

INTRODUCTION

Postcolonial Migrations and Identity Politics: Towards a Comparative Perspective

Ulbe Bosma, Jan Lucassen and Gert Oostindie

On the eve of the Second World War, the governments of Western Europe were as ill-prepared for the war to come as they were for its devastating consequences to their colonial empires. Even less did they anticipate the large-scale migrations that would accompany decolonization. This book addresses postcolonial migrations, not just to Europe but also beyond. The assumption of the contributions is that it is useful to differentiate the category of 'postcolonial migrants' from other types of migrants, because of their pre-migration legal status, their familiarity with metropolitan language and culture, and possibly also because of kinship relations with the metropolitan population. The obvious next question then becomes whether these pre-migration characteristics, and possibly identity politics based on the individual pre-migration history, facilitated their integration in the metropolis – and, conversely, how their long-standing relationships with the metropolis impinged upon the way metropolitan governments and populations at large perceived these 'repatriating' immigrants.

In this introduction, we explore some of the broader themes which are addressed in greater depth in the following chapters on specific countries. We first present an overview of postcolonial migrations, making the case for a broader perspective beyond the obvious European examples. Next, we discuss in more detail the paradoxical linkages between decolonization and postcolonial migration. This in turn leads to another look at the very concept of the 'postcolonial migrant'. In the next two sections we summarize the various trajectories of postcolonial migrations to Europe and beyond. The closing section offers some hypotheses and preliminary answers to the questions raised.

Notes for this chapter begin on page 22.

Postcolonial Migrations: An Overview

In the wake of the dissolution of the European empires following the Second World War, large flows of migrants reached the former metropolitan countries. These movements were momentous and dramatic, but also limited in time (mainly the first decades after the war) and place (Europe and its former colonies). These migrations are well documented, to the point that they have obscured a wider, indeed global, phenomenon. Colonial powers were not exclusively European, neither were massive migrations after the collapse of empires unique to the period after 1945. In Europe, the end of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires, the devastation of the German Reich after 1945 and the implosion of the Soviet Union (the successor to the Tsarist Empire) caused massive movements of populations. Postcolonial migrations were not limited to European colonial powers, as shown by the post-1945 repatriation of Japanese from Manchuria and Korea. In a totally different political context, the massive displacement of people as a result of the partition of the former British Raj into India and Pakistan in 1947 is also a postcolonial migratory movement.

To complicate matters, if these postcolonial movements of people were indeed prompted by political change, the line between postcolonial migration and labour or ‘welfare’ immigration is not easy to draw. Even long after decolonization had been concluded, and in spite of restrictive policies, the United Kingdom and France in particular continued to attract large numbers of migrants from their former colonies. From yet another perspective, in some exceptional, mainly Caribbean, cases decolonization was not accomplished by a transfer of sovereignty but rather by some model of further integration with the metropolis. This is the case with the French overseas departments, the Netherlands Antilles and a few remaining British overseas territories, but equally with the former American colonies of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. In all of these cases, the continuation of constitutional bonds would prove a stimulus for migration to the metropolis. Again, it is difficult to differentiate between ‘postcolonial’ and labour migration in these instances. In the American case, the picture becomes even more blurred should we conceive as somehow ‘postcolonial’ the massive migration from the informal former empire – from Cuba through the rest of Latin America to the Philippines.

In short, European postcolonial immigration is part of a larger history; the large influx of postcolonial immigrants was not unique to Europe and there is no clear-cut definition of the postcolonial migrant. In the pioneering study *Europe’s Invisible Migrants*, the editor Andrea L. Smith calculated that between 1945 and 1990, Western and Southern Europe received some five to seven million immigrants from (former) overseas territories.¹

Yet as Nicole Cohen writes in this book, the number of post-imperial Japanese immigrants ‘coming home’ after 1945 amounted to a staggering 6.5 million as well. In his discussion of Puerto Rican migration to the United States, Jorge Duany makes the point that the present number of migrants from this Caribbean-associated territory is now some four million, but that this number easily doubles if we include migrants from the communities originating in the former protectorate of Cuba and the pre-war colony of the Philippines. By the mid-1990s, the break-up of the Soviet Union had resulted in some nine million refugees in its former constituent states.² As Allison Blakely demonstrates in this book, the migratory consequences of this imperial collapse have continued apace ever since.

These migrations had immediate demographic consequences for the receiving countries. The dissolution of the Soviet Union led to massive migration movements, and the Japanese population had increased by 7.5 per cent in the wake of its retreat from Asia. Less dramatic but still important in terms of demography were the emigrations to France, Great Britain and the Netherlands, with population increases of between 3 and 4 per cent, whereas the figures for Western Germany and Portugal would be respectively 8.1 and 7.5 per cent (see table I.1). At present, first or second generation postcolonial migrants make up 7 to 8 per cent of the total British and French populations. With 10 per cent, the European proportion is highest in Portugal, whereas the figure is relatively low in the Netherlands, at just over 6 per cent. The overwhelming majority of migrants from the non-industrial South originated from the former colonies. The major exception to this rule is the Netherlands, where there was remarkably little overlap between postcolonial immigration streams and labour recruitment.

With the notable exception of the United States and to a lesser degree France, none of these societies had seriously considered themselves to be countries of immigration. After the Second World War the Western European colonizing states, Japan and Russia, changed almost overnight from highly expansionist nations to societies confined within their own borders attracting large groups of immigrants. This applies equally to Germany, whose role as a European colonizing state is often forgotten. Of course the German state was forced to cede its overseas possessions after its defeat in the First World War, but this transition did not result in significant postcolonial migration to Germany. The shrinking of its territory (*Ausgrenzung*) and the eventual defeat of the Nazi regime, however, brought about a massive ‘repatriation’ of Germans and *Völkendeutsche* – descendants of Germans who, often centuries ago, had settled in the Balkans and Russia. In a long, drawn-out process starting in the late eighteenth century,

the Turkish Empire experienced similar immigration waves as a consequence of its retreat from the Balkans.

It took quite some time before scholars started thinking of these postcolonial migrations, and the related immigration and integration experiences, as a distinct category of migration. The past decades have seen an avalanche of studies on virtually all dimensions of migration, focusing on the migrants themselves, on integration and identification, on political opportunity structures and identity politics, on transnationalism and so on.³ Of course, much of this work has focused on postcolonial migrations, particularly to Europe. However, we believe that to date, a systematic comparison of postcolonial migrations worldwide has been lacking.

We are aware that our usage of the concept 'postcolonial' may elicit questions and opposition. The field of what has become known as 'postcolonial studies' is dominated by discourses on the relationships of power in many fields (economic, political, discursive) between formerly colonized peoples and metropolitan power. In this paradigm, the term 'postcolonial migrants' would be reserved for subaltern migrants from the (former) colonies, rather than for returning settlers and colonial elites. As will become evident from the rest of our introduction and indeed from all following chapters, the present usage of 'postcolonial' is broader both in its application to a wider set of migrants and in our rejection of the theoretical underpinnings of this one particular interpretation of colonial and postcolonial history.

The essays in this book aim to provide historical body and substance to debates on (postcolonial) immigration in the core group of European countries – Great Britain, France, Portugal and the Netherlands – in a comparative framework. These contributions address in a systematic way for individual countries the themes of migration, citizenship, metropolitan opportunity structures and postcolonial migrants' identity politics. As such, they provide state of the art overviews on each of these national experiences. Taken together, these studies provide a rare comparative perspective on areas of the post-war world with entirely different immigration regimes. We feel the comparison of these individual cases, including the emergence and reception of postcolonial identity politics, will help us address the crucial wider question of how societies deal with contemporary social inequality and ethnic and religious differences, and with the place of their own colonial history in their understanding of the nation and national identity.

Table I.1. Postcolonial immigrants and their proportion of the population of the receiving country for the first generation, related to the date of their arrival

<i>Country*</i>	<i>Postcolonial immigrants (millions)</i>	<i>Population (millions)</i>	<i>Postcolonial immigrants' proportion</i>
Turkey (1930)	?	14	>10
West-Germany (1980)	5	62	8.1
Japan (1950)	6.250	83	7.5
Portugal (1980)	0.650	10	6.5
Russia (2000)	6	143	4.2
The Netherlands (1980)	0.550	14	3.9
France (1970)	2	51	3.9
U.K. (1970)	2	56	3.6
United States (2000)	4.350	298	1.4
Belgium (2000)	0.125	10	1.2
Italy (2000)	0.550	58	0.9
Spain (2000)	0.180	43	0.4

Figures derived from Smith, *Invisible Migrants*, p. 32, with the following additions: Spain excluding recent flows from Latin America; Germany and Turkey see further on in the Introduction; Russia based on Perevedentsev, 'Migratsiia naseleniia', http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/B08_12/Main.htm,⁴ and estimates Gijs Kessler, IISH; Japan, see Nicole Cohen, this book; U.S.A., see Jorge Duany, this book (excluding migrants from Cuba and the Philippines, which would bring the total to 8.4 million).

*Reference years pertain to the period in which the great majority of first-generation postcolonial migrants had settled. Absolute figures given for the number of postcolonial migrants are rough estimates; the same therefore applies to the suggested proportional share.

Decolonization and Postcolonial Immigration

The different decolonization processes produced two, opposing outcomes with crucial implications for migration dynamics. The classical, most frequent and indeed intuitively logical outcome was the transfer of sovereignty, as in the cases of India/Pakistan, Indonesia, Algeria, Angola, and so on. Such constitutional changes were sometimes accomplished after serious armed struggles, sometimes after protracted negotiations, and often following a combination of both. In many cases the prospect of independence caused mass migrations to the metropolis from those segments of society whose fate was directly tied to the colonial structure: European settlers, Eurasian and Eurafrikan middle classes, colonial soldiers and the

like. In some other cases, especially in the Caribbean, independence was relatively easily negotiated with an encouraging metropolis that was no longer interested in the retention of its former empire. Unexpectedly, the transfer of sovereignty in these instances was preceded and/or accompanied by mass migration involving cross-sections of the former colonial populations, as citizens – much against the high hopes of the nationalists – voted with their feet against the new constitutional status. In none of these cases were the metropolitan governments and societies particularly enthusiastic about the mass immigrations. In all of these, the migrants exercised the still prevalent, or at least enforceable, rights of citizenship they would lose after the transfer of sovereignty.

The alternative outcome of the post-war decolonization process was some sort of neo-colonial arrangement, in most cases endorsing a degree of autonomy for the former colony, in some others full integration, but ultimately continuing a direct postcolonial constitutional relationship. This applied invariably to small entities, the ‘confetti of empires’ scattered around the globe but concentrated in the Caribbean. In this sub-region of the Americas, three European powers as well as the United States are still constitutionally present, partly or even mainly because the local populations have refused to accept independence. In all cases this mutual acceptance of a neo-colonial relationship implied affirming or bequeathing full citizenship rights to the inhabitants of the non-sovereign territories, and in most cases – until recently the U.K. was a glaring exception – these citizenship rights included the right of abode in the metropolis. In most instances, this right stimulated mass settlement in the metropolis and an atypical pattern of persistent circular migration.

Returning to the entire category of postcolonial migrants, we should make some crucial qualifications to the notion of full metropolitan citizenship rights. Included in this is distinguishing between citizenship rights and the right of repatriation. In most postcolonial metropolitan states, the latter is enshrined in the concept of ‘repatriates’ or ‘returnees’, *repatrianten* (Dutch), *retornados* (Portuguese), *repatrianty* (Russian) or *hikiage-sha* (literally ‘salvaged’, Japanese). Most metropolitan countries were initially hesitant to endow such rights to postcolonial immigrants. Some withdrew these rights at some point with the objective of discouraging or curtailing immigration from the decolonizing territories, as did the United Kingdom in the early 1960s and Portugal just before the independence of its African colonies. In both cases a metropolitan ancestry was imposed as a condition for repatriation. In those cases where the transfer of sovereignty was accompanied by mass migration, there was legislation aimed at defining future arrivals from these former territories as migrants *tout court*, without specific entitlement to citizenship. Only where post-

war decolonization took the form of a constitutional incorporation into a new postcolonial political structure did postcolonial citizenship include the right of abode in the metropolis.

Citizenship rights rooted in the colonial period, pre-migration socialization, command of the metropolitan language, educational, cultural and sometimes religious affinity – in short, what Gert Oostindie in his contribution concerning the Netherlands summarizes as ‘the postcolonial bonus’ – were usually of great help in the integration of postcolonial immigrants. In their early phases of settlement they were often assisted by metropolitan governments facilitating their access to housing, the labour market and welfare provision. This assistance, of course, was not meted out with the same intensity everywhere, with the emerging Western European welfare states providing the most extensive support, particularly after the 1960s.

Neither was state support evenly distributed to citizens of former metropolitan nations. In general, postcolonial immigrants closest to the colonial rulers benefited most, whereas those perceived as ethnically distinct and non-European had more problems acquiring full citizenship rights and were more likely to encounter discrimination. In most countries, in spite of a postcolonial bonus, substantial numbers ended up in disadvantaged parts of cities and were overrepresented in the top rankings of all the wrong lists, whether for unemployment, housing or deviancy.

The record for intergenerational social upward mobility seems mixed, but just as for other immigrants there are firm indications, not of overall improvement but certainly of incremental success over the generations. Timing mattered a lot. Postcolonial immigrants arriving in Europe after three decades of unprecedented economic growth might have benefited from unhindered entrance and other full citizenship rights, but nevertheless found themselves competing with other ‘guest labourers’ in a post-industrial labour market. The children of the French Antilleans recruited in the 1960s for the expanding French labour market found that their competitive advantages crumbled a few decades later. In contrast to their traditional preferential status, these *négropolitains* were subsequently often seen as belonging to a diffuse category of black French, including the large numbers of later, often illegal, sub-Saharan African immigrants. In all, as with the Caribbean youth in Britain or the Netherlands, or with Puerto Ricans in the United States, pre-migration social and cultural capital is but one factor determining the chances for successful social integration of these immigrants, the host society’s acceptance of them, and immigrant identification with society at large. The sharp rise in unemployment figures in Europe in the 1980s has washed away the ‘bonus’ of being a postcolonial immigrant.

In some cases, the argument of colonial linkages, and hence community rights and governmental responsibilities, helped to secure access from former colonies even if the immediate linkage had long been severed. In this regard, Margarida Marques details how this type of communitarian pressure to secure greater leniency in immigration policies benefited tens of thousands of Africans and Brazilians in Portugal. Even though the rights of abode for non-repatriates were formally curtailed after the collapse of the Luso-African Empire, many were still accepted. Likewise, almost two centuries after the independence of Brazil, it still proved relatively easy for Brazilians to settle in Portugal – their command of the Portuguese language being a crucial postcolonial asset.

The belated Spanish experience of postcolonial immigration is another case in point. Most of the Spanish Empire had already collapsed by the early nineteenth century. Around 1900, Spain also lost Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines, and was left with nothing but a few scattered settlements in Africa. While the later remnants of a long colonial history left Spain with a delicate postcolonial relationship with the Western Sahara, this linkage was of little importance in comparison to the strong bonds still existing with the Spanish-speaking Americas. Over the centuries, millions of Spaniards had migrated there, mostly for economic reasons but at times, as after the civil war of 1936–1939, also through political motivation. Conversely, political refugees escaped from Spanish American dictatorships from the 1960s through to the early 1980s, followed by substantial labour migration from all over the continent. As an outcome of bilateral agreements rooted in the rhetoric of a common *hispanidad*, it is much easier for Spanish American nationals to obtain Spanish citizenship than it is for immigrants from other non-EU countries. Indeed, in 2008, of the 2.3 million residents of Spain who were born in Latin America, 1.8 million did not hold Spanish citizenship.⁵ In other words, while decolonization was a thing of the remote past and while these immigrants therefore do not qualify as postcolonial migrants in the strict sense, their presence in Europe is a direct consequence of colonial history – producing millions of Spanish-speaking, Catholic potential migrants who were clearly preferred in Spain over other migrants from the South.

In most cases, postcolonial migrations have been characterized by a near-exclusive orientation on the former metropolis. A partial exception here involves postcolonial migrants from the former British Empire. Migration from the British West Indies in particular has been markedly bifurcated, leading simultaneously to the United Kingdom and the United States, both before, during and in the immediate aftermath of decolonization. For the majority of cases however, this criterion of orientation on the former metropolis is relevant.

In Western Europe, there is one more characteristic of postcolonial migration which merits attention. In France, there is a large measure of overlap between Muslim and postcolonial immigration, the major exception among the postcolonial migrants being a minority from the Caribbean, Indochina and the Jewish from Algeria, and the major exception among the Muslim immigrants being the Turks. In the United Kingdom, there is only a partial overlapping, as the majority of South Asian immigrants are Muslim but a substantial minority of South Asians are either Hindu or Sikh, and black Britons are predominantly Christian. In the Netherlands and Portugal there is little overlap between the two categories. One may consider that this has assumed relevance as a political factor, as the crisis of Western European multiculturalism has become increasingly linked to misgivings about Islam.

Colonial Subjects to Postcolonial Migrants: (Dis)continuities

'Postcolonial' is used in this book in a broader sense than simply a temporal one (as in the description 'after the end of the colonial empires'). It alludes to the ways the colonial past has left material and non-material legacies, ranging from metropolitan demographics and culture to ongoing ideological and possibly psychological impacts. The issue of colonial-to-postcolonial continuities has been widely discussed in the academic sphere, but has increasingly attracted wider attention, for example in the recent fierce French political debates on the nature and impact of colonialism.

In France, as in Portugal and Russia for that matter, there is a direct historical connection between decolonization and the breakdown of the metropolitan political system. Portugal rid itself of the Salazar regime and its former colonies in one stroke, and its new Socialist government made anti-colonialism a serious issue during its first ten years from 1974. It later on gave an amnesty to irregular immigrants from its former colonies, and more recently formulated a multicultural approach as a key issue in its governmental programme. In contrast to Portugal, France became less democratic as its Fifth Republic, born from the turmoil of the Algerian war, followed the path of an increase in presidential powers at the expense of the parliament. The violence of the struggle for decolonization reached Paris on 17 October 1961, when an FLN (the Algerian National Liberation Front) demonstration was brutally oppressed and some hundred, mainly Algerian, demonstrators were killed.⁶ However, most other de-

colonizing nations managed to proceed with the process without letting it interfere as dramatically with domestic politics.

From a (post)colonial migrant's point of view, there may have been continuity between the experience of colonial traditions of labour recruitment and segregation and the concomitant socio-racial, apartheid-like structures 'back home', and the European policies regarding entrance and settlement of 'non-Western' immigrants and new practices of (re)defining (postcolonial) citizenship. In the metropolis, postcolonial immigrants often experienced a chilly reception and racial discrimination, just as the lesser numbers of colonial migrants had witnessed in the pre-war decades. The continuities were tangible and painful – yet did not stop new migrants from coming in.

It would be unwise therefore to underestimate the factor of metropolitan racism as one dimension of the continuity from the colonial to the postcolonial period. 'Race', of course, did not have the same significance in all colonial and postcolonial settings. Neither did racism. In the post-war period, overt racism did not disappear, but became unacceptable in official parlance, at least in the Western world. But other antagonisms surfaced. Since the 1990s, debates on immigration throughout Western Europe have tended to focus on the problems of Islam and the alleged refusal of Muslim immigrants to assimilate into metropolitan culture. As Shinder Thandi notes in his chapter on the United Kingdom, religion surpassed race as the mobilizing factor, which seems to follow the logic of oppositional identity politics on the part of the receiving society and the immigrants – on both sides, we may add. We might well ask what difference religion and race make in this respect, just as we should wonder about the colonial roots of contemporary stereotyping. It is not a foregone conclusion that (post)colonial boundaries have become less relevant.

Both the persistence of old antagonisms and the emergence of relatively new ones remind us of pessimistic claims that contemporary migrations are far more problematic than the pre-war migrations to Europe and the United States. This position defines contemporary immigration as basically problematic, suggesting that not only racial, cultural and in particular religious differences, but also transnationalism, the demands of a post-industrial labour market and the concomitant educational demands all work together to increase social inequality. As most non-Western immigrants will suffer from this, they will find their integration thwarted; the result will be exclusion, partly self-sought, or the segmented assimilation of new immigrants at best. This pessimistic perspective is often taken to apply to most postcolonial immigrants as well.

The contributions to this book strongly suggest, however, that the integration problems of most postcolonial immigrants were class based, or for

some of them related to the illegal status of their residence in Europe. The later cohorts of postcolonial immigrants resemble in many respects the labour migrants of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, and their diachronic convergence towards the absorption and assimilation or integration of immigrants in all periods. Successful integration as measured by socioeconomic, educational and even political parameters, first and foremost needs time – roughly three generations. This more optimistic analysis also departs from a more flexible definition of the end result. ‘Full integration’ does not imply complete assimilation or acculturation to the receiving society’s cultural conventions, and may well include continuing political as well as cultural transnationalism.⁷

Even if we accept the position of diachronic convergence, however, the collective pre-migration profiles of postcolonial migrants do matter to the integration process. There are a few hard and many more soft criteria and resultants, but there are three important ones which set postcolonial migrants apart from other non-elite migrants from the Global South. The first is the prior possession of, or relative ease of access to, full metropolitan citizenship rights. The second criterion is cultural and linguistic affinity; and the third one is the way in which migrant biographies are linked to diasporic experiences and the specific character of transnational bonds with their countries of origin. In this respect a distinction needs to be made between subaltern and dominant groups within the colonies, the latter being the classical ‘colonials’, who were invariably metropolitan citizens.

Exposure to metropolitan cultural influence differed considerably between and within the former colonies. Not all colonial regimes valued the transfer of metropolitan culture and language to the same degree. Even within one colonial empire there could be remarkable contrasts that would leave strong postcolonial legacies. For example in the former Dutch Caribbean, Suriname did eventually adopt Dutch over the local Creole *Sranantongo* as the national language, whereas in Curaçao the Creole *Papiamentu* retained its dominance over Dutch until today, seriously disadvantaging Antillean immigrants in the Netherlands. Throughout all colonial empires, exposure to and adoption of metropolitan culture and language were more prevalent in the higher echelons of society. In turn, the social hierarchy correlated almost by definition with levels of economic development and urbanization, and also with ‘race’, ethnicity and colour.

Exposure to metropolitan culture was thus unevenly distributed, but overall we may conclude that all postcolonial migrants had gone through a degree of pre-migration socialization which gave them a competitive edge over other, non-elite immigrants. This does not imply total cultural affinity. It should not be taken for granted that this exposure would result in enthusiastic adoption of all aspects of metropolitan culture. Nor, of

course, should one expect a positive appreciation of the colonial period and its legacies. The metropolitan sojourn has often ended up producing precisely the opposite. Postcolonial identity politics centred not only on issues such as full civil rights, but equally on recognition of the questionable morals of colonialism and its (presumed) contemporary legacies.

First of all, there are the traumas of colonialism, slavery, indenture and race discrimination that burden the relations between postcolonial migrants and receiving societies. Moreover, in most cases there was the experience of a 'chilly reception' by metropolitan societies. Neither cultural affinity, shared citizenship nor, in the next generation, birth in the metropolitan country guaranteed a warm welcome after decolonization. The marginal position of the *barkis* in France – the local soldiers who fought alongside the French in the Algerian War – is a case in point. In other cases the returnees were somehow made responsible for national humiliation and defeat, as Nicole Cohen argues in the case of the six million Japanese *bikiagesha* (salvaged) who were repatriated from Korea, Manchuria and other Japanese colonial possessions after 1945. The reception given to Portuguese *retornados* and repatriated Dutch was less hostile, but was nonetheless often experienced as cold by the repatriates. It did not help that in the postcolonial metropolis, the burden of discredited colonialism was happily transferred to its repatriated local accomplices, now depicted as opportunistic exploiters coming to rely on their fatherland.

The history of postcolonial migration also suggests some sort of nexus between the colonial experience and the post-war adoption of multicultural policies. Over time most governments in Europe and the Americas did acknowledge the importance of participation of citizens from different national and cultural backgrounds to engage with one another about, in the favourable expression of Craig Calhoun, 'the social arrangements which hold them together'.⁸ No doubt, the increasing receptivity towards diversity as part of a fundamental human rights discourse has been pivotal in creating space for the articulation of differences in Europe, as it has in the United States and Canada. But it seems that the adoption of models of multiculturalism by the Canadian and British governments – and perhaps also in the Netherlands and Australia – was also grounded in colonial experiences of managing diversity.⁹ Of course this openness to some sort of multiculturalism, however moderate, did not arise spontaneously, but rather in response to the identity politics of postcolonial migrants. Either way, the connections between colonialism, postcolonial migration and the rise of multiculturalism in these countries seems evident.

Postcolonial migrants have continued to engage in diasporic and transnational linkages, maintaining close contacts with and sending money to families or communities in their country of origin. At the same time,

there has been a constant exchange of non-material goods – cultural, religious and political ideas. The question is whether this sets postcolonial migrants apart from other migrants. The concept of diaspora in postcolonial migrations has become topical since Hugh Tinker's *The Banyan Tree*, and later on in the works of Steven Vertovec, Robin Cohen and others.¹⁰ Transnationalism is nothing new, even though transnational networks have become increasingly dense as a result of modern means of transport and communication. There is some debate as to whether the concept applies in an imperial context, in which case transnationalism may be seen as an early constitutive force in building postcolonial identities. Perhaps the concept of diaspora has been stretched to its limits or beyond, but certainly for postcolonial migrants the concept of dispersion and the paradox of temporal, physical and mental distance, and at the same time cultural affinity, does apply – as in concepts such as the Black Atlantic, or in affinities with 'Hindustan' or more down-to-earth in the Bollywood craze.

We may wonder in particular whether postcolonial migration has produced a specific kind of political transnationalism. Again, the evidence is inconclusive. There have been many instances of postcolonial immigrants in the metropolis struggling for political change in their country of origin, as with Algerians in France, Moluccans in the Netherlands and Latin American political exiles. The arguments deployed were invariably based upon the assertion that metropolitan government could not simply turn away from the legacies of empire. On the other hand, there is little indication that the governments of the countries of origin, former colonies, have been systematically involved in postcolonial migrants' associations. This seems to contrast with the practices of the Turkish and Moroccan governments, as well as with Arab governments and agencies supporting the cause of Islam in Europe. We may tentatively state that the political transnationalism of the former colonies is less pronounced than that of the sending nations of labour migrants.

The Core Countries of European Postcolonial Migration

Having delineated certain contours, we may now ask ourselves where specific European states fit in, and which other countries may provide additional comparative insight. We may begin with the Netherlands; perhaps the easiest case and one which indeed inspired us in the first place to think of postcolonial migrations as a category analytically separate from other migrant groups. There were basically three successive waves of substantial migrations to the metropolis. The first round, from 1945 through to the early 1960s, was directly connected to the process of the decolonization of

Indonesia and involved selected groups linked to the demise of the colonial regime. The second round, in the 1970s, involved the mass migration of a cross-section of the Surinamese population, preferring the metropolis over an independent republic. In the last and ongoing round that began in the 1980s, citizens of the still non-sovereign Dutch Caribbean islands have exercised their right of abode by settling in the metropolis, permanently or temporarily. These postcolonial migrations had little overlap with two other categories, namely labour migrants recruited mainly in the southern Mediterranean region, followed by family reunion, and political and economic refugees from Asia and Africa.

Portugal presents a similar case. Just like the Netherlands and with more justification, Portugal thought of itself as an emigration country up to the 1960s. In addition to the ten million Portuguese living in Portugal itself, there were another five million Portuguese living in diaspora, as Margarida Marques notes in her contribution. This changed after the rather sudden fall of its dictatorship and the subsequent transfer of sovereignty to Angola and Mozambique in the mid-1970s. Within a few years, Portugal had received 580,000 *retornados*, of whom 60 per cent had been born in Portugal.¹¹ At least 100,000 of them left for another destination, and in this respect there is also a strong similarity to those repatriated from Indonesia, of whom one-sixth left for the United States, Australia and other destinations. Even if those repatriated were relatively privileged, they still had problems in adapting to metropolitan society.

The cases of the other two countries experiencing mass migration from the former colonies are more complicated. France recruited foreign labour from the late nineteenth century until the 1970s, mainly from Italy and Poland. This policy was only reinforced by successive waves of (post)colonial labour migrations. Though in the pre-war years hundreds of thousands of labour migrants from French overseas territories were already working in France, the first mass migration dates from the early 1960s and involved one million *pièdes noirs* (including 130,000 Algerian Jews who had received French citizenship in 1870), French settlers departing from Algeria after its bloody war for independence, and about 140,000 *harkis* (colonial soldiers) and other 'indigenous' Algerians. In the same decade, the state started concerted programmes for labour recruitment in the non-sovereign French Caribbean departments, following earlier waves of labour migration from North Africa. Perhaps the immigration of substantial numbers of political refugees from former French Indochina also qualifies as 'postcolonial' in the sense we use it – albeit there was a time-lapse of some two decades between the departure of the French and the start of this migration. Much of the immigration into France over the

past three decades has still been from former French colonies, primarily in Africa.¹²

The British case has several similarities to the French one. The United Kingdom has a long tradition of immigration, only partially connected to its overseas empire. The links between the collapse of empire and migration are ambiguous. The post-war decolonization of British India in the late 1940s coincided with the beginnings of migration, but this only gained momentum long after. The same applies to other former British colonies in Asia and Africa. In contrast, migration from the British West Indies starting in the 1960s largely preceded the transfer of sovereignty. It is a moot point therefore how we should define 'postcolonial migrants' to the United Kingdom, and to what extent it remains useful to speak of postcolonial identity politics and metropolitan receptivity to claims linking the colonial history to migrants' concerns. But certainly in the work of British postcolonial scholars such as Stuart Hall and Paul Gilroy, who have been of crucial relevance to the development of postcolonial studies, 'postcolonial' is defined in very broad terms, going far beyond British imperial history and its aftermath.¹³ This difference between French and British postcolonial consciousness is not coincidental, but hinges on the fact that the United Kingdom has become part of a wider Western post-colonial world shaped by its own former settler colonies and dominions – the United States, Canada and Australia. These three countries play quite an important role in the debates on postcolonialism and multiculturalism. We will return to this point at the end of our introduction.

Other 'Postcolonial' States

There is a second group of former European colonial powers which *prima facie* have less to do with the issue of postcolonial migrants. The Spanish Empire had virtually collapsed by 1900, Germany ceded its short-lived African colonies at the end of the First World War, and Denmark sold its tiny Caribbean islands to America in 1917. Migration from these various former colonies was insignificant in all but the Spanish case, and bears no immediate relation to the process of decolonization. The picture becomes more complicated in the cases of the post-war decolonization of the African possessions of Italy and Belgium. Italy was forced to leave its short-lived East African colonies in 1941 and its possessions in the Balkans in 1943/44, while Belgium consented to the transfer of sovereignty to the Congo in 1960. Italy received about 600,000 immigrants from North Africa, but these came both from its own and the French colonial territories.

Belgium received some 120,000 immigrants from the Congo after 1960, the great majority of these being Belgian repatriates.

Germany and Denmark did not experience any significant immigration from their former overseas colonies, and while postcolonial migrations from Africa to Spain, Belgium, and Italy were of some consequence, they have not attracted much scholarly attention. It is debatable whether, in these five countries, colonial reminiscences play a role in attitudes towards migration at large.¹⁴

This second group of European countries presents the possibility of an alternative take on the way metropolitan states deal with their colonial past. The question becomes how and when these states, in the virtual absence of postcolonial immigrations (Denmark, Germany) or with much smaller numbers (Spain, Belgium, Italy) and hence less exposed to postcolonial identity politics, have reflected upon their colonial history, if at all. Answering this question, we suppose, may also help us to better understand the British, French, Dutch and Portuguese ‘memory wars’ – including the counterfactual question: how would colonialism resonate had there not been massive postcolonial migrations? An obvious case in point is the way Atlantic slavery is actively commemorated in the three European countries with a sizable Caribbean population, namely France, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, but is all but ignored in Portugal, Spain and Denmark.¹⁵

In a discussion of migrations linked to the decolonization histories of European powers, Russia seems an odd case, both because the country is not always thought of as truly European and because of the conventional but never tested idea about European colonialism implying expansionism crossing salt water. Yet the Russian case certainly provides intriguing insights. Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union – a decolonization of sorts – about twenty-five million ethnic Russians found themselves politically and culturally displaced. At least three million ethnic Russians living in one or other of the former Soviet Republics either chose to return to Russia, or were forced to do so. The rights of these ‘expatriate’ Russians are still part of Russian power geopolitics.¹⁶

However, there is an additional field for comparison, which is spelled out by Blakely in his pioneering contribution. This may not yet cover as much ground as most of the other chapters, but provides us with some remarkable new comparative insights. Just like countries such as Portugal and France, which have their *retornados* or *piets noirs* on the one hand and the (North) African (labour) immigrants on the other, there is a clear demarcation line in Russian postcolonial migration between Slavic and non-Slavic migrants. The Slavic postcolonial migrants to the Russian Federation came overwhelmingly from the (poorer) Asian and Central

Asian parts of the former Soviet Union. Many of them had belonged to the elites of the non-Russian republics. In contrast, the millions of non-Slavic migrants had provided labour in the realm of the former Soviet Union for half a century, but were subsequently no longer able to obtain work permits. Currently 3.5 million Azeris, Armenians and Georgians are living in the Russian Federation, mainly around Moscow. A substantial proportion, possibly a good majority, does not have a regular status. Their marginalized position in the former metropolis reminds us of the status of sub-Saharan Africans in Portugal and France – though it seems that Russian hostility towards these living remnants of empire is exceptional by any standards.

Similar examples of implosion of empire followed by migration ('repatriation') from the lost territories to the nuclear state are provided by the Ottoman and German empires. The implosion of the Ottoman Empire stretched over 150 years from the lost sea battle of Çesme in 1770 to the peace treaties of Sèvres in 1920 and Lausanne in 1923. Step by step it lost Southern Russia with the Crimea (1783), Egypt (1811), Serbia (1815), Greece (1829), Algeria (1830), Romania, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Cyprus (all 1878), Tunisia (1881), Crete (1900), Libya (1912), Albania (1913) and the rest of the Arabian provinces at the end of the First World War. Acts of ethnic cleansing were endemic throughout this process. As a consequence, refugees and those loyal to, or dependent on, the empire took refuge in the shrinking motherland which increasingly lost its multi-ethnic and multi-religious character.¹⁷ Atatürk reworked the demographic history of the implosion into the ideal of a purely Turkish nation. In total, many millions of Turks (or, more precisely, Muslim immigrants, including some from the Caucasus) were involved in this 'repatriation' – sometimes more than once in a lifetime – the last stage of which may have been the immigration of seven hundred thousand Turks from Bulgaria between 1940 and 1990. Most of these immigrants settled in urban north-western Anatolia. Today between a third and a quarter of the Republic's population are descendants of these Muslim immigrants, known as *Muhacir* or *Göçmen*.¹⁸

The German Empire was not dismembered piecemeal but shrunk with two enormous blows: after the First World War it had to cede – apart from its overseas colonies – major border regions with Poland, Denmark and France; and after the Second World War, apart from its conquests since 1939, more border regions with Poland. Both events triggered massive streams of refugees to Germany. Other immigrants of German stock joined in. Their grandparents and other forefathers had settled in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe in the preceding centuries, as a rule

at the invitation of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires, not in the least to populate territories newly conquered from the Turks. After the First World War about one million refugees were registered, 850,000 from the territories ceded to Poland, 150,000 from Alsace-Lorraine, and a mere 16,000 from the tropical colonies.¹⁹ After the Second World War the numbers were even more impressive. In 1950 the Federal Republic of Germany in the West counted 7.9 million refugees and the German Democratic Republic 1.4 million. But this was not all: whereas in 1950, 16.5 per cent of the West German population consisted of refugees, five years later this proportion was 17.5 percent.²⁰ These groups were strongly organized and constituted an important part of the electorate. Because of a clause in the German Constitution closely related to the emerging Cold War, any person who could claim German descent was entitled to enter the Federal Republic.²¹ This resulted in the immigration of 1.36 million *Aussiedler* between 1950 and 1987 and another 3 million between 1988 and 2004, of which the vast majority were from the Soviet Union. The total number of 'German' immigrants after the Second World War amounted to some 14 million.²²

For comparative purposes, it is useful once more to look beyond Europe. With regard to openness to multiculturalism, the United States and Japan are on two extremes of the scale. The American academia has played a dominant role in debates on multiculturalism and postcolonialism worldwide. The relative American openness may partly be explained by the fact that, in contrast to European countries, the United States has thought of itself as the quintessential immigrants' nation, as well as by its growing unease with its own record of dealing with the now small Native American population, and the considerable African-American population. The United States moreover has attracted massive immigration from Latin America, a continent with a long experience of informal American imperialism.

The aftermath of Japan's colonization of parts of continental East Asia, and particularly the post-war repatriation of millions of Japanese, presents an altogether different story. There has been little debate on colonialism within Japan, and it has completely discarded the multicultural rhetoric that was part of its pan-Asian expansionist history. The postcolonial migrants or *bikiagesha* may well present their multicultural past as a positive extra dimension against a homogeneous Japanese culture – the parallels with the ways in which the *pièds noirs* in France and the *Indische Nederlanders* in the Netherlands present their colonial pasts as multicultural are clear. But as Nicole Cohen remarks, there is precious little mainstream appreciation in Japan of postcolonial identity politics, and the postcolonial immigrant population seems to have virtually no political power.

Multiculturalism and Identity Politics

From the above we can only conclude that there is not an unambiguous historical connection between postcolonial migration, degrees of multiculturalism, and hence openness to identity politics. The different histories of the receiving states, as well as the heterogeneity of the various groups of postcolonial migrants, do not enable us to identify such a connection easily.

With this caveat in mind, we may now turn to the question of whether preceding colonial histories determined or at least strongly influenced the formulation of integration policies by postcolonial states. How did these prior experiences impinge upon their receptivity or their rejection of 'identity politics' and the development of multiculturalism? In general, we suggest that postcolonial states with pre-colonial native minorities plus long histories of European immigration – for example the United States and Canada, but also Australia and possibly New Zealand – are among the most committed to multiculturalism. On the other end of the continuum, there are a number of states with a long and often violent history of linguistic, cultural, religious and ethnic diversity – Russia and Turkey, but also Austria, heir of a former double monarchy – where the concept of multiculturalism (consequently) has made hardly any impact at all.

In Europe, the United Kingdom pioneered multicultural policies, in a context in which vociferous community leaders and intellectuals of post-colonial backgrounds had acquired substantial political influence. A decade or so later, the Netherlands came to adopt a more moderate model of multiculturalism, again stimulated by postcolonial demands. France hesitated between the anti-communitarian republican traditions and the immigrant demands, which in the French case almost equated to the demands of postcolonial migrants. Over the past two decades, more room has been allowed for *diversité*, but even so, support for multiculturalism has remained relatively low – the more so as republican ideals are associated with *laïcité* whereas multiculturalism is often associated with extreme communitarian demands, particularly those made by radical Islamists.

Meanwhile, over recent decades, Belgium, Germany and Portugal have all taken some steps in the direction of multiculturalism – some steps forward, some backwards, as has been the case all over Western Europe, but with the years post-2000 clearly featuring a return to more nationalist approaches to identity issues. Portugal is a remarkable case, a nation that like its giant heir Brazil has acknowledged its mixed diasporic character. At the same time, the ideology of Lusophony has less to offer to its subaltern postcolonial immigrants from Africa and equally has trouble in accepting

that along the way the Portuguese language and culture have been thoroughly creolized, with Brazil rather than Portugal now leading the way. Multiculturalism therefore has become a politically contested, progressive alternative to the imperial ideology of Lusophony.

It is necessary to disentangle an evident nexus linking a colonial past and the degree of postcolonial immigration to multiculturalism and hence receptivity to the claims of minorities, in this case postcolonial identity politics. It may help if we broaden our definition from ‘postcolonial’ to ‘post-imperial’, which makes it easier to incorporate the post-war experiences of Germany and Russia. There seems to be a remarkable inverse relation between the importance of post-empire immigration and the political choice in favour of or against multiculturalism, as Table I.2 below illustrates. In fact, the higher the demographic impact of post-empire migration, the lower the adherence to multiculturalism. Demography is of course not the only factor impinging upon the ideology and practice of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism works strongly in the U.K. and its former settled colonies, and has captured more progressive political forces in continental Europe in particular. In South European countries it is clearly a countervailing force against the dominant concepts of national identity.

Table I.2. Comparing the ranking of countries in terms of post-imperial migration with susceptibility to multiculturalism

<i>Multiculturalism</i> >	<i>Low</i>	<i>Moderate-Low</i>	<i>Moderate-High</i>	<i>High</i>
<i>Post-imperial Immigration</i> √				
High [4.9 +]	Germany Turkey	Japan	Portugal	
Medium [3.6–4.2]	Russia	France	Netherlands	U.K.
Low [0.4–1.8]	Italy	Belgium Spain	Denmark	U.S.A. Australia Canada

*Percentages from Table I.1

Further, if we compare with recent total immigration, we do not find a positive correlation. France and the U.K. are equally important as immigration countries, but have very different positions regarding multiculturalism. Both Germany and the typical English-speaking former settler colonies (United States, Canada and Australia) are countries with high levels of overall immigration, but clearly Germany is not very susceptible to multiculturalism in contrast to white settler colonies (See Table I.3). One striking commonality, however, in the group of European countries housing substantial numbers of both postcolonial and other migrants (France, Germany and the Netherlands) seems to be their hesitance to

adopt, if not downright reject, multiculturalism. Perhaps this reflects the fact that the early generation of postcolonial migrants (*pieds noirs*, *Volksdeutsche* and *Indische Netherlanders*) all chose a path of assimilation and indeed ended up being smoothly integrated, thus setting a normative model which other migrants were not able or perhaps willing to emulate.

Table I.3. Comparing the ranking of countries in terms of non-postcolonial ('other') immigration in general with their susceptibility to multiculturalism

<i>Multiculturalism > Other Immigration</i> √	<i>Low</i>	<i>Moderate–Low</i>	<i>Moderate–High</i>	<i>High</i>
High	Germany	Belgium France	Netherlands	U.S.A. Canada Australia
Middle	Italy	Spain	Denmark	U.K.
Low	Turkey Russia Japan	Portugal		

From this perspective it seems only natural that high post-imperial immigration in Japan did not produce any inclination towards inclusionary politics and national self-criticism, simply because of the absence of any other types of immigration. In contrast to that, it is striking that three of the four European countries in the moderate to high postcolonial immigration category – France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom – have recently acknowledged the significance of colonialism in their national histories, increasingly allowing for a fair degree of self-criticism. The reason why Portugal has lagged behind in this respect may be that its share of postcolonial migration consisted mainly of repatriates, usually a more conservative community – as were the *pieds noirs* and *Indische Netherlanders*. Germany, finally, was mainly welcoming lost compatriots whose reintegration could well be accomplished without broadening definitions of the German nation. And here, we find striking similarities with the imploding former Ottoman and Russian empires.

As we proceed into the twenty-first century, we may well wonder about the continuing relevance of categorizations exploring the links between types of migrants and openness to multiculturalism. Throughout continental Europe, but also in the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada, we observe a tendency towards narrowing definitions of the nation and hence away from a high level of multiculturalism. At the same time, there is broad agreement that immigrant communities have come to stay and that their integration is a top priority. There are heated debates, sometimes attacks on 'foreigners' and particularly Muslims, but there is no silencing of dissident voices, and a broad acceptance of postcolonial voices. In

this respect too, the undigested history of colonialism and post-imperial migration to Japan and Russia produces an altogether different, more uncomfortable postcolonial condition.

Notes

1. Smith (ed.), *Europe's Invisible Migrants*, 32.
2. Pilkington, *Migration, Displacement and Identity in Post-Soviet Russia*, 4.
3. e.g. Penninx, Berger & Kraal, *The Dynamics of International Migration and Settlement in Europe*. See also Bade, Emmer, Lucassen & Oltmer, *Enzyklopädie Migration in Europa*. (soon to appear as *International Migration Encyclopedia*) and the website www.imiscoe.org.
4. See also Perevedentsev, 'Migratsiia naseleniia', 69–79.
5. INE statistics provided by Joaquín Arango at the IISH seminar, 8–9 November 2008. Until recently, Spanish American immigrants could obtain Spanish nationality after only two instead of the regular ten years of legal residency; dual nationality was allowed as well.
6. Chilling analogy: almost two decades later, the responsible police chief, Maurice Papon, was convicted for crimes against humanity for his role in deporting Jewish children during the Vichy regime.
7. See for these debates Lucassen, Feldman & Oltmer, *Paths of Integration*. The very use of concepts such as 'integration', 'assimilation' and 'acculturation' is contested; cf. Hargreaves, *Multi-Ethnic France*, 37.
8. Calhoun, *Social Theory and the Politics of Identity*, 327.
9. e.g. Day, *Multiculturalism and History of Canadian Diversity*.
10. Tinker, *The Banyan Tree*; Vertovec (ed.), *Aspects of the South Asian Diaspora*; Cohen, *Global Diasporas*.
11. See Lubkemann, 'Race, Class and Kin in the Negotiation of "Internal Strangerhood" among Portuguese Reatornados, 1975–1900', 9 and Rocha-Trindade, 'The Repatriation of Portuguese from Africa', 337.
12. Cohen, this book. Recent overviews include Hargreaves, *Multi-Ethnic France*; Silverstein, *Algeria in France*; and Beriss, *Black Skins, French Voices*. See also *Qui a peur du postcolonial? Défis et controverses*; and Blanchard, Bancel, Lemaire (eds), *La fracture coloniale*.
13. Shinder Thandi, this book. See also Hall, 'Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms'; Hall, 'Cultural Identity and Diaspora'; Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic*; Gilroy, *After Empire*.
14. See, for Italy, Andall, 'Immigration and the Legacy of Colonialism'; for Belgium, Ceuppens, *Congo Made in Flanders?*; for Germany, Lutz and Gawarecki (eds), *Kolonialgeschichte und Erinnerungskultur*; for Denmark, Olwig, 'Narrating Deglobalization'.
15. Oostindie, 'Public Memories of the Atlantic Slave Trade and Slavery in Contemporary Europe'.
16. Zayonchkovskaya, 'Recent Migration Trends in Russia', 117–23, 128–30.
17. Zürcher, *Turkey. A Modern History*; Hütteroth, 'Bevölkerungsexplosion und innerstaatliche Wanderungen'; Kitromilidis, 'The Greek-Turkish Population Exchange'; McCarthy, 'Muslim Population Movements and Mortality'.
18. Hütteroth, 'Bevölkerungsexplosion', 276–79.
19. Oltmer, 'Deutsche Zuwanderer aus den nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg abgetretenen Gebieten', 525–29.
20. Bauernkämper, 'Deutsche Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene aus Ost-, Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa in Deutschland und Österreich seit dem Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs'.
21. Dietz, 'Aussiedler/Spätaussiedler in Deutschland seit 1950'.
22. Bauernkämper, 'Deutsche Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene'. Not included are millions of prisoners of war (POW), repatriated after ten or more years of captivity by the Russians.