication that comes to the fore in these latter observations is grounded in the identification of a subject with the heritage object, and follows a very particular way of apprehending truthfulness or genuineness, which can be traced back to the Romantic era.

As a key term of modernity, authenticity forms a ‘container which is used in modern society so as to negotiate what is taken as genuine and false, good and bad, beautiful and ugly’ (Rehling and Paulmann 2016: 99). Many authors have argued that current notions of authenticity are derived from the Romantic revolt against the ‘disengaged rationality’ of Enlightenment thought, and the fragmentation and disenchantment of the world to which it had led (Taylor 1989; Bendix 1997; Guignon 2006; Fillitz and Saris 2013). The Romantic Movement rejected analytical truth-finding procedures whereby the observer was ‘set over against a world of objects that are to be known and manipulated’ (Guignon 2006: 42). Instead, it sought to undo the divide between the knowing subject and the world, and restore ‘the primal unity and wholeness in life’ that had been lost (Guignon 2006: 42). True knowing, in the Romantic mode, was grounded in the idea of an experiential ‘resonance’ between subject and object (Taylor 1989: 301). One of the iconic images of the Romantic era – the painting *Der Wanderer über dem Nebelmeer* by Caspar David Friedrich (1818) – forcefully evokes this idea. The painting shows a lonely hiker standing on a mountaintop, taking in the wild mountainous landscape in front of him. He is portrayed from behind: the wind plays with his hair, with his elegant coat, as well as with the shreds of foggy clouds in the depths below. Friedrich has depicted this lonely hiker not as a figure taken out of the world and put in front of it so as to be able to study it from a distance (as in the detached Enlightenment procedures of truth-finding through experiment and reasoning), but as a figure that seeks to open himself up to the world, to thus experience the resonance between his most inner feelings and the landscape. The hiker finds himself reconnected with the world in the realization that world and self are ‘made of the same stuff’: his inner moods and experiences are the landscape, just as the mountains and winds are his inner moods. Authenticity, in the Romantic mode, is this desire for the undoing of the divide between self and world.

The sensation that self and world are ‘made of the same stuff’ immediately recalls the kinds of experiences many heritage formations seek to produce. Like the lonely hiker, visitors are invited to open themselves up to the historical legacy, and experience themselves and the castle,
the shipwreck or the windmill as ‘one and the same’, ‘made of the same stuff’. The fact that these modes of address are found in heritage sites the world over, including places that can hardly be characterized as direct heirs to the Romantic legacy, testifies to the reappraisal of Romantic notions of authenticity as part of the category of heritage. Importantly, the emphasis placed on authenticity in UNESCO heritage discourse and policy is relatively recent. Tracing its genealogy in a highly illuminating (German language) article, Michael Falser explains that the Venice Charter (e.g. the International Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and Sites) of 1964 only mentioned authenticity twice. It was only in 1977 that authenticity became a central criterion for evaluating whether a particular cultural form could be recognized as world heritage. The Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention include a ‘Test of Authenticity’ (§9), stating:

The property should meet the test of authenticity in design, materials, workmanship and setting; authenticity does not limit consideration to original form and structure but includes all subsequent modifications and additions, over the course of time, which in themselves possess artistic or historical values. (quoted in Falser 2015: 34)

Between 1977 and 2013, this document was reworked twenty-five times and the relevance of authenticity and integrity as key values was stressed. In this process, the ‘Conference on Authenticity’ that took place in 1994 in Nara, Japan, at the instigation of UNESCO and the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS), was of key importance. It extended the ‘Test of Authenticity’ with the intention to move ‘from a Eurocentric approach to a post-modern position characterized by recognition of cultural relativism’ (quoted in Falser 2015: 36). Twenty years later, in Florence in 2014, the NARA+20 conference ‘On Heritage Practices, Cultural Values, and the Concept of Authenticity’ called for local and global understandings and values attributed to authenticity to be taken into account in the UNESCO definition of World Heritage (Falser 2015: 37). As Falser argues, this opened the door for processes of cultural essentialization and provincialization that, in legitimizing cultural difference, ironically tended to echo longstanding stereotypes.

Taking into account the global diffusion and operation of heritage regimes and the increasing emphasis on authenticity, our prime concern is to grasp the way(s) in which subjects become emotionally and sensually entangled with heritage objects (or do not). In order to do so, we need to move beyond the Romantic vocabulary of authenticity that informs scholarly and policy discourses about culture and heritage, and pay attention to the way contemporary heritage regimes (Bendix 2013) organize ‘the cultural production of the real’ (Van de Port 2011). We envision two possible routes into this theme. One is to unpack the theoretical black box of identification so as to gain a better insight into the dense trafficking
of emotions, fantasies and desires between subjects and heritage objects. The second involves an exploration of the aesthetics of persuasion, which brings out the pivotal role of materiality and the senses in the making of heritage. Both discussions will bring us closer to an understanding as to how the experiential and the conceptual merge, to produce in the subject that ‘sense of essence’ that lies at the heart of heritage formations. Our basic proposition is that a sense of authenticity as an essence is evoked in beholders through shared sensations and experiences with regard to forms of cultural heritage.

Modes of Entanglement: Subjectivity and Identification in Heritage Formations

‘Identification’, says William Mazzarella, ‘is the process by which the self recognizes itself in something that is alien to itself’ (2004: 356), and he urges researchers to open their eyes to the existential given that we come to be who we are through this ‘detour’. For Mazzarella, there is something inherently alienating in identification. It is like standing in front of the mirror and realizing that what one is looking at is an image, not one’s ‘self’. Identification is intrinsically relational. Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper (2000), in a much-cited article on the centrality of identification in processes of self- and world-making, make a useful analytical distinction between ‘identifying as something’ and ‘identifying with something’. The first mode refers to a cognitive operation: people, objects or practices are intellectually recognized as fitting a certain description or belonging to a certain category (2000: 17). In this mode, one identifies oneself (or an other) as pertaining to ‘the Albanians’, ‘the Nation’, ‘Islam’, ‘the working class’ or, indeed, that image in the mirror. The second mode refers to what they call the ‘psychodynamics’ of identification, which involves ‘identifying oneself emotionally with another person, category or collectivity’ (Brubaker and Cooper 2000: 17). One might characterize this second mode of identification as a form of ‘empathic imagination’ (see Oksenberg Rorty 2006) or mimesis (see Taussig 1993), for here, identification implies a carrying oneself over to that with which one identifies, to the point of becoming that something. Given our attempt to understand the entanglement of subjects with forms of cultural heritage, we need to explore this second mode of identification further.

The popular ‘genealogy TV show’ Who Do You Think You Are? offers a good example that spotlights how this merging of oneself with a larger narrative that is incorporated into one’s biography may occur on the level of personal experience. The fact that this takes place on television indicates the important role of media in framing modalities of the search for a deep, grounded and ‘authentic’ self (see also De Witte, this volume): heritage is always subject to framing and mediation. In this show, celebrities, assisted by a research team, reconstruct their family tree, so as to better understand
‘who they are, and where they come from’. In one episode, viewers follow Jerome Bettis, a retired African-American football player. The voice-over introduces Bettis’ probing of the past as ‘a search for a long-lost ancestor, which brings him closer to his family’s link to slavery’. The names that are dug up in different archives and civil registers in the state of Kentucky are identified as Bettis’ forefathers. What drives the show, however, is not the intellectual recognition of certain people as Bettis’ ancestors; it is Bettis’ identification with some of these people, and for this to happen, the producers of the show provide him with facts that allow for narrative elaboration. The first finding concerns the ‘rebellious’ great-grandfather, called Burnett, who had left his wife and children, but also had had the courage to take his white employer to court after the man had beaten him with a stick in the workplace (and as the historian tells Bettis: a black man taking a white man to court was no mean feat in the American South of the late nineteenth century). The second finding concerns Bettis’ great-great grandfather, called Abe, who sued a railroad company for the physical harm he had suffered when hit by a train. The third finding concerns the fact that this Abe was born a slave, and sold at the age of ten after the death of his masters. In all of these archival revelations, Bettis is being invited to see himself reflected in these figures of the past, to recognize that he and they are ‘one and the same’. Bettis takes up this invitation wholeheartedly, and over and over again he reports how his own personality traits and ways of being match those of these distant historical figures. Reflecting on the actions of his great-grandfather he states:

Wow! So he was a bit of a rebel by the looks of it. So, this really helps me, for with the divorce that we saw earlier, coupled with this rumour that he was a trouble-rouser, I was starting to develop a negative perception. And now I don’t think that applies. I think he was a strong-willed African-American man in a time that you really could not be a strong-willed African-American man.

The discovery that Abe had been sold at an auction at the age of ten, thus being separated from his parents, visibly moves Bettis, who is the father of children that age. Bettis is then taken to the very estate where Abe had lived and worked until he was sold. This is how he reflects on that moment.

Standing there on that land, and knowing what happened there, I understood what my family had to go through ... I definitely think that some of the strength in the Bogard family was born on that day, on that field, when my great-great grandfather Abe was sold. Because at that point he had to grow up, and be a man, and that is a very frightening and difficult thing to do at that age. But my great-great grandfather, he did it! And that helped to shape the life he lived, with that no compromising, never-give-up attitude that he had. I was so proud to have Bogard blood running through my veins! It was so special.21

What this example brings to the fore is the way in which differences between Bettis and his forebears are constantly dissolved, and they actually
become one. This merging occurs at the level of experience, and is mediated via material items, for the archival documents that Bettis is presented with are, at the moment of his encounter with them, the persons to which they refer. As we see Bettis gazing at the somewhat shaky ‘X’ with which illiterate Abe signed his complaint against the railroad company, we realize that for Bettis, that scribbled sign is Abe. Just as when we see Bettis standing on that nondescript, rainy field outside Paducah, Kentucky, we realize that this site is the agony of young Abe and his parents. Such merging, in ‘identification with’, is common in reports of people’s relation with personal and collective heritage objects.

In *Trouble with Strangers* (2009), Terry Eagleton discusses this human capacity to merge with something or someone other in many of its manifold manifestations. Borrowing from a Lacanian vocabulary, he describes this capacity as ‘the imaginary’, and many of the instances he sums up are immediately recognizable: the phenomenon called transitivism, in which we duck away when someone in a film gets hit; the sense of ‘communion’ with the object world that occurs when we stand ‘captivated’ by something; the ‘magnetism’ with which we may be drawn to certain objects; the ‘mimetic desire to merge with the world’ and the fleeting moments when indeed ‘subject and object, self and world, seem to be tailor-made for one another’ (2009: 10): the sensation that the world is part of ‘our own inner substance, centred upon it, spontaneously given to it, leashed to it by an internal bond’ (2009: 11). This human capacity to overcome the differences introduced by language and the symbolic order is not only activated in mystical practices (where it is easily recognized), but, as Eagleton argues, is a necessary and inextricable part of the way people become subjectively entangled with the worlds of meaning they inhabit. For it is the capacity to blend oneself into the object world that connects us with that world, allowing the subject ‘to rest assured that society lays special claim to it, singles it out as uniquely precious and addresses it, so to speak, by its name’ (Eagleton 2009: 11).

Trying to further qualify the ‘imaginary’ register of identification, Eagleton points out that this kind of identification is pre-reflective. ‘It is as though we relate to things directly by our sensations – as though our very flesh and feelings become a subtle medium of communication, without the blundering interposition of language and reflection’ (2009: 10). Although he calls these identifications ‘comfortable delusions’, Eagleton also acknowledges that there is a plurality of ways of knowing, encompassing both cognitive and emotional registers. To return to the example of Jerome Bettis: rather than unmasking his imaginary identifications as ‘mere fantasies’ (and thus privileging the symbolic register as the realm of truth), the point is to acknowledge that fantasies are simply another mode of apprehending the world. What Eagleton and many others help us to see is how people cultivate their capacity to sense the world, attune to their felt relationship to it, step into their fantasies and thus arrive at a point where
the truth or fakeness of things is no longer relevant, and things simply are
the way they make themselves felt (see also Marleen de Witte’s concept
of heritage as ‘corpo-real’). We would like to stress that for us, calling
attention to the reality effects of imaginary identifications does not imply
a celebratory stance towards them. Across Europe we witness the rise of
identitarian movements and populist stances which vest old nationalist
tropes with affective energy and articulate highly exclusivist apprehensions
of the world that are experienced as real (and claim to be more real than
the picture of the world projected by mainstream politicians and dominant
media). Our concern is to get a deeper understanding of the processes
through which people develop such a sense of the real, and the role of
cultural heritage therein.

Aesthetics of Persuasion

As noted above, authenticity is not intrinsic to cultural forms – in the
sphere of heritage and beyond – but is a quality attributed to such forms
in particular sociopolitical configurations. It is one of the salient ironies
of our time that the concern with authenticity, whether from a critical
scholarly stance or whether fuelled by a desire for the ‘real thing’, is rooted
in a deep insecurity about the lurking gap between reality and its represen-
tation. Having no ontological grounding in an objective outside reality, the
authenticity of a cultural form can only be achieved through procedures
of representation and certification that profile it as present and real to its
beholders. In this sense, the authentic is not given – though often posing
as such – but rather, is a result of a careful ‘cultural construction of the
real’ through which particular cultural forms and their beholders become
sensorially, emotionally and mentally entangled. In this endeavour, aes-
thetics plays a prime role. As Wolfgang Funk, Florian Groß and Irmtraud
Huber put it poignantly in their introduction to their volume Aesthetics of
Authenticity:

For if reality remains fundamentally inaccessible, authenticity can only mani-
fest itself through its representations, and subjective aesthetics becomes the
only means by which the gap between the real (whatever that may be) and the
symbolic can possibly be approached. Any aesthetic analysis of authenticity,
understood in the etymological sense of ‘aesthetic’ as perceiving something with
one’s senses, is always already constructivist as it foregrounds the individual’s
sensual response in the establishment of authenticity as a category. (2012: 12)

There is a strong resonance between the approach of these authors,
who focus on ‘medial constructions of the real’ in the sphere of literature,
film and art, and our approach to understand how formations of cultural
heritage are, to invoke Clifford Geertz (1973), vested with an ‘aura of
factuality’ (see also Meyer, Roodenburg and Van de Port 2008). We all take
as a starting point an understanding of representation as a world-making
practice in its own right, rather than a mere reference to an unrepresentable exterior reality. By virtue of having the capacity to represent, humans are able to make and unmake worlds, albeit, as Marx (1999 [1852]) observed, not under conditions of their own choosing but in historically and culturally situated settings.

The key issue pursued in this volume, then, concerns attempts to orchestrate shared sensations and experiences in authenticating a heritage form as an essence rather than a mere construction. The point is that a sense of authenticity as an essence is effected through a particular aesthetics to which it owes its reality effects. At stake is a dynamic and performative take on authenticity that locates it in the sensorial, emotional and intellectual relations that ensue between particular people and heritage items. The fact that people, as outlined in the previous section, need to be enticed, captivated, convinced and mobilized to see such forms as their heritage: something that belongs to them and that underpins their belonging, and hence is part of their identity, forms the backdrop against which we would like to unpack the term ‘aesthetics of persuasion’.

Before turning to the issue of persuasion and the approach to heritage formation that ensues from it, it is necessary to briefly address the complex relation between aesthetics and society. Born as a discipline in eighteenth-century Germany, aesthetics, as understood by influential philosopher Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714–1762), was devoted to the study of the production of knowledge through the senses and emotions. In Baumgarten’s sense, aesthetics was the science of perception and sensation. Building upon the old, Greek dualism of aisthesis and logos, he took aesthetics as analogous to reason, understood as another, albeit inferior, way of relating to and knowing the world through the ‘lower’ senses. In so doing, he built upon Aristotle’s conception of aisthesis outlined in On the Soul, which designates ‘our corporeal capability on the basis of a power given in our psyche to perceive objects in the world via our five different sensorial modes ... and at the same time a specific constellation of sensations as a whole’ (Meyer and Verrips 2008: 21; see also Verrips 2006). As a philosophical discipline, following Baumgarten (1750) and Kant (1790), aesthetics was concerned with theorizing beauty, art and the role of the senses in gaining knowledge.

With the rise of the modern social sciences in the early twentieth century, there was little room for the pursuit of aesthetics as a discipline. As pointed out by the cultural sociologist Andreas Reckwitz (2008, 2015), mainstream social theory operated under the aegis of an Ernüchterungskur (curative process of sobering up, from an enchanted pre-Enlightenment world) that characterized modern society as disenchanted, objectified (versachlicht), rationalized and subject to functional differentiation, in which aesthetics was confined to the subsystem of art. This focus on the ‘rational’ yielded a mainstream of scholarly meta-narratives and approaches within social science that saw no significant relevance for aesthetics in theorizing
and researching the social.\textsuperscript{24} The focus on acts, rules and regulations marginalized the levels of experience, embodiment and sensation, confining their study to the discipline of psychology. Alternative appraisals of the sensorial, affective and corporeal dimension of experience and their constitutive role for social action articulated in the margins of the sociological mainstream – in phenomenology, pragmatism and philosophical anthropology – remained peripheral to the grand narrative of rationalization (Reckwitz 2015: 18–20). As Reckwitz aptly described it:

In this classical sociological ‘grand-récit’, the aesthetic as the sphere of intensified sensory perception and of the affects, of the creative shaping of experience beyond practical action and the disruption of meaning in cognitive-normative systems tends to appear as the Other of Modernity, but in no case as its social center. (2008: 260)\textsuperscript{25}

A major transition occurred in the 1980s, with the rise of postmodern theory and in the aftermath of practice theories as developed by Pierre Bourdieu (1977). As pointed out in the beginning of this section, once the realization has taken hold that our access to the world is mediated, and that the body and the senses are central to these mediations, it makes sense to take into account the aesthetic dimension of political, social and cultural practices (see also Meyer 2009, 2016). Importantly, as Reckwitz (2015), drawing on Rancière (2006, 2009) stresses, aesthetic practices are historically situated, rather than universal, and operate within specific regimes that shape subjects sensorially, emotionally and mentally. His proposition to extend the study of social practice to include aesthetics is well taken:

Practices do not only organize action, they also organize experience, affects and sensory perception in their culturally specific ways: via the sensitization of particular senses in favor of others, via a routine invocation of particular mental-somatic states of experience, via the evocation of particular sensations as well as calling upon ‘affective-neutral’ common sense. For sociological analysis, it is crucial to not see phenomenologically ‘inward’ states, to not account for perception, experience and affect ‘psychologically’, but instead to model them as components of cultural practices. (2008: 278)\textsuperscript{26}

Our appreciation of aesthetics as a key dimension of political, social and cultural practices is located in this scholarly project of overcoming the rift between aesthetics and the social sciences. As anthropologists, we have long been critical of – and puzzled by – the neglect of the senses in mainstream social science theory and have sought to develop alternative concepts, such as the notion of ‘aesthetic formation’ (Meyer 2009; see also Van de Port 2009), which allows for an empirically grounded study of how assemblages of people and cultural forms emerge and are sustained.\textsuperscript{27} The point here is that aesthetics can no longer be regarded as a domain confined to philosophy and the arts that sociocultural research may
comfortably neglect. Aesthetics is enmeshed with power and vice versa, in the sense that:

Structures of power must become structures of feeling and the name for this mediation from property to propriety is the aesthetic. If politics and aesthetics are deeply at one, it is because pleasurable conduct is the index of successful social hegemony, self-delight the very mark of social submission. What matters in aesthetics is not art but this whole project of reconstructing the human subject from the inside, informing its subtlest affections and bodily responses with its law which is not a law. (Eagleton 1989: 78)

In other words, modes of sensuous perception, feeling and cognition emerge within specific aesthetic-political regimes or aesthetic formations with their particular 'distribution of the sensible' (Rancière 2006, see also Meyer 2015b: 19–21). One of the guiding propositions of this volume is that the turn to aesthetics and the senses is tremendously fruitful for the study of heritage. Such a new focus moves our inquiries beyond a mere concern with the construction and framing of heritage, and opens up new alleys to understand the processes through which forms of cultural heritage, as powerful 'sensational forms' (Meyer 2006, 2014) that convey a sense of direct presence of the past, become appreciated and appropriated, as if they were real essences. Meyer initially developed the notion of sensational form in her research on religion to account for the genesis of a sense of divine presence amongst believers in practices of religious mediation. In so far as heritage is also geared to re-presenting valued items from the past or offering privileged access to it, the notion of 'sensational form' may well be extended to this domain (see Stengs, this volume). The notion of sensational form may be helpful in exploring the politics of authentication through the lens of the senses and aesthetic practices, by which forms of cultural heritage appear as enshrining an indisputable essence for their holders. The formation of heritage, as this volume shows, can fruitfully be analysed as a political-aesthetic and material process, and, by the same token, can offer a privileged case to study how essences are fabricated and made real in processes of world-making.

Since heritage is not given, but has to be constituted through the cultural production of the real, it has no natural owners. Situated within specific aesthetic formations, the making of heritage is not limited to the material construction and profiling of particular sites and items; it also involves the constant concern to resonate with and deepen particular 'structures of feeling' and distributed sensibilities in relation to these sites and items. Such sensibilities arise through particular, more or less streamlined, sensorial, emotional and mental engagements with material forms, be it valuable objects, buildings, sites and spaces. The past is present in and through such concrete items (Stordalen and Naguib 2015), which may be (or may not yet be) framed as heritage. In this volume, attention is paid to the affective-sensorial relations between humans and material heritage.
forms, questioning the ‘agency’ of such forms in relation to their beholders (Latour 2005) as well as the longstanding human-object entanglements (e.g. Hodder 2012) that are encapsulated in forms of cultural heritage and shape their aesthetic appeal and effects. This appeal does not only pertain to cherished heritage forms but also to gloomy remnants of past violent regimes, such as the Voortrekkersmonument in Pretoria that iconizes Afrikaner nationalism and apartheid (Jethro, this volume).

So, it is by being enveloped in a political-aesthetic regime that a form of cultural heritage ceases to be merely an object on display ‘out there’ in the world but becomes an embodied part of a lived experience (see also Svašek 2007, 2016) – a ‘second nature’ – that conveys a strong aura of authenticity and a sense of essence. The fact that this process of embodiment is far from taken for granted, but requires specific modes of address and specific styles and designs that are appreciated as persuasive and binding, calls for a detailed investigation of the ‘aesthetics of persuasion’ through which people relate to particular forms of cultural heritage.

As heritage is not given naturally, persuasion is a necessity. This involves both the mobilization of all kinds of devices, narratives and material forms on the part of heritage builders to persuade its addressees and indulgence in self-persuasion – the preparedness to identify with such forms emotionally and mentally – on the part of those addressees. Persuasion operates partly on a conscious level but also through repetitive exposure, in the sense of a pervasion of people’s senses and bodies by virtue of being part of a particular political-aesthetic environment. In recent years, heritage industries have increasingly invested in profiling cultural heritage forms as an ‘Experience’ that speaks to the senses and emotions and that lends itself to being easily appropriated. As the examples offered in this volume show, this is a complex process that may or may not be successful. People may refuse to be captivated, declining to identify with or embrace a heritage form (see contributions by Woets, Stengs, Bakker and Jethro in this volume) or may strongly contest the official recognition of a particular form as heritage, as is the case with the heritagization of acarajé, a food item closely tied to Candomblé, which evokes negative responses on the part of Pentecostals (see Reinhardt, this volume).

As a rhetorical technique employed to convince listeners without direct force, using just appropriate words, persuasion has been met with suspicion since classical antiquity. In his famous treatise, The ‘Art’ of Rhetoric (written around 330 BC, see translation by Freese 1926), which systematizes earlier attempts to understand the power of oratory to win people’s minds by words, Aristotle defined rhetoric as ‘the faculty of discovering the possible means of persuasion in reference to any subject whatever’ (Aristotle, trans. Freese 1926: 15). His foundational ideas can still be fruitfully applied to public oratory in our time. Discourse in the public sphere, rather than conforming to Habermas’ ideal of communicative action based on purely rational argumentation, is situated in an arena
of mobilization. Diverse actors and instances – including the sphere of heritage – call for attention, seeking to mobilize and persuade others. With trust in the possibility of stating truth and describing the world objectively having lost currency, scholars show a strong interest in the world-making powers of words and, by implication, in forms of rhetorical persuasion and pervasion.

Exploring the psychological and ethical dimension of speaking and listening, Aristotle focused on how an orator seeks to convince listeners of his trustworthiness by putting them into a certain frame of mind. In this context, he discusses questions of style and arrangement of speech, emphasizing that ‘it is not sufficient to know what one ought to say, but one must also know how to say it, and this largely contributes to making the speech appear of a certain character’ (Aristotle 1926: 345). Importantly, he noted that style conveys emotion, making the content of the speech appear credible. Moreover, the appearance of artificiality must be concealed, and that of naturalness maintained, ‘for that which is natural persuades, but the artificial does not’ (Aristotle 1926: 353). Persuasiveness, in this understanding, is not intrinsic to that which is spoken about, but a quality realized via speech that reaches the listeners and appears natural.

We find an analysis grounded on a view of rhetoric as a practice that links speaker and listeners through persuasion compelling, because it takes into account the coexistence of ethics, emotions and logic. In our view, rhetoric can be extended towards broader modes of expression than oratory alone, involving media such as radio, film, television, and the internet, and a broader set of aesthetic strategies that seek to persuade listeners. Forms of rhetorical persuasion operate within particular political-aesthetic regimes that appeal to the senses, emotions and intellect and hence are central to the making of culture and heritage (see Meyer and Girke 2011). With its rich array of expressive forms and the inbuilt need to captivate and convince beholders to identify, heritage is a domain par excellence for a detailed study of how the aesthetics of persuasion actually work. Successful persuasion involves a double process: first, the launching of a persuasive heritage design and, second, personal and collective practices of intense self-persuasion that assert that one is a legitimate heir to a particular cultural form from the past through which one’s own belonging achieves a deeper relief, as in the case of football player Jerome Bettis, who enthusiastically re-cognized and re-membered his great-great grandfather as part of himself and vice versa.

In sum, while the concepts of politics of authentication and aesthetics of persuasion fold into each other in understanding the dynamics of heritage formation, we think that distinguishing them analytically is important in order to unpack the cultural construction of the real undertaken in these dynamics. Taking into account the aesthetics of persuasion employed to vest authorized forms of cultural heritage with authenticity is central for understanding why and how people identify with such forms as an essential
part of their being in the world. The contributions to this volume explore the specific means through which forms of cultural heritage are designed in order to persuade and be appropriated, on the one hand, and how and why they come (or do not come) to be taken as credible and authentic by beholders, on the other.

This Volume

There are many possible ways to organize a volume such as this one, as the texts of our contributors speak to each other across various dimensions, both thematically and regionally. We have opted for a clustering of chapters dealing with heritage formations in Brazil, on the African continent and in Europe. This provides a thick sense of the regional particularities of heritage dynamics.

André Bakker discusses the case of the Pataxó Indians from Southern Bahia. For most of the twentieth century, the Pataxó came to be regarded, within a traditional ethnological canon, as an ‘acculturated’ group, being often characterized – both within and outside academia – as caboclos (‘half-breeds’) rather than Indians. Over recent decades, however, they have increasingly engaged in what they call ‘the rescue of culture’. In his chapter, Bakker focuses on the emergence and canonization of novel practices of body adornment. He identifies a mimetic leaning from the Pataxó towards the exuberant body paint, colourful feathering and piercings of Amazonian and Central-Brazilian Indian peoples, which have become icons of cultural integrity in Western imaginations. Bakker points out that such mimetic practices, which may strike readers as ‘copying’ and make-believe, echo a widely reported Amerindian ontological template: the incorporation of alterity as the critical modus operandi of Amerindian socialities. Interestingly, the case of the Pataxó also shows important modifications of this tendency: their mimetic practices do not exclude the root-oriented modes of self-making associated with modern identity politics. References to the ancestral past in the re-making of a Pataxó cultural canon play a pivotal role. Modern identity politics and Amerindian modes of incorporating alterity need not, therefore, be seen as mutually exclusive and necessarily opposed, but simultaneously at work in contexts where the authentication of Indianness is compellingly at stake.

Bruno Reinhardt’s discussion of the recent heritagization of a popular Bahian street snack – a bean fritter called acarajé – reveals how the introduction of a heritage framework in such everyday practices as producing and selling food generates endless paradoxes, inconsistencies and incoherences. The acarajé, rooted in West-African cuisine and strongly associated with the Afro-Brazilian religion Candomblé, was widely recognized as an iconic representative of the regional cuisine and identity of the state of Bahia and the African legacy to Brazilian culture at large. The call for its heritagization followed controversies over evangelical street vendors
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卖零食为‘耶稣馅饼’，试图将产品带出坎多姆布勒和非洲-巴西文化。随着辩论和‘从下面’的争论——包括卡萨拉吉卖家、最近皈依了基督教的摊贩、来自联邦大学的学者、坎多姆布勒寺庙和黑人运动协会——雷因哈特探索了遗产和宗教话语的复杂纠缠。有趣的是，雷因哈特并没有仅仅揭穿官方遗产话语——以及它们关于文化认同的主张——是不真实的。相反，他提出，遗产化过程中产生的不一致和不协调可能正是使其话语得以令人信服的一部分。遗产形成的核心活力可能取决于对霸权叙事的裂缝的利用，这些裂缝允许新的声音加入民主的噪音中，这些声音努力定义自己的身份，同时作用于遗产机制保卫的开放未来。

玛利亚·路易莎·阿多利菲的章节提供了第三例来自巴伊亚的案例，讨论了非洲-巴西世界中文化遗产和实践的遗产化。她观察到，例如，在坎多姆布勒的世界中，许多寺庙正在竞相将他们的实践确认为古典。她讨论了这一发展，将其置于改变巴西文化政治的背景下，以及国家历史和艺术遗产研究所（IPHAN）对这些变化的反应。决策决定将文化遗产作为国家遗产，这些决策基于‘技术’理由——也就是说，基于这些资产的‘内在’艺术品质或它们的‘显而易见’历史重要性。多年来，这些资产被认可为与巴西殖民历史相关的。然而，最近几十年来，这种情况发生了变化。非洲-巴西人和土著人民寻求被纳入巴西国家叙事，也要求他们的文化遗产，包括许多所谓的‘非物质’实践，被认可并作为‘遗产’登记。虽然，对于国家而言，强调这些文化遗产的非物质方面和领土，出于许多原因，是更偏向于满足非洲-巴西人的主张，阿多利菲展示了黑人主体是如何发展新的方式来陈述和展示物质性作为其真实性的一个基本要素。

杜安·杰特罗在他的章节“‘报告过去’：新闻历史与《星期日泰晤士报》遗产项目”的形成”中，探讨了在后种族隔离时期南非的遗产形成中，真实性和审美感性的作用。为了庆祝其百年纪念日，2006年，《星期日泰晤士报》，南非最主流的独立报纸，发起了《星期日泰晤士报》遗产项目（STHP）。它由三十六个特定地点、互动的公共艺术纪念物组成，纪念各种各样的
newsworthy’ historical events and public figures; an interactive website; and other informative media products. The project’s authenticity was portrayed as deriving from the popular taste of South African news consumers who had endorsed the Sunday Times. As such, the STHP was formed out of South African history cycled through the Sunday Times’ legacy of news practice and news history. Employing news values as design criteria for a post-apartheid heritage project, the Sunday Times actively blurred the lines between the apparent altruism of heritage formation and the self-interest of capitalist enterprise. Jethro shows that while the STHP did seek to update the newspaper’s brand image, it was nonetheless convincing as a heritage form because it created different forms of surplus value: economic surplus value by creating funding for the arts; cultural surplus value by expanding the spectrum of South Africa’s public heritage narratives; and civic surplus value by developing a publicly accessible, independent historical counter-narrative. Overall, the STHP mediated, negotiated and contested post-apartheid heritage formation through proposing new knowledge forms and through innovative material aesthetics.

Ruy Llera Blanes’ chapter discusses the question of religious and cultural heritage as seen from the musseques (informal settlements) of Luanda, Angola. Luanda is a city marked in recent years by a complete overhauling of its urban planning and public architecture. Blanes sketches how aesthetic, architectural and heritage paradigms are in constant negotiation and operation in the public sphere, through tropes such as the ‘New Luanda’, the ‘Dubaization of Luanda’, etc. In stark contrast with the flashy monuments and cathedrals seen in the city’s central and more modern quarters, the architectural structures in the musseques are characterized by a seemingly unfinished, makeshift, decaying aesthetics. The Angolan ruling elite considers these buildings, and the neighbourhoods in which they can be found, to be a ‘backward’, ‘clandestine’ Luanda, doomed to succumb sooner or later to the New Luanda. But, in fact, they not only remain in place, but continue to be spaces of intense interaction and creativity. This is the case of one such neighbourhood, the ‘Republic of Palanca’, where ethnic (Bakongo), spiritual and economic processes configure a unique modality of ‘being Luandan’. Blanes argued that in places like Palanca, the transitory condition of its construction is actually an invitation towards modalities of temporal experience (from memory to expectation) that transcend the material codifications of mainstream paradigms. In fact, they often constitute politically configured heritage formations according to local understandings. From this perspective, ‘scaffolding heritage’ refers to how ‘work in progress’ constructions play a role in processes of political negotiations of legitimacy and authenticity in Angola.

In her chapter ‘Corpo-Reality TV and the Authentication of African Heritage’, Marleen de Witte explores the capacity of heritage formations to seduce and capture those addressed by them. Her in-depth analysis of a weekly ‘heritage talent show’ on a Ghanaian commercial TV station
allows her to discuss the ways in which the fashioning of tradition and the styling of the past appeal to and stimulate the senses and the body. The show featured a competition between cultural troupes from various communities in the Greater Accra Region that performed aspects of their community’s cultural heritage: town history, royal funeral rites, marriage rites, traditional dance, etc. In the week preceding the show, the young candidates studied the details of the assignment from their elders at the chief’s palace in their community and transformed the traditions into a spectacular choreography fit for television. A jury consisting of traditional spiritual leaders, Ga personalities and entertainment professionals judged their performances, but the decisive judgement came from the Ghanaian public, voting via cell-phone technology. Branded by Kasapreko, one of Ghana’s major alcoholic beverage manufacturers and sponsor for many traditional festivals, the show, and TV Africa as a whole, addresses a growing, mainly urban market for ‘African heritage’ as style. Focusing on the role of the body and the senses in underpinning the various understandings of authenticity/reality/truth that emerge from this merging of cultural heritage and contemporary TV formats, De Witte shows how the corporeal and sensorial aspects of local performance genres intersect with the spectacle and sensory appeal of reality TV in the commercial production of ‘African authenticity’.

Rhoda Woets discusses creative engagements with the past in contemporary Ghanaian art. In the vibrant, globalizing art scene of Accra, where she did her research, these engagements are strikingly different from those of the pioneering generation of modern Ghanaian artists. The latter mobilized and styled an ‘African heritage’ in their artwork in the 1950s and 60s, so as to arrive at an authentic Ghanaian modern art. Contemporary artists do not speak in unison about the value of heritage, and what role it might play in artistic work. The one thing they probably agree on is that ‘heated discussions are necessary’. Researching the diversity of opinion, Woets shows that many artists are, somewhat paradoxically, inspired by cultural forms that many intellectuals view as part of an authentic Ghanaian heritage, while also investing their work with global meaning and messages for humankind. Other artists emphasize the need to move beyond conceptions of an immutable African essence in their urge to connect to global, cosmopolitan artistic discourses. Woets finds that the display of cultural pride through heritage design is not sufficiently addressed by the often-heard argument that references to cultural heritage are merely a strategy to distinguish oneself in a competitive art market. Moreover, the conventional dichotomy between African artists who deliberately evoke a distinct African identity in their work, and those who eschew the portrayal of some kind of prefabricated ‘African heritage’, is more complex than often suggested. Heritage repertoires are not static but encompass a resource from which artists creatively produce new art styles in the encounter with new (foreign) markets.
Markus Balkenhol examines two recent examples of heritage formation by Dutch Afro-Surinamese. At a time when concerns about the colour of ‘Dutchness’ have provoked public debate, a grassroots initiative of Afro-Surinamese in Amsterdam successfully petitioned for a statue of Anton de Kom (1898–1945), an Afro-Surinamese intellectual and activist. Unveiled in 2007, the statue became highly contested because many people felt offended by the design: a naked torso emerging from a tree. Protestors argued that this portrayal reified colonial fantasies of wildness, sexuality and blackness instead of providing an image of de Kom ‘as he really was’. Balkenhol contrasts the controversy surrounding the statue with the unproblematic acceptance of the Kabra (ancestor) Mask created by Marian Markelo, a priestess in the Afro-Surinamese Winti religion in the Netherlands, and Boris van Berkum, a Dutch artist. Alarmed by severe budget cuts in the Dutch cultural and museum sector, they undertook a project to ‘safeguard’ African heritage in the Netherlands and to reappropriate masks to honour the African ancestors. Using 3D technology, six wooden Yoruba masks were scanned in the Africa Museum, computer rendered, and milled into polyurethane foam. The new 3D masks situate the project in a politics of authentication that promises to grant material and palpable access to the past and the spirit world through material form. Discussing the ways in which these heritage formations were – and were not – persuasive, Balkenhol highlights the role of ancestors. Again, this chapter shows that the production of heritage is deeply entangled with religious concerns.

In her chapter, ‘Ascertaining the Future Memory of Our Time: Dutch Institutions Collecting Relics of National Tragedy’, Irene Stengs investigates one specific way in which people seek to construct the future memory of our present time: by preserving objects pertaining to extraordinarily emotional events. The material is based on three case studies, all related to twenty-first century Dutch society. The objects concerned are: the pistol that killed politician Pim Fortuyn (May 2002); the knife that the assassin left in the chest of filmmaker Theo van Gogh (November 2004); and the car that was used in the attack on the Queen and the royal family during the 2009 Queen’s Day celebrations, which killed seven members of the audience. Stengs analyses the fierce debates surrounding the preservation and possible exhibition of these objects in Dutch museums. The Rijksmuseum, for instance, considered the pistol that killed Fortuyn comparable to the ‘relics from Dutch national history’ (vaderlandse relieken), whose preservation and exhibition are among the museum’s core tasks. Taking this argument as her point of departure, Stengs first discusses the aforementioned objects as sensational forms that inform the creation of contemporary secular relics. Second, she addresses the interplay between the memories of eyewitnesses; the authentication of future history; and the contestations over the question as to who has the authority to single out objects as ‘anticipatory heritage’.
The volume is concluded with a set of comments by David Chidester, David Berliner and Ciraj Raasool. Based on a detailed reading of the chapters, they spotlight common themes, questions and challenges for future work on heritage-making in our time.

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**Notes**

This introduction seeks to spell out some core ideas that underpin our approach to processes of heritage formation. Special thanks for constructive criticism and stimulating suggestions to Anandita Bajpai, Ferdinand De Jong and one anonymous reviewer.

1. As noted in the Preface, our research was made possible by the NWO multidisciplinary research programme on Cultural Dynamics, which highlighted ‘heritage’ as a significant example. The programme declared the study of cultural heritage to be ‘key’ in providing an answer to the ‘sudden feeling of crisis’, whereby ‘Western societies have lost their self-assurance’ (Frijhof 2013: 5). The programme further stated that ‘The homogeneity of national societies is breaking down, the importance ascribed by societal partners and other players to cultural differences and diversity is being given greater weight, and globalization seems to be generating unexpected effects on societal integration and social cohesion’ (Frijhof 2013: 5). The programme further asserted that ‘Western societies are wrestling with their identities, with their place in the world, and with their contribution to overall happiness’ (Frijhof 2013: 5). By focusing on the dynamics of heritage formation in several national settings, we sought to contribute to debates on identity and the politics of difference by broadening the scope towards various multi-ethnic and multireligious societies outside of Europe.

2. As pointed out by Brumann and Berliner, this kind of analysis has also been pursued in the context of ‘critical heritage studies’, which tend to ‘reinvent the deconstructive arguments made earlier about “tradition” … or “culture”’ (2016: 7).
3. We are aware that this approach may be reminiscent of current debates regarding ‘ontology’, but we leave an exploration of the way our arguments articulate with that literature for another occasion.

4. This attention would certainly include Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s concept of ‘strategic essentialism’, coined in the 1980s to denote a political strategy whereby minority groups essentialize themselves in order to claim certain rights.

5. For example, see Bendix, Eggert and Peselmann (2013); Berliner (2012); Blumenfield and Silverman (2013); De Jong and Rowlands (2007); Lowenthal (1998); Schramm (2004).


11. Most scholars customarily start their genealogy of the heritage concept somewhere in the (long) nineteenth century, using such marker points as the French Revolution, the 1882 Ancient Monument Act in Britain or the establishment of the National Trust in 1895.

12. For a very helpful overview of the ‘rise and setup of UNESCO world heritage’ see Brumann and Berliner (2016: 8–13). For a long-term perspective on heritage formation as ‘civilizing mission’ from colonial settings to the rise of UNESCO see Falser (2015).

13. See the special issue ‘Heritage and The Sacred’, Material Religion (9[3], 2013) co-edited by Marleen de Witte and Birgit Meyer. Moreover, processes of secularization and unchurching, yielding a decline in church membership and the closure of church buildings, entail a process of conversion of lived Christianity into forms of cultural heritage that embody the Christian past. See the HERA-Project, Iconic Religion, in the context of which Daan Beekers and Birgit Meyer conduct research on the reproduction of Christianity as heritage in the Netherlands: http://iconicreligion.com/portfolio/amsterdam/. This project also produced the online exhibition The Urban Sacred: http://www.urban-sacred.org.

14. The decision was made on 15 January 2015. For an analysis of the debates, see Balkenhol (2015), Helsloot (2012), Van der Pijl and Goulordava (2014).

15. See Abu El-Haj (2001). In a similar vein, Biblical archaeology is criticized for striving to authenticate claims towards a Jewish and early Christian past in Palestine, and Jerusalem as the Holy City of Judaism and Islam by producing evidence through the matching of written and material sources. For the construction of the Holy Land as a longstanding imperial and ecclesiastical project see Norderval (forthcoming).

16. The remark stands in sharp contrast with reports that IS has obtained significant revenues by selling these items. On the flipside of the public vandalization of world heritage stands the sale of antiquities in the global market. Both the destruction and sale of items associated with pre-Islamic cultures ultimately affirm the value attributed to them. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/26/isis-fighters-destroy-ancient-artefacts-mosul-museum-iraq

17. The concerns of these officials may also have been imbued with affect – driven by their love for history and the Dutch landscape. We should take care not to assume facile oppositions between ‘passionate villagers’ and ‘cold bureaucrats’. For a discussion, see Berliner (2012).

18. For a full discussion of different understandings of authenticity (as ‘original’, ‘facsimile’, ‘verisimilitude’, ‘authentic reconstruction’) on a heritage site in the United States, see Bruner (1994).
19. German original: ‘... ein Container, der in der Moderne dazu benutzt wurde, um auszuhandeln, was jeweils echt und falsch, gut und böse, schön und hässlich galt’. In their evocative essay, historians Andrea Rehling and Johannes Paulmann trace the use of the notion of authenticity and the striving for the genuine in history, archaeology, philosophy and heritage politics. As part of the Leibniz Forschungsverbund Historische Authentizität they call for a historical study of the politics of use of authenticity and the role played by scholars in the contemporary production of the past as heritage.

20. Although the movement was clearly indebted to eighteenth-century Sentimentalism, this current was also criticized for ‘promoting public displays of emotions that were conducive to insincerity’ (Wilf 2011: 470).

21. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z-sA4Rau2rY&list=ELrBPjEuWsGsc&index=5

22. But, as Rancière (2006) reminds us, such pre-reflexive understandings are eminently political (see also below).

23. Baumgarten’s (1750) work is not available in English translation but may be accessed online in Latin through Cambridge Books. An English translation of Kant’s (1790) work is available online through the Internet Archive: both are included in the References. In aesthetic theory as it developed in philosophy since Baumgarten and Kant, art and aesthetics were understood as constitutive of the sensus communis aestheticus or aesthetischer Gemeinsinn in the German original (Kant 1790), which served as a new paradigm for the formation of community in post-enlightenment bourgeois society (Eagleton 1990: 13). In his famous treatise Über die Ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen (1795), which may well be regarded as the foundational manifesto for modern subjectivity, Friedrich Schiller presented aesthetics as a crucial domain for the cultivation of ethical sensibilities: for him, in mediating between sensuousness (Sinnlichkeit) and reason (Vernunft), matter and spirit, body and mind, aesthetics was indispensable to the making of modern personhood and society (see also Rancière 2006, 2009). However, the importance attributed to aesthetics in the genesis of community and a didactic of self-cultivation by these and other eighteenth-century thinkers was barely pursued in the course of the nineteenth century, with its strong, enthusiastic investment in Romanticism, on the one hand, and pursuit of Enlightenment Rationalism, on the other; sensuousness and reason, body and mind, tended to drift ever farther apart. When sociology emerged as a modern discipline in the early twentieth century, it leaned strongly towards the latter rationalizing strand (Reckwitz 2015: 16–21).

24. Of course, there were thinkers who followed alternative paths, like Nietzsche and Simmel (see Reckwitz 2008: 260).


27. Our own inroad into the study of the senses does not derive from, but certainly resonates with, anthropological approaches to aesthetics grounded in the study of art (e.g. Coote and Shelton 1992; Gell 1998; Svašek 2007).
28. See Sirupa Roy (2007) on pervasion and techniques of producing nationalism in India. With thanks to Anandita Bajpai for drawing our attention to this work, and to the concept of pervasion.

29. Both rhetoric and science depend on oratory. Interestingly, even though Aristotle regarded rhetoric and science as different, he conceded that every system of instruction needs style to some extent. However, whereas science operates in a strictly intellectual register that, at least ideally, can do without rhetoric because scientific facts speak for themselves, rhetoric is about the art of convincing and influencing opinion via means other than sheer facts alone: it needs specific means of persuasion. Over the past century, the idea of a pure science that can do without persuasion because its facts speak for themselves has become subject to increasing critique and doubt.

30. Aristotle: ‘Appropriate style also makes the fact appear credible. For the mind of the hearer is imposed upon under the impression that the speaker is speaking the truth, because, in such circumstances his feelings are the same, so that he thinks (even if it is not the case as the speaker puts it) that things are as he represents them; and the hearer always sympathizes with one who speaks emotionally, even though he really says nothing. This is why speakers often confound their hearers by mere noise’ (1926: 397).

References


