Chapter 6


On 16 September 1957, the day after the CDU/CSU’s historic victory in the election to the third Bundestag, Chancellor Adenauer spent part of his day “reviewing” a triumphant victory parade before the Chancellery in Bonn. This victory parade, however, was a bit out of the ordinary: it was not made up of adoring West German citizens celebrating the reelection of their chancellor. Instead, with military music blaring, Adenauer reviewed a procession of thirty-six blue Volkswagen buses belonging to the advertising firm Mobilwerbung. These buses, equipped with the latest film projection and audio equipment, had spent the summer crisscrossing West Germany, in cities and towns both big and small, screening campaign films and organizing public relations activities on the behalf of Adenauer and the CDU/CSU. This ceremony was arranged, Der Spiegel commented, because Adenauer wanted to officially acknowledge and honor what had earned his election victory: party propaganda. As Adenauer approached the Chancellery, one of the VW buses sped through the streets of Bad Godesberg and Bonn announcing “The chancellor is coming!”—as it had done so often in preparation for Adenauer’s rallies during the campaign. During the ceremony Adenauer was in such a jubilant mood that he even raised a glass of champagne in celebration, a most uncommon occurrence for the chancellor, who rarely drank. The chancellor then solemnly presented the firm with a medal engraved with his profile in relief and the inscription: “In deep gratitude for your service.” However in the midst of the festivities, the dour chancellor quickly turned serious, declaring

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that “the celebration is over” since the state elections in North Rhine–Westphalia were the following year and the party must commence its preparations.¹

Adenauer had every reason to celebrate after the election. The 15 September 1957 Bundestag election was unquestionably the high point of the CDU/CSU’s electoral success during Adenauer’s government.² The CDU/CSU’s winning of 50.2 percent of the vote marked the first and only time in the Federal Republic of Germany that a political party gained a majority. In many ways, the trend begun in 1953 of transferring votes from splinter parties to the main parties of the CDU/CSU, SPD, and FDP continued in the 1957 election, although the FDP’s share of the vote did decline slightly to 7.7 percent. In 1949, splinter parties had captured almost 28 percent of the vote. By the 1957 election this figure had dropped to just over 10 percent. The CDU/CSU picked up most of these votes, ensuring the party its greatest electoral victory.³ Without a doubt, the 1957 election was the zenith of what has been termed the “Adenauer Chancellery.”

This election also proved to be a crucial juncture in the SPD’s painful and difficult road to reform that led to the Bad Godesberg Program in 1959, in which it finally abandoned any form of socialism as part of its economic platform. Since the 1949 election, the SPD had gained in terms of overall votes (6.9 million vs. 9.4 million in 1957) and the percentage of the vote (29.2 vs. 31.8 percent). Nevertheless, the party fell further behind its main competitor, the CDU/CSU, whose share of the vote skyrocketed from 31.0 to 50.2 percent during that same period. The SPD could not break out of its “thirty percent ghetto” made up primarily of the working-class vote, and the resulting defeat spelled dramatic changes in the party’s platform and personnel.

The 1957 election was also a landmark in terms of the evolution of West Germany’s political culture and the project of selling the economic miracle. Over the course of the campaign, the CDU/CSU’s application of public opinion surveys and advertising principles developed in the transitional 1953 campaign came to full fruition. In 1953 the CDU/CSU had used polling that sketched out the broad contours of West German public opinion to shape its campaign. In the 1957 campaign the party utilized polling far more intensely in both the planning and execution of the campaign. The CDU/CSU now precisely researched the sociological structure of the supporters of the various parties. In addition, the CDU/CSU began to research particular pieces of prospective propaganda to ascertain their exact resonance with the West German population—thereby allowing the party to tailor its propaganda to speak to specific sociological groups and maximize its campaign’s effectiveness. In this way, the CDU/CSU fully embraced techniques, borrowed from commercial advertising, of carefully investigating the “target” consumer of its product, in this case a party image. This approach to political ideas traces back to the growth of organizations such as Die Waage, the Institut für Demoskopie, and the Federal Press Agency, which all looked to practices in the United States for guidance, resulting in what could be termed as the “Americanization” of West German campaigning. Although only eight years removed, the crude propaganda instruments of the 1949 campaign that spoke primarily to
the party’s base were long gone. With the new propaganda tools, Adenauer and the CDU/CSU master fully crafted a campaign centered around the themes of security, stability, and prosperity.

The CDU/CSU initiated planning for the 1957 election almost immediately following the 1953 victory. The so-called Wednesday circle of leading national party leaders began meeting over a year in advance of the election to begin hashing out strategy. In order to coordinate the national election strategy with the CSU, Adenauer asked the CSU chairman Hans Seidel to send CSU representatives to the meetings. By January 1956, the CDU’s leadership realized that the party’s organization must be revamped to succeed in the upcoming election. Adenauer voiced concern at an executive committee meeting that the 1953 victory might negatively affect party members’ motivation to strengthen their party because all appeared to be going well.

North Rhine–Westphalia Interior Minister Franz Meyer was named the CDU’s campaign manager and undertook, along with the CDU party manager Bruno Heck, to strengthen the party’s organization during 1956. Their efforts to increase the party membership from its 1956 level of about 230,000 proved somewhat disappointing as party membership remained under 250,000 at the time of the campaign. A considerable number of the 195 Kreisgeschäftsführer (district party managers) hired in preparation for the 1953 campaign had been let go because the district, regional, and federal party organizations could not afford to pay them. With increased financial contributions from industry in election years, the party was able to ensure that every district party organization had a manager back in place to prepare for the 1957 campaign, and in fact, each manager was provided with an auto to facilitate campaign activities. Meyer spent much of the summer of 1956 traveling through West Germany, working to build up district party organizations. With considerable success, in November 1956 he pushed the CDU’s executive committee to install election leaders (Wahlleiter) in each voting district to help organize and direct campaigns. Also months before the election, Meyer worked to educate and train local party leadership in how to distribute campaign materials, including leaflets and posters, and how to maintain party membership lists.

Not only did the CDU want to strengthen its organization, it sought to coordinate the campaign more effectively with lower echelons of the party, and especially with its individual Bundestag representatives. In late 1956, Bruno Heck sent out a number of polling and sociological surveys to the state and local organizations to help them formulate a campaign strategy for their own regions and districts. Also, starting in January 1956 the central party headquarters began an extensive sociological and statistical study of the West German electorate. This study included a sociological analysis of the West German population in terms of gender, religion, education, class, and size of home town/city; a statistical analysis of the previous Bundestag and Landestag elections; and finally a sociological and political analysis of each election district to be given to the respective Bundestag representative or candidate. The reports generally reaffirmed what the
party already knew in terms of its voters’ background: the party’s strongest support came from smaller towns, rural areas, Catholics, women, and older West Germans. Nevertheless, this systematically quantified analysis of each voting district endowed the CDU/CSU candidates with a wealth of data to campaign effectively at the local level. In addition, it gave the central leadership a broad view of the general characteristics of the electorate so that it could begin to formulate strategies for making inroads into groups less likely to support the CDU/CSU.

In late winter 1957 the CDU/CSU commissioned the Institut für Demoskopie to research the sociological structure of the CDU/CSU’s, SPD’s, and FDP’s support. The organization’s analysis, “Parteien unter der Lupe” (Parties under the Microscope), broke down the supporters of the various parties into three groups of “strong,” “middle,” and “weak” according to age, sex, education, income, religion, and occupation, among other categories. Overall, it indicated that both the CDU/CSU and the SPD enjoyed support from about 29 percent of the population, respectively, with the FDP coming in at 5 percent. Fifty-nine percent of the CDU/CSU’s supporters described themselves as “weak” or “middle” supporters while 34 percent were self-described as “strong” supporters and 7 percent provided no answer. The survey discovered a few tendencies in the sociological makeup of CDU/CSU supporters: its Protestant followers were more likely to fall into the “middle” or “weak” category, while 68 percent of the “strong” supporters were Catholic (58 percent total of CDU/CSU supporters were Catholic). The report echoed the earlier reports that the strongest CDU/CSU supporters, those least likely to change their votes, tended to be Catholics, especially Catholic women from rural areas. In addition, a majority (67 percent) of the CDU/CSU’s strong supporters attended church frequently. Interestingly, this survey did not categorize supporters of the parties according to their possible background as refugees from East Germany or other areas of Central or Eastern Europe.

In addition, the survey identified the voters who appeared to be solidly in the SPD’s camp. The typical “strong” supporter tended to be male (57 percent), not highly educated (91 percent Volkschule only, that is education up to about age 14), and from the working class (78 percent). This group of “strong” SPD voters constituted, by the Institut für Demoskopie’s estimates, about 11 percent of the West German population. The survey indicated that along with these “strong” voters, the “middle” and “weak” SPD supporters were probably not going to drift into the bourgeois parties’ camp.

Perhaps most importantly, the survey analyzed the sociological makeup of undecided voters. Sixty-nine percent of these respondents self-identified with the CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP, and other parties. In addition, 21 percent of respondents did not identify with any specific party yet were still planning to vote, while 10 percent were not planning to vote. This group of undecided voters was generally heterogeneous, but nevertheless a few characteristics did emerge. The CDU/CSU’s weakest supporters and those who were undecided were heavily weighted toward women (56 percent vs. 54 percent of the total population), Protestants (68 percent vs. 59 percent of the total population), the better educated (28 per-
cent with higher education vs. 22 per cent of the total population), and persons not attending church regularly (49 percent seldom or never vs. 43 percent of the total population).

It was to this undecided segment of the population that the CDU/CSU had to gear its message. It constituted the key “swing vote” that would determine success or failure in the election—in which the message of economic success along with the Adenauer’s leadership would be crucial issues. The survey clearly showed that the CDU/CSU had strong support from Catholic voters, but this was not sufficient to get elected. Besides, since the 1949 Bundestag election the Catholic churches in West Germany had left no doubt about which party they wanted their flocks to vote for. Such insight into the makeup and views of the electorate clearly explains why the CDU/CSU did not emphasize its religious roots in its national-level propaganda. A strong showing from the Catholic and religious Protestant vote was almost guaranteed to the party. Thus, propaganda on economics was directed toward the decisive “undecided” segment of the population, especially women, that would act as the swing vote. While surveys indicated that 43 percent of the general population saw reunification as the most important issue in West Germany, economic issues (economic conditions, prices, wages, and currency) was a clear second (30 percent of the general population vs. 21 percent of CDU/CSU supporters).10

In the 1957 election the work of professional advertising agencies, together with the application of ever more precise sociological and polling analyses of the electorate, contributed to a more exact, deliberate construction of the CDU/CSU’s image. Although the advertisers’ impact might have been relatively limited in the 1957 campaign in comparison to their role in the 1960s elections and beyond, their presence was quite significant for the very first time.11 In the 1957 campaign two advertising agents, Dr. Hegemann of Düsseldorf and Die Werbe of Essen, designed and distributed two important components of the CDU/CSU’s propaganda: posters and magazine advertisements that profiled CDU/CSU leaders and highlighted West German consumerist prosperity.12 Their role was clearly defined and significant: the advertising agents did not help provide the basic conceptualization of the campaign, but instead transformed the party’s ideas into effective propaganda.

In addition, although political parties, governmental organizations, and various interest groups had utilized public opinion surveys since 1948, the 1957 election was the first one in which the exploitation of the surveys became extensive. The CDU/CSU had been tracking the general trend of public opinion since the Federal Press Agency had contracted the Institut für Demoskopie and the EMNID Institut in 1951 to conduct regular surveys for the government. The Bundesgeschäftsstelle also contracted with EMNID to conduct specific surveys in preparation for the 1957 election.13 But compared to the 1953 campaign, in 1957 public opinion surveys were used far more precisely to test even particular pieces of propaganda. The CDU/CSU researched its main campaign slogans, including “Keine Experimente” (No experiments) and “Wohlstand für Alle” (Prosperity for
all), through polling surveys conducted by the Institut für Demoskopie. In fact, “no experiments” was formulated by the commercial advertising agent Hubert Strauf, who had masterminded Coca-Cola’s famous “Mach mal Pause!” (Take a break!) advertising campaign of the 1950s. Heidrun Abromeit, in his analysis of campaigning practices in West Germany, commented that a good slogan must “focus a campaign. It should express what the impending election is really about and in the best case provide the motive for electing a party or person.” With the aid of advertising agents and polling, the CDU/CSU’s slogans accomplished this goal by powerfully expressing the themes of security and prosperity. In her defense of the use of polling research as part of the political process, Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann likened surveys to plebiscites, a most basic form of democracy. But in many respects, the CDU/CSU increasingly used public opinion surveys not only to monitor the mood of the nation, but to better sell its political product by means of pretesting the party’s propaganda to determine how it resonated with the public. The surveys were used not so much to understand public opinion so that the party could engage in a true dialogue with it, but rather in order to manage, direct, and exploit it.

Undoubtedly, the use of polling surveys and modern advertising techniques had a significant impact on the campaign’s tone and focus. As in the 1953 campaign, in 1957 the CDU/CSU concentrated its election focus upon the persona of Chancellor Adenauer. Particularly important was the CDU/CSU’s emphasis on its leading personalities as “brand names” of the party representing the party image, a break from older German electoral traditions of emphasizing a party’s program. In large part, this was a lesson learned from the American-style election campaigns, such as the “We like Ike” slogans in Dwight D. Eisenhower’s 1952 and 1956 presidential campaigns. In fact, the CDU campaign chief Bruno Heck made two six-week trips to the United States to observe the 1952 and 1956 presidential campaigns and drew heavily from these experiences in shaping the CDU/CSU’s campaigns. There he would have observed campaigns’ emphasis on the creation of a presidential candidate’s image, a characteristic of American campaigns since the early nineteenth century. In addition, by the 1952 campaign, the two main American political parties were utilizing professional advertising agents to shape their campaigns, a technique that the CDU/CSU picked up for the 1957 campaign.

Particularly effective in the United States was the use of television spots to project Eisenhower into the consciousness of the American public. Clearly, one thing that Heck had brought from America was the focus placed upon personalities in political campaigns. By drawing upon a more American approach to campaigning, the CDU/CSU led the shift taking place in West Germany in the 1950s from an overtly ideological politics to one increasingly based on personalities and the party image. In large measure to reach out to different sociological groups of voters, the CDU/CSU in 1957 concentrated upon West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and his cabinet with one of the campaign’s main slogans, “Adenauer und seine Mannschaft” (Adenauer and his team). In the realm of economics, the
CDU/CSU no longer espoused, as it had in 1949, the more ideological position of the social market economy and its relation to the creation of an organic, Christian community. Instead, the party focused more upon newly gained opportunities for individualistic consumption, a sentiment personified by Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard and likely to attract key undecided voters. In contrast, the SPD’s campaigns were still based on narrow ideological positions focused on its base—mostly male, Protestant workers and failed to attract a broad range of interests.

But by early 1957 it appeared that Adenauer’s popularity had somewhat waned since the 1953 election. For example, polls in April 1953 and January/February 1957 asked whether Adenauer should remain as chancellor or relinquish the position to someone else. In April 1953, 48 percent thought Adenauer should remain, against 26 percent who thought someone else would be better. In contrast, by January/February 1957 only 36 percent of respondents believed that Adenauer should remain chancellor, while 41 percent preferred that someone else take up the position. It seemed that most of the respondents who wanted a new chancellor regarded Adenauer’s age as a liability. Nevertheless, Adenauer still possessed a powerful resonance with the public opinion, a point of which the party was quite conscious, having monitored the party’s and the chancellor’s popularity with a battery of ongoing polls since the Federal Press Agency had contracted the Institut für Demoskopie in 1951.

In conjunction with the swing in Adenauer’s popularity, the CDU/CSU’s support dipped from the second half of 1956 through about late spring 1957. In fact, the SPD’s support surpassed the CDU/CSU’s between August 1956 and January 1957. It then remained about even until April 1957, when the CDU/CSU began pulling ahead. Nevertheless, Adenauer’s reputation drew support exceeding that of his party. In the first quarter of 1957, a period when the CDU/CSU was lagging behind the SPD in the polls, 45 percent of West Germans agreed with Adenauer’s policies versus 23 percent who disagreed and 31 percent who were undecided. In December 1956, 56 percent of West Germans believed that Konrad Adenauer was West Germany’s most capable contemporary politician, in comparison to the 6 percent of support garnered by Erich Ollenhauer. Adenauer commanded a clearly defined image among the West German population. According to a December 1956 Institut für Demoskopie survey, West Germans were most likely to describe Adenauer as “clever,” “diplomatic,” and “persistent, tough.” In the election campaign the CDU/CSU played off Chancellor Adenauer’s image among the West German people. Adenauer represented an authoritative, patriarchal figure, someone who brought legitimacy to the West German state—qualities that the public felt no other West German politician could match. As Hans-Peter Schwarz has commented, the voters demanded “a successful, hard-boiled, bewitchingly entertaining, fully self-assured patriarch, who promised them all would be well if only they voted for the CDU.”

The CDU/CSU realized that for the West German population, Adenauer represented a sense of security that could be translated into electoral success.
report from the CDU’s Bundesgeschäftsstelle commented that in Adenauer the CDU/CSU possessed a figure representing experience, authority, and the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany. The key to the campaign was to develop and exploit the personalities of “Adenauer and his team,” who exemplified “independent men” and “not functionaries and pawns of the party apparatus.” This image of the CDU/CSU being composed of capable men with genuine accomplishments was built to directly contrast with the CDU/CSU’s portrayal of the SPD leadership as party hacks and ideological apparatchiks. The CDU/CSU had to run a campaign stressing that West Germany should not change horses in midstream. “Training new personnel is in general expensive and means continued risks (experiments!),” one campaign strategy report commented.26

Until his death in May 1957 from an infection contracted in Africa, Otto Lenz proved critical in the formation of the CDU/CSU campaign, much as he had been in the 1953 election. In preparation for the election, he activated the numerous parallel propaganda efforts that had been developed for the previous 1953 campaign. In early January 1957, at a low point in the party’s popularity, Lenz reported to Adenauer that an immediate “advertising action” was necessary since it would be impossible to achieve such a steep climb in the party’s popularity in the final months before the election. Lenz outlined the challenges and tasks of propaganda, including various brochures to be published by the Federal Press Agency, a poster campaign backing NATO and the support of Hungary, and a decrease in import taxes on tobacco—all to be enacted in order to boost Adenauer and his government’s popularity. As in the 1953 campaign, Mobilwerbung, the organization outfitted with equipment-laden VW buses, roamed the Federal Republic screening pro-government films—especially ones dealing with West Germany’s NATO membership. But the main thrust of Lenz’s activities was to elevate the popularity of Chancellor Adenauer, including strategies such as sending a letter from the chancellor to all West German households asking for their vote and launching a campaign train that carried Adenauer across West Germany to give speeches in each town and city where the train stopped.27

In terms of economics, the CDU/CSU feared that the favorable public opinion toward economic progress had dulled. A February 1957 report indicated that although the party’s economic policy was no less successful between 1953 and 1957 than it had been between 1949 and 1953, the public’s confidence had somewhat decreased. The report commented that “[t]he memory of the years between 1945 and 1948 has faded and the fulfillment of material needs has led the population decreasingly to a corresponding contentment. Instead, what is detected is a continual extension of what are considered needs.”28 In other words, expectations grew even more quickly than the rise in living standards. The campaign must give a “representation of the economic successes since 1949 through 1953 with the help of graphic and numerical examples.”29 The key to the campaign was convincing West Germans of the material improvement they had enjoyed since 1948.
saw this as perhaps the chief problematic issue for reelecting the Adenauer government. Leading up to the election, public opinion surveys revealed great anxiety over the rise of prices. In March 1957 the Institut für Demoskopie produced a report, “Das Zentrum der Krise” (Center of the Crisis), that analyzed public opinion regarding prices. The majority of West Germans (72 percent) believed that prices would rise in the ensuing quarter year. The report posited that prices were a critical issue in voter attitudes. “One must,” the Institut’s report commented, “come to terms with the realization that the stability of prices for the majority of the population also is the symbol for economic and political stability.” The West German population feared that the economic gains of the past years would be lost. In addition, only 18 percent of West Germans regarded their economic conditions as being better than the year before, despite the fact that real wages had been rising throughout the 1950s. To a certain extent, the CDU/CSU was facing attitudes that had been present since the Korean Crisis of 1950–1952, so the report merely reiterated the importance of the West German public’s view of prices. Overall, the report concluded that although living standards were rising with the improvement of the West German economy since 1948, the public’s expectations had correspondingly risen.

Nevertheless West Germans were not completely pessimistic. Thirty-three percent of respondents to an Institut für Demoskopie survey believed that economic conditions were good, while another 48 percent believed they were middling. That left only about 10 percent who thought conditions were bad. In addition, all through the 1950s there was a guarded optimism in terms of personal living standards. For example, in the summer of 1956, 25 percent of respondents to an Institut für Demoskopie survey believed that their situation was better than the year before, up from 12 percent in May 1951. Perhaps more tellingly, only 16 percent in the summer of 1956 believed conditions were worse than the year before, compared to 56 percent in 1951. By 1956 the vast majority of respondents (84 percent) perceived either no difference or an improvement in their condition from the year before. By the summer of 1957 this figure had climbed to 90 percent.

Part of the guarded optimism was perhaps the result of strategic policies instituted by Economics Minister Erhard that helped keep the rise in prices in check. From late 1956 into the summer of 1957, consumer prices remained relatively stable, especially for such goods as food, beverages and tobacco, and housing. Erhard, who was fully familiar with the latest polling data, perceived the danger of higher prices in an election year. In a March 1957 letter, Erhard explained to Adenauer that the opposition and trade unions were pushing for higher wages, driving the rise in prices, and creating an unfavorable climate for the government. Since Erhard had no faith that industry would hold firm against the unions’ demands, he proposed two ideas to the chancellor. First, Erhard wanted to assemble 1,500 to 2,000 leaders of industry, crafts, wholesale trade, and retail to inform them of the dangers currently threatening the free market system. He hoped to obtain their promises not to contribute to inflation by raising wages prior to the election. Second, Erhard wished to assemble representatives from
forty to fifty firms “whose products every housewife knows” and persuade them
to not raise prices, then proclaim their intent through advertisements appearing
in leading newspapers. Over the spring of 1957, retailers embarked on a pub-
licity campaign explaining that their goods were cheaper or no more expensive
than in 1955. In addition, leading brand-name manufacturers’ advertisements in
West German newspapers declared that their prices would not rise before the
year’s end. Then other manufacturers and retailers fell into line and announced
similar efforts. In addition, the government lowered import duties on coffee and
tobacco, a measure suggested by Otto Lenz that provided a visible example of the
decrease in prices. With these actions, West German consumers, especially
women, saw prices stabilize in the decisive period prior to the election.

Furthermore, in January 1957 the Bundestag passed a reform of pension laws,
a piece of legislation that contributed to creating favorable conditions for the CDU/
CSU. Despite Erhard’s objections that it would spur inflation and ultimately cre-
ate a welfare state, the reform instituted what has been called a “dynamic” or “pro-
ductivity pension” system. Pension payments were linked to the productivity of
the economy and the per capita income of those employed. This meant that pen-
sions would rise with increases in the real social product. With this measure, pen-
sions were immediately increased by 60 to 90 percent for West Germany’s 7
million pensioners, allowing them to actually live on their payments. The change
was calculated back to 1 January, so many pensioners received a monetary lump
sum in the spring of 1957. Undoubtedly, this pension increase and the additional
money in pensioners’ pockets meant stronger support for the CDU/CSU. Institu-
tür für Demoskopie surveys demonstrated that this was a hugely popular action,
and not merely for the pensioners themselves. In general, a large percentage of the
West German population supported generous pensions. One February 1957 sur-
vey indicated that 79 percent of respondents supported a “good pension” coupled
with high taxes over low taxes and a poor pension. In other words, West Ger-
mans valued the long-term security of solid pensions over more money in their
pockets in the short term. This support for the pension system, which continued
through the end of the 1950s and into 1960s, became a cornerstone in the
CDU/CSU’s social policy. But in early 1957, the CDU/CSU pushed the reform
forward chiefly with an eye to the upcoming election.

Perhaps more than in any of its previous Bundestag campaigns, the CDU/
CSU framed its campaign message around a highly developed and clearly articu-
lated metaphor of “Adenauer and his team” as protective parents who provided se-
curity, stability, and prosperity to the West German family. They were to be portrayered as capable leaders and experts who offered a protective insulation to
West Germans in the face of a painful past and a dangerous present, all the while
enabling West Germans to avail themselves of the pleasures of a rising consum-
erism. As one CDU report on the main campaign themes suggested, the party
must present itself as the one with “experienced, expert statesmen.” This idea ran
through all aspects of the campaign. The party was to represent security in foreign
policy by touting its ability to overcome the burden of the Nazi and war past
through its European policy and relationships with the West, while still acting as a “speaking partner” (Gesprächspartner) with the Soviet Union—as seen by Adenauer’s 1955 trip to Moscow to negotiate the release of German POWs. Unsettling issues, such as the possibility of arming West German troops with tactical nuclear weapons, were muted and pushed off stage. Although Adenauer secretly thought that the West German Bundeswehr would need to equip itself with such weapons in the future, West Germans were disturbed by this prospect, as polls clearly indicated when the issue entered into public and political debate in the early part of 1957.39 Social security was represented by the creation of new jobs, strengthening of pensions, and improvement of health insurance. This approach dovetailed with the emphasis upon Chancellor Adenauer as a symbol of the nation’s—and not least, the party’s—security and stability.40 Overall this metaphorical approach to campaigning not only attracted voters by inviting them to share the party’s worldview; also, through the creation of a coherent image of the party, it helped shape voter perception of the CDU/CSU itself, while at the same time directing voter perceptions of the SPD and the Federal Republic.

Central to this metaphor of the party’s leadership representing paternalistic security was the exploitation of West Germany’s economic expansion as one of the party’s main achievements. In essence, the CDU/CSU did not treat economic prosperity and the accompanying rise in GNP and consumption levels as merely positive developments in and of themselves. Instead they linked economic expansion with deeper, cultural currents—as West Germans’ desire for security and stability. As one outline of campaign themes explained, the idea of economic security had to be stressed using the slogans, “Prosperity for all—Stability—No Experiments—Continue Upwards—All should live better!”41

Since Economics Minister Erhard possessed a powerful and positive resonance with the West German public, he became, next to Adenauer, the most important symbol in the campaign. In July 1957, 51 per cent of respondents in a poll expressed a good opinion of him while he was unknown to only 12 percent, making him the most consistently well-known minister in Adenauer’s cabinet.42 Erhard was described by the CDU/CSU “as the Minister of the consumer, the first German Economics Minister with wide popularity.”43 The CDU/CSU saw that one of its chief tasks for the election was to shape and exploit Erhard’s popularity and his image as the father of the economic miracle, an image that he had cultivated since his days as head of the Economics Administration of the Bizone in 1948. This campaign emphasis on Erhard as representing not just economic reconstruction but a growing prosperity and consumerism signalled a clear shift in terms of the meaning of economics to West Germans. Not so much was economic reconstruction or the social market economy represented as part of the reconstruction of an organic, Christian community, as in the 1949 campaign, or as part of the legitimacy of the Federal Republic, as had been the case in the 1953 campaign. Instead, open consumerism was highlighted more extensively and portrayed as not only the satisfaction of individual desires, but as manifestation of an overall sense of national and personal security. As the CDU report con-
cluded, propaganda should highlight “ownership for everyone as additional protection of the general prosperity and the independence of the individual and his family.”

In many respects, the CDU/CSU was borrowing the commercial advertising approach that one sells not the product itself, in this case Adenauer and the party, but instead some sort of individual benefit, both rational and emotional, that the prospective consumer, in this instance the voter, gains from the product. In the case of 1957 the party was selling the idea of security and stability as represented by its “brand names” of the party leadership, who clearly articulated the identity of the party. Commercial advertising’s influence is revealed not only by the fact that the party retained two advertising firms to develop its propaganda, but also by the way the party allocated its resources. Central to the CDU/CSU’s undertaking was a massive advertising campaign in popular magazines and newspapers aimed at popularizing Adenauer’s cabinet. Out of the DM 6.5 million budget for the central party, DM 1.9 million (30 percent) was expended on the ad campaign and another DM 1.6 million (25 per cent) went to its poster campaign—which was organized and run by the advertising firm of Dr. Hegemann. Die Werbe, the CDU/CSU’s advertising agent in charge of the magazine and newspaper campaign, commented early on in the campaign that, “It is continually to be kept in mind, that propaganda for these personalities must also be propaganda for Konrad Adenauer.” The initial advertisements portrayed Adenauer with the leading cabinet personalities who had spoken at the party’s May 1957 convention in Hamburg. Later advertisements depicted the cabinet members themselves, especially the best-known ones, creating a sense of each as a capable individual. Prior to launching the campaign, the Die Werbe provided a detailed analysis of the readership of the various popular magazines, including the total circulation, gender, and size of the cities of the readership. The circulation of the proposed magazines was quite large, totaling 10.8 million copies. Through the summer of 1957 the CDU/CSU placed the heaviest concentration of their advertisements in illustrated magazines, such as Der Stern, Quick, and Hör zu, which were noted for their colored photos and easily-read articles of general interest. In the two weeks before the election, the ad campaign’s focus shifted to local, regional, and national newspapers, including Die Welt am Sonntag and Bild-Zeitung, with a total circulation of over 11 million copies. In all, the party generated twenty-three different advertisements that appeared in a total of over 21 million newspapers and over 80 million magazines. Meanwhile the overall number of leaflets distributed actually declined—from over 22 million in 1953 to 20 million in 1957. By comparison with these magazine advertisements, the leaflets were blunt instruments. Armed with comprehensive information on each magazine’s readership, the CDU/CSU was able to precisely direct its message to targeted potential voters—much as commercial advertising targets potential consumers.

The application of commercial advertising techniques represented an important step in the “Americanization” of West Germany’s political culture, a process in which the CDU/CSU conducted more issue- and personality-based campaigns
to attract broad-based support. One of the party’s slogans from the campaign succinctly summed up the overall spirit of the campaign: “Our Performance Is Our Program.” Eschewing inflexible, ideological program statements in favor of many different, image-centered advertisements gave the party the ability to modify its message slightly for each prospective group of readers, thereby calculatedly reaching key groups of undecided swing voters. An Erich Peter Neumann report to the Bundesgeschäftsstelle of the CDU clearly reflected this use of commercial advertising in the political realm. Neumann’s Institut für Demoskopie maintained many connections to the advertising industry through its surveys, which were often commissioned by advertising agents. In this report for the CDU/CSU he filled in the details involved in a full-blown advertising campaign. Neumann suggested that the CDU/CSU prepare upwards of thirty different advertisements for the campaign. That strategy contrasted sharply with campaigns for commercial products that repeated a given advertisement over and over again. Since there was so much overlap in the magazines’ readership, Neumann believed that continually republishing the same advertisements during a concentrated period prior to the election would bore the readers and lessen the effectiveness of the advertisements. New advertisements that resembled one another in layout and conceptualization would continually attract the public’s interest as well as maintain coherence in regard to the campaign’s major themes. In addition, Neumann urged the CDU to test the resonance of many of the advertisements through test surveys before adopting them for the campaign.

In fact, the Institut für Demoskopie conducted a series of surveys to test the effectiveness of some of the particular pieces of CDU/CSU’s propaganda. Although undertaken after the CDU/CSU had formulated its advertising campaign, one survey clearly demonstrated that propaganda incorporating the name “Adenauer” achieved more resonance than material merely bearing the label “CDU,” or at least was less likely to trigger a negative reaction. This survey, conducted in July 1957, showed that respondents were more likely to agree with statements such as “Adenauer has brought Germany back onto its feet” than ads replacing “Adenauer” with “CDU/CSU.” In addition, advertisements depicting the various cabinet members were tested to ensure that readers went away with the desired image. Other aspects of the advertisements were tested as well, such as their clarity and whether they generated interest. Generally speaking, what the CDU/CSU learned from these surveys was that personalities sold the party better than the party could sell itself—an insight that clearly played itself out in the campaign, much as it had in 1953. In 1957 Adenauer’s extensive campaigning machine once again traversed the country—replete with his special election train, dramatic processions escorting his black Mercedes into villages, rallies accompanied by martial music, and posters proclaiming in anticipation, “HE comes!” before his arrival at a rally.

This personification of the CDU/CSU was carried out largely in gendered terms. The CDU/CSU played off the resonance that Chancellor Adenauer commanded as an authoritative, patriarchal figure who provided legitimacy to the
West German state. In contrast, Erhard, the most popular member of Adenauer’s cabinet, was portrayed as the approachable and amiable, yet capable economics minister who had secured West Germany’s economic miracle. Clearly, CDU/CSU campaign managers wanted to take advantage of Erhard’s image as a minister of the people who represented the interests of average West German consumers, and not merely industry. No longer, as it had done in the 1949 campaign, did the CDU/CSU attempt to attract the “Christian housewife” by evoking an organic, humanist West German society achieved through economic reconstruction. This group was already solidly in the CDU/CSU camp. Instead, the CDU/CSU appealed to the female swing voters, who were more likely Protestant and nonreligious, by illustrating the opportunities for consuming newly available products, such as fashionable clothing, more varied foods, washing machines, and refrigerators, that satisfied the desires of individual women and their families. Back in the 1953 election, public opinion surveys had taught the CDU/CSU to avoid “cultural-political issues” in the campaign for fear of alienating the nonreligious members of the electorate; instead the party stressed its leadership’s achievements in bringing economic prosperity and security to West Germany. Most effectively, perhaps, the CDU/CSU created and exploited Erhard’s image through an advertising campaign entitled “Männer um Adenauer” (Men surrounding Adenauer) that highlighted Adenauer’s leadership and the support of his capable cabinet.

Since Erhard was the focal point of the CDU/CSU’s pitch to female voters, particularly the undecided female voters, the party’s advertising agent suggested that Erhard be portrayed “as the defender of the consumer, optimally in a scene with housewives”; thus one advertisement depicted Erhard at an outdoor market among women doing their shopping (Illustration 6.1). The text, like that of many other CDU/CSU advertisements, evoked the memory of the currency reform as the turning point in the narrative of West Germany’s economic resur-

Illustration 6.1 Men around Adenauer: Professor Ludwig Erhard
gence. It recalled how Erhard had reassured the West German public with convincing calls for reason in the face of uncertainty. This advertisement gave Erhard masculine attributes by linking him to Adenauer and the CDU/CSU-led government. As it pointed out, “Adenauer named the bold [mutagen] professor in 1949 as the Economics Minister in the first, freely elected government of the Federal Republic.” Erhard was referred to by both of his titles—“Professor” and “Federal Economics Minister”—thereby giving him an aura of authority and expertise that helped legitimate his policies. Voicing Erhard’s concern for the consumer, the advertisement noted that “[t]he good and sufficient care [Versorgung] of consumers, according to Erhard, is the basis of a healthy economy.”

The text also forged a connection between Erhard and housewives, softening his image and even giving it feminine characteristics. “Eighty percent of the wages and income,” it commented, “go through the hands of the housewives. Therefore the Economics Ministers especially likes to speak to them. For them he personally concerns himself with prices. Housewives are his most important partner”—unmistakably evoking the stories, retold in magazines such as Der Spiegel in 1953, of how he would visit the local markets in Bonn and converse with the throngs of customers there. He was described as one of them, but simultaneously a figure who moved within the halls of power defending women’s interests as consumers. From this vantage point, Erhard’s image was slightly androgynous. The advertisement’s illustration encouraged this sense by placing Erhard among women in the feminine space of the marketplace as he listened to their concerns, but meanwhile dressed him in a formal suit and tie, indicating his involvement in the masculine world of politics.

The Institut für Demoskopie ran a survey that tested the public’s reaction to the advertisement—including whether readers found the ad interesting, visually attractive, and informative, and how it affected their opinions. The final version appeared with two changes from the draft. The title was changed to “Männer neben Adenauer” (Men beside Adenauer), thereby suggesting a stronger connection to “Adenauer and his team” than the draft title of “Men around Adenauer.” In addition, Erhard was without his trademark cigar in the final version because, as the test survey indicated, readers were disturbed by Erhard’s speaking with housewives with a cigar in his mouth—another example of the softening of Erhard’s image. Forty percent of the respondents who had seen the advertisement remembered Erhard’s connection with the housewife and the consumer, the main image that the CDU/CSU leadership wanted people to retain.56

An alternate advertisement portrayed Erhard in a more masculine light with a stronger-looking profile of the economics minister looking over a scene of trucks, cars, and foot traffic crossing the West German border and a text that explained Erhard’s accomplishment of establishing West Germany’s position in the world economy. Test surveys indicated that this advertisement possessed more resonance with the public than the first Erhard advertisement, especially among men.57 Apparently, however, the CDU/CSU more widely published the advertisement depicting the “softer,” more approachable Erhard with housewives—particularly in the leading women’s magazines with a clearly consumerist bent, such as Brigitte, Con-
Not only did these magazines have a predominantly female readership, they also tended to have a heavier readership in larger cities and in more Protestant areas such as Lower Saxony—where the CDU/CSU hoped to peel away votes from the bourgeois parties of the FDP and DP. Evidently the party realized that the undecided female vote was key to its success and sought to construct an image of Erhard with which women could identify and, given the background of the magazines' readership, deliver its message directly to a targeted audience. Together, the campaign created a gendered sense of stability within the CDU/CSU family, or as the slogan expressed it, “team.” Each member had his specific responsibility. Adenauer provided the political strength to lead West Germany’s diplomatic relations in turbulent times, while Erhard’s policies enabled West Germans to enjoy enhanced living standards at home.

Another example of the “Men beside Adenauer” series, which was published following the CDU’s May 1957 party conference, portrayed Erhard and Adenauer in the midst of what appears to be an intense policy discussion (Illustration 6.2). The visual depiction of Erhard’s working so closely with Adenauer lent itself to the CDU/CSU’s idea of building “Adenauer and his team.” Through his association with Adenauer, Erhard assumed an image of stability and authority, a point backed up with title “Professor” before Erhard’s name. The illustration put Erhard physically close to Adenauer, but clearly in a subordinate role with Erhard positioned behind Adenauer and looking slightly up to him. The text emphasized the visual impression. It made sure to point out that Adenauer had specifically selected Erhard for the position of economics minister. Although the advertisement clearly stressed the Erhard-Adenauer connection and put Adenauer in the position of authority, Erhard did take center stage, with the viewer seeing the economics minister’s face straight on, contrasted to the profile of Adenauer.

Like much of the contemporary conservative propaganda that drew upon and helped create the mythology surrounding the 1948 currency reform, the advertisement recounted the massive change in economic fortunes since 1948. But instead of merely talking about economic policies, the advertisement was crafted to give the reader an impression of personalities. As in other ads, the text was devised to portray Erhard as a man of action, a “bold” man. “He freed us from the guardianship of ration cards,” the ad exulted: “He produced room in which healthy competition could operate. He made the Deutsche Mark into one of the hardest currencies in the world.” The beneficiaries of his labors are identified not as individuals, but as all Germans. Economic reconstruction helped establish West Germany as the legitimate German state within the German nation. The text claimed that “[n]ow and in the future we can help all Germans only if we continue undeterred on our path. Only this way will we achieve reunification.” Via the advertisement’s text, Erhard and economic reconstruction are linked to Adenauer’s statesmanship and stability. Although polling data are unavailable for this particular advertisement, data from similar advertisements suggest that male voters were the target audience of this appeal, especially given its placement of economic issues in the context of the more masculine world of foreign affairs.
MÄNNER NEBEN ADENAUER:

Professor Ludwig Erhard

Niemand denkt gerne an schlechte Zeiten zurück, die längst vergangen sind. Wer will sich heute noch an die Jahre der Not, der Bezugscheine und des Schwarzen Marktes erinnern? Sagten wir uns nicht leichthin, wir seien eben fleißig gewesen, und unser gegenwärtiger Lebensstandard belohne uns nur für die vielen Mühe? Auch unsere Brüder und Schwestern in der Ostzone haben seit der Währungsreform schwer gearbeitet. Aber sie waren nicht frei, sie durften ihre Regierung nicht selbst wählen. So wurden sie um die Früchte ihres Schaffens betrogen.

Wir hatten das Glück, in der Persönlichkeit Dr. Konrad Adenauers einen Bundeskanzler zu bekommen, der das Wohl aller Bürger fördern wollte. Nach diesem Grundsatz suchte er seine Mitarbeiter aus.


Auch Professor Ludwig Erhard gehört zu Adenauers großer deutscher Volkspartei, der CDU/CSU. Er setzt sich mit allen Kräften für ihr Programm ein:

WOHLSTAND FÜR ALLE
EINHEIT FÜR DEUTSCHLAND . FRIEDEN IN DER WELT

Illustration 6.2 Men beside Adenauer: Professor Ludwig Erhard
The magazine and newspaper advertising campaign was not the only approach to creating the party’s image. With the help of the professional advertising firm of Dr. Hegemann, the CDU/CSU launched an extremely effective poster campaign in the months leading up to the election featuring painted portraits of Adenauer and his cabinet. Like the whole campaign, the posters reaffirmed a sense of security and stability under strong leadership. Adenauer’s portrait, painted by the Austrian artist Professor Aigner, dramatically depicted a tanned, vibrant, and young-looking 81-year-old chancellor whose piercing blue eyes locked in the viewer. In the bottom left-hand corner the slogan “No Experiments!” was boldly inscribed over Adenauer’s name. A poster of the same series proclaiming “Prosperity for All!” portrayed Erhard as a determined and serious member of Adenauer’s team. All the politicians’ portraits were placed on a blank, white background, drawing the viewers’ attention to the serious faces themselves. In this important respect, the poster campaign reflected the “Ding an Sich” (thing in itself) traditions of European poster art and advertising in which the focus of the ad was on the inner qualities of a product, expressed through an evocative, aesthetic sensibility. This approach contrasted with the CDU/CSU’s American-style magazine ads, which created a meaning of the party’s political products—Adenauer and his team—in a clear, social context.

As U. W. Kitzinger commented in his analysis of the 1957 election, “Most obvious to the casual observer—and most voters must have come into that category—was the CDU’s poster campaign. It was an epitome of the whole, brilliant in conception, executed professionally, centralized, expensive, and complete.” In contrast to the SPD, which relied on party members to place its posters, the CDU/CSU farmed this time-consuming task out to a professional advertising firm. Indeed, the firm was contracted so early that it was able to reserve the desirable locations in cities and towns; then, during the first week of August, it began placing the posters. The mass saturation of posters was unprecedented. The advertising agency that orchestrated the CDU/CSU’s poster campaign boasted in its after-report that “[o]n all advertising pillars and billboards one saw the picture of the Chancellor, whether in large cities or in the countryside.” By the advertising firm’s estimates, over ten million posters were mounted in towns and cities that were home to 90.8 per cent of the West German population. In fact, 53 per cent of those queried in October 1957 remembered seeing the CDU/CSU’s handiwork.

This report illustrated the model arrangement of the posters for the campaign (Illustration 6.3). Adenauer was positioned at the top left of any row of posters. Interspersed among portraits of Adenauer’s cabinet were the main campaign slogans: “No Experiments,” “Actions count,” “On the 15th of September,” and “Vote CDU/CSU.” Since the economics minister was the second most important figure in the campaign, Erhard’s portrait was invariably placed to the right of Adenauer above the slogan “Wohlstand für Alle” (Prosperity for All). Taken as a whole, the poster campaign constituted a striking visual statement of the campaign’s central concepts. The portraits themselves depicted serious, take-charge men, an effect intensified by the coloration of the portraits. The lining up of the multiple
portraits, punctuated by the key campaign slogans, communicated to the nation an image of a unified team of responsible leaders. The SPD’s poster campaign contrasted sharply with the CDU/CSU’s. In this decidedly more understated campaign, with portraits often half the size of Adenauer’s, the SPD’s Ollenhauer looked inconspicuous and ineffectual in comparison to the towering chancellor.61

In addition to linking Erhard with Adenauer to symbolize West German prosperity and security, the CDU/CSU propaganda stressed the rising consumerism enjoyed by many individual West Germans. The link between economics-related propaganda and Adenauer was designed to convey a sense of security for the nation as a whole. Economics helped underscore the legitimacy of the Adenauer government, and by association the whole West German state, in the eyes of the electorate. Yet much of the CDU/CSU’s propaganda did not allude only to security and stability in the public sphere, but also to the enhanced fulfillment of individual desires for consumer goods and with that the creation of a sense of security within the private sphere. In this respect, the 1957 campaign fully developed the approach begun in the 1953 campaign of portraying the private action of consumption as the actualization of Adenauer and Erhard’s public policies. The sense of private economic security engendered by consumption paralleled an overall sense of public security created by the CDU/CSU’s leadership and its policies. The CDU/CSU propaganda linked these two spheres by showing how its policies created the opportunity for individual West German citizens to pursue new levels of consumption—thereby achieving their sense of private security. In turn, by pursuing consumption, West Germans were proving and strengthening the
validity of CDU/CSU policies. By making this connection, the CDU/CSU obliterated any distinction or difference between what might be considered private decisions of consumption and more public acts of civic participation. To consume passively was tantamount to civic participation in the newly formed West German democracy, and other than casting votes all that was asked for by the Adenauer government.

In preparation for the campaign, the CDU sought to investigate public perceptions of consumption, prosperity, and security. It arranged in March 1957 for the Institut für Demoskopie to conduct what amounted to a focus-group testing of the slogan “Prosperity for all.” That slogan was already closely associated with the CDU/CSU’s main economic spokesman, Ludwig Erhard, who earlier that year had published a book by the same title that recounted the social market economy’s principles and successes. The Institut’s survey interviewed 50 men and women who were considered to be working-class with the primary goal of comparing the relative effectiveness of the slogans “Prosperity for all” and “Property for all.”

The survey initially explored what “prosperity” meant to the respondents. Generally speaking, they conceived of prosperity as “the securing of the most important requirements of daily life, such as food, work, clothing, and caring for the old.” During free time it involved going to the theater or movies, pursuing a hobby, and taking a vacation. For them, the concept of “prosperity” very seldom extended to luxuries or higher-end articles such as automobiles and homes. According to the survey, the slogan “Prosperity for all” strongly resonated with this group. Most of the respondents (27 out of 50) had a positive reaction to a poster bearing that slogan. Perhaps most significantly for the CDU/CSU campaign, 30 out of 50 respondents regarded the slogan as attainable. In other words, the majority believed that economic security was at hand for West Germans. In addition, the respondents favored the slogan “Prosperity for all” over “Property for all” (29 vs. 6, with 15 no opinion). Opinion surveys translated directly into campaign strategy. One campaign planning report commented that “Prosperity for All” should be favored over other slogans because the Institut für Demoskopie survey deemed it “not as annoying or provocative” as “Property for all.” Informed by this survey, the CDU/CSU went forward with “Prosperity for all” as one of its core slogans of the campaign.

Beginning in August and through the duration of the campaign, the CDU/CSU capitalized on the survey’s insights by running a barrage of advertisements in newspapers and illustrated TV, radio, and women’s magazines. Designed by the Dr. Hegemann advertising firm, the same outfit that had planned and conducted the CDU/CSU’s poster campaign, the advertising series proclaimed “It’s going better for all of us.” With their combination of illustrations, slogans, and text, the ads had the feel of commercial advertising common in newspapers and magazines. Each ad invited the reader into a shared experience of consumerism, one supposedly common to all West Germans with the three variations proclaiming that, “The clothing closet attests:” “The paycheck attests:” and “The shopping bag attests:” (Illustration 6.4, Illustration 6.5, and Illustration 6.6). The telling
Illustration 6.4 The clothing closet attests: It’s going better for all of us!
Die Lohntüte bestätigt es:

**Uns allen geht es besser!**

Ja, es ist eine Tatsache: wir alle verdienen mehr! So nahm zum Beispiel der Brutto-Wochenverdienst der Industriearbeiter in den letzten sechs Jahren um 57% zu, während die Einzelhandelspreise im gleichen Zeitraum nur um 6,4% gestiegen sind. Arbeit für alle bei gutem Verdienst und stabiler Währung! Wann konnten wir uns jemals so viel leisten, so viele Wünsche erfüllen? Die Lohntüte bestätigt es: es geht uns besser, viel, viel besser – uns allen. Das soll unserer Regierung erst eine andere mal nachmachen!

»Wohlstand für alle« ist kein Schlagwort mehr.
»Wohlstand für alle« ist und wird Wirklichkeit – für viele bereits heute, für alle sicher morgen; es geht weiter aufwärts wie bisher, wenn wir keine Experimente machen. Am 15. September haben Sie es in der Hand: Wer mit Verstand wählt, wird Bewährtes wiederwählen – Adenauer und seine Mannschaft. Die Partei dieser Männer ist die CDU/CSU, die große, alle Schichten unseres Volkes umfassende Partei, die unbeirrt ihre Ziele verfolgt:

**Wohlstand für alle**

**Einheit für Deutschland**

**Frieden in der Welt**

Illustration 6.5 The paycheck attests: It’s going better for all of us!
Illustration 6.6 The shopping bag attests: It’s going better for all of us!
illustrations depicted scenes of the new prosperity, consumerism, and familial security: a woman clothes shopping on a busy street packed with cars and pedestrian traffic, a man returning home to his family bearing a gift for his child, and a woman shopping for food with her baby in front of a market overflowing with goods. In contrast to the 1949 campaign, the 1957 election propaganda featured no "women standing alone." Instead, the advertisements suggested each figure was part of a stable, "complete" family enjoying the material benefits and comforts of the economic miracle.

The text of each advertisement recounted the increased availability of consumer goods and the establishment of a stable, hard Deutsche Mark. Linking these developments together were Erhard’s economic policies. The ads asked the reader to look to the back to the days of the immediate postwar period when there were shortages of food, clothing, and jobs; then it contrasted the situation at the present. The last paragraph of the text was identical in all three variations of the advertisements. Building upon the results of the Institut für Demoskopie’s focus group, the advertisements proclaimed: “Prosperity for all’ is no longer a slogan. ‘Prosperity for all’ is and will become reality—for many already today, surely for all tomorrow. It will continue upwards as it has up until now, step by step, if we avoid all experiments.” These advertisements packaged economic expansion as fulfilling individual materialistic desires. Economic prosperity was not about achieving reunification or the reconstruction of a new organic, Christian German community, but instead about increasing personal consumption. All one had to do was “Look around your household. Open your closet. That attests: It’s going better for us, much much better for all of us.” However, this individualistic consumption did have more public ramifications: by participating in consumption and supporting the party that had brought it about, the advertisement implied, the individual consumer/voter was encouraging improvement in conditions for West Germans of all social classes—thereby bringing all citizens together in the West German community. In this respect, much as had been done in the 1953 campaign, individual consumerism was defined not only as a private act of choice, but also as one with more public and civic dimensions. Individual prosperity was, in fact, “prosperity for all.”

Not only did the ads simultaneously emphasize the new consumerism emerging in West Germany as a goal in itself and also as a practice having more public implications, but they also played off the mythology and image that had emerged around Erhard as part of “Adenauer and his team.” As two of the ads commented, Erhard had kept the promise he made, back in the darkest days following the war, of better times ahead. The party was not selling any economic policy or ideology but personalities. In fact, at this point the CDU/CSU made no real mention in the campaign of the social market economy or its sociopolitical implications. This economic policy was now merely personified in the figure of Ludwig Erhard and manifested by the consumer goods themselves.

In many respects the CDU/CSU’s advertisements reflected some of the sentiments created and disseminated through Erhard’s various public relations efforts.
Ever since his work in the 1930s with Wilhelm Vershofen at the Society for Consumer Research, Erhard had clearly grasped the importance of public opinion and sentiment not only in patterns of consumption but also in politics and public policy. Throughout the 1950s Erhard had been very active in managing public opinion. Clearly, Adenauer and the CDU/CSU sometimes resented Erhard’s public relations machine, since it did not always adhere to the party policy positions (especially on the issue of antitrust legislation) and could potentially divert financial contributions from the party.

However, by the 1957 election the CDU/CSU was clearly tapping into the image that had been created around Erhard. On the level of influencing the opinion of politicians, journalists, and educators, Erhard benefited from the work of the Aktionsgemeinschaft Soziale Marktwirtschaft (Action Group for the Social Market Economy) that had been active since 1953. In addition, he enjoyed the support of the so-called Erhard Brigade, a group of journalists and Bundestag representatives working to spread Erhard’s ideas of the social market economy. Named after the “Brigade Ehrhardt,” a Freikorps unit involved in the failed Kapp Putsch of 1920, this group acted as a pressure group supporting Erhard’s ongoing efforts for increased economic liberalization and effective antitrust legislation.66

In early 1957 Erhard published his book Wohlstand für Alle (published in English as Prosperity through Competition), which recounted the development of the social market economy in West Germany and its successes. In terms of more immediate impact on the 1957 election campaign, industrial and commercial interests distributed 12 million copies of the illustrated magazine Wir Alle (All of Us). This visually attractive publication contained accounts of “average” West Germans reflecting on advances in wages and opportunities in consumerism that West Germany had enjoyed. Like other pro-Erhard propaganda it stressed his deep concern for average consumers in a highly personal way—for example through his answering letters with questions from individual West Germans. Meanwhile, SPD leaders were connected to crass Marxism—perhaps most crudely by including a photo of Ollenhauer sitting in front of a portrait of Karl Marx and allowing the readers to reach their own conclusions.

At the forefront of efforts to construct a mythology around Erhard was, of course, Die Waage’s advertising. Since 1953 it had conducted publicity campaigns with advertising series handling issues such as prices, work hours, and the relationship of productivity and living standards. These efforts were considerable as the organization spent DM 1.1 million, DM 1.6 million, and DM 900,000 in 1954, 1955, and 1956 respectively. Although in non-election years Die Waage concentrated on more purely economic issues or labor relations, in many respects the organization helped prepare the ground for the CDU/CSU to reap the harvest in the 1957 election. One of the Die Waage campaigns starting in 1955 centered on ads depicting Erhard making appeals directly to the West German people or segments of the citizenry—such as housewives, small savers, workers, and industrialists—while also responding to current developments in the economy. Die Waage’s executive committee hesitated to under take such a campaign, since the
organization wanted to focus on the advantages of the social market economy rather than generate publicity for a single political figure. However, given the insistence and financial support from Erhard’s camps, Die Waage assisted in the technical development of the “Erhard Column.” There were clearly advantages to focusing on Erhard. One of Die Waage’s reports on the campaign explained that Erhard “counts as the most popular member of the federal cabinet, and indeed not only because his ministerial work has brought visible fruit for everyone, but also because his unique temperament, his occasional inclination toward impulsive-ness and not least because of his Bonhomie.” However, as the election neared, Erhard exerted more pressure on Die Waage to change their tactics. In an April 1956 meeting with Die Waage’s executive committee, he argued that the Fritz and Otto ads should be ended. He later pushed for the “Erhard Column” ads to come to the fore in preparation for the election campaign and for Die Waage’s financial resources to be directed to such an effort.

Despite this conflict in the 1957 campaign, the CDU/CSU and Die Waage worked much more closely than in 1953 to coordinate the themes developed in their propaganda. A letter from Erich Peter Neumann, the political liaison for the Institut für Demoskopie, to Die Waage’s treasurer, Alphons Horten, highlighted some of these connections between the CDU/CSU and Die Waage. Neumann reported to Horten that Otto Lenz, Adenauer’s state secretary and the mastermind behind the government’s propaganda efforts, had agreed to a meeting with Die Waage and was interested in “how they [Die Waage and the CDU/CSU] could pursue coordinated advertisements. He [Lenz] had agreed with the Chancellor that close collaboration is something to aim for.” Here Die Waage’s public pronouncements that it was not aligned with any particular party were brought into serious question. Undoubtedly, Die Waage hoped for a victory by the “bourgeois” parties when it solicited funds, but it appears that in more private moments, Die Waage’s leadership sought to lend direct support to the CDU/CSU.

With this cooperation, Die Waage’s advertisements harmonized well with the CDU/CSU’s vision of the main themes of the campaign: security, stability, and prosperity. In fact, several of the Die Waage advertisements appearing before the election echoed the CDU/CSU’s slogans with “No experiments” and “We know what we have.” As one proposal within the organization suggested, the main theme of the ads for the election year was “freedom from fear.” The report saw West Germans as being gripped by fear: fear of the rise in prices, fear of unemployment, and fear of an economic downturn. The emphasis, much like the CDU/CSU’s, was upon demonstrating the tangible benefits of Erhard’s economic policies that all West Germans enjoyed and showing that the alternatives would jeopardize the economic benefits they had secured. An important component of this advertising campaign was to stress that reliance upon the state through a planned economy would not alleviate the fears of rising prices. The only sure way to safeguard the economic achievements made since the currency reform was to stay the course, an unsurprising position to take in support of a party in power. This message of “freedom from fear” was to reach both the middle classes—whose bour-
geois values had to be reconstructed after previous governments had wiped out their savings—and the working class. The working class, the report warned, had reached new income levels, but had not yet taken on middle-class practices and attitudes, such as savings and home ownership, and was still potentially under the influence of the “old slogans.”

Throughout all of Die Waage’s ad campaigns, there were concerns that Die Waage’s advertisements were not reaching their targeted working-class audience because they were not being placed in the newspapers most read by workers. As a result, in the 1957 election campaign, Die Waage utilized some new methods for spreading its message in order to reach not only Dr. Lieschen Müller, but also Lieschen Müller, that is not only for Dr. John Doe, but also John Doe. Fritz and Otto remained the main characters in the dialogue series. But this was supplemented by a monologue series that would represent “our economy to various types of people.” Also, a cartoon series would speak to a less-educated readership that was harder to reach through purely textual advertisements.

In addition, Die Waage produced a cartoon film entitled “Behalte deinen klaren Blick” (Retain your clear view) that recounted the achievements of the social market economy and reminded viewers of conditions only twelve years before. Throughout the film, when things were “seen through the wrong lens,” the screen turned red and showed the plight of the gaunt-looking workers laboring under the planned economy with its shortages and poor conditions. In addition to the cartoon film, Die Waage produced eighteen different ads appearing in newspapers and magazines with a total circulation of 22 million copies in preparation for the election.

The format of the Fritz and Otto series had evolved a bit from its earlier manifestations. Instead of a dialogue in which Fritz finally reaches a “clearer” understanding of the economy after a bit of persuasion from Otto, in this series both Fritz and Otto agreed right from the start. In addition, Fritz and Otto appeared decidedly more middle-class as they were dressed in jackets and ties in all the illustrations, giving the impression that somehow the two characters had risen out of the working class. To a large extent, Die Waage’s advertisements underscored the idea that West Germany society had undergone a “deproletarization.” The message was that the social market economy had not merely facilitated material betterment of the rich, but had improved the conditions of all West Germans. With this belief in the social market economy, Die Waage hoped, the working class would not only vote for the CDU/CSU, but also could be weaned from its more radical demands for wage raises or codetermination.

From this perspective, the message of the advertisement with the banner “Everyone has a part of it!” was clear: the time had arrived when broad sections of West German society had achieved true prosperity (Illustration 6.7). Standing with his pal Otto before a prominently featured refrigerator, Fritz gushed that he could afford a motor-scooter, that Brigitte, his wife, had a washing machine, and that refrigerators had been twice the price only four years before. But he regarded the new pension program as the most important result of Erhard’s economic policies because it spread the wealth to everyone. Made possible by the success of
Alle haben was davon!

»Nein, Otto, versteh’ mich nicht falsch: Ich bin natürlich froh über meinen Motorroller. Auch Brigitte ist ganz begeistert von ihrer neuen Waschmaschine. Und der Kühlshrank – der übrigens vor 4 Jahren genau das Doppelte gekostet hättest – kommt uns allen schön zugute! Aber – was mir an Ludwig Erhard am meisten imponiert, ist eben doch die neue Rentenordnung.«

»Mensch – bis du was davon hast, vergehen ja noch 30 Jahre!«

»Ganz egal! Zu wissen, daß man auch noch im Alter anständig leben kann, daß man nicht nur nach Schema F wie bisher so ’n paar Pimperne kriegt, sondern auch mit seiner Rente am Erfolg der Wirtschaft beteiligt ist – das ist schon was! Mein alter Vater hat jetzt nach der Rentenreform 295 Mark. Davon kann er leben.

Bisher mußte ich ihm 50 Mark im Monat zugeben, damit er überhaupt rumkam. Und jetzt ist er wieder – wie es sein soll – der liebe, gute Großvater, der noch hier und da seinen Enkelkindern mal ’ne kleine Freude machen kann.«

»Na Fritz – das soll er dem Erhard verdanken?«

»Aber klar! Der hat unsere Wirtschaft stark gemacht. Von nichts kommt nichts! Nur mit steigender Produktivität konnten wir eine solche Rentenreform überhaupt verkaufen. Und Erhard hat sich für sie eingesetzt, weil er sofort einsah: Das ist ein Stück echter Sozialer Marktwirtschaft.«

»Tja – eigentlich sind wir seit 1949 schön ein Stück fortgekommen...«

DIE WAAGE

Deshalb bleiben wir auch in Zukunft bei Erhards Sozialer Marktwirtschaft

Erscheint in der Tagespresse und in der BILD-Zeitung

Illustration 6.7 Everyone has a part of it!
Erhard’s economic principles, he explained, it was a true example of the social market economy, ignoring that Erhard, in fact, was opposed to the new pension system. As Fritz put it, “From nothing comes nothing!” The advertisement concluded, as did all of Die Waage’s appeals in the 1957 campaign, “We therefore are sticking with Erhard’s social market economy in the future.”

Clearly, the ad was making use of the symbolic capital that the refrigerator had acquired in West Germany. Polling indicated by the second half of the 1950s that the refrigerator had become the focus of West Germans’ consumerist aspirations. Debates between left and right had raged upon the availability and meaning of the refrigerator. In the summer of 1953 Erhard and trade unionists had exchanged barbs in a series of articles appearing in Welt der Arbeit. One article attacked Erhard’s economic policy as benefiting only capital and demanded higher wages and more equitable income distribution so that everyone could enjoy the products of modern technology. In a 16 June 1953 article entitled “A Refrigerator in Every Household,” Erhard responded that initially any luxury good, which a refrigerator was in 1953, was consumed by the rich. Holding the line on possible inflation, Erhard argued that merely granting consumer credit would not sustain a rising living standard. Rather, increased productivity was ultimately the only way to increase real purchasing power. This was the way, Erhard noted, that the automobile had been transformed from a luxury good to a common article in the United States.76 Evoking such earlier discussions, Die Waage made it clear that this time of prosperity was now at hand.

Not only the Otto and Fritz series, but all of Die Waage’s advertisements projected the same view: West Germany’s material conditions had markedly improved since the 1948 currency reform, wealth was being equally distributed throughout society, and all sections of society were enjoying a consumerist sense of comfort and security—echoing some of the organization’s 1956 ads that the “class war has come to an end.” The comics series (Illustration 6.8) portrayed West Germans as taking part in a new consumerism that many were already actually enjoying, or

Illustration 6.8 When one is not blind …
hoped to enjoy in the near future. The characters were depicted buying autos, building their own homes, going to the movies, and talking about purchasing new suits and appliances. It was Erhard’s economic system that made “Life worth living again,” as one strip commented. The monologue series stressed the same ideas by depicting various people within West Germany—the elderly, women, children, or apprentices. The social market economy took these different segments of society and reconstructed a new West German community based upon consumerism. One advertisement bearing the slogan “A new life obtained!” pictured a refugee woman who, as the text explained, had fled to West Germany with her children when her prisoner-of-war husband failed to return home (Illustration 6.9). No mention appeared of the psychological hardships stemming from her life during the Third Reich or experiences of flight, distancing her from any dislocating connections to the old regime. Instead, her story begins during the occupation period in 1947. With her husband absent, she and her children were expelled from Upper Silesia and suddenly “left with nothing.” The advertisement explained that the social market economy had made possible a new life, a solid income, and a secure future for this woman “standing alone.” In this way the achievement of material well-being was privileged over and insulated against any psychological or spiritual rehabilitation. In Die Waage’s view material security made any psychological insecurity practically irrelevant, thereby creating a feeling of “freedom from fear.”

Through these various advertisements, the CDU/CSU and Die Waage identified and adapted to an evolving trend in West German consumerism and succeeded in attaching a political meaning to it. Indeed, given their access to a wealth of public opinion data, they were exceptionally well informed of the changes occurring in West German society. As Otto Lenz commented in a forward to a 1956 Institut für Demoskopie study on the “Social Reality”: “We live in an age of social upheaval. The fact that this change proceeds silently and its effect is barely perceived, does not change its evolutionary character.”

Illustration 6.9 A new life obtained!
free time and new consumer goods, particularly the refrigerator had become “symbols of the aspirations of civilization of the broadest social masses.” Market research and public opinion polling clearly revealed the rising expectations of West German consumers in the midst of the economic miracle. In a summer 1955 survey, 49 percent of respondents indicated their belief that an electric refrigerator was an essential part of a proper living standard, although very few West Germans stated that they actually owned such an appliance. Despite their growing aspirations, most West Germans viewed their financial circumstances as quite favorable: 27 percent of respondents regarded their income as “good” and another 42 percent as “sufficient.”

Michael Wildt has argued that there were two phases of consumption in West Germany during the 1950s. In the years immediately following the 1948 currency reform, West Germans spent most of their incomes trying to replace basic goods lost during the war, such as food, shelter, and clothing. This changed dramatically during the 1950s. In 1950, 46.4 percent of the income of an average four-person working household went for food. By 1960 this had decreased to 36.2 percent. To be sure, most West Germans’ budgets continued to be tight, but beginning around 1957 the demand for luxury goods started to increase. More money was spent at first on luxury goods such as coffee, tea, alcohol, and tobacco, fashionable clothing, and movie tickets. In fact, 1956 was a high point in the number of movie-goers in the Federal Republic, tallied at 818 million in that year. A few years later this rise in luxury consumption was followed by increased spending on vacations, travel, beauty products, and electrical appliances such as refrigerators, televisions, and electric ovens. Throughout their advertisements, Die Waage portrayed these consumer goods that were still not affordable for most West Germans as the norm, thereby strengthening the impression of West Germany’s material progress. For example, Die Waage’s advertisement “Everyone has a part of it!” prominently featured the refrigerator as a normal consumer good, although official statistics showed that in 1955 only 11 percent of West Germans actually owned the product. By 1958 this figure had grown to 21 percent and to almost 52 percent by 1962. The CDU/CSU and Die Waage exploited this growing realization of consumerism and ever increasing expectations and associated them with specific political conceptions. Consumerism was not merely concerned with fulfilling needs or desires, but was connected to ideas of West German legitimacy as a whole, overall social harmony, and a sense of individual security provided by the Adenauer-led government. There is no hint in the advertisements about the moral and social hazards of increased materialism—concerns so often articulated by the CDU/CSU immediately following the war, in the 1949 campaign, and by social conservatives throughout the 1950s.

In fact, Erhard defended the implications of consumerism in a chapter of Wohlstand für Alle entitled “Does Prosperity Lead to Materialism?” He explained that despite objections that the social market economy had led society toward a “corrupting materialism,” all economic activity and increased productivity in fact had the goal of “opening up improved and freer ways of living for the whole peo-
ple.” This economic progress would “liberate man from material want and stress” and indeed, with increasing prosperity would decrease materialism since “an increase in prosperity created the environment in which man is lifted from a purely primitive materialistic way of thinking.” Erhard redefined consumerism, once a force that shackled the German people to materialistic drives that manifested themselves in Nazism or communism, as one that liberated them to form a more harmonious, just, and free society. Whether true social conservatives were buying such a message is questionable at best, but in any case the party was clearly trying to adapt its consumerist vision to the electorate. 81

The advertisements of Die Waage and the CDU/CSU mirrored sociological developments taking place in West Germany as perceived by Helmut Schelsky, a prominent 1950s sociologist who strongly advocated a social policy that supported domestic roles for women. In his book, *Wandlungen der deutschen Familie in der Gegenwart* (The Transformation of the German Family at the Present Time), Schelsky argued that although the upheaval of war and the immediate postwar years had been extremely dangerous for the family, the 1950s were seeing the regeneration and strengthening of the family. Both men and women retreated to the family as a source of stability and security after the upheaval of the 1930s and 1940s. Schelsky detected a growing trend of women wanting to take up roles within the household and as mothers, while men were to provide financial support for the family. 82 Other studies supported Schelsky’s view. One 1956 sociological study conducted in West Berlin investigated the attitudes of working mothers. The majority of interviewees living in “complete” families, which were defined as a family with a husband, wife, and children, desired higher wages and job security for men so that “mothers won’t be forced to take up employment.” 83

Undoubtedly, the economic depression of the early 1930s, the war years of the first half of the 1940s, and the so-called hunger years of second half of that decade had a critical impact upon West Germans’ search for familial security in the 1950s. 84 Schelsky argued that hand in hand with the reconstruction of the family within an ever expanding, open economy went the decline of the importance of class stratification, identity, and tensions during the 1950s as a “levelled middle-class society” (*nivellierte Mittelstandsgesellschaft*) was created. The destruction of the Second World War and the ensuing flight of refugees brought down the social levels of some, while new economic, professional, and living opportunities in postwar West Germany permitted others to rise—resulting in an ever increasingly middle-class and less ideological society. To Schelsky, the rise of consumerism was an essential feature in this transformation of West German society. 85

Undoubtedly, as Robert Moeller has argued, Schelsky figured in the creation of a conservative social policy, spearheaded by the CDU/CSU, that sought to construct an idealized “complete” family of working father and stay-at-home mother that did not often correspond to reality as rates of women working outside the home rose during the 1950s. In the early 1960s, two thirds of working-class families needed women to work in order to maintain their standard of living. In addition, as Elizabeth Heineman has shown, marriage rates of women in-
creased dramatically during the 1950s, resulting in relatively historic levels of marriage despite the continuing “surplus of women” of about 3 million. However, single women after the war tended increasingly to be ones who were widowed or divorced and supporting a household with dependents, as compared to single women who had never married—as was the case for most single women before the war. Others have argued that although income levels continually rose during the 1950s, Schelsky’s view of a “leveled-out middle class society” did not reflect West Germany’s social conditions as class differences continued and the concentration of wealth remained relatively uneven.86

Although conservative visions of society did not correspond to an empirical reality, they did have great political utility. With their access to public opinion polling, Die Waage and the CDU/CSU were able to create a coherent and attractive picture of a reconstructed West German political, social, and family life that resonated with the West German public. It was a portrayal that echoed Schelsky’s vision of a passive, consumerist, middle-class, and non-ideological West German society. The 1957 campaign successfully made use of the West Germans’ desire for stability—be it political, economic, social, or familial—while at the same it exploited their fear that all gains might be lost. The different gendered images surrounding the national political figures of Adenauer and Erhard created a sense of public stability within the family of the CDU/CSU and also of West Germany that ran parallel to the scenes of private familial security in conservative propaganda. While Adenauer looked after West Germany’s standing in the world, Erhard concentrated on the domestic issues of economics and improvement of West German living standards. From this perspective, the CDU/CSU and its parallel propaganda projected an image of itself imbued with the values that the sociologist Schelsky described as vital to West Germans: wholeness, completeness, stability, and security. The CDU/CSU promised these values, in large measure, through the passive consumerism of the economic miracle and by avoiding any risky “experiments.”

Compared to earlier campaigns, the CDU/CSU did not often attack the SPD directly—in part because it did not want to hand the party any free publicity. The campaign followed the commercial advertising motto that “Persil [a West German laundry detergent] talks only of Persil.”87 The party took this approach knowing that it was unlikely to lure voters from the SPD. This was a campaign in which the CDU/CSU presented itself as beyond mere party ideology and as working in the interests of all parts of this mythical “leveled middle-class society.” The messages of security and prosperity were ones that could appeal to supporters of the smaller parties within the bourgeois camp. If anything, the CDU/CSU’s attacks on the SPD could be seen less as a way of wooing prospective voters from the SPD than as a portrayal of the CDU/CSU as the only party strong and stable enough to thwart the SPD threat. On the occasions when the CDU/CSU actually attacked the SPD directly, it was Adenauer who led the charge. Perhaps the most famous of these attacks was a July 1957 speech in Nuremberg in which Adenauer claimed that a SPD victory would be “the ruin [Untergang] of Ger-
many”—especially in regard to the SPD’s position against A denauer’s policy of Western alignment. Hans-Peter Schwarz has suggested that this was A denauer’s calculated attempt to answer the SPD’s stirring up of fear within the electorate—particularly in regard to possible nuclear r earmament—by kindling an ev en greater countervailing fear. To be sur e, the go vernment-supported ADK spent much of the summer of 1957 conv ening hundreds of rallies and meetings that clearly delineated the threat of the Soviet Union to not only West Germany, but to the West in general. In most cases, the CDU/CSU defined the SPD more indirectly—especially by using the “N o experiments” slogan. If the CDU/CSU’s overriding metaphor was that A denauer and his team were the protective, capa-ble parents providing all forms of security for the West German people, the entailment of “no experiments” was that the SPD represented something dangerous, unproven, and alien to the West German family—a sentiment that despite the postwar evolution of the SPD ran deep in the psyche of bourgeois Germany and was particularly acute within the context of the Cold War.

In contrast to the CDU/CSU campaign that relied so heavily on polling and advertising consultants, from a technical viewpoint the SPD approached the election campaign in a much different manner. The party was in the process of modernizing its campaigning in hopes of reaching out to new segments of West German society, but there was clearly hesitation and division within the party regarding what these new campaigning techniques meant in terms of its policies and its relationship to the working class, its political base. In preparation for the campaign, the party’s executive committee commissioned various opinion surveys to provide a basis for its campaign strategy, with an eye particularly toward developing propaganda for groups of what it called “soft voters” whom the committee felt might be swayed to the Social Democratic camp. Their surveys were useful in painting broad trends in public opinion; however, the party did not carefully test the resonance of particular pieces of propaganda within the public. As a result, the SPD’s propaganda appealed primarily to the party’s main working-class constituents, despite the new use of polling and advertising techniques.

For several years the SPD had been commissioning polls from EMNID to track general public opinion trends. Leading up to the election, the SPD retained DIVO to conduct various surveys that dealt specifically with election issues. Very early on in the election preparations, the surveys indicated that the rise in prices was a possible issue on which the SPD could go on the offensiv e. One goal was to “make the CDU-Minister Erhard responsible for the price incr eases.” In terms of economics, the surveys, like those commissioned by the CDU/CSU, showed that the rise in prices was the chief concern among the population. In addition, 75 percent of respondents believed that the federal government could do much more to help control the rise in prices. Overall, the attack on prices incr eases was part of the larger campaign theme that the SPD represented security for all West Germans, a campaigning approach supported by Fritz Heine, the chairperson of the Werbung und Propaganda Ausschuß (Advertising and Propaganda Committee) and the party’s campaign manager.
As the SPD realized, its financial limitations required that it concentrate efforts upon a number of specific target groups in order to expand its share of the vote in the upcoming Bundestag election. Coming out of the 1953 election, the SPD had sought to profit from some “lessons learned.” One report analyzing political attitudes through 1955 commented that the SPD tended to appeal to its traditional voters at the expense of trying to attract new ones. The report divided voters into categories of “soft” or “hard” party supporters. As it observed, “The ‘soft’ voter is above all pragmatic. . . . He feels no loyalty to a certain party and changes to any party which he believes will best consider his interests.” The “soft” voter supported the CDU/CSU because he saw his own economic situation improving. The report saw that the traditional German electoral milieu and subcultures were loosening in the postwar society, in part because of the growth of an increasingly middle-class society, and that the SPD must find ways to seize advantage of such larger social changes. The report concluded that for the SPD to overcome the “30 percent hurdle,” it must do a better job of targeting the “soft” voters. The party should not change its fundamental policies, but the “soft” voters and “hard” voters who were the traditional SPD supporter had to be attracted to the party through different appeals. The “soft” voter capable of being won over tended to be better educated and younger, have a higher income, and inhabit larger population centers. This conceptualization of “soft” and “hard” supporters became fundamental to formulating the SPD’s strategy in the upcoming election and highlighted a crucial challenge for the SPD leadership: How could the party attract new supporters without alienating its base?

As the 1957 election approached, the SPD’s public opinion surveys indicated that there was a substantial group that could be won over to the SPD, and prospects looked good for the SPD in late 1956. The popularity of the CDU/CSU had fallen through the year, and in fact had dropped behind that of the SPD by November 1956. In addition, there were about 4 million new voters as compared to the 1953 election. In January 1957 Fritz Heine figured that there were still 10 million undecided voters, of which about half were going to vote. Ollenhauer, however, commented at a meeting of the executive committee that “[w]e should not overestimate the worth of the polls, but nevertheless we should pay serious attention to them, especially in regard to the high percentage of undecided voters.” Polling reports from the autumn of 1956 repeated earlier results and indicated the specific target groups, making up 37 percent of all eligible voters, that the SPD felt it could potentially win over. These groups consisted of “soft” SPD voters, “soft” CDU voters, “soft” voters of the smaller parties, undecided voters with SPD inclinations, and undecided voters with CDU inclinations. The undecided voters and the “soft” voters of the CDU and smaller parties tended to be from the middle class and have a professional background. The report recommended that the SPD test the effectiveness of its appeals to the “soft” voters through public opinion polling, in addition to continually tracking the fluctuations of these groups between the two main parties. Despite these recommendations, in the end the SPD failed to utilize public opinion polling to track the effectiveness of
its propaganda, and the party’s central strategy of targeting the “soft” and undecided voters ultimately fell flat.\textsuperscript{95}

The SPD began formulating its technical approach for the campaign well in advance of the 1957 election. At the 1956 Parteitag (party congress) Bruno Gleitze, a polling expert within the party, spoke to the assembly about revamping the SPD’s political advertising. He stressed that political propaganda must be sold as if it were a “brand name product.” Although such a campaigning philosophy was critical for success, Gleitze argued that the party’s propaganda should not be too loud or contain exaggerated phrasing, thereby echoing common condemnations of older advertising styles. His comments reflected some of the changing attitudes within the party toward a potential clash between substance and image in party propaganda. He observed that “[t]he simple person does not make the effort to take apart sentences or sort through ideas. What is not immediately picked up by him and does not elicit a positive reaction, has already evaporated.”\textsuperscript{96} A 1956 article by Klaus Besser in Die Neue Gesellschaft, a Social Democratic magazine founded by some of the party reformers, supported Gleitze’s position. The article explained that in order for the SPD to reach out to new social groups, the party must devise new ways to speak to these potential voters. The SPD’s election campaigns, the article claimed, had been run too much by politicians rather than advertising and publicity experts. The relation between the party and voter should be similar to that of producer and consumer. Echoing CDU/CSU strategies, an election campaign should not be based upon factual arguments or a good program, the article explained, but rather upon personalities that embody the party. These personalities of party must somehow respond to the “primitive demands” that lay within the electorate.\textsuperscript{97} Besser’s position was quickly attacked by the political scientist Klaus Schültz, who argued that such an approach to politics was bound to fail. He argued that many of the “soft” voters fell within the bourgeois camp. The only way to break into this group of voters, bring them out of their traditional decision-making mold, and attract them to the SPD was to center the campaign upon concrete, positive arguments and not upon personalities and image. Despite his concerns, Schültz did agree that the party must do a better job of directing its advertisements to the correct voting groups and not merely speak to party leaders and members.\textsuperscript{98}

This divided approach to the campaign was reflected within the party’s leading circles. Overall, the Advertising and Propaganda Committee advocated a SPD campaign that differed from the CDU/CSU’s. Well over a year before the election, the committee began debating whether the SPD should run a relatively more negative campaign, or concentrate on a factual, positive campaign. The committee decided at the time that before a decision could be made the executive committee should authorize some polling to provide some sense of the public sentiments.\textsuperscript{99} At a January 1957 meeting of the Advertising and Propaganda Committee, Fritz Heine identified three options for the upcoming campaign: an aggressive, negative campaign, one that was factual and positive, or one in which the SPD would represent itself as the party of national unity that stood above the
interparty conflicts. He regarded the third option as intriguing, feeling that it would constitute the best defense against the CDU/CSU attacks, yet overall unfeasible because the SPD’s position up to this point was that of an opposition party. Against Heine, and in face of the realization in early 1957 that the CDU/CSU was going to run a campaign less with “argumentation than with atmosphere” and really “throw down the gauntlet” with an aggressive campaign, the Bezirkssekretär (regional party leaders) pushed for a more “factual” campaign. This tone for the election campaign, centered upon the slogan “Security for all” was confirmed a few days later by Ollenhauer and the executive committee.

Meanwhile, the ongoing reform of the SPD economic program had been growing since the early 1950s. It was becoming increasingly clear among many of the party reformers that the SPD’s program must be adjusted to changing economic and social conditions—especially the apparent success of the social market economy. By 1957 the SPD was not calling for the socialization of the economy on a broad scale. Instead, its official program had been transforming since Schumacher’s death in 1952. The Dortmund Action Program of September 1952 revealed shifts in the party’s ideological positions toward competition, market mechanisms, and consumer choice, while at the same time retaining the party’s social and humane concerns. The program called for improved living standards, increased production, full employment, and the just distribution of the social product. Although the party still identified as one of its goals limited socialization and planning of elements of the economy—such as the nationalization of the coal and steel industries, some governmental direction of investments, and the introduction of codetermination in industry—there were now rumblings of “echter Leistungswettbewerb” (true competition) where suitable. By no means did the program accept Erhard’s social market economy, describing it as the “capitalist law of the jungle,” but it did acknowledge the need for competition within a Social Democratic economy. This evolving and more pragmatic position was exemplified by the slogan of the leading SPD economist, Karl Schiller: “Competition as much as possible, planning as much as necessary.” Pointing out that as consumers, workers had a substantial interest in true competition among business firms resulting in lower prices, he became the strongest advocate for reforming the SPD’s economic program toward a more market-oriented position.

Reformers had been expanding their voice in the party since the SPD’s defeat in the 1953 election, especially on local and regional levels. The reformers realized that because anything smacking of state and bureaucratic controls had been discredited by the experience of the postwar years and developments in the East, the party should formulate new ideas about how to regulate the free market. There were many disagreements, however, as to what type of market-oriented socialism the party should advocate and how that might alienate some of their core supporters who were attuned to more class-warfare rhetoric. Some reformers felt uneasy about accepting elements of the free market, fearing the party was losing touch with its fundamental principles. They stressed that the social considerations of the economy must remain the focus and that the party had to retain subtle
means of steering the economy and redistributing wealth. In addition, the party found itself facing the risk that any of its critiques of the free market would be painted by the CDU/CSU as the SPD’s dredging up old concepts of the controlled economy. In addition, some of the party’s older guard, such as Ernst Nölling and Victor Agartz, continued to push the SPD’s 1953 campaign plans for socialization of heavy industry.¹⁰⁴

Despite intraparty discord, the elements of reform were incorporated into the election campaign. The party’s platform for the 1957 election, put forth at the 16 June “election congress” held at Dortmund, recognized the existence of a “German economic miracle,” but stated that it had benefited only a small section of society. The rise in prices had undermined the advances made by the bulk of society. Nevertheless, the SPD attacked the idea of price ceilings as means of controlling prices. Instead, the importation of goods should be balanced with the exports so that prices could stabilize. In addition, it renounced state controls of the economy and supported a form of the free market by proclaiming:

We Social Democrats demand free economic development, free competition, and private property conscious of its responsibilities to the common good. Cartels, monopolies, and marker dominating industrial groups are to be prevented from misusing their supremacy to the disadvantage of weaker groups. . . . Our free society must be protected from controlled economy measures.¹⁰⁵

Yet, the SPD sometimes still gave the impression that it saw socialization as a party objective—for instance in a pamphlet published by Willi Eichler in April 1957 that stated that socialization remained a goal of the SPD. The confusion was exacerbated by the fact that Eichler actually was one of the party’s leading reformers and chaired the committee that had produced the 1952 Dortmund Action Program.¹⁰⁶ Overall, the SPD tried to downplay its Marxist roots in the campaign. In his analysis of the 1957 campaign, the political scientist U.W. Kitzinger has pointed out that the party wished to cleanse itself of any ideological taint and portray itself as an unrevolutionary, trustworthy, and respectable organization. However, the perceived revolutionary legacy of the party’s past was not easy to overcome. To most of the public, the party did not represent a political force that had struggled for social justice or resisted the Nazis with much of the party leadership having spent the years of the Third Reich in exile or languishing in concentration camps. Rather, to much of the electorate the party was seen as speaking only for the working class, organized by functionaries and bureaucrats, and acting as a dangerous and unreliable element in the midst of Cold War tensions. This assessment was due in no small part to the harsh invective directed against the party since 1945 by the CDU/CSU.¹⁰⁷

Because much of the electorate divided itself between the socialist and bourgeois camps, the group that the SPD identified as a potential “swing” vote was relatively small. Since the SPD’s polling research indicated that in this group was mainly members of the middle-class, most of the propaganda on economics attempted to refer to more middle-class prerogatives. But this was a group that the
party had no means of attracting because of the indeterminate and unsettled state of the party’s ideology. From this perspective, the party program was still an important factor in the 1957 election campaign, if only because the SPD’s program and propaganda seemed so disconnected, or at least created a picture that was a bit unclear. In contrast, the CDU/CSU’s image was unified, and perhaps more importantly, coherent. It presented a worldview to the voter that seemed understandable and attractive to the segment of the population it wooed.

Undoubtedly, the SPD updated much of its propaganda by using more visually appealing illustrated magazines developed by professional advertisers to supplement traditional materials. For example, the party distributed 9.2 million copies of the magazine Illus. Each of the publication’s four editions displayed a cover depicting happy children or attractive young women and incorporated articles and pictures attacking the CDU/CSU for rearmament, the threat of atomic war, and failure to achieve reunification. All the magazines sought to construct a more statesmanlike image around Ollenhauer by portraying him with Eisenhower, to promote SPD proposals for constructing more social housing, and generally to showcase the successes of SPD leadership in some of the individual states. As in earlier campaigns, the SPD tried to hammer the CDU/CSU on the issue of increasing prices. But in comparison to propaganda from earlier campaigns, the people depicted were not so distinctly working-class. Instead the characters portrayed in the ads’ pictures were clearly middle-class, or the text spoke to the dangers facing economic gains made in the recent years. Rather than merely harping on the rising costs of basic goods, such as food, the SPD also accused the CDU/CSU of maintaining the high prices of luxury goods such as refrigerators by forbearing to break up monopolies that controlled their prices. (Illustration 6.10)

In a series of pamphlets meant to exploit West German fears of economic developments, the SPD again portrayed people who were clearly from the middle class. The fold-out brochure proclaimed, “Sie stehen im Mittelpunkt” (You are the focus), while explaining that the consumer was the center of the economy (Illustration 6.11). According to the brochure, the CDU/CSU had allowed prices to rise and large industry to garner more and more power. Like in the magazine Illus, this brochure attacked the CDU/CSU for increasing prices by taxing relative luxury goods such as cigarettes, coffee, and liquor. By 1957 the SPD was so much on the defensive that it had to admit that living standards had risen considerably since the currency reform, but it attempted to attribute this economic success to sources other than Erhard and the CDU/CSU. The brochure commented, “Thanks to the willingness to work and the skill of our workers, white collar employees, technicians, and salesmen many people in the Federal Republic have a welcomed a high standard of living.” In the SPD’s view the CDU/CSU was not helping the consumer with its seemingly weak actions against cartels. But this was a difficult position to defend, especially considering the resonance that Erhard possessed as the “minister of the consumer.” Given the increased prosperity enjoyed by many West Germans, one has to wonder if the SPD’s message was really hitting the mark.
Overall, Kitzinger was correct in his analysis of the 1957 election campaign: the political product the SPD had to sell put the party between a rock and a hard place. It needed to please both its party membership and the electorate as a whole, even as financial constraints and the party’s organizational structure limited the SPD even further in the type of campaign it could run. The CDU/CSU was not dependent upon its party membership for the vast majority of the contributions.
to fund the party. Therefore, the party leadership was free to devise its own campaign strategy, attempting to corral the undecided voters instead of just speaking to groups that made up the rock-solid CDU/CSU support. In contrast, the SPD could not abandon its mostly working-class membership because much of its

Illustration 6.11 We have accomplished a lot!
funding was drawn from party contributions by its members, people who were close to the party’s Marxist roots. The tone of the campaign resembled the party itself: sterile, a bit confused, divided, and filled with half measures—an image of the party that the CDU/CSU itself was trying to create.

With these failings in campaigning the party opened itself to the onslaughts of the CDU/CSU. Since the party was beholden to its working class members, its propaganda did not effectively appeal to the crucial “swing vote” by coming out clearly and strongly in favor of the free market. Although the electorate might have harbored a sense of insecurity about its economic future, the SPD was unable to project itself strongly enough to shift people from the bourgeois to the socialist camp, especially when the party image seemed confused or incoherent. This comparative weakness of the SPD was further exploited by the CDU/CSU, with its emphasis upon security and stability as personified by Adenauer and his team. Overall, the SPD, unlike the CDU/CSU, failed to frame and define the issues of the campaign to its own advantage, especially in regard to security and economics, and was constantly kept on the defensive by the CDU/CSU. The Social Democrats had not yet come to grips with the reality that political campaigns revolve around the image and mood surrounding the campaign, as much as rationally based appeals to the electorate—an aspect of campaigning that the CDU/CSU had mastered.

Clearly, the matter of funding was also central to this issue of campaigning styles. The CDU/CSU and its parallel campaigns had financial resources far exceeding what the SPD could contribute to the campaign. While the SPD was mostly supported by party membership, income from business enterprises, especially newspapers, and special election contributions from individuals and firms, the CDU/CSU enjoyed a much larger income stream. The CDU/CSU’s money was funneled in from primarily business sources through the system of Fördergesellschaften (promotional associations) developed for the 1953 campaign and through civic associations developed after the 1954 tax-law change that allowed firms to deduct party contributions from their taxable income. Unlike the earlier Fördergesellschaften, the civic associations could devote all of their income to political parties and were used particularly to support bourgeois parties’ federal headquarters. Although firms did not gain any tax advantage by using these organizations since businesses could now make direct, tax-deductible contributions to parties, they decided to continue channeling funds through the promotional and civic associations in part because they helped to shield their books from probing eyes trying to detect any contributions going to particular parties.

It is almost impossible to say exactly how much was spent in favor of the CDU/CSU, especially in light of the vast amount expended on parallel campaigns. Nevertheless, a few comparisons can be made to convey an idea of the differences in expenditures. For example, Kitzinger estimated that the central party headquarters of the CDU spent about DM 6.7 to 7 million specifically on propaganda materials for the 1957 election. This appears about right in light of archival sources. In addition, the central party spent about another DM 7 to 9 million on
related expenses and upkeep of the national-level party. In comparison, the SPD executive committee expended a little over DM 4 million. But costs incurred by the executive committee constituted only about half of the SPD’s expenses. Kitzinger estimated that about another DM 4 million was spent by the SPD’s local and regional organizations, raising the SPD’s total outlay to a grand total of about DM 8 million. In comparison, the CDU/CSU’s national-level costs were only the tip of the iceberg compared to its campaign’s total expenses. Kitzinger estimated that the CDU/CSU spent, in addition to the approximate DM 13 to 16 million at the national level, about DM 12 million at the regional and district party levels—which, as money generated by the state promotional and civic associations, often represented direct contributions to individual candidates from local businesses (estimates are that the CDU/CSU at its various levels received in total DM 15 million from the civic and promotional associations). Altogether, Kitzinger calculated, the CDU/CSU itself spent about DM 25–30 million on the campaign, much of it in an intense rush of advertising in the final weeks before the election. This figure exceeds by a factor of three or four what the SPD spent.

Beyond the union parties, a vast web of propaganda campaigns worked on the government’s behalf, including the actions of the Federal Press Agency, Adenauer’s election train, and the Arbeitsgemeinschaft demokratischen Kreise. Kitzinger estimated the combined costs of the CDU/CSU and parallel campaigns, outside of the government’s propaganda work for the first nine months of 1957 and its normal public relations activities, at about DM 30–35 million. Overall, in areas where we can check, Kitzinger’s numbers appear to be roughly correct. In terms of Die Waage’s costs, Kitzinger estimated that they should have amounted to approximately DM 1.5 million, which was about Die Waage’s internal estimation of its costs. It might not be cavalier to take Kitzinger’s overall estimates of the parallel campaigns as approximately correct. The exact figures might be disputable, but the overall picture is clear: the gap between CDU/CSU and SPD election campaign spending was enormous. Also important is not only that the CDU/CSU had far more money to spend on the campaign in comparison to the SPD, but that it benefited from a web of organizations that could share information among themselves. Public opinion survey results could be transferred among the CDU/CSU, the Federal Press Agency, and the ADK, and moreover many of the surveys were commissioned for by the Federal Press Agency in the first place. As a consequence of the coordination of these organizations, their propaganda was mutually supportive and generated a coherent picture of Adenauer and the CDU/CSU.

The SPD’s failure in the 1957 Bundestag election resulted in a reform of the party’s propaganda efforts that paralleled the programmatic reform leading to the historic Bad Godesberg Program. In the autumn of 1957, after the party’s crushing electoral defeat, voices at various levels within the SPD put forth proposals calling for the improvement of the party’s propaganda efforts. One report discussing possible advertising strategies suggested a dramatic change in the tone and style of the SPD’s campaign. As it noted: “The last election has clearly shown with the reshuffling and changing of opinion before the election how little the politi-
cal attitudes and decisions of the voters are influenced by real political developments and common ideas on these developments. Clearly the SPD’s attitude toward the electorate was in the process of evolving, at least within certain circles. The task of the party was elaborated, “We should place an emphasis of our advertisement and propaganda for the broad groups of voters not upon political information and influence, but instead all energy in the next four years should be employed for the creation of solid good will.” An important element in the creation of this “good will” was the application of modern public relations techniques. The stereotype of the SPD as purely a worker party had to be changed if the party was to achieve success.

Part of this change in the SPD’s attitude toward the electorate was an effort to popularize the party itself. One report admitted that the SPD faced tough new challenges: “The party must find new ways and means to talk clearly about the ideas of social democracy to groups alienated from the party.” An important element in this popularization of the SPD, the report concluded, was the use of “modern social science.” This included more intensive use of public opinion polling, particularly research on the “motives” of the voters. Other post-election reports called for the modernization of the party’s advertising methods. The SPD leadership went on to call for the more effective use of advertising professionals along with the application of public opinion research. Some letters sent to the campaign manager, Fritz Heine, even suggested that the SPD borrow advertising techniques from Die Waage. In order to achieve “good will” with the electorate, SPD party leaders were clamoring to revamp the technical aspects of the party’s campaigning.

Like the road to reforming the party’s platform, this transition was not easy. The conflict between the party’s old and new elements clearly surfaced in a 31 January 1958 meeting of the Advertising and Propaganda Committee. Committee members complained that not enough had been done in the previous twelve years to update the party’s campaigning techniques with an eye toward advertising, collecting polling data, and tracking the psychology of the voters. The intense competition among the parties, argued one committee member, demanded that the methods of commercial advertising be applied to political advertising. In fact, he argued, the techniques of commercial advertising and political advertising were not so different. He asked: “What do we want with our propaganda? We want to sell ideas, a program, not to bring tangible things to people. We must familiarize ourselves with it [commercial advertising]. We must build trust for our program, for our ideas, and for our people.”

In contrast, Fritz Heine, the old campaign leader from the Weimar Republic, appeared resistant to such changes. He was fearful of the influence that the “economy” would have on the politics of the party. He commented, “The political leadership of the party can never allow decisions to be taken out its hands, or where the accent of the party would be placed.” He pointed out that much that was politically necessary might not lend itself to good propaganda. Undeterred by the attacks of the young reformers, he thought that the Advertising and Propaganda
Committee could exert a greater influence upon the party’s executive committee in the future if it formulated a clear concept for the party’s propaganda for the next election. This was one salvo between the party’s old and new guards in a battle that continued to rage in the future.

Over the next few years much of the SPD’s older leadership was jettisoned in favor of more vibrant, energetic personalities. The 1957 election would be Heine’s last national election as the party’s campaign manager. To many reformers within the party, Heine as head of the Advertising and Propaganda Committee represented the inflexibility of the party’s encrusted leadership in Bonn that kept new ideas from percolating through the organization and guaranteed defeat at the ballot box. After the crushing 1957 defeat, local party organizations complained that the election propaganda was inadequate and began calling for the removal of Heine from his position. One resolution from the district of Weser Ems stated that the SPD’s propaganda no longer spoke to the working population because it was too academic, and that advertising professionals must revamp the party’s appeals. The SPD organization of Baden-Württemberg complained that the party had to work harder to change voters’ perceptions of the party. It presented a litany of complaints, including the campaign’s focus on Ollenhauer at the expense of other party leaders, the party leaders’ scaring away of bourgeois voters by using the term “comrade” (Genosse), and the party’s inability to defend itself against charges that it favored socialization throughout the economy.

At the next SPD party congress in 1958 in Stuttgart, Heine was not reelected to the party’s executive committee. In May 1959, Waldemar von Knöringen, a reformer who had acted as the Advertising and Propaganda Committee’s public-opinion polling expert, was named to head the committee. In November 1959 the party put forth the Bad Godesberg Program, in which the SPD accepted the free market, albeit with social underpinnings. For the next Bundestag election in 1961, the SPD picked up on campaign techniques used by the CDU/CSU, especially the concentration on vibrant personalities to represent the party. In fact, the emphasis upon party personalities began as early as the 1958 city elections in West Berlin. In this campaign, Willy Brandt was placed in the “center of the entire campaign” and depicted as independent of the SPD party machine. Because Brandt sent his main campaign manager, Klaus Schültz, to the United States to observe the Kennedy/Nixon campaign, Brandt’s autumn 1961 campaign for chancellor almost exactly duplicated Kennedy’s presidential campaign. This rising political star would become vice-chancellor in the grand coalition of the CDU/CSU and SPD between 1966 and 1969 and finally would lead the SPD into forming a government in 1969.

With 50.2 percent of the vote, the 1957 election the CDU/CSU reached the apex of its power. For its broad success, the party relied upon appeals that drew heavily upon the image of the economic miracle. West Germany’s maturing economic reconstruction and expansion were integral aspects of the party’s image which was centered on security, stability, and capable leadership that provided West Germans with new levels of consumerism. At the same time the cultural and
religious elements featured more prominently in earlier campaigns became increasingly muted. Polls after the election bear out this view. A DIVO poll indicated 23 percent of those who voted for the CDU/CSU viewed “satisfaction with material prosperity and the economic upswing” as the most important reason to vote for the party—up from 19 percent in 1953. Economic success was at the top of the list, while 22 percent of CDU/CSU voters were satisfied with the party’s policies overall and 9 percent expressed trust in Adenauer. Meanwhile, the “Christian character” of the party as the most important reason voters chose the CDU/CSU decreased from 21 percent in 1953 to 16 percent of respondents in 1957. The party successfully targeted women: 54 percent of women voted for the CDU/CSU in 1957, up from 47.2 percent in 1953. In addition, this election’s high turnout of 87.8 percent of eligible voters compared to earlier Bundestag elections and especially state elections benefited the CDU/CSU, particularly at the expense of the smaller parties.

As this chapter has shown, a well-oiled publicity machine employing modern political advertising and polling techniques gave the CDU/CSU an enormous advantage over its rivals, motivating voters to get out and cast their ballots for the CDU/CSU. With the apparent diplomatic and economic successes of Adenauer’s government, the party successfully created and sold an image of itself focused on the party’s leadership, especially Adenauer’s, and of West Germany prosperity. In contrast, defeat in the 1957 campaign ceded the transformation of both the SPD’s propaganda techniques and its platform, demonstrating that in its most bitter defeat the seeds of the party’s later successes were planted. In addition, the SPD’s reform pushed the West German party system along its inexorable path toward the middle, where consensus now emerged in regard to the fundamental form of the West German political economy.

Notes
2. For a good treatment of the 1957 Bundestag election, see Kitzinger, German Electoral Politics: A Study of the 1957 Campaign.
7. Wahlanalyse für das Gebiet der Länder der Bundesrepublik, I-172-32/4 (NL Lenz), ACDP.
9. Ibid. Wolfgang Hirsch-Weber and Klaus Schütz found that voters floated within either the socialist or bourgeois camps, but rar ely between them. That is, an undecided voter within the bourgeois would not vote socialist, but instead chose among the bourgeois parties. Wähler und Gewählte: Eine Untersuchung der Bundestagwahlen 1953, 163–182.
12. For an overview of the CDU/CSU’s newspaper and advertising campaigns, see the SPD report Gegnerische Kräfte und Einflüsse im Bundestagwahlkampf 1957, 48–52.
20. As Franz Meyers commented: “Mr. Heck has brought the experience from America that the election campaign plays out in large part in front of the TV screen and the radio receiver. But the nearer the election approaches, the more the personal presentation and contact of the candidates with the voters comes to the fore, and especially in political rallies.” Buchstab, Adenauer: “Wir haben wirklich etwas geschaffen,” 1221.
22. Ibid., 160.
24. The survey asked West Germans, “Which of the following characteristics, in your opinion, is descriptive of Adenauer?” The most frequent responses were “clever,” “diplomatic,” and “persistent, tough.” They received a response of 55 percent, 54 percent, and 51 percent respectively. Respondents could select more than one characteristic. Noelle and Neumann, The Germans: Public Opinion Polls, 1947–1966, 242.
26. Leitlinien für den Bundestagwahlkampf: Argumente und Tendenzen, VII-003-003/3, ACDP.
28. Sitzung, 12 February 1957, I-172-32/4, ACDP.
29. Leitlinien für den Bundestagwahlkampf, VII-003-003/3, ACDP.
30. Das Zentrum der Krise, March 1957, Institut für Demoskopie, I-172-37/5 (NL Lenz), ACDP.
31. Ibid.
33. Statistisches Bundesamt, Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart, 1958), 427.
34. Letter from Erhard to Adenauer, 12 March 1957, III/23, StBKAH.
35. Kitzinger, *German Electoral Politics*, 84; and Letter from Lenz to Adenauer, 3 January 1957, I-172-32/4 (NL Lenz).
38. For more on metaphors and political discourse in the American context, see George Lakoff, *Moral Politics: What Conservatives Know That Liberals Don't* (Chicago, 1996). For more on how metaphors affect the way we think and view the world, see George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago, 1980).
40. Leitlinien für den Bundestagwahlkampf, VII-003-003/3, ACDP.
41. Ibid.
42. Noelle and Neumann, *The Germans: Public Opinion Polls, 1947–1966*, 283. Franz-Josef Strauss was unknown by 11 percent of respondents (compared to 40 percent in November 1956), but also enjoyed the favorable opinion of only 29 percent. The only other ministers as well known as Erhard were Foreign Minister von Brentano and Finance Minister Fritz Schäffer, who were unknown to 14 percent of the population. Other ministers were unknown by at least 30 percent of respondents, and as many as 80 percent did not know the Post and Telecommunications Minister, Siegfried Balke.
43. Leitlinien für den Bundestagwahlkampf, VII-003-003/3, ACDP.
44. Ibid.
45. Hetterich, *Von Adenauer zu Schröder*, 224–225. The expense on leaflets had declined from 14 percent of the budget in 1953 (DM 360,000) to 2 percent (DM 150,000).
46. Leitsätze für die Besprechung über die Wahlpropaganda der CDU 1957, VII-003-003/3, ACDP. Although this document is not signed by the firm in charge of the CDU/CSU advertising Die Werbe, the content and tone of the document suggests that it is a set of recommendations to the CDU/CSU.
47. See the analysis of the magazines’ readership provided by the advertising firm, Die Werbe, in reports dated 17 April 1957 and 12 July 1957. VII-003-003/3, ACDP.
49. Letter from Neumann to Bundesgeschäftsstelle der Christlich Demokratischen Union, 2 April 1957, I-172-30/5 (NL Lenz), ACDP.
53. Leitlinien für den Bundestagwahlkampf, VII-003-003/3 ACDP.
54. Die Bundestagswahlen vom 6 September 1953, December 1953, VII-003-002/1, ACDP.
55. Leitsätze für die Besprechung über Wahlpropaganda der CDU 1957, VII-003-003/3, ACDP.
57. Männer neben Adenauer: Eine Serie von Anzeigen Tests (V), ZSg 132/556/VI, BA Koblenz.
58. Figures given in the report by Die Werbe, VII-003-003/3, ACDP; compared to statistics in *Statistisches Bundesamt, Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, 28 and 36.


62. Wohlstand für Alle, March 1957, Institut für Demoskopie, I-172-37/5 (NL Lenz), ACDP.

63. Ibid.

64. Leitsätze für die Besprechung über die Wahlpropaganda der CDU 1957, VII-003-003/3, ACDP.


66. Koerfer, Kampf ums Kanzleramt, 147–150.

67. Die Prinzipien der Erhard-Columne, 20 May 1957, NE 1159, LES.

68. Akennotiz über die Zusammenkunft, 24 April 1956, Die Waage, Zugang 121, LES.


70. Letter from Neumann to Horten, 19 January 1957, I-172-32/4 (NL Lenz), ACDP.

71. At the annual meeting of Die Waage in February 1952, Greiß stressed that Die Waage “is not an organ of the government, a party, or instrument to assist in elections.” Die Waage Jahresversammlung, 8 February 1957, Die Waage, Zugang 137, LES.

72. Anregungen zur Waage—Campagne bis zur Bundestagwahl 1957, Die Waage, Zugang 78, LES.

73. This was a concern expressed by the Federal Press Agency. See letter from Dr. P. M. Weber to Dr. Hohmann, 14 February 1957, B145/1630, BA Koblenz.

74. Protokolle, Die Waage Vorstandssitzung, 13 March 1957, Die Waage, Zugang 136, LES.


77. Institut für Demoskopie, Die soziale Wirklichkeit: Aus einer Untersuchung des Institutes für Demoskopie (Allensbach am Bodensee, 1956), 12–13 and 44–45.

78. Wildt, Am Beginn der “Konsumgesellschaft,” 59–75. See also Schildt, Moderne Zeiten: Freizeit, Massenmedien und “Zeitgeist” in der Bundesrepublik der 50er Jahre.


82. Helmut Schelsky, Wandlungen der deutschen Familie in der Gegenwart, 63–87. For more on Schelsky and his view on family policy, see Moeller, Protecting Motherhood, 117–120.


84. A survey of young men in March 1952 reported that during the war 58 percent of respondents had anxiety about members of the family 57 percent suffered hunger during the postwar years, and 51 percent had persons dear to them who were killed or reported missing. Noelle and Neumann, The Germans: Public Opinion Polls, 1947–1966, 156. Also a survey conducted by the Americans in the American Zone of Occupation in June 1949 reported that six out of ten Germans would support a government offering economic security over one guaranteeing civil liberties. Merritt and Merritt, Public Opinion in Occupied Germany: The OMGUS Surveys, 1945–1949, 294.

85. Schildt and S wyotttek, “Reconstruction’ and ‘Modernization’: West German Social History during the 1950s,” in Moeller, West Germany Under Construction, 413–440.


87. Kitzinger, German Electoral Politics: A Study of the 1957 Campaign, 104.

89. SPD, Jahrbuch der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands, 1956/1957 (Bielefeld, 1958), 298.

90. Protokoll der Sitzung des Werbung und Propaganda Ausschuß, 3 May 1956, SPD Parteivorstand-0594, AdsD.

91. Protokoll der Sitzung des Werbung und Propaganda Ausschuß, 18 January 1957, SPD Parteivorstand-0595, AdsD. See also the Sitzung des Parteivorstandes, 22 and 23 January 1957, SPD Parteivorstand Protokolle 1957, AdsD, in which this position then was affirmed by Ollenhauer.

92. Neue SPD Wähler: Woher?, SPD Parteivorstand-02595, AdsD.

93. Sitzung des Parteivorstandes, 22 and 23 January 1957, SPD Parteivorstand Protokolle 1957, AdsD.

94. See a polling report written by the SPD (some of its wording is identical as the “Neue Wähler: Woher?”) found in the ACDP without the cover page, I-172-33/5 (NL Lenz), ACDP. Other internal SPD reports were found in Lenz’s records, indicating some “leaks” in the SPD’s secrecy.

95. Reports from late in the campaign echoed this conclusion. See, for example, Die Arbeiterschaft vor der Bundestagwahl. Eine Studie, 7/57. This report is located in the library of the AdsD. See also Kitzinger, German Electoral Politics: A Study of the 1957 Campaign, 136–137.

96. Parolen und Propaganda, Vorschau auf den Bundestagwahl 1957, SPD Parteivorstand-02559, AdsD.


99. Protokoll der Sitzung des Werbung und Propaganda Ausschuß, 3 February 1956, SPD Parteivorstand-0594, AdsD.

100. 15 Sitzung des Werbung und Propaganda Ausschuß, 18 January 1957, SPD Parteivorstand-0595, AdsD.

101. Sitzung des Parteivorstandes, 22 and 23 January 1957, SPD Parteivorstand Protokolle 1957, AdsD.


103. Klotzbach, Der Weg zur Staatspartei, 243.


106. Kitzinger, German Electoral Politics: A Study of the 1957 Campaign, 133.


108. SPD, Jahrbuch der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands, 1956/1957, 300–301.

109. Sie stehen im Mittelpunkt, RWV 2/132, NWHStA.

110. Kitzinger, German Electoral Politics: A Study of the 1957 Campaign, 150.

111. Ibid., 202–221; and Heidenheimer and Langdon, Business Associations and the Financing of Political Parties, 52–54.

112. Kitzinger, German Electoral Politics: A Study of the 1957 Campaign, 309.

113. An estimate generated by the Bundesgeschäftsstelle of the CDU from April 1957 saw the costs at DM 6.5 million. Bundestagwahl, Kostenvoranschlag, VII-003-003/3, ACDP.


115. Kitzinger, German Electoral Politics: A Study of the 1957 Campaign, 312.

116. Letter from Horten to Greiß and Jacobi, 5 February 1958, Die Waage, Zugang 117, LES.

118. Die grundsätzlichen Werbeaufgabe der nächsten 4 Jahre, SPD Parteivorstand-0592, AdsD.
119. Ibid.
120. Vorschlag zur Einrichtung einer parteiinternen Forschungsstelle, SPD Parteivorstand-0592, AdsD.
121. Anmerkungen und Vorschläge für SPD-Propaganda, SPD Parteivorstand-0592, AdsD.
122. Werbung und Propaganda Ausschuss Protokolle, 31 January 1958, SPD Parteivorstand-0595, AdsD.
123. Ibid.
125. Resolution der Bezirks Weser Ems, 24 April 1958, SPD Parteivorstand-02595, AdsD.
126. Kritische Erfahrungen bei der Bundestagswahl (Baden-Württemberg), SPD-LO Baden-Württemberg, 725, AdsD.
127. Klotzbach, Der Weg zur Staatspartei, 428.
129. See results in DIVO Wahluntersuchung, SPD Parteivorstand-02543, AdsD.