INTRODUCTION

David W. HAINES, Shinji YAMASHITA, and J.S. EADES

This book focuses on the dynamics, trends, and meanings of East Asian migration, paying particular attention to the ways in which East Asian migration is important in its own right but also to how it can complement the broader literature on migration research and theory. The East Asian material is especially helpful, for example, in indicating the interaction between internal and international migration (thus helping to reunite two long-separated areas of human movement), the degree to which out and in-migration often offset each other (thus countering the common emphasis on immigration alone), and the extent to which migration is of unclear duration (thus challenging conventional categorizations of temporary versus permanent migration).

The East Asian material also permits an initial reconnaissance of what a general theory of migration might entail, especially the need to recognize the fluid nature of human movements that vary in intention and actuality, the variable and often unplanned length of migration, how instances of migration channel subsequent decisions about migration, and how the processes of migration must be separated conceptually from the histories of those who migrate. To move, it appears, is human – and to move again perhaps even more so. Such a broad view of migration, based on the East Asian experience (Haines 2008, Yamashita 2008b), may help to provide a better orientation to the much less geographically fixed social order of the twenty-first century and help to bring about a better understanding of the many human options and constraints in an increasingly globalized – yet also atomized – world.¹

In this introductory chapter we provide some general comments on the major trends in contemporary East Asian migration and then introduce the organization of the book and the kinds of issues it raises for what we will hope will be an enhanced – and more internationally collaborative – understanding of human migration.

Rising Affluence, Changing Lifestyles

As has often been noted, the increasing affluence in most East Asia countries has led to new demographic patterns, kinds of work, and lifestyle choices. This has been documented with increasing interest by social scientists, who have focused
on consumption, mobility, and the kinds of industries that accompany them. The new middle classes are more highly educated than previous generations, and also more highly urbanized. Their families are smaller. The effects of the one-child policy in China are well known, but Hong Kong, Korea, Japan, and Taiwan have also become statistically one-child societies, without the need for such draconian policies. Part of the reason for the decline in family size is economic: more and more women with higher levels of education are part of the labor force, and have less time for childcare. Part of the reason is demographic: as child mortality sinks towards zero, there is less need to reproduce in order to produce heirs as security in old age. As families shrink, many of the functions of the family have been taken over by the state, or the market in the wealthier countries, often utilizing migrants from outside – a process described by Douglass (2009) as “global householding.” Another factor is the expense of education. Paradoxically, increasing affluence means that children may remain dependent on their parents for a longer rather than a shorter period. The period of education financed by parents now often extends beyond compulsory education to high school and even university and beyond. The phenomenon of “parasite singles” (Tran 2006), adult children continuing to live with their parents and enjoying the benefits of free or very inexpensive housing, cooking, and laundry services, is well known in Japan, and could be spreading to the rest of the region. At the other end of the lifespan, older people are living longer and, for an increasing number, this is spent in relatively affluent retirement. Generous pensions mean that people can travel and experience other lifestyle options, resulting in new flows of international migration in search of recreation, medical services, health care, and a more desirable lifestyle for less money.

One of the most obvious results of the new affluence is the emergence of the tourist industry. In the Asia Pacific area, many regions and smaller countries are increasingly basing their strategies of economic development on the tourism industry, selling images of paradise whether in Bali, Thailand, Southern China, the Philippines, Australia, or the Pacific Islands (Yamashita, Din, and Eades 1997, Picard and Wood 1997, Yamashita 2003). Their clienteles come increasingly from the richer countries of East Asia – from Japan, Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore.

Like tourism, education has also become increasingly globalized and international. Once more, this has been largely driven by the middle classes, either by the parents looking for the best education for their children’s job prospects and mobility, or by the students themselves looking for education and training which they cannot find at home. This may start at a young age. There is a long tradition of “parachute” children from Taiwan – and now from Korea – who are sent to the United States for their education, where they may spend much of the time living on their own or with relatives, and thus become used to fending for themselves. Education has also become an important element in governmental manpower
recruitment and training programs, and this too is having an enormous impact on patterns of international migration and the responses of states to it. The highly developed countries have long made up for a skills shortage in areas such as mathematics, science, and technology through recruiting from overseas, and the education system has been an important part of this. Students who arrive to study at the undergraduate or postgraduate level often stay on and become integrated into the local skilled labor market (Mani 2005). Singapore takes this one stage further, by recruiting students at the high school level as well as the university level, and offering them scholarships in return for a period spent working in Singapore after they graduate (Ko 2004).

The decline in fertility coupled with rising life expectancy also contributes to new forms of movement in the region. Medical tourism, for example, is on the rise and the search for medical care, often coupled with the desire for a more affluent retirement lifestyle, may result in permanent settlement. In East Asia, the largest market is probably Japan, and Thailand and Malaysia have both begun to offer deals for retiring Japanese looking to improve their lifestyles within the limits of their pensions (Miyazaki 2008, Ono 2008). Some have acquired second homes in the sun, while others have moved there permanently. Another driver in this respect is the diminishing availability of family support in old age. Families are now much smaller and more scattered than they were, especially in low-fertility societies such as Japan, so even though the government’s policies throw much of the burden of care on the family, the family is often simply not there. This results in two flows of migrants: the flow of care workers from countries like the Philippines to take over the responsibility of care from family members in countries like Hong Kong and Singapore (Toyota 2008); and the flow of the elderly looking for the sun, recreation, and eventually cheaper care services in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. These issues are illustrated in particular detail in this volume’s chapters by Mika Toyota (Chapter 16), and Shinji Yamashita (Chapter 11).

All of these flows have been facilitated by the falling cost of transport thanks to a new generation of cost-efficient wide-bodied airplanes and competition in the airline industry. The costs of international travel are in many cases the same as, or cheaper than, domestic travel, with the result that people prefer to spend the same money on traveling abroad, where they get better, cheaper, and, above all, different service. Migration used to be a one-way process, but it is now just part of the establishment of a transnational network of friends and relatives. The costs of communication have also fallen, with cheap internet connections and email services together with the falling costs of phone calls and mobile phones.
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The Economic Impact

Many of these shifts represent a development of what has become known in the literature as the “new international division of labor” or NIDL thesis. In his study of migration, Robin Cohen (2006: chapter 7) summarizes this as follows. In the second half of the twentieth century, industrial capital increasingly moved from the metropolitan countries to the periphery to establish factories. However, unlike earlier attempts of industrialization, these were intended to produce goods for export, rather than for import substitution, and they formed the backbone of the economic success of the Asian Tigers, the newly industrializing countries (NICs) that followed Japan’s lead in staging economic “miracles.” The reason for the shift was the search for cheaper, skilled labor, due to the increased costs of reproducing labor power in the older advanced industrialized countries which, in turn, was due to the construction of the welfare state and the organization of the workers. As a result, the older industrialized countries shifted from importing migrant workers to exporting production. Meanwhile, the urban labor forces of the NICs were swelled by the movement of rural labor to the cities, while governments set up beneficial fiscal regimes to help foreign companies wishing to come in and invest. Goods exported typically included electronics and clothes, with a high value to weight ratio, so that the cost of transport was less than the savings through cheaper labor. The result was rapid economic development in East Asia coupled with stagnation and rising unemployment in the older industrial countries such as Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Cohen admits that the NIDL thesis provides a powerful explanation for many of the observed changes in the world economy in the postwar period, though he does criticize it both on conceptual and historical grounds, in that “NIDL theorists have ignored or misconceived the historical evolution and successive phases of the international division of labour” (Cohen 2006: 157–158). He also argues that the current “transnational phase” in the division of labor “should be conceived as embracing a number of different forms of labor utilization not adequately depicted in NIDL theory. These all have implications for the patterning of migration flows” (Cohen 2006: 162). This is the phase of the international division of labor brought about by a number of factors in the postwar period: the collapse of colonialism, the rise of transnational capital, the boom in the oil industry, and the relocation of production to peripheral regions such as East Asia. The resulting shifts in migration patterns include the flow of both unskilled and skilled labor to the oil economies, the growth of demand for new services in the “global cities” which are the centers of the finance industry (Sassen 1992) or competing in the international mega-events and tourism market (Ren 2009), the promotion of labor exports as a development strategy by countries like the Philippines, and the rise of China as an international exporter of cheap labor (cf. Cohen 2006: 1). In other words, the NIDL has provided a platform on which complex movements
of people within the newly developing countries are played out, alongside new forms of labor migration to the older industrialized countries, and particularly to the global centers of finance with their insatiable need for cheap labor to provide accommodation, catering, entertainment, and sexual services.

The growth of the middle classes and the rise of lifestyle migration within, between, and from the newly affluent countries of East Asia have made these patterns even more complex. If the NICs became wealthy through taking over the production of consumer goods from the West, their transition to being countries with large middle classes has meant the growth of large consumer and recreational service industries, which themselves can be marketed to the international elite. The current crop of advertisements on international television, portraying the major countries of the region as tropical paradises offering both young and middle-aged jet setters a cornucopia of delights, is one symptom of this. Another genre of advertisement is that of the “shop till you drop” type, branding such places as Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia as glorified supermarkets offering unlimited access to global designer goods. And, of course, transport between them is offered by the airlines with their competing first and business class services, complete with glasses of champagne, stewardesses presenting orchids, and ever more lavish pull-out sleeping arrangements. The increased affluence in East Asia thus indicates that the region may be a particularly valuable site for reconsidering these issues of NIDL theory.

The Contradictions of Transnationalism

At a more mundane level, these movements of people are leading to increasingly transnational social and family structures as well. From the increasing interaction of migrants and locals, there are more transnational partnerships and marriages and more children potentially claiming citizenship in multiple countries. Core institutions that have been taken for granted are now being challenged, forcing states to re-examine these institutions and, if necessary, bring them in line with new realities.

Perhaps the most obvious institution being challenged is citizenship itself. Laws on citizenship vary widely from country to country. Most basically, there is the distinction between the Latin terms *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis*, whether one acquires the right (*jus*) of citizenship by being born of the soil of a country (*soli*) or being of descent from existing citizens through relationships of blood (*sanguinis*). States in which immigration has been common have generally adopted the idea of *jus soli*, given that few citizens are blood relatives of the original inhabitants. Older nations have tended to emphasize *jus sanguinis*: the great majority of residents are the children of previous residents. Originally, many countries adopted a patrilineal rule that the line of descent had to be that of the father, and that children were
not entitled to the citizenship of their mothers, but increasingly this has changed, with both the father and the mother recognized as potential sources of citizenship. This then raises the possibility of bi- or multi-national children (e.g. where children of two parents of different nationalities are born in a third country with *jus soli*). Some countries have long allowed the possibility of dual citizenship, the Commonwealth countries with large populations of British origin being good examples. Britain now also has very flexible citizenship arrangements with the Republic of Ireland. In other cases, such as those involving Japanese parentage, children in theory have to decide which nationality to take upon reaching adulthood, though it is probable that at least some continue to exercise both.

It is likely that in the future many countries will relax their citizenship laws and recognize dual citizenship. India has recently been moving in this direction, realizing that the worldwide diaspora of families of Indian descent represents a huge resource in terms of talent and capital, one on which the ancestral homeland could usefully draw. China would also stand to gain in the same way as India, given the vast numbers and economic prominence of the overseas Chinese. In 1990, Japan changed its immigration law to allow the settlement of South Americans of Japanese descent, who now form distinctive Portuguese- and Spanish-speaking minorities in Japan (Tsuda 2003, Sasaki 2008). Increasing numbers of Korean residents are taking citizenship in Japan, as are the highly-skilled Chinese discussed by Liu-Farrer (2010). But whether children will want to exercise certain citizenships will also depend on the economic standing of the countries concerned. In the global migration market, some passports – those of the developed countries – are clearly worth more than others.

Another crucial issue that states have to consider with increasing transnationalism is the welfare system. Are the migrants entitled to the same welfare and pension payments that citizens enjoy? It can be argued that long-term migrants do, in that they have paid taxes and pension contributions and contributed to the national economy over the years, even if they have not taken citizenship. At the other end of the labor market, however, countries generally try to avoid the costs of labor reproduction while reaping the benefits of cheap labor. One extreme example is that of Singapore, where migrant female care givers from the Philippines and Myanmar are forbidden to form partnerships with locals and subjected to regular pregnancy tests – if tested positive, they are deported (Eades 2004). In contrast, Singapore is very generous in providing student scholarships in return for the students’ long-term commitment to working in Singapore (Ko 2004). Japan provides another extreme example in not allowing the influx of unskilled labor at all, though it is an open secret that some industries such as construction and the sex trade depend massively on unregistered foreign labor.

A third crucial issue involves nationality and ethnicity. In the general Asia Pacific region, the variation in both is extensive (Eades 2001), ranging from (a) large fairly homogeneous nation states, in which minorities tend to be either as-
simulated, ignored or given marginal recognition (as in China, Japan, Korea, and perhaps Thailand and Myanmar) to (b) postcolonial states with artificially imposed boundaries dating from the colonial period, in which a variety of ethnic and language groups do their best to coexist (as in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and, despite its large Chinese majority, Singapore), to (c) settler states populated mainly by immigrants and their descendants, with the aboriginal peoples forming a small and often marginalized minority (as in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the United States, and perhaps also Taiwan). The East Asian countries described in this book (China, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam) fall into the first of these categories. For all of them, increasing levels of transnationalism are likely in the long run to undermine notions of national homogeneity and identity.

In China, these issues of nationality and ethnicity are dealt with within a framework of officially designated minorities, which were established following the Stalinist model from the Soviet Union in the 1950s. This has so far been resistant to change, though there are clearly minorities which are in fact very diverse, and others that are not recognized at all. More recently, the incorporation of Hong Kong and Macau as special administrative regions has created a new kind of quasi-ethnic enclave with cultural and political arrangements quite different from those of the rest of the country. In Japan the situation is somewhat different. It does not have the kind of minority situation found in China. However, it does have Ainu and Okinawans, and it also has a large resident population of Koreans who are still officially foreign (Ryang 1997, Fukuoka 2000), as well as the burakumin, a caste-like group with status problems left over from the stratification system of the Edo period (i.e. up to 1868). More recently, the influx of Latin Americans of Japanese descent has created new and relatively visible minorities who tend to be disadvantaged in the labor market because of their poor command of Japanese. The paradox is that having previously seen themselves as Japanese in Latin America, they are now both seen and define themselves as Latin Americans in Japan (Tsuda 2003, Sasaki 2008).

Global Cities, Global Countryside

The places where all these factors collide are usually the cities. With globalization, East Asian cities function as ever more extensive and complicated intersections of national and international forces and connections. As the core element of the current phase of globalization, David Harvey’s notion of “time-space compression” may be particularly helpful. According to him, “time-space compression” is generated by “flexible accumulation,” a post-Fordist mode of production (Harvey 1990: 147). Importantly, the “compression” of the world generates the transnational mobility of information, products, money, and people all over the world. For East Asia overall, Douglas Massey and his colleagues (1998) noted that, by the
1980s, international migration had spread into Asia, not just to Japan but also to newly industrialized countries and regions such as Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand. By 2000, it was estimated that approximately fifteen million transnational migrants had spread out from East Asia, while Southeast Asian countries such as Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand had received over four million guest-workers. Even in Japan, where migration control is rather tight, registered foreign residents numbered 2.22 million people (1.74 percent of the total population) in 2008 (although dropping slightly thereafter). This number may seem low compared with migrant-receiving countries such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and many E.U. countries, yet for Japan this number represents nearly a three-fold increase compared with the number of 783,000 in 1980.

This globalization is particularly apparent in the formation of the “global city” (Sassen 1992). In East Asia, cities such as Tokyo, Seoul, Beijing, Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Singapore are good examples. They serve as symbols of global capitalism and as central nodes of what Arjun Appadurai (1997: 33–36) has called “global cultural flows.” But they are all very different. For instance, Keiko Yamanaka reports on the distinctive situation in Hamamatsu (Shizuoka Prefecture) in central Japan. She focuses on the emergence of groups of citizens concerned about the legal rights of recently arrived immigrant workers and their children. These immigrants – notably Japanese-Brazilians, undocumented Asians, and industrial trainees (kenshūsei) – work as unskilled laborers without full legal protection. As a result, they frequently suffer discrimination and exploitation. In this situation, local citizens have organized groups that work on behalf of the immigrants in labor disputes, and on issues of health, welfare, and equal human rights.

Singapore, as described by Brenda Yeoh and Theodora Lam (Chapter 4), offers a different scenario, a small island nation state with about four million people, but with one of the highest levels of GDP per capita in Asia. The creation of a cosmopolitan and creative city is a key plank of the government's vision for Singapore in the twenty-first century. The plan entails a wide range of strategies to “cosmopolitanize” both people and places in the city. The two possible arenas of tension and slippage seem to be Singapore’s founding philosophy of multiracialism based on the Chinese-Malay-Indian-Others model – and here Singapore is indeed more Southeast Asian than East Asian – and the everyday reality of (un)cosmopolitanism in the contact zone of locals and migrants.

The emphasis on such international global cities, however, may elide the more pervasive extent of the sheer number of very large cities in East Asia. Zhang Jijiao (Chapter 3) focuses on the broader Chinese situation through survey work on multiple ethnic groups in multiple Chinese cities, aiming to provide a sketch of this range of urban experience that is changing rapidly because of international and national forces. In China, domestic migration from rural areas to big cities is much more important than transnational migration in the current stage of urban development, yet it is still directly connected to global forces and processes. This
kind of ethnic migration to Chinese cities, after all, is interwoven with vibrant communities of those from other countries, such as the Korean enclave discussed by Kwang-Kyoon Yeo (Chapter 5). Here East Asia, and China in particular, provide a valuable site for considering how migrant social networks function comparatively between internal migrants in general, internal ethnic migrants, and international ones, considering, for example, the lives and trajectories of international Korean migrant communities and Korean minority migrant communities.

Yet the forces of increasing globalization are also seen in rural areas. Such areas are affected by global migration in various ways. In Japan, for instance, there has been the phenomenon of the “import” of Asian brides since the late 1980s. Today, the marriage age of Japanese women is one of the highest in the world. Young Japanese women nowadays often seem to find few positive reasons to get married, and they are thus reluctant to do so. In some villages where depopulation continues, the exodus of women to the cities has led to a dearth of younger women, and so brides are “imported” from places such as the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Korea, and China (Yamashita 2008a: 109). The American anthropologist Lieba Faier (2009) has discussed how Filipinas as oyomesan (the Japanese word for brides) play an important role in the rural community in Central Kiso, Nagano. Without them the Japanese rural community cannot maintain its family (ie) system. One finds similar cases of “bride import” in Taiwan and Korea as well (Yamanaka 2007). Furthermore, in rural Japan, under the legal status of kenshūsei (trainees), Chinese grow vegetables in highland Nagano, Filipinos work at orange farms in Ehime, and Indonesians fish for bonitos in Miyazaki. The Japanese rural economy itself is therefore increasingly based on these guest-workers.

The overall issue of guest-workers in Japan also deserves attention in relation to the coming of a “super-aged” society with a low birthrate. Japanese society is likely to face more labor force problems as Japan’s population continues the decline that began in 2005. It is estimated that the percentage of the population over sixty-five years will increase to 33.7 percent by 2035, and 40.5 percent by 2055, compared to 23.1 percent in 2010. Given this background, Hidenori Sakanaka, the former director of the Tokyo Immigration Office, and Akihiro Asakawa, a migration policy specialist, have proposed a “10 million foreign migrants plan” for Japan by 2050 (Sakanaka and Asakawa 2007). For Japan, as for several other East Asian societies, migration thus lies at the intersection of policy concerns about economics and about demography.

Structure of the Book

Any attempt to encompass these many strands of East Asian migration must address the fundamental problem of how to pursue a topic as broad as migration across the breadth of East Asia. For this book, we have opted for very broad
inclusion. For example, we have included both internal and international migration, very short-term tourist visits and permanent settlement, and have returned Vietnam and Singapore to the East Asian fold as vital comparisons to China for both international and, in the case of Vietnam, internal migration as well. We have thus attempted to illustrate as far as possible the full range of migration, rather than focusing on a single kind, whether labor or business, tourism or marriage, short or long term, useful though more focused approaches can be.

In organizational terms, the book is in three sections. The first section addresses the general regional, state, and city contexts in which migration occurs. Nicolas Lainez opens the discussion with an historical discussion of trafficking in colonial Vietnam. His discussion establishes at the outset how sharply inscribed and durable many of the migration channels in East Asia are. Xiang Biao continues with an examination of how the process of migration intersects with the complex structuring of national and local government in China. Migration, his chapter suggests, reflects not only passage across terrain and across borders, but also up and down through complex governmental and commercial hierarchies. Zhang Jijiao’s chapter introduces the topic of internal migration and how – especially in the case of China’s very extensive migration of minorities – internal migration has much of the flavor of “transnational” migration since it too requires crossing legal, economic, and cultural borders. Brenda Yeoh and Theodora Lam then show a very different kind of “Chinese” city set in a Southeast Asian regional context of cultural diversity. Finally, Kwang-Kyoon Yeo and Keiko Yamanaka provide discussions of two very different urban areas and both the formal and informal ways in which migrants are included in, and excluded from, the societies to which they move. These chapters are a reminder of how diverse East Asian cities can be, and thus how diverse the experiences of migrants within them are.

The second section focuses on family, gender, lifestyle and culture. The first three chapters illuminate the range of issues that result from the intersection of migration and family. Hy Luong starts with a discussion of Vietnam and the way in which migrants – through family ties – are wound into moral networks that transcend the divisions of place. Caroline Grillot then takes us to the border between Vietnam and China, showing the complex practical and symbolic interactions between Vietnamese women looking for Chinese husbands and Chinese men looking for Vietnamese wives. Hung Thai and Masako Kudo then add two complementary studies of women who marry very different kinds of foreign men: Vietnamese women marrying overseas Vietnamese and Japanese women marrying immigrant Pakistanis. Shinji Yamashita and Okpyo Moon complete the section by bringing tourism into the discussion, thus balancing the implicit durability of families with the seemingly more evanescent experience of tourists. Their two chapters bracket the possibilities, from short-term historical tourism of Koreans in China, to very long-term, “long-stay” movements of Japanese to Southeast Asia. Tourism, their chapters suggest, has many forms, can sequence
into longer-term migration, and is itself also the result of prior visits of various kinds.

The third section of the book focuses on the intersection of ethnicity and nationality with work. Haeng-ja Sachiko Chung begins with ethnic Korean hostesses and club owners in the Japanese city of Osaka; Gordon Mathews discusses African entrepreneurs in Hong Kong (and how they navigate life in a city which often supports their work but not them); and Brenda Yeoh and Katie Willis discuss the lives of ethnic-Chinese Singaporean women when they move to China (almost inevitably as non-working spouses even though they have well developed careers in Singapore). These cases represent a range of people in a range of occupations with a range of different effects: sometimes expanding economic roles and activities, sometimes constraining them, and sometimes simply changing them. The final chapter of the book, by Mika Toyota, turns to the specific issue of care work and the way in which the skills of women are evaluated differently in sending and receiving countries, but in both cases with similar ambivalence. Thus despite the need for skilled health care, government policies often restrict the free movement, and extended stay, of exactly those people who can provide that care.

Some Cross-Cutting Themes

The concluding chapter of this book will return to the broader implications of these chapters, both individually and collectively. But it may also be useful to indicate from the outset some of the particular themes that emerge in this book and that often cross-cut its formal organization.

The first, and perhaps most obvious, theme that emerges is the degree to which people and objects are in motion in different kinds of ways with varying implications for future additional movement. The migrants themselves are quite varied, from low-skill labor to highly talented professionals, from female entertainers to international brides, from short-term tourists to long-stay retirees. One particularly interesting set of migrants are people who, like the authors of this book, migrate in order to look at migration. They are one of many kinds of short- and mid-term migrants who return as changed people to changed societies, often creating further migrant flows – of their students for example. Whatever the nature of the migrants, it remains hard to predict the exact duration of their stay somewhere else, and the nature and duration of their return to their original country.

A second theme involves the multiple and complex meanings of “skill.” Migration researchers often generalize about low-skilled labor versus high-skilled “talent,” but the actual nature of skill is often far more complex than those simple categories would suggest. Whether as club hostesses or health care providers, for example, many female migrants have very high levels of social and personal skills – functioning as both managers and psychologists – for which they receive rela-
tively low rewards. Receiving societies often respond to this complexity with policies that are inherently ambivalent, seeking to bring in the labor but also making it difficult to stay, as with the Japanese response to the need for care workers.

A third theme is families. While some chapters are explicitly about families, many more have families as part of their story. The life histories of migrant families, and of families which are mixed migrant/non-migrant, are often very complex, with interweaving strands of general social change (for example, that women generally now have greater access to more jobs) and the developmental cycle of the household (for example, that women may move in or out of the labor force depending on the presence and age of children). Migration adds another unpredictable strand. The presence of in-migrants to help with domestic chores, for example, may give women more latitude to pursue their careers outside the home. But out-migration of those professionals may then reduce their activities outside the home. The discussion by Yeoh and Willis of Singaporean women, for example, suggests how when the women move with their husbands to China, they often end up much more restricted to the home as household managers and parents, and may continue that pattern on their return to Singapore. The implication is that attempts to understand contemporary migration must include consideration of how the future lives of families will develop in response to both internal dynamics and external changes.

A fourth theme involves the blurring of conventional categories. In much of the migration literature, very conventional notions of migration still endure. For example, people are discussed as moving from “here” to “there” (or “there” to “here”) and doing so with some finality. The result is sometimes a dichotomy between temporary and permanent migrations. Much of the material in this book, however, suggests the opposite: that short- and long-term moves are intermixed in many migration histories; and that any seeming permanency of migration may evaporate as migrants return to their origins. There is sometimes an analogous assumption that migration constitutes a move from the familiar to the unfamiliar. Yet this too is often misleading. Japanese, for example, often move in retirement to places they already know from their pre-retirement careers or to places that offer much that is somehow familiar, whether in terms of people, culture, and even scenery (such as irrigated rice fields).

A fifth theme involves the complexities of migration processes. For example, in his chapter Xiang Biao traces Chinese migrants who move “downstream” toward destination countries but also “upstairs” in terms of bureaucratic structures in China. Migration, after all, is not just about people moving from place to place and often across national borders. It is also about the local, national, regional, and global domains and institutions that shape the flows of migration and the experiences of migrants. Understanding this multidimensional nature of migration may benefit from ways of looking at migration and society that come out of the East Asian tradition. Zhang Jijiao suggests one such option in his reference to the
distinctly Chinese way in which Fei Xiaotong conceptualized human networks. Hy Luong’s discussion of moral networks among migrants in Vietnam also invokes a quite distinctly East Asian sense of how individual decisions are also simultaneously set within social, moral, and familial frameworks. The broader suggestion is simply that in dealing with the complexities of East Asian migration we may all benefit from considering the complexities of East Asian thought about human mobility, as well as the complexities of East Asian migration itself. Our title itself is drawn from that tradition, specifically the frequent exhortation of the Yi Jing (I-Ching) that the best course may be to seek one’s destiny across the waters – whether they be vast oceans or simple rivers.

Notes


2. The rules of the game are vastly different for the wealthier social classes on the move, compared with the migrant poor. The world is rapidly becoming differentiated into the citizens of rich countries, who are tolerated almost anywhere as long as they bring their credit cards with them and don’t stay too long, and those from the poorer countries who are treated with great suspicion. In general, tourists come from the wealthier countries. However, even tourists may come to stay permanently, and not just those ready for retirement. As Yamashita has noted, many Japanese tourists to Bali over the years, particularly women, have ended up becoming enamored both with the place and with Balinese partners, and have settled there, forming transnational and multicultural families (Yamashita 2003; Yamashita, Chapter 11 in this volume). This is part of a growing trend in the Asia Pacific region. The shortage of women of marriageable age in many areas, particularly isolated rural areas with high levels of out-migration, means that either a lot of bachelors stay unmarried, or that wives have to come in from even poorer regions. In China, the flow of wives is generally from West to East, while in Japan, there has been systematic importation of wives from other Asian countries for many years (Douglass 2009). Meanwhile, among the more cosmopolitan populations and the more international wards of the larger cities, the
numbers of international migrants and the local arrangements catering for them will continue to increase (Nagy 2009).

3. There is, in addition, the broader issue of what state reactions are, and should be, to these new types of migration. Many of the lifestyle migrants, for example, are wealthy or have useful skills. The question therefore becomes, how can the destination countries maximize the benefits of these new kinds of migration while minimizing the problems?

In the case of tourists, the benefits are obvious. They spend money locally and create jobs. There are potential problem areas. Many commentators see tourism as destroying the local culture, though others have suggested that cultures are always changing anyway, and that tourism creates new forms of culture that are often beneficial (Yamashita 2003). In providing income, tourism also provides resources for maintaining local cultural forms – forms of culture that lack market value are often very difficult to perpetuate. Casinos can also be a way of generating revenue, although without regulation they often create opportunities for corruption or attract the unwelcome attentions of organized crime (Lintner 2002). Sex tourism is another problem area, though historically sex has always been linked strongly with tourism, and the problem will probably persist as long as do the huge differences in wealth within developing countries that give rise to the problem. One other problem is that tourism facilities may have a negative impact on the environment. As a result, forms of sustainable tourism are now being explicitly addressed. But generally if regimes want to encourage inbound tourism, they have to make entry easy, through relaxing or abolishing visa requirements, at least for short-stay visitors, and make adjustments to regulations covering gambling, consumption of alcohol, and other potential problem areas.

Educational migrants are also generally viewed favorably. Not only is education a valued export industry, but it also creates a skilled labor force that can be recruited into the local labor market, as in Singapore (Ko 2004). The presence of foreign students may allow the expansion of universities in a period of demographic decline, as is presently the case in Japan. However, there are also problems: education may well be a cover for migrants who are actually engaged in other less welcome activities, as is a perennial fear in Japan. Nevertheless, if the corollary of the export of education is that the workforce is likely to become more diverse and multicultural, then governments will eventually have to react by bringing immigration procedures, employment regulations, pensions, and welfare entitlements into line with those of the migrants’ own countries, to allow them to move across national boundaries.

With older migrants looking for alternative retirement settings, there are also clear benefits and problems for the destination countries. As people age, their costs to society generally increase, especially in terms of health care. As long as they can pay, they may well provide a useful income stream for the local medical industry, allowing the expansion of employment and infrastructure. They may also help to support the population in rural areas which are otherwise facing falling fertility and a declining population (Mock 2008). Citizenship and passports may provide opportunities for governments to make money, filtering out the poor, and only allowing in those with big bank accounts who are able to support themselves and contribute to the local
economy. As with other forms of migration, those with financial resources are greatly preferred by destination countries.

4. While there is much that is different between migration in East Asia and migration in North America and Europe, there is also much about the topic that is rather similar. Many of the migrant groups are nominally the same: Vietnamese, Filipinos, Thai, Pakistanis, Brazilians, Nigerians – much less the Chinese, Japanese, and Koreans who are again now found with increasing frequency in each other’s countries. Much of the dynamic of migrant life and migrant-host society interaction is also quite comparable. In particular, the situation of low-wage migrant labor is similar, including the range from fully legal (and regulated) workers to those who overstay the time limits of their visas, work despite a visa that prohibits work, or cross national borders illegally. The day-to-day realities of such migrant lives in the shadows – whether Chinese in Japan and Korea, or rural Chinese in Chinese cities – would be all too familiar to a North American audience: financial insecurity, weak unionization, limited housing, lack of medical care, poor (if any) education, harsh constraints on family life, and general cultural and social disavowal. Yet there is indeed much that is different between East Asia and North America. The scale of international migration is still, for example, far lower in East Asia. Historically, the degree of cultural diversity is also much lower. One result is that, somewhat paradoxically, the smaller numbers of migrants in East Asia are in many ways more culturally challenging.

5. In the classic English translation of the classic German translation of the Yi Jing (Baynes 1957), this comes out as “it furthers one to cross the great water.” The original Chinese, however, is a little more compact (利渉大川) and less about frothy seas. It turns out, for example, that the “great water” is just a “big river” and the meaning of the metaphor thus depends a great deal on whether one imagines the Yangtze River, the Yellow River, or perhaps one of those smaller rivers that Caroline Grillot notes on the China-Vietnam border.

References


