Introduction

In 1742, Vicar N.J. Bjerregaard started digging into a barrow in his parish of Lardal in Vestfold, in southeastern Norway, hoping to find ‘relics from the heathen past’. But despite the best efforts of the peasants he had hired for the work, the vicar was disappointed. The mound contained nothing but some fragile ceramic pots, a piece of rope with a brass handle and a bit of woollen cloth. So much for the glorious past of the noble forefathers (43 queries from the Government Office 1743, ms 181, Lardal, query no 41). Knowing their life and deeds well from the works of Snorre Sturlason and other saga writers, the vicar had entertained quite other expectations for the barrow’s contents.

In 2009, the Norwegian Year of Cultural Heritage was celebrated, with ‘cultural heritage in everyday life’ as its special theme. Among the examples of cultural heritage described on the project’s website we find family photographs, the smell of a special kind of industrial pollution in a provincial town, old and new clothes, landscapes, audiotaped memories and inventories of household utensils and home decorations. The project declares itself and its very inclusive profile to be ‘all-embracing, both socially and time-wise, and comprising both tangible and intangible cultural heritage. By adopting this theme we are hoping to involve a wide range of the population, including volunteers and professionals on the local, regional and national level’ (The Norwegian Year of Cultural Heritage 2009).

There are considerable differences between Bjerregaard’s obvious disappointment over the clay pots and other inconspicuous artefacts dug out of the mound and the joy of collecting, preserving and displaying household utensils, love letters and vernacular buildings demonstrated by the people responsible for the Year of Cultural Heritage. Present day heritage workers are enthusiastic about objects from everyday life, while Bjerregaard rejected what he found as merely prosaic household chattels. The terminology used to describe the artefacts has also changed. Bjerregaard looked for what he called relics or antiquities, and the pots did not, in his view, qualify as such. Today, the predominant term is heritage, which comes very close to being an all-inclusive concept, as
long as somebody is willing to take on the role of the heir, i.e., to accept the inheritance.

These differences and the processes of change that have brought them about will be the theme of this book. What is to be explored is not the history of specific artefacts, but rather the ways artefacts from the past have been spoken of, evaluated and categorized during the last 250 years and the terms that have been used to name and describe them.

In the eighteenth century, antiquaries like Bjerregaard hunted barrows and other sites all over Europe for objects that could be directly related to persons and events from a literary canon of Norse, mediaeval or classical texts, or even to the Bible (e.g., Sweet 2004; Eriksen 2007; B.E. Jensen 2008). Today, we look for heritage and find it virtually everywhere. One of the aims of this book is to investigate how this concept has come into general use and ended up supplanting or subordinating all other terms that have formerly been in use within the same field: antiquities, vestiges and relics, historical monuments, historical or archaeological artefacts. The Norwegian Year of Cultural Heritage closely follows an international trend, not only in its choice of name, but also in picking everyday life as a topic and in signalling the all-inclusiveness of its approach. What kinds of change do these shifts in terminology and perspective reflect? This book will argue that they do not simply stem from an interest in new kinds of (old) objects, but also express changing ideas about why and in what ways the past is important to the present: ideas about the structural relationship between past and present are changing. In more general terms, such changes can be seen as expressions of different regimes of historicity, an expression coined by the French historian François Hartog. Each regime of historicity is the outcome of a different way of experiencing the temporal aspect of the human condition, hence acquiring its own expressions in culture as well as in historiography (Hartog 2003).

Research Questions and Perspectives

Both ‘antiquities’ and ‘cultural heritage’ are terms referring to man-made objects (mainly) from the past. They also convey the idea that these artefacts are in some way valuable. Age and value are entangled, but the relationship between the two will vary in rather complex ways. The pots and other items found by Bjerregaard probably were ancient, but that does not seem to have affected him. To him, it was more fundamental that they were not rare. Pots of this kind were found in barrows from time to time, and they also resembled household utensils used by peasants in his own time. What Bjerregaard really wanted to find were artefacts of the kind mentioned in the literary sources: weapons, jewellery and other ornamental pieces signalling the wealth and
power of their owners or in other ways carrying symbolic meaning. Today, on the other hand, pots of the kind that Bjerregaard rejected are highly cherished museum pieces, defined as parts of the national cultural heritage. National and international law protect them and other artefacts of their kind not only from theft, but also from otherwise becoming commodities on the commercial market. Museum pieces are valued for their age, for their scarcity and in some cases for their artistic qualities. They are also treasured for the knowledge that archaeologists, historians and other researchers are able to gain from them and for their symbolic significance as parts of national or even global history. The kitchen utensils and other everyday life objects that received attention during the heritage year, on the other hand, were not very old, nor particularly rare (at least not compared with the archaeological material), but even they share the quality of belonging to a world of days gone by, of fleeting memories, of transitoriness and change. Their value comes from the memories that are attached to them, from the stories that are told, but also from the social and cultural reality they reflect. The inclusiveness expressed by the heritage year project can, furthermore, be regarded as a value in itself, reflecting a political programme to make heritage more democratic and accessible, less elitist (Niemi 2009).

This book will explore what kinds of artefact have been regarded as antiquities, as historical monuments and finally as heritage during the period from the mid-eighteenth century to the present. But again, this will not be an inventory of artefacts or collections of artefacts, nor a history of the museums and other institutions built for their preservation and care. The focus is not on the objects themselves and their history during this period, but rather on the categories of objects and on their constitution. How are the categories made, and how are actual objects recognized as belonging to them? How do the networks of meaning implied by these categories or genres change over a period of time? Why is the ancient pot from the mound valueless to Bjerregaard when he is looking for antiquities, while a far newer pot from grandmother’s kitchen could be cherished by heritage hunters in 2009 – who at the same time might shun pots like Bjerregaard’s for being overdetermined national monuments now on display in museums? The answers to these complex and paradoxical questions are not to be found in the pots, but in the values ascribed to them and in the words and notions used to express those values.

Establishing categories means sorting objects and negotiating which objects belong and which do not: a process of including and excluding. It implies developing terms and concepts and designating them to specific objects. This process always takes place in the present, even when the criterion for designation and inclusion is some kind of age-based value. Recognizing objects as belonging to a category called antiquities, heritage or the like means separating them from the vast number of other objects implicitly characterized by their novelty or contemporaneity. Apart from the simple cumulative dimen-
sion – a number of things are older today than they were, for example, in the eighteenth century – the principle of this is relational. Antiquity, history and heritage do not represent absolute qualities but are words that describe different kinds of relations between the past and the present. These relations, in themselves always things of the present, will recognize and single out quite different objects for their ‘pastness’ against correspondingly varying contemporary backgrounds. What vary are not merely what is ‘old’ and what is ‘new’ (or contemporary) in different historic periods but also the relationships that are established and that structure the experience of temporality. Over a period of time the same object – i.e., an old clay pot – may be termed a heathen relic, an antiquity, a historical object or a piece of cultural heritage. The pot remains the same, even if it becomes slightly older, but the changing terminology does something to the way it (and the past it represents) is ascribed meaning in the present. Naming certain artefacts from the past as heritage rather than as antiquities may serve to single out other kinds of artefacts than before, but it quite certainly reflects other ways of thinking about the meaning and value of such artefacts in the present. The change of terminology indicates that our way of thinking about the past has changed. What do these changes actually imply?

The taxonomy of treasured objects from the past will change over time, the system being under constant negotiation. Normally, some objects will represent obvious fits into the existing categories, while others will challenge them, threatening the borders and the definitions of categories and classes and frequently ending by changing the system. How does this happen? When did pots of the kind that Bjerregaard rejected enter the museums? What processes made grandmother’s kitchen pots follow suit, 250 later, under the name of ‘cultural heritage of everyday life’? What had happened in between? What kinds of objects are not valued as heritage in contemporary society – and why?

Even if the age-based values function as a tool for sorting out and cherishing certain objects compared with others, this does not mean cutting them off from their context in the present. Such an isolation would render the objects meaningless rather than valuable. As we shall see (Chapter 2 in this volume), the connection between antiquities and literature was fundamental to eighteenth-century antiquaries. To Bjerregaard, what mattered was to find artefacts that could be related directly to the heroes and chieftains of Norse and mediaeval literature, whose courage, valour and deeds were equalled only by those of the classical canon. In this case, antiquities referred to a universe of timeless heroism. During the nineteenth century, historic monuments and historical objects came above all to be related to a search for national particulars and to processes of nation building (Chapters 5 and 6 in this volume). In our own time, identity, belonging and ‘roots’ seem to be the main issues when speaking about heritage. Hence, the significance of the cherished objects is as
deeply based on the concerns of every epoch as on any value relating to age alone. This was why Bjerregaard rejected the pots and other inconspicuous items from the barrow: the literary sources had little to say about crumbling clay and smouldering cloth. It was not at all heroic. The home decorations and household utensils inventoried by the Heritage Year, on the other hand, are highly relevant to identity projects. Such material communicates messages about belonging, family bonds and shared family values in a close and easily recognizable setting. In neither of these cases is age alone decisive. Rather, the value of the objects is linked to their existence in the present. What is fundamental is that they in some way or another embody a link from the past to the present.

To grasp the full meaning of the changing terminology – from antiquities to heritage – it is then necessary to explore the relationship between these terms and the age-based values they represent on the one hand and the variety of shifting concerns, meanings and interests on the other. Which issues have been relevant and dominant, and how are they entangled with the age-based values? In what ways does the changing terminology reflect such contemporary concerns rather than describe the old objects it refers to? This implies that rather than taking eighteenth-century antiquarianism as a simple indication that ‘they were interested in heritage too!’ the language used in different periods will be taken to indicate time-specific ways of relating to the past and producing knowledge about it. Correspondingly, the emergence of ideas about ‘world heritage’ and its preservation from the 1970s onwards will not be seen as the development of a more mature and responsible attitude towards cultural goods of universal value, establishing itself after centuries of ignorance and neglect. Even this terminology, and the set of ideas it communicates, is first and foremost the answer to concerns and challenges specific to our own era.

One of the concerns of this book will be to investigate the contemporary issues and interests that the terminology of each period relates to. Does the word ‘antiquities’ really inscribe cherished objects into the same fields of values and evaluation as does ‘heritage’? Is it merely the number and range of objects that have grown, or does the designation of the same objects using different terms imply significantly different ways of relating to them?

The focus on terminology rather than on the objects themselves signals a discursive approach. From what has been said so far, it follows that discourse serves to generate and organize knowledge in specific social contexts. Hence, discourse is understood as a social practice closely connected to other practices pertaining to the same artefacts. Bjerregaard, or rather the peasants he hired for the work, was digging. The Heritage Year people, on the other hand, were largely occupied with inventorying and publishing on the Internet. In between, we find collectors, curators, preservationists, archaeologists, amateur and professional historians, researchers, journalists, visitors to heritage sites,
museum guests, and so on, all carrying out a number different practices relevant to the role or profession they are undertaking. In different ways, all these activities represent modes of relating to the artefacts, handling them (directly or indirectly) and evaluating them. The discursive practices represent the advantage of being among the more explicit in several of these aspects. It is they who define the artefacts as antiquities, as monuments, as heritage. They may also to a large degree be said to determine other activities. Bjerregaard would not have hired peasants to open the barrow had he not already entertained the idea that it contained what he called ‘antiquities’ and that digging was a relevant method for getting hold of them. No less would the Heritage Year people try to chart the smell of industrial pollution or bother to publish other people’s family memories if the concept of ‘everyday life heritage’ was not already established. Hence, discourse is seen as a social practice of major significance.

The terms used to designate the objects themselves will stand at the centre of the investigations: which terms are used and how does terminology change historically? The aim is to use the terminological shifts to trace other developments, concerning the experience of temporality and the changing relations between past, present and future. For this reason, the terms must be contextualized and other words and concepts also brought into the investigation. Terms and phrases expressing change and rupture, tradition and continuities, processes and development will be explored. How are such experiences expressed, which are the predominant? What kind of language is used and which metaphors are chosen? Moreover, what kind of practices are described and discussed, and what do these practices actually imply? What does it mean to dig a barrow or preserve a building? The idea here is not to describe developments in archaeological or preservational methodology, but to examine the way practices related to cherished objects from the past are spoken and written about, to trace ideas and understandings of why and in what ways the past is important to the present. Attention will also be paid to agents and forces: what agents and forces create historic change, whether understood as decay or progress, and how do they function? Finally, the patterns of discourse will be analysed to shed light on which contemporary issues the objects of the past and their value are related to.

Analytically, a discursive approach has the advantage of making it possible to distinguish between the distinctly contemporary concept of heritage and heritage discourse on the one hand, and a more general interest in material remains from the past – the kind of objects that today are called heritage – on the other, without identifying the one with the other. This gives a means for circumventing the somewhat futile discussions on ‘how old is heritage really?’ (For an overview see for example, Harvey 2001). More importantly, the distinction between the contemporary terminology and the general phenomenon
Introduction

enables us to have more nuanced views of how this field has been designated, evaluated and transformed during nearly two and a half centuries.

**Between Heritage Studies and Antiquarianism**

This book situates itself within two relatively separate fields of research and attempts to bridge them: on the one hand, the heritage studies field, and on the other, the history of antiquarianism. The aim is above all to extend the field of heritage studies by giving it a deeper historical perspective and discussing its theoretical foundations. Studies in this field tend to fix the beginning of interest in what was to become heritage to the period of the French Revolution and, more generally, to the opening of formerly royal collections in Europe to a larger public (Smith 2006: 16ff). The late eighteenth century saw a new interest in the monuments saved from revolutionary vandalism by the work of such men as Abbé Grégoire, Alexandre Lenoir and Quatremère de Quincy and in the cultural goods made available to the general public through the new museums like the British Museum (1754), the Fridericianum in Kassel (1779) and the Louvre (1791) (Pommier 1991; McClellan 1994; Bennett 1995; Sloan 2003). The French looting of Italy in the 1790s and the British Lord Elgin’s transport of the Parthenon marbles to London just after 1800, on the other hand, fuelled the first European debates over the moving of artwork – bought or stolen – from one country to another (St. Clair 1998; Eriksen 2001). During the nineteenth century, the work of men like Ruskin, Viollet-le-Duc and others not only contributed to the development of new ways of handling cultural goods of past times, but also to the conceptualizing and evaluation of them in specific ways (Choay 1999). Ways of thinking and talking about material remains from the past were changing (Babelon and Chastel 1994: 57ff). New kinds of old artefacts were valued, and they were valued by new and other groups of people than before. Public collections grew, and during the nineteenth century, preservation of monuments and the building of the large museums became important national tasks.

Laurajane Smith affirms in her book *Uses of Heritage* that ‘as has been well rehearsed in heritage literature, the current concept of heritage emerged in Europe, particularly Britain, France and Germany, within the context of nineteenth century modernity’ (Smith 2006: 17; see also discussion in Harvey 2001). At best, this is a conditional truth. On the one hand, nobody, or at least marginally few, actually wrote or spoke about ‘heritage’ in the nineteenth century. They preferred the term (historic) monument. On the other hand, it is true that within the contemporary field of heritage studies, the great nineteenth-century interest in historic monuments, museums and preservation
work has been given much attention and is regarded as part of more general processes of modernization, which undoubtedly is correct. Smith herself also points to the fact that nineteenth- (and to some degree eighteenth-) century terminology was different, and she particularly examines the use of the term monument in its European context (Smith 2006: 19). Nevertheless, despite her explicitly discursive approach, Smith shows little sensitivity to linguistic nuances and seems to have chosen to regard all terms in use in different epochs as expressions of the same concern. Smith has set herself the task of examining what she contends is a particular discourse of heritage ‘that emerged in late nineteenth-century Europe and has achieved dominance as a “universalizing” discourse in the twenty-first century’ (Smith 2006: 17). The linguistic and terminological diversity within this discourse is not addressed.

This book takes a different perspective. Even if the interest in cultural goods from the past did gain considerable momentum from the mid-nineteenth century and hence coincides with a very intense phase of modernization, it was not a new thing. Moreover, this interest did not centre on the term heritage, which implies that it most probably followed another logic than the contemporary heritage discourse. The explorations of this book will take these variations as a cue to trace nuances and differences worthy of consideration, rather than seeing them as historically random expressions of one continuous trend or one identical set of concerns. This implies an understanding that the terms employed are important cultural expressions in themselves. They bear significance not merely as reverberations of social reality, but as active elements in it. In her study on the French Revolution, Lynn Hunt has argued that linguistic expressions, in her case utterances of revolutionary politicians, not merely reflect social reality, but could be active means for change. Her claim is that ‘words did not just reflect social and political reality; they were instruments for transforming reality’ (L. Hunt 1989: 17). In our case, the various ways of speaking about artefacts from the past are seen as means to change the ways such artefacts have been perceived, understood and valued.

The links between nineteenth-century interest in historic monuments and modernization processes are not to be disputed. The historic interest that beset the Western world during the nineteenth century was complex and profound, and a number of its expressions had a very direct bearing on the understanding of material remains from the past. Not least does this apply to the emergence of the new scholarly disciplines that studied these remains, like modern archaeology and source-based history. Nonetheless, acknowledging the link between modernization and the interest in material remains from the past should not lead us to equate such an interest with modernization or to see it merely as a symptom of modernity (Harvey 2001). The link is relevant to a specific historical period, not to the phenomenon as such, and indeed will obfuscate it if made into a defining or all-explanatory factor. People have taken
an interest in material remains from the past in other periods too, but for other reasons. Hence, their evaluations have been structured along other lines of thought.

Also, as the discursive approach invites close readings and attention to the nuances of terminology, references to the processes of modernization have quite a modest explanatory value, easily becoming too general. Nineteenth-century nation building aided by inaugurations of historic monuments and twenty-first-century personal identity construction through ethnic or religious heritage might be quite meaningfully related to ‘modernization processes’, but it might both be equally relevant to investigate how these projects differ from one another and how the differences are expressed. Hence, it will be useful to explore how the different terms in question refer to different issues within modernity and how they relate to different aspects or stages of modernization processes. In this way, the generic terms will be broken down, and it will be relevant to uncover the specificities of meaning within ‘heritage’, as well as ‘modernization’.

One aim of this book, then, is to undo the equation between the contemporary interest in heritage and the nineteenth-century interest in historic monuments and see them as cultural expressions of more specific concerns, relevant to their respective periods. Including the older antiquarian tradition in this picture provides a means for developing the perspective further. It implies seeing the developments of the nineteenth century not as a beginning but rather as one stage in a complex and more comprehensive story of different ways of relating to the past.

The invention of the term antiquities – meaning material or other remains from the past – is usually ascribed to the Roman Marcus Terentius Varro, himself avidly interested in the past of Rome. More relevant in this context are the antiquarian studies that became an integral part of Renaissance humanism. With the study of inscriptions, for example, on monuments and graves, coins and medals, as its main focus, this way of studying the past combined humanist methods for studying texts with an interest in material remains – namely, those that carried words or text on them (Momigliano 1990). These texts frequently had (or were given) legal implications, as they in some way concerned genealogy, privileges and property. Antiquarian studies often had important juridical aspects, and the study of material remains could be accompanied by an interest in ancient systems of custom or law (Momigliano 1990: 54ff). Originally concerned with the Greek and Roman past, the antiquarian interest gradually grew to include the national pasts of the various European countries. Classical texts also served as sources to the heathen pasts of these countries, above all Tacitus’s *Germania* was important to antiquaries in northern Europe who were hunting for material remains that might confirm what this text had to say about their own forefathers. In Scandinavia, Norse literature came to be
used in similar ways. During the eighteenth century, an interest in the medi-
æval pasts of the northern European countries was also slowly emerging, not
least on the British Isles (Piggott 1989; Sweet 2004; Eriksen 2007).

Only the eighteenth-century phase of antiquarianism will be treated here.
The intention is not to write a complete history of antiquarianism, and the
eighteenth century suffi ces to add important elements to the concerns of
this book. Belonging to the period before the breakthrough of historicism,
in Foucauldian terms to the classical épistémé, eighteenth-century antiquari-
anism represents other ways of organizing knowledge than our modern ap-
proach. Hence, it seems reasonable to believe that the terminology specifi c to
this period genuinely refl ects a relevant diff erence. Antiquarianism has oft en
been seen as an early form of archaeology as well as a contributor to the de-
development of the modern discipline of source based history (Schnapp 1996;
Momigliano 1990). However, it might be equally important to note that in
this period, antiquarian studies were closely related to natural history and its
methodology (Sweet 2004; Pomata and Siraisi 2005: 4). Its traditional connec-
tion to jurisprudence has already been pointed out (above). Including eight-
eenth-century antiquarianism means entering a landscape where knowledge
was structured in other ways and where scholarly disciplines formed other pat-
terns and relations than what came to happen later. This does not only situate
the interest in ‘heritage’ within a wider historical frame, it also gives a means to
ask other questions about the genealogy of the modern concepts.

The Scope and Content of the Book

The book presents a series of case studies based on Norwegian source material
from the mid-eighteenth century to the present. The cases are presented in
chronological order. However, the aim is not to establish a complete history,
but rather to approach the various discursive practices in question through
the close reading that case studies make possible. Jean-Claude Passeron and
Jacques Revel point to the diff erence between an example and a case. An exam-
ple will always be an example of something; it represents a category, a theory or
some other overarching idea. This means that even if the example itself is spe-
cifi c, local and concrete, what makes it relevant and illuminating will always
be its reference to some generality or ambition of such. Examples can be used
to explain, persuade or instruct, and their unique energy comes from the way
they make the general specifi c and let the specifi c refl ect the general (Passeron
and Revel 2005: 18; see also Lyons 1989). A case, on the other hand, represents
a challenge to generalizations, existing theories, dominant categories or habits
of thought. It will often originate from a confl ict between established rules and
the expected outcome of their application. This confl ict will produce consid-
erable ambiguities and ambivalences, and the case thus represents a situation which is ‘provisoire, mais intolerable’ (Passeron and Revel 2005: 16). In this lies also its productivity. The case is ‘an enigma to solve, a question to interpret’. This challenge does not, however, mean that the case denies every norm or transgresses all boundaries. Rather the opposite is true, as Passeron and Revel go on to point out that the case is inseparable from the construction and elaboration of theory or normative frames. It is just because the case represents a challenge to existing theories and dominant norms that its existence – and interpretation – supplies a unique possibility to develop theory and explore norms. This dialectic relationship between the normal (or normative) and the ‘case’ is fundamental and is also what makes the case an important epistemic tool. The case supplies a site for reflection, interpretation and the development of new insights. Even though it represents a challenge to existing theories or preconceived ideas, the case does not remain in its isolated and atypical position. When the enigma has been solved, insights gained and new theories or ideas developed, the case will be reinserted in history and contribute to improved understanding, not merely of its own particularity, but of its context. Nonetheless, a case will never be the means of generalization. It remains a site for explorations and in-depth probing, and its outcome will be new questions just as much as answers to old ones (Passeron and Revel 2005: 20ff).

Using the perspectives discussed by Passeron and Revel, the cases presented in this book will serve as sites of exploration and discussion of theory, rather than milestones along a line of historical progress. Taken together, the cases will not tell a coherent story of historical change over 250 years but contribute to a broader picture of how material remains from the past have been talked about and looked after in different ways over this period of time. They also will suggest a number of themes and perspectives to elaborate on and open for a nuanced understanding. They are not in themselves atypical of their period or context. Nonetheless, they have not been chosen to generalize or present a historical line. What makes them interesting is rather the possibilities they supply to investigate historical difference, to illuminate variety and complexity in the organization of knowledge and to understand the multiplicity and richness of meanings and ideas.

Even if the empirical material comes from Norway, the discourse that is being analysed is not restricted to this country. ‘Empirical material’ in this context has a double meaning. The material remains to which the discourse refers are located in present-day Norway, a region that until 1814 was part of the twin-monarchy Denmark-Norway. Furthermore, the sources, i.e., the texts that are to be investigated, are also Norwegian and written in Norwegian or Danish, which was the official language of the twin-monarchy. The discourse, on the other hand, is international, and those who speak are members of international networks. Even if the structures of these networks have changed,
as have also the technologies to maintain them, this holds true for the entire period. In the eighteenth century, scholarly works were no longer written in Latin. Nonetheless, Latin still served as the common language of the Republic of Letters. Scholars in Denmark-Norway, as well as in other countries, were still able to communicate in Latin. They were educated in Latin literature and history, some also in Greek. Their frame of reference was the classical world, and, as we shall see, together with the Bible, classical literature also functioned as their main supply of historical source material. In Norway, the status of Latin and Greek in education gradually lost ground during the nineteenth century as educational politics acquired a more modern focus and cultural politics was heavily engaged in nation building. But as ethnologist Orvar Löfgren has pointed out, nation building, with its drive towards what is specific and unique to the individual nation, has its own international grammar: to a certain extent, all nations are unique in approximately the same way; they develop the same repertoire of uniqueness (Löfgren 1993: 217f). Apart from the flags, hymns and so on that Löfgren himself mentions as examples of this, it might be added that to the national uniqueness belongs a certain amount of historic monuments and a discourse about them. This national discourse is shaped by an international grammar, implying that even if the monuments referred to uniquely national events, persons and phenomena, they tended to commemorate the same kind of events and also to be designed according to iconographic repertoires and symbolic languages that followed international trends. The contemporary heritage discourse is international for other reasons. Its core and primary proponent is UNESCO, whose work also lay behind the heritage term when it came into frequent use from the 1970s onwards. Today, the vocabulary developed by UNESCO has thoroughly influenced the entire field, far beyond the monuments and sites that are, or strive to be, on UNESCO’s own World Heritage List. Nonetheless, as the active partners in the UNESCO system always are the ‘state parties’, the international or even global aspirations of UNESCO’s work will always be anchored in individual states, i.e., in nations.

This book may be read as a collection of essays. The next chapter is a discussion of relevant theory, aiming at relating the field of heritage studies and collective memory to the more general perspectives of historicity. The subsequent chapters are more empirical and supply case studies. Chapters 2 and 3 both deal with eighteenth-century antiquaries. In the first of these we once again meet Vicar Bjerregaard, accompanied by other eighteenth-century antiquaries. The aim is to investigate their approach to what they called antiquities or relics and to understand the major impact of textual sources in these studies. The perspective changes in the subsequent chapter. While most of the antiquaries we meet in Chapter 2 subordinate material relics to the authority of texts, and therefore, like Bjerregaard, often were rather disappointed by the actual find-
nings, the protagonist of Chapter 3 represents a very different approach: in 1771 the antiquary and historian Gerhard Schøning published a major work on the partly derelict mediaeval cathedral in Trondheim. The argument of the chapter is that Schøning represents a type of antiquarian work that can rightly be seen as closely related to natural philosophy, with great emphasis on close observation and very detailed descriptions. In Chapter 4 we move on to ruins. In northern Europe particularly, derelict buildings were long considered as rubble, often used as quarries, and generally did not attract antiquarian attention. The term ‘ruins’ was not in common use until Diderot made them an object of aesthetic appreciation as symbols of time and vanitas with his work from the 1760s. This aesthetic approach can also be seen to represent a transition from the older, textually based and systematic view of antiquities to the perspectives of the nineteenth century with its interest in historical development and national particulars. Chapter 5 takes us to the early nineteenth century and the growing interest in mediaeval monuments, heretofore thought too ‘Gothic’, i.e., too inharmonious and barbaric to merit interest, but now discovered in northern European countries as witnesses of national cultures independent of classical ideals. In Norway, this mediaeval interest was above all related to the country’s ornate wooden churches constructed of standing timber. Museums are the theme of Chapter 6. To modern museum visitors, finding historical objects on display is no surprise. Rather, museums are generally regarded as their ‘natural’ place. The chapter argues that this understanding of museum collections and museum work emerged in the late nineteenth century. The open-air museum with its collections of old buildings is the Scandinavian contribution to this historization of museum principles. In Chapter 7 we turn to monuments and a discussion of Riegl’s ideas about intended and unintended monuments. War memorials have had great impact on the development of public memorial culture during the twentieth century, and the chapter explores the development of such monuments in Norway. Chapter 8 addresses the concept of heritage, with particular emphasis on its origin in the UNESCO system and the institution of the World Heritage List. Finally, Chapter 9 continues the discussion of the implications of the notion of cultural heritage, using the Norwegian Heritage Year 2009 as its case. The chapter ends with a conclusion comparing the historicity regime and experience of temporality that is reflected in three main terms that have been investigated throughout the book: antiquities, historical monuments and cultural heritage.