INTRODUCTION

THE MASSACRE
AND HISTORY

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Massacres have occurred throughout recorded history and are even known to have existed in pre-recorded times. Archaeologists have found, for example, evidence of a Neolithic massacre in Talheim, Germany, which is believed to have taken place over seven thousand years ago. The remains of thirty-four victims, male and female and ranging in age from two to sixty, were unearthed during digs in 1983 and 1984. They were bound and most killed by a blow to the left temple before being thrown into a pit.¹ There is more than enough evidence to suggest that as agricultural societies expanded in Neolithic times, so too did disputes over territory resulting in an increase in the frequency of massacres.² In recorded times, one of the earliest known reports of a massacre is to be found in the Bible, which details how, around 1350 BC, Joshua and the Israelites, after laying siege to Jericho, ‘utterly destroyed all that was in the city, both man and woman, young and old, and ox, and sheep, and ass, with the edge of the sword... And they burnt the city with fire and all that was therein’.³ It is a scene that has been played out countless times, almost as though it were part and parcel of warfare, although until quite recently scholars have paid scant attention to and failed to explain the dynamics and indeed the psychology of massacre.

Much of the scholarship surrounding mass killings has come out of genocide studies.⁴ Indeed, the words ‘massacre’ and ‘genocide’ are still often used interchangeably, especially in genocide research where mass
killings of innocent civilians come under scrutiny. Scholars have only recently turned their attention to the study of massacre as a separate phenomenon. Although the two approaches – genocide on one hand and massacre on the other – began along parallel paths of development, massacre research has been overshadowed by genocide studies to the point where few scholars outside the field of massacre studies differentiate between massacre, mass killing and genocide.

A number of scholars have nevertheless set themselves apart in the field of massacre studies. Brenda K. Uekert, a sociologist, investigated and analysed ten cases of government massacres in both authoritarian and democratic states across five global regions between 1987 and 1989. She identified two types of government sponsored massacre: the ‘political massacre’, designed to maintain the balance of power, and which occurred when the state, often authoritarian, felt threatened; and the ‘genocidal massacre’, designed to manipulate the balance of power, and which was used to promote or exacerbate ethnic tensions. Massacre in these instances was an act of state terror whose purpose was either to instil fear into the population or eradicate a particular group.

A few years later, Mark Levene and Penny Roberts attempted to establish a framework within which massacre could be examined seriously from a number of different perspectives. Levene then attempted to set an agenda for the study of massacre in part by posing a number of simple but essential questions such as whether ‘man’s inhumanity to man’ was the result of our evolution, whether one could proffer an overarching explanation, or whether massacre was simply an aberration that did not normally happen in ‘civilized’ societies. It is of course impossible to answer these questions with any certainty – perhaps they are too broad – but they did prompt the other leading scholar in massacre studies, also a sociologist, Jacques Semelin, to argue that rather than dismissing massacre as an aberration, outside of rational discourse, it should be studied as a rational act with its own internal logic and therefore within the structures of social science. This is what he has attempted to do in a series of articles and books that have provided historians in particular with an interpretive framework to study the ‘event of massacre’, which include discussion of its function and characteristics, as well as a definition and methods to investigate it. The act of massacre, Semelin has argued, is not so much an expression of power by a strong regime but a sign of its weakness. The preconditions suggest a state under siege from within in which ‘the weight of fear and of the imaginary seem to be ever present’. Massacre can therefore be initiated from ‘above’, by leading military and political and religious leaders, but it can also be initiated from ‘below’ by local militias or settlers on the colonial frontier, for example. Massacre is, in other words, a dynamic process which can easily get out of hand.
Notes for an Anatomy of Massacre

This collection sets out to differentiate even further the processes involved in massacre, mass killings and what often accompanies the sort of personalized killing that is dealt with here, atrocities committed against the bodies of the victims. Along with Jacques Semelin, massacre, we would like to underline, is an entirely separate phenomenon from genocide.10 Genocide cannot occur without massacre, but massacres do occur without genocidal intent. As with the term ‘genocide’, so too is there little consensus over what actually constitutes a ‘massacre’ or indeed a ‘mass killing’. Jacques Semelin defines massacre as ‘a form of action that is most often collective and aimed at destroying non-combatants’.11 As a general rule, this is true, but this neither takes into account the frequent occurrence of armed civilians killing other unarmed civilians or combatants in times of war, of oppressed peoples rising up against their oppressors,12 or of the numbers of deaths that must occur. In a case study of ‘rage and murder’ that took place in an isolated French village in 1870, for example, Alain Corbin referred to the killing of one man by a group of local villagers as a ‘massacre’.13 In a sense, it was. The manner in which the killing took place, which involved torture committed against the victim by a number of members of the community, fits within the traditional, literary usage of the word and can legitimately be referred to as a ‘massacre’ because of the brutal nature of the act. It is not uncommon, in other words, for historians to refer to the killing of one or two people as massacre. We think it preferable, however, to see this kind of killing as murder or as lynching,14 in part because the individual identity of the victim, unlike in the case of massacres, is entirely relevant.15 In this respect, we would suggest, as has the Guatemala Human Rights Commission in the United States, that a minimum of three people must be killed, collectively, in order for the murders to make up a massacre.16 On the other hand, a massacre must occur for a mass killing to take place, although mass killings are not, generally speaking, geographically or temporally limited, that is, they usually occur over a longer period of time and involve greater numbers of people than a massacre. Where mass killings occur, there is no intention to eliminate entirely the victim group in question. It is not genocide, although it may be a step along that path.

A distinction should in effect be made between a legal and an historical working definition of massacre. There is no legal definition of massacre (as there is for genocide). The International Criminal Court and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia do not use a definition of massacre in their proceedings against war criminals but instead rely on definitions of crimes against humanity. One of the articles – 7(1)(b), ‘Crime against humanity of extermination’ – refers to perpetrators killing ‘one or more persons, including by inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a
population’, and ‘a mass killing of members of a civilian population’.

Individual homicide and mass killings are thus confounded. Amnesty International has defined massacre as the ‘unlawful and deliberate killings of persons by reason of their real or imputed political beliefs or activities, religion, other conscientiously held beliefs, ethnic origin, sex, color or language, carried out by order of the government or with its complicity’. For the historian, however, these definitions are too restrictive. They presuppose armed conflicts in which civilians are the target and do not, for example, take into account massacres committed by armed civilians against unarmed civilians or indeed unarmed combatants.

Levene and Roberts have rightly pointed out that massacres are one sided and that they thus demonstrate an ‘unequal relationship of power’. A massacre occurs then when ‘a group of animals or people lacking in self-defence, at least at a given moment, are killed – usually by another group who have the physical means, the power, with which to undertake the killing without physical danger to themselves. A massacre is unquestionably a one-sided affair and those slaughtered are usually thus perceived of as victims; even as innocents’. Levene considered that this definition took account of military massacres, as occurred, for example, after Culloden, when the remnants of a defeated army were cut down in flight; a Saint Valentine’s Day massacre when one group of gangsters liquidates another; or a series of communal massacres, such as the killing of thousands of Ibos in Northern Nigeria in 1965.

Jacques Semelin has found that the key types of massacre were in a dichotomous relationship. For example, local massacres, such as face to face encounters where the perpetrators and victims probably knew each other, were the reverse of long-range massacres, such as aerial bombings, where neither the perpetrators nor the victims knew each other. Bilateral massacres which took place in civil wars were the reverse of unilateral massacres, which the state carried out against its people. Finally, what Semelin describes as ‘mass massacres’, as in Indonesia in 1965 or Rwanda in 1994 where between 500,000 and 800,000 were killed in a few weeks, were the reverse of the smaller scale ‘mass massacres’ as in Algeria and Columbia where large groups of people were killed in mass demonstrations in operation.

More recently, David El Kenz, in a bid to further distinguish between violence, mass killings and what has been termed ‘genocidal massacres’, proposed a new term – massacrology – and outlined three problems common to the study of massacre. First, there is what he dubs the instrumentalization of the massacre event itself, that is, the concealment of the massacre among the perpetrators and the demand for recognition among the victims. This will often lead to different historical treatments of the event and, indeed, debates and controversies surrounding the histories of a region or country. That is why there is a debate about the nature of violence in the colonial frontier in Australia and North America. Second, if massacre remains a recurring theme throughout history,
then recourse to an historical anthropology appears necessary, as long as it is contextualized. Third, sources are at the centre of any massacre study, and will reveal attitudes and constructions around the meaning of massacres that are significant to particular periods.

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There is little possibility of there ever being a widely held consensus on what constitutes massacre, so varied are the circumstances in which they have occurred throughout history. What we hope to provide here is an ‘overarching explanatory framework’ that will throw light on both individual cases of massacre, mass killing and atrocity, as well as providing a mechanism for understanding the phenomenon across time and space. We would thus describe massacre as the killing by one group of people by another group of people, regardless of whether the victims are armed or not, regardless of age or sex, race, religion and language, and regardless of political, cultural, racial, religious or economic motives for the killing. The killing can be either driven by official state policy or can occur as a result of the state’s lack of control over those groups or collectives on the ground. Massacres, in other words, can occur with or without official state sanctions although the state, especially in the colonial context, often turns a blind eye to the killing of indigenous peoples by groups of settler-colonizers that are geographically removed from the centre of power and over which it has little or no control. The massacre is limited in time, that is, it takes place over hours or days, not months and years, and is generally confined in geographical space.

Some Common Features

Semelin distinguishes between massacres committed close up (person to person); those committed at a distance (such as bombings); bilateral massacres (committed during civil wars); unilateral massacres (committed by the state against its people); and ‘mass massacres’ which aim at eradicating a particular group (but which are not genocide). One other category can be added to this. In her chapter in this collection, Inga Jones points to massacres taking place during the Wars of the Three Kingdoms occurring either in the heat of the moment, when for example a town was stormed after a siege – referred to as hot-blooded killing – and massacres that were planned – referred to as cold-blooded killing – such as the killing of Irish prisoners and the drowning of female and children camp-followers after the battle of Philiphaugh in 1645.

Massacres are, fundamentally, a masculine enterprise. They are often a brutal but short event, aimed at intimidating the survivors. Military massacres, especially those following battles or campaigns, are common to most periods of war from ancient times to the present. Massacres are rarely if ever spontaneous or irrational, even if the atrocities which
often accompany the killings appear to verge on the unhinged. A distinction can also be made between mass killings conducted from afar, as with the aerial bombing of civilians that occur as a result of advances in warfare and that are consequently distant and removed, and massacres that take place on the ground and which are therefore up-close and personal. The decision to exclude aerial bombings from a definition of massacre and to describe them as mass killings will no doubt irk some people. Some of the contributors to this volume see bombings as massacre. And since we have defined massacre as limited in time and space, the killing of large numbers of people over extended periods of time (weeks, months and even years) – such as the murder of hundreds of thousands in Russia during the Stalinist purges, or the man-made famines, or the killings that took place in Indonesia under Suharto in 1965 – are better categorized as mass killings, although massacres can occur within that time frame.

We would also argue that in order for massacre to occur the perpetrators have to be present at the killing site and that the act of killing has to involve the direct physical intervention of the perpetrator. This more narrow description does not necessarily exclude massacres committed by lone gunmen suffering from psychological problems of one kind or another and with which we have become all too familiar in recent times, from Columbine in the United States to Port Arthur in Australia. Most perpetrators of massacres, however, are sane and have clear intent, that is, they are ‘normal’ and are part of a wider community set on eliminating another group or community.

All of this leaves out a fundamental question surrounding the dynamics of massacre, namely, why groups kill other groups in the first place. Every massacre is surrounded by a particular set of circumstances, and the perpetrators are driven by different reasons that have to do with the place and timing of the killings. This is true even when there is a consistent pattern for the circumstances of massacre, as on the colonial frontiers in Tasmania and Victoria in Australia, and in California, Montana and Old North West in the United States. On the frontier, as the chapters by Rob Harper, Lyndall Ryan, Ben Madley, and Blanca Tovías de Plaisted show, the consistency in pre-conditions is extraordinary, namely, the alleged destruction of valuable property and/or the alleged killing of a colonist coupled with the over-riding belief that the Indigenous people have no right to the land. In these cases, massacre is a well-planned reprisal, usually in the form of an armed dawn attack on a camp of sleeping men, women and children.

Circumstances

Given the enormous variation in circumstances that can occur over time and place, it becomes problematic when trying to formulate a general theory of massacre. Mark Levene questioned whether massacre is a
function of grass-roots ‘fears, anxieties or even violent impulses which find their focus, or alternatively are projected into a convenient out-group’. One can go even further and postulate, given the monotonous regularity with which massacres have occurred throughout the ages, whether there is not some kind of natural disposition in people that drive them to eliminate groups they see as a threat to their own survival, even though scholars tend to shy away from this kind of biological pre-determinism. John Docker has not. He suggests that the explanation for massacre might be found in our primate origins. When that happens, he points out, the perpetrator can give himself up to an orgy of killing that can only be described as pleasurable.

This type of observation is, however, a statement of fact; it is not an explanation. Common to all types of killing is the distinction between groups. Once a group is perceived as the Other, ‘a shifting and uncertain category’ as Docker points out, even if they had lived in close proximity and cooperation up till that time, then the desire on the part of one group to eliminate the other group comes to the fore. Massacres and mass killings occur when a group of people or a community wishes to subjugate, eradicate, exact revenge on, or impose power and control over another population, or when it sees another group as a threat to its own survival. It is sometimes done to recover lost prestige, and sometimes done to change the existing political order. Religion and race undeniably play a role, but all massacres and mass killings, regardless of the circumstances, are ‘political’ in the broadest sense of the term. Scholars of massacre, however, would do well to delve a little deeper in order to go beyond the most obvious motives. Rob Harper makes the point in his case study of the massacre of 100 Moravian Indian converts in 1782. Each massacre, argues Harper, has to be placed in its social and political context. In doing so, and in moving beyond motive-centred interpretations, we can come to a better understanding of why and when massacres occur, why the perpetrators are so bent on the physical elimination of the Other, and why, more often than not, bystanders are prepared to look the other way.

The Perpetrators and the Victims

Local grievances can often begin the process towards massacre, but they invariably require a higher authority to either approve or to turn a blind eye to the killings. This is certainly the case for the examples provided here on the Australian and US colonial frontiers, but similar scenarios occurred in other theatres, even if, once again, the circumstances surrounding this particular factor can vary. We can assume that in the case of the Khoisan people on the Eastern Cape frontier of South Africa, for example, that Dutch settlers who sent out raiding parties to kill Khoisan did so without the knowledge of any central authority, but with the complicit approval of the local Dutch communities.
the massacre was perpetrated by men who took the law into their own hands, relinquishing responsibility to a higher authority, and believing that they would either escape arrest or conviction. While the perpetrators of genocide act on orders from the state, a massacre can be either ordered from above or it can be driven from below.

The targets of massacre are invariably groups of people who are defined as an unwanted Other – ‘enemies of the Revolution’ for example – or who, in the case of the colonial frontier, are in the possession of a resource desired by the colonists. The victims are consequently ‘dehumanized’, a necessary precondition in order for massacres to occur. The rhetoric of extermination, regardless of ideology or the degree of state control, is often therefore a prerequisite for the massacres to be carried out. They do not have to belong to a racial or religious Other – in the case of the civil war in the Vendée during the French Revolution, for example, or again during the English Civil War, victims were targeted because of their supposed political affiliations – but it generally is the case. The perpetrators, on the other hand, are more often than not young men, although there are rare instances in which women also take part in massacres and mass killings.

Massacre and Atrocity as Performance

One of the distinguishing features of the My Lai massacre was that many of the victims were first tortured and mutilated, then killed, or mutilated after being killed. The study of atrocities, loosely defined as exactions committed by perpetrators against the body of a victim, living or dead, such as rape and torture or the removal of body parts, but which can also include instances of cannibalism, has not received much attention from scholars, although some sociological studies exist. Masacres, and to an even greater extent atrocities, can be interpreted on one level as public, performative acts in which the body serves as a kind of stage on which suffering is inflicted. The victim thus becomes part of a perverse morality play, of sorts, in which the mutilated body serves as a warning to others. In Spain during the Napoleonic wars, for example, the mutilated body served as a warning to those who collaborated with the French as well as to those who opposed them. This can also occur in the modern urban context, as both Annie Pohlman has demonstrated for Indonesia, and Hélène Jaccomard for Paris in 1961, when a number of Algerians were found ‘hanging from trees in the Boulogne woods, and others, disfigured and mutilated, floating on the Seine’.

When killers mutilate the body of their victims, either before or after the killing takes place, the type of mutilation carried out can often contain a symbolic dimension. As Natalie Zemon Davis has pointed out for the early modern period in Europe, mutilation often involved religious symbolism so that the removal of an offending body part – a hand, the tongue – was seen as a symbolic purging of the (social) body. One can
find the same potential symbolic value in mutilation in the modern era. Tutsi men were literally cut down to size by Hutus during the Rwandan crisis. In Indonesia, the mutilated body of Communists, as Annie Pohlman shows in her chapter, served a similar function. Mutilation could also be a means of affirming the killers’ identity upon the victims’ bodies in which they transgress their own cultural taboos. ‘It is another means of destroying the victims before killing them’ but it could also mean that the killers gain pleasure from the act.

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Patterns of violence exist then across cultures and across the ages; the same atrocities are to be found in seventeenth-century England as in twentieth-century France or Indonesia. To understand them, however, they have to be placed in context. It is only once that has been done that we can hope to draw some preliminary overarching conclusions about massacre, mass killing and atrocity. From the studies in this collection, therefore, we can assert that:

* The perpetrators often (but not always) know the victims and have often (but not always) lived in close proximity to them for many years before the massacres and atrocities occur. This was the case, for example, in the Indonesian massacres of 1965–66. This was also the case for the settler-Aboriginal massacres on the Australian frontier; the perpetrators knew the victims well. In other instances, however, such as the Japanese sack of Nanking, or the Katyn massacres, the killing was often a calculated attack on unknown innocent people.

* The tendency to cover up a massacre or mass killing is a relatively recent phenomenon. Attitudes towards killing and massacre have distinctly evolved over time. In the ancient world, as is aptly pointed out by Jane Bellemore, the Romans not only widely practiced massacre, and boasted about it, as did Caesar in his semi-autobiographical work, the *Gallic Wars*, but they even exhibited it on monuments, such as Trajan’s column. For the ancients, massacre was the right of the victor, and was practiced against those who were outside of civilization. In the sixteenth century, hostages were regularly taken from hostile communities and often consequently executed. The denial of massacre therefore almost never occurred before the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries. In the modern era, on the contrary, massacres are often reported as a ‘battle’ or military engagement. Various other code words exist, especially in the colonizers’ lexicon, to describe what in effect is a massacre – ‘dispersal’, ‘clash’, ‘collision’, and ‘rencontre’ to name but a few. This seems to have been common on the Australian colonial frontier, where settlers, soldiers, Native Police and Military Police were the perpetrators. The corollary to that is the realization that the act of killing innocents is morally reprehensible, hence the desire to cover it up.
In order for a massacre to be uncovered, it is either the sheer size of the killings that makes it impossible for them to remain ignored, such as at Srebrenica in July 1995 when more than eight thousand Bosnian men and boys were killed by Serbian troops, or when individuals, perpetrators or survivors speak out about their experiences. In many other instances, however, scholars only come to know of massacres and mass killings if they are later revealed in memoirs, letters, journals, oral accounts, more often than not long after the incident. Within these accounts, there is a tendency to provide minimal detail of the massacre in which the witness come perpetrator may have been involved, and a great deal more detail of massacres perpetrated by others. Writing in these instances can often act as a catharsis for both the perpetrators as well as those who managed to survive (although these are rare). Indeed, perpetrators sometimes assume the voice of the victims, describing the horrors they witnessed and experienced.

Massacres can thus be ‘discovered’. This was the case, for example, with the sites of mass killings during the Terror in Stalin’s Russia in the 1930s, or indeed of the discovery of the Katyn graves in Poland in 1942. On that occasion, as Claudia Weber shows in her chapter, the discovery can be used by the perpetrators to cast doubt on their own responsibility, effectively laying the blame on others. On occasions when massacres occurred openly, on the other hand, they were meant to be public statements, examples that everyone knew of. On occasions when they were covered up and conducted in secret, it becomes much more difficult for succeeding generations to determine when and where those massacres may have occurred and who was implicated in them, either as victims and perpetrators. As François-Xavier Nérard demonstrates, the Soviet State was so secretive about its state-sponsored mass killings that even the executioners were later executed. Even when massacres are later discovered, not always evident given that perpetrators generally attempt to hide the traces of their actions and deny any involvement in them, some in the public, unable or unwilling to confront their own nation’s dark past, will not believe that what occurred was a massacre at all.

Discovery raises questions about who will be believed, who are the witnesses, and how they can speak out. Witnesses can rarely speak out at the time, so formal investigations usually begin long after the event, when witnesses find the courage to speak out. When that happens, however, perpetrators are sometimes already immune from conviction. Particular massacres, moreover, can often traumatize entire communities either because they were complicit in them or because they had lost so many of their own people. The act of investigation in war crimes trials or political mediation does not always bring reconciliation. In any event, the witness, who may not speak out until long after the event, is critical to understanding how historians can investigate massacre. Rather than relying on the evidence closest in time to the incident, the
historian may have to rely on the evidence furthest in time. In taking this approach to interpreting the evidence, the historian needs a coherent methodology.\textsuperscript{40}

**Understanding the Perpetrators**

Descriptions of particular massacres are not enough to capture the processes behind the mass killings. In general, the focus of case studies or theoretical works which attempt to explain the dynamics of massacre focus on the victims. Little attention is paid to the perpetrators of massacre, their motives, and the psychological processes involved, except in the broadest of terms. Massacres are generally explained away by racial, political or religious hatreds. That only goes part way to explaining the dynamics of killing. Important too is understanding the cultural and social contexts which enable what are very often people inexperienced in the act of killing to now commit the most barbarous acts. In short, what enables an individual to take part in a massacre, what are the inner workings of the perpetrators, their logic, their thought processes, and actions? How does an ordinary person become a mass murderer?

In the search for answers to these questions, massacre studies can learn much from the mechanics of killing and the Holocaust. Barbarity is not a biological predisposition – it is learned, cultivated and taught and is the end product of interaction with others.\textsuperscript{41} It is, in one sense, within the reach of any individual who might be subjected to the processes of transformation. As we see time and again in these pages, ordinary people, in the right circumstances, can commit extraordinary acts of barbarity.

Nor do we know much about the psychological impact of mass murder on the perpetrators. Dwyer’s essay is one of the few that dwells on the horror relived many years later by men who either witnessed or carried out atrocities and who brought themselves to write about it, in this case, veterans of the Napoleonic wars. The men (and women) who commit massacres are not sadists and do not do so for pleasure. They are often traumatized by what they have done or seen for many years after. While the acts they are involved in might be barbaric, the people committing them are not: they come from all walks of life.

**The Future of Massacre Studies**

The studies in this collection show the potential for massacre within all societies throughout the ages to the point where, it could be argued, ‘civilization’ and ‘massacre’ go hand in hand. Violence, mass killings, and atrocities have always existed; this should as such be seen as key to understanding how, when and why massacres occur. The question, how-
ever, should not be whether they occur as a result of ‘rational’ processes or whether they should be regarded as fundamentally ‘irrational’ or ‘barbaric’. The question should be about the conjunction of how rationalized society and violent passions’ erupt at particular points in time to produce massacres and mass killings. Jacques Semelin has argued for the importance of studying massacres not only as isolated incidents, and as the most dramatic and tragic form of an overall process of destruction, but also as an organized process of civilian destruction, targeting both people and their property. These one-sided acts of destruction, aimed at individuals and groups who are not in a position to defend themselves, involve ‘a totally dissymmetrical relationship between aggressor and victim’ and could involve at some point a role reversal where the victims in turn become murderers.

There is a need for a coherent method of approach to the study of massacre in all its ramifications. In 2005, Jacques Semelin cautioned researchers about the pitfalls of comparison of massacres in relation to equivalence or uniqueness. He argued that each sequence of massacres had their own uniqueness that needed to be explored in historical context. None could transcend history. Above all it was critical for the massacre researcher to be free from ideological and normative approaches. The fact that most modern massacres are carried out in secret suggests that a forensic approach is the best way to proceed, one which covers the following: an identification and profile of the perpetrators and victims according to age, sex, social origin, motive and benefit; constructing the figure of the enemy; the modus operandi; the historical time frame; and the political and media effects and ‘aftermath narratives’.

Massacre studies perform a critical role in the protection of human rights. The modern conception of the state is that it holds a monopoly over violence and that, when necessary, it will use its armed forces – the army, the police – to suppress dissent and rebellion. With regard to massacres, however, the question is much more complex. While it is a truism that the state can impose itself on a people through the use of extreme violence, repressed and abused peoples can also rise in revolt against the state, resorting to often extreme measures of violence against its representatives or supporters. The appearance of Mark Levine and Penny Robert’s seminal work, *The Massacre in History*, in 1999, was one of the first attempts to draw attention to the phenomenon in a systematic way. Since then, the field of massacre studies has moved onto new ground. Although there is much about the dynamics of massacre that remains to be understood, historians are also interested in how massacres are remembered and recalled, and just as importantly, how they are represented and made use of in history. The increased attention to the history of violence has shed light on mass killings and atrocities in more general terms, to the point where we now better understand specific massacres and mass killings. It is now obvious, in the light of recent work on memory and massacre, that how the ways these events are
recalled and celebrated is tremendously important for our understanding of their impact on the societies in which they took place.

Massacre is never an aberration. It is an integral part of human history. The twenty essays in this collection range in chronological time, from prehistory (Docker) to the Greek and Roman periods (Bosworth, Baynham, Bellemore), across the Medieval and Early Modern periods (Marvin, Jones), to the Napoleonic era (Dwyer), nineteenth-century colonial settler societies (Harper, Ryan, Madley, Tovías de Plaisted, Schlunke), to twentieth-century imperialist societies (Finaldi, Weber, Nérard) and their responses to colonial resistance (Jacommard, Pohlman, Laderman, Baines) to incidents in the late twentieth-century post-colonial societies (Pohlman, Baines), and the early twenty-first-century war in Afghanistan (Rockel). The collection, deliberately, does not contain essays about the Holocaust and genocide. Rather, the purpose is to explore the varieties of massacre across a long period of historical time (\textit{la longue durée}), and how each is remembered, as a way of drawing out the differences and similarities. We trust that the collection will encourage further research on other instances of massacre and further inform this emerging and increasingly important field of study.

Notes

4. See, for example, Robert Gellately and Ben Kiernan (eds), \textit{The Specter of Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical Perspective} (New York, 2003).


23. See, for example, Tony Roberts, *Frontier Justice: A History of the Gulf Country to 1900* (St Lucia, Qld., 2005).


28. On the other hand, Robert Gellately and Ben Kiernan, ‘The Study of Mass Murder and Genocide’, in idem. (eds), *The Specter of Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge, 2003), 10, think there is little to be gained from the notion that human nature ‘explains’ the collective drive to kill.


38. This was the case for some in the American public who believed My Lai was concocted by Viet Cong sympathizers (Oliver, *The My Lai Massacre*, 53).


42. The same question is asked of the Holocaust by Stone, *History, Memory and Mass Atrocity*, 12.