

INTRODUCTION



In January 1904, conflict erupted between Germans and Bantu-speaking Herero in central German South-West Africa (SWA), present-day Namibia. The “Herero uprising,”¹ as it became known, touched off numerous wars across the German colony.² Once groups of Khoikhoi-speaking Nama and Oorlam in the south also took arms in the second half of the year, South-West Africa descended irretrievably into war.³ Although the hostilities were formally declared over on 31 March 1907, and the last concentration camps for “prisoners of war” closed on 27 January 1908, neither of these measures ushered in genuine peace.

Colonial wars were “decidedly violent,” almost without exception.⁴ The colonial powers generally agreed that provisions of international law that were intended to curb violence did not apply to conflicts with supposedly “primitive” societies.⁵ In this sense, the title of Lawrence James’s 1985 book about the British campaigns in Africa, *The Savage Wars*, is certainly apt. Even so, the wars of “pacification” that Imperial Germany conducted against the Herero, Oorlam, and Nama in SWA between 1904 and 1908 were exceptional in many respects. The Herero people today still remember the war as a devastating and traumatic experience. Combat, flight, internment, and forced labor claimed tens of thousands of victims.⁶ German colonists, on the other hand, actually celebrated their cruel treatment of the Herero.⁷ The German campaign left behind legacies that are still visible today, more than one hundred years after the end of German colonial rule.⁸ The war decimated and weakened the groups that had once dominated the region to such an extent that the Nama and Oorlam in particular still remain on the margins of Namibian society today. The “native policy” of the postwar era,

which anticipated some aspects of South African apartheid, added insult to injury.⁹

The “pacification” of SWA ushered in a humanitarian catastrophe. Today’s historiographical debates about German South-West Africa focus on the issue of genocide—and rightly so, from a moral and political perspective. But this was not always the case. Humanitarian considerations played a minor, if any, role for most European observers at the time. The racist and Social Darwinist spirit of the era meant that even the extermination of entire peoples could be seen as a “natural,” and not particularly upsetting, occurrence. But even setting humanitarian considerations aside, the situation in SWA was catastrophic. The outbreak of war and the apparent lack of alternatives to the brutal subjugation of the Herero sealed the failure of the “peace” policy that Theodor Leutwein had pursued for years.¹⁰ The moniker for Leutwein’s policy was certainly a euphemism, but it did show that Imperial Germany had attempted to avoid the military conquest of its colony for as long as possible. The war with the Herero was only the beginning. Upon arriving in the colony, the hastily dispatched German troops proceeded with such severity against their opponent, hardly distinguishing between friend and foe, that even the allied Witbooi-Oorlam rebelled and took up arms against their colonial masters.¹¹ The conflict continued to expand and became the “most murderous” war that Germany had yet waged, resulting in the death of “every fifth man.”¹² The financial burdens were so extreme that the budget debate led to the dissolution of the Reichstag and the so-called “Hottentot elections” of 1907.¹³

Worse, these expenditures produced no real operational success. Despite its utmost efforts, Imperial Germany—a “victory culture” par excellence—was unable to subdue supposedly “primitive” opponents, who sometimes numbered only in the low hundreds.¹⁴ More soldiers came to the colony during the first year of the war than the total number of whites in all years thereafter, until the end of German rule in 1915. In the end, it was raw strategic superiority—the steady influx of manpower and material—that gave the Germans the upper hand to defeat their opponents. Their methods were sometimes undistinguished. They chased the famous Bondelswarts military leader Jacob Morenga into British territory, where he was ultimately killed by Cape Police, and they bought peace with the Oorlam leader Simon Kooper by offering him a pension. Reports from soldiers and other eyewitnesses clearly show that “cruelty and acts of brutality”—supposedly out of character for German soldiers (“because what isn’t allowed, can’t be”)¹⁵—occurred on a daily basis in SWA.¹⁶

Despite the vicious fighting, the territory remained “unpacified” for years. Even after the war in the colony was formally declared over on 31 March 1907, the British major Wade (who was assigned to German headquarters as an observer) reported to his superiors that roving Herero continued to pose a threat, although this could not be stated in official reports.¹⁷ Unlimited warfare proved to be expensive for the colony and its future by destroying its resources, especially Herero labor and cattle.¹⁸ Many observers must have questioned whether colonial rule was worth the utter devastation that it wrought. The war that had been set into motion defied any cost-benefit analysis.

The wars of “pacification” upset the Kaiser so greatly that they soon were no longer allowed to be mentioned in his presence.¹⁹ But even beyond the Imperial court, no one seemed to have been satisfied with the outcome of the war. Officers and colonial authorities regarded the military’s performance as deficient,²⁰ while missionaries deplored the excessive violence. Critics of colonialism grew louder, and settlers continued to grouse and complain.²¹

The esteemed Prussian/German war machine fell far short of expectations, although its organization and performance had been regarded as exemplary worldwide. With the utmost effort and sacrifice, it obtained results that satisfied almost no one—indeed, that almost no one foresaw.

There was an astonishing discrepancy between war aims and the means that were employed to achieve them, on the one hand, and the actual outcome of the war, on the other. This discrepancy provides the point of departure for the following study, which—in contrast to prevailing narratives—tells a story of misfires and setbacks, and situates the genocide of the Herero within it. Genocide arose from failures in planning and became the tragic climax in a “campaign of disappointments,” as the officer W. E. Montague characterized the British war against the Zulu in 1879.²² This interpretation of the war and genocide is by no means typical of scholarship on Namibia, but is seen more often in colonial revisionist or apologetic texts—part of an attempt to relativize the wars of “pacification” or to deny the genocide outright.²³ By contrast, I embrace this interpretation as a point of departure for explaining the genocidal escalation.

Three broad themes are central to my investigation of the Herero genocide: *complexity*, which sharpens and refines familiar narratives; *racism*, an ideology that was part of the New Imperialism and essential to the escalation in SWA; and finally, *emotion*. I introduce these themes below, followed by an overview of the book’s organization and a discussion of sources.

Complexity

My analysis of colonialism and the wars of “pacification” that were integral to its establishment and entrenchment departs from conventional approaches.²⁴ Instead, I treat colonial rule as a complex open system that depends upon the interplay of its constituent elements, evolving in unforeseen ways and constantly giving rise to new structures.²⁵ Open systems must adapt to their environments, as Sidney Dekker explains.²⁶ Many of these adaptations are not centrally coordinated, but are instead driven by peripheral actors with particular interests and highly limited information. Even seemingly insignificant actions can combine with other, unanticipated factors and set processes into motion with unforeseeable results. This is the essence of complexity. Complex systems are constructs that transcend their individual parts; complexity necessarily characterizes systems, not their components. Individual components cannot comprehend a system in its entirety, and they likewise cannot foresee all of the consequences of their actions. Instead, components act locally, with limited knowledge, mostly governed by the narrower interests of their immediate surroundings. Complexity arises from networks of local relationships and interactions, and these networks can lead to unforeseeable—and sometimes disastrous—consequences. Even innocuous actions can have dire consequences, which is why there can be such disproportion between cause and effect.²⁷

My approach is not altogether new to genocide studies. Jacques Sémelin, Michael Mann, Mark Levene, Martin Shaw, and Christian Gerlach have anticipated important aspects of this approach by criticizing the teleological and deterministic tendencies of conventional genocide studies; instead, they understand mass violence as a process that is characterized by contingency.²⁸ There are, of course, unavoidable pitfalls in dealing with a case that is more than one hundred years old—beginning with the missing records of the South-West African Schutztruppe, or “protection force,” which were lost over the course of the two world wars. Thus, an empirically based, detailed analysis of the process of violence is not a simple undertaking. Complexity is a heuristic principle for gauging the gradual escalation of violence in a multifaceted situation. Above all, it means that this study does not limit itself to the search for a single cause or origin, but also considers systemic relations. Wherever possible, I take the entire spectrum of actors, or groups of actors, and their mutual relationships into account. Because complex systems are not coordinated centrally, from the “top down,” but are defined by the interactions of their individual components, the focus of my work likewise shifts downward from the “top” to the “bottom.”

Before I discuss how colonial rule in German South-West Africa can be understood as a complex system, I will briefly address the characteristic weaknesses of conventional, or “less complex,” depictions.

“Genocide” is originally a legal term. Legal authorities seek those who are guilty, and genocide studies support the search. Genocide scholars sometimes appear to be driven less by a desire for knowledge and more by the demands of international law, as they work to build a plausible “case” within the relevant legal norms. Legal summations of this kind tend to follow their own rules, selectively presenting events so that a case corresponds to definitions from the Genocide Convention of 1948, and glossing over other details that do not support this aim.²⁹ Given the gravity of the crimes in question, it is easy to see how guilty parties are made out to be “monsters” in certain respects.

In the mid-1960s, East German historian Horst Drechsler published *Südwestafrika unter deutscher Kolonialherrschaft*—the first critical, comprehensive portrait of German colonialism in SWA, notwithstanding its Marxist slant. He was the first expert to describe the wars of “pacification” against the Herero and Nama (-Oorlam) as genocide.³⁰ It is no exaggeration to say that his book, which was translated into multiple languages, shaped a narrative that has remained influential many years later.³¹ Drechsler’s intent was to expose the particularly aggressive and criminal character of “German imperialism,” which he believed was still alive in what was then West Germany.³² He depicted the driving force of imperialism as an impersonal abstraction, even while ascribing to it the very human capacity of devising criminal strategies—as well as demonic powers to put these strategies into action.³³ Recent studies are more nuanced, and also more personal. They identify Lieutenant General Lothar von Trotha as a key perpetrator; his command marked the beginning of the genocidal phase in the campaign against the Herero.³⁴ Jeremy Sarkin, by contrast, assigns particular blame to Kaiser Wilhelm II, although his work otherwise resembles Drechsler’s in many respects.³⁵

Regardless of whom these studies identify as main offenders, a common problem is their emphasis on individual actors, to the neglect of other factors. Worse, these studies distort the actual course of events by imposing a predetermined structure onto their “case.”

Before proceeding further, some definitions are in order. According to the Genocide Convention of 1948, genocide is defined, on the one hand, by specific acts that comprise the “physical element” (*actus reus*) of genocide.³⁶ In addition, genocide involves the “special intent” (*dolus specialis*) “to destroy, in whole or in part, that national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.”³⁷ These acts already may be punishable by law, but only *as genocide* if this “special intent” can be proven. Thus,

genocidal intent—and being able to prove it—is decisive. Although furnishing legal proof may not be difficult, and in some circumstances this proof is self-evident because of the nature of the acts committed, establishing proof so dominates genocide studies that they frequently overstate their claims. Case studies tend to establish genocidal intent early on, making implementation seem almost inevitable.³⁸ Historical events are thereby reduced to a sequence of predetermined steps. Drechsler goes so far as to stylize even the most obvious failures of the German war machine as planned successes, making “German imperialism” seem demonic or even omnipotent. In Drechsler’s view, the entire German colonial project drove toward a single telos from the very beginning—the extermination of indigenous peoples.³⁹ More recent scholarship also establishes genocidal intent early on, if not as early as Drechsler, and at least struggles to identify setbacks for the German war machine—which underscores how nonintuitive it can be to tell the history of the campaign as a history of failure. Because the scope of these studies is often modest, they tend to smooth over or compress the course of events, and neglect to differentiate between phases or groups of historical actors. This heightens the impression of a seamless course of events.⁴⁰

A further point to consider is how remarks that seem to reveal Trotha’s racist and exterminatory motivations are ordinarily invoked by those who seek to prove genocidal intent.⁴¹ Such remarks can be taken out of their original context and made to fit an ideological profile, which provides the basis for explaining that Trotha’s measures actually sought to eliminate the Herero as a group.⁴² Because (so the argument goes) Trotha was a “monster” with racist and exterminatory intent, the goal of his violent practices was to exterminate the Herero. In fact, Trotha’s letters are full of bloodthirsty, contemptuous remarks—but what exactly does this explain?⁴³ A closer look often reveals that supposed revelations of Trotha’s mindset are highly situation-dependent and tailored to a specific audience. When Trotha addressed certain actors, for example, he may have been trying to compensate for setbacks, or to mask the feelings of powerlessness that they caused. This suggests that such revelations, taken alone, explain very little—and that they must be more deeply explained. It mattered, of course, that the commander-in-chief’s intellectual horizons were more deeply colored by Social Darwinism than that of his predecessor, and that he saw indigenous labor as expendable in a settler colony. A commander-in-chief who did not hold similar views might have acted differently in certain situations. But even apart from such considerations, we still have to explain when and how these patterns of thought were activated and translated into action. We would do well to remember that there are always gaps

between imagination and intent, intent and planning, and planning and execution. In some circumstances, intentions can be realized only if an appropriate opportunity arises, which in turn depends on an array of factors beyond the control of individual actors. In sum, the “Why?” question about the motivations of perpetrators can be answered only with a detour through the “How?” question—that is, by reconstructing events in a detailed way and differentiating between actors and periods of time.⁴⁴ This is the work of this book.⁴⁵

A seamless course of events is hardly plausible because Germans and Herero were at war with one another in a conflict that was evenly matched for some time.⁴⁶ This means that we should speak of *interaction*—even in the genocidal phase, which was characterized by an increasingly lopsided balance of power. Interactions develop dynamics of their own that cannot be fully anticipated, transcending the intentions and expectations of all sides. This is especially true of warlike interactions, which are notoriously difficult to predict.⁴⁷ Genocides are not one-sided events, but are codetermined by the actions of victims—an observation that has led Martin Shaw to call for an end to one-sided depictions of perpetrators and their intentions, and greater attention to the social dimensions of genocidal violence. This call has gone unheeded, not only by Drechsler.⁴⁸ If genocides are to be understood as interactions, then reconstructions that depict only the execution of perpetrators’ intentions and plans are necessarily one-sided and insufficient.

Depictions that present a seamless, one-sided flow of events and that focus on main offenders tacitly assume that these events were determined from the top down—as if what was ordered from “above” was carried out “below,” and what happened “below” was prescribed from “above.”⁴⁹ More recent scholarship, generally about other cases, has emphasized how peripheral actors influenced the flow of events and even central decision-making processes.⁵⁰ Thus, Jacques Sémelin asserts that extreme violence can be deciphered only when it is observed simultaneously “from above” (the perspective of high-ranking decision-makers) *as well as* “from below” (subaltern perpetrators on site).⁵¹ Members of the latter group are rarely compliant instruments of their superiors, but instead help to determine the momentum and character of the processes in question.⁵² We need not dwell on details here. Most significant in this context is that existing scholarship on SWA has remained largely untouched by these developments, continuing to search for (main) offenders. Seeking to prove genocidal intent, these works usually show that the genocide definition has been met *and* surpassed. They overstate their case by disregarding whatever upsets the search for proof, by artificially limiting the field of actors under observation, and by compress-

ing, “rationalizing,” and smoothing over events. In short, conventional studies are tailored to a simple, linear system—or more accurately, they tailor the case of SWA to correspond to this system.

To what extent can we speak of colonial rule in SWA as a complex system? When the campaign against the Herero did not go according to plan, leading to outcomes that satisfied no one,⁵³ one reason was that events were not as determined by “top-down,” central control as is usually assumed.⁵⁴ The “utopia of statehood”⁵⁵ may have informed all modern colonial endeavors to a greater or lesser degree, but most often only as a prescription or a counterfactual ideal. At no time did a strong central authority exist in German South-West Africa. It is true that settlement here was initiated later than elsewhere, coordinated “from above” (that is, by a comparatively authoritarian state),⁵⁶ but we should not overstate this distinction. Although the colonial state appeared to be an extension of its metropolitan counterpart, each represented a fundamentally different “order of violence.”⁵⁷ Within Germany, the state held a monopoly on the use of force, but overseas it was one actor among many in the political arena. In this hybrid system of sovereignty, the state (especially before 1904) mediated between settlers and the autochthonous grandees with whom it held fragile alliances.⁵⁸ The settlers cannot be considered “citizens” or “civilians” in a traditional sense because they saw themselves as the vanguard of conquest, or even “race war.” The colonial state was a weak state—unable and unwilling to check the privatization of violence by settlers and soldiers. An arrangement of power that I call “despotism by the white colonizing class” coalesced behind its back. The colonial state was not meaningless or irrelevant to the settlers, but—in contrast to the metropolitan authoritarian state—its functions were largely reduced to provisioning, military defense, and regulating colonial society’s internal affairs.

Before 1904, uprisings in SWA were local affairs that attracted little attention in the German metropole. The governor, who was also commander of the colonial forces, acted more or less at his own discretion. But after January 1904, when Herero raids cost 123 white lives and sparked public outrage in Germany, Berlin became more and more involved in colonial affairs. This shift brought issues to the fore that had not previously played a role. Thus, securing colonial rule was no longer sufficient; now great power prestige was at stake. The situation grew more complex over the course of the war.

The field of state actors splintered into multiple conflicting groups. A divide opened up between metropole and colony, which was apparent in the differing views of the uprising held by functionaries in SWA and in Germany, as well as in the differing strategies that flowed from these

divergent assessments. The long-serving colonial officers known as “old Africans” had previously served mostly as administrators, and this was reflected in their habitus and style of waging war. They felt at least some social responsibility toward the colony and its population⁵⁹—unlike the metropolitan officers who came to South-West Africa only because of the war, and who increasingly shaped the course of events. As experts in the use of force, the latter group distanced themselves from the established colonial officers, seeing themselves as the actual experts in the arena of war. Civil servants, in turn, defined themselves in opposition to the metropolitan officers; their mission was to reestablish a peaceful order after years of military dictatorship and unfettered violence. In short, the “pacification” of South-West Africa was defined by opposing interests—state/private, metropole/colony, and military/civilian.

Extreme violence arose from the tensions between heterogeneous, and sometimes antagonistic, forces. Its escalation should be understood as a gradual process that involved relations between many different historical actors, each of whom were pursuing their own goals and interests—sometimes with a limited perspective and obeying their own logic. These diverse interactions produced new, not entirely predictable constellations that extended beyond the actual intentions of the actors involved. Violence did not have a single author, but many different ones.⁶⁰

The orientation around complex systems frees us from the usual constraints of focusing on main offenders, an approach that neglects too many other considerations. It also redirects our attention to the broader spectrum of actors who shaped the process of violence in one way or another. It is true that Trotha held considerable power and autonomy as the commander-in-chief, and that another leader might have taken the campaign in a different, less devastating direction, especially after initial plans failed. It is a mistake, however, to limit the question of genocide by identifying Trotha as *the* cause. Such an approach neglects, for example, that Trotha was only one candidate for a strategic program that was essentially already in place. Violence and cruelty toward indigenous people had been normalized well before Trotha’s arrival in the colony, and they continued to inform daily life there after he left. Although he held special authority and shaped the course of the war like no other single person, he was also one of many actors who enabled the exercise of violence against indigenous people. The orientation around complexity counterbalances the exaggerated “intentionalism” of genocide studies in general, and studies of South-West Africa in particular, which are often teleological or deterministic in their reconstruction of events. Finally, the orientation around complexity heightens our awareness of the limited control that individual actors hold over broader processes.

Racism

The long-serving colonial governor Theodor Leutwein reported back to Berlin that the settlers did not shrink even from murder and manslaughter (*Mord und Totschlag*) because they saw the Herero as an “inferior race.”⁶¹ Elsewhere, Leutwein noted that assaults against the Herero went unpunished because judicial authorities were motivated by the same “racial hatred” as perpetrators. His remarks underscore the fundamental importance of racism in colonial society.⁶² Racism shaped all social relations in the colony, as we will see in multiple contexts. Here, I would like to emphasize a particular aspect of this racism: normalizing deviance. In his correspondence with superiors in Berlin, Leutwein did not ignore how *Mord und Totschlag* represented—or at least, should have represented—acts of deviance. White subjects were not allowed to do whatever they pleased, yet they escaped prosecution for even the most serious crimes. This points to the normalization of deviance, a process that Sidney Dekker has identified as central to the onset of numerous catastrophes.⁶³

Racism provided the foundation for these normalizing processes. Racism was no mere side effect of colonial socialization; rather, it defined relations between colonizers and the colonized in a deep-seated way.⁶⁴ The era of German colonialism occurred at the height of what might be called “race-based racism” (*Rassenrassismus*).⁶⁵ This presumed that humanity was comprised of different subspecies, or races, which were defined by certain biological and cultural characteristics (some of which were superior to others).⁶⁶ These differences provided the basis for establishing a hierarchy of humans, which could be used to justify existing relationships of power and exploitation.⁶⁷ Tino Plümecke sees the remarkable expansion of the discourse of race as part of the broad social changes that contributed to European modernity.⁶⁸ On the one hand, intercultural contacts multiplied and intensified as globalization accelerated under the banner of colonialism. On the other, modern self-awareness (leading to the postulates of freedom and equality) heightened the need to justify practices of domination overseas. Racism went hand in hand with colonial expansion as a justification for conquest, exploitation, and destruction. Colonial expansion simultaneously strengthened and gave shape to racism.⁶⁹ The proponents of “race-based racism” constructed groups of humans (“races”) on the basis of supposedly natural differences, arranging them hierarchically so that their own group was at the top, with the rest of humanity underneath. Alongside Social Darwinism, which “naturalized” and de-ethicized politics and history,⁷⁰ this racism reached its historical zenith in the era of the New Imperialism. The

balance of power shifted in favor of the industrialized colonial powers to such an extent that they were able to divvy up the last remaining “blank spots” on the globe.

Colonial rulers liked to see themselves as servants of a “civilizing mission”—which meant that they accepted, in principle, that indigenous peoples could be civilized, and that the divide separating colonizers from colonized could eventually be overcome.⁷¹ Such pronouncements often had very little to do with actual governance, however, and we should be cautious of taking them too literally. Even the South-West African settler newspapers, which rarely minced words, did not suggest that “natives” could not be Christianized. The newspapers did, however, propose that Christianization might take “centuries,”⁷² and that in the meantime Africans ought to be put to work in service to whites. As such, Christian instruction and education for Africans was unnecessary, and possibly even detrimental.⁷³ This shows that there were ways to exploit Africans ruthlessly without denying them the capacity for “civilization” altogether, and also that the “civilizing mission” was often empty rhetoric, cloaking colonial practices rooted in discrimination and segregation, exploitation, and violence. The high-minded concept of “assimilation,” which long informed French colonial policy, was essentially just another instrument of racist discrimination. It constantly placed new demands on colonized peoples in order to keep them at bay.⁷⁴ Regardless of what the immediate relationship between colonial masters and colonial subjects looked like, it was always characterized by a fundamental difference that could not be overcome,⁷⁵ and this difference was essentially racist.

Racism was ubiquitous, but it did not always lead immediately to extreme violence. Teleological depictions too often draw a continuous line between racism as a negative predisposition toward “others” and racism as a system of extermination, as Pierre-André Taguieff laments.⁷⁶ The English, French, Portuguese, and others also claimed African territories in this era, with attitudes that were hardly less racist than the Germans. They also confronted rebellions and put them down brutally—but exterminatory campaigns remained an exception. There is no question that racism gave German settlers and soldiers (the “violent few,” as Randall Collins describes them⁷⁷) a motive to humiliate, injure, or kill Africans. Racism also encouraged many officials and bystanders to look away or ignore these transgressions. Racism expressed itself not only in direct actions taken to harm the physical and psychological integrity of colonized people, but also in complementary modes of behavior such as neglect and avoidance—forms of “desocialization” that can be just as injurious as open hostility.⁷⁸ Whites were at best indifferent to the fate of

indigenous people because of the unbridgeable distance that they kept between themselves and the “natives.” Even serious crimes could be tolerated within the shadow of this indifference.

Public discourse in this era shows us that Africans came into view only as *means* (to borrow Kantian terminology), never as *ends in themselves*. This was true even for protagonists who lobbied on the Africans’ behalf. Advocates of limited warfare pointed only to the economic damages that the loss of African labor would bring. The “value” of Africans was measured solely by their usefulness to others, not according to any intrinsic humanity. Reichstag delegates who questioned the motivations of indigenous resistance, let alone whether such resistance was justified, drew only scorn and laughter in the assembly.⁷⁹ Since almost no one framed their arguments on ethical grounds, a robust opposition to radical military strategies never materialized, even if few people directly advocated for these.

Racism may further help to explain a distinctive aspect of the Herero genocide.⁸⁰ This genocide was the first of its kind that was primarily executed by regular army units—that is, by volunteers serving in the home army under the command of professional officers. The “dirty work” was not delegated to a paramilitary force, militia, or similar organization, as was often historically the case.⁸¹ Because the soldiers accepted that Africans were inferior and not fully human, they did not question orders that were diametrically opposed to their oft-touted ethos of “chivalry.”

“Privatized violence” perpetrated by the settlers, in particular, plunged the colony into war. State administrators, courts, and the public sanctioned this violence by taking no action against it, obeying the imperative of racial solidarity. The unstated racist consensus meant that belated efforts to stem the violence were half-hearted and ineffectual, and that very soon, soldiers stopped upholding otherwise customary behavioral norms. Racism is an important condition for the escalation of violence, precisely because it lays the groundwork for normalizing deviance.

Emotion

Traditional depictions of the wars of “pacification” in South-West Africa paint a picture of a nearly omnipotent German war machine, which acted in a broadly rational and purposeful way. Such depictions unintentionally mimic the inflated self-image of colonial leaders, who in turn stylized the Africans as unsophisticated creatures of instinct. Needless to say, colonial leaders were human—fallible and susceptible to all kinds of irrational impulses. Their own egos were not as sovereign as they

might have hoped.⁸² They lost self-control frequently, and their actions were driven by emotions such as fear, shame, and rage. Methodologically speaking, conventional genocide studies with teleological or deterministic schemata tend to adopt a highly rationalist approach. In the present context, however, this approach is insufficient. We must keep in mind that the Herero genocide was a product of war, and that wars evoke—and to a large degree, are shaped by—complex emotions. People react emotionally in exceptional circumstances such as wars, as we can see in Sémelin’s “idea of a dynamics of destruction that is liable to change, slow down or speed up.”⁸³ The emotional reactions of people in crisis situations can also heighten the complexity of events, producing feedback effects that are typical of complex systems, and potentially accelerating key developments.

One concern is that a theoretical emphasis on emotion may tread too far into the realm of psychology, beyond the competence of a historical and sociological study. We should keep in mind, however, that emotions are not “private property,” but are responses to social reality, as Sighard Neckel has emphasized. And since the origins of emotions are not exclusively individual, they cannot be explained by psychology alone.⁸⁴ Indeed, since emotions inform nearly every aspect of human experience and social relations, it is difficult to understand why sociology avoided this field of study for so long.⁸⁵

Emotions represent the relationship between a person’s motives and social environment, influencing his or her actions in a motive-serving way.⁸⁶ Each person possesses a range of important concerns, including goals and motives, likes and dislikes, and norms and values. Emotions lend meaning to the world by providing motive-relevant appraisals of human encounters and experiences. Thus, emotions constantly evaluate the degree to which internal⁸⁷ and external stimuli in the form of objects, persons, and events satisfy individual motives or other relevant concerns.⁸⁸ These appraisals trigger “action readiness” for modifying one’s relationship to the environment in a motive-serving way, and they lead to a selection of appropriate behaviors.

Emotionality should not necessarily, or even exclusively, be understood as an exceptional condition (being “beside” oneself with emotion). Emotions regulate all of our activities, so we should not regard them as something exceptional, or even pathological. Even so, in *The Emotional Politics of Racism: How Feelings Trump Facts in an Era of Colorblindness*, Paula Ioanide shows us how emotions can override reason and better judgment—which happens again and again.

We will see how colonial socialization was fundamentally shaped by emotions such as fear and mistrust. Using Trutz von Trotha’s sociology

of colonial rule as a point of departure, we will see how these emotions affected not only the colonizers' external relations to the colonized, but also the internal relations of colonial society, unleashing forces that weakened the colonial state and allowed violence to escalate. Members of colonial society were drawn toward actions that not only failed to advance their interests, but in some respects actually undermined them. The settlement of South-West Africa was formally initiated, planned, and organized by the state, but emotions of colonial society such as fear and mistrust thwarted the state's ambitions and increasingly shaped the course of events. Studying emotions complements the sociological study of governance by encouraging us to look beyond the aspirations of colonial rule—to how it actually functioned, and why.

The Herero campaign developed much differently than German military officials expected, as the usual routines proved ineffective and offered no real guidance. Elsewhere in this book, we will see how the campaign unleashed emotions such as fear, embitterment, and frustration—sources of violence and cruelty that did not depend on orders or plans “from above.” These emotions took on a life of their own and, in turn, affected the campaign itself. The emotion of shame was particularly significant for the genocidal escalation of the campaign.⁸⁹

Shame is the social emotion par excellence because it is so closely bound to its particular historical, cultural, and social context.⁹⁰ Analyzing shame means delving into the “innermost parts of society” in order to understand its norms, rituals, self-perceptions, and anxieties.⁹¹

The question of shame is central to the context of colonial rule. To the extent that wars occur within the “colonial situation”—that is, “in the name of a racial (or ethnic) and cultural superiority dogmatically affirmed” by the colonizers⁹²—defeat brings humiliation that is practically intolerable for the “superior” power. The example of Italy, which lost its war against Ethiopia at Adwa in 1896, underscores how deeply such humiliation can be felt. Avenging this defeat became an immediate priority of the subsequent Italian fascist regime.⁹³ For an emerging great power that was still as unsure of itself as Imperial Germany, the very existence of the uprising—and the fact it was not put down immediately—raised uncomfortable questions. The incompetence of Imperial Germany in South-West Africa was on display for all of the other great powers to see. Prussian/German military elites were particularly ill-equipped to deal with shame. Any sign of weakness drew scorn in Wilhelmine society, where a “cult of ruthlessness” prevailed.⁹⁴ Shame was bypassed, leading to the “shame-rage mechanism” that was first described by psychologist Helen B. Lewis. Thomas J. Scheff subsequently introduced the concept to sociological discussions of violence.⁹⁵ The connection between shame

and rage is key to understanding the escalation of genocidal violence in SWA. Emotions increasingly determined the course of the war, and the consequences were disastrous.

Scholars have been reluctant to identify the failures of the German war machine in South-West Africa. Thus, they have rarely investigated the *meaning* of operational failure—including its emotional significance to key historical actors, and what “action readiness” it inspired. Regardless of whether these actors’ appraisals were prereflective or unconscious, they took place within a specific political and historical constellation, and they were the product of a specific cultural milieu and its corresponding social expectations. We must understand this social context in order to decipher the actors’ emotions and the actions that they evoked.

Organization

I have narrowed the scope of the following investigation in two important ways. First, I focus on the war between the Herero and Germans, leaving the battles in the south largely out of view. These wars were, however, closely related. Because of the fighting against the Bondelswarts in the southernmost part of the colony, troops were absent from the north at the end of 1903, which gave the Herero an immediate incentive to strike. Likewise, the Witbooi-Oorlam’s experiences with the Germans in the Herero campaign contributed to their reasons for taking up the fight against the colonial power. Such connections notwithstanding, the wars were different conflicts with different dynamics, and so they deserve to be considered separately.⁹⁶ Second, I direct special attention to the year 1904, when the threshold to genocidal violence was crossed.

The narrative follows the progression of violence over time. Each chapter focuses on a particular actor or group of actors. I begin with the settlers, whom I situate within a special “order of violence.” The South-West African colonial state was a weak state, which struggled to assert control over the white population throughout its entire existence. Privatized violence overwhelmed the state even in “peacetime,” casting a shadow over the entire period of German rule in South-West Africa. Deviance was normalized early on, establishing a precedent that was highly consequential for the later escalation of violence. I show how the violence of the settlers was connected to racism, the “colonial situation,” and the effects of this situation on the internal relations of colonial society.⁹⁷ I devote particular attention to the emotions of fear and mistrust.

Further, I depict how privatized violence and state inaction ultimately drove the Herero to take arms, as well as how these phenomena influenced the thrust of their attacks. Because the history of the war was told and recorded almost exclusively by Germans, I cannot, unfortunately, present the Herero perspective as thoroughly as that of the Germans. Uneven documentation makes this imbalance unavoidable. In many cases, we can only speculate about the motivations of the Herero. In any event, the Germans deeply resented Herero resistance, and the conflict soon descended into a spiral of violence. The cruelty of colonial society and its desire for revenge shaped at least the first weeks and months of the fighting. The settlers radicalized the direction of the war at both the strategic and tactical levels.

In chapter 2, I investigate the strategic positions that were held by relevant actors at the beginning of the war. On one side, there was the long-serving governor, Theodor Leutwein, who argued on behalf of a traditional, comparatively limited style of fighting. On the other side, there was the metropole, which pushed for unlimited warfare. The metropole sought a war of annihilation—by which I mean a war of political, rather than genocidal, destruction. Disappointed by Leutwein, the metropolitan leaders turned to Trotha as their candidate for waging this war. Trotha's ideas were more radical than those of his predecessor, but their two positions were initially not as far apart as is often assumed.

Chapter 3 examines the campaign, which Leutwein began and Trotha continued. The goal of this campaign—military annihilation—was announced early on, but it seemed attainable only through operations that were difficult to execute in SWA. Trotha assumed the command after Leutwein failed to crush Herero resistance—but operational success eluded Trotha too. Only after the failure of operations, which Trotha long refused to acknowledge, did the campaign “bypass” shame and gradually enter its genocidal phase. The military doctrine of annihilation per se did not lead to escalation; a greater problem was how this doctrine was applied in an unforeseen scenario, which is why it ultimately failed. The initial effects of metropolitan influence and the change in command were ambiguous. The “metropolitanization” of the campaign involved moments of escalating violence, but also moments of restraint. The triumph of the former was by no means inevitable.

In chapter 4, I turn to the brutalization of the troops within the context of the developing war. The field of actors was characterized not only by horizontal, but also vertical, differentiation. Cleavages were evident not only between groups such as settlers, metropolitan officers, and civil servants (who posed a challenge to the military dictatorship); they also ran through the military hierarchy. As in other long wars, the “top” and

“bottom” gradually pulled apart. Genocide studies too often focus exclusively on top decision-makers, thereby ascribing comprehensive, causal significance to the decisions of political and military leaders. These studies are distinguished by a hierarchical view “from above.” More recent scholarship increasingly emphasizes the influence of peripheral and lower-ranking actors on the course of events, and even on central decision-making processes.⁹⁸ I follow this path as well.

Fear and embitterment motivated the soldiers to keep going, even when “combat operations” were reduced to tracking down and slaughtering miserable Herero stragglers—mostly the elderly, women, and children. This brutalization occurred as part of a broader process of normalizing deviance. Fear and embitterment, each in different ways, reflected the disjuncture between strategy and the actual site of operations. The emotions took on special intensity when experienced before an opponent who was seen as inferior. Racism also played a role in this context. Violence “from below” constituted a separate dimension in the process of violence, but it coexisted and interacted with the campaign, which was ordered “from above.”

Chapter 5 explores the troubling finding that the violence and cruelty did not end even after Berlin officially revoked the strategy of annihilation. Civil servants were tasked with overseeing the “pacification” of the colony. Responsible for “native policy” and the ideologization of the regime of the camps, they established an order so repressive that Herero society did not recover, but continued to shrink in the remaining years of German rule. Shame continued to play a role, contributing to the radicalization of postwar politics. Civil servants dealt with the failure of Trotha’s campaign by continuing the war by other means, thereby laying the groundwork for permanent white rule in SWA.

Sources

My work follows the maxims of the “new” research on violence (see especially Trutz von Trotha, “Einleitung: Zur Soziologie der Gewalt”), and my goal is to provide a thick description (in the manner of Clifford Geertz⁹⁹) of the process of violence. To this end, I have consulted many different sources.

Records from the National Archives of Namibia (NAN) and the Federal Archive Berlin-Lichterfelde (BArch) provide the foundation for this study. These archives hold correspondence between the colonial government and the commander-in-chief of the Schutztruppe in German South-West Africa, in addition to correspondence with authorities

in Berlin (particularly the Imperial Colonial Office and Great General Staff). I also consult documents from the colony's district (*Bezirk*) and division (*Distrikt*) offices—including telegrams, orders, reports, assessments, and declarations.

Newspapers published by settlers—above all, the *Deutsch-Südwest-afrikanische Zeitung* (DSWAZ) and the *Windhuker Nachrichten* (WN, called the *Nachrichten des Bezirks-Vereins Windhuk* until 1904)—help to reconstruct the settler “ethos” and the colony's actual political order, as well as the conditions that led to the escalation of violence. These newspapers are available at the National Library in Windhoek. They give voice to the settlers and offer deep insight into colonial society and the tensions and conflicts that defined it. The articles were often written by locals, whose critical tone provides a valuable counterpoint to the official reports that they disputed.

The sociological provenance of this study is evident in chapter 2, which focuses on the settlers. The chapter relies on—and critically engages with—Helmut Bley's *Kolonialherrschaft und Sozialstruktur in Deutsch-Südwestafrika*, which was published in 1968 and remains invaluable. From a different systematic perspective, I formulate my own conclusions about the colony's political order.

The experiences and emotions of historical actors are particularly important to “violence from below,” brutalization, and other aspects of this study, and so I devote special attention to ego documents such as diaries and letters.

The personal diaries of military men that were published within their own lifetimes were subject to censorship, and some—like the soldier Max Belwe's 1906 memoir, *Gegen die Herero 1904/1905*—were even enhanced by professional writers. These texts tend to maintain considerable distance from the events they describe, perhaps unintentionally seeking to rationalize events after the fact. They certainly do not give us a sense of “what actually happened” (*wie es eigentlich gewesen ist*), to borrow the words of the young Leopold von Ranke. Rather, these texts present a stylized self-image that addresses special interests and particular audiences in the corresponding language—raising awareness about the “colonial issue,” for example, or recognizing the achievements of the troops. These texts contributed to a broader discourse that extended beyond the colonial war. Even so, they contain details about the “face of war” that are not found in official communications, reports, or war diaries.

The same is also true (with some exceptions) for the unpublished personal diaries and letters of soldiers, civil servants, and settlers in the National Archives of Namibia, the Federal Archive in Koblenz, and the German Archive for Diaries in Emmendingen (DTA). These, too, were

produced at some distance from the events they describe, in the brief phases of leisure and contemplation that the war sometimes allowed. Even ego documents not originally intended for publication can be shamelessly self-serving—as with the diaries of the long-serving South-West African colonial officer Viktor Franke. But even these texts express disappointments, judgments, and emotions that might have otherwise been suppressed, especially if they involved “comrades,” superiors, or the military apparatus. Writers engaged in dialogue with themselves or other confidants to let off steam—even (or especially) about their superiors and the military apparatus. Such writings can teach us a great deal about the frictions in this “small war.” Experiences and perceptions are an important dimension of wartime events, particularly with respect to phenomena such as brutalization. While official and semiofficial documents (such as the 1906 report by the Great General Staff’s historical department) provide the framework for reconstructing events, ego documents can tell us about feelings, motivations, and morale. They are indispensable for understanding what happened.

This is especially true of Lieutenant General Lothar von Trotha’s war diary, which covers the period between the commander-in-chief’s appointment in the spring of 1904 and his departure at the end of 1905. Genocide studies, in general, are strongly oriented toward “intent.” Since Trotha is rightly viewed as this genocide’s defining figure, his notes seem that much more relevant. The South African historian Gerhardus Pool, the Namibian farmer Hinrich Schneider-Waterberg, and the historian Isabel Hull were granted access to this diary, which is otherwise restricted, although they apparently worked only with the typescript (1a; with supplements 2a and 3a), which was posthumously transcribed in 1930 by Lothar von Trotha’s second wife and widow, Lucy von Trotha. She supplemented this typescript with additional documents (2a and 3a), the original versions of which apparently no longer exist. The typescript was meant to be published for propagandistic purposes, to disprove the “lie” of colonial guilt. Thus, it is unsurprising that the typescript deviates significantly from the handwritten diary in some places. Particularly bellicose or sanguinary remarks, grievances, and (especially) passages that criticized subordinates and superiors were cut or softened. The differences between the typescript and original diary would be worth a study of their own, especially since these differences are not always immediately apparent. I am grateful to the Trotha family for granting me access to the handwritten war diary for this study.

Holdings in the Botswana National Archives and Records Services (GNARS), Cape Town Archives Repository (KAB), and Public Record Office (PRO) of the National Archive in London have also been exceed-

ingly helpful. These archives contain some of the few contemporary documents that allow the Herero and Nama to speak for themselves. During and after the war, British officers and civil servants who were responsible for the eastern and southern border (with Botswana and the Cape Colony) and outlying areas conducted numerous interviews with refugees and others who fled across the border, in order to learn more about the conditions, morale, and further ambitions of the warring parties. They drafted reports and informed their superiors about the situation along the borders and in German South-West Africa. These records provide an important outside perspective on the war as a whole—and, in particular, on German military efforts and successes. This is especially true of the reports by two British officers, Colonel Trench and Major Wade, who were assigned to the headquarters of the South-West African Schutztruppe as observers. The comparative neglect of such sources is puzzling, particularly since the records of the South-West African Schutztruppe itself has been lost. The holdings in SWA were destroyed with the invasion of South African troops in 1915, while those in Germany apparently fell victim to the bombings in World War II. Without the correspondence that has been preserved in British archives, between South African authorities and the German consul general in Cape Town, we would not know (for example) about the fate of a teamster named James, who was recruited in the Cape Colony and then murdered in South-West Africa. His story helps us understand the routine nature of violence against blacks, as well as the workings (and failures) of German military justice.

To a certain extent, German missionaries also provide an outside perspective on circumstances in the colony. The archives of the United Evangelical Mission in Wuppertal and the Evangelical Lutheran Church in the Republic of Namibia (ELCRN) are rich. Although missionaries were at the forefront of colonial penetration, they consistently, if not always, pursued their own agenda. They sought to missionize “natives” who lived in their midst, and so their primary “clients” were Africans. Insofar as they took their mission and pastoral duties seriously, they could easily run into conflict with settlers and colonial authorities. Shortly after the outbreak of war in 1904, these groups did place some of the blame for escalation in the missionaries’ hands. The missionaries saw themselves as Germans, so in the end their loyalty remained with Germany. Nevertheless, in many situations they mediated between the native people and colonizers, and so their own perspective was not always identical with the interests of colonial society. They sought to provide a differentiated view of colonial power relations and the causes and circumstances of the war. Missionary reports and chronicles provide

the basis for any detailed depiction of how violence escalated in January 1904, by also taking the indigenous perspective into account. Mission reports further tell us about the deadly conditions of the concentration camps established at the end of 1904.

Perhaps the most controversial source on this topic is the “blue book” that Jeremy Silvester and Jan-Bart Gewald republished in 2003 under the title *Words Cannot Be Found: German Colonial Rule in Namibia: An Annotated Reprint of the 1918 Blue Book*. Apparently conceived by the British during World War I as an instrument of propaganda, the blue book challenged Germans’ claims to their colonial possessions. It was unquestionably tendentious and later retracted. Andreas Eckl has clearly outlined the weaknesses of this source.¹⁰⁰ Although its scholarly value is limited, the collected (passages of) interviews with survivors of the war are very moving. I refer to the blue book in this study, but only secondarily, for purposes of illustration, without basing my arguments in the relevant passages entirely on this source.

Attentive readers may notice some similarities between passages in this text and passages in some of my previously published works.¹⁰¹ My earlier findings and arguments have, of course, contributed to this book, but here they are integrated within an original, more comprehensive argument that differs from my past work in some important respects. Specialists may also note that I do not mention two particularly recent and relevant works by other scholars—Christiane Bürger’s *Deutsche Kolonialgeschichte(n): Der Genozid in Namibia und die Geschichtsschreibung der DDR und BRD* and Christian W. Zoellner’s *Deutsch-Herero-Krieg 1904: Eine Betrachtung unter dem Aspekt Völkermord*. These were unfortunately published too late to be incorporated here.

Notes

1. This term is misleading in multiple ways. For one, “uprising” implies that the Herero were not a legitimate warring party, despite the dubious legality of the “protection treaties” (*Schutzverträge*) that established German colonial rule. See, for example, Theodor Leutwein, *Elf Jahre Gouverneur in Deutsch-Südwestafrika* (Windhoek, 1997), 222. In this text I use the term “uprising” only for linguistic variation. Moreover, “the Herero” presumes a uniformity that was not necessarily present in polycephalous societies. The circumstances surrounding the firing of the first shots in Okahandja (residence of Samuel Maharero, paramount chief of the Herero) on 12 January 1904 remain murky, as does the escalation of a few local skirmishes into a war that encompassed much of Herero society.
2. Andreas E. Eckl identifies two wars, distinguishing the Germans’ war against the Herero from the one against the Nama (-Oorlam). See Eckl, *S’ist ein übles Land hier: Zur Historiographie eines umstrittenen Kolonialkrieges; Tagebuchaufzeichnungen*.

- gen aus dem Herero-Krieg in Deutsch-Südwestafrika 1904 von Georg Hillebrecht und Franz Ritter von Epp (Cologne, 2005), 16. Since the Nama (-Oorlam) consisted of many independent groups that made their own decisions about war and peace, and—as far I can see—the campaign against them was not waged in a uniform way, it seems appropriate to speak of multiple wars. See Großer Generalstab, *Die Kämpfe der deutschen Truppen in Südwestafrika*, vol. 2 (Berlin, 1907).
3. Andreas Bühler, *Der Namaaufstand gegen die deutsche Kolonialherrschaft in Namibia von 1904–1913* (Frankfurt, 2003); and Walter Nuhn, *Feind überall: Guerillakrieg in Südwest: Der Große Nama-Aufstand 1904–1908* (Bonn, 2000).
 4. Dierk Walter, *Organisierte Gewalt in der europäischen Expansion: Gestalt und Logik des Imperialkrieges* (Hamburg, 2014), 151.
 5. Dierk Walter, “Imperialkriege: Begriff, Erkenntnisinteresse, Aktualität,” in *Imperialkriege von 1500 bis heute: Strukturen—Akteure—Lernprozesse*, ed. Tanja Bühler et al. (Paderborn, 2011), 16–17.
 6. Larissa Förster, *Erinnerungslandschaften im kolonialen und postkolonialen Namibia: Wie Deutsche und Herero in Namibia des Kriegs von 1904 gedenken* (Frankfurt, 2010), 132ff.
 7. See, for example, Großer Generalstab, *Die Kämpfe der deutschen Truppen in Südwestafrika*, vol. 1 (Berlin, 1906), 218. There is no question that indigenous casualties were substantial—numbering in the tens of thousands for the Herero alone—although we do not have exact figures. To begin, it is unclear how many Herero lived in the colony before the war. The British trader Hewitt estimated a population of 150,000–200,000 at the beginning of 1904. But the missionary Kuhlmann counted only 50,000–60,000 residents, and the missionary Irle proposed an even lower number. See C. H. Rodwell, Acting Imperial Secretary, to the High Commissioner, Johannesburg [?], 9 March 1904, GNARS RC 1/18; and A. Kuhlmann, *Auf Adlers Flügeln* (Barmen, 1911), 85. Furthermore, as Jonas Kreienbaum has recently emphasized, we do not even know the precise numbers of survivors of the German concentration camps. He estimates that “the total number of Herero war prisoners must have easily exceeded twenty thousand.” See Jonas Kreienbaum, *A Sad Fiasco: Colonial Concentration Camps in Southern Africa, 1900–1908*, trans. Elizabeth Janik (New York, 2019), 90. The number of Herero who escaped to British-held territory is also unclear, with estimates ranging between 1,000 and 6,000–9,000. See Sarkin, *Germany’s Genocide*, 141. The 1911 census counted 15,130 Herero on South-West African territory, although it is important to note that the colonists’ knowledge about their subjects was generally quite limited. See Horst Drechsler, *Südwestafrika unter deutscher Kolonialherrschaft: Der Kampf der Herero und Nama gegen den deutschen Imperialismus 1884–1915* (Berlin, 1966), 252.
 8. Jeremy Sarkin, *Germany’s Genocide of the Herero: Kaiser Wilhelm II, His General, His Settlers, His Soldiers* (Cape Town, 2011), viii.
 9. Jürgen Zimmerer, *Deutsche Herrschaft über Afrikaner: Staatlicher Machtanspruch und Wirklichkeit im kolonialen Namibia*, 3rd ed. (Münster, 2004); and Birthe Kundrus, *Moderne Imperialisten: Das Kaiserreich im Spiegel seiner Kolonien* (Cologne, 2003).
 10. Leutwein, *Elf Jahre Gouverneur*, 242.
 11. As part of an inquiry into the “Witbooi uprising,” on 11 November 1904, Leutwein wrote that newly arrived soldiers had warned the Witbooi fighters that it would be “their turn next” after the Herero. Some of the fighters deserted and joined up with Hendrik Witbooi, who declared war on the Germans after learning more about their intentions. (NAN ZBU D.IV.M.1, pp. 3ff.)
 12. Rudolf Vierhaus, *Am Hof der Hohenzollern: Aus dem Tagebuch der Baronin Spitzemberg 1865–1914* (Munich, 1979), 221.

13. Matthias Häussler, “‘Die Kommandogewalt hat geredet, der Reichstag hat zu schweigen’: How the ‘Hottentottenwahlen’ of 1907 Shaped the Relationship between Parliament and Military Policy in Imperial Germany,” *Journal of Namibian Studies* 15 (2014): 7–24; Frank Oliver Sobich, “*Schwarze Bestien, rote Gefahr*”: *Rassismus und Antisemitismus im deutschen Kaiserreich* (Frankfurt, 2006); and George D. Crothers, *The German Elections of 1907*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1968).
14. See, for example, Otto Busch, “Deutschlands Kleinkrieg,” Cape Town, 27 January 1906 (no. 14), NAN, A.0529, pp. 6ff.
15. Christian Morgenstern, “Die unmögliche Tatsache,” *Alle Galgenlieder* (Zurich, 1981), 164.
16. StBR, 60th session, 17 March 1904, p. 1896B. General Staff officer Maximilian Bayer made similar remarks. See Maximilian Bayer, *Mit dem Hauptquartier in Südwestafrika* (Berlin, 1909), 190–91.
17. See the report from 5 April 1907, KAB GH 35/139: “Correspondence: High Commissioner Re Rising of Natives in G.S.W.A., 1904–1906.”
18. “Der Aufstand,” *DSWAZ*, 15 December 1904, 1.
19. Vierhaus, *Am Hof der Hohenzollern*, 221.
20. Ludwig von Estorff, *Wanderungen und Kämpfe in Südwestafrika, Ostafrika und Südafrika 1894–1910*, ed. Christoph-Friedrich Kutscher, 2nd ed. (Windhoek, 1979), 117.
21. Sobich, “*Schwarze Bestien, rote Gefahr*,” 227.
22. W. E. Montague, *Campaigning in Zululand: Experiences on Campaign during the Zulu War of 1879 with the 94th Regiment* (LaVergne, 2006).
23. See, for example, Brigitte Lau, “Ungewisse Gewissheiten,” in *Der Wahrheit eine Gasse: Anmerkungen zum Kolonialkrieg in Deutsch-Südwestafrika 1904*, ed. H. R. Schneider-Waterberg (Swakopmund, 2006), 141–58; and Karla Poewe, *The Namibian Herero: A History of Their Psychological Disintegration and Survival* (New York, 1985).
24. See Trutz von Trotha, *Koloniale Herrschaft: Zur soziologischen Theorie der Staatsentstehung am Beispiel des Schutzgebietes Togo* (Tübingen, 1994), 32ff.
25. See Klaus Mainzer, *Komplexität* (Munich, 2008), 38ff.
26. Sidney Dekker, *Drift into Failure: From Hunting Broken Components to Understanding Complex Systems* (Farnham, 2011), 87ff.
27. *Ibid.*
28. See Jacques Sémelin, “Elemente einer Grammatik des Massakers,” *Mittelweg* 36 15, no. 6 (2006): 18–40; Jacques Sémelin, *Purify and Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide*, trans. Cynthia Schoch (New York, 2007); Michael Mann, *Die dunkle Seite der Demokratie: Eine Theorie der ethnischen Säuberung* (Hamburg, 2007); Mark Levene, *The Meaning of Genocide* (London, 2005); Martin Shaw, *What is Genocide?* (Cambridge, 2007); Christian Gerlach, “Extremely Violent Societies: An Alternative to the Concept of Genocide,” *Journal of Genocide Research* 8, no. 4 (2006): 455–71; and Christian Gerlach, *Extrem gewalttätige Gesellschaften: Massengewalt im 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 2011).
29. To assess these works fairly, one must consider the time and circumstances when they were written. Works that coincided with the war’s hundredth anniversary appropriately took issue with the Federal Republic of Germany’s reluctance to make a clear admission of guilt. Not until 2015 did the first state official, Bundestag president Norbert Lammert, speak of “genocide” (*Völkermord*), thereby ushering in an overdue transformation in the official discourse. Parts of the German and German-Namibian public still dismissed the happenings in SWA as “normal colonial warfare.” See Janntje Böhlke-Itzen, “Die bundesdeutsche Diskussion und die Reparationsfrage: Ein ganz normaler Kolonialkrieg?” in *Genozid und Gedenken: Namibisch-*

- deutsche Geschichte und Gegenwart*, ed. Henning Melber (Frankfurt, 2005), 103–19; Christoph Marx, “Entsorgen und Entseuchen: Zur Diskussionskultur in der derzeitigen namibischen Historiographie—eine Polemik,” in *Genozid und Gedenken*, 141–62; and Reinhart Kößler, “Im Schatten des Genozids: Erinnerungspolitik in einer extrem ungleichen Gesellschaft,” in *Genozid und Gedenken*, 49–77. Within this context, the social and political significance of these works was unmistakable.
30. Drechsler, *Südwestafrika unter deutscher Kolonialherrschaft*, 15 and 183.
 31. Even Drechsler’s most questionable theses are repeatedly cited—and thus, to a certain extent, affirmed—without comment. See, for example, David Olusoga and Casper W. Erichsen, *The Kaiser’s Holocaust: Germany’s Forgotten Genocide* (London, 2010), 145; Dominik J. Schaller, “Kolonialkrieg, Völkermord und Zwangsarbeit in ‘Deutsch-Südwestafrika,’” in *Enteignet—Vertrieben—Ermordet: Beiträge zur Genozidforschung*, ed. Dominik J. Schaller (Zurich, 2004), 217, note 156; and Alison Palmer, *Colonial Genocide* (London, 2000), 146. The influence of Drechsler’s work extends beyond academic circles. Visitors to Namibia who pose (seemingly) naive questions about the German colonial era may well be asked if they haven’t read “the Drechsler.”
 32. Drechsler, *Südwestafrika unter deutscher Kolonialherrschaft*, 158.
 33. Drechsler’s image of the perpetrators was wholly monolithic. By contrast, just two years later Helmut Bley distinguished between the interests of the metropole and those of colonial society, emphasizing—at least in principle—that colonialism was a complex phenomenon, involving heterogeneous groups of actors and internal antagonisms. See Helmut Bley, *Kolonialherrschaft und Sozialstruktur in Deutsch-Südwestafrika 1894–1914* (Hamburg, 1968), 15. For the English translation, see Helmut Bley, *South-West Africa under German Rule 1894–1914*, trans. Hugh Ridley (London: Heinemann, 1971).
 34. These works point to Lieutenant General Lothar von Trotha’s assumption of the military command in May 1904 as the beginning of the genocidal phase. See Wolfgang Benz, “Kolonialpolitik als Genozid: Der ‘Herero-Aufstand’ in Deutsch-Südwestafrika,” in *Ausgrenzung, Vertreibung, Völkermord: Genozid im 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. Wolfgang Benz, 2nd ed. (Munich, 2007), 37; Gesine Krüger, *Kriegsbewältigung und Geschichtsbewusstsein: Realität, Deutung und Verarbeitung des deutschen Kolonialkriegs in Namibia 1904 bis 1907* (Göttingen, 1999), 50; and Schaller, “Kolonialkrieg, Völkermord und Zwangsarbeit,” 167. Recent studies that are specifically concerned with genocide focus on the wars between 1904 and 1908. Although these studies’ authors address their subjects with greater nuance than Drechsler, their methodological approaches are quite similar. See Joël Kotek, “Le Génocide des Herero, Symptôme d’un Sonderweg Allemand?,” *Revue d’histoire de la Shoah* 189 (2008): 177–97; Benz, “Kolonialpolitik als Genozid”; Jan Bart Gewalt, “Imperial Germany and the Herero of Southern Africa: Genocide and the Quest of Reconciliation,” in *Genocide, War Crimes and the West: History and Complicity*, ed. Adam Jones (London, 2004), 59–77; Benjamin Madley, “From Africa to Auschwitz: How German South West Africa Incubated Ideas and Methods Adopted and Developed by the Nazis in Eastern Europe,” *European History Quarterly* 35, no. 3 (2005): 429–64; and Jon M. Bridgman and Leslie J. Worley, “Genocide of the Hereros,” in *Century of Genocide: Eyewitness Accounts and Critical Views*, ed. Samuel Totten et al. (New York, 1997), 3–40. They, too, conclude that the outcomes of the campaign were apparent from the start, and that German warfare entered its genocidal phase early on.
 35. See Sarkin, *Germany’s Genocide*.
 36. This includes the following acts: First, killing members of the group; second, causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; third, deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to destroy the group, in whole or in part; fourth, impos-

- ing measures to prevent births; and fifth, forcibly transferring children to another group.
37. William A. Schabas, *Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes* (Cambridge, 2000), 214ff.
 38. For a critical view, see Levene, *The Meaning of Genocide*, 35ff.
 39. Legal scholar Jeremy Sarkin adopts a similar approach, establishing genocidal intent early on. He sees the impetus for genocide in the settlers' hunger for land; acquiring land became a socially sanctioned imperative of Imperial German state policy. Sarkin, *Germany's Genocide of the Herero*, 8.
 40. Once again, Sarkin's monograph provides an instructive example. The title *Germany's Genocide of the Herero: Kaiser Wilhelm II, His General, His Settlers, His Soldiers* highlights Sarkin's assumption that the groups in his study acted in concert, orchestrated by the Kaiser from the top down.
 41. Jeremy Sarkin traces genocidal intent back to the Kaiser and even explores the monarch's medical history in a chapter titled "The Kaiser's Personality": "The Herero genocide is also clearly linked to the Kaiser's aggressive behaviour and sadistic streak." See Sarkin, *Germany's Genocide of the Herero*, 162.
 42. The conventional view eventually confronts a serious problem. The ideological profile that it wants to construct depends on structural logic that, to a greater or lesser extent, must transcend time in order to classify people and their actions. By this reasoning, Trotha's actions that meet the objective criteria of genocide can be broadly characterized as "genocidal" because Trotha is a radical racist. How, then, to explain the fact that Trotha initially waged a "conventional" war against the Herero, even though he possessed dictatorial powers after the declaration of martial law, and carte blanche from the Kaiser? Most case studies "solve" the problem by ignoring contradictory evidence and continuing to identify the start of the genocidal phase with Trotha's assumption of command.
 43. For a critical take, see Birthe Kundrus, "Entscheidung für den Völkermord? Einleitende Überlegungen zu einem historiographischen Problem," *Mittelweg* 36 15, no. 6 (2006): 7.
 44. Trutz von Trotha, "Einleitung: Zur Soziologie der Gewalt," in *Soziologie der Gewalt: Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, ed. Trutz von Trotha (Opladen, 1997), 22.
 45. Perhaps the most important finding of the (no longer so) "new" research on violence (*neuere Gewaltforschung*) is its emphasis on violence as a *process*. See Trutz von Trotha, "Einleitung"; Trutz von Trotha and Michael Schwab-Trapp, "Logiken der Gewalt," *Mittelweg* 36 5, no. 6 (1996): 56–64; Birgitta Nedelmann, "Dichte Beschreibungen absoluter Macht," *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 46, no. 1 (1994): 130–34; Birgitta Nedelmann, "Schwierigkeiten soziologischer Gewaltanalyse," *Mittelweg* 36 4, no. 3 (1995): 8–17; and Birgitta Nedelmann, "Gewaltsoziologie am Scheideweg: Die Auseinandersetzungen in der gegenwärtigen und Wege der künftigen Gewaltforschung," in *Soziologie der Gewalt: Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, ed. Trutz von Trotha (Opladen, 1997), 59–85.
 46. Jon M. Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros* (Berkeley, 1981), 104ff. Further, we should not too be too hasty in presuming an asymmetry between victims and perpetrators, thereby underestimating Herero resistance. The conventional view tends to exaggerate the Germans' power over the Herero, constructing a one-sided narrative that is determined by the Germans. Emphasizing Herero agency does not automatically minimize the "extremely repressive character" of German measures. See Jürgen Zimmerer, "Rassenkrieg und Völkermord: Der Kolonialkrieg in Deutsch-Südwestafrika und die Globalgeschichte des Genozids," in *Genozid und Gedenken: Namibisch-deutsche Geschichte und Gegenwart*, ed. Henning Melber (Frankfurt, 2005), 28.

- Herero persistence, despite dwindling room to maneuver, may help to explain why the Germans turned to increasingly repressive measures, as this persistence undermined colonial leaders' fantasies of omnipotence and their sense of superiority.
47. Trutz von Trotha, "Formen des Krieges: Zur Typologie kriegerischer Aktionsmacht," in *Ordnungen der Gewalt: Beiträge zu einer politischen Soziologie der Gewalt und des Krieges*, ed. Sighard Neckel and Michael Schwab-Trapp (Opladen, 1999), 72.
 48. Shaw, *What is Genocide?*, 81–82.
 49. In some cases, forms of violence are simplistically traced back to an intent to annihilate "from above" and situated within an "impressionistic" picture of atrocities in order to heighten their lurid and criminal nature. See, for example, Casper W. Erichsen "Zwangsarbeit im Konzentrationslager auf der Haifischinsel," in *Völkermord in Deutsch-Südwestafrika: Der Kolonialkrieg (1904–1908) in Namibia und seine Folgen*, ed. Jürgen Zimmerer and Joachim Zeller (Berlin: Links, 2004), 80–85; and Casper W. Erichsen, *"The Angel of Death Has Descended Violently among Them": Concentration Camps and Prisoners-of-War in Namibia 1904–1908* (Leiden, 2005). Anything that helps to achieve this effect is thrown into the mix, regardless of the particular actors, circumstances, or distinctive aspects of violence that are involved. In other cases, facts are ignored when they cannot be linked to an order, or to proof of intent "from above," as required by international law. This arbitrarily curtails the process of violence, although—as we will see—violence "from below" is a separate dimension and an integral component of this process.
 50. Gerlach, "Extremely Violent Societies," 459.
 51. Sémelin, "Elemente einer Grammatik des Massakers," 30–31.
 52. Gerhard Paul and Klaus-Michael Mallmann, "Sozialisation, Milieu und Gewalt: Fortschritte und Probleme der neueren Täterforschung," in *Karrieren der Gewalt: Nationalsozialistische Täterbiographien*, ed. Gerhard Paul and Klaus-Michael Mallmann (Darmstadt, 2011), 4.
 53. Scholarship on SWA has tended to overestimate the Germans' effective power, while overlooking the extent of their failings. Horst Drechsler, perhaps the harshest critic of "German imperialism," unintentionally reproduced colonial leaders' inflated self-image by depicting them as nearly omnipotent in his 1966 book, *Südwestafrika unter deutscher Kolonialherrschaft*. More recent studies have broken new ground. The very titles of works by Jakob Zollmann (*Koloniale Herrschaft und ihre Grenzen*, or *Colonial Rule and Its Limits*) and Jonas Kreienbaum (*A Sad Fiasco*, about concentration camps in southern Africa) emphasize the discrepancy between aspirations and reality.
 54. See, for example, Sarkin, *Germany's Genocide of the Herero*.
 55. Trotha, *Koloniale Herrschaft*.
 56. Caroline Elkins and Susan Pedersen, "Introduction," in *Settler Colonialism in the Twentieth Century: Projects, Practices, Legacies*, ed. Caroline Elkins and Susan Pedersen (New York, 2005), 7ff.
 57. Peter Hanser and Trutz von Trotha, *Ordnungsformen der Gewalt: Reflexionen über die Grenzen von Recht und Staat an einem einsamen Ort* (Cologne, 2002), 315ff.
 58. Leutwein, *Elf Jahre Gouverneur in Deutsch-Südwestafrika*, 240.
 59. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, 1957), 9.
 60. The concept of "multi-causality" (see Gerlach, "Extremely Violent Societies," 465) does not capture this complexity. The number of causes alone is not as significant as how they interact with one another and their effects.
 61. Leutwein to the Colonial Department (16 February 1904), NAN ZBU, D.IV.1.2: Herero-Aufstand 1904. Feldzug; Politisches. Vol. 4: October 1904–December 1905, p. 5.
 62. Quoted in Bley, *Kolonialherrschaft*, 177.

63. Dekker, *Drift into Failure*.
64. Thomas McCarthy, *Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human Development* (New York, 2009), 24.
65. See, for example, Wolf D. Hund, *Rassismus* (Bielefeld, 2007), 13.
66. Robert Miles, *Racism* (London, 2003), 89. There are as many schemes for classifying human races as authors who seek to create them. One of the earliest, by Carl von Linné, associates somatic traits like skin color with other qualities like laziness—as in the case of “the African.” See Plümecke, *Rasse in der Ära der Genetik*, 74. Contemporary research on genetics and evolution shows us that characteristics such as external appearance (the typical basis for constructions of race) reveal little about genetic relationships, as these characteristics developed comparatively late and in response to certain environmental factors.
67. “Race-based racism” was discredited, at the latest, with the demise of the openly racist Nazi regime. Racism itself was by no means defeated, but this variation fell out of favor. Western democracies today discourage hegemonic groups from presenting themselves as superior, or from promoting particularist interests, because this behavior conflicts with liberal ideals. See Yasemin Shooman, “. . . weil ihre Kultur so ist”: *Narrative des antimuslimischen Rassismus* (Bielefeld, 2014), 188. Subtler forms of discrimination have emerged, including intellectual categories that exist for precisely this reason. The “new racism” is not grounded in biology or a fixed definition of race; its argument, rather, is cultural. The new racism detects differences between (fictive or actual) human groups, without casting judgment or using these differences to formulate hierarchies. This at least, is the rhetoric. See Pierre-André Taguieff, “Die Metamorphosen des Rassismus und die Krise des Antirassismus,” in *Das Eigene und das Fremde: Neuer Rassismus in der Alten Welt*, ed. Ulrich Bielefeld (Hamburg, 1998), 221–59.
68. Tino Plümecke, *Rasse in der Ära der Genetik: Die Ordnung des Menschen in den Lebenswissenschaften* (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2013), 62.
69. See, for example, Plümecke, *Rasse in der Ära der Genetik*, 26; and Christian Geulen, *Geschichte des Rassismus* (Munich, 2007), 41.
70. Hannsjoachim W. Koch, *Der Sozialdarwinismus: Seine Genese und sein Einfluss auf das imperialistische Denken* (Munich, 1973), 56.
71. See George M. Fredrickson, *Racism: A Short History* (Princeton, 2002), 108.
72. “Vortrag des Herrn Erdmann—Harris,” *Windhuker Nachrichten*, 15 June 1905, 3, insert.
73. “Aus Südafrika,” *DSWAZ*, 7 February 1906, 1, insert.
74. Hund, *Rassismus*, 110.
75. Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (Princeton, 1993), 10ff.
76. Taguieff, “Die Metamorphosen des Rassismus,” 223.
77. Randall Collins, *Violence: A Micro-Sociological Theory* (Princeton, 2008), 370–412.
78. Hund, *Rassismus*, 110; and Carl-Friedrich Graumann and Margret Wintermantel, “Diskriminierende Sprechakte: Ein funktionaler Ansatz,” in *Verletzende Worte: Die Grammatik sprachlicher Missachtung*, ed. Steffen K. Herrmann et al. (Bielefeld, 2007), 149.
79. See, for example StBR (19 January 1904), 14th session, 363ff.
80. Boris Barth correctly asserts that racism is a necessary condition for genocide. See *Genozid—Völkermord im 20. Jahrhundert: Geschichte, Theorien, Kontroversen* (Munich, 2006), 183. In contrast to the genocide of European Jews or the Tutsi in Rwanda, the Herero were “racialized,” desocialized, dehumanized, and excluded from the universe of moral obligation even before the genocidal process began. Discriminating between “white” and “black” was fundamental to colonial socialization.

81. The perpetrators of genocide are usually states. See Helen Fein, *Genocide: A Sociological Perspective* (London, 1993), 12. These regimes may nevertheless use nonstate actors to enact their radical policies. Since state organizations are subject to law and the massacre of women and children is usually considered unjust, state organizations are not easily instrumentalized for criminal plans. For an opposing view, see Stefan Kühl, *Ganz normale Organisationen: Zur Soziologie des Holocaust* (Frankfurt, 2014).
82. See Sigmund Freud, “Eine Schwierigkeit der Psychoanalyse,” in *Gesammelte Werke, Bd. XII: Werke aus den Jahren 1917–1920* (Frankfurt, 1999), 11.
83. Sémelin, *Purify and Destroy*, 325.
84. Sighard Neckel, *Status und Scham: Zur symbolischen Reproduktion sozialer Ungleichheit* (Frankfurt, 1991), 15–17.
85. Jonathan H. Turner and Jan E. Stets, *The Sociology of Emotions* (Cambridge, 2005), 1.
86. Manfred Holodynski and Wolfgang Friedlmeier, *Development of Emotions and Emotion Regulation*, trans. Jonathan Harrow (New York, 2006), 12.
87. Emotions also play a significant role in directing attention and memory. The latter is a selective process, based on countless decisions about what is worth retaining (or not). These processes occur at such high speed, and in such quantity, that they cannot be consciously controlled.
88. Holodynski and Friedlmeier, *Emotionen*, 19. In this context, Nico Frijda notes that “appraisals are continuously made, and appraisal is around anyway, because animals and humans are set to make sense of the environment and what happens there.” See *The Laws of Emotion*, 112.
89. The sociologist George Steinmetz and the historian Isabel Hull have clearly established that the violence escalated only after original plans of operation failed, and that this turning point represents the key issue that must be explained. See George Steinmetz, *The Devil’s Handwriting: Precoloniality and the German Colonial State in Qingdao, Samoa, and Southwest Africa* (Chicago, 2007); Isabel V. Hull, “Military Culture and the Production of ‘Final Solutions’ in the Colonies: The Example of Wilhelminian Germany,” in *The Specter of Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical Perspective*, ed. Robert Gellately and Ben Kiernan (Cambridge, 2003), 141–62; and Isabel V. Hull, *Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany* (Ithaca, 2005). It seems to me, however, that neither Hull nor Steinmetz sufficiently recognize the consequence of this failure and what it meant to the Germans. Steinmetz himself concedes that he is not interested in the process of violence itself (*The Devil’s Handwriting*, 192). Hull, by contrast, focuses on the role of military organization and routines, so she does not closely examine the crisis brought on by failure.
90. Agnes Heller, *Theorie der Gefühle* (Hamburg, 1980), 111.
91. Neckel proposes that shame can shed more light on a society’s moral interior than its formalized norms and ideals. See Neckel, *Status und Scham*, 18.
92. Georges Balandier, “The Colonial Situation: A Theoretical Approach,” in *Social Change: The Colonial Situation*, ed. Immanuel Wallerstein (New York, 1966), 54.
93. Nicola Labanca, *Oltremare: Storia dell’espansione coloniale italiana* (Bologna, 2002), 112ff.
94. Norbert Elias, *The Germans: Power Struggles and the Development of Habitus in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, trans. Eric Dunning and Stephen Mennell (New York, 1996), 206.
95. See Helen B. Lewis, *Shame and Guilt in Neurosis* (New York, 1971); Helen B. Lewis, “Introduction: Shame—The ‘ Sleeper ’ in Psychopathology,” in *The Role of Shame in Symptom Formation*, edited by Helen B. Lewis (Hillsdale, 1987), 1–28; Thomas

- J. Scheff, *Bloody Revenge: Emotions, Nationalism and War* (Lincoln, 2000); and Thomas J. Scheff and Suzanne M. Retzinger, *Emotions and Violence: Shame and Rage in Destructive Conflicts* (Lincoln, 2001).
96. Eckl, "S'ist ein übles Land hier," 16; and Werner Hillebrecht, "Die Nama und der Krieg im Süden," in *Völkermord in Deutsch-Südwestafrika: Der Kolonialkrieg (1904–1908) in Namibia und seine Folgen*, ed. Jürgen Zimmerer and Joachim Zeller (Berlin, 2004), 126–27.
 97. Robert Delavignette, *Les vrais chefs de l'Empire* (Paris, 1939).
 98. Gerlach, "Extremely Violent Societies," 459.
 99. Clifford Geertz, "Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture," in *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York, 1973), 3–30.
 100. Jeremy Silvester and Jan-Bart Gewald, eds., *Words Cannot Be Found: German Colonial Rule in Namibia: An Annotated Reprint of the 1918 Blue Book* (Leiden, 2003); and Andreas Eckl, "S'ist ein übles Land hier."
 101. See especially Matthias Häussler and Trutz von Trotha, "Brutalisierung 'von unten': Kleiner Krieg, Entgrenzung der Gewalt und Genozid im kolonialen Deutsch-Südwestafrika," *Mittelweg* 36 21, no. 3 (2012): 57–89; Matthias Häussler and Trutz von Trotha, "Koloniale Zivilgesellschaft? Von der 'kolonialen Gesellschaft' zur kolonialen Gewaltgemeinschaft in Deutsch-Südwestafrika," in *Zivilgesellschaft und Krieg*, ed. Dierk Spreen and Trutz von Trotha (Berlin, 2012), 293–317; Matthias Häussler, "From Destruction to Extermination: Genocidal Escalation in Germany's War against the Herero, 1904," *Journal of Namibian Studies* 11 (2011): 55–81; Matthias Häussler, "Zur Asymmetrie tribaler und staatlicher Kriegführung in Imperialkriegen: Die Logik der Kriegführung der Herero in vor- und frühkolonialer Zeit," in *Imperialkriege von 1500 bis heute: Strukturen—Akteure—Lernprozesse*, ed. Tanja Bühner et al. (Paderborn, 2011), 177–95; Matthias Häussler, "Grausamkeit und Kolonialismus: Zur Dynamik von Grausamkeit," in *On Cruelty*, ed. Trutz von Trotha and Jakob Rösel (Cologne, 2011), 511–37; Matthias Häussler, "Soldatische Hinterwälder oder Avantgarde? Über die einsatzbezogenen Erfahrungen der Kaiserlichen Schutztruppe in 'Deutsch-Südwestafrika,'" *Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift* 71, no. 2 (2012): 309–27; Matthias Häussler, "Zwischen Vernichtung und Pardon: Die Konzentrationslager in 'Deutsch-Südwestafrika' (1904–08)," *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 61, no. 7/8 (2013): 601–20; and Matthias Häussler, "'Kultur der Grausamkeit' und die Dynamik 'eradierender Praktiken': Ein Beitrag zur Erforschung extremer Gewalt," *Sociologus* 63 (2013): 147–69.