Introduction

Growing Together?
Processes and Problems of German Unification

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In contrast to the accolades given to the “peaceful revolution” in 2009, the subsequent celebrations of the twentieth anniversary of German unification remained curiously muted. No doubt the political class was pleased with its achievement of reuniting the two hostile parts of the country in a peaceful fashion: “Never in its history has Germany been so democratic, law-abiding and social.”¹ But in private conversations an introspective mood prevailed. Especially in the new-old capital of Berlin, colleagues were telling each other their complicated life stories in order to illustrate the gains or losses of the transformation after 1990. At the same time, political leaders pleaded for “sober patriotism” to be combined with tolerance, modesty, and solidarity. Rather than being obsessed with measuring the slow progress toward “inner unity,” most public commentary treated unification as the new normalcy and mused about how to live with its consequences in the future.²

After four decades of Germany’s division into ideologically opposed camps, it should not have been surprising that the process of coming together would be complicated. The accession of bankrupt postcommunist states to a successful Western-style country created additional difficulties. Since many Easterners were overwhelmed by the imposition of Western patterns, intellectuals like Hans-Joachim Maaz grumbled that their efforts to adapt were insufficiently appreciated. At the same time Western columnists like Arnulf Baring pointed to the ingratitude of former GDR citizens for the massive financial transfers, articulating a widespread resentment

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against their sacrifices. \(^3\) Academic opinion also remains split between pessimists who emphasize the noticeable gap in material indicators and the contrast in political attitudes, and optimists who stress the considerable progress in living standards and the basic agreement on democratic values. \(^4\) Has the glass become half full or does it remain half empty?

One key issue in the debate about the problems of unification is the causal weight to be assigned to the disastrous GDR legacy versus the deficiencies of the parliamentary democracy of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Of course, there is ample evidence pointing to the negative aftereffects of the SED, such as the ubiquity of Stasi corruption, the decrepitude of the planned economy, and the devastation of the environment, not to mention the psychological contortions caused by living under a dictatorship. \(^5\) But one can find equal reasons to decry the depredations of casino capitalism, the excessiveness of the personnel purge, or the need to reform the FRG system, all of which are compounded by the frequent arrogance of Western advisors. \(^6\) Hence, the complaints of both popular clichés of Jammerossis and Besserwessis seem to have a point. Moreover, their mutual misunderstanding is compounded by an underlying ideological polarization: while an anti-communist Right harps on the need to remove the noxious debris left by the GDR, an anti-fascist Left prefers to criticize the heartlessness of the competitive FRG. \(^7\)

The scholarly literature is only moderately helpful in assessing the course and results of German unification, since it is itself part of the intellectual discussion. The well-funded social science effort to research the “post-communist transformation” in Eastern Europe that largely focused on the democratization of the political system seems to have fizzled out. \(^8\) In the German context the transition was also overshadowed by the discussion of the progress of unification, which inhibited a comparative perspective. Due to the temporal proximity of the events and the lack of access to official documentation, few historians have so far dared to address the issue of unification. When they have written about the last two decades, as Andreas Wirsching has done, they have focused on social changes and the impact of globalization. \(^9\) Interdisciplinary efforts to explore different facets of unification in essay collections have remained tentative because of the disagreement about how to turn their respective pieces into a larger mosaic. \(^10\) Therefore a comprehensive assessment is still sorely needed.

Crucial for such an evaluation is the development of criteria that make the implicit assumptions about what constitutes unity explicit. To gain perspective it might be helpful to look at the precedent of the founding of the first national state in 1871, the degree of coherence in other federal systems like the United States, or the success of the transformation of other postcommunist states. \(^11\) Such references suggest that the effort at
“creating equivalent living conditions” (Herstellung gleichwertiger Lebensverhältnisse), mandated by the Basic Law, need not produce complete equality, but rather narrow the socio-economic differences. Similarly, joining disparate political cultures does not require agreement on every issue, but implies the need to respect other opinions as legitimate in debate. Crucial is the acceptance of a common constitutional framework for resolving conflict as well as the existence of a shared sense of cultural identity that allows a plurality of views. With these qualifications in mind, the following remarks will examine five policy areas in order to ascertain the successes and failures of the unification process during its first two decades.

**Political Process**

The chief political issue in the debate is the stability of democracy in the new states in the East. Even cautious Western commentators, like Gero Neugebauer, who concede differences in the approval of democracy, point to the establishment of a national party system, the realignment of conflict structures, and the push for more participation as indicators of a growing consensus. More skeptical Eastern observers like Heinrich Bortfeldt stress the asymmetrical character of unification, the disappointment of the civic movement in the “rule of law,” the permanent minority position of the smaller third of the country, and the discrediting of the GDR through media scandalization, which makes Easterners “feel like strangers in their new home.” Stressing a comparative perspective, American scholars like Helga Welsh challenge these simple dichotomies by pointing toward the important role of the unification discourse in the media as focused on the elusive concept of inner unity, which highlights the process’ shortcomings rather than its accomplishments. Such divergent evaluations raise the question: how deeply rooted is democracy in the East and the West?

On a formal level the incorporation of East Germany into the expanded Federal Republic has been remarkably smooth, since it was already prepared by the peaceful revolution. Led by dissidents, the mobilization of the masses in large scale demonstrations produced pressure for a democratization of the GDR during the fall of 1989: the bloc parties began to emancipate themselves, the pseudo-parliament (Volkskammer) started to have contested votes, and the SED-led government transformed itself into a real coalition that even accepted opposition ministers without portfolio, thereby infusing the existing constitutional structures with real political life. The banners, slogans, assemblies, and discussions of the civic movement produced a moment of intoxicating politicization in which citizens vented their frustration and participated in decision making through the
numerous roundtables. However, this popular movement did not create new institutions but rather culminated in the election campaign of March 1990 that restored the functioning of parliamentary democracy in the crumbling GDR.12

By eliminating the alternative of an all-German constitutional convention, accession according to paragraph 23 of the Basic Law mandated the transfer of existing FRG institutions to the East. The political parties that had cooperated in the first free elections began to merge during the summer of 1990, although their membership structure continued to differ. In preparation for incorporation, the de Maizière government also dissolved the administrative districts and restored the Länder that had existed up to 1952 in order to fit East Germany into the federal structure. At the same time, the cities, towns, and rural areas reclaimed their self-government, providing a local underpinning of democratic administration. Finally, independent interest groups and organizations such as trade unions and employers’ associations also spread to the East, taking the place of the SED’s “transmission belts” and reviving civil society. Both revolutionary experience and Western aid propelled this transformation process, quickly substituting Western structures during the self-dissolution of the GDR.13

For all of its speed, the results of this political import have been somewhat ambiguous because it has taken time for East Germans to grow into the new institutions. To begin with, in March 1990 the dissidents who had led the democratic awakening were relegated to the parliamentary margin due to their reluctance about unification and their amateurish campaign style. At the same time, the postcommunist Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) succeeded in capitalizing on Eastern resentment against Western tutelage to establish itself as strong regional party with participation in some state governments. Moreover, the moderate Social Democratic Party (SPD) paid for its unwillingness to accept reform Communists with weaker representation in the new states than in the West. Even in the victorious CDU, East German members found themselves in a permanent minority position, muting their voices in decision making. Very few Easterners like Angela Merkel or Joachim Gauck therefore ascended to national prominence. Even the creation of an Eastern caucus in the Bundestag and Bundesrat could only partially counteract Western paternalism.14

The achievement of “inner unity” in political culture has also been lagging, since East Germans often feel like second-class citizens whose lives are insufficiently appreciated. The critique of the SED dictatorship and the scandalization of Stasi collaboration have created a widespread feeling of disparagement, because former GDR citizens see themselves as more closely identified with the political system than the privatized people in
the FRG. As a result, representative surveys reveal more skepticism of democracy with only every third respondent satisfied with its current form. At the same time only every fourth East German favors the social market economy. Moreover, in comparing individual freedom with social solidarity, the new citizens choose the latter considerably more often than do West German respondents. While most East Germans consider their personal economic situation to be positive, they tend to be more pessimistic about the general outlook for the future. Though only one-eighth want the GDR back, this discrepancy reveals a considerably weaker attachment to parliamentary democracy in the East than in the West.\textsuperscript{15}

In a formal sense the political transformation has been successful, as it avoided the conflict and turbulence usually associated with a fundamental change in systems. Within a relatively short period of time, East Germans could enjoy the fruits of a proven order—such as the rule of law and a competent administration—based on West German patterns transferred wholesale. But this regulated transition to a ready-made system also exacted a considerable price in foreclosing alternatives and blocking potential exceptions that would have preserved some presumed Eastern advantages. In the process, not only were discredited SED elites replaced, but the new citizens were relegated to the role of passive learners rather than active creators. Compared to the transition in other East Central European states, the fundamental asymmetry of a discredited system joining a successful concern left little room for newcomers to find their own way. While the subsequent metamorphosis of the PDS into the Left Party in the West signals the arrival of a five-party system on a national level, the embrace of democracy remains a work in progress.\textsuperscript{16}

In psychological terms, the unification process has also left a series of scars which will take time to heal. In contrast to the self-determined transition of the East European neighbors, the transformation of the GDR has been largely managed by West Germans, fitting the five new federal states into the existing FRG pattern without sufficient attention to their experiences before and during the peaceful revolution. Hence many new citizens have felt overwhelmed and resent having exchanged their Communist masters for Western politicians, administrators, and journalists. Though some civil society groups sought to initiate an East-West dialogue, President Richard von Weizsäcker’s advice to listen to each other’s life stories has all too often been ignored. Even after realizing some of the advantages of the rule of law, many East Germans still feel like second-class citizens, because their struggles were not sufficiently appreciated.\textsuperscript{17} Only by seizing the opportunities created by unification is the younger generation likely to overcome this difference, based on wounded pride.
Economic Problems

In the economic realm, the discussion continues to revolve around the reasons for the underperformance of the Eastern economy: was it the legacy of Communist mismanagement or the ruthlessness of the capitalist takeover? West German analysts like Wolfgang Seibel tend to stress the importance of Eastern wishes for currency parity as well as union demands for equality of wages, while arguing that the Trusteeship Agency (Treuhandanstalt), founded by the Modrow government, was a success since its privatization policy represented an institutional solution to an unprecedented problem of conversion. In contrast, East German intellectuals like Rainer Land still regret the failure of the potential alliance between SED reformers and civic activists that led to the Western domination of unification, which resulted in the collapse of many GDR companies and the creation of a fragmented economy that shows promise in some complementary areas. Ironically, the American historian Jonathan Zatlin is actually more critical of “putting the monetary cart before the economic horse” and of the lack of countercyclical spending. Will East Germany remain a Mezzogiorno or is it on the way to recovery at last?

The economics of unification proved surprisingly problematic, since the GDR factories were more decrepit than anyone realized. The key decisions about the form of the transition were already made with the offer of a currency, custom, and social union that recalled the nineteenth-century Zollverein as a step toward incorporation into a unified Germany. Critics often forget that it was pressure by the East German citizens, expressed by the slogan “if the DM does not come to us, we will go to it,” that forced an excessive conversion rate of 1:1.5, though actual buying power was closer to 1:4.4. The impending state bankruptcy, continuing migration to the West, and limited window of diplomatic opportunity left decision makers little choice, even if many economists, like Bundesbank chief Karl Otto Pöhl, would have preferred a more gradual transition. Similarly, the Trusteeship Agency, first proposed by the civic movement and only then transformed into a privatization device, did not make a profit from disposing of publicly owned property but rather had to sell companies at an enormous loss.18

Instead of generating “flourishing landscapes,” as promised by Chancellor Kohl, the introduction of the social market economy produced a veritable “unification crisis” in the new states.19 The insufficiently understood reason for the adjustment shock was a double transition, from plan to market and from protection to global competition, that exposed the inherent weakness of Günter Mittag’s Kombinate. Since labor productivity in the East was only about one-third of that in the West, most Eastern goods were suddenly priced out of the market. Moreover, the previous barter
trade with the East European neighbors collapsed due to the conversion of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) to convertibility, since these states could now buy cheaper and better products on the world market. At the same time, East German consumers contributed to the disaster by rejecting their own goods for the more attractively packaged Western wares that were only sometimes of superior quality. The result was a massive deindustrialization that shut down about two-thirds of East German factories within the first two years.²⁰

The consequences of the unification shock for the Eastern standard of living were paradoxical, since they combined job losses with gains in consumption. The initial collapse of Fordist production and its replacement with less manpower-intensive industries led to a drop in the work force from 8.9 to 5.8 million. Since more Easterners than Westerners wanted to work, the result was structural unemployment at twice the Western rate that peaked in 1997 and again in 2004/05 at over 19 percent, two times the level in the old FRG. This figure did not even count people parked in retraining schemes (the infamous “ABM positions”) or sent into early retirement, which affected women more than men. The Western social security systems cushioned these job losses with massive transfers to new clients who had never paid into them. Propelled by union pressure, Eastern wages quickly rose to about four-fifths of the Western rate, increasing buying power in the new states. Social protests were largely avoided, since Easterners were soon able to afford the same level of consumer goods as their Western cousins.²¹

Though initially dynamic, the subsequent catch-up process eventually stalled, creating the specter of a German Mezzogiorno permanently left behind. To jump-start the economy, the Kohl cabinet launched a German Unity Fund and a 7.5 percent surcharge on the income tax that financed the transfer of about 2 trillion Euros to the new states. These funds repaired infrastructure, renovated housing, and provided a safety net, triggering a rapid growth until the late 1990s. But after the IT bubble burst, East German production no longer expanded, freezing the gap in productivity at three-quarters and production levels at four-fifths of those of the old FRG. While agriculture was highly successful due to the larger unit size inherited from the collective farms (LPG), many newly created small businesses failed, and much of the modernized manufacturing remained under Western control. Deindustrialized towns like Hoyerswerda and many rural areas lost population when young women, especially, moved away. Yet around other cities like Leipzig, Dresden, Jena, and Berlin, growth continued, showing not just decline but also a new dynamism.²²

The prospects for the East German economy therefore remain unsettled, pointing toward a fragmented pattern of contradictory developments.
Part of this disappointment must be attributed to the legacy of the GDR, which was much worse than the official claim of being the tenth leading industrial state suggested. But the severity of the adjustment was also a product of the triumph of politics over economics, since the desire of the East German people for instant access to Western prosperity produced decisions like implementing an excessive conversion rate and a rapid rise in wages that undercut their capacity to compete. While aggregate statistics show a perpetuation of the East-West gap, more differentiated regional data reveal a contradictory pattern of decline in some areas and actual growth in others. If the self-fulfilling prophecy of further contraction is to be stopped, it will be necessary to reverse the negative image perpetuated by the media and to tell more of the Eastern success stories. In terms of labor flexibility, the East is already ahead of the West in adjusting to global competition.23

The negative publicity in the national media about Eastern stagnation has exaggerated the difficulties of economic adjustment. Aggregate statistics that show a continuing gap in income and productivity mask the decline of some Eastern towns like Brandenburg that have lost key industries like steel and the rise of other neighboring cities like Potsdam that are already surpassing troubled areas in the West. While the East is still losing population, especially in outlying rural areas, its lower wage levels and more flexible labor contracts have retained some industries and favored other start-ups. No doubt, the collapse of the Kombinate and the rapid privatization have shifted ownership of large companies to the old FRG, but a new Mittelstand of smaller innovative firms is gradually emerging in the new states, not only supplying the big manufacturers, but also becoming more competitive in exporting products to the neighboring countries.24 Only when such hopeful developments outweigh the continuing contraction in other areas will the East begin to prosper again as a whole.

Social Upheaval

More diffuse in its issues, the social debate turns on the impact of different experiences on East-West communication that have complicated the process of the East and West adapting to each other. Taking as an example women as potential losers of unification, Western feminists like Ute Gerhard still resent their exclusion from political decisions and ponder whether their own gender theory, which stressed that “the private is political,” contributed to the misunderstandings with Eastern advocates of pragmatic equality. Eastern feminists like Ingrid Miethe point to the practical emancipation of GDR women, who are proud of reconciling work
and family, which made them resent Western discursive dominance and produced recriminations rather than mutual understanding. American observers like Myra Marx Ferree take a comparative view instead, stressing that through global influences and European Union (EU) pressure some of the GDR solutions like public child care are coming back into the debate. The initial lack of understanding among feminists raises the more general question: how is the surprisingly difficult process of social convergence actually to succeed?

The social transformation yielded much frustration, since expectations of sameness at the time of the fall of 1989 quickly turned into realizations of difference due to decades of separate development. As the pictures of people dancing on the Wall show, the initial encounters were often joyful, with strangers embracing each other, because they allowed the resumption of personal ties that had been severed for so long. But the removal of the barrier also revealed how much Germans on both sides of the Iron Curtain had grown apart in their lifestyles and values due to their communist or democratic experiences. Moreover, the meeting was not of equals, since the Westerners were politically and economically dominant, relegating Easterners to the role of poor relations. Even among groups like athletes or academics, who were engaged in similar pursuits, there were deep misunderstandings, since the different contexts had produced contrasting experiences that hampered communication and cooperation. Social responses to unification ranged from defensive withdrawal to eager exploration of difference.

Coping with the Westernization of Eastern society required a wrenching adjustment from collectivism to individualism in outlook and behavior. With the end of the GDR the vaunted Kollektiv of the tutelary state, mass organization membership, and institutions like polyclinics collapsed, removing a protective cocoon. Suddenly, the fresh FRG citizens were faced with new responsibilities, having to fill out tax returns or life insurance forms and needing to resist the blandishments of consumer credit, lest they bankrupt themselves. Much of their repertoire of coping mechanisms became worthless, since personal connections such as “vitamin B” (Beziehungen) which made negotiating the rules of a dictatorial system possible, were no longer useful. In contrast to the Eastern response of not wanting to stick out, post-1968 Western behavior put a premium on self-assertion and lifestyle dramatization—routines that seemed strange and irrelevant. Autobiographical accounts like Jana Hensel’s or Ingo Schulze’s stories describe the difficulties of negotiating this unknown terrain in which different rules applied.

As in other historical upheavals, German unification turned social hierarchies upside down, creating both winners and losers in the process.
Predictably enough, the overthrow of the SED system cost the party Nomenklatura, officers in the People’s Army and the State Security Service, and other regime-related personnel their privileges. Also displaced in the institutional transformation were many intellectuals, dismissed for political involvement, incompetence, or lack of funding, who then became spokespeople for Eastern victimization. At the same time former regime opponents, active members of the churches, and surviving bourgeois professionals who had suffered from restrictions under the SED dictatorship now had a chance to advance into leadership positions previously denied to them. While the middle generation had the hardest time adjusting, people close to retirement age profited from the higher pensions and the young had new opportunities to learn and travel. A new elite of successful politicians, businessmen, and professionals therefore faced an older group of resentful victims of the transformation.

The transfer of Western institutions was both necessary and problematic, because the Eastern arrangements had to be fit into the national pattern, yet some of the imports were themselves already in need of reform. For instance, the huge GDR Academy of Sciences was broken up in order to make its institutes compatible with the decentralized structure of the Max-Plank, Helmholtz, and Leibniz Societies of the FRG, setting free superfluous personnel. Similarly, the democratic restructuring of the universities that made them internationally competitive again was achieved at the cost of dismissing many Eastern faculty and hiring Western newcomers. During this housecleaning, too many SED-tainted institutions like youth centers or culture houses, which might have been worth preserving, were shut down. Only a few GDR legacies, such as the secular Jugendweihe that replaced a religious confirmation, survived. Ironically, a decade later some of the dissolved institutions like walk-in clinics or infant care centers returned in new guises as a result of overdue all-German or EU-inspired reforms.

Has the enlarged Federal Republic therefore, as critics maintain, become “one state with two societies”? On the one hand, some social indicators point to a lingering difference: East Germans tend to be less well off; their poverty rate was 17 percent in contrast to the Western figure of 12 percent in 2005. Initially, Eastern women also engaged in a birth strike, dropping the reproduction rate even below that of their Western counterparts. Though 1.5 million Westerners have moved East since 1990, fifty thousand more Easterners migrate westward each year, depopulating entire areas. But on the other hand, life expectancy has increased by about a decade since unification, indicating that East Germans have become much healthier. Moreover, household income is approaching Western levels so that levels of ownership of consumer durables have become virtually identical. As a result, survey scores with regard to life satisfaction and
other indicators are approximating each other in East and West. The evidence therefore points toward a narrowing of differences in a long-term process of halting integration.\textsuperscript{30}

A case in point is the negative impact of the transformations unification has triggered for women. Western feminists found their agenda stopped in its tracks, because the task of helping the East trumped increasing gender equality. Many Eastern women, nine-tenths of whom worked, also found themselves unemployed, because the struggling companies shed the social services and white-collar jobs in which they concentrated. Moreover, the abortion controversy threatened what had been a practical right in the GDR since 1972. In contrast, gains such as freedom to travel, easier access to supplies, and better provision of fashionable consumer goods failed to outweigh the reduction of child-care services. Moreover, Western autonomous feminists, bent on an ideological agenda, and Eastern women’s activists, intent on improving their daily lives, talked at cross-purposes. Only the realization that women in the old and the new states were equally affected by the new “risk society” and pressure from the EU improved communication so as to help develop a common response to these challenges.\textsuperscript{31}

\textbf{Cultural Conflict}

The acrimonious cultural debates generally focus on the loyalty of prominent East German writers to the SED dictatorship and their criticism of the confusing pop culture of the Federal Republic. By looking at poems, short stories, and novels, Western scholars like Klaus R. Scherpe explain the demise of GDR literature as a result of the loss of the privileged role of its authors, the failure of their socialist ideology, and their lack of understanding of the rules of consumer culture. East German academics like Frank Hörmigk instead resent the Western discrediting of their own past and recount shocking experiences of displacement of Eastern intellectuals from their positions, rejecting the superficial condemnation of GDR literature which has created deep alienation between East and West. North American \textit{Germanisten} like Frank Trommler offer a broader Cold War framework to account for the collapse of the Eastern “reading culture” due to the loss of its therapeutic function in the Western media landscape. These interventions raise the troubling question: does this cultural commentary merely reflect personal disappointments or does it offer a deeper understanding of the historic upheaval?

The cultural response to the democratic awakening was so ambivalent because intellectuals who had spearheaded the protests felt betrayed by
the aroused citizens who rejected their dreams for a Third Way. The struggle against censorship led to an outpouring of wit in shouted slogans, funny placards, and critical statements—venting decades of frustration over the limitation of free speech by the SED. Rock musicians, actors, and writers were some of the first calling for the lifting of censorship and discrediting the ruling old men by satire. But with the dissolution of institutions like the Writers’ League, which had guaranteed their income and other privileges, state support for culture vanished, so that authors now found themselves at the mercy of an unknown market for cultural production. Moreover, the revival of open debate robbed them of their special position within society where they served as a substitute channel of public expression and as conscience for the ruling party. In the end, their project of democratizing socialism was overtaken by popular demands for the Western social market economy.

One ironic result of the transformation was the marginalization of Eastern intellectuals in the national German cultural institutions and media landscape. With readership plummeting, many party organs were forced to shut down since Easterners preferred the glossier presentation of *Bild* or *Super-Illu*. Western news corporations bought up Eastern papers and radio and TV stations and purged their leadership of Communist personnel, though in the ranks some Eastern journalists tended to survive. The newly formed regional conglomerates catered to a provincial Eastern media taste. While some GDR stars like Kurt Masur profited from the liberalization, other artists lost their safe positions in exchange for gaining more freedom of cultural expression. Since most Western readers were only mildly interested in what went on in the new states, the leading papers and media outlets hired few Easterners like Friedrich Dieckmann. Unused to market competition, many of the new foundations of 1989 like *Die Anderen* went under, meaning that Easterners found their voices muffled in the national debates.

Confronting the past of the SED dictatorship was also complicated by the resolve to do a better job with Communism than with National Socialism the second time around. Since prominent writers like Christa Wolf had defended Socialism while trying to reform it, Western literary critics fiercely attacked the failure of Eastern authors to distance themselves from the regime in a veritable writers’ quarrel (*Literaturstreit*). The controversy escalated through the Stasi-scandalization of the media, when it was discovered that even such avant-garde poets and darlings of the Prenzlauer Berg scene like Sascha Anderson had worked for the ministry for state security. Many former dissidents and regime victims who had suffered in prisons like Hohenschönhausen or Bautzen denounced the GDR as an *Unrechtsstaat*, an illegitimate state not respecting the rule of law. Moreover,
a Bundestag Commission of Inquiry held two sets of widely publicized hearings to discredit the SED dictatorship. No wonder that with so much negative publicity many East Germans felt attacked, having their life histories disparaged retrospectively.35

Not surprisingly, disappointment with transition problems and resentment against wholesale condemnation inspired a nostalgic longing for an idealized GDR, called (N-)Ostalgie. The loss of familiar objects of material culture and difficulties in adapting to an unknown Western system made many East Germans recall their earlier life with fondness. In retrospect, the once-grey GDR looked comforting, making even the vexing standing in line remembered as “a community of solidarity.” Businessmen quickly discovered that they could make money by catering to tastes for Eastern rock music, selling revived Eastern brands in special Ostshops and treating the GDR as a somewhat scary memory park.36 Ironically, the commercialization of these longings created a posthumous East German identity that fed on hurt pride. Nonetheless, the claim that this Ostalgie amounted to a new East German ethnicity is an exaggeration, since most citizens of the new states have arrived in the FRG at least as members of their respective states like Saxony or Brandenburg.37 Also, Westerners reacted to the disappearance of the old FRG with a sense of Westalgie.

Due to such contestation, the vanished GDR has become a lively site of cultural production, ranging from literary efforts to media representations and commemorations. Almost in ritualized fashion, critics of unification like Daniela Dahn decry East German discrimination while defenders like Richard Schroeder blame the SED for most current difficulties.38 At the same time writers like Uwe Tellkamp communicate their ambivalent recollections of growing up in a dissolving GDR in ambitious novels like Der Turm.39 Filmmakers present partly ironic, partly dramatic representations of East German realities in successful movies like Goodbye Lenin or Lives of Others that manage to convey some of the dreams and disenchantments under communism. By now the SED regime has even been turned into a family soap opera Weissensee on TV, indicating that the topic has become safe enough for entertainment.40 Yet the memorialization of the GDR by the Federal Government and the Berlin Senate is likely to remain controversial since it conveys conflicting lessons of anti-totalitarianism or of participatory democracy.41

In the cultural response to unification writers lament about loss of their special position rather than welcome their new creative possibilities. Eugen Ruge’s prizewinning novel In Zeiten des abnehmenden Lichts presents a swan song of the inevitable end of the GDR, but does not really suggest much hope for a better future. The book describes the failure of the anti-fascist grandparent generation to create a better socialism due to its prole-
tarian illusions as well as the inability of the parent cohort to rebel against Stalinist repression. But the self-portrait of the children is also depressing, since the narrator fails to create a new life in the Federal Republic and is left to die in a provincial Mexican hotel overlooking a Pacific beach. The powerful descriptions conjure up the progressive erosion of the utopian faith in socialism and the subsequent disillusionment about the heartlessness of capitalist consumer society. Whether with irony, nostalgia, or regret, much post-communist literature continues to be fixated on the grey GDR past rather than on a more colorful European future.

International Normalization

The emotional debate regarding foreign policy revolves around the implications of “normalization,” searching for an appropriate role for the revived German national state in Europe and the world. Western commentators like Beate Neuss stress the partial revision of the paradigm of a “civilian power” toward accepting military missions abroad, necessitated by the Balkan Wars and legitimized by the Constitutional Court, which allowed Bundeswehr troops to participate in multilateral combat assignments beyond self-defense in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) area. Eastern foreign policy specialists like Erhard Crome vehemently oppose this broadened reading of the Basic Law, claiming that the Two-Plus-Four Treaty forbids any use of military force in humanitarian interventions and betraying a deep suspicion of NATO as a Western alliance. Distanced U.S. observers like Andrew Port also criticize the unpredictability of German behavior, including the refusal to get involved in the second Iraq War or in the liberation of Libya, as irresponsible, since it did not follow Washington’s lead. This dispute poses the question: what should be the correct role of the enlarged Federal Republic abroad?

In contrast to the difficulties with achieving “inner unity,” the impact of unification on the course of German foreign policy has been more muted. Initially, the specter of an enlarged FRG revived historic fears of German expansionism among political elites and editorial writers in Israel, Britain, France, and Poland, just to name a few. But the joyful images of the fall of the wall kindled a sympathetic response among neighboring populations. Moreover, East European dissidents realized that their road to Europe led through a reunited Germany. While U.S. President George Bush supported unification from the beginning, it took much persuasion to bring François Mitterrand on board through the promise of a common currency, and to persuade Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev with the offer of economic help to allow not just self-determination but also NATO
membership. In the end the Two-Plus-Four negotiations seized the chance finally to solve the “German problem” through accepted frontiers, renunciation of ABC weapons and a considerable reduction in the size of the Bundeswehr.\textsuperscript{44}

Even after unification the new Federal Republic preferred to behave as a “civilian power,” avoiding unilateral acts of force and fostering international cooperation.\textsuperscript{45} On the one hand, West Germans had been culturally demilitarized after the Second World War, leading many young men to reject military service even in a civilianized Bundeswehr that understood itself as “citizens in uniform.” On the other hand, the East German peace movement had rejected the communist militarism of the National People’s Army (NVA), while the SED peace propaganda against the West left a legacy of suspicion of NATO.\textsuperscript{46} As long as it was a “semi-sovereign state,” the old FRG had been able to hide under the American nuclear umbrella, preferring to pursue its interests through negotiation and, if necessary, through DM diplomacy. In contrast to the assertive Empire or aggressive Third Reich, the foreign policy culture of the Federal Republic was therefore characterized by multilateralism and consultation within NATO or the EU. Rejecting its domineering legacy, Germany had come to embrace the promotion of peace.

In response to international expectations, the FRG gradually reinterpreted these precepts, leading to a slow “normalization” in accepting more responsibility. Part of the problem was the prohibition of the Basic Law, formulated to prevent another world war, which allowed participation in collective security measures and use of force only in cases of self-defense (Articles 24 and 87a). Though Bonn refused to join in the first Gulf War, the Constitutional Court in 1994 ruled, in order to allow peacekeeping in the Balkans, that German soldiers could participate in actions of collective security as long as a Bundestag majority approved their deployment on a case-by-case basis, such as the Stabilization Force (SFOR) mission to pacify Bosnia. When the Kosovo crisis confronted the red-green cabinet with the request to authorize combat, Foreign Minister Fischer turned the “never again Auschwitz” slogan around to argue that Germans should not tolerate genocide at their doorstep. Yet sending troops to Afghanistan was initially justified as “reconstruction,” and remained controversial when it looked more like war.\textsuperscript{47}

Though returning to the center of Europe, united Germany continued to see itself as “a middle power,” acting more regionally than globally. No doubt, Gerhard Schroeder embraced a more assertive style than Helmut Kohl, openly speaking of “national interest” and pursuing a permanent seat in the United Nations’ Security Council. In negotiations about the EU budget, the red-green coalition was no longer content to offer more Ger-
man money in order to facilitate compromise. Similarly, Berlin refused to go along with the preventive war against Iraq unleashed by President George W. Bush, because it considered the justification of “weapons of mass destruction” or al-Qaida flimsy, and instead preferred to create a coalition of the unwilling with France, Russia, and China. In the post–Cold War setting the German government also tried hard to mediate between Moscow and Washington in order to keep the Russian government involved in the international community. While Chancellor Angela Merkel has been less assertive in appearance, she has also proven tenacious in advancing German views.

Will the Federal Republic eventually learn to play a leadership role in an integrating Europe? Several reasons speak against the resurgence of a “Fourth Reich,” even in a more benign form. The legacy of two failed attempts at domination has made neighbors wary of any efforts to lead; confronted with the consequences of unification and globalization, Germany does not have the resources to go it alone; and the limited size and lack of nuclear weapons of a volunteer Bundeswehr make it unsuited to serve as the core of a common defense. Yet there are also some factors that indicate that Germany is becoming a “regional hegemon” with a consensual approach that wields normative power: the FRG does have the largest economy in Europe and remains an industrial powerhouse; when Franco-German cooperation finds common ground, it pulls other EU members along, and the steadiness of the response to the Anglo-American financial meltdown commands respect. If it manages to articulate common European interests, Berlin’s influence is likely to grow.

The difficulties of German leadership in Europe have become evident through the sovereign debt crisis, in which Berlin has resisted international pressures to bail out its weaker neighbors with easy money. When Greek interest rates rose beyond the country’s capacity to repay its debts due to internal corruption and irresponsible fiscal policy, domestic German opinion did not allow Chancellor Angela Merkel to rescue the country by writing a blank check. But since the Euro crisis threatened the future of the European Union and German exporters wanted to preserve their markets, the government had to respond. The result has been a controversial policy of creating a limited credit umbrella (European Stability Fund, etc.) while insisting on cut-backs to balance the budget and structural changes to restore competitiveness. Strongly criticized by financial interests and the New York Times, this stepwise approach has reassured markets with regard to Spain and Italy, much larger and healthier economies. Balancing domestic and international pressures, this cautious incrementalism in cooperation with France has calmed the hysteria of the financial markets due to the strength of the German export economy.
Unification as Process

More than two decades after the peaceful revolution, the debate about German unification remains unresolved, since many hopes have been disappointed but most fears have also been belied. On the political level the transfer of democratic institutions appears to be working well enough, and in foreign policy the enlarged FRG still prefers to behave like a “civilian power.” It is rather the collapse of most Eastern industry, the depopulation of stagnant regions, and the feeling of being a “second-class” citizen that gives reason for concern. To be sure, there are encouraging examples of civil society initiatives aimed at retying bonds across the former Iron Curtain, such as city partnerships, youth encounters, student contests, and the like. But there is no denying that united Germany is governed by Western elites, that the media slight Eastern topics, and that disparities in wealth continue between the old and new states. Moreover, divergent experiences also inform survey responses on issues like freedom and equality. At this time it remains unclear whether these differences will decrease to the level of regional distinctions or whether the “Wall in the head” will remain, dividing the country internally rather than externally.

In the euphoria of the fall of the Wall, many Germans simply assumed, as in Willy Brandt’s felicitous phrase, that “what belongs together, will grow together.” By just removing the ugly concrete barrier, cutting many kilometers of barbed wire, and reopening roads, the divided parts of the country would reunite automatically. This widespread expectation was based on a somewhat naive hope for the reassertion of an underlying national unity rather than on a sober assessment of the impact of separate development during the preceding four decades in two hostile blocs. Chipping away at the Wall, opening new border crossing points, reconnecting rusty railroad tracks, reopening overgrown streets, rebuilding decayed bridges—in short, getting rid of the physical remnants of division—turned out to be the easier part. But erasing the mental, institutional and social effects of living in two ideologically opposed systems proved to be much more complicated. Making the transition from a late communist dictatorship to a fledgling democracy with a market economy was an upheaval that would require several decades.

Unlike the struggles of neighbors, the German transformation was both privileged and problematic, because it took the form of national unification. In contrast to the expectation of many Easterners, the accession of the five new states to the Federal Republic meant that this was not a merger of equals, but the incorporation of a bankrupt state into a successful system that had prevailed in the Cold War competition. Transformation as unification meant that Western patterns, institutions, and even elites would
be transferred to the East rather than Easterners being allowed to find a Third Way or to contribute much of their own legacy to the new mix.\textsuperscript{54} No doubt, joining the FRG offered an attractive shortcut to material prosperity and political liberty—but this option, which neighboring countries did not possess, has exacted a steep price in deindustrialization and Western tutelage. East Germans were more quickly able to obtain consumer goods, gain human rights, and participate in politics, but also found themselves in a dependent role, living on transfers from the West.

Though critics preferred a slower transition through a deliberate merger between equals, the Kohl government and East German voters decisively rejected this alternative. No doubt, unification via paragraph 146 of the Basic Law would have permitted an all-German debate about a new constitution that could have picked up innovative ideas of the Round Table. Also holding off the introduction of the DM, choosing a lower currency conversion rate, or pursuing an industrial policy might have preserved more Eastern industry and safeguarded more jobs.\textsuperscript{55} But the reasons for moving quickly seemed ultimately compelling: on the one hand, the instability in the Soviet Union meant that there was only a limited window of diplomatic opportunity that might slam shut at any moment if Gorbachev were overthrown. On the other hand, the East German citizens who had been deprived for decades did not want to wait any longer for a Western standard of living. Rapid unification offered them a once-in-a-lifetime chance to move to a new country without actually leaving home.\textsuperscript{56}

Reversing the effects of decades of division and forging a new kind of unity among Germans has therefore turned out to be a lengthy process full of mistakes and unanticipated difficulties. The fall of the Wall was only the first step along a road that would take an entire generation or more to traverse. Also, the cost of Western financial support to the East has amounted to a staggering 2 trillion Euros, much more than Chancellor Kohl was willing to admit. Only after the transfer of Western institutions had been completed could overdue reforms for the entire country like the modernization of universities be begun and some Eastern institutions like child care centers be revived…. But in the meantime a generation has grown up without personal recollections of division, in a society in which Easterners and Westerners mingle with a sense of shared identity, evident during the last soccer World Cups of men and women.\textsuperscript{57} Since only a small minority wants the Wall back, unification has become the new normalcy. Germany therefore can now build on its regained unity in order to meet new globalization challenges like economic competitiveness, integration of immigrants, and the Euro crisis.
Notes


5. Richard Schröder, Die wichtigsten Irrtümer über die deutsche Einheit (Freiburg, 2007).


13. Lothar de Maiziere, “Ich will, dass meine Kinder nicht mehr lügen müssen,” Meine Geschichte der deutschen Einheit (Freiburg, 2010). That aspect of unification is often taken for granted.


24. See the targeted economic development policy of the state of Brandenburg: http://www.brandenburg.de/de/wirtschaft.

25. On an ironic level, Peter Timm’s movies *Go Trabi Go* from 1991 and 1992 dramatized these difficulties.


33. Lecture of Dr. Lutz Mükke on the underrepresentation of East Germans in the media at the dialogue in Cotonou/Westfrica, September 2010.


38. See Dahn, *Wehe dem Sieger! and Schroeder, Die wichtigsten Irrtümer über die deutsche Einheit*.

Bradley Prager, “Passing Time since the Wende: Recent German Film on Unification,” in Anderson and Langenbacher, *From the Bonn to the Berlin Republic*, 115–130.


Helga Haßendorn, *Coming of Age: German Foreign Policy since 1945* (Lanham, MD, 2006).


This charge of missed opportunities, raised by unification critics, still influences a good deal of scholarship. But see Eric Langenbacher, “The Germans Must Have Done Something Right,” in Anderson and Langenbacher, *From the Bonn to the Berlin Republic*, 397–413.


Beatrice von Weizsäcker, *Die Unvollendete. Deutschland zwischen Einheit und Zweiteit* (Cologne, 2010).