Introduction

EUROPE DURING THE FORTY YEARS’ CRISIS

The Persepolis of the spirit is no less ravaged than the Susa of material fact. Everything has not been lost, but everything has sensed that it might perish. An extraordinary shudder ran through the marrow of Europe. She felt in every nucleus of her mind that she was no longer the same, that she was no longer herself, that she was about to lose consciousness; a consciousness acquired through centuries of bearable calamities, by thousands of men of the first rank, from innumerable geographical, ethnic, and historical coincidences.

– Paul Valéry, ‘The Crisis of the Mind’

Like many others meditating at the time on the tragedies of war and on Europe’s future, Paul Valéry felt at once a tragic sense of uncertainty combined with the hope that Europe could find the strength for its rebirth. Defining and understanding the ‘European soul’ became central in all cultural and intellectual milieux; far from being mere intellectual quarrels, such debates stemmed, on the contrary, from the immediate need to banish the risk of a new war and, more fundamentally, from the urge to avoid the complete destruction of European civilization.¹

Even though Europe was suffering its greatest crisis, many agreed nonetheless with Valéry that ‘not all had been lost’; the crisis of ‘Europe’s soul’ was not seen merely as a negative result in itself, but was viewed as a phase from which, if the right decisions were taken, Europe could emerge even stronger. In some writings of the time, the crisis was perceived as an opportunity to stop the disintegration of Europe, whose decay had started long before the outbreak of the Great War. As José Ortega y Gasset wrote in 1930:

Is it as certain as people say that Europe is in a state of decadence; that it is resigning its command; abdicating? May not this apparent decadence be a beneficial crisis which will enable Europe to be really, literally Europe? The evident decadence of the nations of Europe, was not this a priori necessary if there was to be one day possibly a United States of Europe, the plurality of Europe substituted by its formal unity?²
Crisis, in this sense, was a chance to rethink an existing state of affairs, not simply a concentrated moment of instability or a premonition of collapse.³

This study looks at those authors who perceived the crisis in similar terms, and sheds light on the different solutions they put forward. While many agreed that action should be taken, the answers they gave to the European question were quite different. Some turned to the past to find the roots of European civilization, referring to Christianity or to humanism in their search for a common identity. Others, on the contrary, believed that Europe had to be a collection of nations whose integrity had to be maintained; to them, the only possible project was a confederation of nation-states representing 'unity in diversity', which Europe, as the site of freedom, had to preserve. Finally, there were those who called for the creation of a federation at the expense of the independence of individual nation-states, which were considered the reason for Europe's downfall rather than the cause of its greatness.

The three main approaches proposed, respectively, a regeneration of Europe in terms of a return to its past, where the continent's cultural unity had to be sought (Part II), the preservation of a perpetual present, designed to maintain and redeem the achievements of European civilization in the face of contemporary deviations (Part III), and the generation of a new and different future, constituting a break from the catastrophe of the First World War and the conditions of the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s (Part IV). Such approaches were frequently combined in the numerous treatises and articles on 'Europe' after 1917, but one in particular – past, present or future – was usually emphasized. The first approach, which aimed to recreate a European past, derived from many sources, including a revolt against the imposition of a supposedly revolutionary or illegitimate regime at home, fear of Bolshevik or capitalist versions of modernity, a yearning for a new moral or religious order, scepticism about the principle of national self-determination, and a longing for the resurrection of multinational aristocracies and empires, especially those of Austria-Hungary.⁴ In such a paradigm the nation-state was often irrelevant and what mattered was the quest for a lost cultural unity. The second approach considered Europe's 'present' – from the eighteenth century onwards – the time of its greatest achievements, thanks above all to the triumph of the nation-state, which intellectuals like Johan Huizinga and Lucien Febvre sought to reconcile with the presumed existence of a European 'culture' and the need for a European political structure.⁵ It was predicated on the belief that all possible solutions to a European question had to be founded on the continuing independence of the continent's nations and on the assumption that only by preserving national differences could Europe be the locus of freedom. Finally, the third approach, which envisaged a fundamentally different future for Europe, came to rest on the programmes put forward by federalists, who outlined a solution eschewing past or existing experience. To them, the independence of Europe's nation-states was the ultimate cause of conflict and the cause of Europe's downfall.
Europe as an Idea and a Project

These ways of addressing Europe’s predicament after 1917 reflect three different understandings of the relationship of Europe to its own past, its present and its future. Of course, all the authors analysed considered Europe’s ‘temporality’ in a broader sense, since all conceived of a project for a future Europe. Significantly, all called for some sort of action at a time when the two main extra-European powers were jeopardizing the capacity of Europe to master its own destiny. It could seem, precisely in this era of crisis, that Europe had either to perish or to become a ‘project’ – a projection of itself. The period considered is based on such an understanding. 1917 adumbrated the fall or eclipse of Europe, since it marked its incapacity – as a result of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia and the United States’ intervention in the First World War – to determine its own destiny, while 1957 represented the end – or, at least, transformation and diminution – of the crisis, with the signature of the Treaty of Rome. Against a backdrop of decolonization and superpower politics, European governments appeared to have accepted the need to concentrate on their own continent, as one region amongst many, and to find new ways of coordinating national interests and policies. Importantly, none of the three approaches – oriented towards the past, present and future – clearly triumphed over the others. It was arguably the very diversity of Europe’s past and the variety of attachments to Europe’s actual achievements which helped to preclude a clear, future-oriented federal solution to Europe’s problems. Despite appearances, these different conceptions of Europe were present at the birth of the European Communities and remained significant for their future.

This volume reassesses historians’ and political scientists’ assumptions about the nature, role and importance of conceptions of Europe as obstacles to and catalysts of integration before and after 1957. It asks whether the transition from a set of ideas about Europe to the European project was as significant or definitive as is sometimes supposed; it questions the extent to which such ideas were linked to cultural criticism and permeated by a sense of pathos as a consequence of the continent’s supposed self-destruction and exposure to external threats; it enquires whether 1945 really constituted a watershed – or ‘zero hour’ – in either the conceptualization of Europe or the realization of European integration; and it examines whether a putative transformation of political conditions on the continent – the development of internecine ideological conflicts, the Great Depression, the partition of Germany and the establishment of the ‘iron curtain’ – brought about a thorough-going revaluation of Europe’s territorial scope, its shared values and culture, its existing and envisaged institutions, and its place in the world. These suppositions, which are characteristic of much of the secondary literature on the topic, are in many instances warranted, but they are rarely substantiated and are sometimes unfounded. At the very least, it is legitimate to ask whether, as is often assumed, the geopolitical conditions produced by the Second World War turned specific conceptions of Europe into feasible projects, or whether such ideas, already circulating in the interwar years, helped to create an
understanding of what Europe was, which in turn helped to set the intellectual premises on which a project of European integration could be based.

The assumed disjunction between Europe as a project and as an idea, which is partly the result of the subsequent significance of the European Union, the incremental nature of European integration and the dominance of positive or empirical social sciences such as economics and functionalist sociology, has had several distorting effects, not least by obscuring the tardiness and uncertainty of the project of integration itself. Many scholars have succumbed to the temptation of seeking the ‘origins’ of European integration in failed attempts to establish a supranational organization in the late 1940s (the Council of Europe) and early 1950s (the European Defence Community and EPC), the resistance of the war years, the Pan-European movement of the 1920s and ’30s, and the various ‘foundations’ of a purported European identity before that date, referring to etymology, geography, Christianity, the Enlightenment, the pentarchy of Great Powers, cosmopolitanism, nationalism, imperialism and, even, National Socialism, according to Richard Swedberg’s analysis of the literature on Europe.11 Such a modus operandi tends to overstate the importance of the different precursors of integration, isolating them from the various discourses and institutional contexts of which they were a part.12 This study treats ideas of Europe as elements of broader debates about morality and culture, capitalism and economics, foreign policy and imperialism, and different aspects of politics relating to the welfare state, economic planning, liberal and social democracy, and sovereignty, territory and power. These debates evolved quickly, contained many inconsistencies and were subject to uneven forms of dissemination, transfer and reception, undermining the notion of origins or foundations and informing inchoate designs for a European set of institutions.

Periodization

Debates about Europe after 1917 were framed primarily by the experiences of the First World War, of course, which had widely been experienced, in Georg Simmel’s phrase, as a ‘cultural crisis’.13 To many observers, the war seemed to have demonstrated Europe’s capacity to destroy itself through the misuse of technology and state organization. As a consequence, it appeared, especially to those on the right, to have exposed its own civilization, which was usually associated with middle-class and aristocratic milieux, to the menace of a revolution by ‘barbarians’ – Bolsheviks, socialists or Jews – at home, or invasion by ‘barbarians’ – most notably, ‘Slavs’ – from abroad. Such anxieties were salient in treatises such as Hermann von Keyserling’s Spectrum of Europe (1928), José Ortega y Gasset’s Revolt of the Masses (1930), Arnold Toynbee’s A Study of History (1934), and Oswald Spengler’s Decline of the West (1918–22), which outsold all other works of non-fiction in Germany during the 1920s and early 1930s.14 However, it is worth noting that these authors – and like-minded cultural pessimists on the left and in
the centre – were also influential during the period when a ‘European community’
was being discussed after the Second World War, not merely after the Great War.
Technocracy, the overextension of science, misreadings of the Enlightenment,
anonymous bureaucratization and the standardization of culture were all targets
of Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer’s *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1944) and
Hannah Arendt’s *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951), just as they had been the
objects of Max Weber’s, D.H. Lawrence’s, T.S. Eliot’s and Paul Valéry’s criticism
after the First World War. There was an ongoing and understandable ambivalence
about ‘modernity’ and ‘civilization’ – with ‘Modernism’ at once critical and
constitutive – throughout the entire period between 1917 and 1957, but it did not
usually entail an abnegation of the European Enlightenment, scientific progress,
state building, political freedoms, welfare or industrial production. The threat of
communism was established in 1917 and fear of Americanization was
commonplace by the 1920s, as were their respective attractions. For these and
other reasons, it is misleading to depict interwar discourses about Europe’s cultural
decline giving way to postwar plans for a European community. Multifaceted
discourses ran alongside, and were connected to, more concrete planning
throughout the period up to – and beyond – 1957.
The Second World War, although it was quickly succeeded on the Continent
by the partitions of the Cold War and the presence of U.S. or Soviet soldiers in
most states, did not constitute a caesura in the discussion of ‘Europe’. The very
onset or even existence of a single ‘Cold War’ in Europe has been challenged by
historians such as David Reynolds, who has rightly pointed out that the logic of
military might, ideological conflict and economic incompatibility was only
manifested belatedly, and that the retention or reacquisition of empires by Britain
and France continued to give them a world role until the mid-1950s. The
division between the Comecon countries and Western Europe largely confirmed
older distinctions between the ‘West’ and the ‘East’, ‘Germanic’ and ‘Romance’
peoples and ‘Slavs’, and ‘Europe’, ‘Mitteleuropa’ or ‘Zwischeneuropa’ and ‘Eastern
Europe’ or the ‘Balkans’. The United States, despite rhetorical support for a
‘United States of Europe’, did not push consistently for, and sometimes opposed,
the creation of supranational organizations on the continent. The same was true
of the United Kingdom, which was still Europe’s largest economy and its principal
military power in the late 1940s and 1950s. Such conditions left the question of
European integration in the balance, with discourses about Europe continuing to
play a role. Many of these discourses did not correspond to a periodization
beginning or ending in 1945: fears and hopes of ‘globalization’ appeared much
later, in the 1970s and 1980s; economic lessons had been learned from the
Depression, predicated on greater coordination of national economies, but they
had been discussed, and even acted upon, much earlier than the end of the
Second World War, as Andrew Shennan, Richard Kuisel and others have pointed
out in the French case; ‘history’, notwithstanding new taboos and traumas,
remained vital, perpetuating antagonisms and anxieties, which helped to prevent
the ratification of the European Defence Community in 1954, and initiating
attempts at reconciliation, which contributed to the creation of a self-interested and limited Franco-German axis at the core of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951. Above all, the recovery and reconstruction of nation-states, together with accompanying national narratives of revival and self-sacrifice, took precedence in the ‘postwar’ demobilizations of the 1920s and the 1940s and 50s, as Alan Milward and Richard Bessel have indicated, with uncertain but unavoidable consequences for discourses about Europe.

The diplomatic and political shifts of the post-1945 era, especially U.S. coordination of military policy in Western Europe, helped to defuse tensions and enable greater cooperation between old enemies to take place. Yet the main shifts, which were mediated discursively, took place over a longer period. The principal antagonism – between France and Germany – was deep-rooted and was arguably not overcome until the signature of the Franco-German Treaty in 1963. European empires had been under threat since 1914, and in the German case colonial possessions had been seized in 1919, but they remained in place in most instances, with the exception of India, until the 1950s and 60s. The opposition between communism or socialism and capitalism or liberal democracy had been characteristic of foreign and domestic policy in Europe since 1917. Although fascism had been extirpated in 1944–45, right-wing authoritarian dictatorships remained on the fringes of Europe in Spain, Portugal and Greece, and fear of a reversion to fascism was common in former dictatorships such as Germany, Austria and Italy. When the German philosopher Karl Jaspers asked Where is the Federal Republic Heading? in a widely discussed book in 1966, his answer was towards dictatorship. Debates about Europe were tied to such internal and external political discourses throughout the interwar and early postwar periods. The terms of debate – whether Europe should be confederal or federal, national or supranational, political or economic – remained the same.

**Plan of the Book**

It is the aim of this volume to examine the relationship between ideas of Europe and projects designed to create common European institutions. Such a relationship was an enduring, complex and formative one, as were the connections between conceptions of Europe and wider discourses about culture and politics. René Girault might be right in identifying a *Europe vécue* as a valid object of study, rather than a *Europe construite* or a *Europe pensée*, but it is misleading to imply that there is little left to say about an ‘imagined’ or ‘thought’ Europe. Rather, the panoply of ideas and overlapping, sometimes contradictory, discourses about Europe constitute an essential and still under-researched part of our understanding of the interwar and postwar periods and of attempts, then and later, to achieve European integration. Using the methods and approaches of intellectual history, this study explores familiar and unknown aspects of the subject in a new way. Part I asks how important federal and other plans for Europe’s future were in
contemporary discourses and in actual policy making. It has two main claims. The first is that the analysis of this particular period – never before considered in a volume on Europe – is of seminal importance in understanding the birth and, to a certain extent, the later development of the European Community (EC). The second claim is that, precisely in such a period of radical ideological oppositions, distinct approaches to the solution of Europe’s crisis can be identified. All of these relate to the different ways in which Europeans conceived of their own identity. Part II looks at intellectuals whose conceptions of Europe concentrated, above all, on the past; Part III examines the works and ideas of writers and thinkers who wished to emphasize the achievements and power of Europe in the present; and Part IV analyses the writings of advocates of new projects, which were usually federal, for Europe’s future. This distinction between backward-looking, synchronic and forward-looking approaches to Europe, although only a question of degree, illuminates the ways in which the historical identity of the continent and collective images of the EC were understood by contemporaries, defining different narratives, explanations, diagnoses and solutions concerning a putative ‘European question’.

The volume aims to reassess the relationship between ideas of Europe and the European project; it asks whether conceptions of Europe before 1957 were pessimistic, defensive, progressive, cultural, economic or political; it questions the relevance of 1918 and 1945 as turning points in the history of the conceptualization of Europe and of European integration; and it reconsiders the impact of long- and short-term political transformations on assumptions about the continent’s scope, nature, role and significance. The next section considers the limited consensus which existed in respect of ‘Europe’ (Chapter 3) and investigates the impact of conceptions of the continent and its future on policy making in the 1920s (Chapter 1) and in the late 1940s and 1950s (Chapter 2). The emphasis here is on interaction and transfer – and on obstacles – between the conceptualization of Europe in the public sphere and the formulation and implementation of policy. Subsequent sections examine the full and disparate range of such conceptualizations of Europe as a means of reconstructing the debates and the intellectual horizons of opinion and decision makers.

Notes

4. On the link between uprooted aristocrats in Central and Eastern Europe and ‘Europeanism’ after 1918, see Chapters 5 and 8, where Łukasz Mikołajewski points to the aristocratic background of ‘East European’ intellectuals such as Jerzy Stempowski.
5. See Chapters 12 and 14.
6. See, for instance, the Swiss historian Gonzague de Reynold, L’Europe tragique (Paris, 1933), 393.

8. For an introduction to this literature, see E. du Réau, L’idée d’Europe au XXe siècle. Des mythes aux réalités (Brussels, 1996).


14. See Chapters 4–9 and Chapter 11.


17. For Germany, see V.G. Luijelvicius, The German Myth of the East, 1800 to the Present (Oxford, 2009), 130–219; M. Burleigh, Germany Turns Eastward (Cambridge, 2002); M. Nolan,


