Introduction

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The shadow of the Third World hangs over the study of the radical protest movements of the 1960s in Europe and the United States. When thinking about this decade, Third World actors such as Ché Guevara, Frantz Fanon, Amilcar Cabral, and Ho Chi Minh often spring to mind alongside the likes of Rudi Dutschke, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Stokely Carmichael, and Tom Hayden. Scholars have long acknowledged that individuals, groups, language, ideology, tactics, and, indeed, the very idea of a Third World liberation movement inspired student groups and activists in Europe and the United States. These scholars have referred to the Third World as providing a “mandate for revolution”¹ and of “receiving unprecedented attention”² from activists in the West.³ Many radicals hoped that a new “Third World International” could be formed out of the solidarity between Western and non-Western students.⁴ As Max Elbaum notes, in the 1960s, “Third World Liberation Marxism-Leninism” came to replace Soviet Marxism, effectively differentiating one generation of leftist dissent—what became known as the New Left—from an older generation.⁵ The editors of 1968: The World Transformed note that “with the fading of the Marxist and Soviet models, the heroic factory worker and peasant had been replaced by the heroic Third World freedom fighter.”⁶ Scholars have also examined the effect of the Third World on specific student movements. Timothy Brown and Quinn Slobodian both point out that the state visits of Tshombe and the Shah of Iran galvanized West German students, leading to the massive outpouring of dissent in 1967 and 1968.⁷ Meanwhile, Kristen Ross’s study of May ‘68 traces the origins of the French student movement to the Algerian Civil War.⁸ As each of these authors demonstrates, the Third World became the vehicle for the social, cultural, and political transformation in the West.

The Third World not only inspired many students to take to the street in the 1960s, it also provided a model for the radicalism of the decade. Many activists in the Civil Rights Movement, for example, saw the Third World as a natural ally.⁹ The Third World and the Black Power movement became so intertwined in the 1960s that many in the United States no longer differentiated between the two causes. Decolonizing the Third World meant freedom at home for African-Americans, and vice versa.¹⁰ The Third World also impacted many white students. As Todd Gitlin notes, the antiwar movement’s inability to end the Vietnam War also caused many white middle class youth to turn to the revolutionary tactics of the Third World.¹¹ This frustration also tore apart the Students for a Democracy Society (SDS), one of the foundational organizations of the 1960s.
What emerged out of this factionalism was the Weather Underground, a group that, as Jeremy Varon notes, believed that only the Third World revolutionary, and not the white middle class in the United States, could actually stop the monolithic force of American imperialism. The Weathermen saw themselves as a compliment to the Third World revolution, struggling against imperialism inside the centers of power. The Red Army Faction in Germany, meanwhile, asserted that anyone who identified themselves with Third World revolutionaries—and not the proletariat—were themselves part of the new revolutionary vanguard.

And yet, despite its importance to activists and revolutionaries in the West, the Third World remains terra incognita in the scholarship on the 1960s. To be sure, there are a number of excellent studies on individual countries in the Third World, as well as numerous discussions of Third World countries that appear in global examinations of the 1960s. Still, the Third World as a body politic has yet to be considered. And if we are to produce a truly global understanding of the 1960s, we must, as Martin Klimke suggests, take up the case of the Third World, not as it was in the minds of Western students, but as it exists in history and on the ground. It is here in which we will encounter both familiar and novel aspects of the struggles of the 1960s, and confirm as well as challenge previous categories and notions about this decade.

The present study in no way represents a complete survey of the 1960s in the Third World; indeed, such a task would exceed the length of this book. While we are pleased to include case studies that spread across Africa, Asia, and Latin America, we recognize that for every new contribution to the field offered by this volume, there are just as many silences. The reader will no doubt wonder why Pakistan and Bangladesh, Turkey, Ethiopia, Peru, Egypt, and a host of other countries are not included. To be frank, it is not because they are not important or do not fit into the Third World matrix, but simply because we could not cover every aspect of this rich and nuanced decade. We therefore consider this book to be the opening, rather than the decisive, remarks on the Third World in the 1960s.

The case studies that follow offer a diverse sample of the Third World experience in the 1960s. They illuminate new features and novel paradigms of the 1960s that are not discussed in most studies of Western student movements. In such a reexamination there are some questions that arise at the outset. What is the Third World and how can we analyze the Third World as a part of 1960s radicalism? Does the periodization of the 1960s even fit with the Third World? If not, how should one think about “the 1960s” as a historical period in the Third World? Finally, for the sake of global context, what are the similarities and differences between the activism of the Third World and the movements of Europe and the United States, and how can exploring them increase the understanding of each arena? Instead of rehashing themes with which many readers will be familiar, this introduction focuses much more on the differences between Western and Third World movements in an attempt to break down old paradigms and discuss new categories.
Time and Place: Why the Third World? Why the 1960s?

We have purposefully chosen to include the term Third World in the title of this volume. We do so knowing the controversy surrounding its usage, as well as its implied global hierarchy based on a modernization paradigm.\(^{17}\) We also understand that the term has become outmoded since the end of the Cold War.\(^{18}\) Although we reject its pejorative connotation, we use the term in this volume to elucidate its meaning in a specific historical epoch.\(^{19}\) For one, it allows for the distinct grouping of different countries with the shared historical experience of colonialism, which shaped some of the protest movements of the 1960s. Second, the term helps distinguish a group of countries that hoped to avoid Soviet and American influence during the Cold War, with varying degrees of success.

Despite its Western origins—the term comes from a French sociologist\(^{20}\)—the idea of the Third World was realized in political practice with the formation of loosely based political, cultural, and social groupings articulated at the 1955 Bandung Conference.\(^{21}\) It was at Bandung that leaders from countries throughout the Third World recognized the importance of non-alignment and pledged to remain neutral in the Cold War. We may therefore conclude that the countries in this volume share a similar, although certainly not homogenous historical experience during the Cold War. This “flexible network” of loosely bound states operated via “degrees of affinity” rather than a “hard sense of uniqueness.”\(^{22}\) Although the term Third World may be outmoded today—replaced by the vague (and equally questionable) Global South—we stand by its value as a historical idea of vital importance during the Cold War. Discarding the term would be to erase a historical situation that did indeed play a central role in the global protest movement of the 1960s. From this perspective, applying the modern concept of a Global South to the 1960s is anachronistic and temporally disjointed. Because of its importance, the idea of the Third World, as well as a lengthy examination of the term’s origins and variations, occupies the first section of this volume.

If Third World is indeed a useful term, then how does it fit into the idea of the 1960s? Was the 1960s even a decade of any great significance to the Third World, which experienced almost non-stop social and political agitation since the end of World War II? This question of periodization is perhaps one of the most difficult to answer because the borders of “the 1960s” are so complex and hazy. Indeed, the 1960s had multiple trajectories, and it therefore seems logical to contend that it has multiple periodizations. In the West, one may begin an analysis of the 1960s, or at least the Civil Rights Movement, with the Montgomery Bus Boycott of 1955.\(^{23}\) It was in Montgomery that Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., first rose to national prominence. Perhaps the spirit or the ethos of the 1960s in the Third World emerged in 1947 with the independence of the Indian subcontinent, where a great tide of anti-colonialism signaled the final destruction of the French and British empires. Or, as Frederic Jameson contends, perhaps the 1960s began somewhere in the late 1950s, in the streets of Algiers, or in the
Ghanaian capital of Accra, or outside of the gates of Dienbienphu or maybe even in Havana, which validated the *foco* theory that provided a theoretical basis for Western youth and global revolutionaries. Indeed, the impact of Ghana’s independence in 1957 could serve as an excellent starting point—not only did Ghanaian independence stir the entire continent of Africa, but it also made an important impact across the Atlantic. Dr. King’s visit to Ghana in the year of its independence inspired the young members of the Civil Rights Movement to look toward Africa in their struggle for equality and justice. The point is that we need to allow ourselves flexibility in our understanding of time. The 1960s is a general timeframe, not a hardened structure into which we can place the vast movements and ideas examined in this volume.

And yet the protest movements explored in this volume were distinct from the anti-colonial struggle in Ghana or Algeria discussed above. If the 1960s were born in struggle against colonialism, then they matured in a very different milieu. With that in mind, the Third World in the 1960s may be conceived of in two overlapping waves. The first wave, which ended in the mid 1960s, consisted of movements that focused on the anti-colonial struggle for national independence. Indeed, between 1945 and 1965, more than 50 independent states emerged, most of them in the Third World. Activists in the second wave, however, fought against neo-colonialism and the project of the nation-state, which tended to subvert progressive activism in favor of stability. Indeed, many of the charismatic and progressive nationalist leaders of the anti-colonial movement had lost power by the early and mid 1960s, and were replaced by leaders who were more authoritarian and less tolerant of dissent. What replaced the radical anti-colonialism of the earlier part of the decade was therefore a frustration with the inefficiency and injustice of postcolonial society, the lingering presence of colonial institutions, mentalities, and influences, and the subordination of the socialist agenda to that of the nation. The new elites of the Third World realized that the radicalism and progressivism of the anti-colonial agenda was difficult to merge with the new project of nation building. As Frederic Cooper notes regarding the process of decolonization in Africa, “Politicians built a powerful challenge to colonial regimes. But once in power, such leaders understood all too well how dangerous such claims were.” The nation-state, as it turned out, was simply unable to create an equal and just society, and instead began to repress any challenge to its power. It was this political, social, and cultural environment that sparked the protests of the second wave of the 1960s.

By focusing on the this second wave in the Third World, this volume presents case studies that have by and large not been considered in analyses of the decade. However, the “two waves” of the 1960s is a soft rather than hard point of demarcation. The themes that comprised the anti-colonial nationalism of the earlier part of the decade often echoed in the social movements discussed in this volume. As Prasenjit Duara notes, the movement against colonialism was not simply fought for the transference of power, but was also “a movement for...”
moral justice and political solidarity against imperialism.” The second wave of the 1960s in the Third World was in many ways the same fight, although the disputants had changed. Even in the Americas, where many nations had experienced independence well before much of Africa and Asia, the ideological battle against imperialism, neo-colonialism, and the abuses of the nation-state also fueled countless protests in the 1960s.

In addition, it’s important to recognize that colonial rule was still present in some parts of the Third World during the 1960s, even if the white elite considered their country to be independent. Indeed, this volume contains accounts of anti-colonial struggles against minority white rule in Rhodesia and South Africa. Even those states that had gained formal independence still had to contend with the continued influence of the Western powers. This presented a difficult dilemma for many activists in the Third World. On the one hand, strengthening the nation-state was the surest antidote to neo-colonialism. On the other hand, a strong state often came at the expense of individual rights and political dissent. Many activists thus had to walk a very fine line between the nation-state and neo-colonialism. The second wave of the 1960s therefore became a movement against the former colonial powers who sought to manipulate the Third World, as well an attempt to gain access to new institutions and rights, which were often suppressed in favor of projects of nation-building and modernization.

The beginning of the decade may have hazy boundaries, but it clearly marked a “moment of transition” in the Third World, just as it did in Europe and the United States. But what of an end to the decade? Many participants and scholars have recognized that the energy of the 1960s in the West was transferred to other important movements, such as the women’s rights and nuclear non-proliferation movements, the fight for gay rights, and numerous environmental causes, among others. The 1960s in America and Europe did not end, it simply diffused; the same can be said for the Third World. Marking an end to the 1960s in the Third World is to suggest that either the activists were victorious in their respective struggles, or that they were silenced by their opponents. The events of 1960s should be understood as situated within struggles against oppression that continued in subsequent decades—the most notable being against South African apartheid. As in the West, the 1960s continues to shape social movements and collective action throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America, suggesting that the ideas of this decade had no clearly definable ending.

Common Ground and New Territory

There are certain hurdles one must surmount in order to create a global framework that properly captures the social movements of the 1960s. Scholars must primarily define certain similarities and differences that existed between the West and the Third World. Pointing out these differences will help identify new
paradigms and patterns that will help scholars draw a more global portrait of the 1960s. Of course, differences and similarities between different countries and continents abound. Instead of becoming bogged down in an infinite comparative analysis, this study takes a more thematic approach to the Third World.

One important catalyst that sparked social movements in Europe and the United States, as well as in the Third World, was an active concern over education and education reform. In fact, education reform provides an excellent example of the intersections between First, Second, and Third World movements. The importance of education reform has been well documented in the scholarship on Western student movements in the 1960s. The Western education system was outmoded and ill-prepared for the massive influx of new students after World War II. As several studies in this volume point out, this was also the case in the Third World. Education reform was an impetus for broader social movements, first encouraging mobilization and then fostering a rebellious milieu that quickly expanded beyond college and secondary school campuses. Many students began to see the university as a microcosm for society’s ills. For example, Congolese students’ complaints about the continued Dutch influence at Lovanium, the country’s most prestigious university, eventually came to represent President Mobutu’s refusal to Africanize Congolese society. Seminary students in Rhodesia felt the same way; the racist policies of the Church denied the students their African heritage at their school, just as did white rule in Rhodesia. In Brazil, students entered into an intense and prolonged dialogue about the meaning of education and its role in Brazilian society. They also protested against the collaboration between Brazil’s Ministry of Education and the United States government, and the imperialistic relationship between these two countries. Similarly, students in the Philippines coalesced around the Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism, and demanded less US influence and more Filipino say in the education system. As these cases demonstrate, protests that began at universities often became emblematic of deep-seeded problems in these individual societies.

Despite this and other similarities, there are countless historical developments unique to the Third World experience in the 1960s. Highlighting the differences between the West and the Third World, which occupies the majority of this section, is not meant to obviate a broader global perspective, but rather to suggest new categories of analysis and new ways of understanding the radicalism of the 1960s. This is particularly illuminating when considering the source and simultaneity of the Third World 1960s. Scholars of the 1960s have long attempted to locate a common impulse that drove students and activists into the streets in the West. These scholars have reached varying conclusions; some claim that the influence of the mass media galvanized Western students. Others claim that a certain zeitgeist—what George Katsiafas refers to as the eros effect—swept over the generation. Still others have identified the political and cultural climate of the Cold War as a main reason for the many social movements in the 1960s. While these models may fit Western cases, it is difficult
to apply some of these explanations to the Third World. For example, television did not enjoy the same widespread dissemination and impact in the Third World as it did in Europe and the United States, where viewers tuned into the nightly news and found on their screens the horrors of the Vietnam War. Furthermore, information in many parts of the Third World was censored on a more pervasive level; radio and print media were heavily regulated, and in many cases, operated by the state. The mass media thus proves inadequate as a general explanation for the scope of these movements in the Third World.

Furthermore, the Cold War resonated very differently in the Third World than it did in the First and Second. For one, the Cold War was far more than a “cold” battle of ideologies in the Third World. Proxy wars orchestrated on behalf of the superpowers were part of the day-to-day experience of many young Third World nations (and nationalists) in the 1960s, and the reality of assassination, political imprisonment, and outright massacre amounted to much more than an ideological debate. And yet, there was also a certain distance to the Cold War. In the Third World there was an open engagement with and blending of various ideologies that seem diametrically opposed to the blustering political battles of the First and Second Worlds. Leftists in much of the Third World embraced an ideology that blurred the Sino-Soviet split, and aid-dependent governments often walked a thin line between economic systems in order to maintain relations with both sides of the Cold War.40 Such perfidious behavior was not accepted in the First or Second Worlds. Third World leaders also used the Cold War to advance their own politics. The Cold War presented many governments with an easy excuse to deal harshly with internal dissent. The trade and arms deals made in the name of ideological alignment (or non-alignment) were more physically present as an aspect of the Cold War for Third World dissidents opposing a military junta than for activists facing a comparatively less armed police force in the West.41

The diversity of participants and activists in the Third World 1960s also indicates that many of the categories and classifications used to understand the Western 1960s are untenable in the context of the Third World. For example, although heavily disputed, the 1960s in the West is often categorized as a “youth revolt.”42 Scholars have asserted that the fusion of “youth” with consumer societies acted as catalysts for the unrest of the 1960s in the United States and Europe.43 Applying this term to the Third World, however, holds little value, despite the important role that students played in the anti-authoritarian revolts of the decade. Instead of classifying the 1960s in the Third World as a youth revolt, this volume illustrates that a host of institutions participated in the myriad social movements discussed herein. Churches and religious institutions, NGOs, radical nationalist movements, various left and right wing organizations, and (in the case of Indonesia) the army all played an important role in the Third World 1960s. While the movements in 1960s in the Third World were driven by younger people, “youth” as a category, with its own language, style, habit,
or mentality, was not an essential part of many of these protest movements. Ideology, resources, familial and societal links, and a host of other factors took precedence over youth as a distinctive social category.\textsuperscript{44}

Not only does this volume present new actors and institutions that were important to the Third World in the 1960s, it also challenges the mythology that came to embody the Third World in the West. Todd Gitlin notes that the radicals of the 1960s in the United States “increasingly found exemplars and heroes in Cuba, in China, in the Third World guerrilla movement, in Mao and Frantz Fanon and Ché and Debray.”\textsuperscript{45} And yet, one will notice that these “heroes” of the Third World are not central figures in this volume. That is not to deny the profound impact that these people had on the world in the 1960s. This volume, however, has consciously decided to focus on the characters, actors, and dissidents that are not often present in the Western discussion of the Third World. It is therefore not a study of the “heroic Third World guerrilla,” but instead a look at those who were on the ground, who were in the arenas, who were waging their respective fights, and who sometimes came and went too quickly to make a global impact. We should therefore think of the Third World in the 1960s with a more complete list of characters: Ché Guevara and the Jamaican dancehall crowds, Frantz Fanon and the Indian journalist, the Cuban guerrillas and the Rhodesian seminary student. The goal is to compare and contrast the Western imagination of the Third World and the Third World as it existed on the ground in the 1960s, populated by those who are often invisible in popular memories of the decade. The merger of these two realities can provide a more complete, and indeed more global and dynamic, landscape of the 1960s.

Despite this expanded list of the activists who affected their respective societies in the 1960s, the Third World lacked any significant or united countercultural movement. The counterculture was an important if not central characteristic of the Western student movement.\textsuperscript{46} Groups like the hippies, the Situationists, or Kommune I saw cultural freedom as the key to political liberation and infused cultural space with political meaning. The Provos in the Netherlands, for example, staged large public provocations such as a free bicycle program in order to draw attention to the negative impact that the automobile had on society. Others, like the Situationists and the members of Kommune I placed great currency in the impact of the spectacle, and attempted to shock a complacent society out of its lethargy by exposing the pernicious effect of bourgeois culture.\textsuperscript{47} For many of the countercultural groups, challenging cultural norms was a means to also confront social and economic inequities. The Situationists, for example, believed that art “needed to find its role in the transformation of everyday life” and that artists were to “agitate and polemize against the sterility of and oppression of the … ruling economic and political system.”\textsuperscript{48} The counterculture in general became an international phenomenon, and also acted as a key means of organizing youth in Europe and the United States.\textsuperscript{49} It was, in the end, one of the cornerstones of the 1960s in the West.\textsuperscript{50}
This volume is noticeably devoid of any equivalent countercultural movement that resembles the Western experience. That is not to say that culture as a point of contention or as a political by-product was absent from the Third World experience during the 1960s. Indeed, as James Bradford’s chapter demonstrates, reggae and the culture surrounding this musical genre played a major role in the Jamaican protest movement of the 1960s. And of course active countercultures emerged in places like Brazil and Mexico, and formed around new modes of expression throughout the Third World. Culture was central to the 1960s in the Third World; activists infused their political demands with culture symbols and constructed meanings. But the ethos of the Western countercultural movements—a desire to completely remove oneself from society—is less in the forefront in the Third World. The idea of “turning on, tuning in, and dropping out,” as US countercultural icon Timothy Leary prescribed, is not present in many of the case studies of this volume. One of the reasons for this is that the actors and dissidents in this volume had nothing to drop out from. Many felt that they did not have a place in society, whether because of racism, authoritarianism, or the lingering effects of colonialism. These activists believed that dropping out of a society in which they had no rights was useless. Many others were still actively engaged in the crafting of new nations. The 1960s in much of the Third World was therefore a movement to drop in to society, a battle for inclusion and for representation.

There is also a notable difference in the pitch and level of violence in the Third World as compared to the Western experience. Of course, Europe and the United States were not without their incidents of violence during the 1960s; Italy experienced a prolonged period of intense violence, while certain organizations in West Germany and the United States turned toward terrorism after realizing the ineffectiveness of nonviolent tactics. And yet, as Arthur Marwick observes, the 1960s was characterized by a “measured judgment” from the authorities. According to Marwick, the freedom of the student movement, and particularly the counterculture, to act without massive interference was due to the “existence in positions of authority of men and women … who responded flexibly and tolerantly to their [sic] demands.” Such tolerance and flexibility did not generally exist in the Third World. Almost every case study presented in this volume—from Brazil and Mexico, to the Congo and South Africa, to the Philippines and Indonesia—contains instances of extreme violence, most often originating from the state or other institutions of authority. This made some of the protest movements of the Third World in the 1960s rather short lived. Activists were readily harassed, arrested, imprisoned, physically abused, and sometimes executed. Violence therefore became a tool of the Third World authorities, an antidote to dissent that leaders in the West were unwilling or unable to use.

This does not, however, exonerate the West from any sort of violent reaction to dissent. By and large, the Western states used violence against their own people less than the authorities in the Third World, although the nature of
Western capitalism relied on the deprivation and continued political injustice of the Third World. While the authorities proved flexible and tolerant of dissent in their own country, their entire system in part relied on the continuation of violence in the Third World. The United States, for example, may have moderately tolerated the Yippies or the New Left, but they would not tolerate the Vietcong, or anyone accused of being a part of that revolutionary group in Southeast Asia. The same can be said of France; measured judgment was observed in the streets of Paris in May 1968, but not in the streets of Algiers several years before that. Cases of this nature abound. The victims of this violence in the Third World were not the political elites, but instead were often the very actors and characters included in this volume. The students, farmers, activists, and dissidents bore the brunt of violence not only from their own leaders, but from many Western countries alike.

No Roadmaps for New Directions

In light of these differences, is it still possible to claim that a global protest movement did indeed exist in the 1960s that encompassed Europe, the United States, and the Third World? Yes—the 1960s was the weaving together of individual (national) strands of history. These strands can stand alone, but the tapestry that they produced represented a semi-cohesive whole. One can therefore choose to study these national strands, or step back and examine the entirety of their individual efforts; this volume does both. Each chapter focuses on individual Third World social movements of the 1960s; the reader, upon finishing this book, however, will have gained a wider understanding of the decade. This in-depth and prolonged discussion of the Third World, when considered alongside the myriad studies of the 1960s in Europe and the United States, will produce a truly global topography of the decade. Studying the Third World, and the case studies presented in this volume, however, requires what Arif Dirlik has called a “double vision”—the reader must hold in his or her mind both the individuality of each case study, as well as the recognition that the examples presented herein represent one part of a larger narrative that took on a global shape in the 1960s.54

To make this task more manageable, the present volume is arranged along thematic rather than geographical lines. Grouping together case studies with similar stories, narratives, actors, and examples better illuminates some of the major themes of the 1960s in the Third World that stretched across both temporal and geographical boundaries. We recognize the power that such groupings hold, however, and emphasize that the purpose of this volume is not to build borders, but to cross them. Thus, the reader will find that many of the chapters might also fit well in another section, or come together in a completely new pattern if viewed side by side. These new connections are precisely what we hope
to accomplish, and see this structure as an introductory schematic—open to change, interpretation, and new directions.

The first section, “Crossing Borders: The Idea of the Third World and the Global 1960s,” offers four chapters that examine the historical development of the term Third World, as well as the ways in which the idea of the Third World gained currency during the 1960s. These chapters together illustrate that just as the Third World itself was a dynamic arena with a multiplicity of (sometimes competing) voices, so too were the imaginary and discursive spaces of the “Third World.” Together, these chapters point to wide-ranging, and at times even fluid, notions of the Third World that moved across borders in all directions. In addition, as this section endeavors to highlight, the “Third World” has always existed in a conceptual dialectic. In all of the definitions of Third World, we see ideas of First and Second World defined and negotiated as well.

As a point of departure, Christoph Kalter explores the initial usage of the term tiers monde and its journey through time and space to the usage employed by the French radical Left of the global 1960s. The essays that follow, in this section and throughout the volume, represent different trajectories of this idea, sometimes overlapping, sometimes wildly divergent from previous usages. Within these variations, one particularly salient feature of the term is the fundamental inspiration of Third World as a potentially revolutionary force (like the Third Estate during the French Revolution). This prediction of revolutionary prospective remained common throughout many of the different ideological manifestaionst. Indeed, as Kalter illustrates, Frantz Fanon saw the discursive power of the term Third World alongside its literal power and used it as a unifying identity (in the form of Third Worldism) for a potentially global collective of formerly colonized Third World revolutionaries. The Third World then could rally around a shared experience of oppression and abuse (as did the Third Estate) on one hand, but also a shared identity based on a collective power that, if united, could undoubt-
edly overwhelm the global power dynamic. The term Third World, for Fanon and those that agreed with him, was certainly not a pejorative term—it was the reclamation of an idea and a militant position.

Similar notions of empowerment are seen in the periodicals examined by Avishek Ganguly. In India, we can observe a flipping of the lens—rather than a worldview—in which when we look into the Third World Other, we see an articulation of the First World Other. The view of the 1960s from the Naxalite perspective, and their supporters’, was decidedly more guided by the revolution-
ary forces in the Third World, and the actions taking place in Europe and the US were more echoes of the battles at home. Certainly there are expressions of solidar-
dity, and even a shared identity on a basic level, but the Third World worked from a self-defined position of influential dominance, and in doing so, on at least a discursive level, placed the First World into a more Third World–centered world order.
That is not to say that the term was applied in the same way across different countries. Zachary Scarlett illustrates how this recognition of the revolutionary potential of the Third World was present in Chinese students’ imaginations and put to very China-centric usages. By positioning Mao Zedong as a glorious leader of global anti-imperialism (vis-à-vis Third World Revolution), the symbol did more to define Chinese students’ sense of their own revolutionary identity during the Cultural Revolution than to collectively empower the Third World. In fact, as both Scarlett and Ganguly’s work demonstrates, the Maoism of different Third World interpretations took a decidedly non-China-centric trajectory, and responded to locally relevant issues. Thus, while Chinese students imagined that they were inspiring the poor masses of the world, many of their would-be followers had adopted only certain facets of Maoism and moved on.

Of course this is not to cynically imply that the expressions of solidarity were not genuine—or that students (in China or elsewhere outside the Third World) were unable to see beyond their own myopic experience. Indeed, as can be seen in Konrad Kuhn’s chapter, the idea of the Third World had a massive mobilizing appeal in Europe, and solidarity with Third World struggles presented a new, and highly effective, framing opportunity for humanitarian aid organizations. Famine and disaster imagery may have been fundamentally othering in their representations, but they also provided a starting point, or a foothold, for First World actors to engage with the negative consequences of imperialism and neo-colonial exploitation. Furthermore, the issue of solidarity with the Third World victims built bridges between organizations with different goals, and to some extent, a new, more informed, politicization of aid and compassion work. These bridges extended across borders and linked not only First World activists with Third World activists, but opened new channels of movement resources to which the Third World gained access. Indeed, in the issue of solidarity and aid we see a widening of the cast of players engaging in the global 1960s on both sides of protests.

All of the chapters in the volume demonstrate that the idea of the Third World was mobile, highly malleable, and far from monolithic. In the second section, “Fresh Battles in Old Struggles: New Voices and Modes of Expression,” we explore four case studies that deal with protest movements that began long before, and in many cases extended long after, the 1960s. This section demonstrates that the 1960s did not exist in a temporal vacuum and that these movements are part of a long history preceding, and following, the sensational moments of the late 1960s. Within these protracted struggles, however, the presence the global milieu of the 1960s is visible, as are new modes of expression and negotiation that emerged during the decade. Thus, this section illuminates the effect of the 1960s on longer campaigns of resistance as well as placing aspects of the 1960s into a clearer historical context.

As Colin Snider’s chapter demonstrates, university reform in Brazil is rooted in a larger dialogue between the state and population over the direction and
development of the nation, the role of education, and eventually, the role of democracy. As Brazilian students negotiated with the state, the 1968 Reforma Universitária represented a significant success in and of itself, but in the larger struggles for democratization, the decade was less clearly victorious. The students’ ability to form new alliances and the adaptability of the students’ campaign to the introduction of military rule marks only one aspect of the longer process of negotiation and contests for power.

While Brazil’s students were contending with a new regime of power in the form of military rule, other cases in the section present cases of old power facing new consciousness. White dominance and racist oppression was certainly not new in the 1960s, nor was resistance to these institutions. However, the 1960s did mark a point in which “blackness” as a mobilizing identity crested. The influence of both the US Civil Rights Movement and the Black Power movement in South Africa and Jamaica, as presented in this section in the chapters by Chris Saunders and James Bradford, are two of countless examples illustrating black empowerment as one the most mobile and lasting ideas circulated in the 1960s. The racist roots of colonial domination were clearly present in the policies of apartheid under which South African blacks lived every day, and the presence of oppression was irrefutable and certainly deeply entrenched in local societal structure. Yet, as Saunders’ chapter demonstrates, in the 1960s a globally informed black consciousness drew inspiration from writings by authors with origins outside of South Africa; Frantz Fanon, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and Malcolm X expressed a black solidarity and identity that echoed and embodied the idea of a Third World revolutionary potential. This empowerment would take many more years to manifest into actual freedom for blacks in South Africa, but the struggle against apartheid became ideologically and physically more global in the 1960s.

Similarly, as James Bradford demonstrates, the influence of Black Power in Jamaica’s poor quarters led to expressions of both outrage and hope. The Rodney riots represented black frustration with continued oppression, and the politicization of music, in the form of reggae, embodied another mode of black consciousness. Both the riots and the reggae drew on international notions of black consciousness and Third World empowerment, but also placed the identity in a very personal and local mode of expression. Nicholas Creary’s chapter also presents a case in which black seminary students contended with a newfound sense of empowerment. In this study, however, the focus of white domination is the church. Creary brings a new dynamic into the discussion of race and the 1960s. Analysis of race in the 1960s often centers on governmental policies, but there were certainly institutions of power outside of the government exercising racist oppression as well. As Creary’s contribution deftly reminds us, the 1960s unsettled that power in various corridors.

In addition to the tension between white domination and black oppression, this section also illustrates important moments of cooperation on issues of race.
Saunders and Creary both provide examples in which white and black students were able to see a common identity beyond (or at least beside) race and oppose the injustice together. These alliances offered shining examples in the 1960s that a movement built of new, globally informed ideas of justice was possible.

The struggle against racism was not new, nor was it won, in the 1960s. Neither was the struggle for university reform or democratization in Brazil. Indeed, very few of the issues of the 1960s were actually new at all. The 1960s, in these chapters, represented a new engagement with old issues. This new engagement also took novel forms and allowed for fresh voices to come forward. These studies demonstrate that while much of the action of the 1960s took place in the street and on college campuses, it also occurred in quiet seminary halls, cricket fields, the offices of military dictators, and dancehalls.

In the final section, “Unfinished Business: Challenging the State’s Revolution,” we present four case studies in which students in Mexico, the Philippines, Indonesia, and the Congo challenged the state’s claim to represent a revolutionary or postcolonial government. In each of these cases, students ask a fundamental question: “What do we do now that the revolution has supposedly already taken place?” This question was particularly important for the Third World. The French and American Revolutions aside, students in Western Europe and the United States all looked at social and cultural transformation as something that was to come in the future, and did not have to contend with governments that claimed that revolutionary politics was a thing of the past. Of course, as these four studies point out, despite the state’s claim to represent a revolutionary or post-colonial government, they were anything but. Indeed, what prompted students in Mexico, the Philippines, Indonesia, and the Congo to take to the streets was the fact that these supposed “revolutionary” governments had become, over varying amounts of time, defenders of the status quo. They may have claimed the revolutionary or postcolonial mantle, but in reality they displayed the same entrenched, conservative, and unyielding qualities of many Western governments. What the students in each of these countries came to realize in the 1960s was that postcolonialism in the Congo, guided democracy in Indonesia, institutionalized revolution in Mexico, and nationalism in the Philippines were constructed notions used to maintain order and to propagate the power of individual leaders or mass political parties. The goal of the students during the 1960s was to tear down this façade.

Challenging the state’s revolutionary monopoly meant making nationalist claims, a theme that each author highlights in their respective studies. These four chapters therefore work to unsettle common approaches to the 1960s, which often do not focus on nationalism. The reader will notice that these nationalist claims manifested themselves very differently. In the Philippines, for example, the Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism (MAN) heavily criticized the Philippines’ industrial and economic policies, Marcos’s close relationship with the United States, and the continued influence of foreigners in the Philip-
pines’ national affairs. In Indonesia, however, students made the opposite claims, demanding more American influence in the Indonesian university. Nevertheless, both sets of students relied on nationalist repertoires in an attempt to change policies in their respective countries. So, too, did students in the Congo, who criticized the government for its reliance on colonial tactics (especially when it came to disciplining dissent), and demanded that Mobutu Africanize the Congolese university. Even in Mexico, a state that gained independence well before the Congo, Indonesia, or the Philippines, students still relied on what Julia Sloan calls a “history of revolutionary nationalism to justify their position.”

The students’ nationalism upsets the binary between activists and the state that is present in many instances of unrest in the 1960s. As each of the authors in this section demonstrates, the students’ demands, as well as their rhetoric, often overlapped with that of the state. At times this blurred the line between state and student, and occasionally allowed for the state to absorb the student movement more easily. Pedro Monaville, for example, demonstrates that Congolese students and President Mobutu both claimed to represent the interests of a post-colonial society. Meanwhile, in Indonesia, there was little distinction between the army and the main student group, the Indonesian Student Action Front, as Stephanie Sapiee’s chapter points out. Despite fierce disagreements in the Philippines between Marcos and the main student movement, Erwin Fernandez’s study shows that in the end “its [the student groups’] objectives fit well with Marcos’s nationalism.” Even in Mexico, where the students and the state fought a fierce battle that ended in horrible violence, students protested more against the current iteration of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and its ossification, than against its revolutionary heritage. As Julia Sloan’s chapter points out, the PRI was able to placate dissent when it rediscovered its populist past and incorporated many activists from the 1968 student movement into the bureaucracy.

Each of these case studies, despite their differences, brings forth a unique strand of the 1960s experience: that of challenging a ruling elite that is not necessarily anti-revolution, but relegates revolutionary politics and culture to history. And this, in essence, became the central conflict for the student groups discussed in this section. Where each government claimed to be the official caretaker of a revolutionary society, the students saw elites, hierarchy, contradiction, and the status quo. The 1960s was an exercise in reclaiming the revolutionary mantle from an older stultified generation of leaders. In the end, however, the ruling parties and elites could not abide such a challenge to their power or a disruption to the status quo, and so dissent was often met with bloodshed and violence, both from the government and (in the case of Indonesia) from the students and the army.

While the sections discussed above represent a unique theme or narrative that can be found in each of the chapters, we hope that the reader will continue to approach the Third World as a loosely bound collective body. Getting bogged down in the particularities of each case study is to lose the scope and dimension
of the broader Third World experience. The opposite is also true; approaching this collection of essays from a purely global perspective is to obviate the nuance of each individual case. What is required of the reader is a very delicate balance that allows for the global, national, and local to coalesce into a single history. The chapters in this volume do not claim to define the Third World experience of the 1960s. They serve to open the field and to begin a new conversation. If this volume unsettles or upsets notions of what the 1960s means, what the Third World means, or how they might come together in a scholarly conversation, then our aim has been achieved. This is an exciting step in what promises to be a rich and highly nuanced discussion that will include voices from and about the 1960s. In the end, what this volume hopes to demonstrate is that a truly global analysis of this decade is impossible without an in-depth and prolonged conversation about the Third World.

Notes

Samantha and Zachary would like to thank Timothy S. Brown, Martin Klimke, and the three anonymous readers for their very helpful comments regarding this introduction and collection.

3. David Barber, however, disagrees with the New Left’s commitment to the Third World. He contends that the failure of the New Left was partially due to their inability to understand their whiteness and privilege and to truly embrace both the Black Power movement and liberation struggles in the Third World. See David Barber, *A Hard Rain Fell: SDS and Why it Failed* (Jackson: University of Mississippi Press, 2008), 8–9.
5. Ibid., 48.


13. Ibid, 70.


19. For an in-depth discussion of the historical origins of the term *Third World*, see Christoph Kalter’s chapter in this volume. As the subject is addressed at such length in the first chapter, we won’t duplicate the discussion of the historical development of the term in this introduction.


27. Although Latin America and the Caribbean did not follow the same trajectory as Africa and most of Asia, these countries still had to deal with a distinctive form of colonialism. The Monroe Doctrine and the United States’ continued forays into the Caribbean and South America meant that these countries were nominally independent, but not free of outside interference.
32. The Congo is perhaps the clearest example of Western influence in a nominally independent power. The United States first supported the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, and then saw that Mobutu Sese Seko was able to come to power. In 1968, President Mobutu ordered the slaughter of students protesting against Western influence in Congolese society. For a discussion of the Congo in 1968, see Pedro Monaville’s chapter in this volume. For a general analysis of the United States’ manipulation of the Congo, see David N. Gibbs, *The Political Economy of Third World Intervention: Mines, Money and U.S. Policy in the Congo Crisis* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991).
33. Partha Chatterjee discusses the development of the nation-state in the Third World, tracing its normalization as a means of political and social organization to the Bandung Conference. He also discusses the ideal of a strong state in the face of colonial oppression. See Partha Chatterjee, “Empire and Nation Revisited: 50 Years After Bandung,” *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* Vol. 6, No. 4 (2005): 477–496.
34. Horn (2007), 229
35. In addition, the social movements of the 1960s have, in some ways, set the tone for subsequent dissent. Directly confronting the nation-state, as protesters did in the 1960s, has become the cornerstone of political protest in many Third World societies, especially because other outlets to engage with the state—democratic institutions, open forums, political rights—are unavailable to many citizens. See, Lisa Thompson and Chris Tapscott (eds.), *Citizenship and Social Movements: Perspectives from the Third World* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), 26.


40. Egypt is a particularly strong example, in which both Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar Sadat attempted to balance their policies between nationalism, leftism, capitalism, and radical Islam, as well as pressure from the Soviet Union and the United States. The pressures of the Cold War shaped the reigns of each of these men. See John Waterbury, *The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983).


42. Scholars such as Detleft Siegfried have challenged the utility of this concept of “youth revolt.” See Siegfried, “Understanding 1968: Youth Rebellion, Generational Change and Postindustrial Society,” in Alex Schildt and Detlef Siegfried (eds.), *Between Marx and Coca-Cola: Youth Cultures in Changing European Societies, 1960–1980* (New York: Berghahn Books), 71.


44. Of course, the idea of youth revolt does lend itself particularly well to the case of Mexico, particularly in the counterculture of Mexico City, as discussed in Eric Zolov, *Refried Elvis: The Rise of the Mexican Counterculture* (Berkley: University of California Press, 1999).

45. Gitlin (1993), 263.


49. Klimke and Scharloth (2008), 6

