INTRODUCTION

Divided and Connected
Perspectives on German History since the 1970s

Frank Bösch

Over the last decade, the field of contemporary German history has changed considerably. It has been enriched by a broader thematic and methodological scope, as well as transnational perspectives that have propelled scholarship in new directions. Yet despite these shifts, historians still tend to approach the history of East and West Germany separately. Rather than peering over the Wall, scholars have contextualized developments in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) primarily with an eye toward Western industrialized nations or to the global South. For many historians of West Germany, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was seen as a truly separate country whose history was the purview of research institutes in East Germany or Berlin. Even in the multifaceted theoretical debates surrounding a transnational, “shared,” or “entangled” history, the idea of a German-German history was conspicuously absent.¹ Perhaps because the focus of these endeavors was to trace the “trans-state” history of a later reunited nation, a national narrative seemed to be out of place. Similarly, general overviews of contemporary German history have continued to approach the FRG or the GDR separately, even when they extend beyond reunification.² German-German perspectives have mostly been reserved for the bilateral relations and encounters between the two German states, ranging from Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik to Biermann’s expatriation and Kohl’s plans for reunification.³

By consciously adopting a German-German perspective, this book suggests a different approach to the history of contemporary Germany. Departing from the already well-researched diplomatic level, it offers a comparative look at changing social structures in East and West Ger-

"A History Shared and Divided: East and West Germany since the 1970s" by Frank Bösch. http://berghahnbooks.com/title/BoeschHistory
many, such as work, the economy, welfare, education, lifestyle, and politics, as well as the environment, sports, and media. It not only takes into account the separate histories or differences between the states, but also openly seeks to detect similarities and interactions between East and West. Embracing the double-edged meaning of a *geteilte Geschichte*, this book explores the “shared history” of Germany as well as its “divided” past, purposefully leaving open the question as to whether we can speak of an “entangled history.”

At its core, this book analyzes how East and West Germany have changed since the 1970s. Up to now, the often rapid transformations that occurred in the last third of the twentieth century have been dealt with separately, either from the perspective of the specific problems associated with socialism or that of the structural shifts within Western industrialized societies brought about by globalization “after the boom.” With a comparative look on both sides of the Wall, this collection questions whether there was a prevalence of commonalities or whether system-based differences dominated the trajectories of each state. Quite often, the significant changes that took place during these decades extended well beyond German borders, as with the economic crises of the 1970s, the general political paradigm shift, environmental and energy problems, consumption, sports, or the new role of electronic media and computers. Moreover, in terms of the GDR in particular, this book takes a critical look at whether the downfall of socialism can be explained through the prism of the challenges associated with the West. Flipping this perspective around, it also questions to what extent the FRG was influenced by the system rivalry with the GDR.

Additionally, the scope of this book consciously stretches beyond 1990 into the post-reunification era. On the one hand, it examines the extent to which East Germany adapted to the West while noting which differences remained in place. On the other hand, it discusses the changes in the West brought about through reunification. It also explores the idea that East Germany functioned as a laboratory for future developments in Germany as a whole, which has been put forth as a theory within the context of the “neoliberal reforms” in Eastern Europe. Even in terms of the 1990s, a long-term perspective reveals that there was still very much a *geteilte Geschichte*, marked by the countless differences that persisted despite reunification and rapprochement between East and West.

In order to trace these parallel, interwoven, or separate developments, this book often adopts a comparative perspective, but it by no means intends to erase the differences between a market-oriented democracy and

"A History Shared and Divided: East and West Germany since the 1970s" by Frank Bösch. http://berghahnbooks.com/title/BoeschHistory
a socialist dictatorship with a planned economy. It cannot be forgotten that these different forms of state pervaded all aspects of life. After all, systems of rule and power do not simply disappear when looking at social changes; to the contrary, it becomes all the more clear just how deeply such mechanisms were embedded within society.

A famous press photo of Renate Stecher (GDR) and Heide Rosendahl (FRG) crossing the relay finish line at the Munich Olympic Games in 1972 illustrates this idea of a geteilte Geschichte in many ways. It represents the competition between the two systems as well as the social differences between East and West. Not only do the separate national emblems on the uniforms symbolize the race between the two countries, but also they allude to the different sport training systems and the doping accusations directed at the top GDR athletes. Likewise, the photograph also visualizes overarching international and German-German developments, such as the major role of sports on the international stage in the struggle for prestige and recognition, which was undoubtedly a strong motive behind the FRG’s concerted efforts to become the host country for the Olympic Games in 1972 and the World Soccer Championships in 1974. Sports in the GDR also functioned as a means of communication across the Wall, for example in the guise of (supervised) teams traveling abroad or media reporting on events. The victory of the FRG’s relay team in a neck-and-neck race with the GDR similarly underscores West Germany’s intensive support of sports during this time as it sought to keep up with the world’s leading athletic nations. Doping had also become widespread in the FRG after 1970, which made the Olympic Games in Munich a turning point for both German teams. Additionally, as Stecher and Rosendahl crossed the finish line, they were both wearing shoes manufactured by Adidas, a West German company that dominated the global market in the 1970s; their similar hairstyles also reflected lifestyle trends that crossed the border between East and West. Behind the scenes at the time, their careers were also quite telling as both women attended sports colleges and pursued careers in sports after graduation. Indirectly, moreover, this snapshot finish underscores the great amount of public accolade enjoyed by high-performing female athletes on both sides of the Wall. When the photo later reappeared within the context of reunification, however, it spoke to the problems associated with bringing two national sports systems together, such as in the debates over the dismantling of East German training centers, doping, and broken careers. Ultimately, the East German Renate Stecher lost her job after reunification while the West German Heide Rosendahl enjoyed a successful career in sports education until her retirement.

"A History Shared and Divided: East and West Germany since the 1970s" by Frank Bösch. http://berghahnbooks.com/title/BoeschHistory
Scholarship on Contemporary History and the Two German States

Shortly after reunification, a few scholars began calling for an integrated German-German history. Christoph Kleßmann in particular pleaded for an “asymmetrically intertwined parallel history” (asymmetrisch verflochten Parallelgeschichte) that explored the tensions between division and entanglement, taking into account that the FRG was a stronger point of reference for the GDR than the GDR was for the FRG. As Kleßmann put it, “The Federal Republic could have easily existed without the GDR.”\(^{12}\) He also suggested that it was worth considering whether the development of the Federal Republic was also shaped by the existence of the GDR, especially given the major influence of anti-communism on many aspects of society.\(^{13}\) Even West German consumption, sports, or gender roles took on a different political significance in a divided Germany. Kleßmann also proposed six phases and points of reference for such a discussion, including “the beginning of the block building,” “the internal dynamics of both states,” and “the cross-system problems faced by advanced industrial societies” since the 1970s.\(^{14}\) Similarly, Konrad Jarausch has advocated a “plural sequential perspective.”\(^{15}\) Both Jarausch and Kleßmann cite the 1970s as a turning point. Others, including Thomas Lindenberger, have proposed that border regions should be approached as spaces created by political rule that foster a particular way of dealing with “others,” bearing in mind that the process of demarcating boundaries also generates links.\(^{16}\)

These approaches ensured much debate among German historians for a long time. In recent years, however, proponents of different schools of thought and methodologies have come to embrace the possibilities and the necessity of a cross-border perspective.\(^{17}\) For the most part, these arguments differ from one another primarily in terms of how far they believe a comparative, or even an entangled, perspective can go without erasing the differences between the systems. Despite his general approval for this type of scholarship, Horst Möller has also cautioned that “a careful selection of those topics that can actually be compared for particular phases and that were at least relatively independent of the system is necessary.”\(^{18}\)

German-German perspectives have also become increasingly viable in recent years due to the changing regional, diachronic, and thematic trends within scholarship. Whereas Kleßmann and Jarausch were mostly interested in specifically German developments in the decades after World War II, it has now become more common to situate Germany within a European perspective—and less as the legacy of National So-

"A History Shared and Divided: East and West Germany since the 1970s" by Frank Bösch. http://berghahnbooks.com/title/BoeschHistory
cialism than as the dawn of a unified Germany and Europe. In particular, the 1970s and 1980s now tend to be painted as the backdrop for present-day problems rather than a postwar history. Instead of working from the rationale behind institutions emerging in the postwar period, these narratives look to their deterioration and renewal by following the trail from their formation to their later reproduction. They are paving the way for a more nuanced joint German perspective that can shed more light on the historical context of cross-border, or specific West and East German, problems. After all, for at least half of the last fifty years of history, Germany has been a reunified nation. At the same time, there has been a move to sketch out continuities between the Kaiserreich (imperial era) and the 1970s for a variety of topics, bundled under the umbrella of modernity. In order to avoid constructing purely teleological narratives of the paths to liberalization or the postmodernity of the 1970s, however, it is also essential to look across the Wall to the GDR.

The last decade has seen an influx of new topics in historical scholarship that foster and even necessitate cross-border perspectives, such as energy and environmental history, the history of everyday life, the history of consumption, sports history, the history of medicine, or media history. Not least, moreover, global history has changed the way we look at Europe and Germany. From a German angle, the Federal Republic and the GDR may often have seemed to be two completely different worlds. But, from a European or even a global perspective, the ties between the two Germanys become all the more apparent. Correspondingly, some cultural history studies have recently been published in the United States that portray both East and West Germany as postfascist societies.

In sum, although a joint German perspective has been relatively seldom employed, this book nonetheless draws upon an array of existing scholarship, not all of which can be explicitly mentioned here. One of the most important works on German-Germany history up to 1970 remains Christoph Kleßmann’s two-volume study that came out prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall. Since its publication, only a few general overviews have approached East and West Germany together. When such studies do include both states, the sections on the GDR more often than not tend to serve as a foil for the story of the FRG’s success. Furthermore, the joint chapters on both Germanys mostly concentrate on the political relationships within the framework of Ostpolitik and reunification. Using such a comparative perspective, Mary Fulbrook, for example, describes both states as competing experiments and urges that the achievements of the GDR in social politics, women’s rights, and family policies should be recognized. A brief overview of German-German cultural history from the pen of Carsten Kretschmann also highlights Western transfers and
niches within the GDR. He also highlights the shared cultural heritage of both countries that dated back to the eighteenth century and was successfully unified at an institutional level in 1990.²⁶

Likewise, there are a number of histories of the GDR that range in scope from short introductions or accounts of everyday life to comprehensive handbooks on the SED (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands / Socialist Unity Party of Germany).²⁷ In particular, they deal extensively with German-German relations during the 1970s and 1980s, and their chapters on consumption, media, or opposition to the regime refer to influences coming from the West. However, scholars of the GDR still disagree over the consequences of the rapprochement process between East and West Germany in the 1970s/80s. Some historians argue that the improved relations between the two countries stabilized and prolonged the SED regime, whose economy would have collapsed without support from the West, thereby paving the way for protests at an earlier stage. A more recent work has surmised that the Federal Republic continued to recognize the GDR, without paying attention to whether the East actually made the concessions that had been demanded of it.²⁸ Others have assessed the rapprochement between the two Germanys as a necessary precondition for reunification because it made the Wall more permeable. In particular, travel across the border and television from the West raised the expectations of GDR residents. Yet, these arguments are not mutually exclusive: entanglements such as those resulting from the so-called billion-mark loans from the FRG in 1983 simultaneously prolonged and weakened the rule of the SED.²⁹

A more integrated German-German perspective has been put forth in essayist style by Peter Bender, who once worked in East Berlin as a WDR (Westdeutscher Rundfunk / West German Broadcasting) correspondent. He focuses primarily on the major political developments—that is, division, rapprochement, and reunification.³⁰ With an eye toward social history, Konrad Jarausch has interpreted German-German history as a process of recivilization and renormalization following the downfall of National Socialism, which was pushed forward in the West after 1945 and 1968, but not until 1989 in the East via civil rights advocates and their protests.³¹ Additionally, a number of edited volumes on specific events or topics have been published that speak to interwoven phenomena beyond the realm of politics. Above all, the collection of case studies edited by Christoph Kleßmann under the banner of a “double postwar history of Germany” has opened the doors for a comparative approach.³² A volume published by the Institut für Zeitgeschichte (Institute for Contemporary History) has also made reference to a “doubled Germany” and explored moments of German-German interaction as a springboard for examining

"A History Shared and Divided: East and West Germany since the 1970s" by Frank Bösch.
http://berghahnbooks.com/title/BoeschHistory
the continuance of a culture of competition as well as new overarching problems within a longer time frame. With a nod to Andreas Wirsching, this book suggests that “the opposition between the systems of democracy and dictatorship should not be overemphasized.” Contributions in more recent essay collections also deal with topics such as collective memory in both Germanys or microhistories of media and systems of infrastructure that crossed the border, such as transit routes. Specialized studies have also analyzed economic relations and sports in the two states.

Numerous social science publications have discussed the process of transformation that began in 1990. For the most part, these studies concentrate on the new federal states—that is, the old GDR—and the transfer of elites and institutions from West to East. Additionally, they make use of statistics and polls to assess the persistence of a difference between East and West Germany that was still quite discernible even two decades after unification, especially in terms of wealth and political culture as well as structures of civil society and variances in the use of media. In many of these books, East Germany is depicted as the “other” in the form of a “transitional society.”

As of late, calls to move beyond approaching the transformations in East Germany as a process of “delayed modernization” and adaptation to the West, for example, have grown louder. Scholars have pointed out that West Germany also changed during these decades, especially within the framework of unification and globalization. Heinrich Best and Everhard Holtmann, for instance, have pointed out a “doubled transformation in which problems related to unification and the challenges of the global economic and finance crises overlapped.” Likewise, the political scientist Timm Beichelt has urged that supposedly specific Central European problems should be approached from a pan-European perspective with respect to global challenges, suggesting that the term transformation be applied to all of Europe.

On the other hand, it can be argued that some modern-day changes appeared earlier in the former East German states than in the old FRG, especially in areas such as childcare, family structure, secondary schooling, or shifts in mentalities and values. In some fields, reforms were initiated in eastern Germany in the 1990s that were just surfacing in the West, which meant that the East seemed to function as a laboratory for neoliberal experimentation, above all in terms of privatization and deregulation. Philipp Ther has argued, for instance, that calls for reforms coming out of East Germany also migrated rhetorically to the West in the second half of the 1990s, making the case for what he terms neoliberal “co-transformations.” The ambivalent nature of these changes is often

"A History Shared and Divided: East and West Germany since the 1970s" by Frank Bösch. http://berghahnbooks.com/title/BoeschHistory
coupled with the notion of freedom, as in the title of Padraic Kenney’s book on the transformation of Eastern Europe, *The Burdens of Freedom*. Andreas Wirsching has also alluded to the success as well as the downsides of liberalization by referring to “the price of freedom.” Yet the processes outlined here cannot be simply explained by looking at the constellations in East Germany after 1990; rather, they must be embedded within their proper historical context going back for decades on both sides of the Wall.

The increasing number of publications offering European and global overviews also deal with Eastern and Western Europe jointly, albeit in a more generalized way. They usually contrast the booming postwar decades in the West with the building of socialism into the 1970s, before comparing the period “after the boom” with the downfall of socialism in the two decades that followed. In doing so, they have demarcated similar phases on both sides of the Wall, but they continue to build their arguments around the respective state systems. Alongside these separate “rise and fall” narratives, some studies drawing on social science approaches have stepped toward a social history of Europe. Brief accounts such as Jeremy Black’s *Europe since the 1970s* have drawn a line between East and West for some topics, such as economics, but deal with other aspects of society—including the environment, health, and education—from an overarching standpoint. Given that these studies still work from a Western perspective, they have focused on overarching transformation processes that can be verified statistically, pointing—as Göran Therborn does—to a certain similarity in the erosion of a future-oriented sense of modernity at the beginning of the 1970s. Hartmut Kaelble, in contrast, has highlighted the increasing divergence of the two states in the 1980s, citing the deteriorating economy in the East compared to the expansion of the welfare state and education in the West. He also maintains that globalization drove Eastern and Western Europe further apart. Although some of their approaches and findings are questionable, these European overviews nonetheless offer a broader perspective that moves beyond German borders.

Studies on the cultural history of the Cold War, on the other hand, have analyzed direct links between Eastern and Western Europe. They have devoted a great deal of attention to the exchange of elites and elements of civil society, such as academics, dissidents, and youth groups. Likewise, media relations have been a major focus, especially in terms of the exchange of television programs and images. In doing so, the gaze of scholarship has shifted to countries such as Hungary, Finland, or France because they were particularly open to contacts from the other side of the Iron Curtain. These examples underscore the extent to which some coun-

"A History Shared and Divided: East and West Germany since the 1970s" by Frank Bösch. http://berghahnbooks.com/title/BoeschHistory
tries acted independently of the bloc during the Cold War. Undoubtedly, the interactions between East and West Germany must also be situated within the context of this broader rapprochement process.

**The Promises and Pitfalls of a German-German History**

The difficulty of grappling with two different political systems is not the only reason why existing scholarship has tended to separate the FRG and the GDR. Another important factor has been that Western historical narratives are generally linked tightly to the self-descriptions of contemporaries and corresponding observation techniques. Public opinion polls, the media, and social science studies have provided the foundation for analyzing Western societies, but such avenues were virtually nonexistent in East Germany. We do not have any kind of media-based narrative of crisis for the GDR, nor do we have a comparable comprehensive and influential set of opinion polls that indicate a “value shift” or a fundamental ideological shift. Correspondingly, sociological concepts such as “postmaterialism,” “postmodernity,” or “individualization” that emerged out of such observations have not been mapped onto the GDR. Thus, on many levels, a German-German perspective can foster a critical discussion of these concepts and ascriptions. Yet it also remains questionable whether it makes sense to use these kinds of concepts in the absence of corresponding self-descriptions and whether these notions are intimately linked to democracy, making them virtually incompatible with socialism and the GDR.

Additionally, the difference in access to archival material has contributed to a historiographic division between East and West Germany. Given that the majority of sources pertaining to the GDR are governmental records, many of which have been accessible for the period up to 1989 for a while now, the perceptions and practices of surveillance as well as the perspective of the SED have played a key role in narratives of East German history. Similar materials are not as prevalent for West Germany, especially since the files from the 1980s are just now becoming accessible. In the meantime, studies that work with alternative sources (ego-documents, oral history, etc.), and especially those that document everyday life, have demonstrated their potential for making comparisons between East and West easier while also allowing for overarching assessments that bridge across the Wall.

The rivalry between the two systems as well as détente and the acceptance of a “bipolar world” did in fact prompt a few comparative social science studies as early as the 1970s/80s. Along the lines of a convergence...
theory, contemporaries detected a stronger rapprochement between the two systems in the postindustrial age. Alternatively, adopting a magnet theory approach, they observed how East Germany adjusted to follow the lead of the economically stronger West, at least in the early postwar years. They point out that this competition led to a permanent surveillance of the “other” on both sides of the Wall that extended to many different aspects of society. Yet the primary task of future scholarship should not be to determine whether these contemporary studies, which tended to overestimate the GDR, were accurate; rather, the more interesting question is what kind of impact these studies had. Did they lead to the approval or rejection of reforms, or did they foster appropriation in a modified way using different terminology?

A German-German history must become more than just a narrative that places existing interpretations of the Federal Republic and the GDR next to each other. Rather, it needs to take a lead from transnational history and examine reactions to general problems, cross-border relationships, and reciprocal perceptions. These three levels of interaction were often, but not always, mutually dependent. The cognizance of the other Germany at times culminated in action, at times in ignorance. Cross-border challenges, such as the oil crises in the 1970s, may have led to different reactions, but they nonetheless demonstrated the interdependence of the two states.

Of course, there are a number of potential pitfalls inherent in such a German-German perspective. The greatest danger surely lies in the risk of portraying East Germany as the “five new federal states” even prior to 1989, thereby neglecting the dictatorial power of the SED or fundamental differences between East and West. Careful reflections must also be made when choosing specific topics in order to determine whether they come from a more Western standpoint (such as environmental protection or migration) or rather an Eastern one (social equality).

Moreover, it must be taken into account that the differences between the German states were understandably large in some areas. This applies in particular to political history in a narrow sense, which can hardly be approached jointly. To an extent, however, such a classic political history has been pushed to the sidelines by a history of politics that relies more heavily on social perceptions and actions. Likewise, the economic differences between a statist planned economy and a more dynamic market economy were no less significant. That said, however, the economic exchanges between East and West grew over time, and a concealed structural change began to peek through in the GDR. At the same, the limited ability of the social market economy to adapt flexibly to new problems also became clear as time went on. Furthermore, there were also quite
apparent differences in terms of migration, which was virtually nonexistant in the GDR. But, as the contributions to this volume underscore, there were structural commonalities even in these areas, making it worthwhile to adopt a cross-border perspective.

The chapters in this book confirm Christoph Kleßmann’s assertion that the respective perceptions of the other state were indeed asymmetrical; the GDR was more strongly oriented toward the FRG than the other way around. It must be added, however, that the people of the FRG and the GDR both looked westward: from West Germany to the United States, and from the GDR to West Germany. Impulses coming from the United States often came to the FRG first before wandering in translated form to the GDR. This doubled western gaze, however, also established a link between both states. Such twofold, mediated transfer processes can be found in a number of aspects of everyday life, ranging from the world of work to music culture and computer technology. Innovations from IBM, for example, migrated to Siemens before making their way to Robotron. Especially in terms of popular culture, there were also lines of direct exchange between the GDR and the United States, especially via Hollywood films from the 1970s onward.55

Some might question whether it is anachronistic to write a shared German history rather than a European or global history in this day and age because it risks generating a new national narrative. Others might suggest that the FRG and the GDR should be examined in relation to their neighboring states—as has been done elsewhere—especially given that France and Poland were both key players in German history. It also seems tempting to situate the GDR more strongly within the context of Western Europe. Such an approach might reveal that differences between the two Germanys did not necessarily always stem from the different political systems and the socialism of the GDR, but might also have emerged out of a specific West German culture in terms of issues such as women’s work or childcare, major nonuniversity research centers, or centralization.56 Many of these phenomena were not intrinsic to the GDR as they also appeared in France or Great Britain around the same time.

Despite the objections mentioned above and the trend toward focusing on a comprehensive history of Western Europe, there are four main points that speak in favor of a German-German perspective:

First, both Germanys had a common past that continued to shape society, economics, culture, and mentalities long after the Berlin Wall was built. As the division of the country lasted for only forty years, both states shared the common experience of National Socialism and World War II, as well as the Weimar Republic.57 The memories of the Great Depression were just as present in minds of the population in the 1970s as those of

"A History Shared and Divided: East and West Germany since the 1970s" by Frank Bösch. http://berghahnbooks.com/title/BoeschHistory
1968 in present-day society. Similarly, the continued existence of familial relationships across the Wall ensured for a divided but also at least sometimes shared family history. The official interpretations of the past were quite distinct in the East and the West, but a cross-border boom in history came at the end of the 1970s, bringing with it the restoration of old town centers, as well as the so-called “Prussian renaissance.”

Second, more so than other states, East and West Germany had a communicative connection. In particular, this was made possible through the cross-border (yet very asymmetrical) reception of radio and television in both Germanys, which Axel Schildt has pithily described as “two states, but one radio and TV nation.” Additionally, the significant increase in telephone calls and letters between East and West Germany in the 1970s and 1980s attests to growing communication networks between the two states that far exceeded those with the French or the Poles, thanks to the shared German language. Simultaneously, there was a rise in the interactions taking place within the realm of economics and church circles as well as the number of travelers to and from the GDR, such as journalists, athletes, and artists. According to the Federal Ministry for Intra-German Relations, five million GDR citizens visited West Germany in 1988; 1.2 million of them were under retirement age. In many ways, these experiences with the West more than likely fostered a renunciation of socialism as well as the wave of travel out of the GDR in 1989.

Third, as a result of the intense rivalry between East and West Germany and the mutual insistence on drawing lines of demarcation, the two states were more closely tied to one another than to other neighboring countries. On the one hand, they were permanently engaged in refuting practices and concepts coming from the other side of the Wall; on the other hand, this rivalry spurred on domestic improvements in each state, be it in terms of social policy or education, sports, or dealing with the Nazi past.

Last, given the shared history of Germany since reunification in 1990, it also makes sense to look at the decades beforehand from a shared perspective, not with a focus on 1989, but rather with an eye to the difficulties involved in growing together as one Germany. Such an approach allows for a better understanding of why there are still significant differences between East and West even today. Both Germanys are the divided past of our unified German present.

It must be kept in mind, however, that many things were different in East and West, even if they shared the same name. A political party or
trade union in the West was fundamentally different from a political party or trade union in the East. Likewise, the search for transfers and entanglements bears the risk of overinterpreting the relevance of individual contacts, interactions, or mutual observations—a danger that is inherent to transnational history in general. Moreover, the creation of a new teleological master narrative leading up to 1989 has to be avoided. Not only do historians need to explain the downfall of the GDR, but also they have to account for its long-lasting stability, which made even West German experts think that reunification was not on the horizon in early 1989. And, finally, it cannot be assumed too rashly that a sense of national unity or a shared German identity in both states justifies a joint perspective in and of itself. Even within the GDR, a feeling of “we” evolved that did not necessarily correspond to the “socialist nation.” Too little attention has been paid up to now on how the concept of the “nation” developed within the context of divided Germany and how stronger supranational identities were built before and after unification.

The 1970s as a Period of Transition: Approaches and Perspectives

The last third of the twentieth century is a particularly interesting period in contemporary history because it marks the formative phase of current challenges. The decades since the 1970s have brought societal progress as well as affluence to both East and West, but also new problems and crises of a quite fundamental nature. The ambivalence associated with these changes appeared in both German states, but it has mostly been discussed with respect to the Federal Republic. Although vocational training periods were extended and chances for upward mobility expanded in West Germany, the unemployment rate also climbed steadily. Income, personal wealth, and the welfare state grew, but so, too, did the gap between rich and poor. While the state began introducing new regulations in the 1970s, neoliberal concepts such as competition and self-reliance also gained a strong foothold. In addition, technological innovations such as computers, cable television, or nuclear power signalized the path to the future, but this technology also strengthened the fears of what was yet to come. Whereas politics and society feared the “limits of growth” and damage to the environment, mass consumption flourished during this time as discount supermarkets and shopping centers sprouted up around the country. The list of such ambivalent and long-lasting changes could go on and on. For instance, Germans became more cosmopolitan and international in their outlooks, and the number of migrants living permanently...
in Germany increased, but xenophobia also gained momentum over the long run. And, as one last example of this tension between advancement and crisis, emphatic demands for women’s equality clashed with the problematic challenges of making family and career compatible in the West.

Without a doubt, a German-German history of the 1970s and 1980s evinces its own particular tensions. On the one hand, the division of Germany became more entrenched during this period. The international recognition of the GDR and its acceptance (for all intents and purposes) in the Federal Republic heralded a new era of self-confident independence for both states. The barriers along the border became more insurmountable as the commitment to reunification and the unity of the nation dwindled rapidly. For West Germany, at least, opinion polls clearly indicate this shift: in 1970, seventy percent of West Germans still believed that the Federal Republic and the GDR were part of one nation. By 1984, however, over half of those polled no longer believed this was the case.65 On the other hand, the 1970s were the decade in which détente intensified the relationship between the two states at a political and economic level, as well as in the culture of everyday life. This exceeded the level of exchange of the 1950s, when there was still a great deal of traffic between East and West in Berlin before political, economic, and even cultural contacts dissipated as the border between the two Germanys was built up.66 Ostpolitik under Willy Brandt and rapprochement within the context of the Helsinki Accords effectively amplified the interactions and expectations flowing across both sides of the Wall. The mounting independence of each state and the entanglements of the 1970s and 1980s belong together like the flip sides of the same coin. German-German phenomena, such as the often cited expatriation of the East German singer-songwriter Wolf Biermann in 1976, exemplify this tension between interaction and distance. This blend of independent development and new entanglements not only helps to explain why many East Germans came to see West Germany as an unattainable standard, prompting them to turn away from the SED, but also accounts for the persistence of a separate consciousness after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

In general, the 1970s are often portrayed as a period of crisis in historical scholarship. As Eric Hobsbawm has put it, “The history of the twenty years after 1973 is that of a world which lost its bearings and slid into instability and crises.”67 Scholars point to the collapse of “old” industries, the significant deceleration of the postwar boom in economic growth, and the rise of inflation, debt, and unemployment as indicators of the postboom era, although these trends actually began to appear a bit earlier.68 Economically, the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in 1973 also signaled the end of the postwar consensus. For the most
part, these issues have been examined from a national perspective and tied to cross-border developments, but put down to accelerated globalization. At the same time, historians have outlined a cultural shift that took place in the 1970s that was characterized by trends such as increasing individualization, secularization, and postmaterial values. Above all, the dwindling faith in progress is cited as the major indicator that the era of modernity had come to an end. Göran Therborn has thus spoken of an “amazing concentration of social historical turns.” Based on the corresponding contemporary diagnoses of the problems, step-by-step reforms were introduced in the late 1970s in many Western countries. These included the neoliberal trends that emerged in Great Britain and the United States, and then spread to other parts of Western Europe, arriving in a less aggressive form in the Federal Republic.

Yet it has seldom been discussed whether these crises narratives and terms such as the “end of modernity” or “high modernity” also apply for socialist countries. Ulrich Herbert’s programmatic article on “high modernity,” for instance, largely ignores socialism as it focuses on “processes of change in the West.” Stefan Plaggenborg, in contrast, argues that modernity can be used in reference to Soviet-style communism because it featured characteristics such as mechanization, scientification, disciplinary institutions, or secularization, even though modernization as such had failed in this context. Moreover, it is still up for debate whether the term “modernity” aptly describes a phase of history extending into the 1970s. When approached analytically as a temporal category encompassing the experience of accelerated change, an openness to the future, and historicized self-portrayal, then “modernity” is by no means “over” in that it also aptly applies to the digital age. Analyzing the fundamental assumptions that underlie “modernity” therefore promises to revise our understanding of the past as well as the present.

Most studies of the 1970s cite the oil crisis of 1973 as a decisive turning point because it accelerated other changes and symbolized them in a nutshell. Economically, the crisis stood for a financial downturn; culturally, it represented the abandonment of faith in the future and the belief in limitless growth; and, politically, it marked the displacement or extension of the East-West conflict and tensions between the northern and southern hemispheres. Furthermore, the oil crisis came to represent accelerated globalization because it underscored the mutual interdependence of the global market. Upon closer inspection, however, the oil crisis also marked a step-by-step and limited process of transformation. Energy costs, for instance, had already been on the rise and continued to fluctuate in the decades that followed. Simultaneously, “growth” remained a clear goal in politics and economics as well as among the majority of consumers.
Alongside this literature on crises, studies by American and UK scholars in particular have focused on the manifold breakthroughs and new beginnings that emerged in the 1970s, such as a new consumer culture, the expansion of education and a “knowledge-based society,” computerization, or progress in equality for women and minorities.\textsuperscript{77} In terms of the history of everyday life, however, this strong analytical focus on “crises” runs into problems. For many, the 1970s were associated with many positive cultural experiences and memories in the East as well as the West, especially given that available income and wealth were on the rise. This was coupled with improved housing, significant growth in terms of travel and consumption, and new experiences of individual freedom, especially in the West.\textsuperscript{78} Correspondingly, future scholarship needs to take into account that the narratives of (public) crises often ran parallel to narratives of (private) satisfaction in the culture of everyday life.

For the most part, scholarship on the GDR in the 1970s and 1980s also emphasizes the growing economic problems, but it hardly connects them to the crisis discourse of the West. Likewise, most studies have stressed the state’s inability to reform despite the fact that it was aware of these problems. In particular, they cite Erich Honecker’s adherence to a course of “consumption socialism” that necessitated high subsidies for social welfare, housing, or food items.\textsuperscript{79} Although this plan was supposed to ensure the loyalty of the population, it forced the government to borrow additional money from the West. Not surprisingly, given the fact that the Federal Republic remained an important point of reference, much of the scholarship on the GDR deals with the political and economic relations with the West, including cross-border communication or contacts made through the church or opposition groups.\textsuperscript{80} Similarly, the Helsinki Accords have served as an ideal prism for cross-border perspectives because they opened the door for a discussion of human rights, and the so-called “third basket” fostered migration out of the GDR.\textsuperscript{81} Scholarship investigating the sociology of the GDR has also used comparative statistics on the social and economic situations in both Germanys to underscore the superiority of West German society on all accounts.\textsuperscript{82} Likewise, the impact of international transformations on the GDR has also been a popular topic for scholarly discussion. Recently, one study looked at the GDR’s problems with its coffee supply coming from outside the Eastern bloc within a German-German context. It traces interactions with capitalist countries ranging from the private packages sent from the West filled with West German “Jacobs Krönung” coffee to the coffee crisis in 1977, when public outrage forced the SED to stop its attempts to increase the proportion of malt-based coffee substitutes in the ground coffee sold in

"A History Shared and Divided: East and West Germany since the 1970s" by Frank Bösch. http://berghahnbooks.com/title/BoeschHistory
the GDR; the government had begun changing the coffee “recipe” in light of the rising coffee prices on the global market.\(^8\)

To what extent can the postboom era be approached as a *geteilte Geschichte* in which differences are tied to commonalities and interactions? First, the contributions in this book do not shy away from pointing out fundamental differences between East and West, as the authors are well aware that the SED sought to infiltrate all aspects of society ideologically. Yet, at the same time, they are keen to identify various relationships and contacts that linked the two Germanys together. For the most part, they show that changes that began to appear in the Federal Republic in the mid-1970s made their way to the GDR a few years later.

The international recession in the 1970s and the structural transformation processes affecting the economy in the West function as the main springboard for the analyses in this book. The consequences of these transformations often appeared more slowly and were less apparent in the planned economy, especially given that comparable economic data was not yet publicly available. But, as of the second half of the 1970s, the economic downturn was unmistakable in the socialist state. Thanks to the planned economy, it was not accompanied by visible phenomena such as high unemployment and inflation, but it did bring increasing debts, supply shortages, and slumping productivity.\(^8\) Consequently, the faith in a better future considered to be characteristic of “high modernity” also disappeared under socialism in the 1970s, despite all the propaganda efforts to the contrary. The condensed five-year plans designed to adapt to the fluctuating global market were also evidence of this shortened sense of time. Peter Hübner, for example, has thus spoken of a “shift from a growth-oriented paradigm of progress to a security-oriented paradigm of consolidation” that also affected the GDR.\(^8\) Although hardly any reforms were introduced in the East at the end of the 1970s, there was still a great awareness of the fact that the planned economy, even with the help of Western capital and technology, could not catch up.\(^8\)

Furthermore, the oil crises in 1973 and 1979 resulted in significant consequences for the GDR, although this aspect has largely been neglected in scholarship up to now. Even in the socialist state, energy import prices spiked—albeit a few years later—especially after the Soviet Union began selling more natural gas and oil to the West and reduced its supply to the GDR. This exacerbated the shortage of foreign currency in the GDR, fueled rising prices at the beginning of the 1980s, and forced the GDR to rely even more heavily on its outdated coal mining industry.\(^8\) In contrast to the Federal Republic, which had implemented energy saving measures in the 1980s, the GDR failed to reform. Simultaneously, the energy mar-

"A History Shared and Divided: East and West Germany since the 1970s" by Frank Bösch. 
http://berghahnbooks.com/title/BoeschHistory
ket actually stood for growing German-German entanglements as of the 1970s because the GDR increasingly supplied West Berlin, as well as the rest of the Federal Republic, with products processed in its refineries. Likewise, the financial entanglements between East and West continued to grow substantially as a result of the global economic crisis. Accordingly, the GDR debts owed to nonsocialist countries climbed from DM 2 billion in 1970 to DM 40 billion in 1989. The Federal Republic provided diverse loans in exchange for humanitarian concessions as well as more freedom to travel across the border, which in turn intensified these entanglements. Other transfer payments also increased sharply in the 1970s, ranging from transit fees and bailouts for prisoners to wire transfers between churches and considerable private Deutsche Mark transfers. These payments had more than far-reaching consequences. They not only fostered exchange at a personal level and altered the consumption potential in the GDR by enabling foreign currency transactions (such as at Exquisit, Delikat, and Intershop), but also this influx of money from the West helped to pay for the rebuilding and even construction of churches in the GDR beginning in the early 1980s.

As the contribution of Ralf Ahrens and André Steiner to this book illustrates, the long-term origins of the crises in East and West were certainly quite similar in that they stemmed from problems resulting from the ebbing of the sustainable economic boom of the postwar decades. Faced with staunch competition from East Asia, industrial sectors in both Germanys, such as the textile industry, collapsed as the energy sector grew. Naturally, there were also clear differences between East and West. East Germany, for example, still lacked something comparable to the booming West German automobile industry, despite its attempts at modernization. Moreover, the short-term factors fueling the crises of the 1970s also varied, and the reactions to these problems differed even more so. These factors therefore further deepened the divide between the countries. Whereas the GDR restrengthened its centralized control over the planned economy, the FRG turned away from its Keynesian-inspired demand-based policies to monetary-oriented measures designed to reduce inflation and business-friendly “supply-side” economic policies. At the same time, Honecker’s “consumer socialism” in particular necessitated economic interactions with the Federal Republic that ultimately made the GDR more dependent on the West and strengthened the longing for goods rather than appeasing such desires.

Especially in the world of work, the GDR came under intense pressure to reform, but at best it reacted only very slowly to international developments. Rüdiger Hachtmann’s chapter analyzes the increasing significance of rationalization, automation, and flexible forms of work that came

"A History Shared and Divided: East and West Germany since the 1970s" by Frank Bösch. 
http://berghahnbooks.com/title/BoeschHistory
to the Federal Republic through globalization and augmented Fordist production models. Simultaneously, it points out how the modernization of production did not occur in the GDR, especially since the autarchism of the socialist conglomerates put the brakes on these processes. As with the contribution by Ralf Ahrens and André Steiner, this chapter also underscores that it would be misleading to think in terms of polar opposites and to categorize the West as a burgeoning service-based society and the East as a stagnating industrial society. Until 1970, Hachtmann argues, employment in the three main sectors developed quite similarly, and the service sector in the East continued to grow more strongly than most scholars have assumed. At the same time, he notes, the Federal Republic was also still quite industrial. Work became more important in the factory-centered GDR as the East Germans clearly worked more per capita and per year on average than West Germans. There was, however, a tendency toward a decline in these numbers on both sides of the Wall.

In turn, leisure time, the family, and consumption increased in value. As the chapter by Christopher Neumaier and Andreas Ludwig illuminates, structural similarities appeared between East and West. A consumer society became firmly established, not only in West Germany, but also in the GDR; a certain diversification of lifestyles also took place on both sides of the wall, despite the often limited availability of consumer goods in the East. In the GDR, too, consumption went beyond necessity and was linked to status and self-realization. Additionally, the transition to self-service and supermarkets transformed consumption in both Germanys, while plastics, for example, came to symbolize modernity on both sides of the Wall. This chapter also exemplifies the related trend toward individualization by looking at the pluralization of different kinds of families in both countries. It must be noted, though, that divorce and domestic partnerships among unmarried couples sparked more controversy in the West than they did in the East.

Not only did Germans on both sides of the Wall use media in similar ways in their free time, but they also consumed similar content. As of the 1970s, it was generally tolerated to listen or watch Western radio or television channels (although it was never openly discussed). Viewing and listening to these broadcasts had become common practice for much of the GDR population and even among SED members. Yet, at the same time, the media also stands paradigmatically for the asymmetrical nature of the entanglements between East and West because West Germans received very little input from GDR media. As the chapter by Frank Bösch and Christoph Classen also stresses, media connections grew on other levels—for example, through the reports of West German correspondents based in East Berlin that made their way via Western media back to the

"A History Shared and Divided: East and West Germany since the 1970s" by Frank Bösch.
http://berghahnbooks.com/title/BoeschHistory
East or through the trade in Western programming or the adaptations of FRG programs on GDR channels that were designed to win back listeners and watchers. Based on these interactions, scholarship on television thus speaks of a “contrastive dialogue” in relation to the GDR.\textsuperscript{94} The organization of journalism and the political content of the media, however, remained fundamentally different, especially in the print sector. On the newspaper market, in contrast, there was a tendency toward convergence that was linked to consumption and lifestyle changes.

Simultaneously, the FRG media called for a change in politics in East and West. The emergence of a camp of critical political journalists who raised fundamental political questions in relation to specific grievances nurtured the protest movements of the 1960s and 1970s and the general public interest in politics. Around 1980, a peace movement, as well as an environmental protection movement, emerged in the East along with an alternative milieu. Although they were much smaller than in the West, Western media made sure that these trends became visible in the East and could feed on Western input.\textsuperscript{95} No less significant was the transformation in attitudes toward politics, as the contribution by Frank Bösch and Jens Gieseke illustrates. In East Germany, the general interest in politics also grew around 1970, especially over the course of Brandt’s Ostpolitik, but then it waned in disappointment for a time. Bösch and Gieseke’s chapter also explores the appearance of the much discussed “political disenchantment” in the West, as well as in the East, noting that an increased aversion to the SED could be detected in the GDR, even among party members.

Interestingly, environmental protection was taken up as an issue by both governments as early as 1970. This occurred within the context of an international trend in the West in which even the Republican Richard Nixon was involved. In both Germanys, however, the governments lost interest in the mid-1970s, increasingly turning to nuclear energy and coal power plants as they felt the effects of the oil crises. As the 1980s rolled around, the course of both states began to diverge on environmental issues. Whereas environmental protection was fostered in the FRG through numerous laws—primarily in response to pressure coming from civil society—the GDR turned into one of the largest pollution producers in Europe for its population and size, as Frank Uekötter’s chapter points out. In a sense, East Germany proved to be more capitalist than the West, as the FRG had put more environmental restrictions on its industries. The fact that the GDR provided a depot for hazardous waste from the West in exchange for foreign currency further underscores this point. Frank Uekötter also notes how these dealings in waste likewise represent the environmental entanglements between East and West. Polluted rivers

"A History Shared and Divided: East and West Germany since the 1970s" by Frank Bösch.
http://berghahnbooks.com/title/BoeschHistory
such as the Elba and the Werra did not stop at the border, nor did the soot from the smokestacks or the radioactivity unleashed by the Chernobyl disaster in 1986 (the latter of which the SED had tried to downplay to the dismay of many East Germans). At the very least, piecemeal solutions had to be found to deal with these situations, regardless of political borders and boundaries.96

A further challenge for both states in the 1970s proved to be the expansion of the welfare state. Both Germanys increased the scope of their welfare measures in an effort to bolster growth just as the economic crises took hold. Consequently, it has been argued that the sociopolitical developments in the two Germanys at this time were reactions to the structural economic changes that unfurled over the course of the third industrial revolution.97 Likewise, some scholars have also claimed that Cold War competition spurred on the expansion of the welfare state in East and West.98 Winfried Süß’s chapter, however, presents a more nuanced perspective, noting that the GDR played less of a role in West German welfare politics in the 1970s and 1980s than in reverse. The SED state in fact sought to legitimize itself by expanding its welfare policies with an eye to the West. In both states, the welfare state quickly turned from a solution into a problem of its own, and both Germanys shied away from substantial restructuring.99 The organization of welfare policies in the East and West differed, as did their emphases. However, pro-family policies played a larger role in both states, especially given the concerted efforts to increase sinking birth rates, that even met with short-term success in the GDR at the end of the 1970s. East and West also followed divergent paths when it came to social risks. Pensioners profited from the expansion of the welfare state in the West, for example, whereas they faced the threat of poverty in the highly work-oriented GDR. Simultaneously, unemployment generated a new kind of social inequality in the West, while GDR residents paid for job security by accepting less upward career mobility, a privilege that seemed to be reserved for SED officials. Another kind of social inequality also emerged in the GDR, and it was defined by personal access to Western products and currency.100

The world of work was also transformed in the 1970s by the introduction of computer technology. While the Federal Republic caught up with the United States at least incrementally, massive pressure was put on the microelectronics industry in the GDR to innovate. However, the East never managed to even get close to keeping up with the global market, despite investing billions in funding programs.101 As Jürgen Danyel and Annette Schuhmann show, computers transformed the world of work in both German states, especially in government offices, security departments, and large factories. The impact of this computerization, however,
was clearly more dynamic in the Federal Republic. Toward the end of the 1970s, they note, suspicions against computer-supported surveillance grew in the West; in the East where Stasi investigations relied on digital technology, however, fears about surveillance were not directed at computers per se. Their chapter revises the assumption that the population of the GDR had virtually no access to computers. They note that private computers primarily made their way to the East as personal gifts from the West, but many young people used computer technology in schools, factories, and youth clubs.

Sometimes the GDR was even the frontrunner, and it was the FRG’s turn to play catch-up. For example, the duration of schooling and qualification processes had already grown significantly in the 1960s in the GDR, improving women’s access to education in particular. The Federal Republic finally caught up in the 1970s, and then it actually went on to trump the GDR quantitatively. Not only the Sputnik crisis but also the forecasting strength of comparative (OECD) statistics and forecasts became quite influential in this respect, as explained by Emmanuel Droit and Wilfried Rudloff. After both Germanys initially overcame the problem of an academic shortage, they found themselves faced with a “glut of academics” at the end of the 1970s, to which they reacted differently. Whereas the GDR limited the number of students, the Federal Republic slightly tightened access to the universities by introducing the numerus clausus, decreasing student loan amounts, and providing alternative career advice. In both states, the expansion of the educational system was supposed to improve opportunities for upward social mobility. However, it is quite telling that the chances for workers’ children to move up the academic ladder ultimately remained limited in both systems.

Especially in terms of sports, the GDR clearly appeared to be in the lead. In the early 1970s, the large-scale efforts to promote competitive sports in the GDR began to bear fruit as the East overtook the FRG in the Olympic medal count. In response, the Federal Republic expanded its competitive sports programs, which Jutta Braun discusses in her contribution to this book. Simultaneously, the GDR neglected its mass sports programs, only slowly reacting to impulses from the West, but without sustainable results. In addition, the GDR adopted the use of Western advertising at the end of the 1980s, and officials in the East and West reached agreements in order to avoid any further boycotts of the Olympics.

All things considered, East and West seemed to have taken the most divergent paths when it came to migration and mobility. The Federal Republic not only made more of an effort to attract foreign workers, but also its many migrants were allowed to stay permanently despite deportation attempts. Nonetheless, Maren Möhring’s contribution points out over-
arching similarities and links between East and West within this context. It was not Italy or Turkey that had the highest emigration rate in Europe initially, she notes, but rather the early GDR. The construction of the Wall put a stop to this emigration, but both Germanys increasingly sought to bring in unskilled foreign workers, who then settled on the margins of society in the East as well as the West. The GDR was clearly more profit oriented when it came to migration, especially given that migrants to the East were only tolerated as long as they were economically useful and only granted limited rights; any transgressions (including pregnancy) resulted in deportation. Möhring also outlines similarities and connections in terms of mobility, noting that travel abroad was popular in both Germanys, although the East Germans were more limited in their travel destinations and usually only permitted to visit socialist states.

This shared history could naturally be explored in many other areas. Chapters on architecture, the churches, and high or popular culture could further embellish this complicated picture of East and West Germany from the 1970s onward, a history that vacillated between new entanglements and the demarcation of boundaries. A special chapter on gender has not been included because gender is a topic that touches on many aspects of society and played a major role in many of the transformations discussed in this book, including those affecting work, the family and lifestyles, education, and migration. After all, the high percentage of female employment in the GDR, which rose significantly in the 1970s—parallel to the expansion of childcare—is often cited today as one of the major differences and positive achievements of the GDR. Indeed, the contrast to the FRG in this context is unmistakable as the conservative sociopolitical model of the “male breadwinner” discriminated against women financially, socially, and legally. Abortion policies also differed markedly between East and West. At the same time, calls for reforms in gender politics were often put down in the Federal Republic with reference to the Eastern enemy, despite the fact that many neighboring countries to the West had already been offering full-time daycare for children. The slight rise in women’s employment in the Federal Republic in the 1980s mostly only applied to part-time work. Notwithstanding these differences, many chapters here also note the continued discrimination against women and the persistence of gender differences in West and East Germany. In both states, women only seldom climbed to the highest ranks of politics. Wage differences, the unequal distribution of housework, and clearly defined childcare roles also remained firmly entrenched in the GDR, despite other beneficial policies. Moreover, given that women in the GDR generally perceived themselves as having equal rights, a women’s emancipation movement never really emerged in the East; in the West,

"A History Shared and Divided: East and West Germany since the 1970s" by Frank Bösch. http://berghahnbooks.com/title/BoeschHistory
however, the women’s movement made sustainable inroads, especially in terms of issues such as sexism or male violence against women.\textsuperscript{107}

In sum, it can be duly said that there were similar developments that often occurred in relation to each other, despite the well-known structural differences between East and West Germany. Both states had to develop crisis management policies that were designed to overcome present difficulties rather than to shape the future. The achievement of security was one of the main concerns behind such measures, which explains why both states refrained from making fundamental reforms during times of crisis, opting instead to cling to structures that they could hardly afford to finance.\textsuperscript{108} As a result, not only the West, but also increasingly the GDR came under pressure to innovate. The term “innovation” steadily cropped up in the West in the 1970s. It became one of the main demands placed not only upon technology, but also the service and research sectors, as well as consumption, the media, and lifestyles—not to mention fashion, design, and music.\textsuperscript{109} The GDR sought to copy these innovations or develop its own with a great outlay of capital, but it always lagged behind or failed entirely.\textsuperscript{110} In doing so, the East German state was able to at least partially satisfy the desire for choice that was tied to growing desires to lead an individualized life. This transformation was propelled in both states by the media’s increased penetration of society. Especially the full coverage offered by television generated cross-border communication and entertainment offerings related to almost all aspects of life.

**Offset Transformations after 1990**

Expectations were running high as the GDR joined the Federal Republic. However, in East Germany at least, this annexation proved to be fraught with myriad disappointments. The rapid transformation processes that engulfed the new federal states have often been described. The old Federal Republic, in contrast, has often been portrayed merely as a stagehand, financial backer, and liquidator for the transformation of East Germany, hardly changing itself over the course of reunification. At most, the fall of the Berlin Wall and reunification was transmitted through the media as a caesura of historical experience, but one that had only very little effect on daily life in the West.\textsuperscript{111} Even after 1990, the relationship between East and West generally remained an asymmetrical one, especially since the East fixed its gaze more on the West than in reverse. Nonetheless, as different contributions to this book demonstrate, the West did not remain unaffected by the massive changes taking place in the East. For exam-
ple, developments appeared in the new federal states that seemed to be specifically East German from a Western perspective until they crept over to the West a few years later. The pointed catchphrase referring to "East Germany as the avant-garde" only seems to partially fit in this context.\textsuperscript{112} Rather, the notion of offset transformations seems to be more useful given the fact that many of these transformation processes emerged in the West back in the 1970s. Moreover, rather than moving closer together, the gap between East and West seemed to be growing larger again at the end of the 1990s. Consequently, we can still speak of a \textit{geteilte Geschichte} after 1990 that was both shared and divided, shaped by differences as well as interactions and new commonalities.

When considering the massive migration movement unleashed at the end of the Cold War, 1990 was very much a caesura for all of Germany. In just the first four years after the fall of the Wall, 1.4 million people (approximately 8 percent of the population) left the former territory of East Germany for the old Federal German states, especially those in southern and northern Germany as opposed to the western portions of the country. Likewise, there was a rapid influx of "ethnic Germans" from Eastern Europe, as well as asylum seekers, although Germans judged "asylum cheaters" to be the main problem in 1991. As Maren Möhring explains, the marginalization of foreigners actually contributed to the process of German-German integration. At the same time, however, it also increasingly marginalized East Germans on the whole as more xenophobic, despite the fact that refugee centers also went up in flames in the West. Even today, the differences between East and West in terms of migration are still quite striking. There are far fewer foreigners in the East, but the biases against them are stronger than in the West. This phenomenon cannot be attributed simply to the GDR past, especially since right-wing populist parties are gaining strength across all of Western Europe. That said, however, the GDR’s restrictive way of dealing with foreigners has had a lasting influence.\textsuperscript{113}

Apart from the new right-wing populism that has emerged, the end of the Cold War brought a decline in political interest and commitment in the West as well as in the East. As of the end of the 1990s, democracy was valued much more negatively in the East than in the West, even among the youth.\textsuperscript{114} But even this turn away from classic politics was part of an overarching international trend. In the West, however, the parties, unions, and associations could rely on an established support base despite their dwindling numbers. Meanwhile, these kinds of organizations could hardly even gain a foothold in the East, where protest movements and party preferences tended to be short-lived. As the chapter on the

"A History Shared and Divided: East and West Germany since the 1970s" by Frank Bösch. http://berghahnbooks.com/title/BoeschHistory
transformation of politics argues, this cannot be attributed solely to some kind of East German backwardness; rather, it was also part of a western European trend that also reached the Federal Republic a decade later.

The differences between East and West can certainly be explained to a great extent by the clearly weaker economic situation of the East, especially considering the high unemployment and the often traumatic career downgrades suffered by many after 1990. In contrast to other postsocialist countries, the restructuring process was quite successful in East Germany, admittedly thanks to the definite break with socialism as well as West German transfers. As Ralf Ahrens and André Steiner illustrate, however, numerous mistakes can also be detected in the deindustrialization of the East. The “Aufbau Ost” reconstruction program for the East, for example, generated a short-lived stimulus package for the West German economy until a longer phase of stagnation set in. After the collapse of socialism in the East, an unprecedented phase of privatization and dismissals took place that at least indirectly affected the West. Calls for privatization, cost reduction, and more flexibility had already been often voiced in the Federal Republic in the 1980s, but now they were finally being implemented, not only in conjunction with international trends, but also as part of privatization in the East. Additionally, the East experienced the rapid advancement of “McJob” types of work, as Rüdiger Hachtmann refers to the increase in the number of tenuous, flexible, and poorly paid new jobs in the service sector. This kind of work can be seen in the call centers or private nursing facilities popping up all over that have become more commonplace throughout Germany since the 1990s.

Concurrently, the state had to cough up the funds to pay for the social costs of this liberalization. Undoubtedly, the East was the forerunner in terms of work and especially women’s employment, which only began to rise significantly in the West just a few years prior to reunification.

In order to avoid tax hikes, as Winfried Süß explains, reunification was paid for to a great extent out of social insurance funds. Consequently, reunification proved to be a challenge for unified Germany’s welfare state. The increasing marketization of social welfare benefits—and pension provisions in particular—was one consequence of this. Others included the move away from traditional social security schemes in the West, especially given that the Hartz reforms, for example, also threatened the middle class’s ability to uphold the status quo. At first, East and West aligned in terms of social status, although enormous differences could still be seen, particularly in wealth. In the 2000s, however, the differences began to increase again, as did the gap between rich and poor in the West. Correspondingly, East Germans were more insistent in their demands for social equity and a stronger welfare state, which partly ex-
explains the enduring success of the SED successor party, the PDS (Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus / Party of Democratic Socialism), at election time. These debates over social inequality also spilled over to the West, making it possible for the leftist party Die Linke, which had largely been formed out of the PDS, to firmly establish itself as a national party in Germany.

Even in the realm of sports, Jutta Braun identifies a “doubled transformation.” Numerous competitive sports centers were closed down in former East Germany after 1990 to make way for recreational sports facilities. Debates over East German sports, and especially doping, however, have increasingly begun to make reference to doping practices in West Germany. Likewise, the dip in unified Germany’s medal count sparked a conflict over sport promotion programs, which in turn prompted the adoption of approaches that had been used in the GDR. Simultaneously, however, there were also differences that persisted in the realm of sport. For example, although several competitive sports centers for Olympic disciplines survived in the East, recreational sports did not gain much of a foothold, even among the youth. This trend toward individualized sports also extended to all of Germany and not just the East. Nowadays, more Germans belong to a fitness center than to a soccer association.

The cultural and lifestyle differences between East and West can also be detected in terms of media use, as the chapter by Frank Bösch and Christoph Classen underscores. Although almost all East German media outlets were taken over by West German companies after reunification, it quickly became quite clear that there were lasting differences in terms of media use. Commercial television programming and local channels are more popular in the East than public broadcasters. The same applies to the national daily newspapers and other news magazines, such as the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung or Der Spiegel, which are hardly bought in the East. Media with a regional identification (such as the former district press outlets, MDR [Central German Broadcasting] or illustrated magazines with an East German image) are clearly favored in the former GDR. These media not only strengthen a separate self-image of the East, but also the nostalgia for the old GDR or “Ostalgie” that has set in since the end of the 1990s. But here, too, the East Germans anticipated a trend that later reached the West in the move away from the national daily press and public broadcasting companies, which cannot be explained solely through the competition coming from the Internet.

Above all, however, the East was very clearly a trendsetter in the areas of family and education. The East proved to be the innovator when it came to providing more childcare facilities, the alignment of the school systems, or the introduction of the twelve-year Abitur (high school grad-
ulation exam) because the new federal states experimented with intermediary solutions when they began to adapt to Western models. As the chapter on education articulates, however, this process first took place within the competitive international context of the PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment) tests, which washed the taint of socialism off full-day and comprehensive schools, as well as off standardized testing.

At the beginning of the 1990s, many contemporary social scientists predicted that it would take a long time for East Germany to align with the West, and most estimates ranged between ten and fifteen years.\textsuperscript{119} Most of these scholars never thought that a transformation would also take place in the West. Today, it has not only become quite clear that it has taken much longer for East and West to grow together, but also that life in the former FRG has also been transformed. The old Bonn Republic of the 1970s and 1980s now seems to be a “distant country,” giving rise to a left-wing as well as a right-wing form of “Westalgie.”\textsuperscript{120} One major factor contributing to this accelerated experience of time is surely the rapid digitalization of almost all areas of life, which is why computer technology—as a new key topic in historical scholarship—is dealt with in a separate chapter of this book. With the advent of Internet-based digital communication, a world that was once populated by telephone boxes, singular television programs, and index card files has disappeared in both the East and the West.

A German-German perspective is just one of many possible approaches to the history of contemporary Germany, but it is particularly promising for the decades before and after 1990. The fact that all kinds of differences persist between East and West even twenty-five years after reunification speaks in favor of the need to account for the historical influence of divided Germany. At the same time, however, the rapid tempo of the reunification process can only be explained by looking at the myriad lines connecting East and West that were not stopped by the Wall in between.

Frank Bösch is professor of European history at the University of Potsdam and director of the Center for Contemporary History (ZZF) in Potsdam. He is the author of several books on modern German and European history, including \textit{Die Adenauer-CDU} (2001), \textit{Das konservative Milieu} (2002), and \textit{Öffentliche Geheimnisse} (2009). His most recent book is \textit{Mass Media and Historical Change: Germany in International Perspective, 1400–2000} (Berghahn Books, 2015).

"A History Shared and Divided: East and West Germany since the 1970s" by Frank Bösch. http://berghahnbooks.com/title/BoeschHistory
NOTES


2. See Eckart Conze, Die Suche nach Sicherheit: Eine Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin, 2009); Edgar Wolfrum, Geglückte Demokratie: Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von ihren Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart (Munich, 2007); Manfred Görtemaker, Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Von der Gründung bis zur Gegenwart (Munich, 1999); Axel Schildt and Detlef Siegfried, Deutsche Kulturgeschichte: Die Bundesrepublik—1945 bis zur Gegenwart (Munich, 2009).


4. For the major point of reference for the debates over West Germany, see Anselm Doering-Manteuffel and Lutz Raphael, Nach dem Boom: Perspektiven auf die Zeitgeschichte seit 1970 (Göttingen, 2010).


7. Schroeder warns against this; see Klaus Schroeder, Der SED-Staat: Geschichte und Strukturen der DDR 1949–1990 (Cologne, 2013), 902.

8. See the use of this image in Tagesspiegel, 11 August 2013 and 26 September 2013; Die Welt, 27 November 2009.


der geteilten und zusammengehörigen deutschen Nachkriegsgeschichte,” 


24. For the strongest account of both Germanys and their (political) relations, albeit mostly within a political history context, see Peter Graf Kielmansegg, *Das geteilte Land: Deutsche Geschichte 1945–1990* (Munich, 2004).


"A History Shared and Divided: East and West Germany since the 1970s" by Frank Bösch. 
http://berghahnbooks.com/title/BoeschHistory
27. See, for example, Ulrich Mählert, Kleine Geschichte der DDR (Munich, 2009); Hans-Hermann Hertle and Stefan Wolle, Damals in der DDR (Munich, 2006); Schroeder, Der SED-Staat.
35. Tobias Hochscherf, Christoph Laucht, and Andrew Plowman, eds., Divided, but Not Disconnected: German Experiences of the Cold War (New York, 2010); Detlef Brunner, Udo Grashoff, and Andreas Kötzing, eds., Asymmetrisch verflochten? Neue Forschungen zur gesamtdeutschen Nachkriegsgeschichte (Berlin, 2013).
36. See, for example, Jörg Roesler, Momente deutsch-deutscher Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte 1945 bis 1990: Eine Analyse auf gleicher Augenhöhe (Leipzig, 2006); Balbier, Kalter Krieg.

"A History Shared and Divided: East and West Germany since the 1970s" by Frank Bösch. http://berghahnbooks.com/title/BoeschHistory
39. See also Raj Kollmorgen, Ostdeutschland: Beobachtungen einer Übergangs- und Teilgesellschaft (Wiesbaden, 2005).
42. Ther, Die neue Ordnung, 97.
44. Andreas Wirsching, Der Preis der Freiheit: Geschichte Europas in unserer Zeit (Munich, 2012).
50. Tobias Hochscherf, Christoph Laucht, and Andrew Plowman, eds., Divided, but Not Disconnected: German Experiences of the Cold War (New York, 2015); Annette Vowinckel, Marcus M. Payk, and Thomas Lindenberger, eds., Cold War Cultures: Perspectives on Eastern and Western European Societies (Oxford, 2012).
52. For an assessment of this “Wertewandel” (value shift) in the West, see Bernhard Dietz, Christopher Neumaier, and Andreas Rödder, eds., Gab es den Wertewandel? Neue Forschungen zum gesellschaftlich-kulturellen Wandel seit den 1960er Jahren (Munich, 2014).
53. See Werner Weidenfeld and Hartmut Zimmermann, eds., Deutschland-Handbuch: Eine doppelte Bilanz (Bonn, 1989).
54. Annegret Groebel, Strukturelle Entwicklungsmuster in Markt- und Planwirtschaften: Vergleich der sektoralen Erwerbstätigkeitsstrukturen von BRD und DDR (Heidelberg, 1997), 100; André Steiner, “Bundesrepublik und DDR in der Doppelkrise europäischer Industriegesellschaften. Zum sozialökonomischen

"A History Shared and Divided: East and West Germany since the 1970s" by Frank Bösch. http://berghahnbooks.com/title/BoeschHistory
55. See, for example, Uta G. Poiger, Jazz, Rock, and Rebels: Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany (Berkeley, 2000); Uta Andrea Balbier and Christiane Rösch, eds., Umworbener Klassenfeind: Das Verhältnis der DDR zu den USA (Berlin, 2006).
56. Kaelble, Der historische Vergleich, 127.
57. Jarausch, ” „Die Teile als Ganzes erkennen.””
62. Wirsching, ” „Für eine pragmatische Zeitgeschichtsforschung,”” 13–18.
63. Jarausch, Die Umkehr, 286. It has also been argued that this sense of “we” first emerged with the nostalgic “Ostalgie” of the 1990s: Thomas Ahbe, ” „‘Ostalgie’ als eine Laien-Praxis in Ostdeutschland: Ursachen, psychische und politische Dimensionen,”” in Die DDR in Deutschland: Ein Rückblick auf 50 Jahre, ed. Heiner Timmermann (Berlin, 2001), 781–802.
65. Bender, Deutschlands Wiederkehr, 204.
67. Hobsbawm, Age, 403.
68. Doering-Manteuffel and Raphael, Nach dem Boom.

"A History Shared and Divided: East and West Germany since the 1970s" by Frank Bösch.
http://berghahnbooks.com/title/BoeschHistory


80. See, for example, Claudia Lepp and Kurt Nowak, eds., *Evangelische Kirche im geteilten Deutschland (1945–1989/90)* (Göttingen, 2001).


84. André Steiner has already pointed to a “Growth Crisis of 1969/70.” See An-


86. Ther, *Die neue Ordnung*, 72.

87. See André Steiner, “‘Common Sense is Necessary’: East German Reactions to the Oil Crises of the 1970s,” *Historical Social Research* 39, no. 4 (2014): 231–50.

88. On these transactions with the West via the “KoKo,” see Judt, *Der Bereich Kommerzielle Koordinierung*.


"A History Shared and Divided: East and West Germany since the 1970s" by Frank Bösch. 
http://berghahnbooks.com/title/BoeschHistory
103. On the East, for example, see Patrice Poutrus and Christian Th. Müller, eds., *Ankunft—Alltag—Ausreise: Migration und interkulturelle Begegnungen in der DDR-Gesellschaft* (Cologne, 2005).
104. For exact figures, see Rüdiger Hachtman, *Tourismus-Geschichte* (Göttingen, 2007), 15–51.
105. See, for example, Poiger, *Jazz*.
108. At the moment, the term “Versicherheitlichung” (securitization) has only been used in reference to West Germany: Conze, *Die Suche nach Sicherheit*, 571.

“*A History Shared and Divided: East and West Germany since the 1970s*” by Frank Bösch.
http://berghahnbooks.com/title/BoeschHistory

115. See also Ther, *Die neue Ordnung*, 277–305. At the same time, Ther argues that, in terms of the metropoles, Warsaw reacted more effectively than Berlin.


117. See the current statistics from the DOSB (German Olympic Sports Confederation). Retrieved from http://www.dosb.de/de/service/download-center/statistiken.


**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


"A History Shared and Divided: East and West Germany since the 1970s" by Frank Bösch. http://berghahnbooks.com/title/BoeschHistory


"A History Shared and Divided: East and West Germany since the 1970s" by Frank Bösch. http://berghahnbooks.com/title/BoeschHistory


"A History Shared and Divided: East and West Germany since the 1970s" by Frank Bösch. http://berghahnbooks.com/title/BoeschHistory


Judt, Matthias. *Der Bereich Kommerzielle Koordinierung: Das DDR-Wirtschafts-

"A History Shared and Divided: East and West Germany since the 1970s" by Frank Bösch.
http://berghahnbooks.com/title/BoeschHistory


Raphael, Lutz. “Das Konzept der ‘Moderne.’ Neue Vergleichsperspektiven für die deutsch-italienische Zeitgeschichte?” In *Jenseits der Moderne? Die siebziger Jahre als Gegenstand der deutschen und der italienischen Geschichtswissen-

"A History Shared and Divided: East and West Germany since the 1970s" by Frank Bösch. http://berghahnbooks.com/title/BoeschHistory


Spitzer, Giselher. “Doping in Deutschland von 1950 bis heute aus historisch-soziologischer Sicht im Kontext ethischer Legitimation.” Bundesinstitut für

"A History Shared and Divided: East and West Germany since the 1970s" by Frank Bösch. http://berghahnbooks.com/title/BoeschHistory


