

INTRODUCTION

## RHETORIC IN SOCIAL RELATIONS

*Jon Abbink and Shauna LaTosky*



I bless the sacred powers of persuasion  
That makes calm the storm in the body  
The presence of God in persuasion  
Draws the poison fangs of evil  
Undoes the knotted mess of brooding evil  
In the gentle combat of persuasion  
Good wins over good with goodness  
And none lose.

—Athena, in Aeschylus, *The Eumenides*

This volume presents a series of reflections and empirical case studies on a central, if not *the* central, domain of rhetoric and culture: human social relations. Indeed, nothing of rhetoric – neither the verbal strategies of persuasion and oratory (in the original Aristotelian view), nor in its wider sense, as a feature of the ‘new rhetoric’, being ‘the effective use of informal reasoning in all fields’<sup>1</sup> – is outside the field of social relations as the constitutive dimension, or rather fabric, of human behaviour and culture. In addition, the recent ‘rhetorical turns’ (cf. Simons 1990; Bender and Wellbery 1990; Mokrzan 2014; Meyer, Girke and Mokrzan 2016) show an underlying concern with the multi-dimensional linguistic, bodily and evolutionary phenomena underlying and associated with the forms and uses of rhetoric, seen as a quintessential human ‘faculty’ for living and surviving in society, as well as shaping, and being shaped by, its culture(s). The present series, *Studies in Rhetoric and Culture*, initiated by Ivo Strecker and Stephen Tyler, is a prime example of it.

As George Kennedy already noted in his inspiring 1998 book *Comparative Rhetoric*, this faculty of ‘rhetoric’ is found among humans in all societies and is by no means a prerogative or art of literate societies only, although as a phenomenon it was conceptually and reflexively developed in the Western tradition after Isocrates and Plato’s *Dialogues*. We could also make an argument for extending the study of rhetoric into non-human domains, as in ‘bio-rhetoric’ (Kull 2001; Pain 2002), akin to evolutionary studies,<sup>2</sup> but we will not pursue this issue here. Partly addressed in this volume, however, is the role of non-verbal rhetoric, via sound or images (see du Mesnil’s chapter).

The concept of ‘rhetoric’ and its scope are not self-evident. Each of the preceding volumes in the Rhetoric Culture Project (RCP) series had to grapple with definitional issues, the intellectual relevance of which must be included here. Since the first volume in the series, *Culture and Rhetoric* (Strecker and Tyler 2009a), which proposed the theoretical and methodological foundation for research on the *figurative* and *persuasive* dimensions of social relations (Mokrzan 2015: 257), several innovative notions have emerged which demonstrate that the mutually constitutive nature of rhetoric and culture goes hand in hand with social relations, but also ethnography (Meyer, Girke and Mokrzan 2016: 10, 14). Rhetoric culture theory (RCT) insists that an ethnographic approach – following upon Kennedy’s comparative one – is fundamental for recovering multiple rhetorical traditions. Ethnography allows for active and long-term engagement; that is, a scientific rhetoric that begins with mutual respect and a commitment to listening and observing how ‘actors deal with the contingencies in their lives and their own awareness that words, deeds, and ideals do not usually match’ (ibid.: 14). RCT also demands that any understanding of culture and rhetoric must encompass ‘the whole spectrum of human sensibility’ (Streck 2011: 133), as well as the ‘oscillating forces of the cooperative and the confrontational in interaction’ (Girke and Meyer 2011: 9), as ‘dialogue is only one side of the rhetorical medal’ (ibid.). This corroborates our claim that rhetoric helps to make sense of what connects *and* disconnects people, and thereby must keep track of universals, or in the words of Robling, ‘anthropological invariants’ (Robling 2004: 8), that enable humans to engage at all in socio-culturally embedded rhetorical activity. While a great deal has been learnt in recent years about social relations and discourse, especially from the work of linguistic anthropologists (e.g. Haviland 2010; Irvine 2019; Gal and Irvine 2019; Duranti 1994), and in that of many cognitive anthropologists (e.g. D’Andrade 1995; Hutchins 2006; Bloch 2012, [2013] 2017; Whitehouse and Laidlaw 2007), few frame these issues explicitly in the connection between rhetoric and culture. Judith Irvine (2011: 35) is of course correct when she writes that ‘the moral life of language does not reside in the linguistic properties of utterances alone, nor only in the moment of interaction. The words

not spoken, the discourse contexts, the interactional and societal histories, the responses by interlocutors, the conventions of genre, the regimes of language, truth, and knowledge that prevail in the interlocutors' social worlds – all these are relevant as well. However, according to RCT, what makes them relevant are their rhetorical qualities. Where RCT guides us is in its novel exploration of the emergent qualities of culture (Girke and Meyer 2011), or put differently, how culture emerges out of 'rhetorical action' (ibid.: 2). This perspective differs from the predominantly semiotic approach (e.g. Irvine 2019; Gal and Irvine 2019) and linguistic-social pragmatics of much of anthropological linguistics and communication studies (e.g. Duranti 2007).

Central to our own idea of a dialectic of bonding and contestation is the 'constant productive tension' referred to above, a tension that sustains and constrains social relations and which is closely linked to another genuine innovation of RCT: chiasmus. This figurative, cognitive and comparative tool, as well as a mode of ethnographic reflection (cf. Wiseman 2009: 87), has served to underline the series and RCP. When Tyler and Strecker (2009: 29) refer to the 'chiastic spin,' what is meant here is not only the rhetorical energy generated and exchanged in social interactions, but also the power of metaphor and other important figures and tropes for stimulating and persuading others to act (Meyer, Girke and Mokrzan 2016: 8).

While we build on these and other innovative ideas of the RCP, including a return to embodied rhetoric, as we discuss later in this Introduction, at the same time we push these insights further, as connections to newly evolving domains of research have to be made (see the sections below entitled 'Contestation' and 'Beginning with the End, Ending with the Beginning').

The first challenge for the present volume was to first delineate the two themes, 'rhetoric' and 'social relations,' both very comprehensive concepts. Despite recognizing their relevance and inherently wide scope, the danger is to extend them too much and to lose critical edge.<sup>3</sup> We begin by saying that: (a) all human social life is relational and *constituted* in relationality on various levels, from kinship units to wider, imagined units such as 'the nation' or a religious community; and (b) that all rhetoric, as a form of communication, is rooted in the social and has at its core figuration and persuasion strategies (cf. Strecker and Tyler 2009b: 3), although not all persuasion in social life is rhetoric: think of direct physical force and intimidation – when used they are usually quite compelling, not discursively persuasive; (c) these rhetorical persuasion strategies, however, refer to a (partly shared) reality that is explored and tested in supplemental rhetorical operations, that is, they have plausibility claims. This is where the 'rhetoric-as-epistemic' – that is, 'knowledge-forming' – argument comes back. Even as rhetoric is *not* to be equated with 'rational discourse,' it does produce implicit claims to knowledge.<sup>4</sup> Persuasiveness in whatever form

may flout realities beyond rhetoric, and rhetoric's 'arguments' and intended meanings may be challenged. Apart from that, as the ancient Greeks already mused, rhetoric often 'fails': it does not always win audiences or redefine social reality. This is in contrast to Athena's noble words, cited at the beginning of this Introduction. We see *social relations* as the entire spectrum of engagements that humans enter into as members of a society, relations that by nature are cooperative as well as fractious and competitive. The social relationality of humans – a natural phenomenon – necessitates rhetoric action, both cognitive and expressive. This does not imply that *all* aspects of social relations (or of culture) are to be studied merely in their verbal-linguistic, discursive dimensions, as quantitative research on descent and kinship, settlement patterns, energy use and so on also has a role to play. The *culture* concept is ill-defined in the RCP, but we see it here in the standard anthropological sense as the dynamic body of shared and transmitted patterns of behaviour, values and templates marking a human group's way of life.<sup>5</sup> More specifically: culture is a dimension of human functioning, and constitutes 'repertoires of meaning', constructed and (re)produced in social interaction. So we follow no essentialist conception of it, because cultural repertoires are open and dynamic.<sup>6</sup> Humans are quintessentially verbal-discursive in social relations: 'culture' may be a rhetoric construct, but it is embedded, located, *within* human sociality; that is, social relations are primary in having conditioned culture, as symbolic/meaning systems composed by rhetoric action. Sociality is our evolutionary past, our kinship, our embodied mimetic practices for survival.

In this book we, perhaps obviously, focus chiefly on rhetoric in expressive forms as produced in social relations, primarily but not exclusively verbal-discursive. We thus see *rhetoric* as the basic human register of interactive discursive action in society, with inherent dimensions of persuasion and argument directed to an audience, and appealing to a body of shared (social) values or identity. More specifically, we might start with the short definition by Thomas Farrell (1993: 15), seeing rhetoric as 'the practice of public practical reason' in human society. Farrell was against the ever-extending definitional scope of rhetoric and chose a more classic position. He described rhetoric as a collaborative art, 'directed towards making ongoing sense of experiences by expressing them as themes and arguments, inviting decision, action, and judgement' (ibid.: 25). This is the stuff of social life, and points to both the informal, pragmatic 'real life' aspects of human social discourse and to the ongoing efforts people make to influence and convince others, via the entire range of figurative, symbolic and 'cognitive' utterances/messages that mark human discursive action (also including *ritual*). In the current rhetorical turn – perhaps to be called the second one, after that of the 1980s and confirmed by work done in the Rhetoric Culture Project – the concept of rhetoric has reverted to

its original broader meaning, and escaped its reduction, since the Romantic Age, to (the study of) *elocutio*, the mere production/delivery of figures of speech (cf. Sperber and Wilson 1990: 140). So rhetoric for us refers to a core characteristic of human functioning, and to the ensemble of discursive utterances and strategies used in social interaction, marked by efforts at persuasiveness, in many registers.<sup>7</sup> This is not ‘a Western conception’ of rhetoric, as some critics would have it (Bate 2014: 541–42, 544). The ethnographic examples in this volume are telling in that all of them exhibit (un)conscious strategies of persuasion, this regardless of the wider question that rhetoric may very well be rooted in evolutionary processes of embodied cognition, for example via chiasmic structures. Indeed, as Pelkey demonstrates in Chapter 1, chiasmus is a basic model and structure in social rhetoric, occurring time and again in many domains.

We concur with the thesis that rhetoric in the wider sense is thus constitutive of culture, that it calls (or at least affirms) a common, collective cultural *identity* into existence, and we look at this via the lens of social relational settings that delimit the scope, depth and time frames of rhetorical activities and strategies. Rhetoric, as creative, persuasion-oriented discursive practice in the service of social cognition and symbolic meaning-making, does *not* proceed from conceptual or ideological blueprints or mind models, but is pragmatic and adaptive – a ‘collaborative art’ (Farrell 1993). It is rooted in ordinary discourse, practice and real communities (White 1985: 701), and speaks to the indeterminacy of social life. Seen in its social settings, however, this does not mean that rhetoric is arbitrary, opportunistic or relativistic in its effects: shared meanings, ‘theories’ and knowledge of the social and of the world are indeed produced, which are ‘tested’ against reality and adjusted. We do not agree with the postmodern notion that reality is (entirely) a rhetorical construct, nor do we see the future of rhetoric studies in a social constructivist approach (cf. Simonson 2014: 107–8).

In assessing the settings or context of rhetorical performances/expressions, there is also the issue of whether an ‘identity’ of a social group needs to exist *before* rhetoric practice can have its effects or impact. The underlying assumption of the Rhetoric Culture Project is posited upon the chiasmic figure that ‘just as rhetoric is founded in culture, culture is founded in rhetoric’<sup>8</sup> – ‘culture’ is being produced by rhetoric and rhetoric has a cultural basis, that is, it induces members of a society into specific features and figures of speech and into cultural references that create difference, identity and plurality. Surely rhetoric always speaks to notions of the shared ‘background knowledge’ of the interlocutors. Kenneth Burke already tied the exercise of rhetoric to processes of *identification* (cf. Davis 2008: 128) – otherwise rhetoric would not ‘work’. Important to note, however, is that people are not ‘prisoners’ of the rhetorical

conventions of their social or cultural group; they argue within it in a dialectical fashion and create new linkages and insights beyond it. This points to the universalist basis that is found in the human rhetorical faculty *across* cultures and which creates conditions for the apprehension of common truths about reality, for example via science, despite the various rhetorical constructions about it (which may differ).<sup>9</sup>

In current rhetorical theory, including rhetoric culture theory, we may see a gradual fusion of two of the classic forms of discourse as identified by Aristotle (c. 330 BC [2004]: 1356a): of *rhetoric* as observation and practice of the available means of persuasion, and of *dialectic*, the practice of (dialogic) argument and debate to reach shared insights or truths.<sup>10</sup> This fusion is a fortuitous development that allows us to stave off the, what we could call, eternal ‘Sophist threat’ of seeing and using rhetoric as *only* a set of persuasive strategies, as a contentless, ‘non-virtuous’ means (Plato) merely to gain discursive victory, often amounting to deception. This is Plato’s version of it in his dialogue (against) *Gorgias*. Rhetoric is more than that; it has social and cultural resonance, and usually refers to shared meanings and truths beyond the oratorical constructions of persuasiveness.<sup>11</sup> This means: (a) that rhetorical analysis does not necessarily consist of a self-referential description of discourse and does not obviate the need for critical testing of knowledge claims and the growth of knowledge;<sup>12</sup> and (b) more specifically relevant for our volume, that rhetoric, in our sense, is also set in relations of power, hierarchy, inequality and gender relations and so on, and should be studied in those settings.

Indeed, social relations everywhere are marked by a dialectic between conflict and harmony, tension and resolution (see below), or in the words of our book’s two main sections, contestation and bonding. We here refrain from further theorizing this trait of human society, but would refer to the basic ideas in the comprehensive approach outlined by historian-critic-philosopher René Girard and its relevance for human culture. It is based on the recognition of a universal human disposition towards ‘mimetic rivalry’: imitative relationships and strivings that humans forge in a competitive manner – both negative and positive – whereby the desires that humans experience are formed and shaped in imitation of the desires of *others*. This is an essential *social* process that ultimately could be explained in an evolutionary sense.<sup>13</sup> The ‘other’, either as a member of the immediate kinship unit or of a wider affinal, occupational, virtual or other human group, is a social partner or competitor (not necessarily ‘aggressor’) that evokes the constant need for rhetorical engagement, thus (re)creating and shaping culture. Rhetoric in this sense – and this also underlies the Rhetoric Culture Project – unites argumentative and emotional aspects.<sup>14</sup>

It will be clear that in this Introduction, and equally in most of the chapters in this volume, we of course see the use and analysis of rhetoric as going *beyond* conceptualism, discourse analysis and cognitive anthropology. Indeed, as we said, the rhetorical faculty is constitutive of human social relations and thereby of culture (cf. White 1984, 1985; Keane 2015), although it is not prior to the latter in an evolutionary sense, because hominins and early humans were social *before* they were rhetorical in the discursive sense. The subsequent development of (proto)human society in itself has also accelerated the development of the role of rhetoric *within it*, because in competitive relations, good strategies of persuasion – and frequently, deception – confer more survival value and societal success.<sup>15</sup> The discussion of ‘rhetoric as epistemic’, that started with Robert Scott’s 1967 paper, has also shown that rhetoric, as praxis, produces (conditions of) knowledge and is a way of obtaining truth(s). Zhao (1991) has reformulated the argument, defining rhetoric as ‘praxis which integrates both knowing and doing in public discourse’, that is, not factual knowledge but normative knowledge ‘grounded in the life contingencies in which we find ourselves and with which we have to cope’ (Zhao 1991: 255–56; see also note 4). This interesting thought is well reflected in the chapters of this volume.

The diversity of cases presented in this volume is indicative of the enormous and utterly fascinating diversity of social relations as ‘settings’ for rhetoric. This puts strain on the ‘cohesiveness’ of the collection but that may be exactly the point: the variability of the social and the multiple modes of power, social tension and hierarchy inevitably and always produce diversity. So we can offer no apology for the wide range of empirical cases here. What unites them is the thorough approach to evaluating the relationality of the social – in both serious and ludic forms – in conditioning and shaping rhetoric in action. In the everyday discursive fusion of allusion, word play, irony, informality, formality and use of tropes, *homo ludens* (Huizinga [1938] 1949) meets *homo rhetoricus*.

## MORE ON SOCIAL RELATIONS: BONDING

From the perspective of a comparative and cognitive anthropology, we might say that ‘relation’ occupies a prominent place of relevance in humanity’s conceptual reservoir. Few other concepts are so pervasive and subtly at work in human – conscious and unconscious – experience of life and active involvement therein. Think, for example, of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s seminal *Metaphors We Live By* (1980). This highly original book is all about *relations*, analogical relationships that pertain between different domains of

human experience and allow the rhetorical creation of situationally appropriate meanings in social contexts. Or take Stephen Tyler's exposition of universal meaning schemata, his 'pillars of naïve realism' (1978: 240), of which the fourth – comparison (ibid.: 243) – makes use of relational thinking and thereby allows the growth of knowledge. In other words, it is certainly attractive to thematize, explore and explain *relations* – cognitive, physical, social or otherwise – that inhere in the many diverse, often surprising ways of human life that rhetoric culture scholars have investigated. Also, 'relation' is basically an appealing topic because it evokes feelings of connectedness, mutuality and belonging, the opposite of solitude and alienation. No wonder 'relation' is often used as a metonym for sexual intercourse, and the English 'relation' is, as the dictionary puts it, a person connected by blood or marriage. The Latin noun *relatio* and the verb *relat* – foregrounding acts of bringing back, reconnecting, joining what belongs together – lie at the back of this embodied English meaning of 'relation'. At the same time, the abstract use of 'relation' abounds in human discourse. Again, this does not come as a surprise when we consider how from dawn to dusk we are agents and patients, subject to chains of cause and effect. As individually we ponder and jointly discuss how things have effects on one another, we gradually move into ever more abstract and often also formal modes of studying relationships, as exemplified especially by philosophy and the cognitive and natural sciences. Anthropology has in the past taken different stances on this matter of processes and traditions of knowledge formation regarding sociocultural relations, but structural anthropology as developed by Claude Lévi-Strauss and his students (especially Pierre Maranda; e.g. 1972) certainly stood out in the novel study of relations, predominantly kinship. Most importantly, the structuralists cultivated the study not only of relations, but of the relations of relations – of the relations pertaining between different domains of culture and modes of being, be they physical, cognitive or social.<sup>16</sup> Structural anthropology was dominant in the 1960s–1970s and brought a wealth of new insights. But criticism of its linguistic-based models and its strict semiotic orientation on formal communication 'systems' led to a decline of influence and to a rise of interest in more pragmatic and interactionist theories and new theories of communication, interactionism and postmodern 'dialogic' approaches (see the pioneering book by Tedlock and Mannheim [1995]). Other approaches taking a less 'literalist' approach to language and utterance emerged as well. While not dominant in anthropology, the post-structuralist 'relevance theory' of Sperber and Wilson ([1986] 1995) is important in the field of rhetoric and communication studies.<sup>17</sup> These authors made a new start in researching the wide spectrum of communication via an orientation on cognitive psychology and focusing on reasoning and rationality, although less so on rhetoric as only located in natural language. In their work,

the attention to social relations as a wider context of discourse and rhetoric was not prominent, but their work still has great importance for comparative studies of social relations and culture, and certainly rhetoric is a sub-set of human communication. Interestingly, in his last work *The Enigma of Reason* (Mercier and Sperber 2017: 9), which is a nuanced plea for an interactionist perspective (ibid.: 9, 11), Sperber ends up with the idea that the ultimate goal of reasoning is persuasion – hence, we are back with ... rhetoric.

While studies of rhetoric already made a comeback in the fields of literary studies, art studies and history from the mid-1950s (for example with Burke as a pioneer), a new rhetorical approach to the study of social relations and culture emerged roughly in the late 1970s–1980s. The influence of prominent thinkers like Paul Ricoeur on metaphor ([1975] 2012) and Hayden White (1973) was formative, and in anthropology a breakthrough volume was Sapiro and Crocker's *The Social Use of Metaphor* (1977). Gradually a host of new themes was added in anthropological approaches to rhetoric and social relations, for instance the study by Michael Herzfeld of 'social poetics' as 'the creative presentation of the individual self'<sup>18</sup> and of 'decorum and style' (Hariman 1992), that gave social relations their particular character. Three related key terms – formation, articulation, modulation – seemed to be especially useful to explore how rhetoric (among other factors) shapes social relationships, notably in relations of kinship and gender, the third (modulation) used by some authors more generally to refer to aspects of 'temperament' and 'emotional tone'. Previous anthropological research on culture and emotion had tended to divide cognition and emotion. But a rhetorical approach to the study of social relations in their full range might be more suited to refocus on the interplay of thought and feeling, mind and emotion, for example in the study of slang, gossip and insult language and their cultural referents. Other classic themes in anthropology next to kinship, affinal relations, gender and sexual relations might be cast in a new light via a rhetorical approach as well, for instance, rituals, or 'reciprocity' – prime mechanisms of bonding.

## CONTESTATION

The underlying theme of this book was termed 'dialectics of bonding and contestation', because we see the tension between them as the engine of social relations: human interaction is rooted in establishing rapport and similarity as well as distance and differentiation *at the same time*. This is the core of social life and marks the agency of humans, rooted in mimesis and competition, both benevolent and rivalrous. Above, we mentioned the strong case for mimetic rivalry as a human trait fuelling tension and conflict, so persuasively

argued in René Girard's work. While the rivalry is for Girard 'pre-linguistic' in the evolutionary sense, it is continued with rhetorical means after the development of language.

The differential and contrary aims of rhetorical performance of humans in and of social relations are present in kin and age groups, but perhaps shown most clearly in 'political' contexts: the play of power and influence within a community, and *of* a community (constituted by rhetorical conventions) vis-à-vis *other* communities.<sup>19</sup> In many of the chapters in this volume, we see this 'political' dimension at work, even in contexts of kinship (Lydall, Bird-David, Zeitlyn) and rivalrous 'love talk' (Reichenbach, Strohmenger). Contestation is at the heart of social life – in view of humanity's inescapable mimetic rivalries – and communities generate it on the basis of elements like gender, age, ability, wealth or 'class', and even if they are politically delineated or 'cohesive', they produce it internally, as witnessed already in the *polis* states of ancient Greece (e.g. in the trial of Socrates). Indeed, Aristotle's classic distinction of dialectic (as the practice of argument and debate; see above) vs. rhetoric and logic reflects this fact of contestation as inherent in human discourse. Structures of power, 'ideological' difference, and the persistence of durable inequality do the rest, and fuel contestation in a material, spatial or discursive sense. In this line, the chapters by Abbink, Peveri and du Mesnil partly address issues of power difference, hegemonism and value inequality.

## STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK: ON THE DIALECTICS

The structure of the book aims to emphasize the persuasive – and chiasmic – ways in which spoken and unspoken forms of language (i.e. rhetoric) are used to bring people closer together, and at the same time how rhetoric can be used – and is used – against social relationships themselves: to create distance or to drive people apart. In the work of the 'father' of modern rhetoric studies, Kenneth Burke (notably in *A Rhetoric of Motives*, 1950), this inherent dialectic based in the very nature of the human process of identification was already extensively commented upon (cf. Davis 2008). It is this constant tension in social relations that the contributors capture in the two parts of this volume, intended to reflect these dialectics of bonding and contestation.

Part I presents the first chapter by Jamin Pelkey, which is a theoretical introduction to one of the key human figures/postures underlying a wide range of social relations: the essentially human upright X-position, the 'embodied chiasmus'. This connects directly to the role that the chiasmus figure has already played in much work on rhetoric, including that of the Rhetoric Culture Project, where its central figurative role was repeatedly emphasized. Chiasmus

of course comes from the old Greek letter *chi* (X), and refers to the rhetorical figure of reversal and mirrored repetition of words or sentence elements. Strecker and Tyler (2009b: 9) argued that chiasmus is useful for the discovery and creation of ‘meaningful relationships,’ and volume 6 of *Studies in Rhetoric and Culture* (edited by Wiseman and Paul [2014]) is entirely devoted to it.

As to social relations, several of the chapters in the present volume show how people position or distance themselves via upright posturing,<sup>20</sup> for instance by sustaining or avoiding the gaze of the other (Lydall, LaTosky, Mokrzan). For example, the feelings that certain bodily movements elicit in social relations (for instance, between husband and wife in Mursi, between daughter and mother-in-law in Hamar, between coach and coachee in Poland, and so on) is a recurring theme worth considering. The ‘upright posture,’ as a form of ‘embodied rhetoric,’ the walking forward and sustaining the gaze of the other, is one element in constructing the self–other relation, the precarious balance in social relations. We will return to Pelkey’s contribution and its challenge towards the end of this Introduction. The point for now is that chiasmic upright postures are embodied in social relations and are recognizable throughout.

Part II is about cultivating close and trusting relationships, elucidating and exemplifying rhetorics of ‘bonding’ through kinship, affiliation and bond-friendship. This section begins with the most primal interdependent relationship between mother and child, and continues with five ethnographic case studies from India, Ethiopia, Cameroon and Egypt that illustrate how close-knit relationships are built on rhetorical layers of kinship, friendship, love, commitment, trust and familiarity. The seventh chapter is more concerned with enculturation. However, it is not set off in its own corner; rather it tells us – by way of a case study – how social relations are the work of enculturation practices, that is, they are produced by culture-specific ways of socialization that teach people how to relate to one another.

In ‘Kinship: Mother and Child of Rhetoric,’ Jean Lydall develops a theory in which the physiologically engendered bond between mother and child is taken as the source of both kinship and rhetoric. She argues that an infant’s ‘cry, driven by a need, is an appeal for care, and the mother responds accordingly, persuaded by the primary bond that the cry invokes. Consciously or unconsciously, the child discovers that transferring its cry, utterance or gesture from one domain to another, for example from hunger to pain, has the effect of persuading its mother, or other carer, to think and act according to its needs. This is the first lesson in rhetoric, by which I mean *the art of persuasion*, that every child experiences.’ Furthermore, Lydall argues that ‘because of their commitment and undying feeling of responsibility towards their dependent offspring, women are highly motivated to engage in creating, recreating,

maintaining and transforming kinship relations by way of rhetoric'. In the section entitled 'Singing Kinship', calling on decades of research and filmmaking, Lydall explores how Hamar women and girls sing '*kinship into consciousness*' and strategically mould their social world by way of song. The songs include lullabies (*laensha*), girls' friendship songs, songs for male initiates (*goala* for a 'brother', 'clapping the birth path' for a 'son'), singing at a bride's going away party (*gaido*), a bride's calming song, and women singing at a funeral. The verses of the songs, which the girls and women compose, are often face anointing, as in the *laensha*, and in some cases epideictic, as in the songs for a deceased man. Lydall describes the friendship song sung by six-year-old Yayo as 'a kind of love song, for isn't kinship all about loving and caring for one another?' In the section entitled 'Ritualizing Kinship', Lydall turns her attention to rituals, and their corresponding rhetoric, to show how they are used to sanction and shape basic kin relationships. Thus, women use the child naming and preconception rituals to rhetorically assert authority over their daughters-in-law, controlling their right to bear legitimate offspring. Likewise, by way of their sons' initiation rites, parents control their sons' labour, determining when they can become independent, and have wives, children and livestock of their own; at their brothers' initiation rites, girls and women go to rhetorical extremes when they demand to be whipped in order to show their love, and thus ensure their brothers' commitment and support.

In the next chapter, Nurit Bird-David continues with this theme of kinship by expanding our appreciation of the complexities of bonding and becoming in 'immediate' hunter-gatherer societies such as the Nayaka of South India. The rhetorical dimension of what kinship terms *do* reveals a tension between the use – or non-use – of kinship terms among some hunter-gatherers and the categorical and logo-centric basis of modern English kinship systems. While the former use such terms to produce 'a sense of communal belonging, at once plural, diverse and immediate', the latter tend to refer to dyadic relations, obscuring the plural, interconnected nature of using relation terms in some hunter-gatherer societies. The author argues that 'sharing life together constitutes the relations'. Bird-David's ideas are nicely summarized in a quote by Redmond (2005: 234) that also reflects the chiasmic nature of social relations in 'immediate hunter-gatherer' societies: 'the kinship web [extends] infinitely outwards towards the boundaries of the known world to make relative strangers into "strange relatives".'

In 'The Rhetoric of Kinship: "Doing Kinship" – Some Mambila Cases', David Zeitlyn delves deeper into questions of kinship and rhetoric that have figured so prominently in scholarly debates. According to Zeitlyn, the debates they have stimulated create the necessity to analyse kinship as 'an emergent aspect of human life', that is, as 'part of the process of social existence'. Zeit-

lyn takes this opportunity to solicit his views on the Rhetoric Culture Project, ethnomethodology and discourse analysis. By analysing the everyday conversations of the Mambila of Cameroon, Zeitlyn argues that it is possible to study how kinship emerges from people's rhetorical practices, which includes the endless ways in which people contest their own kinship relations. This is because, quoting Carsten, 'kinship is a process of becoming, not a fixed state ... it consists of the many small actions, exchanges, friendships and enmities that peoples themselves create in their everyday lives. For most people it is perhaps the heart of their creativity'.

Creating positive alternative social configurations is best exemplified in Felix Girke's chapter, 'Establishing Ethos: The Rhetorical Work of Bondfriendship'. Here Girke provides a compelling case for how institutionalized exchange relations, called *beltamo* (bondfriendship) in Kara (and Hamar) – and found throughout Southern Ethiopia under different names – 'have a value quite incommensurable with the material benefits accrued'. Without dismissing the economic advantages of such relations, especially risk reduction through livestock dispersion, he claims that one-sided regionalistic arguments have their own shortcomings. Drawing on broader comparisons with Melanesia, Girke acknowledges the performative and persuasive aspects of bondfriendship and builds his argument that such relations allow men 'to extend their agency beyond their local group, by persuading others to acknowledge the value of their activity'. Put differently, individuals come to be defined by their relationships with others and the complementary networks that emerge from bondfriendships. Cultivating such life-long bonds helps men to establish personal ethos, which is enhanced by convincing their respective communities to appreciate the material benefits and social value that such non-kin relations have to offer. As Girke so aptly puts it: 'the bond matters, the friends matter, and the –ship, the stabilization of practice, it matters as well and should interest us most'.

Whereas Kara men prove their qualities (or 'ethos') through the public act of cultivating bondfriendships, Shauna LaTosky's chapter, 'The Rhetorics of Purging among the Mun (Mursi) of Southern Ethiopia', offers a lively discussion of what it takes to prove one's quality as a good husband, age-mate, cousin, neighbour and so on. For the Mun, an important locus of rhetorical energy is the body. According to LaTosky, the public act of purging strengthens not only the body, but also social bonds between kin and non-kin. Those who can provide the means for others to purge are recognized and appreciated as generous, caring, compassionate, loyal, reliable, strong and/or loving, depending on the context. This is best illustrated through the collective and everyday practice of purging spicy coffee, which helps to create and maintain meaningful and lasting social relations. LaTosky's detailed ethnographic findings are useful for understanding how social actions operate rhetorically through both material

things (purgatives) and discourse (talk about purging). She also discusses a new kind of rhetoric (a specialized knowledge of biomedicine) that is outgrowing the ability of (purging) rhetoric to handle such modern issues (cf. Brummett 2014: 34).

Steffen Strohmenger's chapter provides a specific account of what it takes to 'prove one's quality as somebody worthy of being loved'. In 'The Art of Playing *Tuql*: How to "Make" Love in Egypt', the author looks at the art of love semantics in Egypt, called *tuql*. He argues that this rhetorical strategy is aimed at 'bringing a (potential) love relationship into existence'. The strategy of trying to win the love of another person involves questions of silence and resistance, but also dishonesty and deceit. An important issue raised is the gendered nature of *tuql*: 'That is to say, while the man *can* be "hard to get" to increase his chances of love, the woman faces the problem that she *must* be "hard to get" to have any chance of love at all'. Strohmenger's study shows how, and the extent to which, gendered rules of *tuql* still apply in contemporary Egypt. Although Strohmenger does not situate his study in a historical context, one will no doubt find interesting parallels between *tuql* and ancient Egyptian rules of rhetoric 'which specify that knowing when not to speak is essential, and very respected, rhetorical knowledge' (Hutto 2002: 213). The point of knowing when to use – or *not* to use – the appropriate language, whether to speak to a child, a husband, an elder or an age-mate, for example, is taken up in the final chapter of Part II.

As we have already mentioned, social relations are produced by culture-specific ways of teaching and learning how people should relate to one another. Ivo Strecker's exposition of 'enculturation as rhetorical practice' helps us, theoretically and empirically, to better grasp this important truth. His fine-grained analysis of Hamar thought and expressiveness on the matter is embedded in the presentation of two new developments relevant for rhetoric culture studies. The first is a reappraisal of the 'science' of education, which has recently begun to position education as a rhetorical practice (Rutten and Soetaert 2012), and the second is resonance theory (Maranda 2011), which explains transcultural understanding as semantic fields that reverberate against each other. Strecker's discourse analysis tries to bring out this 'reverberation' between the semantic fields of Hamar and those of his own. Before he presents and analyses several texts recorded in Hamar, he mentions a particular characteristic of empirical rhetoric culture studies: the prospective excitement experienced at the very moment of recording. 'But the relevance of any recording', Strecker remarks, 'cannot be anticipated in full, and as the researcher later embarks on analysis, many new surprises will be waiting for him'. The detailed textual analysis is preceded by the observation that 'education' is perceived similarly as a 'leading out' in Hamar and the West, but the metaphorical repertoires by which this is

expressed vary. Thus, in Hamar the ‘leading out’ is likened to herding goats. There is no room here to mention all the subtle rhetorical means of enculturation, which Strecker discovers in the texts he has chosen to analyse, but we would like to draw attention to at least the following example where Balambe (the ethnographer’s host and mentor) says the following: ‘Another child doesn’t know how to speak: “What’s stopping that child from speaking?” So, going down to the waters of Galeba or to the waters of Kara, water is poured into a white gourd: “Let the child drink water from the flowing rivers. Let him know how to speak.” Thus he is given water from the flowing river to drink.’ Strecker comments: ‘Could there be a more moving way to speak of the desire for fluent speech and how it might be realized?’ He then points to how for a long time already such metaphorical *cum* magical action has intrigued Western scholars, for example James Frazer, Roman Jakobson, Claude Lévi-Strauss, Kenneth Burke and Stanley Tambiah.

Part III of the collection continues to explore the struggles and the play of attraction and repulsion that goes on in social relations, which we have called contestation. Contestation underpins the challenges, obstacles, uncertainty and precarious nature of social relations. As will become clear in the contributions in Part III, the success or failure of individuals, communities and/or institutions to devise persuasive models of social relations, especially in times of changing circumstances, has to do with everything from understanding the appropriate context for using speech repertoires – from politeness speech to swear words – to identifying how relations of power make claims on our attention and confine the reach and impact of rhetoric as dialogic discourse (see especially Abbink and Peveri). The rhetoric of contestation develops in tandem with the rhetoric of bonding, reflecting the contradictions in social processes and the intense rivalries that can build up. The human need for ‘difference’, for identification with one group and not with others, is a given and generates rhetoric energy directed at ‘others.’ We see this in all five chapters in Part III.

In the first chapter of Part III, on ‘Contestation, Anke Reichenbach’s contribution, ‘Sweet Tongues: The Rhetoric of Politeness in Damascus’, exemplifies the rhetorical role of politeness speech in everyday social relations – but paying attention to tacit contestation. This compassionate and thorough investigation of ‘the preferred strategies of social face-care’ in Damascus draws on Brown and Levinson’s classic model of politeness theory and indigenous concepts and stylistic devices of (im)polite discourse. The discursive approach that she takes falls into three categories, commonly distinguished in the literature as ‘the first, second and third waves’ of politeness research (see Grainger 2011). Although Reichenbach herself does not refer to such distinctions, her critical and in-depth analysis of key politeness concepts reveals her awareness of them. The discerning role that local concepts play, particularly in terms of

making socially acceptable and moral judgements of others (cf. Mitchell and Haugh 2015), is applied to various social politeness encounters. The depth of her empirical analysis can be attributed to her intimate knowledge of Arabic, which helps her to understand the everyday contexts in which politeness terms are applied, but also the tensions created when politeness is used to veil impolite behaviour. While her findings show that positive forms of politeness (i.e. ‘sweet words’) are predominantly used in Damascus (e.g. compliments, greetings, etc.), they can also be – and are – used in negative ways (for instance to mark status difference or to dominate others). While her focus here is on the discursive aspects of politeness, her study nonetheless provokes a certain curiosity about the embodied actions of such performances when she writes: ‘Greeting a visitor in Bab Tuma was – at least in the eyes of a European observer – a loud and long-winded affair involving a lot of kissing, hugging and smiling.’

In his seminal book *Language and Social Relations*, Asif Agha has explained that ‘we cannot understand the variety of social relations enactable in social life without coming to grips with the range of reflexive relationships expressible through speech’ (2007: 17). The vital role of language for reinforcing or sharpening social relationships inspired du Mesnil – and several other authors in Part III – to explore the use of specific speech repertoires, and like the ancient Egyptian rules of rhetoric mentioned in reference to Strohmeier’s chapter, ‘knowledge of when not to use it’ (ibid.). As the first two chapters show, many context-specific registers exist that, like Agha’s understanding of slang (2015) mentioned above, ‘are definable only through relationships’ (cf. Agha 2015: 311). Susan du Mesnil notes that using a specific form of slang – swear words – can be interpreted as an act of social cohesion (cf. Jay 2000). The persuasive impact of swearing has sparked significant debate in sociolinguistics, psychology and other fields of research. Although du Mesnil initially wrote this perceptive text (a lecture) long before it became a popular topic, it has lost none of its originality. In her study of German business and engineering students, du Mesnil measured the use of English swear words in terms of taboo strength, and she provides numerous examples of how ‘taboo strength does not match cross-culturally’. That is, while swearing in a foreign language might be one way to gain social approval, there are also unintended social consequences, as the local connotations of foreign swear words in different (national) contexts can be widely disparate – and deeply embarrassing. The author goes on to infer ‘a relatedness of choice of language and political developments’, which means that ‘socio-political and wider “cultural” conditions have a clear impact on the rhetorics of swearing, and may be related to new, more individualist subjectivities in contemporary post-industrial European society’. Du Mesnil ends with a set of provocative images in order to ask

the question: Are visual symbols currently replacing the emotional strength of words or texts? Developments in contemporary cyberspace seem to bear this out.<sup>21</sup>

Valentina Peveri's chapter is an excellent example of the diverse ways in which rhetoric – in this case, 'the rhetoric of nutrition policies' – creates tension in social relations when it challenges 'traditional' local practices and national identities. After reading this chapter, the popular expression 'We are what we eat!' immediately comes to mind, along with its chiasmic equivalent, 'We eat what we are!' Within the context of Ethiopian nutrition policies and nation-building, of which schoolchildren and their parents are in part the subject, Hadiyya farmers, who already face, accept and combat conditions of environmental uncertainty by cultivating and storing *ensete* (a drought-resistant plant), must now live with the added uncertainty as to the meaning of new rhetoric related to national nutrition policies, school programmes and the long-term effects of such policies on their children and communities. Given the rhetorical value – and current devaluing – of *ensete*, food has become the rhetorical language through which a sense of belonging, ethnic identity and ethnic nationalism are expressed. As Valentina writes: 'we find a nationally constructed idea of what being a modern citizen should entail – that is, learning a structure of taste which revolves around *injera* as the common ground for the palate as well as for achieving a full sense of Ethiopianness'. More broadly, the testimonies that she includes ask: 'how could young people feel that they are part of the nation if the approved type of meal configuration does not capture the story of the *ensete* – its dignity, salience, resilience, and comforting taste – into the national [food] basket?' Using detailed ethnographic examples, Valentina positions current education on food and nutrition, especially in the school curriculum, as rhetorical practices of nation/identity-building. This case of *ensete* growers in Ethiopia 'offers an alternative narrative framework where ecosystems are densely interconnected with social relationships'.

Jon Abbink looks at Suri social life to show how power constrains rhetorical efficiency, showing that traditional means of rhetoric are not always enough to confront issues that are too vast to make sense of. The empirical examples he chooses help to illuminate different rhetorical perspectives found both within and outside of Suri (e.g. Suri rhetoric about the state vs. state rhetoric about the Suri). Under close scrutiny of the political and socio-economic changes taking place in Suri today, such perspectives emerge as highly political. According to Abbink, the rhetorical strength of the Suri to express their position has weakened and, as a result, many young Suri no longer act on the rhetoric used by elders, but are finding their own ways to make sense of modern development rhetoric in their area. As Abbink argues, there are realities that exist 'beyond their rhetorical construction'. Abbink's observations of how

effectively (or ineffectively) rhetoric is translated and its ability (or inability) to capture the imagination of the younger generation lead him to ask how we can ‘go beyond the presentation of rhetorical ingenuities and strategies in various social contexts.’ He suggests that an analysis of rhetoric as ideology (or, in a more analytic manner, ‘cognition’ in that specific society) would allow us to better connect to differing interests and inequalities that form the stuff of human social relations. This matter of defining what rhetoric is or can become (e.g. ideology) and what rhetoric actually does for social relations is further examined in the next – and final – chapter.

Michał Mokrzan provides a lucid account of the rhetorical strategies of coaching and the ways in which they ‘motivate individuals to become more efficient, be satisfied with their own achievements and feel greater responsibility’ in various areas of social relations. Based on extensive ethnographic research with coaches and coachees, Mokrzan shows that the rapid growth of coaching in Poland, and worldwide, goes hand in hand with the dissemination of neoliberal technologies/ideologies of ‘governmentality’ in the domain of social relations, especially work relations. The explicit use of rhetoric in coach-coachee relations is expressed using different persuasive tools, from inspiring attitudinal change (e.g. through metaphors) to building rapport (e.g. through mirroring), to bypass or neutralize disagreement or contestation in the case of ‘unwilling’ coachees. At the heart of this chapter is again rhetoric culture theory, which provides a useful theoretical backdrop for understanding the persuasive and performative language used by coaches to motivate positive change in their coachees (i.e. as neoliberal ‘subjects’) and to influence spheres of social relations beyond the self (cf. Farrell 1993: 3).

## BEGINNING WITH THE END, ENDING WITH THE BEGINNING

Although our treatment of rhetoric in social relations relates primarily to *how* people communicate, from the parts of speech they use, to the multiple and competing discourses/discursive strategies that shape and are shaped by social relations, we also acknowledge, as previous volumes in the *Studies in Rhetoric and Culture* series have done, the importance of chiasmic relationships (see Strecker and Tyler 2009a: 9; Tyler and Strecker 2009: 21; and especially Paul and Wiseman 2014: 1–2). This is the concern of Jamin Pelkey’s opening chapter on chiasmus that we briefly introduced above. In his recent review of the first *Studies in Rhetoric and Culture* series books, Pelkey (2016a) wrote that ‘chiasmus is ... something of a hermeneutic key or prism’ (Paul and Wiseman 2014: 7, 12), enabling us to identify, perform and better understand reversals in perspective or behaviour (see Bollig 2014: 172; Lewis 2014: 188, 199, 212;

Strecker 2014: 87) and better enabling us ‘to live in harmony’ (Paul 2014: 42) with people, ideas and other entities that are ‘at once diverse and in relationship’ (see Pelkey 2016a: 31). We take seriously Pelkey’s advice that insights from phenomenologically embodied cognition may be of use to the Rhetoric Culture Project. Chiasmus is one key element in this venture, as it is a remarkably widespread figure of human thought. As Pelkey further suggests (2016b: 32), ‘typologies of chiasmus are ... needed; and to this end, Paul’s (2014) thoughtful and richly illustrated proposal of four basic categories of chiasmus patterning (cross, mirror, circle, spiral)’ was adopted in his chapter for this volume. Pelkey’s innovative attempt to refine and ground Paul’s (2014) four chiasmus classifications is done using the phenomenon of chiasmus as of bodily movement and interaction in an upright X-posture (see also Pelkey 2016b, 2017). Such a detailed analysis of the dynamics of X-posed figures, which are found throughout our evolutionary past, provides intriguing evidence that the ubiquitous meanings of ‘spread-eagle logos’ found today ‘are rooted far more deeply in the phenomenology and body memory of kinesthesia than they are in the cultural discourses whose purposes they serve’ (Pelkey, this volume). Pelkey goes so far as to speculate that the upright X-posture is perhaps ‘one of the first meaningful, polysemous gestures’ to influence our social-participatory origins as humans (here referring to recent enactivist theory). For him, the question of how social relations are shaped by physical features as fundamentally human as an upright posture is intended to move us beyond ‘problems of solipsism and alienation ... to a space created through dialogue with another’. Turning to some of the latest research on human cognition and linguistic competence (e.g. Zlatev 2017 (inspired by Donald 2012), which argues that both are ‘formed on layered modes of “bodily mimesis” that could only have emerged via social relations’ (Zlatev 2017: 65), analysis of the phenomenology of full body movement through ‘the inverse relationships of arms and legs in motion’ also stimulates further interdisciplinary debate about the embodied origins of social relations and their relevance for understanding rhetoric in social relations today in a comparative, evolutionary sense. It is arguable whether chiasmus – although exceptionally powerful in discourse – is *the* master figure of a general semiotic of human behaviour and culture, including in the field of rhetorical studies. From a rhetorical point of view, chiasmus, next to being bodily anchored, can also be seen as an actively used discursive feature by speakers to indicate subversion, to uncover absurdities, or to argue a point more forcibly via dramatic inversion (cf. Dombek and Herndon 2004: 23). But Pelkey’s pertinent reflections go beyond the discursive and pragmatic aspects of rhetoric as a cultural phenomenon, and bring us back to the issue we alluded to in the early part of the Introduction – and which was repeatedly stressed in this and preceding volumes of the Rhetoric Culture Project: that

of interdisciplinary openness and intellectual collaboration across boundaries, also towards linking psycho-dynamics, embodiment, bodily mimesis (Zlatev 2008) and cognition processes. Relevant here perhaps is Bloch's earlier anthropological work on interpenetration, that is, the internal capacity of humans to 'read' the minds of others (Bloch [2013] 2017: 15). As he writes, 'all social relation[s] implies interpenetration, so the arbitrariness of boundaries within the social fabric applies not just to people who are related but also between all human beings who are in contact' (ibid.). Bloch in his 2012 book already noted (2012: 63) that 'the complexity of human social life is ... built on this continual imagination of the minds of others' ... 'In other words, the most basic predisposition for social relations depends on genetically inherited capacities and not on ones which we could learn' (ibid.). Such insights from the cognitive sciences – and what they omit – have the potential to illuminate some of the key innovations of the Rhetoric Culture Project, including Pelkey's work on chiasmus and embodied rhetoric as fundamental to the inherited capacities of imagining what goes on in the minds of others.

Our evolved human – and culturally varied – capacities to use rhetoric in ways that constitute – and are constituted by – social relations bring us closer to understanding that what we believe others believe and desire and what we believe others believe are our beliefs and desires (to use Bloch's chiasmus) is, indeed, influenced by figuration and persuasion (cf. Knape 2012: 3).

This open approach, necessitating more cross-disciplinary research, promises an ever-richer, more holistic view of rhetoric and social relations in a cognitive-linguistic, evolutionary and cultural perspective (cf. Bloch [2013] 2017, ch. 7), and based on ethnographic examples across time and space. In this spirit, what the contributions in this volume hopefully do is demonstrate the dialectics of rhetoric in and of social relations – rhetoric as both produced by psycho-social and cultural conditions, and creating and shaping human selves and culture in the process.

**Jon Abbink** studied social anthropology, history and philosophy and is a research professor of Politics and Governance in Africa (Political Anthropology) at the African Studies Centre, Leiden University. He did doctoral field research on Ethiopian immigrants in Israel and later mainly worked on Ethiopia and Northeast Africa, focusing on themes like ethno-history, culture and violence, religion and politics, livelihood systems, and culture and environmental management. He was a visiting professor at various universities and has been an elected foreign member of the Ethiopian National Academy of Sciences since 2014. He has published papers/chapters and a dozen books as editor/co-writer on Ethiopian and African Studies. Recent publications include *The Anthropology of Elites* (co-edited, Palgrave, 2012), *Reconfiguring Ethiopia* (co-edited,

Routledge, 2013), a co-authored monograph, *Suri Orature*, on the Suri people (Köppe Verlag, 2014) and the edited volume *The Environmental Crunch in Africa* (Palgrave, 2018).

**Shauna LaTosky** is a socio-cultural anthropologist with a PhD (2010) from Gutenberg-University, Mainz. From 2012 to 2015, she worked at the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology in Halle/Saale as a post-doctoral researcher in the Department of Integration and Conflict, investigating comparative customary law and conflict resolution procedures, especially in relation to traditional livestock management, livestock trade, bridewealth exchange, and changing land use practices in Southern Ethiopia. She was Director of the South Omo Research Center (Jinka, Southern Ethiopia) from 2011 to 2013. Her main research work for the past fifteen years has been in Ethiopia, focusing on Mursi women, modernity, gender relations, pastoralism and development-induced change, identity and rhetoric. Her publications include *The Predicaments of Mursi (Mun) Women in Ethiopia's Changing World* (Köppe Verlag, 2013), articles on agro-pastoralism, Mursi women and material culture in Southern Ethiopia, and the co-edited volume *Writing in the Field: Festschrift for Stephen Tyler* (Lit Verlag, 2013). She currently teaches anthropology at Thompson Rivers University in Kamloops, British Columbia.

## Notes

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1. As a feature of the 'new rhetoric'. See *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 2006 (<https://www.britannica.com/topic/rhetoric/Scope-and-organization-of-argumentation>) (accessed 14 August 2020). See also Enos and Brown 1993, and Flower 1993: 171.
2. Trying to analyse expressive behaviour in terms of primordial (unconscious) rhetoric (Kull 2001: 693).
3. As in the definition in the 1971 book *Prospect of Rhetoric*, cited in Simonson (2014: 106): 'Rhetorical studies are properly concerned with the process by which symbols and systems of symbols have influence upon beliefs, values, attitudes, and actions, and they embrace all forms of human communication, not exclusively public address nor communication within any one class or cultural group'. In addition, to say that *only* rhetoric has the power to produce and reproduce culture and society is a truism (although perhaps not even true).
4. That is, within the social conditions it refers to, and (re)creates some of the accepted canons of social knowledge in that setting. It is 'a way of knowing' (Scott 1967: 17) but not to be equated with scientific knowledge. In that sense, 'epistemic' might have been a misnomer. Perhaps Scott's main flaw is not having properly defined the relationship of his argument of 'rhetoric as epistemic' to the canons/discourse of scientific knowl-

edge claims. Croasmun and Cherwitz (1982) had a good point when they said that Scott's thesis that 'rhetoric creates truth' is insufficient; rhetoric is rather a form of 'inquiry', not critically tested as in scientific argument, and creating 'social truths' (Izumi 2018: 1491). The too relativist epistemology in Barry Brummett's (1990) rejection of Scott's thesis did not bring a solution.

5. Also, the way that 'culture' – via French, coming from the Latin *colere*, meaning 'to tend to the earth and grow', or 'cultivate and nurture' – is impacted and shaped by rhetoric may need more theorizing. How does rhetoric 'sediment' into culture?
6. Compare Bailey in his important study of political rhetoric (1983: 15): 'one may think of culture as a set of rules for interpreting experience and shaping action' ... 'all culture grows out of social interaction, out of communication'.
7. Strecker and Tyler (2009b: 3) make the core point, describing rhetoric as 'the discipline that since antiquity has been concerned with the ubiquity of inward and outward persuasion, and with the hidden agenda of interlocutors'.
8. See <http://www.rhetoricculture.org/outline.htm> (accessed 6 August 2016).
9. This is not to deny that science, including the so-called hard sciences, *also* follows rhetorical conventions. See Weimer's excellent article of 1977.
10. At [www.britannica.com/topic/rhetoric/Rhetoric-in-philosophy-the-new-rhetoric](http://www.britannica.com/topic/rhetoric/Rhetoric-in-philosophy-the-new-rhetoric) (accessed 5 April 2018). White (1985: 687) has argued that rhetoric can also be seen as 'the art of establishing the probable by arguing from our sense of the probable', that is, within a specific rhetorical setting.
11. This was the main thrust of *Writing Culture*, the famous collection edited by James Clifford and George Marcus (1986) on the textual conventions and authorial 'strategies of authority' – a book that had such an (over-extended) influence in anthropology.
12. *Not* only scientific knowledge.
13. For an introduction to this fascinating body of work, see Girard et al. 2007; see also Neufeld Redekop and Ryba 2013. Girard's theory is tested and corroborated in recent work on human cognition (cf. Zlatev 2017). For a nice application of Girard's theory in rhetorical studies, see Vandenberg 2006.
14. Aristotle's concept of rhetoric was also about the issue of integrating reason and emotion!
15. We hereby also refer to the scientific discussions on 'Machiavellian intelligence' (cf. Byrne and Whitten 1988, Whitten and Byrne 1997). See also the fascinating case of 'tactical empathy' (Bubandt and Willerslev 2015), another rhetorical strategy in social life.
16. A prime example is Lévi-Strauss's brilliant study *Le Totémisme Aujourd'hui* (1962).
17. Sperber has continued work on rationality and reason, concluding that the 'basic functions of reason are social'. See his very interesting 2017 interview at: [https://www.edge.org/conversation/dan\\_sperber-the-function-of-reason](https://www.edge.org/conversation/dan_sperber-the-function-of-reason). Cf. also Mercier and Sperber 2017.
18. See <https://johnshaplin.blogspot.com/2017/05/rhetoric-and-constitution-of-social.html>, and his works (e.g. Herzfeld [1997] 2014). We are here reminded of the unique work of Erving Goffman, who in his *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (1959) in fact presented a rhetorical analysis of social interaction driven by individuals' persuasive self-presentation. See also his last work (1983).
19. The relevance of the hugely influential work of Jürgen Habermas should also be explored here. Cf. Rehg 2013.

20. Foreshadowed in Straus [1947] 1952, who said that expressions like ‘standing’ or ‘to be upright’ have a double connotation: one physical, the other psychological or moral. He said that to be upright means to rise, to stand on one’s own feet, as well as not to stoop to anything and to stand by one’s convictions [1947] 1952: 530.
21. One example is Huntington 2013.

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