Chapter 6

1972–75

Deutschlandpolitik at the Conference

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**ILLUSTRATION 6:** Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (left) with US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in Miesbach, near Munich, on 6 July 1974.

For us the CSCE will be the foreign policy priority at least for the year 1973. We stand before the task of playing a political role at the conference. The conference alone will certainly not bring us security; NATO provides us with security. The conference will also hardly bring about more cooperation than the current situation would generate in any case. And yet, the conference holds for us the chance to emerge on a large international stage for the first time on an equal footing and with full voting rights.

– West German State Secretary Frank in an internal meeting at the Auswärtiges Amt, November 1972

It is an indispensable goal for us to achieve the insertion of the comma.

– West German talking points regarding ‘peaceful change’, 21 February 1975

When the multilateral preparatory talks (MPT) were opened in November 1972, none of the participants seated in the Dipoli conference hall in Espoo, on the outskirts of the Finnish capital Helsinki, can have foreseen how long a road they had just embarked on. The Dipoli talks alone lasted from 22 November 1972 to 8 June 1973. Divided into four intense and at times difficult rounds, these preparatory talks ultimately led to an agreement on the agenda, structure and rules of procedure for the actual conference. This final product of the MPT, the twenty-page Helsinki Final Recommendations, or the ‘Blue Book’, turned out to be of essential importance during the CSCE that followed. Everything that was included in the recommendations had to be addressed, nothing that was excluded could be addressed. All agenda items were attached to committees or subcommittees with specific terms of reference – the texts of which had been furiousely fought over during the months in Dipoli. According to the agreed three-stage conference model, the Blue Book was endorsed and approved by the Foreign Ministers in Stage I of the CSCE, held in Helsinki from 3 to 7 July 1973. The second stage was to be held in Geneva, the third and concluding stage again in Helsinki.

In the organisational structure it set out for the second stage of the conference, the Blue Book followed the notorious idea of ‘baskets’ developed during the MPT. For Basket I, dealing with questions relating to security in Europe, there was Committee I and two subcommittees, addressing the list of principles governing relations between states and confidence-building measures, respectively. For Basket II, dealing with cooperation in the fields of economy, science and technology, and the environment, there was Committee II and five separate subcommittees. For Basket III, dealing with cooperation in humanitarian and other fields, there was Committee III and four subcommittees, including one on human contacts. The question concerning the follow-up to the conference, referred to as Basket IV, received its own working group. With the addition of the general
Coordinating Committee, a special working body dealing with the Swiss proposal on the peaceful settlement of disputes, a working group on the Mediterranean and a few other administrative bodies, the total number of organisational elements for Stage II was a staggering twenty-one.\(^4\)

Small wonder, then, that by comparison with the already burdensome Dipoli talks, Stage II of the CSCE turned out to be of an entirely different magnitude still. Following the framework of committees and subcommittees set out in the Blue Book, the over 400 delegates who gathered in Geneva on 18 September 1973 to open the second stage of the CSCE were in the end stuck there in frustratingly cumbersome negotiations for almost two years, until 21 July 1975. During the five rounds of Stage II, there were altogether 2341 official meetings, with countless additional informal meetings in various formations.\(^5\) Just one example are the constant caucuses of the Nine in Geneva, often decisive for the development of Western positions. Since the conference did not have a secretariat of its own, there is no central archival record of it. The Prague office of the OSCE holds all the official documents submitted and registered at the committee meetings, but no records of the meetings as such were kept. However, the paper trail in individual countries is breathtaking. In the German archives, there are altogether 1168 official reports sent by the FRG delegation from Geneva during Stage II. When one combines the German records with similar reports from other relevant archives, the result is an extremely dense narrative documenting, for most of the time, very little movement. During the weeks and months in Geneva, the pace in the negotiations was often invisible to the bare eye. Accordingly, public interest in the CSCE in the West, not particularly high to begin with, soon faded.

Whereas time in Geneva often seemed to stand still, the international Western framework surrounding the CSCE underwent dramatic changes in the years 1973–75. The cohesion of the transatlantic alliance was shaken by a series of events, arguably kicked off by Kissinger’s controversial ‘Year of Europe’ speech in April 1973, leading to a considerable amount of energy being spent on the drafting of a new Atlantic Charter. The energy crisis and the escalating situation in the Middle East further contributed to tensions in the transatlantic relationship. Meanwhile, European foreign-policy coordination was intensified, not least due to the declared goal of a European Union by the year 1980. In terms of personalities, there was a complete change in leadership in all the most important Western capitals – over a period of less than five months in 1974, Pompidou died, Brandt and Nixon resigned and Heath lost an election. Hence, none of the signatories of the CSCE Final Act in August 1975 on behalf of France, the FRG, the US and the UK – Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Helmut Schmidt, Gerald Ford and Harold Wilson, respectively – had been in office when the Geneva negotiations began.
The true heroes of the CSCE process were, without doubt, the mid-level civil servants doing the invisible legwork in the committees and subcommittees in Geneva. For most of the time, these CSCE specialists were able to operate with a fairly high degree of independence, often even writing their own instructions. Yet there were also moments when decisive turning points in the CSCE required interventions from high politics. In retrospect, these intersections give a fascinating picture of the importance attached to the subject matter at the time. What kinds of CSCE issues did the Foreign Ministers and Heads of Government get involved with during the conference? In this final chapter, instead of presenting a comprehensive chronological narrative of all the twists and turns in the various conference phases, I will focus only on a select few cases showing where the primary national interests of the FRG lay in the CSCE. Each of these cases, in its own way, highlights the critical link between the conference and West German Deutschlandpolitik. The first of them is the bizarre story of the seating order in Dipoli.

Alphabet Diplomacy in Dipoli

In the afternoon of 22 November 1972, the delegates of the thirty-four states participating in the MPT – Monaco only joined later to round up the number of CSCE participants to thirty-five – were in for a surprise. Arriving for the opening session of the MPT at the Dipoli conference centre, they found that the delegations were seated around the table according to the French alphabet. Although French was one of the official languages of the conference, up until that moment the Finnish hosts had consistently used English, and the English alphabetical order, in the preparations during the past months. Correspondingly, also the official list of participants, printed in the week leading to the opening of the MPT, listed the delegations along the English alphabet.

Yet at the very last minute – quite literally, since the organising committee was engaged in the endeavour for most of the night between 21 and 22 November – the Finns had gone through the trouble of reshuffling the seating order and printing new name cards of the delegations in French. In the end, this hasty procedural rearrangement proved to be permanent. As one can see in those memorable images of Helmut Schmidt and Erich Honecker sitting next to each other before the signing of the CSCE Final Act in the summer of 1975, the French alphabet prevailed all the way through the conference. But why did this sudden change on the eve of the MPT come about? At first sight the incident, in spite of its peculiarity, hardly seems to merit further investigation. Yet, given a closer look, the
story behind the linguistic switch from English to French actually is a case in point about the overriding importance of *Deutschlandpolitik* for West German CSCE policy.

For as the representatives of the FRG saw the situation, the placement of delegations in Dipoli was anything but a trivial detail. It was directly connected with the omnipresent German question. As early as March 1972, the *Auswärtiges Amt* stressed to the Finnish Government that regardless of the language used in the CSCE context, the Federal Republic wanted its delegation to be listed and seated under the letter referring to the national element in its name, whether D for ‘Deutschland’, A for ‘Allemagne’ or G for ‘Germany’. The Finns, in response, suggested using English and placing both German states under G, with the labels ‘Germany, Federal Republic’ and ‘Germany, Democratic Republic’. This suited the *Auswärtiges Amt*, which considered the case to be settled once and for all.6

Therefore the astonishment in Bonn was all the greater when, half a year later, in October 1972, the Finns suddenly hinted that they would be seating the Federal Republic under F and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) under G.7 This was obviously unacceptable to the *Auswärtiges Amt*, since the arrangement would have left the GDR to appear as the representative of Germany, whereas the defining characteristic of the FRG would have been its form of government, the federal republic. Consequently, the *Auswärtiges Amt* instructed the West German mission in Helsinki to object to this strongly, arguing that it was common international practice to allow each country to decide for itself the name it wanted to be called.8 The first priority was to be placed under G, preferably as ‘Federal Republic of Germany’, but if necessary, ‘Germany, Federal Republic of’ was also acceptable.9 But the Finns remained adamant. In spite of repeated requests from the Federal Republic during the weeks preceding the opening of the MPT, the Finns refused to place both German states under the letter G.10

This left the West German decision-makers in a difficult position. As we have seen in the preceding chapters, one of the key principles of the Federal Republic’s policy during the CSCE preparations had been to avoid open disagreements, between East and West as well as within the West. This was considered even more important when it came to the German question. From the Bonn perspective, the ‘German quarrels’ had to be kept out of the multilateral conference, at almost any cost. This was also evident in the row over the Dipoli seating order. While instructing the head of the mission in Helsinki to continue to press for a solution on West German terms, von Staden added that ‘our paramount interest is to avoid controversy in this question’.11
Indeed, although the seating order was a fundamental question of principle to the Federal Republic, all by itself it did not really have anything to bargain with. Threatening with unilateral withdrawal from the conference over such an apparently trivial matter was hardly an option, since it could easily have led to the failure of the whole conference, with the FRG left to blame for it. Fear of renewed isolation, diluting the recent gains in the freedom of foreign-policy manoeuvre, was constantly present in West German considerations.

Unwilling to act alone, the Federal Republic decided to turn to its Western allies for help. On 20 November, only two days before the MPT were scheduled to begin, Scheel raised the subject at the ministerial meeting of the EC in The Hague. Scheel’s colleagues unanimously pledged to support the FRG in its insistence to be seated under G. At a North Atlantic Council meeting in Brussels on the following day, the remaining NATO allies, equally unanimously, were also brought on board.

Now, with the backing of its allies secured, the FRG could afford to raise the stakes. On 21 November, the Auswärtiges Amt informed Soviet and Finnish representatives in Bonn as well as the Finnish Government in Helsinki of the new, firmer line, authorised by Foreign Minister Scheel. The delegation of the Federal Republic would refuse to take part in the MPT the following day unless its requests on the seating order were met. The Finns were left in no doubt that all of the FRG’s allies were behind this position. At the end of the day, then, the Finns had no choice but to succumb to this West German ultimatum. Bonn’s gamble, only made possible by multilateral Western backing, paid off.

The subsequent switch from English to French was purely cosmetic, a face-saving measure of the Finnish hosts. Contrary to what John Maresca has suggested, I have not found any evidence supporting the idea that it would have been the West Germans themselves who demanded the use of French. The Finnish officials involved have in retrospect taken full and appropriate credit for the decision to choose French. Somewhat curiously, however, they have argued that this was the only way to meet the demands of the Federal Republic. From a purely technical point of view, it seems, the original idea of ‘Germany, Federal Republic’ and ‘Germany, Democratic Republic’ would have served the same purpose just as well.

But what truly mattered was that the West Germans got their way, getting themselves seated according to the national element of the name of the country. The fact that the two German delegations ended up sitting next to each other was merely a by-product of this achievement. With the choice of French, this simultaneously put the two German states at the top of the list, under A (‘Allemagne, République Fédérale d’’ and ‘Allemande, République Démocratique’).
This seating arrangement, symbolising the inner-German rapprochement, naturally produced wonderful photo opportunities over the course of the conference. For the purposes of this book, however, the story behind the small-scale alphabetical diplomacy in November 1972 is also an illuminating example of two broader characteristics of the conference negotiations in the following years. First of all, the row over the seating order in the MPT is a symbol of the central importance of the inner-German relationship to the whole CSCE process – and vice versa. Second, it gives an idea of the way in which the FRG depended on building alliances, whether they were institutionalised such as the EPC or NATO or less formal ad hoc alliances, often with one or all of the Bonn Group powers.

In this particular case, the Federal Republic was able to combine the two elements favourably. Faced with a problem directly connected with both the inner-German relationship and the CSCE, the FRG made efficient use of multilateral means to pursue its national interests. Frank told the head of the Finnish trade mission in Bonn a few days after the start of the MPT that he had seldom seen the European partners so united behind the Federal Republic. But as Frank’s statement suggests, this was clearly a special case. Whereas the seating order was a high-ranking question of national interest for the FRG, the Allies had no fundamental issues involved and could thus easily support Bonn. In more controversial questions, however, taking the lead in the Alliance could be more challenging. Moreover, with the opening of the multilateral conference, the playing field had become wider, now also including all Warsaw Pact countries as well as the neutral and non-aligned states. Navigating in this environment was not always easy, as is well illustrated by the case concerning the possibility of peaceful change of frontiers.

Peaceful Change, Act 1: Defending the Moscow Treaty

The question regarding the inviolability of frontiers as opposed to the possibility of changing them by peaceful means turned out to be one of the key battlefields in Geneva. This was hardly surprising, given the fundamental interests at stake. On the one hand, the main motive of the Soviet Union to initiate the CSCE in the first place had been to confirm the status quo, the postwar borders in Europe, that is. On the other hand, safeguarding the option of peaceful change of frontiers was the most important cornerstone of West German Deutschlandpolitik, given the Federal Republic’s central political aim of creating ‘a state of peace in Europe in which the German people can regain its unity in free self-determination’. As has been shown in the previous chapter, the FRG first introduced the concept of peaceful
change to the Western CSCE preparations as early as February 1972. A collision between the two approaches was thus unavoidable, sooner or later.

What is surprising, however, is the way in which the dominant focus on peaceful change completely overshadowed all other elements of Basket I in West German thinking. Naturally, on the working level the FRG engaged actively in all efforts of the Nine and NATO, contributing to the preparation of joint positions. Thus, the main successes for the Nine in Basket I, the inclusion of human rights and fundamental freedoms on the one hand, self-determination of peoples on the other hand, in the list of ten principles as individual items were major breakthroughs for the FRG, as well. The FRG also wanted to build some kind of bridge between political and military security, and was therefore keen on pushing the adoption of the confidence-building measures such as advance notification of manoeuvres and troop movements. Yet these issues were at no point in time pursued with anything close to the same vigour as details relating to peaceful change. The latter were the ‘special preoccupations of the Germans’, as the head of the UK delegation observed at the end of the MPT.19

As soon as the Dipoli talks got started, the threat of a stalemate on the issue of inviolability of borders became apparent. The Soviet Union was pushing for a separate principle of inviolability of frontiers as the most prominent result of the conference. Interested as he was in a rapid conclusion of the preparatory talks, leading quickly to a prestigious CSCE summit, Brezhnev attempted to resolve this on the highest level. Brezhnev’s message to Brandt, signalling some Soviet flexibility in the labelling of agenda items in return for Western concessions on the list of principles was conveyed through Bahr’s back channel connections in mid-January 1973. Similar messages had also been sent to Nixon and Pompidou.20 Reporting from Helsinki, the head of the West German MPT delegation, Guido Brunner, was afraid that a ‘renegotiation of the Moscow Treaty’ was looming.21

In Bonn, the legal experts of the Auswärtiges Amt were equally worried. An independent reference to the inviolability of borders in the CSCE could dangerously be interpreted as excluding the possibility of ‘peaceful change’.22 In late January von Staden laid out the main arguments of the FRG: inviolability of borders had to be subordinate to a more general principle of refraining from the use of force, otherwise the CSCE could jeopardise the carefully constructed modus vivendi architecture of the bilateral Ostpolitik treaties.23 Accordingly, in early February 1973, the West German representatives in NATO firmly underlined the importance of dealing with ‘inviolability of borders’ together with other ‘principles of relations between states’, and more particularly in direct connection with the principle of non-use of force.24
Finding common ground with the Allies in a question this sensitive was crucial to the FRG, because acting alone could become problematic. The West German delegation had already experienced this in late January, when Brunner stood out in Dipoli, being the only Western delegate publicly opposing a selective Soviet proposal on the contents of the declaration of principles. A series of Soviet complaints about Brunner’s behaviour followed in February, from Falin in Bonn as well as from Gromyko in Moscow. In the Soviet view the West German delegation had challenged the inviolability of borders despite the agreement reached on it in the Moscow Treaty.25

The West Germans saw this differently. It was the Soviet Union that tried to reinterpret the Moscow Treaty in the multilateral framework. Both Frank and Bahr stressed to their Soviet counterparts that the FRG was not willing to violate any borders but neither would it accept attempts to depart from the modus vivendi nature of the Moscow Treaty.26 Soviet efforts to feed in formulations that the FRG had rejected in 1970 were apparent in texts it circulated in Dipoli, with absolutely irreversible positions on territorial integrity and inviolability of borders.27

At first Bahr, always the maverick, would have been prepared to provoke a conflict over the borders issue in the conference. If necessary, such a minor crisis could then be defused at the highest level between the FRG and the Soviet Union – a slightly more flexible West German approach to this question could be used as tit-for-tat in exchange for Soviet influence on the GDR in the inner-German problems regarding humanitarian issues.28

However, the more careful Auswärtiges Amt line prevailed. The Soviet efforts had to be stopped, but the means for achieving this needed to be found in the multilateral toolbox. In early February 1973, the Auswärtiges Amt ruled that a direct bilateral West German-Soviet confrontation in Basket I, concerning the principles, had to be avoided. In the future the FRG needed to coordinate its positions better with the Allies, always making sure that in the particular question of borders the main burden should not fall on the FRG.29 Support was promptly sought, in the Bonn Group, in NATO and in the EPC.30 Cleverly, the West Germans employed differentiated tactics and argumentation in each framework.

In order to mobilise the Bonn Group, the FRG argued that anything hinting at a use of the CSCE framework as a substitute for a post-war peace treaty with Germany would also impede the interests of the Three Powers. Here a suitable point of reference was a resolution of the UN General Assembly on friendly relations between states from October 1970, that is, from after the Moscow Treaty. The FRG argued in the Bonn Group that a declaration of the CSCE should not go beyond what was agreed at the UN, neither in easing the use of violence to change borders nor in restrict-
ing the possibility of peaceful change. In the EPC, on the other hand, the West German argument of choice was the political finality of the European Community, since the pursued European Union could also amount to border changes.

The EPC, then again, was increasingly seen as the most promising route to influence decision making in NATO. The efforts to find a more discreet link between the principles of ‘inviolability of frontiers’ and ‘refraining from the use of force’ were first discussed in the EPC sous-comité. When this line was presented to the NATO allies, the positive response surprised the West Germans. At the end of February, Diesel declared in a handwritten note to State Secretary Frank that in the CSCE context the EPC was already de facto able to ‘pre-programme’ (vorprogrammieren) the NATO positions.

Regardless of the tactical approach applied, the key West German goal remained the same: to avoid a reinterpretation of the Moscow Treaty, to keep open the possibility of peaceful change and not to contradict the Deutschlandpolitik goals. This line was confirmed between Brandt and Scheel in mid-February 1973 and again in a cabinet meeting on 25 April. The CSCE and the Moscow Treaty had to be kept at a distance. As the West Germans saw it, a simple multilateralisation of the bilateral treaties without the multilateralisation of the indirect reservations concerning those treaties (in particular the letter on German unity) was not acceptable.

Before the start of the fourth round of the Dipoli talks, the declaration of principles continued to be the main bone of contention between East and West. For the FRG, the inherent link between refraining from the use of force and the inviolability of frontiers was crucial. In his handwritten instructions, State Secretary Frank stressed that the Allies should be left in no doubt about the primary importance of this matter. The FRG could only support a declaration of principles if the idea behind the letter on German unity – peaceful change – was anchored into the document in some way.

Bahr conveyed this view to Kissinger in Washington in late April, stressing that compromises on the issue of borders that might be acceptable to some Allies would be detrimental to the FRG, since they would hollow out the Moscow Treaty and even the Basic Treaty. The borders issue was an absolute priority for Bonn – if an agreement corresponding to the basis of the Moscow Treaty was not reached, the FRG would not participate in the CSCE at all. Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt gave assurances of full support for the West German position. In the question concerning frontiers the FRG should be the one to decide what was acceptable to the West. Kissinger even went as far as to ask the FRG to inform the US delegation in Helsinki on this, since the White House could not keep track of...
all the manoeuvres going on in the MPT. This US support was repeated two days later in the Nixon-Brandt meeting in Washington. For the time being, however, the Soviet Union could not be persuaded in this matter. In mid-April 1973, Brezhnev had again approached Brandt, Nixon and Pompidou to call for a rapid conclusion of the MPT, a brief committee stage over the summer and a concluding summit in the autumn. At the same time he accused the West of intentional procrastination, in particular with respect to the inviolability of borders. In his response to Brezhnev, Brandt declared that the Federal Government wanted to see the close connection between renunciation of force and inviolability of borders, as had been apparent in the Moscow Treaty, also reflected in the CSCE declaration on principles. The possibility for peaceful change or even abolition of borders needed to stay open. But as Kissinger reported from his discussions with Brezhnev in Moscow in early May, the Soviet leader had categorically rejected a connection between the two principles.

In the end, the Dipoli talks ended in a draw on this particular question. There is no explicit reference to any kind of possibility of peaceful change of frontiers in the Blue Book. Instead, the Helsinki Final Recommendations list the inviolability of frontiers as one of the principles to be addressed in Basket I, directly after the principle of refraining from the threat or use of force. This had been the lowest common denominator acceptable to the FRG, since this could be interpreted as implying at least some kind of connection between the two.

The list of principles itself was conclusive after being set in the Blue Book. But the Helsinki Final Recommendations left the more precise contents of each principle undefined. It was in this context that the debate about peaceful change really began. The FRG insisted on including a reference to peaceful change in one of the ten principles in the declaration of Basket I. Already in his speech at Stage I of the CSCE in Helsinki, Foreign Minister Scheel had raised the issue, stressing that the principles to be agreed on in the CSCE would ‘leave untouched the possibility of frontiers being changed by peaceful means and by mutual agreement’. True to form, Scheel also quoted the formulation of the letter on German unity: ‘the political aim of the Federal Republic of Germany to help create a state of peace in Europe in which the German nation can regain its unity in free self-determination’. At least the French had been informed well in advance about Scheel’s intention to make this reference.

As so often before, the FRG wanted to reach its goals in Europe’s name. Already prior to the convocation of Stage II in Geneva, France had begun to draft its own proposal for a declaration of principles. Alarmed by a possible departure from a common position, the West Germans were able to convince the French of the advantages of a joint approach. France and the
FRG agreed that in the opening weeks of the Geneva negotiations the FRG would at first deliver its ‘explanatory’ document on non-use of force, territorial integrity and inviolability of borders, to be followed by the French proposal for a declaration of principles – all closely coordinated, first with the Nine, then in NATO. In this coordination, the FRG was also able to improve the French proposal to better meet its needs. When this first Western draft of the ‘decalogue’ of principles was tabled on 19 October 1973, the reference to peaceful change appeared under the principle of inviolability of frontiers. At the same time, however, almost all Allies in the Nine and Fifteen considered the explanatory document of the FRG on non-use of force, territorial integrity and inviolability of borders to be too rigorous and maximal as an opening move.

Nonetheless, the West Germans continued to anchor their essential position as a European one. The FRG had been the initiator of a new EPC paper on objectives and strategies of the Nine at the CSCE which was prepared during the early autumn of 1973. This joint effort of the EPC sous-comité and ad hoc group was presented to the political committee and approved by the Foreign Ministers in November. Reading the document, the German impact can easily be detected – essential FRG interests are well represented in it. In the document, the Nine clearly stated that their main goal in all Basket I principles with a territorial aspect was to defend the possibility of a peaceful change of frontiers.

At the same time as the FRG was working to guarantee Allied support in the negotiations in Geneva, it had no qualms about discussing the peaceful change issue bilaterally with the Soviet Union. During Scheel’s visit to Moscow in November 1973 he gave assurances to Gromyko that the FRG was prepared to address the question of inviolability of borders in Geneva in the same spirit as had been the case in Moscow in 1970. There it had been clear that the possibility of peaceful change did not contradict the principle of inviolability. The Soviets, on their behalf, continued to complain to Brandt and high-level officials in Bonn that the West German delegation in Geneva was attacking the inviolability of borders which had been agreed in the Moscow Treaty.

The Soviet complaints were tactical in nature, for on the ground in Geneva, there had been no major confrontations. In fact, there the situation remained more or less unchanged until the spring of 1974. The principle of inviolability of borders as such was not controversial, but there was no progress towards agreeing on a suitable reference in the final document to the possibility of peaceful change, neither in Geneva nor in the correspondence between Brandt and Brezhnev. With the FRG taking its turn as the rotating EC president for the first six months of 1974, the Nine naturally...
held on to the agreed strategy, stressing the need to keep the option of peaceful change explicitly open.52

By March 1974 the delegations in Geneva had finally managed to formulate a text draft for the principle of inviolability of frontiers. Brunner wrote an upbeat report, arguing that the danger of a reinterpretation of the Moscow Treaty seemed to be over. The version also suited the FRG because it contained a bracketed sentence referring to peaceful change, although the final placement of this sentence was still open to discussion.53

At the meeting of the Federal Security Council on 3 April, Brandt confirmed that there were positive signals regarding peaceful change, both from Geneva and from Kissinger’s recent trip to Moscow.54 Yet this positive feeling was premature.

### Peaceful Change, Act 2: Enter Genscher

5 April 1974 was a crucial date for West German CSCE policy. In spite of continued efforts to coordinate positions with the NATO and EPC allies, the FRG was suddenly isolated in the subcommittee focusing on principles. Having been unable to agree on a final text on inviolability of frontiers with a reference to peaceful change, the subcommittee, under increasing pressure to achieve tangible results, now separated the two. While registering the new text on inviolability, the subcommittee also presented, on a separate piece of paper, a formulation to be later placed in ‘one of the principles’:

> The participating states consider that their borders can be changed only in accordance with international law through peaceful means and by agreement.55

This formulation had been acceptable to the FRG in the French draft, when it was connected to the principle of inviolability of frontiers. Yet ‘floating’ alone, it was extremely problematic. Now that the eventual placement of the sentence was left open, it seemed to allow for peaceful change ‘only in accordance with international law’, thus making international law an additional condition for peaceful change rather than peaceful change an inherent consequence of international law. The only positive aspect from the West German perspective was that this marked the first time that the Soviet Union had agreed to an explicit reference to peaceful change in a negotiated text.56 To underline its reservations, the FRG registered a disclaimer in Geneva, stating that the final formulation of the peaceful change clause depended on its placement.57

What followed from this decision of the subcommittee in Geneva on 5 April 1974 was a truly peculiar battle that in all lasted for eleven months.
The minuscule details of this one ‘floating sentence’ on peaceful change were vigorously debated and negotiated, not only by the CSCE delegation in Geneva or by legal experts in Bonn, but also in a series of high-level meetings of foreign ministers and heads of government. The option of peaceful change was an essential national interest of the FRG. Now it was at stake, and it was fought for with the weapons of language and grammar, of syntax and insertion of commas.

On 30 April 1974 Scheel wrote to Kissinger, stressing the primary importance of ‘peaceful change’ for the FRG. It was absolutely essential that the declaration of principles was not at odds with the goal of creating the ‘state of peace in Europe’ referred to in the letter on German unity. If the Soviet Union rejected the inclusion of the ‘floating sentence’ in the principle of inviolability, West German interests could also be met by including it in the principle of sovereign equality. This, however, would require a reformulation of the sentence from its current restrictive and negative significance into a more positive one, expressly stating that peaceful change of frontiers was possible.58

At the same time, first attempts to repair the damage were taken in the EPC framework. At a special meeting of the EPC sous-comité in Geneva the Nine confirmed their view that the logical place for peaceful change was in the principle of inviolability. This position should be defended for as long as possible, although being able to maintain it to the end was highly unlikely. Other options, such as adding it as an eleventh principle, as a general statement or as a disclaimer between the principles of inviolability and territorial integrity, were all considered unsuitable. There was no common understanding on the fall-back position – the FRG preferred including it in the first principle, that of sovereign equality.59

Above all, the FRG’s allies in the Nine were reluctant to make significant changes to the formulation of the floating sentence. They did not agree with the FRG’s fear that the formulation, if not directly linked with inviolability of frontiers, might remain too general, enabling the Soviet Union to claim that the principle of inviolability outweighed peaceful change. Although there were slightly more favourable signals from the EPC meetings later in May, the isolation of the FRG in the Nine in this issue was not completely resolved.60

Meanwhile, the resignation of Brandt and the election of Scheel as the federal president had ushered in a change in government in Bonn. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, while underscoring elements of continuity in West German foreign policy, also brought along new nuances. In the CSCE context it was actually a lot more than that, since Genscher immediately took a keen interest in the CSCE issues. His style in intervening in the CSCE was decisively more
energetic and hands-on than that of his predecessor. Moreover, then as Interior Minister responsible for the Basic Law, Genscher had in 1970 played an important role in drafting the letter on German unity. The minister, himself a native of Halle, now in the territory of the GDR, had a direct interest in safeguarding the peaceful change option. As the UK officials duly noted, in Genscher’s view the FRG delegation in Geneva had given away too much, too easily.

With Genscher at the helm of the Auswärtiges Amt, the normal EPC route was not considered sufficient in the defensive battle. In addition, a rapid involvement of the Bonn Group was necessary. West German senior officials had discussed this already in mid-May, but in early June van Well and the new state secretary, Walter Gehlhoff, decided to seek support for the West German position from the Bonn Group, with an explicit wish for the ambassadors to raise the issue at the highest levels in their capitals.

On 7 June Gehlhoff met the UK, US and French Ambassadors in Bonn and pointed out that the decisive stage in negotiating the text of the declaration on principles was at hand in Geneva. The FRG supported the results achieved so far on sovereign equality, refraining from the use of force, inviolability of frontiers and territorial integrity. Taken as such, however, they could jointly be interpreted as excluding the possibility of peaceful change. Therefore it was essential that an appropriate placement and formulation for a text on peaceful change was found. Gehlhoff argued that this was important because of the future European development, the German national option and the rights of the Three Powers. Hence it was in the common interest of the FRG and the Three, and they should coordinate their positions in the Bonn Group formation quickly and closely already prior to the next caucus meetings of the Nine and the Fifteen in Geneva, so that a new formulation could be registered before the second drafting round of the declaration. Gehlhoff stressed that this matter was of essential importance to the FRG in general and to Foreign Minister Genscher in particular. The project was to be kept strictly confidential, only between the Bonn Group members.

Gehlhoff’s appeal was well received, and an intensive session of Bonn Group consultations on aspects in the CSCE affecting Germany and Berlin was opened on 10 June. The goal was to achieve a joint Bonn Group position before the NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Ottawa a week later. The West German contribution to these talks concerned – naturally – peaceful change. As the FRG argued, the need for reformulation of the text that had been registered in Geneva on 5 April depended on its placement. The best option, inclusion of peaceful change in the principle of inviolability, would in all likelihood be blocked by the Soviet Union.
inclusion in sovereign equality, something the Soviet Union had indicated to be a possibility, would require larger changes to the text, to which the Soviet Union would probably not agree, either. Therefore efforts should be concentrated on including it in the principle of territorial integrity. A completely separate principle on peaceful change was not included in the Helsinki recommendations and was therefore out of the question. Genscher and van Well made this point to Kissinger in a meeting in Bavaria on 11 June.

The Bonn Group talks were brought to a successful close on 13 June. For the West Germans, this solution paid off – the FRG was to a very large extent able to get its positions accepted. The French and the US had been cooperative to begin with, but the UK was at first reluctant, arguing that the topic of peaceful change should only be dealt with locally in Geneva. The UK had grown increasingly frustrated by the promotion of West German special interests, involving ‘erratic and sudden changes of direction’, often embarrassing to their allies.

In the end, the UK resistance was also overcome. The result of the Bonn Group consultations was brought to the four Foreign Ministers, meeting for their traditional dinner (Deutschlandessen) on the margins of the NATO ministerial meeting in Ottawa. The discussion between the four Foreign Ministers was not easy, though. Here it was Kissinger, in particular, who stressed that it was a serious matter to reopen a text that had already been registered in Geneva. When Genscher referred to the West German reservations that had also been registered, Kissinger retorted that nobody had supported the FRG in this.

With strong support from his French colleague, Genscher underscored the dangers of referring to ‘international law’ in the context of ‘peaceful change’ and emphasised that no government of the FRG could, even if it wanted to, sign anything if peaceful change was not clearly addressed. In Genscher’s view the Soviet Union was also completely aware of this, they simply wanted to have a third attempt to overcome these well-known reservations, after having failed at it with the Moscow Treaty and with the Berlin Agreement. Finally the three ministers agreed to support the West German view. The first choice would be to include peaceful change in the principle of inviolability, but if this was not possible, then the text should be reformulated in a positive way to suit another principle. In their joint declaration, the four Foreign Ministers declared that it was ‘necessary that the CSCE Declaration of Principles contains an appropriate passage on the peaceful change of frontiers and be such as not to affect in any way Quadrirpartite rights and responsibilities concerning Berlin and Germany as a whole’. The delegations of the Bonn Group countries in Geneva would be instructed accordingly.
After the direct involvement of Genscher and the Bonn Group, the leeway the German delegation in Geneva had enjoyed was dramatically restricted in this issue. When Brunner in late June reported from his discussions with the local Bonn Group setup on their speculations about a formulation the Soviet Union might accept, the Auswärtiges Amt quickly tightened its leash. Local initiatives in informal talks in Geneva could jeopardise the valuable Bonn Group consensus. The delegation should only operate on instructions from the capital. However, Brunner’s report also raised Genscher’s interest. The minister wanted to know whether the possible compromise formulation discussed in Geneva – ‘the participating states consider that, in accordance with international law, their frontiers can be modified by peaceful means and by agreement’ – would be acceptable to the FRG. The legal experts in Bonn had no objections.

In spite of their initial arguments in Ottawa, the link between Genscher and Kissinger proved to be decisive in handling the issue of peaceful change. The Nixon-Brezhnev summit in Moscow in early July 1974 was the first turning point. Directly after Kissinger’s return from Moscow he met Genscher twice, first at the Dusseldorf airport and again a few days later, on 6 July, this time in Miesbach, close to Munich, on the eve of the football World Cup final. Briefing Genscher on his discussions in Moscow, Kissinger told him that Gromyko had, as expected, again rejected the West German wish to include peaceful change in the third principle, concerning inviolability of frontiers. However, Gromyko had signalled that the Soviet Union was prepared to have a reference to it in the first principle, that of sovereign equality. Kissinger had told him that this required a reformulation of the sentence and wrote his improvised suggestion on a piece of paper:

In accordance with international law the participating states consider that their frontiers can be changed through peaceful means and by agreement.

Kissinger had stressed to Gromyko that this was a US proposal, which still needed to be discussed with the FRG. Genscher considered this to be an important improvement, but would have wanted to see it complemented with ‘and nothing in this declaration shall affect that right’. In Kissinger’s view, however, achieving this additional formulation was very unlikely. In the end, the West German side agreed to this and hoped that Kissinger would continue to discuss the details of peaceful change bilaterally with the Soviet Union, rather than Genscher with the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn. Kissinger agreed to take the matter to Ambassador Dobrynin immediately after his return to Washington.

In effect, then, Genscher had outsourced the defence of this fundamental national interest to the US. As a result of the Miesbach meeting between Genscher and Kissinger, the FRG position was based on the formulation
the US secretary of state had spontaneously written in Moscow. Van Well informed the West German CSCE delegation about the agreed US–Soviet route. The delegation in Geneva should, meanwhile, abstain from any new initiatives in the field of peaceful change. Meeting in Paris on 11 July 1974, the EPC political directors concurred with this procedure and contents on peaceful change. Genscher also won the support of his French colleague for this method. After the FRG specifically urged the US to do so, the US delegation officially registered the Kissinger formula on peaceful change on the final day before the summer recess of the Geneva negotiations, 26 July 1974. But the story was not over with that, because there was as yet no official Soviet reaction.

Peaceful Change, Act 3: Commas for the National Interest

Already over the summer 1974, the trench lines in this legal-linguistic battle had become clear. As the legal experts of the Auswärtiges Amt summed it up, the further up in the sentence the reference to international law, the better for the FRG, the further down, the better for the Soviet Union. Soviet attempts to move it further towards the full stop ensued in September. To complicate things further, there were soon not just one, but several contradictory Soviet responses making the rounds. At least in part this was due to conscious efforts to sow division in the Western ranks.

When Genscher met Gromyko in Gymnich on 15 September, the Soviet Foreign Minister avoided giving a straight response to the Kissinger formula. He acknowledged being familiar with it and pointed out that not everyone in Moscow was happy about it. In the following week, during the General Assembly of the UN, when foreign ministers were gathered in New York, Gromyko referred to this discussion in his meeting with Kissinger. In a classic attempt of divide and rule, the Soviet Foreign Minister claimed to his US colleague that the West Germans referred to the formulation registered in Geneva as a US draft, signalling that the US was the only obstacle in the way of solving the peaceful change issue. In his own meeting with Kissinger, Genscher gave assurances that the West German position remained unchanged. Kissinger and Genscher agreed that the Nine would support the US-registered formulation on peaceful change. If the Soviet Union objected and requested the old formulation, the West could accept this on the condition of its inclusion in the principle on inviolability of frontiers. Completing the triangle of meetings in New York, Genscher firmly underscored to Gromyko that the formulation on peaceful change was a fundamental interest of the FRG. In response, Gromyko formulated a new suggestion:
The participating states consider that their frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, only through peaceful means and by agreement.  

When Chancellor Schmidt paid a visit to Moscow in late October 1974, Brezhnev again pressed for a rapid conclusion of the CSCE. Schmidt believed that the end was near, and stressed that the FRG had only one vital interest in the CSCE: the formulation on peaceful change of frontiers needed to have the same status as other principles. In the simultaneous meeting of Foreign Ministers, Genscher pointed out that there were contradictory versions of the Soviet proposal making the rounds. Gromyko confirmed that the version he himself had delivered in New York was false, the correct Soviet proposal stated that frontiers could be changed ‘only in accordance with international law’. Van Well intervened and told the meeting that the Kissinger formulation registered in Geneva was the common position of the Nine and the Fifteen, not a unilateral US or West German position. The Soviets retorted that naturally everyone would follow the West Germans on this. Later, van Well accused the Soviets of having done all of this on purpose to isolate the FRG.

Meanwhile the pressure on the FRG was also growing from the US side. There were repeated demands for a stronger West German ownership of the floating sentence. State Department officials pointed out that the US having presented the formulation on peaceful change, as agreed by Genscher and Kissinger, as a proposal of its own in Geneva on 26 July had been an ‘accident’. The Europeans should take responsibility of their own demands and count only on silent US support. During his visit to Moscow in late October 1974, Kissinger had told Brezhnev that the US could approve all solutions to the declaration of principles as long as they were acceptable to the FRG. The same degree of flexibility was conveyed in the Vladivostok summit between Ford and Brezhnev in late November. In the West German analysis this was further evidence of US ambiguity – Alliance solidarity was increasingly outweighed by a need to accommodate the Soviets in the CSCE in return for progress in SALT and MBFR.

This ambiguity was finally cleared away on 6 December 1974, when Genscher discussed the CSCE with Kissinger in Washington. Kissinger, who was personally not in the least bit interested in the matter and considered its minute details ‘totally ridiculous’, declared that the US was willing to take the heat from the Soviet Union in the question of peaceful change, so that the FRG could step aside from the line of fire. In Kissinger’s view all the problems in this regard during the autumn were due to Soviet misinformation. The specialists of both foreign ministries were tasked to consult each other on the tactics for the final stretch.
As a result of these US-West German consultations, which were continued in January 1975, the preferred option was the formulation registered in Geneva on 26 July 1974, but two fall-back options were formulated, each moving the attribute ‘according to international law’ a step further towards the end of the sentence. Genscher himself weighed in, emphasising that he had serious doubts about the inclusion of the word ‘only’, also if used in the context ‘their frontiers can be changed only by peaceful means’. Hence, the West Germans were not willing to accommodate the fourth option that contained this word.\textsuperscript{89}

The FRG had agreed to the US maintaining contact with the Soviet Union in this issue, but the West Germans were not consulted in advance about the US decision to suddenly deliver the first agreed fall-back option to the Soviet embassy in Washington on 21 January:

The participating states consider in accordance with international law that their frontiers can be changed through peaceful means and by agreement.\textsuperscript{90}

While the Soviet response to this US proposal was pending, the FRG turned to its European allies. Having learned from the past mistake of being left isolated in Geneva in April 1974, the FRG had since then constantly made certain that it had the support of the Nine for the current formulations on peaceful change.\textsuperscript{91} In mid-February 1975, van Well told US Ambassador Hillenbrand in Bonn that if necessary, the FRG, with the support of the Nine, was prepared for a confrontation with the Soviet Union over peaceful change. The timing of this confrontation was decisive: under no circumstances should the West agree to a second reading of the declaration of principles before the issue of peaceful change was resolved.\textsuperscript{92} The same message was delivered by Blech, whom Genscher had handpicked to lead the FRG delegation in Geneva in November 1974, to a leading member of the Soviet delegation. Despite Soviet attempts to the contrary, the West Germans did not engage in bilateral negotiations with them on the text on peaceful change. Instead, Blech pointed out, the West was expecting a Soviet response to the latest US proposal.\textsuperscript{93}

The response finally came from Gromyko on 17 February, when he met Kissinger in Geneva. In this meeting the Soviet Foreign Minister made yet another counter-proposal:

The participating states consider that their frontiers can be changed in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement.

Although Kissinger suspected that the placement of the reference to international law might be problematic, he promised to consult the Allies and get back to the Soviets on this suggestion. In the US analysis, the disappearance of the word ‘only’ was a major Soviet concession.\textsuperscript{94}
The Auswärtiges Amt was still not completely satisfied. Although the absence of ‘only’ was a step in the right direction, the latest Soviet proposal still contained dangerous elements. For the FRG, all changes of frontiers were in accordance with international law, if they occurred by peaceful means and by agreement. There was no need for a third condition, that of being in accordance with international law. Therefore the FRG preferred a previous version where the reference to international law was further up. If that was not to be achieved, the FRG could, however, accept the Gromyko proposal with one final modification. The FRG would need to insist on the insertion of another comma, between the words ‘changed’ and ‘in accordance’. This was a formulation, when included in the first principle, covering sovereign equality, that the FRG could defend in the EPC and in NATO:

The participating states consider that their frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement.95

The West German response was delivered through bilateral US-Soviet contacts. A week later, on 1 March, it was confirmed through the same channel that the Soviet Union was willing to accept the West German version with the additional comma.96 Van Well informed his colleagues in the Nine about this on 3 March, so that an agreement could be quickly reached in NATO as well, before confirming the formulation to the Soviet Union.97 The West German delegation in Geneva was instructed accordingly on 4 March. In van Well’s view, after agreement of the NATO caucus, this new formulation in connection with Principle 1 should be registered by the US delegation on behalf of the Fifteen.98 On 10 March the Soviet Union confirmed its agreement to the same formulation in a Russian version.99 The US delegation registered the formulation officially on 17 March.

This registration finally ended the battle over peaceful change. As peculiar and petty as the details behind the development of this one sentence may seem, to the Federal Republic it was the essence of the whole CSCE. The rest of the sixty-page Final Act absolutely paled in comparison with these less than two dozen words and the two commas included. From the perspective of Bonn, the option of peaceful change was directly connected with the ‘state of peace in Europe’ the FRG wanted to create. The floating sentence, once it had found its place in the declaration of principles in the Final Act, left a small back door open for the possibility of German unification.
Basket III: Human Contacts

Basket III, with its provisions for cooperation in humanitarian fields, was another topic of particular importance to the FRG. As we have seen in preceding chapters, in the Western conference preparations the FRG had constantly defended a careful step-by-step approach. Instead of provoking conflicts with the Soviet Union and thus endangering the inclusion of humanitarian issues on the conference agenda altogether, one needed to choose a less aggressive tone. For the FRG, Basket III was not a symbolic tool to be used for propaganda purposes. On the contrary, in the inner-German context Basket III could amount to something very tangible. Avoiding controversies in this area was essential for the FRG because of the people-to-people contacts between the two German states. Finding common ground in the multilateral context might further help in facilitating these contacts on the ground. It was precisely due to these Deutschlandpolitik reasons that improving contacts between people was one of the main ideas of West German CSCE policy.

Consequently, ‘human contacts’ was the topic of the first major substantive intervention the West German delegation made early on in the MPT in Dipoli. Presenting this proposal to his fellow heads of delegation in the Dipoli plenary in February 1973, Brunner underlined that a key concept of détente was to make existing frontiers more permeable, not to set new limits to contacts, nor to get rid of any social systems. Personal contacts were one of the three pillars of détente, equally important as security and cooperation. When it came to the discussion of Basket III items in the EPC and NATO, the FRG volunteered to take a leading role in preparing the Western position on human contacts, an element of Basket III which in the West German view had received too little attention. In particular, it was the question of reunification of families that the FRG was interested in. The task of preparing this West German contribution was given to the same civil servant in the CSCE unit of the Auswärtiges Amt who had already a few years earlier developed the first operational draft on human contacts.

On 25 April 1973, at the opening session of the fourth Dipoli round, the FRG delegation appealed for much more progress in Basket III. It was precisely in this basket where the results of détente could be of their most concrete use for individual citizens. In the West German view the goal should be to achieve practical means of cross-border contacts and cooperation in spite of the different systems. In this regard the MPT produced a desired result, since the West, in no small part due to West German efforts, managed to secure a place for ‘human contacts’ as the first separate agenda item in Basket III of the Blue Book. Despite Dutch willingness to
confront the Soviet Union openly in drafting the terms of reference for Basket III, the more realistic line the FRG had called for, focusing on the achievable, prevailed in the caucuses of the Nine and NATO in Dipoli.\textsuperscript{103}

As the Foreign Ministers convened in Helsinki for the opening Stage I of the CSCE in July 1973, the FRG delegation circulated two text proposals for Basket III, formulations for a resolution on reunification of families on the one hand, and on improvement of working conditions of journalists on the other.\textsuperscript{104} These two elements hence formed the basis of West German efforts in Basket III; all other issues were of secondary importance.

As soon as Stage II was opened in Geneva, the Soviet Union began to lobby for an extremely restrictive preamble for the text concerning human contacts and exchange of information. As Gromyko told Scheel in Moscow in October 1973, the Soviet Union had nothing against agreements in this field as long as they did not contradict national sovereignty, the principle of non-interference in internal affairs and the internal legislation of each country.\textsuperscript{105} This would, in effect, have made all formulations that followed null and void. Working against these attempts to neutralise the contents of Basket III was defined as one of the main goals of the Nine in the EPC document on CSCE strategy and objectives, which was drafted during the autumn of 1973.\textsuperscript{106}

Regardless of Soviet stagnation in Geneva, the West Germans, for their part, were not too concerned. In mid-December 1973 van Well told the interministerial CSCE working group in Bonn that in spite of the problems encountered in Basket III so far the mere fact of the humanitarian issues being on the conference agenda had already been useful. Having a multilateral reference point made it easier to address the same topics bilaterally with the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries.\textsuperscript{107} The same realism was reflected in an internal ‘argument catalogue’ on the uses of the CSCE for the West that von Groll drafted in early 1974. For von Groll it was crystal clear that the CSCE was not going to be suitable for use as an instrument forcing the East to change its system. The West could only hope to mitigate the East–West confrontation by increased contacts.\textsuperscript{108}

In its role as the rotating EC President for the first half of 1974, the FRG’s influence on Western decision making was even stronger than usually. Since the Nine had evolved to become the major Western actor in Geneva, the importance of this role had not escaped the Soviet attention either. In January 1974 Brezhnev, who was increasingly frustrated with the slow process towards a summit-level Stage III, wrote to Brandt, repeating the well known Soviet reservations on Basket III. Expansion of contacts and exchanges could only occur with respect to non-interference in internal affairs and to sovereignty, laws and customs of each country. In his response, Brandt gave assurances that the FRG was not interested in creat-
ing controversy, and that the aim of Basket III was not to touch on internal structures of participating states. Brandt also promised to instruct the West German delegation in Geneva to continue working constructively.109

This was not enough for the Soviet Union. When Bahr visited Moscow at the end of February, Brezhnev accused the FRG of the procrastination of the Nine in Geneva. In Brezhnev’s view, not all petty things could be solved at the same time, one should focus on the big issues. Was it not enough, as a first step, to cooperate and not to wage war, the Soviet leader exclaimed. Brezhnev demanded a more active role of Chancellor Brandt in highlighting the importance of progress in the CSCE.110

Brandt did not exactly raise his profile in CSCE issues as a result of Brezhnev’s demands. But when it came to the assessment of the importance of Basket III in general, neither Brandt nor Bahr thought too highly of it. When the CSCE was discussed in the Federal Security Council in early April, Brandt argued that the CSCE should not turn into a permanent event. Prolonging Stage II because of Basket III issues was, in Brandt’s view, useless, since there was not much meaningful to be expected from Basket III.111 In fact, already a year earlier, in May 1973, both Brandt and Bahr had pejoratively referred to the CSCE as the ‘cultural pages’ (Feuilleton), whereas MBFR was the more important and serious business.112

In Foreign Minister Scheel’s order of priorities the CSCE in general figured higher up, but he was not prepared to go to extremes on Basket III either. The focus remained on facilitating ‘human contacts’, nothing more ambitious or provocative. As far West German objectives in Basket III were concerned, Scheel wrote to Kissinger in April 1974, it was in particular due to public opinion that there needed to be tangible results in the improvement of ‘human contacts’.113 Scheel’s successor agreed with this. In the NATO ministerial meeting in Ottawa in June 1974, the new Foreign Minister Genscher argued that in Basket III ‘we owe it to our people that we achieve improvements for individuals’.114

Meanwhile, the FRG delegation in Geneva was growing thoroughly frustrated with Soviet intransigence in Basket III. It was unacceptable to have the left hand destroy what had just been achieved with the right hand, von Groll wrote, referring to the restrictive preamble pushed by the Warsaw Pact time and again, in effect neutralising all achievements in the operative texts.115 Speaking for the Nine, Genscher articulated this disappointment in a statement in early June 1974. The CSCE could be an important milestone in détente, but this required following the Helsinki final recommendations. The Nine had shown flexibility in the declaration of principles, therefore the Foreign Ministers of the Nine were disappointed at the lack of progress in important topics such as improvement
of human contacts and dissemination of and access to information, as well as confidence-building measures.\textsuperscript{116}

In private discussions, however, neither Genscher nor Chancellor Schmidt were too keen on all of the positions the Nine held in Geneva. For instance in early July 1974, at a high-level meeting with their Belgian counterparts, Schmidt and Genscher showed understanding for Brezhnev’s desire to conclude the CSCE rapidly. In Schmidt’s view the West should not lose further time in Geneva with unimportant problems. Instead, it should make up its mind on which issues were of absolute importance to it. ‘A change in the Soviet constitution will certainly not be achieved by wishes expressed in Basket III’, Schmidt said. Genscher concurred, arguing that the West should drop half of its demands in Basket III. One should differentiate between information and human contacts – the number of Western newspapers sold at Soviet kiosks was hardly as important as a minimum level of improvements in personal contacts, something that directly concerned the inner-German relations.\textsuperscript{117}

With the Nixon–Brezhnev summit in the summer of 1974 the pressure for concluding Stage II mounted. In their joint communiqué in early July, the US and the Soviet Union agreed on a very positive wording regarding the CSCE and favoured its final stage taking place at an early date, with the assumption that the results would permit the CSCE to be concluded at the highest level. To intensify the negotiations in Geneva accordingly, Kissinger urged the Fifteen to come up with a list of eight or ten essential points the West required for the conclusion of Stage II.\textsuperscript{118}

Meeting Kissinger directly after his return from the Moscow summit, Genscher quickly made the distinction in West German priorities clear: for the FRG, humanitarian issues were far more important than exchange of information. Genscher and Kissinger also agreed that the preamble of Basket III could contain a reference to ‘respect for laws and regulations’, but nothing further on political, economic and cultural restrictions. Moreover, Genscher proposed that the FRG would take the initiative in defining Western essentials, first convincing the current EPC President, France, to have the Political Committee of the Nine draw up the list, then to have it delivered to the NATO Council, and finally to have the delegations of the Fifteen in Geneva instructed accordingly.\textsuperscript{119}

The paper that came out of the consultations of the Nine in early September 1974 took many West German amendments into account, and listed the following issues as particularly important in Basket III: (a) improvements in reunification of families, marriages, travel and movement of people; (b) better access to foreign news and improvement of working conditions of journalists; (c) better access to books and cultural exchange.\textsuperscript{120}
At the highest level, however, patience with the Geneva negotiations was wearing thin. When Schmidt visited Moscow in late October 1974, Brezhnev again pressed for a rapid conclusion of the CSCE. Schmidt believed that the final stretch was indeed approaching. To facilitate this, he told Brezhnev, he had instructed the FRG delegation in Geneva to act with restraint in the controversial issues in Basket III. The FRG had only one vital interest in the CSCE: the principle of peaceful change. In a confidential one-on-one discussion, Schmidt added that the excessive ambitions of individual diplomats were to blame for the current problems in Basket III. He, Schmidt, was against these artificial measures and had instructed the West German delegation not to engage in any further activities in Basket III. He promised to undertake everything to make sure that the CSCE was concluded successfully and soon.

Indeed, there was not much West German activity in Basket III to speak of during the final months of the Geneva talks. Efforts were concentrated on peaceful change and confidence-building measures. Above all, as soon as the agreement on the text concerning reunification of families was reached on 2 December 1974, the main goal of the Federal Republic had been achieved. In mid-January 1975 the Auswärtiges Amt concluded that all the humanitarian questions most important to the FRG, in particular the reunification of families, were closed in a relatively satisfying manner. Its other pet project, the facilitation of working conditions of journalists, was still an unresolved issue, but the FRG no longer saw any essential problems in Basket III. Completing the negotiations on Basket III might still be delayed due to French interests in the realm of culture, but this suited the FRG well, giving it time to concentrate on its own fundamental interests in Basket I. In their own analysis, the French had already admitted that with the West German needs satisfied, there was not much help to be expected from Bonn in pushing for further Soviet concessions in Basket III.

As Stage II in Geneva was about to be closed in July 1975, the European Council gave a declaration on the CSCE. In it, the Nine highlighted the importance of the conference results, yet regretted that not as much had been achieved in the field of freedom of movement as had been desired. For the FRG, however, the results in Basket III were completely sufficient. Its expectations had been limited to begin with. As one of the key officials in the Auswärtiges Amt formulated it in March 1975, the CSCE was not an instrument for the West to force systemic changes in the East – instead, the task of the conference could only be to agree on common rules for peaceful cooperation. For the FRG, Basket III was not about scoring propaganda victories or about high-profile human rights cases like Saharov.
and Solzhenitsyn. Instead, the FRG was interested in achieving concrete steps to improve the situation of ordinary people, above all in divided Germany. The formulation on ‘human contacts’ agreed in the multilateral context was a valuable reference point for the day-to-day bilateral relationship with the GDR.

But of course not all West German attempts to use the CSCE for Deutschlandpolitik purposes were successful. A living proof of failures is the final brief storyline of this chapter, the stubborn effort to find a role for Berlin in the CSCE.

### Follow-up and Berlin

Egon Bahr’s idea of using Berlin as a CSCE location, already discussed in the previous chapter, continued to resurface during the early years of the conference proper, often following the ebbs and tides of the overall political situation concerning the vulnerable situation of this city. At a meeting of the interministerial CSCE working group in Bonn in January 1973, von Staden once more referred to the idea of Berlin as a conference location. At that moment the situation, neither in terms of the Berlin question nor in terms of the negotiations in Dipoli, was not suitable for pushing this. Should the circumstances change, however, von Staden was willing to take the idea again to the Bonn Group.¹²⁸

In late January, von Groll devoted an extensive memorandum to the potential role of Berlin as hosting some parts of the CSCE or its possible follow-up bodies. Weighing up the pros and cons of having one of the actual CSCE stages held in Berlin, either West Berlin or ‘greater Berlin’, von Groll came to the conclusion that in all scenarios the negative aspects seemed to outweigh the positive ones. Yet as far as having a CSCE follow-up machinery meet in West Berlin was concerned, the situation was different – von Groll saw many potential benefits in it.¹²⁹ By contrast, the legal department of the Auswärtiges Amt strongly argued against the use of Berlin in this context, both as a conference location and as a seat for a follow-up body.¹³⁰

The fact that this was seriously considered in Bonn at all is interesting, given that the official position of the FRG concerning the follow-up to the CSCE at the time remained unchanged: follow-up should only be discussed when the conference results were clear. However, in the event of the creation of a permanent body or committee, the Federal Government continued to maintain the option of offering Berlin as its site.¹³¹ During the spring of 1973, Bahr constantly advocated Berlin in internal discussions in Bonn, arguing that a permanent follow-up body located in Berlin would not only increase attention to the divided city but also con-
solidate US presence in Europe, due to its role as one of the Four Powers responsible for Berlin. Bahr also raised the issue in Anglo-West German consultations in early March 1973, stating that he would rather see a possible follow-up body in Berlin than in any other location. Sir Thomas Brimelow from the FCO informed Kissinger about this a few days later in Washington, noting that ‘history shows that Bahr is a persistent man when he has an idea in his head’.

In a cabinet meeting focusing on the CSCE in early June 1973, Scheel also referred to the role of Berlin. Due to difficult status issues, the FRG had refrained from offering Berlin as a location for one of the conference stages. The same reasons also posed difficulties on a potential use of Berlin as a seat for a possible follow-up body. Nonetheless, the option was still kept open.

Further testimony to this option being alive was one of the texts that the FRG submitted at Stage I in Helsinki in July 1973. The West German paper on scientific cooperation suggested creating a scientific forum – in West Berlin. This suggestion had already been agreed on in advance with the Bonn Group, thoroughly discussed in the EPC and also preliminarily consulted with the Soviets. Referring to this suggestion, Diesel and Brunner both argued that it was important to ‘get something for Berlin’ from the CSCE. Scheel’s speech in Helsinki also included a thinly veiled reference to Berlin: ‘Would it … be too much to ask whether this very Conference does not afford an opportunity to outline in one form or another Berlin’s new role as the symbol of détente in the heart of Europe?’

When Bahr visited London in late October, he told his British interlocutors that the FRG had no direct interest in establishing a CSCE follow-up body. On the other hand, it might provide opportunities to tie the US closer to Europe as well as give its possible seat, Berlin, an additional element of psychological security. In December, the interministerial CSCE group in Bonn discussed a potential Berlin seat for two bodies possibly established by the CSCE: in addition to a science forum there was now also talk about an information centre on technological cooperation. And as late as January 1974, von Groll declared it as an agreed West German position that as part of the conference follow-up the FRG would attempt to achieve such a new organisation – not a political body but a specialised agency – in West Berlin, in order to contribute to the international ‘visibility’ of the city and to counter Soviet attempts to isolate it.

On 20 November 1973 Bahr spoke in Paris about his idea, but by then the French had already decided that the West Germans should be discouraged of whatever temptations they might have regarding the institutionalisation of the CSCE in West Berlin. In early 1974, the Nine unanimously dismissed the idea of a political body with general responsibilities as a
follow-up formation. This was spelled out in the document on ‘Les suites de la CSCE’ of the sous-comité, endorsed by the Political Committee and the Foreign Ministers. Instead, it envisioned an interim period of three to four years after the conference before a reassessment of follow-up needs was to be made. In late February, Bahr wrote to Scheel to protest against these developments in the EC consultations. In Bahr’s view the establishment of a permanent CSCE follow-up body in West Berlin was in the national interest of the FRG. In his response, Scheel told Bahr that not a single Western country favoured a permanent body, and not even the East seriously demanded a permanent seat for follow-up any more. The Nine and the Fifteen had been very reluctant to discuss follow-up at all, and changing that in the current negotiating situation was very unlikely. It was not possible for the FRG to suddenly dismiss Western solidarity over this issue.

On 3 April 1974, when the CSCE was discussed in the Federal Security Council, Bahr made his final appeal for Berlin as a location for the follow-up body. In vain, since this was also the last time it was heard of. With Brandt’s resignation in early May and Bahr’s departure from the Chancellery, the main – and often the only – advocate of this idea had left the scene. There were also other reasons for the disappearance of the Berlin proposal. In late spring 1974 the situation in Berlin was extremely tense due to the West German decision to establish the federal environmental agency in West Berlin. In the Soviet view, this was a violation of the Berlin agreement. Additional problems concerning Berlin were the last thing that the new government of Schmidt and Genscher wanted. But above all, by the spring of 1974 there were no longer any prospects for gaining Allied support for a follow-up body in Berlin. The potential benefits for the situation on Berlin were clearly outweighed by the risks of insisting on the idea. Accordingly, the brainchild of Bahr was permanently forgotten.

Conclusion

Thirty-five heads of state and government were in the limelight during the hot summer days in Helsinki in July and August 1975, when the Final Act of the CSCE was signed. Yet at least among the Western leaders the enthusiasm had its limits. Few of them had been directly involved in the negotiations or even too interested in them – in Kissinger’s words, one would have had to be a Talmudic scholar to fully understand all the nuts and bolts of the text of the Final Act. Schmidt and Genscher, however, had all reason to be satisfied with the result. The fundamental West German interest, the possibility of peaceful change of frontiers, had been success-
fully defended. In this defensive battle, assertive involvement at the highest levels had been required, but these efforts had ultimately paid off.

As has been shown above, when it came to the core interests of the Federal Republic, Schmidt and Genscher did not hesitate, if necessary, to take a few steps back from the regular CSCE method of Western caucuses in the EPC and NATO frameworks. In the legal-linguistic trench war over the formulations concerning peaceful change, the CSCE specialists in Geneva and Bonn were sidelined and the key decisions were taken in the Genscher–Kissinger–Gromyko triangle.

At the same time, this was only the tip of the iceberg – and the exception to the rule. The bulk of the sixty-page Final Act was the result of the expertise and perseverance of countless civil servants in the committees and subcommittees in Geneva. Here the West German role had not been as visible as one could have expected after the preparatory phases. In the vast majority of the issues covered by the Final Act, the FRG had done its homework already pre-emptively, during the run-up to the Dipoli talks. Having influenced the agenda decisively already in advance, the FRG could afford to take a slightly less outspoken role in those issues where its major priorities had already been inserted into the Western preparations. Whenever the EPC coordination ran according to Bonn’s plans, West German interests were pursued in Europe’s name. It was only in issues with direct relevance to Deutschlandpolitik that a more active approach was called for.

Notes

2. PAAA, B150, 323, van Well to Gehlhoff, Genscher, 21 Feb 1975.
4. Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations, 8 June 1973; for a helpful graph on the committee structure of Stage II, see DBPO III/II, Appendix I, 480.
5. According to Möckli, European Foreign Policy, 111.
8. PAAA, B28, 109312, von Staden (AA) to Helsinki, 9 Nov 1972.
9. PAAA, B28, 109312, von Staden (AA) to Helsinki, 10 Nov 1972.
10. For the more detailed day-to-day exchange of telegrams on this matter, see PAAA, B28, 109312; and Spohr Readman, ‘National Interests’.
34. PAAA, B150, 274, Diesel to StS, 27 Feb 1973. See also Möckli, European Foreign Policy, 123–135.
40. PAAA, B150, 278, von Groll to van Well, 19 Apr 1973.
44. ADMAE, 2982, 28 May 1973.
47. PAAA, B9, 178364, 11th meeting of the IMAG-KSZE, 17 Dec 1973.
54. PAAA, B150, 302, meeting of the BSR, 3 Apr 1974.
55. PAAA, B150, 304, von Groll (Geneva) to AA, 1 May 1974.
56. AAPD 1974, doc 102, footnote 7, CSCE/II/A/126, 5 Apr 1974; PAAA, B150, 304, Fleischhauer to 212, 8 May 1974.
59. PAAA, B150, 304, von Groll (Geneva) to AA, 1 May 1974.
60. AAPD 1974, doc 140, Fleischhauer to 212, 2 May 1974; PAAA, B150, 305, Brunner (Geneva) to AA, 24 May 1974; for a review of the developments, see also PAAA, B150, 316, German CSCE delegation to AA, 14 Nov 1974.
61. Author’s interviews with Genscher and Blech.
62. DBPO III/II, doc 86, Fall to Tickell, 17 June 1974.
70. PAAA, B150, 308, Schenk to Gehlhoff, Genscher, 1 July 1974.
73. PAAA, B150, 308, van Well to Geneva, 10 July 1974.
74. PAAA, B150, 308, Steffler to embassies, 12 July 1974.
76. AAPD 1974, doc 223, footnote 8, Brunner (Geneva) to AA, 26 July 1974. See also FRUS 1969-76, vol XXXIX, editorial note 239.
77. PAAA, B150, 308, Schenk to Gehlhoff, Genscher, 15 July 1974.
85. PAAA, B150, 316, van Well to Gehlhoff, Genscher, 18 Nov 1974.
92. PAAA, B150, 322, Gehl to embassies, 13 Feb 1975.
93. PAAA, B150, 323, meeting Blech-Mendelevitch, 12 Feb 1975.
95. PAAA, B150, 323, van Well to Gehlhoff, Genscher, 21 Feb 1975.
97. PAAA, B150, 324, Meyer-Landrut to van Well, Gehlhoff, 21 Feb 1975.
98. PAAA, B150, 324, van Well to Geneva, 21 Feb 1975.
99. PAAA, B150, 324, von Groll (Geneva) to AA, 10 Mar 1975.
100. PAAA, B28, 100001, Brunner (Helsinki) to AA, 6 Feb 1973
101. PAAA, B150, 275, IMAG-KSZE meeting, 22 Feb 1973; see also Mayer, National Foreign Policy, 134-5.
103. PAAA, B9, 178364, IMAG-KSZE meeting, 7 Sep 1973.
108. PAAA, B9, 178364, von Groll to Dg 21, Leiter 02, 4 Jan 1974.
110. AAPD 1974, doc 64, meeting Bahr-Brezhnev, 27 Feb 1974; PAAA, B150, 299, Bahr (Moscow) to Brandt and Scheel, 28 Feb 1974.
111. PAAA, B150, 302, meeting of the BSR, 3 Apr 1974.
118. AAPD 1974, doc 197, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 4 July 1974; AAPD 1974, doc 199, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 5 July 1974; PAAA, B150, 308, Boss (Natogerma) to AA, 10 July 1974.
120. PAAA, B150, 312, van Well (Paris) to AA, 10 Sep 1974.
123. AAPD 1974, doc 351, Boss (Natogerma) to AA, 3 Dec 1974.
127. PAAA, B150, 325, Gehl to Helsinki, 19 Mar 1975.
139. PAAA, B9, 178364, IMAG-KSZE meeting, 17 Dec 1973.
140. PAAA, B9, 178364, von Groll to Dg 21, Leiter 02, 4 Jan 1974.
142. PAAA, B150, 298, von Groll (Geneva) to AA, 1 Feb 1974; PAAA, B150, 298, van Well to Frank, 4 Feb 1974.
143. PAAA, B150, 299, Bahr to Scheel, 26 Feb 1974.
145. PAAA, B150, 302, meeting of the BSR, 3 Apr 1974.