Introduction

BEYOND REVISIONISM
Rethinking Antifascism in the Twenty-First Century

Hugo García, Mercedes Yusta, Xavier Tabet and Cristina Clímaco

This book is the outcome of a collective effort by eighteen historians of seven different nationalities, and arose from historiographical questionings with evident political implications. It has its origins in the realisation, which stems from our research into three Mediterranean countries where antifascism played a leading role in the interwar period (Spain, Italy and Portugal), that the history of this movement, transnational while at the same time located within specific national contexts, has to a great extent yet to be written. In Spain, whose civil war is an inescapable reference point in the formation of a global antifascist culture in the 1930s, historians have barely broached the making of antifascism as a political culture and social movement (despite the abundant bibliography dealing with the various antifascist currents and associations), while in neighbouring Portugal, which was governed for almost half a century by a corporative and traditionalist dictatorship with fascist influences – António de Oliveira Salazar’s Estado Novo (‘New state’) – work on the early opposition to the Salazar regime is very scarce and is compartmentalised into political currents. In Italy, which as the cradle of fascism and antifascism has a long and rich tradition of studies on this subject, the ‘crisis in the antifascist paradigm’ which came into full view in the 1990s is reflected in a – in some cases, radical – re-reading of the so-called ‘antifascist vulgate’ and of the very origins of the current Italian Republic. In these three countries, as in the rest of the world, studies on fascism and its different national varieties far outnumber those on antifascism, as Michael Seidman observes in his contribution to this volume, even though in almost all Western countries the first movement was a failure and the second a success, arguably ‘the most powerful ideology of the twentieth century’.
These gaps and questionings are framed within the context of a political and social crisis whose roots may be found in the ferment sparked around the world by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the break-up of the Eastern bloc. We know today that this event has not led to ‘the end of history’ forecast by Francis Fukuyama in 1992, but it has brought about a re-examination of our view of the recent past, and in particular of the consensus on the historical role of fascism and antifascism upon which most postwar European nations were rebuilt (with the notable exceptions of Spain and Portugal).

Awareness of the role played by the legacy of antifascism in legitimising the Communist dictatorships in the East has contributed to a retrospective re-examination of antifascism, fed, as Stéfanie Prezioso recalls in her contribution, by the growing ‘incredulity towards metanarratives’ – the great narratives of the past penned by religions, science or political ideologies – which Jean-François Lyotard deemed already in 1979 as the essence of the ‘postmodern condition’.

The ‘antifascist paradigm’ that dominated European historiography and politics of memory in the decades following the Second World War had much, indeed, of a metanarrative based on ‘the celebration of brave partisans overthrowing fascist barbarism with the aid of the Red Army’ (in the version that prevailed in the Soviet bloc, described here by José María Faraldo), or on the anonymous ‘victory over evil and silence on the substantial levels of support for’, and collaboration with, fascism and Nazism in European countries (dominant in Western democracies such as France, studied here by Gilles Vergnon).

This narrative was widely questioned in the 1960s by Western European student protest movements, who claimed that postwar democracies were intrinsically or potentially ‘fascist’ themselves; as a result of this overuse, and/or of larger social and cultural changes, the label has lost currency since then. In present-day Europe the antifascist (or, in the term employed by its followers, ‘Antifa’) identity has been reclaimed politically mainly by a heterogeneous collective of far-left groups devoted to fighting xenophobia, classism, sexism and other forms of fascism by direct action, even though the European Antifascist Meeting held in Athens in April 2014, with delegates from eighty groups drawn from the whole continent, suggests that that the current economic and political crisis could be a conducive context for its revival.

This loss of currency has contributed to the historiographical reckoning undertaken by Jacques Droz in his classic work *Histoire de l’antifascisme en Europe, 1923–1939*, published in 1985, remaining valid to a great extent thirty years later: the ‘almost total absence of works of synthesis’ comes in contrast to the profusion of case studies on the various national situations ‘whose perusal … would take several lifetimes’.
Collective volumes and journal theme issues on the subject concentrate not so much on the political, social and cultural movement that developed between 1922 and 1945, which Bruno Groppo dubbed ‘historical antifascism’, but mainly on its legacy or memory since the end of the Second World War.11 This legacy informs a large part of historiographical readings of antifascism undertaken as of 1990, and summarised by Enzo Traverso in the last chapter of this volume, beginning with the radical revisions launched in Italy by the renowned historian of fascism, Renzo De Felice, from the 1970s onwards – firstly regarding the nature of the regime, and then what he described as ‘Resistance vulgate’ – and followed by work published in the following decade by French authors Annie Kriegel and François Furet, and by German authors Antonia Grunberger and Dan Diner, who reduced the phenomenon to ‘the new face of Stalinism’ in the 1930s, the great ‘myth’ and the left’s ‘lifelong lie’ in the twentieth century.12 This view, conditioned by the use of antifascism to legitimise the ‘people’s democracies’ of Eastern and Central Europe, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the opening up of dictatorships in the East, has complicated the task of understanding the historicity of antifascism, stemming from the ‘space of experience’ and the ‘horizon of expectations’ of contemporaries rather than the historian13 – which is to say, the task of seeing it not in terms of what it turned into after 1945, but as the various things that it was, and the ways in which it was perceived and lived, at the different times and places in its evolution since the 1920s.14

Perhaps the greatest obstacle to understanding antifascism as a historical phenomenon is the persistent tendency of historians to identify it with communism. The widespread use of a totalitarian paradigm since the 1990s – which came about by the end of the 1920s within the context of antifascism, but was alienated from the latter due to Stalinist terror, the Nazi–Soviet Pact and the Cold War – turned fascism and Nazism into a mirror-image reaction to the birth of the Soviet state, and its violence in response to that deployed by the Bolsheviks in Russia, within the context of a ‘European civil war’ which would wipe away the differences between political options deemed as equivalent.15 This levelling implied linking antifascism, from its beginnings, to the crimes of communism, confirmed by the opening of archives in the East, as well as interpreting antifascist violence through the lens of those crimes, in particular the violence deployed in armed conflicts (such as the Spanish and Greek civil wars) and in the framework of different national resistance networks to Nazism or to fascist, or fascistised, dictatorships.16 With regard to these interpretations, which underline antifascism’s most sectarian and violent aspects and portray it as the
bitter enemy of democracy, we think it is necessary to insist on its plural nature: for all that Communism may have been one of the main driving forces behind the great antifascist mobilisation in the years 1933–39, especially in the transnational context as Anson Rabinbach’s contribution to this volume makes clear, antifascism was anything but a structured movement with a clear direction, and it was therefore translated into different and changing proposals for, and repertoires of, action.\textsuperscript{17} In this light, the rifts need to be recalled that arose at the heart of antifascism between Communists and non-Communists, and even between different strands of Communism – revolutionaries and democrats, politicians and the apolitical, bellicists and pacifists, believers and secularists – which erupted tragically during the Spanish Civil War and resurfaced after the Hitler–Stalin Pact of 1939.\textsuperscript{18} Putting antifascism into historical perspective, in its country-by-country variants, inevitably leads to acknowledging its many-sidedness and its link to widely varying movements and cultures, which saw in fascism a threat to their very existence: socialism, communism, anarchism, liberalism, Christianity (Catholic and Protestant), pacifism, anti-imperialism and feminism (studied in chapters 8 and 9 by Isabelle Richet and Mercedes Yusta) were perhaps the most influential, but not the only ones.\textsuperscript{19}

In fact, the equation between antifascism and communism has been repeatedly called into question by historians since the mid-1990s.\textsuperscript{19} An example of this is the reflections by Alberto De Bernardi in his introduction to the collective work \textit{Antifascismo e identità europea}, published in Italy in 2004, which is doubtless the most ambitious attempt to build an international history of the movement – and in particular of its memory and influence after the Second World War – undertaken in this period.\textsuperscript{20} In this text, De Bernardi proposed tackling the aforementioned ‘crisis in the antifascist paradigm’ by reinterpreting this concept as an Italian as well as European ‘political culture’, born of the will to offer an alternative to the redefining of national identity brought about by fascism in Italy, based on the militarisation of society and expansionism abroad; but also of the need to define a new world order on which to build peace at a time when a clash was foreseeable between fascism, communism and liberalism. In the midst of the deep crisis experienced by liberal democracy and global capitalism after 1914, antifascism would have been the most ambitious response to the challenge to come up with new relations between liberty, equality and justice, civil rights and social rights, state and market, and political and social representation. De Bernardi interpreted it in a social-democratic tone, locating its origin ‘in the cross between socialist tradition and democratic thinking’.\textsuperscript{21} His proposal approaches those of other authors who have made important
contributions to the study of antifascism in recent decades and who, in some cases, develop or extend them in this volume: according to Eric Hobsbawm, Enzo Traverso and Nigel Copsey, the various antifascist currents were ultimately united by the legacy of the Enlightenment; according to Gilles Vergnon, the antifascist movement that arose in France in 1934 was ‘Jauresian’ or socialist-republican in nature; Ferran Gallego has described the Spanish antifascism of the 1930s as a meeting point for republicanism, social democracy, communism and anarchism; for Andrés Bisso, ‘mainstream antifascism in Argentina was predominantly liberal-socialist’ and he condemned both fascism and communism as equally ‘anti-nationalist’. However, Tom Buchanan has rightly underlined the illiberal aspects of the concept of democracy prevailing amongst antifascists in the interwar period, which tended to lend priority to social justice over respect for pluralism.

The debate over the essence of antifascism – Copsey’s ‘antifascist minimum’, discussed by Tom Buchanan in Chapter 3 – deals, in reality, with the stumbling block to its above-mentioned diversity, which is as ideological as it is social and geographical. In fact, the trend in recent historiography towards exploring the non-Communist forms that the movement adopted has been accompanied by the proliferation of comparative or transnational approaches to the phenomenon, which has been traditionally studied from a Euro- and state-centric perspective. Gerd-Rainer Horn argued back in 1996 that the ‘transnational consciousness’ of European socialists had been one of the main forces behind their reactions to fascism in the 1930s. More recently, Dan Stone has emphasised the key intellectual contribution made by Central European refugees to British antifascism and the need to ‘internationalise’ the history of the movement, whereas Isabelle Richet has pointed out the ‘inherently transnational dimension’ of women’s antifascist networks in Britain in the same period. Still more recently, Joseph Fronczak has made a convincing case for reinterpreting the Hands Off Ethiopia movement of 1935 as a key turning point in the emergence of a ‘global left’ in the twentieth century. A forthcoming book by Michael Seidman will explore ‘Atlantic antifascisms’ in the years 1936–45, and a growing number of research projects are addressing issues such as the antifascist activities of international organisations, the circulation of antifascist exiles and ideas across nations and continents and the ‘spatial politics’ of antifascism. The need for comparative and transnational approaches was also stressed at international conferences on the subject held in Geneva in 2012, Paris in 2013 and Saarbrücken in 2014.

Indeed, antifascism appears as the ideal type of a transnational movement. Its main advocates – socialists, Communists, anarchists,
lubers, Catholics, freemasons – belonged to long-standing international organisations which possessed solid communication channels and social networks. Many were part of, or closely connected to, the ‘antifascist diaspora’ of political refugees from countries under fascist or authoritarian rule: antifascism was, to a large extent, ‘a culture of exile’ built in large cities such as Paris, Moscow, Barcelona, London, New York and Buenos Aires. Its activists viewed politics from a cosmopolitan perspective and felt morally obliged to engage in distant conflicts, whether in Spain or China; they shared a culture that blended concepts and symbols from all over the world and recognised one another as part of a ‘common humanity’. During the movement’s heyday in the mid-1930s, antifascists shared slogans (They shall not pass!), gestures (the raised clenched fist) and an ‘aesthetics of resistance’ best represented by politically engaged artists such as John Heartfield and Robert Capa. As some of the contributions to this volume illustrate, antifascism was not only a set of beliefs and a motivation for action for millions of people throughout the world, but also an essential part of their identity – ‘less an ideology than a mentalité, more of a habitus than a doctrine’, in the words of Anson Rabinbach. Yet, it remained diverse, across nations, regions and political cultures – a meeting place for various strategies, visions and discourses rather than a unified movement. These contradictory elements can only be reconciled by paying attention to the complex interplay between the individual, local, national and global dimensions of antifascism.

This spatial diversity has been transferred to the scientific and social debate on the antifascist movement, where the general trends noted above merge with others belonging to various historiographical traditions and political contexts. In Italy, national and transnational, historiographical and political factors have combined to lend a particular virulence to the dispute. In the 1980s what had been the dominant historiographical narrative since 1945 entered crisis, the one that presented fascism either as a moral (and temporary) sickness of the Italian people, or as a reaction by the ruling classes to the rise of Communism. A narrative which, furthermore, collectively exonerated Italians from the silence over the issue of consensus, and laid the blame for the 1940–43 war squarely on Mussolini and the Germans, in order to stress the worth of the ‘second war’, waged by the Resistance and the Italian Army between 1943 and 1945, as the root of Italian democracy. This narrative construction was called into question in the 1990s by historians such as Renzo de Felice and popularisers like Giampaolo Pansa, who portrayed early postwar Italy as a country in the throes of murders sponsored by the Communist Party during the resa dei conti (‘settling of
accounts’) in regions such as the triangolo rosso (‘red triangle’) of Emilia Romagna. Pansa denounced the ‘great lie’ of the ‘Resistance vulgate’, according to which resistsants always had their hands clean and the CP’s strategy was confined to fighting the Germans and the fascists, and he asserted, rather, that the Communists’ strategy was defined by the USSR and aimed at taking power.\(^3\) The revisionist movement symbolised by Pansa and his successful books is symptomatic of the ‘great levelling of memories’ decried by Régine Robin, which reduces the past to a great narrative of victimisation and results in the replacement of Resistance mythology by revisionist mythology.\(^3\)

What singles out the Italian case is above all the ‘political uses’ of a controversy which, in principle, was historiographical. The debate slipped into the political domain due to interpretations like that of Ernesto Galli de la Loggia, who resumed the old right-wing contention that the armistice of 8 September 1943, far from representing a riscatto, an opportunity to redeem Italy from which the Resistance was born, in fact entailed the ‘death of the country’, which would never rise from the ashes of fascism.\(^4\) During his three terms as prime minister in 1994–95, 2001–06 and 2008–11, Silvio Berlusconi’s milieu appropriated the issue to try to detach antifascism from Italian national identity by demonising Communism, on the one hand, and on the other by transforming the Italian Social Movement, the successor to fascism, into a politically acceptable party. This re-examination of a vital pillar of the Republic’s identity (‘born of the Resistance and antifascism’, according to the conventional phrase) even allowed Berlusconi to denounce the Italian Constitution, one of the most socially oriented in Europe, for its ‘Soviet’ features, and to play down fascist violence by describing Mussolini’s regime as a benign dictatorship which ‘did not murder anyone’, but only sent its opponents ‘on holiday’.\(^4\)

In post-Franco Spain, the scope of revisionism has been limited by the relative political consensus inherited from the transition to democracy in the 1970s and by the fact that Spanish, unlike Italian, democracy had never been identified with antifascism, but rather with national reconciliation after the Civil War and the long Franco dictatorship. This situation notwithstanding, revisionist propositions have circulated widely since the turn of the century, precisely at the time when a sector of civil society began to reclaim the memory of antifascism in the name of the victims of Francoism.\(^4\) The Partido Popular (‘People’s Party’), in government between 1996 and 2004, and since 2011, has carefully avoided any suspicion of sympathy for the dictatorship – to which it is linked by its origins as the Alianza Popular (‘People’s Alliance’), founded by one of Franco’s ex-ministers – and even joined in a condemnation of
the 1936 military rebellion issued by Parliament in 2002, although on occasions it has established a subtle link between the Republic and the Civil War. Popular historians such as Pío Moa have justified the uprising as a response to prior violence by left-wing organisations – in particular, the failed revolution of October 1934, backed by the Socialist Party in the name of antifascism – and defended the dictatorship’s contribution to peace and prosperity in Spain. But these propositions have had more public success than historiographical influence, as can be seen in the case of Moa, a former militant Maoist, whose work Los mitos de la Guerra Civil (‘Myths of the Civil War’, 2003) sold 150,000 copies but was condemned as ‘pseudo-revisionism’ and neo-Francoist by a large majority of specialists. The massive biographical dictionary produced by the publicly funded Royal Academy of History also aroused near-unanimous rejection by the Spanish academic community in 2011 for including entries that did not acknowledge Franco was a dictator, or which dubbed the Second Republic’s last government, led by socialist premier Juan Negrín, as ‘practically totalitarian’. These memory wars over the historical role of fascism and antifascism have been replayed throughout Europe, from Portugal – studied in Chapter 16 by Manuel Loff and Luciana Soutelo – to the former Eastern bloc, where the antifascist narrative has fallen into even more discredit than in the West due to its widespread identification with the traumatic experience of Communism and Soviet imperialism.

As may be seen in this preliminary writing, the historiographical, memorial and political dimensions of antifascism, with the issue of revisionism as a backdrop, are closely linked and hard to untangle. We have thus opted to clarify the volume by dividing it into two parts. The chapters in the first part try to reflect, always from a transnational perspective although they broach concrete and localised cases, on the problems posed by the ‘historical antifascism’ that swept across Europe and other continents between 1922 and 1945. Anson Rabinbach addresses Communist antifascism in the 1930s by revisiting the international campaign to free the German Communist leader Ernst Thälmann, imprisoned by the Nazis in 1934, and showing the complex relationship between Willi Münzenberg, the legendary Comintern propagandist, and his superiors in Moscow, as well as the uneven impact of his innovative campaigns. Next, Michael Seidman challenges the traditional view of the Popular Front, which ruled France in 1936–38 as the epitome of antifascism by emphasising the contrast between its effectiveness in thwarting the domestic far right and its inability or reluctance to stop fascist and Nazi expansionism abroad. Tom Buchanan, for his part, reviews the thorough changes
which British antifascist historiography has undergone since the turn of the century, discusses the problems of extending the concept of antifascism to new social and political groups, as proposed by authors like Nigel Copsey, and defends a more restricted interpretation.

Getting back to the Mediterranean area, Giulia Albanese develops some of the issues posited in this Introduction by analysing how Italian, Spanish and Portuguese historians have dealt with the crisis of liberal institutions in the 1920s and the ensuing appearance of fascist and antifascist movements, and advocating a comparative and transnational approach as the best way to understand both processes. Next, Hugo García tackles the cultural aspect of antifascism – traditionally ignored by political and social historiography – by reconstructing the appearance of a plural antifascist culture in 1930s Spain, as well as the role of external and domestic factors in its emergence and the substantial transformations that culture experienced throughout the Republican period (1931–39). Cristina Clímaco, likewise, reconstructs the origins of antifascism in Portugal, its exile after the establishment of the dictatorship in 1926, and its revival in the second half of the 1930s thanks to international events like the Spanish Civil War.

The first part of the book is closed by three contributions that recover two aspects of fascism traditionally forgotten by mainstream historiography, but which represent two important focal points for renewal in recent literature on the subject. Andrés Bisso takes the spotlight away from the European context by examining the importance, peculiarities and political actions of antifascism in Argentina, a country with many Italian immigrants but which was little affected by fascism, between the March on Rome and the rise to power of Juan Perón in 1946. Isabelle Richet and Mercedes Yusta, for their part, approach the phenomenon from a gender perspective, stressing the important yet little-known contribution by women to antifascism – the ‘temple of virility’ studied by Patrizia Gabrielli47 – and the complex and changing linkage of the latter with feminism, the first author in an Italian context and the second by the path taken by two large antifascist women’s organisations that arose in Europe between the mid-1930s and the beginning of the Cold War. In so doing, they illuminate both the antifascists’ general attitude towards gender roles and the peculiarities of women’s involvement in the movement, ranging from armed participation to ‘existential antifascism’.

The contributions making up the second half contrast and complete the matters discussed in the first half, but above all they delve into the lingering memory and changing public uses to which interwar antifascism has been put since the end of the Second World War, as well as into the causes and implications of the recent revisionist trend in the
literature on the topic. Robert Coale reconstructs the semantic evolution of the term in the discourse of American volunteers in the Spanish Civil War, and of the US establishment between the 1930s and the beginning of the Cold War. José María Faraldo explores the very different meanings of the concept in the Socialist bloc by demonstrating the importance which antifascism and memories of the Great Patriotic War with Nazi Germany had in the discourse that legitimised the Soviet Union from 1945 onwards – shared, to a greater or lesser extent, by the German Democratic Republic and other Soviet satellites in Central and Eastern Europe – as well as its paradoxical persistence in post-Communist Russia, reflected in its use by Vladimir Putin’s government against the 2014 Ukrainian revolution. In another long term study, Gilles Vergnon examines the various forms in which the ‘historical antifascism’ of 1934–38 was represented in France from 1945 to the end of the twentieth century, by showing how the myth of Republican antifascism influenced not only political practice, but also historiographical discourse, and how it has been invoked in response to perceived threats to the Fifth Republic such as the war in Algeria in the 1960s and the appearance of the Front National in the 1980s.

The book ends where it started, by walking us through antifascist remembrance in Italy, Spain and Portugal. Stéfanie Prezioso and Filippo Focardi reconstruct, from different perspectives, the evolution of the historiography, public debates over and politics of memory concerning antifascism and the Resistance in Italy, by attempting to explain the links between these three topics and focusing on the recent crisis in the ‘antifascist paradigm’, and the appearance and peculiarities of Italian revisionism. Javier Muñoz Soro, on the one hand, and Manuel Loff and Luciana Soutelo, on the other, examine how a similar process has developed in the two Iberian countries, which were governed by dictatorships with fascist traits and sympathies until the mid-1970s: Spain, where the long-lasting Franco regime and the troubled transition to democracy have imposed to this day the identification of antifascism with the bloody Civil War of 1936–39, thereby condemning it to political irrelevance; and Portugal, where the struggle over memory revolves around trivialising the Salazar regime (the dictator was voted the greatest Portuguese in history in a poll conducted by state broadcaster RTP in 2007) and, at the same time, around the radicalisation of the ‘Carnation Revolution’, which began with the fall of the Estado Novo in 1974. Enzo Traverso closes this section of chapters, and the volume itself, by running through the book’s main ideas with a general discussion of revisionism in an international context, which distinguishes ‘anti-antifascist’ historiography from the critical
revision inherent in the field, and shows how its view of antifascism distorts the possibility of charting the movement’s history and of understanding its relationship with present-day democracies.

The seventeen studies we have resumed so tightly do not seek to account for the complexity of antifascism as a historical phenomenon and a site of memory which, as we have noted, is as great as the importance it held for the lives and identities of millions of people. Neither is it our intention to offer a new ‘antifascist paradigm’ to replace the one under question – on occasion with good arguments – by revisionist historians. The considerable differences in standpoint between the various contributors – who for the most part have been working on the subject for years and offer us previews of ongoing research – clearly show that antifascism is still an object of historiography which is contested beginning with its very definition, and these differences are unlikely to disappear in the foreseeable future. The volume has three more modest, yet more realistic goals: first, to make known the problems – which are often similar, but at times different – set out by present-day historians of antifascism in various countries and cultures; indeed they affect many of twentieth-century history’s main problems. Second, to trace the paths along which future research may be conducted, amongst them that of undertaking further comparative and transnational studies and of exploring the impact of antifascism on the non-Western world – unfortunately left out of this volume – beyond the existing literature on exiles and on the involvement of various ethnic groups in the Abyssinian and Spanish conflicts.48 Last, but not least, the book aims to underline the implications the historiographical treatment of the phenomenon has for our identity as citizens of democracies which, to a greater or lesser extent, were born of the ‘great antifascist crusade’ of the years 1933–45, so apparently remote from our post-totalitarian world.49

Translated by Martin Roberts

Notes

em Portugal, Porto, 2014; and Cristina Clímaco’s chapter in the present volume.


3. See Chapter 2 in this volume by Michael Seidman.


Another instance of this view is Der missbrauchte Antifaschismus. DDR-Staatsdoktrin und Lebenslüge der deutschen Linken, eds Manfred Agethen, Eckhard Jesse and Ehrhart Neubert, Freiburg, 2000.


14. The proposal made with regard to Italy by Leonardo Rapone in his introduction to Antifascismo e società italiana, Turin, 1999, 7–9.


16. Italian and Spanish historiographies have particularly stood out in this respect. See, for example, Giampaolo Pansa, Il sangue dei vinti. Quello che accadde in Italia dopo il 25 aprile, Milan, 2003; and César Vidal, Paracuellos-Katyn: un ensayo sobre el genocidio de la izquierda, Madrid, 2005.


18. For a detailed account of these conflicts in 1930s Spain, see Ferrán Gallego, La crisis del antifascismo. Barcelona, mayo de 1937, Barcelona, 2007; on the impact of the German–Soviet Pact on international antifascism, see Bernhard Bayerlein, Der Verräter, Stalin, bist Du! Vom Ende der internationalen Solidarität. Komintern und kommunistische Parteien im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939–1941, Berlin, 2008.


21. Ibid., XXII.


Introduction. Beyond Revisionism


36. See the chapters by Stéfanie Preziosio and Filippo Focardi in this volume.


References


Horn, G.-R. *European Socialists Respond to Fascism.* Cambridge, 1996.
Rodrigo, J. *Cruzada, paz, memoria. La Guerra Civil en sus relatos*. Granada, 2013.


Vials, C. *Haunted by Hitler: Liberals, the Left and the Fight against Fascism in the United States*. Amherst, 2014.