
INTRODUCTION



*T*he feminist movement in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) is well known for its provocative and media-effective protest campaigns. In her seminal study *Women in German History*, Ute Frevert highlights how West German feminists ‘disrupted beauty contests, bricked up sex-shops, sat in at churches and doctors’ conventions’ and organized tribunals on abortion, violence against women and other central themes in the women’s movement.¹ While it is widely acknowledged that feminist groups in West Germany have engaged in creative and provocative protest activities, there is little awareness of the fact that some groups have used confrontational or violent methods to advance the cause of women. This book is the first to investigate the fascinating and controversial role of such tactics in feminist campaigns in the decades following the Second World War (WWII). The aim is not to assess whether feminist activism in the 1960s and 1970s was more or less militant than today. Rather it seeks to show that there was a complex interplay between old and new, conventional and innovative, constitutional and unlawful, and peaceful and violent protest tactics, which led to different results in different feminist campaigns.

The women’s movement that started to emerge in West Germany in the late 1960s became one of the broadest, most diverse and dynamic social movements in the history of the FRG. Gisela Notz identifies three different strands of feminism that shaped the development of the women’s movement in the 1970s. The first is the ‘liberal and “moderate” feminists’ who demanded that women should be granted the same rights and entitlements as men.² Second is the ‘radical autonomous feminists who considered patriarchal oppression to be

the fundamental structural category of modern societies, and whose prime aim was therefore the abolition of patriarchy'.³ The third strand is the 'socialist or leftist feminists' who sought to achieve 'a fundamental transformation of capitalist and patriarchal structures'.⁴ In the most detailed and comprehensive study of feminist activism in the FRG to date, Ilse Lenz shows that there were a number of other strands that were less visible but equally important, including the lesbian movement, mothers' organizations, Afro-German feminism and the struggles of migrant women.⁵

Second-wave feminism in the United States played an important role in the formation of the women's movement in West Germany.⁶ The language of German feminists, however, was different from that of their American contemporaries. The differentiation between a biologically determined *sex* and a socially constructed *gender* was developed in the 1950s in the United States in the context of medical research. In the following decades it has been adopted by Anglo-American feminists and scholars from various other fields. In Germany, the term did not gain popularity until the 1990s, when a new generation of feminist activists and academics discovered the work of Judith Butler, Joan Scott and other poststructuralist feminist thinkers. Following Scott and other gender historians, I consider gender a useful category of historical analysis, although the term was not used by feminist activists in West Germany. Of course, gender is just one of a number of factors that have to be considered. In her study of German gender politics, Myra Marx Ferree has rightly pointed out that gender intersects with a range of other social factors, including ethnicity, nationality, age, sexuality and class in particular local manifestations.⁷

The women's movement in the FRG developed structures and a political agenda that differed considerably from those of feminist movements in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.⁸ 'In contrast to the historical women's movement', highlights Ute Gerhard, 'the new one founded no associations or organizations, and had no leaders, but was rather composed of a loose network of groups and broader networks, projects and organized meetings which informed the public about specific issues.'⁹ To underline the variety of topics, political views and forms of organization in feminist circles, some feminist scholars do not refer to *the* German women's movement but to women's movements in the plural.¹⁰ Although I agree that it is important to highlight the diversity of feminist theory and activism, previous research on other political movements in the FRG and in other countries shows that one does not have to use the plural form to highlight the heterogeneous and diverse nature of these movements.

There are different terms to describe the women's movement in the FRG. Some authors refer to it as the 'autonomous women's movement' (*autonome Frauenbewegung*), because many of the women involved sought to achieve 'self-determination for the individual as well as institutional freedom from established forms of politics'.¹¹ However, this name can be misleading, because not all feminists in the FRG aspired to be autonomous, and because '*Autonomie*' became the primary aim and distinguishing feature of a different political movement.

In line with other scholars therefore, I refer to the feminist movement in the FRG in this study as the ‘New Women’s Movement’ (*neue Frauenbewegung*). On the one hand, this name emphasizes that the movement developed a new political agenda and new organizational structures. On the other, it highlights that this movement was inspired by the theoretical framework, political spirit and protest activities of the New Left. Many founding members of the New Women’s Movement had played an active role in student protests, and they identified with the aims and principles of the New Left: they were fundamentally opposed to the existing political structures and aimed to create a society based on anti-authoritarian, anti-fascist, anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist principles. Since the New Left provided important theoretical and political reference points for militant feminists in the FRG, I want to discuss it here in some more detail.

The New Left in West Germany

The 1960s, in a range of Western countries including the FRG, saw a number of groups emerge ‘at the Left of the Old Left’ and go on to make up what became known as the ‘New Left’.¹² While there were significant political and ideological differences among them, all shared, as Donatella Della Porta notes, ‘a concern for a [more] participatory democracy’.¹³ ‘In its rejection of orthodox Marxism and anti-Communism and its dissatisfaction with the Cold War, materialism, and apathy in society’, the New Left in West Germany, write Martin Klimke and Joachim Scharloth, ‘found a connecting point to similar movements in France, Great Britain, the United States and elsewhere’.¹⁴ However, due to Germany’s fascist history and its geopolitical position in the Cold War, the social context in which the New Left developed in the FRG had a distinctive character. In the 1950s, not only the majority of military officers and judges but also many politicians and other public figures had actively supported or sympathized with the Nazi regime.¹⁵ The student and protest movement in West Germany was, among other things, a rebellion by a postwar generation that refused the authority of this ruling elite. Karin de Ahna and Dieter Claessens highlight that due to the long-lasting ideological and social effects of its National Socialist past, the Federal Republic of Germany ‘has never had a traditional relationship to social phenomena such as anarchism, deviance and so on. . . . The willingness to see the dissenter as an enemy of the state or of the people remained, at least until the late 1950s, unchanged’.¹⁶

The republic’s first government under Chancellor Konrad Adenauer adopted politically and economically a pro-Western and anti-communist course.¹⁷ All forms of political opposition and extra-parliamentary campaigns in this period were ‘from the outset seriously handicapped by the relative ease with which Adenauer was able to tar them with the brush of communism’.¹⁸ Soon, communists and socialists ‘found themselves outside the spectrum of legitimate politics’.¹⁹ In 1956, the communist party was banned in West Germany. With the Godesberg programme of 1959, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) distanced

itself once and for all from its socialist heritage.²⁰ In 1966, the SPD formed a grand coalition with the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU).²¹ Since it had the necessary majority in parliament, the grand coalition could pass fundamental reforms such as the 1968 emergency laws²² without noticeable resistance.²³ Facing a lack of active political participation, a number of leftist groups in West Germany united to form a protest movement that became known as the extra-parliamentary opposition (Außerparlamentarische Opposition, or APO).²⁴ Left-wing student activists and other members of the political opposition used the APO as a platform for debate and protest outside of party politics.

The student movement in West Germany had originated in the mid-1960s in Berlin and spread quickly throughout the country.²⁵ The Socialist German Student League (SDS)²⁶ played a central role in the theory, development and coordination of the emerging student movement.²⁷ As ‘the main representative of the New Left, it built on the organizational and personal networks of the Easter March campaign, a movement for peace and nuclear disarmament supported by the German trade unions, which had gathered momentum at the beginning of the 1960s’.²⁸ In the course of the 1960s, the number of female students at West German universities grew significantly. In 1965, they still accounted for only 28 per cent of the student population, but in 1970 they made up 37.9 per cent.²⁹ Women played an active role in the student movement, although only a few publications focus on their contributions.³⁰

Central themes in the student movement of the 1960s included university reforms, German rearmament plans, the Vietnam War, fascism, imperialism and internationalism. The ‘reconstruction of the repressed traditions of Marxism and psychoanalysis through the theoreticians of the Frankfurt school’ constituted the theoretical point of departure for many students.³¹ In the late 1960s, Rudi Dutschke and other leading thinkers of the movement promoted a globalization of revolutionary forces based on the ‘foco theories’ of Che Guevara, Fidel Castro and Régis Debray and on Frantz Fanon’s liberation concepts.³² ‘At the 1967 national convention, Rudi Dutschke and Hans-Jürgen Krahl, the leading theoretician of the Frankfurt SDS, jointly demanded that West German students should move toward a “propaganda of action” in the metropolis, complementing the “propaganda of bullets” in the Third World.’³³

Activists from the so-called Third World played an active role in student protests in West Germany, and they had a marked influence on discussions about protest tactics in the student movement.³⁴ By 1962, the number of foreign students in the FRG had risen to about 12,000.³⁵ Some of the first events that illustrated their important role in student protests were the demonstrations against the visit of the Congolese politician Moïse Tshombe in December 1964. The Tshombe protest was organized by the African Student League, members of the SDS and other student organizations, and by Rudi Dutschke and other members of the small radical leftist group Subversive Aktion. According to Timothy Scott Brown, 150 of the 800 participants in an anti-Tshombe demonstration in West Berlin on 18 December 1964 were foreign students. Brown highlights that the

protest was a key experience for Dutschke and other anti-authoritarian student activists, because the African students ‘helped turn what had originally been planned as “a silent demonstration” . . . into an assault on public order involving catcalls, thrown tomatoes, and scuffles with the police’.³⁶

Inspired by demonstrations in the United States, political struggles in the Third World and by the collaborations with foreign students in the FRG, activists in the West German student movement drew on innovative and creative forms of protest such as sit-ins, teach-ins and civil disobedience. According to Della Porta, the dominant position in the SDS in the 1960s involved ‘the limited violation of rules (*begrenzte Regelverletzung*), that is, a conscious, nonviolent use of lawbreaking as a disruptive form of action’.³⁷ But what does ‘nonviolent’ mean in this context? The German term *Gewalt* is characterized by an ambiguity that was of critical importance to discussions about the scope and limits of political protest in the FRG. Going back to the Indo-Germanic word *giwaltan*, *Gewalt* can imply both violence (*violentia*) and power (*potestas*). It can be used to refer to empowering and limiting, positive and negative, abstract and concrete social interactions and structures.³⁸ In the late 1960s, many student activists distinguished between two different forms of violent actions: damage to or destruction of property and violence against people.³⁹ While they were opposed to behaviour that could harm or kill people, an increasing number of those in the radical Left considered property destruction a tolerable or even necessary form of political activism.

Two events in the late 1960s fuelled discussions about violence and violent resistance in the student movement. The first was the killing of a student, Benno Ohnesorg, by a police officer during a demonstration on 2 June 1967.⁴⁰ ‘A photograph of the dying Ohnesorg lying on the street, with his head bleeding and a helpless woman in an elegant fur coat leaning over him’, highlights Martin Klimke, ‘was to become one of the most iconic images of the German student movement and the 1960s in West Germany’.⁴¹ Many felt that the bullets that killed Ohnesorg were directed against the entire student and protest movement. Some were convinced that only violence could prevent further attacks. The fact that the founding members of one of the armed leftist groups in the FRG decided to call themselves the ‘Movement of June 2nd’ indicates the importance that they attributed to the Ohnesorg killing. Initially charged with manslaughter, the officer that shot Ohnesorg was acquitted of all charges a few months later.⁴² For the first time, West German student activists ‘saw themselves in a position of vulnerability comparable with their Third World colleagues’.⁴³ The fact that a member of the police force could get away with killing a peaceful demonstrator shocked and enraged them. Their anger was also directed at the tabloid *Bild* and other newspapers that blamed the protesters for Ohnesorg’s death and other acts of violence during the demonstration.

In light of the Ohnesorg killing and other attacks against protesters, many student activists began to discuss the limits of nonviolent protest. A few weeks after the attack against Ohnesorg, the newsmagazine *Der Spiegel* published an

interview with student leader Dutschke, in which he declared: ‘Violence is a key constituent of power and thus requires demonstrative and provocative counter-violence on our part. What form it [the counter-violence] takes, depends on the form of the confrontation.’⁴⁴ The issue of counter-violence (*Gegengewalt*) had been discussed in the West German student movement at least since the publication of Herbert Marcuse’s essay ‘Repressive Toleranz’ (Repressive Tolerance) in 1965. Like Marcuse, Rudi Dutschke and other leading thinkers in the movement considered the use of violence legitimate, if it was a response to a greater form of violence, if it was limited to situations in which other means of protest were futile and if it took the form of a symbolic provocation rather than being an end in itself.

A second dramatic and agitational event followed just months after the Ohnesorg killing: the attempted assassination of Rudi Dutschke on 11 April 1968.⁴⁵ On the night after the attack, a mixed crowd of students and groups associated with the Berlin Underground scene⁴⁶ tried to stop the delivery of *Bild* and other newspapers published by the Axel Springer group, which had crudely misrepresented the Ohnesorg killing and repeatedly stirred resentment towards Dutschke, the student movement and the New Left. In November 1968, leftist lawyer and political activists Horst Mahler stood trial for playing a leading role in this protest. Outside the court, a group of about one thousand protesters clashed with police forces. In what became known as ‘the Battle of Tegeler Weg’ (*Schlacht am Tegeler Weg*), the conflict between members of youth subcultures in Berlin and the police reached a new intensity: dozens of protesters and hundreds of police officers were injured, some of them seriously.⁴⁷

While the student movement in West Germany experienced an increasing fragmentation and polarization in the late 1960s, a new feminist movement gathered momentum. There is no official founding moment for the New Women’s Movement, but one incident during the twenty-third conference of the SDS in Frankfurt on 12 September 1968 played a significant role in its formation.⁴⁸ On that day, the feminist filmmaker Helke Sander, spokeswoman of the Action Council for the Liberation of Women (*Aktionsrat zur Befreiung der Frauen*) gave a speech in which she criticized patriarchal structures in the SDS and called for a joint effort to tackle the oppression of women.⁴⁹ When it appeared that the SDS board members wanted to move on to other issues without commenting on Sander’s speech, SDS member Sigrid Rürger threw tomatoes at them. Although their position was not without controversy, Sander’s speech and Rürger’s protest mobilized many women in the New Left. Although it is widely acknowledged that the tomato throwing marked the beginning of a wave of provocative, and at times very confrontational, feminist protest in West Germany, this is the first study to explore and analyse the critical role of militancy in this protest.

Why Militancy Matters

One of the reasons why militancy is rarely used as an analytical category in research on feminism in the FRG is that the term is strongly associated with violent protest tactics in the radical Left, and in the Autonomen movement in particular. Since debates about militancy in the Autonomen movement offer critical insights into political militancy and feminist politics in the FRG, they provide a good starting point for a conceptualization of feminist militancy.

In the 1980s, autonomist groups became a driving force in the increasingly violent conflict between police forces and squatters in West Berlin and other West German cities, and participated in a range of other movements including the anti-nuclear movement, the peace movement, the environmental movement and the New Women's Movement. Like many leftist and feminist groups in the FRG, the Autonomen movement sought and seeks 'to create and institutionalize "dominance-free" forms of political, economic, and social interaction'.⁵⁰ What distinguishes Autonomists from most groups in the New Women's Movement is that militancy formed an integral part of their self-image and public perception. Loosely inspired by neo-Marxist and neo-anarchist beliefs, the movement brought together a range of radical leftist groups who rejected what the sociologist Max Weber famously described as the state's 'monopoly of legitimate physical violence'.⁵¹

Militancy is central to the self-conception and public image of the Autonomen and features prominently in internal movement documents. While there was a clear tendency in parts of the Autonomen movement to romanticize and glorify militancy, controversial debates in internal movement publications show that there was no consensus about the scope and limits of militant protest.⁵² Although the 'legitimacy of militant conflict – as counterviolence that also offered protection from police violence – was not questioned', opinions differed when it came to the question of where it was necessary and appropriate.⁵³ According to historian Freia Anders, it is precisely the vagueness of the term 'militancy' that made it so appealing to the Autonomen. Activists in the movement refused to distinguish between legal and illegal and peaceful and violent protest because they held the view that these categories were defined by the state and served the interests of the state.⁵⁴ It would be wrong to reduce the meaning of militancy in the Autonomen movement to confrontational or violent forms of protest, although both played an important role in the theory and practice of the movement. In this context, militancy also 'signifies a refusal to be co-opted or to let one's decisions and behavior be dictated by the laws and norms of the dominant society'.⁵⁵

In the 1980s, militancy in the Autonomen movement came under scrutiny from a gender perspective. A growing number of autonomous women's groups and 'pro-feminist' men's groups denounced sexual violence within the movement, and criticized dominating behaviour in group discussions and macho militancy.⁵⁶ Despite all criticism within and outside the movement, the Autonomen

have remained committed to militancy. Patricia Melzer has offered one of the first scholarly discussions of militant feminism in the Autonomen movement. Based on an analysis of the writings of the Hamburg-based group Women against Imperialist War (*Frauen gegen Imperialistischen Krieg*), Melzer's insightful study shows that feminists in the Autonomen movement had an important role to play in Germany's Left: they established theoretical and political links between the militant Left and the New Women's Movement.⁵⁷

In this context, the theory and practice of the militant feminist group Rote Zora (RZ) deserve particular attention. Although the RZ, whose ideology and activities will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter, formed in a different political context, the group developed a notion of feminist militancy that resonated strongly with women in the Autonomen movement. The brochure 'Mili's Tanz auf dem Eis' from December 1993 offers the most detailed discussion of militancy in the history of the Red Zora. Literally, the title of the book can be translated as 'Mili's dance on the ice'. This translation, however, does not retain the play on words in the German original: 'Mili's Tanz' resembles 'Militanz', meaning militancy. As the title suggests, the RZ saw militancy as a political balancing act. While criticizing a tendency in the radical Left to glorify and practise 'macho militancy', the authors took the stance that tactics that the state defined as illegal and violent could play a vital role in political protest. The RZ insisted that it 'did not see a hierarchy in different forms of actions. Handing out flyers, squatting, spraying graffiti, gluing locks, throwing stones, planting bombs and setting fire – all was right, if it was coordinated well.'⁵⁸ While highlighting the need for a diversity of tactics, the Red Zora clearly placed particular emphasis on militant and violent tactics.

In their first position paper, the Red Zora insisted that it could be liberating and empowering for women to use violent means to fight against male perpetrators of violence and authorities who abused their power. The group stated: 'Personally, we found it tremendously liberating to break with the feminine peaceableness that was imposed on us and to take a conscious decision for violent means in our politics. We experienced that with our actions, we could break through fear, powerlessness and resignation, and we wanted to pass this on to other women/lesbians.'⁵⁹ By trying to develop a theory and practice of feminist 'counter-violence',⁶⁰ the Red Zora and other militant feminist groups in West Germany challenged the idea that feminism is inherently and necessarily peaceful and tried to convince other women of the worth of militant tactics. These efforts had remarkably little success: with the exception of feminist groups in the Autonomen movement and in the radical fringes of the New Women's Movement, most feminists in West Germany did not want to be associated with militant tactics.⁶¹ Since many feminist historians in the FRG share this view, they have shown little interest in militant and violent protest with a feminist agenda.

Other historical examples show that one does not have to agree with the political views or tactics of militant feminist groups to see their activities as a part of the long and varied history of feminist movements. Undoubtedly, one of the

best-researched episodes of militancy in the history of European women's movements is militant protest in the British movement for female suffrage at the turn of the twentieth century, and the activities of the Women's Social and Political Union (WSPU) in particular.⁶² Laura Mayhall notes: 'The WSPU introduced the use of militancy, first interrupting Liberal Party meetings and heckling political speakers, then moving to the use of street theatre, such as large-scale demonstrations, and ultimately the destruction of government and private property, including smashing windows, slashing paintings in public galleries and setting fire to buildings and pillar-boxes.'⁶³ While some of these activities involved spectacular performances and attacks against property, Mayhall rightly insists that it would be wrong to reduce suffragette militancy to such highly visible acts. According to her, suffragettes practised militancy along a continuum that needs to be understood within the broader context of 'radicalism and women's political activism in the late-Victorian and Edwardian eras'.⁶⁴

The context of women's political activism in Germany was very different from that in Britain. Since the 1840s, German women had fought – primarily but not exclusively with nonviolent means – against patriarchal structures and discriminatory laws. Feminist historians trace the German Women's Movement back to the period of the 'pre-March' (*Vormärz*) that led to the March revolution in 1848. During the revolution, thousands of women organized in democratic groups to support fighters and their families.⁶⁵ A few women, however, 'did not want to leave it at listening, supporting and petitioning. They helped to build barricades and fought alongside the democratic insurgents against the military.'⁶⁶ Between the 1840s and the 1940s, the different living conditions of proletarian and bourgeois women, fundamental political changes, and not least the two world wars had a crucial impact on the feminist movement in Germany. 'Recognizing the interconnections between militarized masculinity and violence', women anti-militarists in the Weimar Republic and in post-WWII Germany called for a new spirit of peacefulness.⁶⁷

The development of the German Women's Movement was, as Ute Gerhard highlights, no 'continuous process', but 'a history of repeated setbacks, stagnation and of many new beginnings under constantly changing social and political circumstances'.⁶⁸ The term 'New Women's Movement' indicates that the feminist groups and networks that emerged in the late 1960s in the context of the anti-authoritarian student movement marked such a new beginning. Radicalized by the attacks against Ohnesorg and Dutschke, repeated clashes with police and polemical attacks against the New Left in the media, a few former student activists took up arms. As the discussion in chapter 2 shows, the violent confrontation between these left-wing militants and the West German state, which peaked in the 'German Autumn'⁶⁹ in 1977 but continued into the 1990s, has strengthened pacifism and anti-militarism in the German women's movement.

Until today, all but a few feminist activists and scholars in the FRG have taken the view that militant tactics are irreconcilable with feminist principles. Against this background, it is hardly surprising that the activities of the Red Zora and

other militant feminist groups have received little attention in the history of the German women's movement. If they mention the Red Zora at all, feminist historians tend to reinforce the assumption that its attacks were not feminist, even if the actors involved protested otherwise. Vojin Saša Vukadinović, for instance, argues that the 'feminist-inspired militancy' (*frauenbewegte Militanz*) of the Red Zora should not be mistaken for feminism.⁷⁰ The aim of this book is not to challenge this widely shared view. What I do want to challenge, however, is the fact that alternative perspectives have been marginalized and silenced. Consciously or unconsciously, historians of German feminism have created a narrative about 'good' feminism and 'bad' militancy, which is based on a limited understanding of both terms.

According to the Oxford Dictionary, the adjective 'militant' means 'favouring confrontational or violent methods in support of a political or social cause', and the German dictionary Duden offers a very similar definition.⁷¹ Derived from the Latin word '*miles*', for soldier, the adjective has been used in a range of political contexts including but not limited to violent conflicts. Charity Scribner highlights that the term has a long tradition in theology, where *ecclesia militans* (militant church) refers to the struggle of devout Christians against earthly sins.⁷² In the late nineteenth century, the German adjective '*militant*' was primarily used to refer to the valiant and fearless defence of a political view.⁷³ Unlike in France and in Italy, where the term is now often used synonymously with the term 'political activist', militancy is now strongly associated with confrontational and violent tactics in Germany.

According to Heidrun Kämper and Elisabeth Link, the meaning of the term changed in the mid-twentieth century, when militancy became increasingly associated with aggression, physical violence and armed conflict.⁷⁴ In the 1950s, legal authorities in the newly formed Federal Republic banned communist parties and other political groups that they considered to be a militant threat to German democracy. By taking a tough stance on left-wing political extremists, the West German state tried to establish itself as a 'militant democracy' (*wehrhafte Demokratie*). Karrin Hanshew's insightful study of terrorism and democracy in the FRG shows how 'almost overnight, democracy's defense went from a point of academic debate to a cornerstone of West Germany's liberal order, evident in the constitutional designation of the state as a *wehrhafte Demokratie* – literally, a democracy well-fortified to defend itself.'⁷⁵ Against this background, it is interesting to note that militancy featured prominently in the writings of leftist groups who promoted a confrontational, and at least in some cases violent, approach to social change in the FRG.

Despite the negative connotations of the term, members of the Red Zora and women's groups in the Autonomen movement were not the only political activists in West Germany who tried to adopt and redefine militancy in the context of feminist activism. Feminist campaigner and journalist Alice Schwarzer, for instance, argues that militancy, in the form of 'hatred' against male oppressors, was a driving force in the formation of the New Women's Movement, and

provided a much needed break with the political opportunism and passivity that have shaped German history: 'But what would a liberation movement be without hatred? Without the question: Are we really going far enough? Are we really not cowards? Are we really not deceiving ourselves? Can we show solidarity also with those who are not, or no longer, acting with 'prudence' when trying to tackle this blatant injustice? Courage to militancy was never a German strength. Nevertheless, it took hold of women in this period [i.e. the post-1968 years].'⁷⁶ Schwarzer is one of the best-known and most-criticized feminists in the FRG. While acknowledging that she has played an important role in the New Women's Movement, the historian Miriam Gebhardt and other feminist critics claim that Schwarzer simplifies and misrepresents the history of feminist struggles in West Germany to present herself in a good light.⁷⁷ Regardless of what one may think of Schwarzer, it is worth noting that she is one of the few feminist authors to draw attention to militant and violent feminist protest.

Drawing on a range of archival sources, autobiographical accounts, interview data and previous studies of feminist protest in the FRG, this book offers the first comprehensive study of militant feminisms in West Germany. Following the feminist theorist bell hooks, I understand feminism as a joint 'struggle to end sexist oppression' – a definition that emphasizes the diversity of feminist theory and practice, and which allows me to explore and analyse a range of protest forms within and outside the New Women's Movement.⁷⁸ Feminist militancy, as understood in this context, refers to historically and politically specific sets of ideas and practices that aim to overcome sexist oppression and are based on the assumption that this objective can only be reached with a confrontational attitude. This broad definition allows me to analyse the complex interplay of different protest tactics in feminist campaigns without reinforcing ahistorical notions of feminism and nonviolence.

Rather than assuming that there is a clear-cut difference between violent and peaceful or militant and nonmilitant feminist activism, I argue, following Laura Mayhall, that feminist activists in post-WWII Germany practised militancy along a constantly evolving continuum of feminist militancy. On one side of the spectrum there were constitutional forms of protest involving little or no confrontation, e.g. petitions. At the other extreme, there were highly visible attacks against property, e.g. bombings and arson attacks with a feminist agenda. In between, there was a whole range of colourful, creative and provocative protest, which involved varying degrees of confrontation. Whether feminist protest actions were perceived as confrontational and/or violent was not determined by the protesters alone. Patricia Melzer rightly emphasizes that property destruction and other less peaceful forms of protest in post-WWII Germany were quickly associated with terrorism and even explicitly peaceful forms of protest in West Germany were often 'perceived as violent by mainstream society'.⁷⁹

The peaceful/violent dichotomy that underlies much feminist activism and research is fraught with problems. A first problem is that a binary distinction makes it difficult if not impossible to account for important nuances,

developments and contradictions within feminist protest movements. Another problem is that the categories 'violent' and 'peaceful' are ideologically charged. One of the first major campaigns in the New Women's Movement was the struggle against violence against women. Melzer has shown that in the context of this campaign, women were often categorically positioned as victims of violence, while violence was seen as inherently masculine or male. At times, this approach to violence was very popular in the New Women's Movement.⁸⁰ Yet it is problematic, because it ignores the many open and hidden ways in which feminists who endorse nonviolent tactics can benefit from violent structures (e.g. because they belong to a privileged class or ethnic group). Another problem with this approach to violence is that it suggests that nonviolence is the only legitimate and effective form of feminist protest, which categorically excludes the possibility that women can draw on confrontational or violent tactics to fight against sexist oppression.

The legendary tomato throwing at the twenty-third SDS conference in Frankfurt in 1968 and other spectacular protest actions discussed in this book illustrate that the use of confrontational and violent tactics in the struggle against sexist oppression in the FRG was sometimes extremely effective. However, this study also shows that a high degree of confrontation is by no means a recipe for success. Some of the most confrontational feminist protest actions in the FRG had little, if any, impact. Others, by contrast, seem to have contributed to the success of protest campaigns but were met with harsh criticism by feminist activists (e.g. because of a lack of communication with fellow activists). When analysing feminist protest in Germany and other parts of the world, we must therefore ask not just one but several questions: How confrontational was the approach taken by the actors involved? What effects, if any, did their actions have? Were the actions considered violent? And, finally, how did feminist activists respond to them? The picture that emerges from an analysis based on these questions is fascinating, complex and at times contradictory.

About the Book

One of my key assumptions is that expressions of feminist militancy and feminist debates about the use of militant and violent tactics have to be analysed both in the context of concrete feminist struggles and in the light of broader political developments; the structure of this book reflects this approach. The first two chapters introduce two political movements that were critical for the formation of militant feminisms in the FRG: the New Women's Movement and left-wing terrorism in West Germany (as mentioned above, armed leftist groups in the FRG did not identify with the label of 'terrorism' and saw themselves as part of the 'militant Left', or used other terminology). Chapter 1 gives a brief overview of the formation and development of the New Women's Movement with particular focus on themes, campaigns and networks that have been important for the

development of militant feminisms in West Germany. It shows that militancy played an important role in the New Women's Movement and manifested itself in a range of ways, including provocative protest activities, civil disobedience and, at least occasionally, arson attacks and bombings.

On 14 May 1970, a group of women and one man liberated the prisoner Andreas Baader at gunpoint from the German Central Institute for Social Issues in Berlin. One of them was the leftist journalist Ulrike Meinhof. Less than two years after writing an article in which she stressed the importance of the tomato throwing and the politics of everyday life, Meinhof and other founding members of the Red Army Faction (RAF) turned to violence to overthrow the West German state. In January 1972, a group of militants in Berlin followed their example and founded the Movement of June 2nd (MJ2). Like the RAF, the MJ2 considered violent attacks against state authorities and institutions not only legitimate but imperative to overcome a political order that they understood as a form of illegitimate violence. Women constituted a significant part of the membership of both groups, and their involvement in leftist political violence was repeatedly presented as an 'excess of women's liberation'. Chapter 2 shows that although a heated public debate on feminism and political violence took place in the 1970s, little attention was paid to actual militant feminist activities. In contrast to most women in the RAF and MJ2, the Red Zora and a part of the militant leftist network Revolutionary Cells (RC) showed an active interest in themes and debates in the New Women's Movement. Trying to combine the politics of the militant Left and the New Women's Movement, the Red Zora developed a distinctively feminist notion of counter-violence.

Chapters 3 to 5 analyse the activities of the Red Zora and other militant protest in the context of three major feminist campaigns: the movement for a decriminalization of abortion, the struggle to end violence against women and a transnational feminist solidarity campaign. This selection does not aim to give a complete picture of militant feminisms in West Germany, and could not possibly do so. Rather, the campaigns discussed have been chosen for two reasons. First, they were initiated and/or decisively shaped by feminist groups, and involved a range of feminist practices including actions that were seen as militant and violent. Second, although previous research has contributed greatly to a better understanding of social and political dynamics in these campaigns, it has paid little attention to the role of militancy. The existing body of literature on the *Autonomen* movement, the squatting scene, the anti-nuclear movement and other political campaigns and subcultures in the FRG, by contrast, has critically examined the role of militant ideas and practices in these movements, and some studies discuss militant groups with feminist aims and principles.⁸¹

The feminist struggle for free and safe abortions, which is discussed in chapter 3, played an important role in the formation of the New Women's Movement. Following the example of a range of other countries, the West German government passed legislation that exempted abortions within the first three months of pregnancies from punishment in 1974, but the Federal Court of Justice

overruled this decision a few months later. While church representatives, conservative politicians and the German Medical Association welcomed the judgement, it was met with disappointment and anger among the many groups who had campaigned for a reform of the existing abortion legislation. Focusing on the years from 1970 to 1977, this chapter gives an overview of a particularly eventful period in the feminist mobilization against the abortion ban. Although the overwhelming majority of feminist activists were committed to nonviolent tactics, some protest activities were seen as violent, and a few caused substantial property damage. In March 1975, a group of women in the militant leftist network 'Revolutionary Cells' planted a bomb at the Federal Court of Justice to protest the court's decision on the abortion ban. A second bombing with a feminist agenda followed in April 1977, when members of the Red Zora carried out an attack on the headquarters of the German Medical Association in Cologne.

Violence against women was a second central topic in feminist activism in West Germany in the 1970s. Although many girls and women in the Federal Republic of Germany experienced sexual abuse and domestic violence on a daily basis, there was little awareness of this problem. In fact, some forms of violence against women were legitimized by tradition or law (e.g. spousal rape). In a joint effort with women from other parts of the world, feminists in West Germany tried to create awareness of and mobilize against gender-based violence. As highlighted earlier, the term 'gender' was not used in the New Women's Movement. What is now commonly known as gender-based violence was referred to as 'violence against women' (*Gewalt gegen Frauen*). A key difference between the two terms is that the former explicitly acknowledges that people of different genders and sexual orientations face discrimination and violence, while the latter focuses primarily or exclusively on people of the female sex. The focus on biologically defined women was both a mobilizing force and a weak spot of the New Women's Movement.

The question of how broadly violence against women had to be defined to tackle visible and invisible forms of abuse was the subject of vivid debate among feminists in the FRG. Even more controversial was the question of what forms of action were necessary and legitimate in the fight against gender-based violence. Focusing on feminist responses to rape and sexual objectification, this chapter analyses and compares different definitions of gender-based violence and gives an overview of feminist initiatives to tackle this issue, ranging from women's shelters to self-defence courses, street protests and attacks against sex shops. Although violent protest played a marginal role in the feminist movement against gender-based violence, it met with more sympathy than in the campaign against the abortion ban.

Global inequalities and transnational solidarity were central topics for the radical Left and the New Women's Movement and played a prominent role in feminist activism in the 1980s. Focusing on a transnational solidarity campaign for women workers in South Korea from 1986 until 1987, this chapter explores the complex interplay of violent and nonviolent tactics, local and global struggles

and different notions of feminist solidarity. In May 1986, the Korean Women's Group in West Berlin received a call for 'sisterly help' from women workers in South Korea. It included a report in which trade unionists described the poor working conditions in a garment factory in a Free Trade Zone in South Korea. The factory produced clothes that the German company Adler sold at cheap prices to customers in West Germany and other European countries. The plea for help from South Korea sparked a thriving solidarity campaign in West Germany that involved groups across the political spectrum. For the most part, protests against Adler in West Germany proceeded peacefully. However, there were some exceptions. In 1987, radical women's groups carried out a series of arson attacks against Adler stores in Germany to support the Korean workers in their struggle. Chapter 5 shows that there is no universal answer to the question of which forms of protest are considered legitimate and effective from a feminist perspective – feminist responses to the attacks against Adler ranged from celebratory enthusiasm to grave concern. Although militant feminist activity in the FRG quieted down after 1987, a recent example discussed in the book's conclusion illustrates that feminist militancy has lost none of its urgency and explosiveness.

Above, I have proposed that we understand feminist militancy in very broad terms as ideas and practices that aim to overcome sexist oppression and are based on the assumption that this objective can only be reached with a confrontational attitude. According to this definition, expressions of feminist militancy can but do not have to involve violent tactics. As the campaigns discussed in the following chapters show, feminist militancy in West Germany occasionally manifested itself in bombings, arson attacks and other highly confrontational protest actions. However, far more often it took the form of small acts of provocation and resistance in everyday life. Although feminist protest with a high degree of confrontation accounts for a small part of feminist protest in the FRG, it deserves our attention. The protest activities and campaigns discussed in this study show that the scope and limits of feminist protest have developed and changed as a result of discussions within and between feminist groups, and in response to broader social and political developments.

The questions identified above can help us to develop a richer understanding of feminist protest in the FRG and of the role of feminist militancy in it. My analysis reveals that feminist protest cultures in post-WWII Germany were more dynamic and diverse than previous research suggests. I discuss activities that were perceived as nonviolent alongside others that were understood as violent, and analyse the interplay and effects of both. I anticipate that many readers will consider at least some of the events and campaigns discussed incompatible with feminist ethics. This, however, should not stop us from critically examining the causes, forms and consequences of militant and violent tactics in the context of feminist activism in the FRG. Precisely because they had the potential to provoke such reactions, the expressions of feminist militancy discussed in this study have triggered important discussions about the ethics and politics of feminist protest.

Notes

1. U. Frevert (1997), *Women in German History: From Bourgeois Emancipation to Sexual Liberation*, translated by Stuart McKinnon-Evans, Oxford and New York: Berg, 296.
2. G. Notz (2004), 'Die autonomen Frauenbewegungen der Siebzigerjahre: Entstehungsgeschichte, Organisationsformen, politische Konzepte', *Archiv für Zeitgeschichte*, 123–48, 133.
3. 'radikal autonome Feministinnen, die die patriarchale Geschlechterunterdrückung als grundlegende Strukturkategorie moderner Gesellschaften ansahen, und daher die Abschaffung des Patriarchats als oberstes Ziel verfolgten'; *ibid.*
4. 'sozialistische oder linke Feministinnen, die eine grundlegende Transformation der kapitalistischen und patriarchalen Verhältnisse anstrebten'; *ibid.*
5. I. Lenz (2010), *Die Neue Frauenbewegung in Deutschland: Abschied vom kleinen Unterschied: Eine Quellensammlung*, 2nd rev. edn, Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag, 25.
6. The Action Council for the Liberation of Women discussed in chapter 1 and other groups in the emerging feminist movement in West Germany showed an active interest in radical feminist texts from the United States.
7. M. Marx Ferree (2012), *Varieties of Feminism: German Gender Politics in Global Perspective*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 9.
8. E.M. Silies (2011), 'Ein, zwei, viele Bewegungen?' in C. Baumann, S. Gehrig and N. Büchse (eds), *Linksalternatives Milieu und Neue Soziale Bewegungen in den 1970er Jahren*, Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag Winter, 87–106, 94.
9. U. Gerhard (2002), 'The Women's Movement in West Germany', in G. Griffin and R. Braidotti (eds), *Thinking Differently*, London: Zed Books, 321–31, here 328–29.
10. See e.g. G. Notz (2006), *Warum flog die Tomate? Die autonomen Frauenbewegungen der Siebzigerjahre: Entstehungsgeschichte, Organisationsformen, politische Konzepte*, Neu-Ulm: AG-SPAK-Bücher.
11. Gerhard, 'The Women's Movement in West Germany', 329.
12. D. Della Porta (1995), *Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 24.
13. *Ibid.*, 24.
14. M. Klimke and J. Scharloth (2008), *1968 in Europe: A History of Protest and Activism, 1956–1977*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 100.
15. J. Varon (2004), *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 33.
16. 'nie ein traditionelles Verhältnis zu Erscheinungen wie Anarchismus, Abweichung usw. gehabt. . . Die Bereitschaft, den Abweichler als Staats- oder Volksfeind zu sehen, ist geblieben, – mindestens war sie bis Ende der 50er Jahre unverändert'; D. Claessens and K. de Ahna (1982), 'Das Milieu der Westberliner "Scene" und die "Bewegung 2. Juni"', in W. von Baeyer-Katte (ed.), *Gruppenprozesse*, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 20–181, 23.
17. W.D. Narr (2008), 'Der CDU- Staat (1949–1966)', in R. Roth and D. Rucht (eds), *Die Sozialen Bewegungen in Deutschland Seit 1945: Ein Handbuch*, Frankfurt and New York: Campus, 51–70.
18. R. Burns and W. van der Will (1988), *Protest and Democracy in West Germany: Extra-Parliamentary Opposition and the Democratic Agenda*, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 9.
19. S. Scheerer (1988), 'Die Ausgebürgerte Linke', in H. Hess et al. (eds), *Angriff auf das Herz des Staates. Soziale Entwicklung und Terrorismus*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 193–429, 221.
20. Klimke and Scharloth, *1968 in Europe*, 98.
21. W. Lindner (1996), *Jugendprotest seit den fünfziger Jahren: Dissens und kultureller Eigensinn*, Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 93.
22. The emergency legislation that the Grand Coalition passed in 1968 was met with fierce resistance from other political parties, from the extra-parliamentary opposition and a range of other

- groups, because it ‘threatened to expand the powers of the executive branch at the expense of constitutional rights in the event of an internal or external state emergency’; Klimke and Scharloth, *1968 in Europe*, 98.
23. For a more detailed discussion, see S. Reichardt (2008), ‘Große und Sozialliberale Koalition (1966–1974)’, in R. Roth and D. Rucht (eds), *Die Sozialen Bewegungen in Deutschland seit 1945: Ein Handbuch*, Frankfurt and New York: Campus, 71–91.
 24. See S. von Dirke (1997), *All Power to the Imagination! The West German Counterculture from the Student Movement to the Greens*, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 34.
 25. Della Porta, *Social Movements*, 37.
 26. SDS (Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund), not to be confused with the US movement of the same period, Students for a Democratic Society. Jeremy Varon’s comparative study *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and the Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies* offers a detailed discussion of the two student organizations and their roles in the development of militant politics in West Germany and the United States.
 27. For a detailed discussion of the development of the SDS and the APO, see T. Fichter and S. Lönnecker (1976), *Kleine Geschichte des SDS*, Berlin: Rotbuch Verlag; P. Richter (1998), ‘Die Außerparlamentarische Opposition in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1966 bis 1968’, in I. Gilcher-Holtey (ed.), *1968, Vom Ereignis zum Gegenstand der Geschichtswissenschaft*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 35–55.
 28. Klimke and Scharloth, *1968 in Europe*, 98–99.
 29. G. Diewald-Kerkmann (2009), *Frauen, Terrorismus und Justiz: Prozesse gegen weibliche Mitglieder der RAF und der Bewegung 2. Juni*, Düsseldorf: Droste, 51.
 30. See e.g. Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung and Feministisches Institut (eds) (1999), *Wie weit flog die Tomate? Eine 68erinnen-Gala der Reflexion*, Berlin: Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung; U. Kätzel (2002), *Die 68erinnen: Porträt einer rebellischen Frauengeneration*, Berlin: Rowohlt.
 31. Von Dirke, *All Power*, 33.
 32. I. Gilcher-Holtey (2008), ‘Kritische Theorie und Neue Linke’, in I. Gilcher-Holtey (ed.), *1968 – Vom Ereignis zum Mythos*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 223–47, 244.
 33. Klimke and Scharloth, *1968 in Europe*, 101.
 34. The term “Third World” was coined during the Cold War, and referred to countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Oceania, and has remained in use since, although it has been the subject of much criticism. Quinn Slobodian has shown that in the eyes of many foreign student activists in West Germany, this category “did not denote comparative backwardness or inferiority”; Q. Slobodian (2012), *Foreign Front: Third World Politics in Sixties West Germany*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 5. Rather, they saw it as a tool for their empowerment.
 35. Slobodian, *Foreign Front*, 17.
 36. T.S. Brown (2015), *West Germany and the Global Sixties: The Antiauthoritarian Revolt, 1962–1978*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 39.
 37. Della Porta, *Social Movements*, 37.
 38. T. Lindenberger and A. Lüdtke (eds) (1995), *Physische Gewalt: Studien zur Geschichte der Neuzeit*, 2nd edn, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 7.
 39. U. Kätzel (2005), ‘Geschlecht, Gewalt und Pazifismus. 1968 und die Anti-Vietnamkriegsbewegung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland’, in J.A. Davy, K. Hagemann and U. Kätzel (eds), *Frieden, Gewalt, Geschlecht: Friedens- und Konfliktforschung als Geschlechterforschung*, Essen: Klartext, 222–43, 233.
 40. K. Fahlenbrach (2002), *Protest-Inszenierungen: Visuelle Kommunikation und kollektive Identitäten in Protestbewegungen*, Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 166; Diewald-Kerkmann, *Frauen, Terrorismus und Justiz*, 31.
 41. Klimke and Scharloth, *1968 in Europe*, 97. While Klimke is right to point out that the Ohnesorg killing was a central moment in the West German protest movement, his description of the photograph here reinforces the gendered stereotype that women were more interested in fashion than in politics and played a largely passive role in the 1968 movement.

42. 'Urteil im Zwielflicht', *Der Spiegel*, 27 November 1967, 74.
43. Slobodian, *Foreign Front*, 132.
44. 'Gewalt ist constituens der Herrschaft und damit auch von unserer Seite mit demonstrativer und provokatorischer Gegengewalt zu beantworten. Die Form bestimmt sich durch die Form der Auseinandersetzung'; 'Wir fordern die Enteignung Axel Springers', *Der Spiegel*, 10 July 1967, 29–33, 32.
45. Della Porta, *Social Movements*, 37.
46. The 'Berlin Underground' is a name given to the alternative intellectual and youth subcultural scene in Berlin during the 1960s and 70s.
47. W. Kraushaar (2006), 'Die Tupamaros West-Berlin', in W. Kraushaar (ed.), *Die RAF und der linke Terrorismus*, Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 512–30, 527.
48. See e.g. H. Schlaeger and N. Vedder-Shults (1978), 'The West German Women's Movement', *New German Critique*, 59–68; E.H. Altbach (1984), 'The New German Women's Movement', *Signs* 9, 454–69; Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung and Feministisches Institut, *Wie weit flog die Tomate?*; K. Schulz (2002), *Der Lange Atem der Provokation: Die Frauenbewegung in der Bundesrepublik und in Frankreich, 1968–1976*, Frankfurt and New York: Campus; G. Notz (2006), *Warum flog die Tomate? Die autonomen Frauenbewegungen der Siebzigerjahre: Entstehungsgeschichte, Organisationsformen, politische Konzepte*, Neu-Ulm: AG-SPAK-Bücher; S. Hertrampf (2008), 'Ein Tomatenwurf und seine Folgen. Eine neue Welle des Frauenprotests in der BRD', in *bpb dossier*. Retrieved 1 March 2012 from <http://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/gender/frauenbewegung/35287/neue-welle-im-westen?p=0>; Gerhard, 'Frauenbewegung'; I. Lenz (2010), *Die Neue Frauenbewegung in Deutschland: Abschied vom kleinen Unterschied: Eine Quellensammlung*, 2nd rev. edn, Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag.
49. H. Sander (1999), 'Rede des Aktionsrates zur Befreiung der Frauen', in A. Conrad and K. Michalik (eds), *Quellen zur Geschichte der Frauen*, Stuttgart: Reclam, 358–68.
50. D.K. Leach (2009), 'An Elusive "We": Antidogmatism, Democratic Practice, and the Contradictory Identity of the German Autonomes', *American Behavioral Scientist* 52, 1042–68, 1044.
51. Although Weber's notion of the 'Gewaltmonopol des Staates' can also be translated as 'the monopoly of the use of legitimate force', the translation as 'monopoly of legitimate physical violence', as suggested by Rodney Livingstone and others, is better suited for my analysis; M. Weber et al. (2004), *The Vocation Lectures*, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub, 33.
52. For a detailed analysis of debates on militancy in internal movement publications, see S. Haunss (2004), *Identität in Bewegung: Prozesse kollektiver Identität bei den Autonomen und in der Schuulenbewegung*, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 169–89.
53. F. Anders and A. Sedlmaier (2013), 'The Limits of the Legitimate: The Quarrel over "Violence" between Autonomist Groups and the German Authorities', in W. Steinmetz, H.G. Haupt and I. Gilcher-Holtey (eds), *Writing Political History Today*, Frankfurt: Campus, 291–316, 296–97.
54. F. Anders (2006), 'Die Zeitschrift radikal und das Strafrecht', in F. Anders and I. Gilcher-Holtey (eds), *Herausforderungen des staatlichen Gewaltmonopols. Recht und politisch motivierte Gewalt am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts*, Frankfurt: Campus, 221–59, 231.
55. Leach, 'An Elusive "We"', 1050.
56. Haunss, *Identität in Bewegung*, 160–69.
57. P. Melzer (2012), "'Frauen gegen Imperialismus und Patriarchat zerschlagen den Herrschaftsapparat": autonome Frauen, linksradikaler feministischer Protest und Gewalt in Westdeutschland", in H. Balz and J.H. Friedrichs (eds), *All we ever wanted . . . eine Kulturgeschichte europäischer Protestbewegungen der 1980er Jahre*, Berlin: Dietz, 157–77, 175.
58. 'Wir sahen keine Hierarchie in verschiedenen Aktionsformen. Flugblatt verteilen, Besetzungen, Sprühaktionen, Schlösser verkleben, Steine schmeißen, Spreng- und Brandsätze legen – alles war wichtig, wenn es zusammengriff'; Die Rote Zora (1993), 'Mili's Tanz auf dem Eis. Von Pirouetten, Schleifen, Einbrüchen, doppelten Saltos und dem Versuch, Boden unter die Füße zu kriegen'. Retrieved 3 December 2015 from <http://www.freilassung.de/div/texte/rz/milis/milis1.htm>.

59. 'Wir selbst empfanden das Verlassen der uns zudiktierten weiblichen Friedfertigkeit bzw. die bewußte Entscheidung für gewalttätige Mittel in unserer Politik als ungeheuer befreiend. Wir erlebten, daß wir mit unseren Aktionen Angst, Ohnmacht und Resignation durchbrechen konnten, und wollten dies anderen Frauen/Lesben weiter vermitteln'; *ibid.* With the term 'women/lesbians', the Red Zora used an expression that was common in women's groups in West Germany. It was used to draw attention to the fact that the position of women and lesbians was related yet not always identical.
60. Chapter 2 offers a more detailed discussion of the RZ's notion of counter-violence.
61. For a more detailed analysis of feminist responses to the Red Zora, see K. Karcher (2015), 'How (not) to "Hollaback": Towards a transnational debate on the "Red Zora" and militant tactics in the feminist struggle against gender-based violence', *Feminist Media Studies*, DOI: 10.1080/14680777.2015.1093099.
62. Important studies of militancy in the British suffrage movement include M. Joannou and J. Purvis (1998), *The Women's Suffrage Movement: New Feminist Perspectives*, Manchester: Manchester University Press; Mayhall (2000), (2003); E.P. Ziarek (2008), 'Right to Vote or Right to Revolt? Arendt and the British Suffrage Militancy', *differences* 3(19), 1–27; J. Purvis (2013), 'Gendering the Historiography of the Suffragette Movement in Edwardian Britain: Some Reflections', *Women's History Review* 4(22), 576–90; L.N. Mayhall (2003), *The Militant Suffrage Movement: Citizenship and Resistance in Britain, 1860–1930*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
63. L.N. Mayhall (2000), 'Defining Militancy: Radical Protest, the Constitutional Idiom, and Women's Suffrage in Britain, 1908–1909', *Journal of British Studies* 39, 340–71, 341.
64. Mayhall, *The Militant Suffrage Movement*, 8.
65. U. Frevert (1986), *Frauen-Geschichte: Zwischen bürgerlicher Verbesserung und neuer Weiblichkeit*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 74.
66. 'Einige wenige Frauen gaben sich mit Zuhören, Unterstützen und Petitionieren nicht zufrieden, sondern halfen beim Barrikadenbau und kämpften auf der Seite der demokratischen Freischaren gegen das Militär'; *ibid.*
67. J.A. Davy (2005), "Manly" and "Feminine" Antimilitarism', in J.A. Davy, K. Hagemann and U. Kätzel (eds), *Frieden, Gewalt, Geschlecht: Friedens- und Konfliktforschung als Geschlechterforschung*, Essen: Klartext, 144–63, 160.
68. 'eine Geschichte wiederholter Rückschläge, Stillstände und vieler mühsamer Neuanfänge unter immer wieder veränderten gesellschaftlichen und politischen Bedingungen'; U. Gerhard (2008), 'Frauenbewegung', in R. Roth and D. Rucht (eds), *Die Sozialen Bewegungen in Deutschland seit 1945*, Frankfurt and New York: Campus, 188–217, 191.
69. According to Tobias Wunschik, the core of the group consisted in autumn 1977 of exactly twenty members; T. Wunschik (2006), 'Die Bewegung 2. Juni', in W. Kraushaar (ed.), *Die RAF und der linke Terrorismus*, Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 531–61, 472.
70. S.V. Vukadinović (2013), 'Spätreflex. Eine Fallstudie zu den Revolutionären Zellen, der Roten Zora und zur verlängerten Feminismus-Obsession bundesdeutscher Terrorismusfahnder', in I. Bandhauer-Schöffmann and D. van der Laak (eds), *Der Linksterrorismus der 1970er-Jahre und die Ordnung der Geschlechter*, Trier: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 140–61, 147f.
71. Retrieved 21 November 2015 from <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/militant>. According to the Duden definition, 'militant' means 'mit bewusst kämpferischem Anstrich für eine Überzeugung eintretend'. Retrieved 21 November 2015 from <http://www.duden.de/rechtschreibung/militant>.
72. C. Scribner (2015), *After the Red Army Faction: Gender, Culture, and Militancy*, New York: Columbia University Press, 13.
73. H. Kämper and E. Link (2013), *Wörterbuch zum Demokratiediskurs 1967/68*, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 679–80. Retrieved 4 November 2015 from <http://alltitles.ebrary.com/Doc?id=10861362>.
74. *Ibid.*, 680.

75. K. Hanshew (2012), *Terror and Democracy in West Germany*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 35.
76. 'Das ist es wohl, was den Frauen, wie allen unterdrückten und gedemütigten Gruppen, am meisten ausgetrieben worden ist: der Mut zum Hass! Was wäre eine Freiheitsbewegung ohne Hass? Ohne die Frage: Gehen wir wirklich weit genug? Sind wir wirklich nicht feige? Machen wir uns wirklich nichts vor? Reicht unsere Solidarität auch für die, die nicht, nicht mehr, die Nerven haben, dieses ganze himmelschreiende Unrecht immer nur in "Besonnenheit" lösen zu wollen? Mut zur Militanz war noch nie eine deutsche Spezialität. Dennoch ergriff er in dieser Zeit auch deutsche Frauen'; A. Schwarzer (1981), *So fing es an! 10 Jahre Frauenbewegung*, Cologne: Emma-Frauenverlag, 24.
77. M. Gebhardt (2012), *Alice im Niemandsland – Wie die deutsche Frauenbewegung die Frauen verlor*, Munich: DVA. For a similarly critical account, see B. Mika (1998), *Alice Schwarzer. Eine kritische Biographie*, Reinbek: Rowohlt.
78. B. hooks (2000), *Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center*, Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 28.
79. P. Melzer (2015), *Death in the Shape of a Young Girl: Women's Political Violence in the Red Army Faction*, New York: New York University Press, 29.
80. *Ibid.*, 69.
81. See e.g. Geronimo (1990), *Feuer und Flamme*, Berlin: Edition ID Archiv; Haunss, *Identität in Bewegung*; Anders, 'Die Zeitschrift radikal und das Strafrecht'; Melzer, 'Frauen gegen Imperialismus und Patriarchat'.