Introduction

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This is a book about the different meanings of ‘democracy’ in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe. It puts these meanings into the context of European history and thereby tracks a range of similarities as well as differences in the development of the language of democracy. It is the claim of this book that knowledge of the languages of democracy and their interconnections is indispensable for understanding the development and complexity of democracy. Concentrating on language also helps us to uncover lost meanings and forgotten stages in that development.

‘Democracy’ was one of the most prominent battle cries of the twentieth century. Two world wars were partly fought in its name, and at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Americans still legitimized their attack on Iraq by arguing that they were bringing democracy. In the twentieth century, democracy became the central political value, claimed by everyone everywhere. At the beginning of the century, only a few republics self-identified as democracies; at the end of the century, only a few dictatorships did not. In the interwar years, fascists could still look down on plutocratic and weak democracy, but they could also claim to represent ‘true democracy’, and after 1945 Western liberals and Eastern communists alike claimed to be ‘democrats’. But what could be the meaning of a word that was used by liberal democracies as well as people’s democracies? Was it more than an empty shell? In 1940 T.S. Eliot wrote: ‘When a term has become so universally sanctified as “democracy” now is, I begin to wonder whether it means anything, in meaning too many things.’

After 1989, there was a brief moment when many people thought that the answer to that question was obvious: people’s democracies were a sham, and liberal democracy was the real thing. Francis Fukuyama even argued that its victory over communism almost announced the end of history as we knew it, that is, the end of ‘mankind’s ideological evolution’. It later turned out that this was just a fleeting, passing moment. One of the things that it showed, though, was the extent to which ‘democracy’ could now be claimed to be a
quality of (liberal, capitalist) government institutions. While elements of this conception can be traced back to liberal theory in the nineteenth century, it rose to complete dominance only in the second half of the twentieth century, especially under Anglo-Saxon influence. This development has also been termed the taming or domestication of democracy and ‘making democracy safe for the world’.

The postvictory moment lasted longer after 1945 than after 1989. Until the 1960s, an institutional and constitutionalist conception of democracy dominated, underlining the importance of the rule of law, stability and prosperity. Then it was challenged, particularly in the 1960s, in the name of participation and autonomy. Whereas its adherents framed participatory democracy as ‘more’ democracy, it was first and foremost a call for another democracy, less institutional and less formal. It was also a return – in a completely different form – to a more social conception of democracy that concentrated on civil society, as Alexis de Tocqueville and his likes had done in the nineteenth century. When these ideas resurfaced in the 1960s in a completely new form, they became dominant and mainstream for the first, albeit a rather short, time. After 1989 and after 9/11 in particular, liberal democracy has been challenged again, not only by Islamist terrorists who did not like democracy, but also in the name of ‘the people’. Political movements and parties that were called ‘populist’ by their liberal opponents often considered themselves the true democrats who would rescue democracy from the hands of the corrupt elite. This rhetoric has also been used in a backlash against liberal democracy as a government philosophy, an attempt to save democratic dreams from democratic governance and as a sign of the distrust of liberal-democratic governments in the sense that they do not do what they pretend to do.

It is debatable whether the populist dreams are a travesty of democracy or still belong to the ‘potent form of wishful thinking’ that democracy is. However this may be, it is clear that the label ‘democracy’ has not only become, but still is, very attractive. It has been used almost as easily to legitimate as to challenge virtually any regime. The word has incredible mobilizing power, and ‘democracy as a political value’ constantly subverts the legitimacy of democracy as ‘an already existing form of government’. This is, of course, more than just a matter of words. Obviously, there is much more to the history of democracy than the history of a word. Recently, it has become quite common to argue that it is more important to look for democratic practices than for democracy as a word, if you want to trace the origin and development of democracy. If you stick only to the word, you run the risk of ‘recycl[ing] the Eurocentric story’ or reproducing definitions by ‘white, wealthy, Anglo-American men’. However, it is only by analysing the history of the word and the conceptions that were connected to that word that you can begin to un-
nderstand the history of democracy as a slogan, as a political ideal and as the apparently almost inevitable legitimating idea of modern society. By tracing the history of the use of the concept ‘democracy’ and related terms, this book is a contribution to the study of democratic rhetoric as well as democracy in general. When, why and how did people use the word ‘democracy’, and what did this mean? It is the central claim of this book that answering such questions leads us to a nonlinear image of democracy in modern Europe and to a rich history of ruptures and differences. In order to show this history of ruptures, the authors of this book devote considerable attention to the use of ‘democracy’ in institutionalized political forums, public debate in printed press, and political theory. This is not because the authors believe that this is the only possible story, but because they think that starting from established politics will give us a point of departure for a history of democracy as a concept, which could subsequently be broadened.

Moments and Ruptures

When tracing the development of democracy, most contemporary authors underline an open end of the ‘unfinished journey’ of democracy.\textsuperscript{10} They often also mention the two sides of democracy, on the one hand, the often tedious and unconvincing reality of the administration of liberal democracies and, on the other, the dreams that mobilize and energize people: two sides that are often at odds with each other.\textsuperscript{11} Today, we often use two different words for those two sides: democracy as in liberal democracy, and populism for the less genteel aspects of the rule of the people. However, the work of, for instance, Pierre Rosanvallon suggests that differing interpretations and continuing tensions belong to the essence of democracy because pure rule by the people is an ideal that is impossible to realize. In this sense, the history of democracy is certainly not one of simple, let alone linear, progress. Hardly anybody would nowadays argue that it is, but more often than not, an implicit idea of progress still prevails, if only because almost all those writing about democracy would applaud the final victory of democracy in some sense. The standard story is also about the modern, representative form of democracy that first emerged in the late eighteenth century. This book does not claim that democratic practices started to prevail from that period onwards. What is clear, however, is that the word ‘democracy’ travelled ‘from book to life’ during the so-called \textit{Sattelzeit} from the end of the eighteenth century to the middle of the nineteenth century, denoting the alleged transitional period between early modern and modern political concepts.\textsuperscript{12} Although it was around 1848 still ‘a rarefied word for a popular thing’, it was no longer uncommon to have ‘democratic’ ideals.\textsuperscript{13}
Until the end of the eighteenth century, ‘democracy’ was a theoretical and historical concept without much practical value. Ancient Athens was seen as an example of what went wrong if you had a ‘pure democracy’ untempered by monarchy and aristocracy: fickle, noisy and excessive mob rule. But this was a phenomenon of ancient times; pure democracy was gone for good. In the classical tradition of political thought, ‘democracy’ was evaluated positively as a useful element only in a mixed constitution, consisting of monarchical, aristocratic and democratic elements. During the French Revolution, these old semantic structures changed profoundly. Edmund Burke immediately condemned the first French Republic as a completely ‘democratic’ regime with all the negative qualities that this entailed. A few years later, some revolutionaries, including the radical Robespierre, proudly started to call their regime ‘democratic’ themselves – in fact, implying some sort of representative democracy. After the Terror, this usage gave the concept a setback and, in the early nineteenth century, it strengthened the old tradition of using ‘democracy’ and ‘democrat’ as pejoratives.

However, from the French Revolution onwards, the concept began to change from a theoretical and bookish word into a word with practical meaning in actual politics. It changed into a modern concept that pointed towards the future. Importantly, an increased use of ‘democracy’ also led to attempts of creating (often national) roots for the modern democracy. In the middle of the nineteenth century, the radical British historian George Grote changed the interpretation of Athens from an outdated example of unruly and despised democracy to the admired cradle of modern democracy. Much more important still was another shining light, distant not in time like Athens, but in space: American democracy. In his book about the American democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville looked at the country as a kind of futurist laboratory of all the elements of democracy that were promoted or feared in Europe in the first half of the nineteenth century. He was concerned about the consequences of ‘the Age of the Democratic Revolution’, but reconciled himself to the inevitable democratic conditions of modern society and studied the nature of this society. And he was part of a tradition of interpreting democracy as a condition of society rather than a political regime. When Tocqueville travelled across the Atlantic, it was an important part of his linguistic baggage that the fall of the ancien régime led to a democratic social state, an état social démocratique. A democratic society was a society without formal estates and without (a strong) aristocracy, but was also a society that did not necessarily have a democratic political system. Tocqueville was convinced by his experience in America that democracy could work in the modern world, a viewpoint that in the decades after the French Revolution and Napoleon, not many people had shared. The perspective shifted from the past to the fu-
ture and from the ancient to the modern world. America was, like the ancient world, quite easy to connect to European history, but as a distant cousin who had a different tradition. The United States was a country without a tradition of monarchy and aristocracy, and with a different rhythm in its history. The development of democracy in Europe was influenced by the concrete example of American democracy – which was, however, used most of the time to warn about the possible dangers of mass democracy. America was not Europe, and European contemporaries did not regard America as part of their own world. The French and the English did not see people from Eastern Europe as part of their universe either, but there were European-wide monarchical, aristocratic and diplomatic networks, and even if there was a centre–periphery divide, the alternation between the two was gradual, and intellectuals in Russia and elsewhere followed British, French and German cultural and political life closely. So, there certainly were many national differences, but, besides certain commonalities in the Atlantic world, there was also a common European discourse about democracy. To a surprising extent, authors in all parts of Europe used the same language, even if they gave it a different connotation and frequency.

For instance, the French conservative liberal, prime minister, historian and opponent of democracy François Guizot was read everywhere in Europe. Immediately after the Revolution of 1848, which had resulted in his downfall, he wrote that ‘democracy’ had become the most effective rhetorical concept of his Age. No government could do without it anymore, he said. After a setback in the postrevolutionary years, ‘democracy’ had become an almost indispensable part of political language in France. The constitution defined the Second Republic of 1848 – which sparked a wave of revolutions and uprisings across Europe – as a republic as well as a democracy. Its most prominent feature was universal male suffrage. This meant political rights for citizens and, as such, it also carried a symbolic load of an ‘investiture’ or ‘crowning’ of social inclusion that could tame its participatory implications.

Even if the Revolution of 1848 seemed to spell the victory of ‘democracy’, and the late 1840s saw a rise of democratic rhetoric and of self-identified ‘democrats’ in many countries, this was a rather short-lived boom. Even if liberals could think that a constitutional monarchy should contain a ‘democratic element’ as a part of a mixed constitution, there were still not many supporters of a ‘pure democracy’. In most European countries, it was still a radical position to call oneself a ‘democrat’. Later in the nineteenth century, it was no longer unusual to invoke the concept of ‘democracy’ in the political battles that took place in different countries. In Denmark, for instance, the most common use of the concept in the second half of the nineteenth century was as a definite noun, ‘the democracy’, Demokratiet. This term signi-
fied the common people and their representatives of the Left (Venstre) in the lower chamber of the parliament fighting for political reforms towards the end of the century, most notably for parliamentarism. In 1901, ‘the democracy’ achieved what it had been fighting for, but this did not mean that Denmark in general was conceived of as a democracy or that the king had lost his role in Danish politics.20

The First World War is another example of a breakthrough or a rupture in the history of ‘democracy’. The war was not started as a war for democracy, but it certainly ended as a victory for democracy. The idea of a ‘Western democracy’ emerged.21 Universal suffrage was introduced in a number of countries. After the war, a range of parliamentary democracies were established from the Baltic Sea to the Balkans. Political and legal theorists built theories of the new political order. Hans Kelsen published the first version of his well-known Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie (1920) and, in 1921, the British scholar and liberal statesman James Bryce talked about the ‘universal acceptance of democracy as the normal and natural form of government’ in his classic work on Modern Democracies.22 Democracy was on everybody’s lips, but it was certainly not a concept with a fixed meaning and, as we all know, many of the new democracies in the 1920s and the 1930s proved rather fragile. Out of those European countries that gained independence during and after the First World War, only Ireland, Finland and Czechoslovakia did not become autocracies or dictatorships during the interwar years.23 Criticism was directed in particular at the workings and nature of parliamentary government across the continent. Many books and articles appeared about the ‘crisis’ of parliamentary politics and the ‘crisis’ of democracy. In the interwar years, many detested parliamentary politics as a talking-shop, but sometimes at the same time supported ‘true democracy’, whether that was communist, fascist, authoritarian or monarchical in character.24 In addition, some parties, factions and intellectuals of different persuasions rejected this ancient (and, according to them, outdated) concept, for a variety of reasons besides the nineteenth-century fear of a tyranny of the majority.

After the Second World War, democracy, in the sense of universal suffrage, majority rule and now also the rule of law and parliamentary politics, had become a generally accepted concept.25 Even much more than the First World War, the Second World War meant a victory for democracy as a concept and, in the West, for parliamentary or liberal democracy as a practice. This was a disciplined democracy that distrusted mass participation. The omnipresence of the concept in postwar Europe did not mean an ‘end of ideology’, as it was postulated in a number of accounts, and the concept of democracy was still highly contested. The difficulty of even finding common ground for understanding democracy was illustrated, for example, by the volumi-
nous The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) report *Democracy in a World of Tensions*, which demonstrated the ideological divide that marked the Cold War era. Within the field of political philosophy, W.B. Gallie famously used democracy as one of his prime examples of his category of ‘essentially contested’ concepts. In the late 1960s and in the 1970s, Western liberal democracies were vehemently criticized again, this time in the name of ‘more’ or ‘participatory’ democracy. By the end of the twentieth century, the issue of the ‘democratic deficit’ in the European Union, on the one hand, and the theoretical attempts of furthering global democracy, on the other, called into question the nation state as the sole locus of democracy. In many European countries populist movements have challenged the important role of the rule of law and the protection of minorities in liberal democracy. Instead, they focus on the voice of ‘the people’ as a guiding principle of majority rule.

**Differences and Transfers**

A conceptual history not only avoids viewing just one period as ‘formative’ in the construction of modern democracy; it also shows significant differences and trajectories in different countries and in different spheres of society. Once research gets away from the fixation on a mainly Anglo-Saxon history of democracy and concentrates on the history of the concept in different national contexts instead, it turns out that the history of the concept is much richer than we knew. Instead of being ‘a latecomer to the laurels of democracy’, it turns out that Spain was one of the first countries to have a lively debate about ‘democracy’. The Netherlands, on the other hand, which has often been portrayed as a pioneering country in the world of democracy, is revealed as a latecomer if you look at the daily use of the term. There were isolated texts with the term in the early modern period and a short-lived popularity of related terms around 1800, it is true, but until the very end of the nineteenth century, the word was hardly used in the Dutch Parliament at all. Popular sovereignty was rejected. The Dutch case shows that we should be very careful about equating a strong civil society or even the rule of law with democracy in the sense of the power of the people at large.

The pace at which the concept of ‘democracy’ gained support in the second half of the nineteenth century also varied from country to country. In France, the Revolution in 1848 strengthened an already existing discourse of democracy, and in the 1870s the Third Republic sealed the victory of ‘democracy’ as a concept. In Britain the breakthrough period was in the 1880s, and in the Netherlands in around 1900. From then on, the concept was no longer used to scare people, but rather to convince them not only of the claims of
the opposition but also of the legitimacy of parliamentary and government politics. Suffrage movements, now also including demands for women’s right to vote, were on the political agenda throughout Europe.

Looking at different national traditions also helps us to understand the ambiguous interplay between concepts related to democracy and to ‘the people’. Every language had its own expressions referring to the people and its power, from the Russian narod to the German Volk and Volksherrschaft, from the French souveraineté du peuple to the Finnish kansanvalta or ‘the power of the people’, including in an ethnic sense, and from the nineteenth-century Spanish expression ‘la Democracia es el pueblo’ (the democracy is the people) to the modern Danish folkestyre with its connotations of participatory democracy. These all had their different connotations and their different rhythms of popularity, and they all demonstrated strategies to give national connotations to democracy or democratic connotations to nationalism. They helped democracy gain legitimacy or fortify democracy when it had become the name of the regime, or they were used by different parties as an additional argument for their specific interpretation of what democracy was. The vernacular expressions also show that democracy did not necessarily belong to the political left; associating it with national traditions made it easier for conservatives to use it as well. These national expressions were used to rhetorically underline the specific national ‘roots’ of democracy. Paradoxically, some of these national traditions, such as the Swiss one, were also used in a common European discourse about the development and different faces of democracy. Studying these traditions helps us to see that democracy was never necessarily a ‘left-wing’ force (see, for instance, Switzerland); it could also be part of a conservative movement, aimed at strengthening the bond between the king and the people (as in Sweden).32

This book is, of course, not the first to deal with the conceptual history of democracy. The best-known attempts are, however, designed as auxiliaries to other types of history, such as the articles about democracy in the conceptual dictionaries Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe and the Handbuch politisch-sozialer Grundbegriffe in Frankreich. They also concentrate on the period before the mid nineteenth century, the ‘Sattelzeit’, as coined by Reinhart Koselleck. There are also other contributions on this period, the most comprehensive being Re-imagining Democracy in the Age of Revolutions, edited by Joanna Innes and Mark Philp, which adds a wider range of countries into the picture.33

This book draws on these studies, but it shifts the attention to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, focusing on later moments of change as well as differences and transfers between different countries: what did ‘democracy’ mean at various points in time and in various places? What were the experiences and expectations that dominated the shifting understandings of
the concept? Who were the ‘democrats’ and what political goals were they fighting for? Who were their opponents and what did they think of democracy? What was the relationship between the rule of law and the concept of democracy in political and legal theory as well as in political discourse? How was ‘democracy’ defined in terms of geographical identifications – as ‘Nordic’ or ‘Western’ democracy? Various researchers have addressed some of these questions, but there is no major systematic study in English or any other major language covering the entire period, let alone one with a general European and comparative perspective.34 The institutional-political part of this history of democracy in modern Europe is well known, but there is no conceptual history of democracy in modern Europe from the Age of Revolution to the present. If literature on conceptions of democracy has covered both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, such as in the important works by Pierre Rosanvallon and John Dunn, it has not concentrated on the variations of the history of the concept in different parts of Europe.35

Theorists from Tocqueville and Guizot to Kelsen, Bryce and Carl Schmitt have on many occasions announced the definitive victory of (some sort of) democracy. Every time this announcement has proved to be premature. Political debates over voting rights, the principle and practice of parliamentarism, constitutional design, industrial relations and so forth demonstrated the disputed nature of democracy more than anything else. We examine such debates and show the contested meaning of the concept and its strategic use. In order to do so, we take debates about democracy in national assemblies, in political movements and at particular (revolutionary) moments as our starting points. As continuous serial sources, the many digitized parliamentary proceedings are a particularly useful point of departure. Thus, this is a volume about the semantics and pragmatics of ‘democracy’ in modern Europe, with special attention being paid to actual political history as well as relevant political and legal theory in a political context. Obviously, it would have been possible to write a book on the same topic using a different range of sources, from religion to fiction, or with a focus on sources discussing economic and industrial relations. We also could have paid more attention to the relationship between democracy and gender. Our ambition has been to include a gender perspective in the volume by discussing in several chapters how ‘universal suffrage’ developed from an exclusively male content in the mid nineteenth century to a slogan of women’s movements in the late nineteenth century, but this is no substitute for a separate or in-depth discussion of the topic. In addition to the gendered aspect of the concept of ‘democracy’, more focus on the relationship between racial arguments and democracy will be needed in the future. Instead, we have chosen to concentrate on the still rather unknown story of the huge national differences in the use of the concept of ‘democracy’ in order
to make it possible to draw conclusions about European similarities as well as differences.

This book seeks to contribute to a transnational history of ‘democracy’ and to a history of the transfer of concepts, as well as to a history of the rhetoric of models and ‘roots’ of democracy. But we cannot ignore the fact that most political debates took place in a national context, and therefore we have chosen to take national debates as our point of departure. Democracy as a regime has until now also been confined to national states; European democracy, for instance, has run into a lot of trouble because it has not conformed to this national pattern. However, we link these national cases to conceptual developments in other countries, which served as models or as export destinations, or that we simply use for comparative reasons. Moreover, the case studies are chosen with care. Until now, most histories of democracy in Europe have, often implicitly, taken countries such as Britain and France as their yardstick. This book pays attention to countries that often disappear in such stories: the Nordic countries, Spain, Russia and the Czech Republic. It contains one contribution devoted to an overview of two centuries of ‘democracy’ in one particular country, and it immediately turns out that the country chosen, Spain, is much more interesting from the point of view of the history of democracy than many people would expect. It appears that there is no single mainstream development of democracy, but instead an abundance of democratic rhetoric in countries that commonly have not been regarded as ‘core countries’ of democratization.

By investigating many different countries, we discovered that there was already in the nineteenth century a strikingly common discourse about democracy, but also that there remained salient national peculiarities and surprising differences. Moreover, besides contributions about one or two individual countries, the book also contains a number of more comparative essays to underline commonalities and to highlight more general developments and a number of key moments in the history of the concept. In many of these cases the tensions within the concept of democracy are visible. One of the lessons of the history of the concept is that we should not conclude too quickly that older patterns are superseded, let alone surpassed, by new ones. After 1989, and partly already after 1945, the victory of liberal democracy seemed complete, but it has become clear that this idea was premature. That is the story of democracy: on many occasions, it seemed to be beaten or its victory seemed to be secured for good, but each time new developments showed that its history had not ended. Nor should we assume too easily that a feature of democracy is really new. It may be true that the notion of ‘stability’ is particularly suited to characterize post-1945 politics and that it had entered the language of politics only in the nineteenth century. However, much that it entailed after 1945 reminds us of
the balance that was considered crucial for the mixed constitution of the early nineteenth century. Also, the post-1945 attempt at domesticating democracy by adding judicial review and European institutions to check national democracy, including the preference of the rule of law over democracy, suggests a return to nineteenth-century discussions about the mixed constitution and the separation of powers. Yet, history never repeats itself, and these new discussions were mostly conducted under the aegis of democracy. Democracy had become the supreme value, whereas in the idea of a mixed constitution, it was only one of the elements contributing to a social balance. However, the similarities are striking, and they are an example of what we see if we look at the history of democracy through the lens of concepts and without the assumption of progress. It is a history of rhetoric, a history of practices; it is a history of the neverending search for ways to ensure the rule and participation of the people, a history of democracy and its discontents.

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eeuw is about nineteenth-century British and French parliamentary rhetoric and culture (2015). He recently coedited Organizing Democracy: Reflections on the Rise of Political Organizations in the 19th Century (2017), which has appeared as the first volume in the new book series ‘Palgrave Studies in Political History’, which he is coediting. He is also one of the editors of the Journal of Modern European History and is a founding member of the international Association for Political History.

Notes

5. See e.g. the oeuvre of Pierre Rosanvallon.
8. E.g. Keane, Life and Death of Democracy.
13. See the chapter by Joanna Innes and Mark Philp in this volume.
14. See the chapter by Jussi Kurunmäki and Irène Herrmann in this volume.
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24. For arguments in which ‘democracy’ was used against liberal democracy, see the chapter by Marcus Llanque in this volume; for the defence of parliamentary democracy, see e.g. Jussi Kurunmäki, “Nordic Democracy” in 1935. On the Finnish and Swedish Rhetoric of Democracy’, in Jussi Kurunmäki and Johan Strang, Rhetorics of Nordic Democracy (Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society, 2010), 37–82.
28. See the chapter by Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey in this volume.
32. See the chapter by Kurunmäki and Herrmann in this volume.
34. E.g. Heiko Bollmeyer, Der steinige Weg zur Demokratie: Die Weimarer Nationalversammlung zwischen Kaiserreich und Republik (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2007); Llanque, Demokratisches Denken im Krieg; Nevers, Fra skældsord til slagord; Matti


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