Chapter 5

1971–72
Towards a European Peace Order?

ILLUSTRATION 5: Minister of Economics and Finance Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor Willy Brandt and Foreign Minister Walter Scheel (from left to right) at the EC Summit in Paris on 19 October 1972.

There has been no other phase in diplomacy like the current one, with so many linkages and reverse linkages.

– State Secretary Frank to Soviet Ambassador Falin, December 1971

The FRG views it [the CSCE] as a long-range process seeking somehow to bridge the deep gap that exists between Eastern Europe and the Atlantic world. Much depends on whether we can find a way to begin this process without creating the impression in the USSR that we are trying to overthrow its regime.

– Political Director von Staden during his visit to Washington, March 1972

In September 1971 at the very latest, the CSCE ceased to be a theoretical construction looming in the distant future. The signature of the quadripartite Berlin Agreement had fulfilled one further Western precondition set for the conference, and the opening of the multilateral preparatory talks (MPT) was increasingly imminent. Although complementary agreements were still needed for the Berlin Agreement to enter into force, this was only a question of time. As it became apparent even to the staunchest of sceptics that the process towards a CSCE could no longer be halted, the policy of the Federal Republic accelerated its shift, moving from attempts to instrumentalise the CSCE towards an active approach to the conference agenda.

In terms of linkage, the position of the FRG changed dramatically. As the date for the opening of the MPT became de facto fixed, the FRG was under self-inflicted pressure to conclude the inner-German negotiations in time, thus reversing the original idea of linkage. Peter Becker has suggested that Allied resistance forced the FRG to abandon its attempts to link the opening of the CSCE with the conclusion of the Basic Treaty. My argument goes a step further, stressing that the prospects of succeeding in a further linkage were considered to be so small that the FRG never even made the genuine effort. There was no longer any active linkage to speak of – the schedule of the CSCE set the conditions for the schedule of the inner-German negotiations, not vice versa.

But the CSCE policy of the Federal Republic had undergone a remarkable change during the two years in office of the Brandt Government. In the period covered in this chapter, the policy of linking other negotiations with the CSCE preparations had already disappeared from the horizon of the key CSCE actors in Bonn. They sat in the Auswärtiges Amt, which was responsible for manoeuvring the increasingly complex multilateral Western web of CSCE preparations. Even with the dawn of the conference, the preparations were still to a large extent an intra-Western affair. The EPC was gaining in importance, leading to occasional conflicts between the political cooperation among the EC members and among members of NATO. With MBFR on a separate track, several of the key competences in CSCE preparations actually no longer rested in NATO.
This development opened a new possibility for the Auswärtiges Amt to pursue West German interests in various multilateral combinations. Multilateralism per se was perceived to be in the West German interest. With its own bilateral options to a large extent exhausted, the FRG saw numerous advantages in avoiding bilateralism in the future construction of East-West affairs. The CSCE was a means to expand the Ostpolitik approach to a multilateral level, and the FRG strove for joint Western positions taking into account essential West German interests. It was a means to exert control over the development of détente, and to defend the fundamental achievements of Ostpolitik. There was also a close nexus between Deutschlandpolitik and the CSCE. Potential agreements made in the multilateral conference were seen as a way to achieve step-by-step improvements in inner-German affairs.

The Decline of the Linkage between the CSCE and the Inner-German Treaty

In mid-September 1971, less than two weeks after the signature of the quadripartite Berlin protocol, Brandt paid a visit to Leonid Brezhnev in the Crimea. This unofficial meeting between the leaders of the FRG and the Soviet Union, organised at unusually short notice, caused a suspicious reaction in the West – again raising old doubts of bilateral West German-Soviet bargaining behind the scenes.4 The West Germans were at pains to convince their allies that the invitation to the meeting had come from Moscow.5 After the trip, Brandt did his best to alleviate the concerns with personal letters to Nixon, Heath and Pompidou, outlining the contents of the discussions and assuring the three major Allies that he had not overstepped any positions agreed in the Alliance.6

In terms of the CSCE linkage, the Crimean encounter was interesting precisely because of this fidelity to agreed Western lines. Prior to Brandt’s visit the Auswärtiges Amt had kept alive the idea of a linkage, treating the agreement of the FRG to ‘multiple bilateral’ talks on the CSCE as an ‘exchange object’, to be awarded in return for Soviet pressure on the GDR in the inner-German negotiations.7 Timothy Garton Ash has aptly demonstrated Brandt’s and Bahr’s attempts to work the Bonn–Moscow–Berlin triangle in Ostpolitik.8 But the German records from the meetings with Brezhnev show that in September 1971 Brandt made no efforts to play the triangle in this way in the CSCE context.

Instead, Brandt told Brezhnev that if the Berlin talks were concluded in time, NATO Foreign Ministers would give the green light to the multilateral preparations in their forthcoming meeting in December 1971.
Brezhnev remarked that the fate of the final Berlin Agreement depended on the complementary inner-German negotiations connected to it.\(^9\) When Bahr briefed the US Ambassador in Bonn about the Crimean discussions, he noted that Brezhnev had clearly indicated that the Soviet Union expected the necessary progress to have been completed by December.\(^10\)

The joint final communiqué of the Crimean talks raised the CSCE as one of the most important items the two leaders had discussed. The communiqué highlighted the willingness of the Soviet Union and the FRG to ‘accelerate the preparations’ for such a conference.\(^11\) This was a direct follow-up to the commitment made to the Soviets in the Bahr Paper and in the Moscow negotiations in 1970, and had been expected by the \textit{Auswärtiges Amt} in advance.\(^12\) Appearing before the \textit{Bundestag} Foreign Policy Committee a few weeks later, Brandt explained that the language in the communiqué was not in contradiction with agreed Allied positions – ‘acceleration’ simply meant attempting to move on from a bilateral to a multilateral phase, provided that the necessary conditions were met.\(^13\)

Nevertheless, the message from Crimea was clear. Without receiving any concrete concessions in return, Brandt pledged to accelerate the conference preparations. The days of horse-trading were long gone. This was further highlighted by another simultaneous development, originating in the North-western neighbour of the Soviet Union. On 10 September 1971, the Finnish Government suggested a package deal to address its relations with the FRG and the GDR simultaneously. This initiative had been secretly in preparation for some time, but had to be published sooner than planned because of an unfortunate slip of the tongue of the Finnish Foreign Minister. This opening transformed the German-Finnish relationship, ultimately resulting in the establishment of full-scale diplomatic ties between Finland and both German states in late 1972.\(^14\) But in the short term, it also had potential consequences for the CSCE policy of the FRG.

There had never been any widespread enthusiasm in Bonn for Helsinki as a conference location as such. It was Finland’s balanced approach to the two German states, below the level of full diplomatic relations, that had made it an acceptable candidate in Federal German eyes. Now that the Finns suddenly launched their initiative at such a critical juncture of the FRG’s \textit{Deutschlandpolitik}, it would have been logical for Bonn to retaliate in the CSCE field. As a first reaction, the \textit{Auswärtiges Amt} was not only irritated at not being informed about Finnish plans in advance, but also contemplated rethinking its position on the suitability of Helsinki to host the CSCE preparations.\(^15\)

But once the dust settled, it became obvious that Bonn was unwilling to create a direct link between the location of the MPT and Finnish policies towards the two German states. Two weeks after the Finnish initiative, State
Secretary Sigismund von Braun instructed the FRG mission in Helsinki not to make an explicit connection between the two. It would be sufficient if the Finns indirectly felt that Helsinki had lost some of its attraction as an absolutely neutral capital. But as far as the official West German position on the MPT site was concerned, the Finnish move had not changed anything. It was considered to be a separate development, not sufficient to question the suitability of Helsinki as a conference venue.

Both examples – the pledge for ‘acceleration’ in the Crimea and the reluctance to pull the plug from Finnish hopes of hosting the CSCE – reflected the change in West German thinking. There was no longer an interest in Bonn, either at the highest political level or at the working level in the Auswärtiges Amt, to attempt to use the CSCE as a bargaining chip in bilateral contacts. And there was also a similar decline in the willingness to continue with the ‘linkage’ policy through the multilateral route in NATO, although here the West German position was still slightly more ambiguous.

In the instructions sent out to embassies about the situation after the signing of the quadripartite Berlin protocol, State Secretary von Braun stressed that ‘the Federal Government does not insist on the conclusion of a general modus vivendi between the FRG and the GDR before entering the multilateral preparations of a CSCE’. According to von Braun’s instructions, not even the more modest bilateral traffic treaty with the GDR needed to be concluded before the opening of the MPT. In the view of the Auswärtiges Amt, the only remaining preconditions for the multilateral CSCE preparations were the completion of the Berlin Agreement and a secured legal position of the Federal Republic with respect to the participation of the GDR.

The reaction of the Allies to this West German position was twofold. On the one hand, they were surprised by the new flexibility. After the signature of the Berlin Agreement, the US had calculated that the FRG would be a major factor affecting European thinking on the timing of the CSCE. Bonn was expected to ‘wish to maintain some correlation’ between the pace of the CSCE and the sensitive question of the development of the inner-German relationship. On the other hand, now that this correlation turned out to be weaker than expected, even the minimum West German requirement of completing the Berlin negotiations was increasingly challenged within the Alliance. Pressure to enter multilateral CSCE preparations, or at least ‘multiple bilateral’ talks, as soon as possible was growing rapidly – particularly from the French side.

But this was a red line for the Federal Republic. The Berlin precondition for the MPT was not negotiable. The planning staff of the Auswärtiges Amt argued that it should be made clear to the Allies that Bonn still considered the timing of the CSCE to be a vital national interest. If necessary,
in extreme situations the FRG should also be prepared to block decision-making in NATO and in the EPC, even at the risk of short-term isolation. In matters of such fundamental importance, the atmospheric losses would be outweighed by substantive gains. Accordingly, State Secretary Frank told the Finnish roving CSCE Ambassador Enckell that the FRG saw no significant difference between multilateral and ‘multiple bilateral’ preparations – the time would be ripe for them after the completion of all three stages of the Berlin talks.

On the MPT, thus, the West German position was unequivocal. Berlin was the only remaining precondition, but an absolutely necessary one. However, the Auswärtiges Amt also for a short time sent confusing signals about potential new linkages with the CSCE proper, proposing that the Federal Government wanted to have the modalities of the UN membership of both German states negotiated before the actual CSCE could be convened. The US diplomats were surprised to hear this, and foresaw difficulties in convincing the French, since it might take years before UN entry would be achieved.

The French were indeed strongly against the idea. In a meeting of the CSCE working group of the EPC in mid-September, von Staden’s suggestion that the UN modalities needed to be clear before the GDR could take part in the CSCE at Foreign Ministers’ level resulted in an open Franco-West German dispute. After the row in the EPC, von Staden argued for the urgent need to consolidate the West German position on this matter and to organise support for it in the Bonn Group. The French, who flatly described the EPC discussion as ‘not successful’, returned to the question in a regular bilateral meeting with the West Germans in early October. By then, however, the West Germans had dropped the idea. The Federal Government in Bonn had meanwhile decided to refrain from any further linkage of the inner-German relationship with the CSCE.

In his telegram to London in late September, the UK Ambassador to Bonn, Roger Jackling, perceptively argued that with the French insisting on the conference, a number of smaller Allies also growing impatient and Brandt himself agreeing with Brezhnev to ‘accelerate’ progress towards the CSCE, a certain relaxation in the West German CSCE position and a less categorical presentation of it were to be expected.

As it turned out, this change in the West German position was made on the very same day Jackling filed his report. A high-level meeting held at the Chancellery in Bonn on 26 September 1971 was the final nail in the coffin of West German CSCE linkage strategies. A small circle, consisting of Brandt, Scheel and the Minister for Inner-German Affairs, Egon Franke, as well as a handful of key officials, effectively decided to give up every-
thing that was left of the plans to link progress in Deutschlandpolitik with the participation in and timing of the CSCE.29

The meeting had two main consequences for West German CSCE policy. Firstly, the Brandt-Brezhnev commitment in the Crimea to accelerate the CSCE process was to be interpreted literally – as soon as the necessary preparations made it possible, the conference should take place. In this view, it was explicitly mentioned, the FRG should closely support France. Secondly, as soon as the Berlin Agreement was in force, the Federal Republic would no longer raise any further reservations, neither concerning the multilateral preparations nor the conference itself. It was emphasised that this did not rule out the ‘disclaimer’ on GDR participation, to be issued in due time.30 The inner circle in Bonn had arrived at the position that there was no longer any reason to procrastinate over the preparation of the CSCE.

When von Staden formulated West German positions on the CSCE in preparation for an EC Political Committee meeting in mid-October, he referred to the decision made in the meeting in the Chancellery on the one hand, and to the ‘situation in the Alliance’ on the other. Both reasons rendered a further use of direct linkage between the CSCE proper and the inner-German modus vivendi impossible. The final Berlin Agreement had to be signed before multilateral East-West preparations of the conference, but that was all the West Germans could demand.31

In this question the Chancellor had taken the lead. In fact, Brandt’s retrospective account in his memoirs, referring precisely to this point in time, is revealing. Writing about linkages and reverse linkages, Brandt argues against imposing ‘political straightjackets’ on oneself and against the ‘fatal tendency’ in the political-diplomatic world to elevate a de facto relationship between two issues into a legal linkage. It was hardly a wonder, Brandt points out, if others then followed suit.32

And others certainly could play the linkage game as well. Just as the FRG had decided to let go of the particular link between the CSCE and inner-German relations, the overall picture of détente linkages took a further turn towards more complication. During the opening week of the UN General Assembly in New York, the Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko publicly declared that the Soviet Union was prepared to sign the final protocol of the Berlin Agreement only once the Bundestag had ratified the Moscow Treaty. This Soviet ‘reverse linkage’, as it became known, had direct implications for the CSCE as well. As Scheel told his French colleague in New York, this Soviet position could in effect block the ratification of the Eastern Treaties in Bonn as well as preparations for a security conference.33 The Soviet move changed the rules of the game once more. Instead of the familiar two-dimensional link between the Berlin Agreement and
the opening of the CSCE, the ratification of the Moscow Treaty was now added as a third element.

**Hesitating on the Berlin Precondition**

When it came to maintaining the grip on the Berlin precondition for the CSCE, the West Germans continued to be able to rely on the support of the major European Allies. The British remained content with ‘taking their cue from the Germans’ on the timing of the CSCE, and openly told the West Germans they did not want to move ‘slower than Bonn or faster than Bonn’.34 The French were also remarkably calm, not willing to upset the plans on timing agreed in NATO.35 The need for the conclusion – meaning the signature of the final protocol – of the Berlin Agreement before the multilateral CSCE preparations was also consolidated as a joint EPC position in October.36

The firm line on the Berlin precondition was endorsed by the Auswärtiges Amt and approved by the Federal Government on 3 November 1971, the first time the CSCE was discussed in the cabinet as a separate agenda point.37 Gromyko’s reverse linkage had merely reinforced the Auswärtiges Amt view on the need to maintain the Berlin precondition unchanged. Multilateral preparations should be begun immediately after the signature of the quadripartite final protocol on Berlin – not sooner than that, not later than that.38 The West German NATO Ambassador gave assurances that an active and consistent West German policy in this matter would keep other NATO allies in line.39

But although this position was consistently presented as the joint view of the government,40 there remained an element of indecision behind the scenes. Talking to his British colleague after a Bonn Group meeting in late October, Klaus Blech, a key West German official, insinuated that not everybody in government circles was in agreement. According to Blech, some outside the Auswärtiges Amt seemed to be prepared to enter multilateral conference preparations even before the Berlin Agreement had been completed.41

Indeed, there was growing disagreement in this matter within the government, between the FDP and Scheel’s Auswärtiges Amt on the one hand, the SPD and the Chancellery on the other. The SPD was clearly having second thoughts on the advisability of holding on to the ‘Scheel Doctrine’ – the line of thinking where a third-party recognition of the GDR before the Inner-German Treaty was perceived as a hostile act – any longer. In an SPD presidium meeting on 27 October, it was Herbert Wehner who called for an immediate cessation of the blockage of GDR participation in international organisations. Brandt agreed with Wehner that this would be
tactically wiser. Supported by Egon Franke, however, Brandt argued that this could lead to severe problems with the FDP and the Auswärtiges Amt, who continued to believe in the potential leverage of the current policy on East Berlin.43

Nevertheless, Egon Bahr stepped in with a new policy line in mid-November 1971. Leading the negotiations with his East German counterpart, Michael Kohl, on the inner-German part of the Berlin Agreement, Bahr was optimistic that the talks would lead to a favourable result in time for the NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting.44 In a high-level meeting of the Bonn Group in Paris, Bahr argued that the current situation was a tactical dream-come-true, since the Soviets were putting pressure on the East Germans to conclude the inner-German part of the Berlin Agreement in order to allow for a positive NATO decision on the CSCE preparations.45 In a restricted informal discussion, Bahr then suggested that if the existing linkages were to postpone the signing of the Berlin Agreement so that it would occur simultaneously with the ratification of the Moscow Treaty, the FRG would be prepared to enter the multilateral CSCE preparations immediately after the conclusion of the inner-German part of the Berlin Agreement. ‘It would not be our business to give the green light in this case, but we would not oppose such a NATO decision’, Bahr said.46

This was a dramatic and sudden change in the West German position. Although Bahr stressed that he was merely stating his personal opinion, a British memorandum referred with certainty to a meeting in Bonn the preceding night, where Brandt, Bahr and ‘ministers directly involved’ had reviewed the situation.47 The change seemed to be genuine. All the more so, since von Staden from the Auswärtiges Amt supported Bahr, stating that the Federal Government was ‘conscious of the risk that they might incur criticism if they appeared to be holding up progress towards a conference for reasons connected primarily with Federal German politics’.48

For the Three Allies, this change in the West German position was a complete surprise, and naturally resulted in different interpretations. France, for its part, had already for some time been openly in favour of beginning the multilateral preparations. Accordingly, the Quai was quick to pick up the argument Bahr had delivered them on a silver plate. Only two days later, Foreign Minister Schumann suggested to Scheel that the MPT should be opened as soon as the second stage of the Berlin negotiations was completed.49 The UK Foreign Office, then again, was clearly irritated about the way in which it had been confronted by the change in West German thinking without any advance notice. Nevertheless, the UK continued to consider the CSCE timing to be primarily a West German affair, and maintained its support for Bonn.50
All of a sudden, then, the United States was alone in the Bonn Group in opposing the accelerated procedure towards the CSCE preparations. The general view in Washington on the whole linkage situation had been cynical to begin with. Kissinger’s aide Helmut Sonnenfeldt argued that sooner or later the West Germans were bound to deliver the CSCE as the next ‘installment payment’ for the Moscow Treaty. Later, Sonnenfeldt made this point even more strongly, arguing that the West German Government had completely ‘mortgaged its freedom of action’ on the CSCE project during Brandt’s Crimean visit. All the same, the new situation was viewed with concern, and prompt steps were taken to restore West German support for the US view on the timing of the CSCE, that is, multilateral preparations only after the signature of the final quadrilateral protocol.

The US was not alone in being uneasy with Bahr’s move. The West German NATO Ambassador Franz Krapf characterised the current West German CSCE position to his US colleague simply as ‘a mess’. In spite of Bahr’s recent statements in Paris that were also well known in Brussels, the official instructions Krapf received from Bonn were unchanged, insisting, as before, on a completion of the Berlin Agreement before the MPT. According to Krapf, Bahr had not informed the Auswärtiges Amt about his intentions in advance. In his official reports to Bonn, Krapf complained about this inconsistency and its repercussions on West German credibility within the Alliance. But whereas Krapf represented the sceptical wing of the West German diplomats, Götz von Groll, the main engine behind the CSCE policies of the Auswärtiges Amt in Bonn, enthusiastically took up the idea of endorsing the multilateral preparations already in the communiqué of the forthcoming NATO ministerial meeting.

This apparent lack of coordination of the CSCE policy of the Auswärtiges Amt was in part due to Foreign Minister Scheel’s visit to Moscow at the end of November 1971. According to rumours making the rounds in Brussels and Bonn, Scheel considered using a more flexible approach to the linkage of the Berlin talks with the CSCE preparations as a bargaining chip in his discussions with Gromyko. This concession would be made in return for Soviet agreement to drop the ‘reverse linkage’. It seems plausible that keeping this tactical option open was a reason for the Auswärtiges Amt to go along with Bahr’s more flexible line on the Berlin precondition. However, as Scheel arrived in Moscow, the Soviet Foreign Minister categorically refused to give in on the reverse linkage, arguing that it was impossible for the Soviet Union to sign the Berlin protocol before the Moscow Treaty was ratified. Moreover, Gromyko flatly rejected any attempts to include the timing of the CSCE preparations in the equation. In the Soviet view, the West was merely trying to set new obstacles to the security conference. Van Well later told the UK Ambassador in Bonn...
that Gromyko had, ‘metaphorically speaking, shrugged his shoulders’ at Scheel’s proposal.60

The conclusions drawn from this in the Auswärtiges Amt were unequivocal – for the Soviet Union the necessity to ensure ratification of the Moscow Treaty outweighed the need for a swift opening of the CSCE preparations.61 Scheel had been prepared to bargain with the MPT timing in Moscow but, once he had failed, the Auswärtiges Amt gained the upper hand in the domestic struggle about the line to take on the timing of CSCE preparations.62

If the Soviet reverse linkage held and the difficult ratification debates in the Bundestag were linked with the final round of the Berlin negotiations, opening the MPT before they were both concluded would be an unnecessary burden on the domestic parliamentary process. This argument was the bottom line for Scheel’s briefings to Brandt and the cabinet about his Moscow trip. The FRG should prefer to cling to the full Berlin precondition at the NATO meeting.63 According to US sources, it was in the cabinet meeting on 1 December that Brandt accepted Scheel’s recommendation that the CSCE preparations should be postponed until the signature of the final Berlin protocol.64 On the following day, the Auswärtiges Amt sent out new instructions, confirming that the full Berlin precondition was to be maintained.65

The brief interlude resulting from Bahr’s solo act as well as from Scheel’s willingness to test the leverage on Gromyko was thus over, and the West Germans returned to their previous position. This was partly due to their own reasoning, but US views certainly had their impact as well.66 As British officials noted, the West Germans were in the end aligning themselves with the US, not with the French, on this issue.67 The British themselves were remarkably indifferent to the question, a position which was succinctly formulated by their NATO Ambassador: ‘If the Germans feel it necessary to hold out until final signature, we agree. If they want to be more flexible we would not stand out against that. We don’t want to be more German than the Germans.’68

As the NATO Foreign Ministers met in Brussels in December 1971, the issue of multilateralisation of the CSCE preparations was one of the main questions on the agenda. The last-minute stagnation in the negotiations on the second stage of the Berlin Agreement gave the NATO meeting an additional flavour – contrary to earlier expectations, the inner-German part had not been initialled before the Brussels meeting. France would have preferred a formulation in the communiqué that would allow for the MPT to begin as soon as the second stage of the Berlin talks was concluded, but the majority position, suiting West German preferences, prevailed. The ministerial communiqué merely reiterated the previous Lisbon statement, that is, readiness to undertake multilateral preparations ‘as soon as the
negotiations on Berlin had reached a successful conclusion’. On this basis, the ministers further declared, they would be ready to initiate such talks ‘as soon as possible’.\(^{69}\) The ‘successful conclusion’ was still not explicitly defined, due to French resistance, but it was by now evident that it meant the signature of the final protocol.\(^{70}\) In a subsequent EPC meeting, all but the French delegation agreed that this was the case.\(^{71}\) Reports from Washington on the Nixon-Pompidou talks indicated that the French were also prepared to accept this.\(^{72}\)

With the NATO consensus more or less intact behind the Berlin precondition for the CSCE, the West Germans argued that the Soviet ‘reverse linkage’ strategy was responsible for the delay inflicted on the CSCE preparations. The three NATO members involved in the quadripartite Berlin Agreement were prepared to sign the final protocol as soon as the complementary inner-German talks were concluded. It was the Soviet Union that had linked the signature with yet another, separate development, and thus postponed the possibility to enter multilateral CSCE preparations.\(^{73}\) But it was also a part of this logic, as Scheel pointed out in a Foreign Policy Committee debate at the Bundestag, that the FRG no longer had an option to slow down the process towards a CSCE. As soon as the Berlin protocol was signed, the conference preparations would begin.\(^{74}\)

### Blackmailing the Finns?

The December 1971 meeting of the NATO Foreign Ministers was clearly a turning point, as far as the linkages with the CSCE preparations were concerned. The case was closed, for NATO and the Warsaw Pact alike. The road for the multilateral preparations of the CSCE would be free after the signature of the final Berlin protocol, no sooner and no later. In the Anglo-West German consultations in late December 1971, Political Director von Staden was already able to predict accurately the schedule for the coming spring. Ratification of the Eastern Treaties in the Bundestag and the parallel signature of the Berlin Agreement would occur in May 1972. Subsequently, the spring meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers would declare that the Alliance was prepared to enter multilateral preparations for a CSCE.\(^{75}\)

Even the leading opposition parliamentarian in European security affairs, Werner Marx (CDU), although sceptical of the CSCE as such, agreed to a large extent with this timetable.\(^{76}\) As a last effort, in the heated foreign policy debate in the Bundestag plenary in late February 1972, ex-Chancellor Kiesinger openly criticised his successor for abandoning the linkage of an inner-German treaty with the CSCE. Brandt, however, could respond
by referring to a joint Allied position on the Berlin precondition. Brandt also added that the FRG had been wise not to create an additional connection between the ratification of the Moscow Treaty and the CSCE. 

Instead of the timing of the opening of the MPT, the focus in West German thinking was moving towards the duration of the multilateral talks. The ‘tea party’ stage would not have a significant impact on the international status of the GDR, but the actual conference was a different story. Therefore, Bonn preferred a preparatory phase lasting long enough to allow an inner-German treaty on the *modus vivendi* to be completed before the actual conference. This tendency to stress the importance of ‘long and thorough multilateral preparations’ had been on the rise in West German thinking during the autumn of 1971. In December, the *Auswärtiges Amt* prepared a working paper on procedures of the multilateral preparations, suggesting that the road towards the CSCE should go through a complex three-stage model – first the preparation of the ‘tea party’ of ambassadors, then the ‘tea party’ itself followed by a consultation of expert delegations, and finally the preconference of deputy foreign ministers.

The working paper was discussed in the EPC and NATO in December 1971 and January 1972. In it, the West Germans argued that the experience of the Ostpolitik negotiations had shown that ‘difficulties can only be overcome without pressure of time, step by step and by flexible negotiations which are coordinated in all their stages’. As a matter of fact, by February 1972 at the latest both London and Washington had recognised the element of procrastination in West German thinking. Bonn’s ‘meticulous plan’ to engage in thorough preparatory talks was seen as an attempt by the West Germans to continue controlling the pace of the process.

Additionally, the Federal Republic naturally wanted to avoid confronting high-level representatives of the GDR in the CSCE preparations for as long as possible.

In March 1972, the West German distinction between the MPT and the conference proper became clearer. Von Staden explained in Washington that the FRG was not yet committed to an actual conference. Possible problems in the inner-German negotiations would certainly have an effect on the procedure of the multilateral CSCE preparations. The West Germans were well aware of the delicacy of this, but seemed to be after some degree of linkage of the conference proper with their negotiations with the GDR. Asked about this in a NATO meeting in Brussels, van Well nonetheless denied the existence of such a linkage. According to him, the FRG merely hoped that ‘progress made in the general détente framework would also have an influence on the talks between Bonn and East Berlin’.

Once again, it was Bahr who spoke more plainly. He told a US diplomat in Bonn that the FRG ‘did not wish at this point publicly to be seen to
make further political linkages in the Eastern policy context. All the same, Bahr went on, because of the status the GDR would gain at a CSCE proper, it ‘should not take place until the FRG negotiations with the GDR were completed’. Later van Well confirmed this – it was indeed crucial for the FRG to ‘clarify its relationship’ with the GDR before a Foreign Ministers’ plenary at a CSCE. In van Well’s view, the means to achieve this was to engage in a lengthy preparatory stage, lasting well into the spring of 1973 if necessary. As the UK Ambassador in Bonn reported in April, the FRG was by no means prepared to ‘get off the escalator of East–West talks’ altogether. On the contrary, the West Germans had for quite some time been fully committed to a CSCE. What the Federal Government and the Auswärtiges Amt in particular wanted was to maintain a maximum amount of flexibility in order to control the pace of the preparatory phase, ‘so that this [could] be lengthened or shortened to fit with the tactical requirements of their negotiations with the GDR’.

Regarding the timing of the MPT, the official CSCE policy guidelines for the FRG, approved by the Federal Government in mid-May, pointed out that the signature of the final Berlin protocol was the only remaining prerequisite for the multilateral CSCE preparations. In a Bonn Group discussion around the same time, the Three and the FRG agreed that there could no longer be any formal barriers to the opening of the MPT after the Berlin Agreement. Because of various fixed dates in the coming autumn, such as the presidential elections in the US and the European Summit, the end of November was considered to be the suitable time for the talks in Helsinki to begin.

The Bundestag ratified the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties on 17 May 1972, and two days later the treaties also passed through the Bundesrat. In fulfilment of the ‘reverse linkage’, as the Eastern treaties entered into force on 3 June, the Final Quadripartite Protocol on Berlin was signed on the same day. With that, all Western preconditions for the opening of the CSCE preparations had been met. In the NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Bonn at the end of May, the Western Alliance officially gave the green light to the MPT. This was also the first occasion when NATO formally accepted the Finnish proposal to organise these talks in Helsinki. The date was left open, but the location was fixed.

Despite the positive echo in the NATO declaration in Bonn, the Finns continued to be uncertain about the West German position on Helsinki as a location for the MPT. ‘Bonn is blackmailing’, was President Kekkonen’s concise diary remark on the CSCE preparations at the end of May. In April 1972, as the Finns were concerned about rumours indicating that the FRG would refuse to participate in the MPT in Helsinki if Finland moved on with its initiative from September 1971 to recognise the German states,
officials from the *Auswärtiges Amt* on several occasions gave assurances that no such strings were attached.\(^93\)

The idea of such a linkage was not wholly unfounded. At the NATO meeting in May 1972, Scheel’s statement in favour of opening the MPT in Helsinki in the autumn was conditional – ‘provided that the Finnish Government did not make any unilateral move in respect of the GDR that would be contrary to the FRG’s efforts to achieve an inner-German *modus vivendi*’.\(^94\) Moreover, in the past six months, the head of the FRG mission in Helsinki had occasionally flashed the CSCE card in his dealings with the Finns, openly suggesting that unwarranted Finnish moves could jeopardise the suitability of Helsinki to host the multilateral talks.\(^95\)

In the general context of West German CSCE policy, however, the Finnish initiative to recognise the German states was only of marginal importance. Moreover, the concerns that did exist in Bonn about the suitability of Helsinki were more efficiently conveyed through the NATO channel, multilaterally and indirectly rather than bilaterally and directly. As agreed in the NATO consultations, the Norwegians and the Danes, who were the first NATO members to engage in ‘multiple bilateral’ CSCE discussions with the Finns in January 1972, also raised these potentially disadvantageous effects of unilateral Finnish moves with respect to the German states.\(^96\) When the Finns realised that Bonn’s position had broader support in NATO, they were quick to draw the conclusion that it was in their interest not to irritate the Federal Republic unnecessarily.\(^97\)

In this way, with the help of its allies, the FRG was indeed able to use the CSCE card to exert influence on the Finns. It certainly contributed to the Finnish decision to accept a proposal for negotiations from the FRG in January 1972, although President Kekkonen on several occasions stressed that Finland’s policies could not be ‘in Bonn’s pocket’.\(^98\) As this example shows, Bonn conducted its CSCE policy multilaterally in NATO and in the EPC, not bilaterally in Helsinki. In fact, the mission in Helsinki was deliberately kept out of the CSCE loop for most of the time. Von Groll openly admitted as much in February 1972. The *Auswärtiges Amt* wanted to make sure that their man in Helsinki did not start to negotiate on CSCE issues directly with the Finns.\(^99\) It was only in March 1972, long after several other Allies, that the FRG opened its official contacts with the Finnish Government on the modalities of the MPT in Helsinki.\(^100\)

In the German Ambassadors’ conference in June 1972, Foreign Minister Scheel pointed out that Helsinki was acceptable to the FRG as the site of the MPT. If Finnish circumstances were to change, they would naturally be taken into consideration when the location of the CSCE proper was discussed. For the time being, Helsinki was one of several candidates...
for hosting the actual conference. A few days later, at a meeting of the Socialist International in Vienna, Chancellor Brandt told the Finnish Foreign Minister Kalevi Sorsa that the FRG would naturally prefer the Finns to wait with their recognition moves until the Basic Treaty between the two German states was concluded. However, Brandt added, if the Finnish Government did not consider this to be possible, it would not be the end of the world.

The Chancellor’s forthcoming attitude was shared by the leading officials of the Auswärtiges Amt. The MPT would in any case be organised in Helsinki. As far as the location of the actual conference was concerned, von Staden argued in July, connecting it with any Finnish overtures in the German question should be carefully avoided. An impression of the FRG punishing the Finns would not be in the West German interest. As a result, the representative of the Federal Government in Helsinki remained isolated and unsuccessful in his efforts to turn Finnish sensitivities in the CSCE question into a means of defending Bonn’s Deutschlandpolitik.

As it turned out, there was plenty of CSCE-related movement on the Deutschlandpolitik front in the summer of 1972. But the subject of the original linkage strategy had become its object.

An Inner-German Shotgun Wedding

At the end of May 1972, Foreign Minister Scheel admitted being fully aware that the GDR was expecting to enhance its international status with the help of the CSCE. ‘That is their trump card, and that is why we are under time pressure’, Scheel told his British colleague. For some reason, this situation led the West Germans to reconsider their position as far as the timing of the CSCE was concerned. As pointed out above, so far the idea had been to control the pace of the multilateral preparations and to make it meet the schedule of the inner-German negotiations. Multilateral preparations could be under way simultaneously with the negotiations for a Basic Treaty, as long as the Basic Treaty was concluded prior to the CSCE proper. Yet in June 1972 the patience and self-confidence in Bonn ran out in this respect. After the signature of the Berlin Agreement had lifted the final obstacle in the way of the CSCE preparations, the FRG decided to play it safe and aim at concluding the Basic Treaty already before the opening of the MPT after all.

The main argument of the Auswärtiges Amt for this change was an old one. As soon as the East German regime sat at the same table with other future participants of the CSCE to prepare the conference, its international status would be raised to a completely new level. But in an ironical twist,
in the new circumstances this decision turned the roles in the old linkage blueprint completely upside down. The original idea of linking the multilateral CSCE preparations with Deutschlandpolitik had been based on the perceived ability to influence the timing of the MPT. Back in 1970–71, this had been tried through the multilateral route, ending in failure.

Now, after the signature of the Berlin Agreement, the option of postponing the MPT no longer existed. The date of the talks in Helsinki had in effect already been set for November 1972. If the FRG wanted to get anything in return for the GDR’s participation in Helsinki, time was running out – the inner-German negotiations had to be concluded rapidly, within the next six months. The pressure was on Bonn, not on East Berlin. The negotiations for the Basic Treaty, which were opened on 15 June 1972, were a race against time. In an interview with the author, Egon Bahr admitted that the Federal Government was afraid that the development was going to lead too quickly to the CSCE, before the basic relationship with the GDR was clarified. It was of fundamental importance for the FRG to be the gatekeeper for the GDR’s entrance onto the international stage.

In a meeting of the Bonn Group in late June, Bahr soberly described the complicated situation to the other three Allies. The GDR would certainly be tempted to drag its feet in the talks in order to wait for the impact of the CSCE. The FRG, then again, attempted to complete the negotiations before the conference, and even the multilateral preparations of the conference, began.

Negotiations on a Basic Treaty will become more difficult once the GDR takes part in a CSCE. ... Nevertheless, the Federal Government is not thinking of establishing a link between these negotiations and the CSCE. We will not set new preconditions for it.

This dilemma of no longer being able to use the CSCE leverage was characteristic for Bonn’s position throughout the negotiations for the Basic Treaty. Bahr himself had fully understood that this was as inherent weakness that would only grow in importance as the opening of the MPT drew closer. Nonetheless, as Foreign Minister Scheel told his French colleague in June, the FRG was firmly committed to concluding the Basic Treaty before the opening of the multilateral talks in Helsinki. As an added value, this would also liberate the CSCE from the burden of unsettled German problems.

In July, the Finnish Government came out with an official proposal to open the multilateral preparations on 22 November 1972. Although the US was reluctant to fix a precise date at this stage, the discussion in NATO made it obvious that a postponement of the MPT was no longer realistic. The Auswärtiges Amt argued that any attempts to change the date would have caused serious damage to the credibility of the Federal Government.
In particular, with explicit reference to the declarations of intent agreed in Moscow in 1970, a postponement would have brought about severe difficulties in the West German-Soviet relationship.\textsuperscript{112}

Brandt’s letter to Brezhnev on 10 August speaks volumes about the situation. On the one hand, the Chancellor referred to the timing of the CSCE preparations in the latter half of November as a given. On the other hand, he tried to persuade the Soviet leader to understand the positive impact an inner-German treaty would have on the conference preparations, if the Basic Treaty was concluded before the MPT.\textsuperscript{113} In a similar fashion, Bahr told the Bonn Group ambassadors that he considered 22 November, the opening day of the MPT, to be a decisive deadline in the inner-German negotiations. After that the GDR would be a stronger and more difficult negotiating partner.\textsuperscript{114} Thus, although the FRG had not yet officially replied to the Finnish suggestion, by early August at the latest the MPT date was fixed in the calculations of the Federal Government.

When Bahr met Erich Honecker in East Berlin in September, he openly told the East German leader that the FRG wanted to conclude the inner-German negotiations by early November. Honecker, although stressing that there were limits to the flexibility of the GDR, curiously implied that he would do everything he could to ensure a victory for the current SPD–FDP Coalition Government in the forthcoming West German elections on 19 November.\textsuperscript{115} A few days later, Bahr told the Bonn Group that there was reason to believe the GDR also wanted to conclude the negotiations on the Basic Treaty before the CSCE preparations.\textsuperscript{116}

In early September 1972, the general reluctance of the West Germans to impose new preconditions on the CSCE and their particular caution when dealing with the potential hosts of the conference led to a minor confrontation with the Allies. When the Finnish Government had initialed an agreement on establishing diplomatic relations with the GDR, discussion in the NATO Council turned to possible countermeasures by the FRG concerning the Finnish role in the CSCE preparations.\textsuperscript{117} The instructions sent from Bonn to the West German NATO mission for this purpose were clear. In the view of the Auswärtiges Amt, there should be no direct consequences whatsoever, neither on the timing and the location of the MPT, nor on the level of representation at those talks. The CSCE and the bilateral Finno-German relationship should be kept apart. Moreover, the instructions underscored that other Allies should also refrain from using Deutschlandpolitik as an argument for postponing the MPT. The site of the CSCE proper was a different story. The FRG had never favoured Helsinki for the main conference, and now the reservations had grown further.\textsuperscript{118}

In the heated debate in the NATO Council, a number of Allies accused the FRG of excessive flexibility. All of a sudden the FRG seemed to be pre-
pared to tolerate a GDR Ambassador at the CSCE preparations, something the Allies had for years helped Bonn to prevent.119 In defence of the West German position, van Well wrote from Bonn that the FRG did not want to undermine Finland in its attempts to strengthen its neutrality. The Federal Government had considered its response carefully, and was prepared to pay the price of short-term tactical losses in the interest of a broader Western perspective. For the time being, the focus of the FRG’s policy should be to minimise disturbance of the inner-German talks.120 The reaction in the Alliance was puzzled, and the West German NATO Ambassador himself strongly opposed these instructions, which in his view took the GDR excessively into account.121 According to a British telegram, there was a lot of talk in the corridors of NATO about the ‘feeble’ attitude of the FRG. Even Secretary General Luns had described the West German behaviour as ‘really extraordinary’.122

As Bahr again argued in October, it would naturally have been optimal if the Western Alliance as a whole had been able to make the CSCE or even the conference preparations conditional on the conclusion of the Basic Treaty. But, in Bahr’s view, the hands of the West had been tied ever since the entry into force of the Berlin Agreement. At this stage, a new linkage could no longer be established.123

During the final stretch of the negotiations for the Basic Treaty, there was only one instance when the FRG was prepared to use the CSCE card. On 6 November, as the signature of the agreement establishing diplomatic relations between Finland and the GDR was becoming imminent, State Secretary Frank instructed the mission in Helsinki to tell the Finnish Government in clear terms that a premature recognition of the GDR would have an adverse effect on the Finnish potential to host the actual CSCE.124 But on 8 November this problem ceased to exist, as Bahr and his East German counterpart Michael Kohl, after almost sixty meetings since June, initialled the Basic Treaty between the two German states. The Finnish Government was quick to draw conclusions from this. On 9 November it sent out the official invitations for the multilateral preparatory talks for the CSCE, to be opened two weeks later. On 14 November the Federal Republic confirmed its participation in the MPT.125

By the autumn of 1972, Bahr had come a long way from the linkage plans he had drafted over three years earlier. Although the Basic Treaty was, in the end, accomplished just in time before the MPT, the timing can hardly be attributed to a consistently implemented West German strategy. Indeed, from the spring of 1972 onwards, the CSCE–Deutschlandpolitik linkage was not merely ineffective from the Bonn perspective – it had turned against its authors. Instead of the FRG luring the GDR to the ne-
otiating table with the promise of a CSCE, the pressure was on Bonn to settle its relations with East Berlin before the conference.

It is difficult to pin down any actual concrete concessions that the FRG might have made in the inner-German negotiations due to this pressure. The CSCE as such was not an issue in the talks.\textsuperscript{126} There also may well have been Soviet pressure on the GDR to conclude the negotiations. Nonetheless, it seems that the wedding comparison put forward by Brandt in his memoirs, quoted at the beginning of the introduction of this book, was not perfectly accurate. Instead, if one necessarily wants to force a marital analogy on the development, that of a shotgun wedding might be more appropriate. As the estimated due date, 22 November 1972, drew closer, the FRG had no choice. A timely inner-German arrangement was the only respectable option.

Certainly, the FRG was not keen on assuming the role of the difficult partner blocking European efforts at détente with selfish demands. However, rather than a fear of isolation, the genuine reason for the erosion of the ‘linkage’ strategy was the changing West German perception of the CSCE per se. From Bonn’s perspective, the substantive elements of the conference began to outweigh its instrumental value, even when it came to Deutschlandpolitik.

**Europeanisation of Ostpolitik**

One of the most striking characteristics of the West German CSCE policy from autumn 1971 onwards was the idea of multilateralising or ‘Europeanising’ Ostpolitik. As has been argued in the preceding chapters, this approach had implicitly been in the making for some time, but after the conclusion of the first stage of the Berlin Agreement in September 1971 it was pursued in a more vigorous and conscious manner than before.

The Federal Republic clearly wanted more from the CSCE than just symbolism. In the memoranda of the Auswärtiges Amt the CSCE was seen as a logical continuation of the European détente which had been initiated with the Moscow Treaty. In this broader framework, the FRG was to pursue an active and evolving ‘strategy of cooperation’. In the long term, the goal of this strategy was a ‘European peace order’. For the time being the military alliances were necessary ingredients of the existing ‘security system’ in Europe, but in the future a peace order could possibly be built upon it – and surpass these alliances. Freer movement of people, ideas and information as well as increased economic cooperation were medium-term goals in the West German strategy.\textsuperscript{127}
In the West German thinking, only a ‘Europe of cooperation’ would be able to safeguard lasting peace on the continent. A peace order overcoming military blocs and the Cold War, and securing lasting stability and cooperation between countries with different social systems, would be more than simply an ‘absence of danger’. Moreover, the CSCE unit of the Auswärtiges Amt noted, the goal of safeguarding peace in Europe ultimately outweighed all other interests of the FRG, including that of German unification. This was in line with the declared objective of the Federal Government to work towards a state of peace in Europe, in which the German people could in free self-determination reclaim its unity – a formulation familiar from the ‘letter on German unity’ in 1970. The CSCE, if properly prepared, was seen as a suitable forum for jointly developing basic elements of European détente, later possibly leading to the peace order and a gradual overcoming of the division of Europe.128

It is worth noting that these considerations of the peace order were not just the subject of idealistic Sunday speeches, but were also seriously advanced on the operative level. In the Auswärtiges Amt, the CSCE was broadly seen as a means to the desired end. The planning staff of the Foreign Ministry constituted an exception rather than the rule, when it in October 1971 expressed its strong reservations on the ‘utopian’ references to a European peace order.129 Here it is important to remember that the direct influence of the planning staff on Auswärtiges Amt policy was far more limited under Dirk Oncken than it had been under Egon Bahr. The British embassy in Bonn later reported that Auswärtiges Amt officials had made a habit of pointing to Brandt’s Nobel Prize speech in Oslo in December 1971 as their ‘source of inspiration in working for a CSCE’. In the UK view, the idea of an eventual European peace pact contained in the speech was a ‘nebulous concept’, but Brandt’s thinking clearly indicated that the present agreements were not an end but rather the beginning of a dynamic process on East–West détente.130

The EPC was increasingly seen as the best framework for the implementation of the German cooperation strategy in the CSCE context. In the West German view, the members of the EC, seeking support from the other NATO members, should take the initiative in making attractive and balanced offers for active economic cooperation between East and West, ranging from increase in trade volumes to energy cooperation. At the same time, the West Germans were no longer prepared to limit European cooperation to issues strictly within the competence of the EC. Instead, the Auswärtiges Amt argued in September 1971, EPC members should attempt to coordinate their CSCE positions as broadly as possible, speaking with one voice whenever possible. This also applied to topics that were primarily a NATO responsibility.131
Indeed, in Bonn the EPC began to overtake NATO as the preferred framework of CSCE preparations. Until the spring of 1971 NATO had clearly been the number one forum for Western CSCE deliberations, but by the autumn of 1971 the EPC was in the ascendancy. Although NATO continued to be in charge of preparing the principles governing relations between states and the general procedure of the conference, and the Bonn Group had a certain privilege when it came to the question of borders and all kinds of legal formulations relating to the four-power rights, there was a growing tendency in the EPC to expand its CSCE work to cover all the issues involved.

As the Auswärtiges Amt saw it, the latest NATO document on the CSCE from May 1971 left plenty of room for improvement. This was particularly the case since NATO members had not been able to agree on a long list of specifics on the principles governing relations between states. In addition, a number of questions on economic, scientific, technical, cultural and environmental cooperation remained open. The attempts to resolve these differences within NATO were proceeding far too slowly for West German tastes – an ‘agreed document’ by the end of 1971 did not seem likely. In contrast, the development in the EPC framework had been rapid. CSCE preparations among the Six had already in some areas overtaken those within NATO, and the recent decision to constitute two separate EPC working groups on the CSCE promised a further acceleration on the European track.\(^{132}\)

At the end of September 1971 the EPC took significant steps towards more efficient CSCE preparation. The existing working group was now called a CSCE sub-committee, or sous-comité, since its French title was used in other languages as well. Following a West German initiative, the sous-comité was mandated to define specific interests of the Six at a CSCE. In addition, a new body, called an ad hoc group, was established to concentrate on the economic aspects of the conference.\(^{133}\)

Cooperation here was certainly not unproblematic, and the West Germans were often frustrated and puzzled by what they saw as French stubbornness. ‘Interpreting the French behaviour is not easy’, von Staden concluded in his analysis of the EPC experience in October 1971.\(^{134}\) The French vehemently opposed the direct representation of the European Community and the Commission at a CSCE, whereas the West Germans were of the view that the EC was a part of a future peace order, and needed to have an appropriate role in the process of East–West cooperation. Moreover, the West Germans argued that any hesitation by the Six in this matter would immediately weaken the position of the Community in Soviet eyes.\(^{135}\)
Despite the underlying Franco-West German tension, in agenda questions progress in the EPC was rapid. Already by late October 1971, based on reports by the sous-comité and the ad hoc group, the Political Committee of the EPC had agreed on its own suggestion for the CSCE agenda, consisting of: (1) a code of good conduct and renunciation of force; (2) military-political questions, including disarmament; and (3) economic, scientific, technical, cultural and environmental cooperation. The FRG’s main contribution to the EPC discussion was in identifying specific EC interests in a CSCE. A joint West German-Italian working paper underlined the importance of cooperation and freer movement. The achievement of concrete results in those areas would to a large extent determine whether the CSCE was a failure or a success for the West. At the same time, however, the paper argued that the West had to take political realities into account and recognise that the policy of cooperation needed to develop within the latitude allowed by the Soviet Union. Above all, the East was not to gain the impression that the West sought changes in existing political or social systems.

The second EPC report on the CSCE, which was approved by the Foreign Ministers of the Six in November 1971, highlighted the preparedness of the members of the European Community to engage in presenting constructive, balanced and attractive offers towards the East. Although the Dutch had had a leading role in drafting the EPC report, they had focused exclusively on security issues at the expense of cooperation. The cooperation elements in the report had then to a large extent been inserted by the FRG. Indeed, the West Germans saw themselves as the decisive engine within the EPC when it came to addressing increased East-West economic cooperation as an important part of détente.

At the same time, the West Germans were increasingly sitting on the fence between EPC and NATO. On the one hand, the Auswärtiges Amt hoped to have the latest EPC report also distributed to other NATO allies as soon as possible, to support the preparation of NATO’s own CSCE report. But on the other hand, whereas the FRG strongly supported EPC work on the cooperation elements of the CSCE, the West Germans called...
for discipline in those issues that were also dealt with in NATO, proposing that the results of the on-going NATO discussion should be awaited before the EPC intensified its own activity.\textsuperscript{144}

In the West German view, experience had already shown that consultations in the EPC proceeded more rapidly and led to a more thorough harmonisation than in NATO. It was all the more important, therefore, to avoid excluding the United States from the preparation of issues such as military elements of security or the principles governing relations between states.\textsuperscript{145} The visit of Joseph Luns, the new Secretary General of NATO, to Bonn in November revealed that the NATO secretariat was also concerned about the overlapping activities of NATO and EPC in the CSCE context.\textsuperscript{146} An apparent reason for this concern was the sluggish movement on the NATO track during the autumn of 1971.

As the CSCE discussion in NATO was resumed after the summer break in September 1971, the official West German position highlighted the need to avoid the most delicate issues at the beginning of the conference. Instead, the West should start with an agenda promising short-term success, focusing on, for instance, cultural cooperation and youth exchange. Although freer movement of people, ideas and information was in the long-term interest of the FRG, the \textit{Auswärtiges Amt} argued that this could come about only at the end of a long process.\textsuperscript{147}

The West German NATO delegation implemented these instructions with a degree of reluctance. In fact, the deputy of the West German NATO mission privately told his US colleague that the instructions they themselves opposed were coming from the working level in the \textit{Auswärtiges Amt}. If the US wanted to influence the West German position, it was best to approach the FRG on a higher political level. George Vest from the US delegation in NATO recommended taking this course of action, since West German ‘persistence in this very soft line of [a] potentially useful freer movement item’ was beginning to jeopardise Allied positions.\textsuperscript{148} This suggestion was taken up by the State Department, and in mid-September 1971 the US embassy in Bonn presented van Well with a paper outlining the ‘substantive and tactical advantages of pushing this item at a conference’. In order to apply further pressure, the working level of von Groll was also approached directly.\textsuperscript{149}

The West German reaction was to defend their position even more vigorously.\textsuperscript{150} On 21 September, the West German delegation in NATO circulated a working paper on freer movement, arguing for a cautious approach:

\begin{quote}
For tactical reasons, we should be careful that long-term aims should not occupy the first place on a CES agenda. Otherwise we would run the risk of sharp disputes right from the very start of the conference, which would produce an atmosphere of irritation and make it very difficult to discuss other items where
\end{quote}
agreement on concrete results would be possible. Rather should we select concrete individual questions in the cultural field where it would be possible to make progress step by step.\footnote{agreement on concrete results would be possible. Rather should we select concrete individual questions in the cultural field where it would be possible to make progress step by step.}

In the US analysis, this reinforcement of the West German position was seen as unfortunate, causing serious concern about the ability of NATO to develop a good bargaining position at the conference. The US embassy in Bonn was duly prompted to continue its efforts to change the West German attitude.\footnote{In the US analysis, this reinforcement of the West German position was seen as unfortunate, causing serious concern about the ability of NATO to develop a good bargaining position at the conference. The US embassy in Bonn was duly prompted to continue its efforts to change the West German attitude.} In bilateral contacts, the \textit{Auswärtiges Amt} officials assured US diplomats in Bonn that the differences in opinion were tactical rather than substantive.\footnote{In bilateral contacts, the \textit{Auswärtiges Amt} officials assured US diplomats in Bonn that the differences in opinion were tactical rather than substantive.}

But this tactical approach quickly began to create genuine front lines within NATO. France sided with the FRG in favouring ‘easier’ subjects, with the UK supporting the US in the opposite view, stressing that freer movement was the most important trump card the West had.\footnote{But this tactical approach quickly began to create genuine front lines within NATO. France sided with the FRG in favouring ‘easier’ subjects, with the UK supporting the US in the opposite view, stressing that freer movement was the most important trump card the West had.} In the search for a compromise within NATO, the West Germans stressed that their order of preference was based on what was achievable, not importance. The West German differentiation between short- and long-term aims was not to be mistaken for a division into first- and second-rate issues, respectively.\footnote{In the search for a compromise within NATO, the West Germans stressed that their order of preference was based on what was achievable, not importance. The West German differentiation between short- and long-term aims was not to be mistaken for a division into first- and second-rate issues, respectively.} But the Americans were not convinced, criticising the FRG for an extensive focus on ‘soft’ issues such as the environment. This referred to a West German initiative for a CSCE resolution touching on precise and clearly defined problems of air and water pollution.\footnote{But the Americans were not convinced, criticising the FRG for an extensive focus on ‘soft’ issues such as the environment. This referred to a West German initiative for a CSCE resolution touching on precise and clearly defined problems of air and water pollution.}

In November 1971, however, there was a new and broader surge of West German activity in the NATO discussion. First, the FRG presented a working paper on principles governing relations between states. The paper was tabled jointly with the US delegation, thus demonstrating that disagreement on freer movement did not prevent functioning West German-US cooperation over other CSCE issues. According to this West German suggestion, the declaration issued by the CSCE should consist of five sets of principles: (1) equal rights and self-determination of peoples and of sovereign equality of states; (2) universal respect by states for human rights and fundamental freedoms; (3) non-intervention and non-interference in the internal or external affairs of any other state; (4) restraint from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any other state; and (5) peaceful settlement of disputes.\footnote{In November 1971, however, there was a new and broader surge of West German activity in the NATO discussion. First, the FRG presented a working paper on principles governing relations between states. The paper was tabled jointly with the US delegation, thus demonstrating that disagreement on freer movement did not prevent functioning West German-US cooperation over other CSCE issues. According to this West German suggestion, the declaration issued by the CSCE should consist of five sets of principles: (1) equal rights and self-determination of peoples and of sovereign equality of states; (2) universal respect by states for human rights and fundamental freedoms; (3) non-intervention and non-interference in the internal or external affairs of any other state; (4) restraint from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any other state; and (5) peaceful settlement of disputes.} The idea of including human rights in the list of principles was a completely new initiative. Introduced in a nonchalant manner in a West German working paper in November 1971, the respect for human rights was in the end also one of the ten principles guiding relations between states listed in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975.
Only a week after the suggestion for the declaration of principles, the FRG made its next contribution in NATO. Reflecting Bonn’s concerns about the inadequate attention given to security issues so far, the Federal Republic made a CSCE agenda proposal of its own. Consisting of three major parts – principles, cooperation and security (including military aspects) – the West German suggestion was practically identical to the one agreed in the EPC framework a few weeks earlier. Additionally, the West Germans wanted the next NATO report on the CSCE also to address the relationship between the CSCE and MBFR. The FRG apparently wanted to intensify the substantive CSCE preparation in the West, calling for more emphasis on security from NATO, and more emphasis on cooperation from the EPC.

On the NATO track, however, progress in the autumn of 1971 was slow. Soon after the West German agenda proposal in mid-November, the latest CSCE study of the Senior Political Committee was circulated. The initial idea of this report on ‘negotiating approaches’ was to be an operational outline of Alliance positions from the perspective of a negotiator, for direct use in the opening round of multilateral talks. However, the report had to admit that while there was some agreement on the basic approach, differences of opinion between the Allies remained in basically all key areas. Moreover, several aspects, such as the precise Western proposal for a CSCE agenda and the question of the relationship between the CSCE and MBFR, were not addressed by the report at all. These omissions were particularly underscored by the West German delegation.

Regardless of its apparent failings, this NATO report was able to identify four potential agenda items of the conference: (1) principles governing relations between states; (2) freer movement and cultural relations; (3) economic, technological and scientific cooperation; and (4) cooperation to improve the human environment. On the principles, the Allies agreed that contradicting the Brezhnev Doctrine was one significant goal of any future declaration, and that it should contain at least the principles of sovereign equality, non-intervention, non-use of force and the peaceful settlement of disputes. But as the British delegation noted, the Alliance was ‘nowhere near agreement’ on the text of a declaration on principles.

As far as freer movement was concerned, the SPC report pointed out that ‘[i]n developing Western proposals …, one of the principal difficulties lies in finding a suitable balance between the politically more difficult issues such as radio jamming and exit visas for Soviet and East European nationals and the relatively easier issues such as intensification of performing arts exchanges.’ This balance had clearly not yet been found.
The NATO Council spent a couple of sessions at the end of November trying to iron out central controversies regarding the report, but no progress was made. The West German push for the inclusion of MBFR on the CSCE agenda did not receive sufficient support. When the NATO Foreign Ministers met in December, they could only take note of the SPC report and urge a rapid settlement of the remaining differences.

In fact, the most advanced part of the NATO study focused on economic, technical, scientific and environmental cooperation. This was facilitated by the extensive groundwork done in the EPC on these items. With the EC Six, Norway, Denmark and the UK already on board, these issues were far less controversial in the NATO framework. Feeding the cooperation topics into the NATO discussion had obviously paid off.

Another lesson learned from the process in NATO was that there was a clear opening for a West German lead. In his telegrams to Bonn, Ambassador Krapf urged the FRG to take a more active role in the CSCE preparation. In Krapf’s view, the discussion in NATO had revealed that none of the Allies had developed a convincing concept of how best to pursue its own interests in the CSCE. Krapf argued that a ‘clear and consistently presented CSCE concept’ of the Federal Government would enable the FRG to take the lead within the Alliance. West German positions were already considered to be decisive in all central questions of a future CSCE – principles governing relations between states, freer movement and economic cooperation. ‘None of the other NATO members has its fundamental interests so directly affected by the CSCE as we do. … From this perspective, we should attempt to commit the Alliance to our optimal positions.’

In its immediate reaction to Krapf’s initiative the Auswärtiges Amt merely reiterated known positions. But the experience in NATO in the autumn clearly planted the seed for the more active West German CSCE policy, which developed in the spring of 1972.

Meanwhile, frustrated by the inefficiency of the NATO mechanism, State Secretary Frank made a surprising proposal during his visit to the US in late November 1971. Frank suggested establishing a coordination instrument for the MBFR and CSCE policies of the West, based on the example of the Bonn Group. This instrument could be used to avoid open controversies of Western states in the actual CSCE, and to guarantee the cohesion of the Alliance policies for the next five to ten years. The US response was reserved, pointing out that the subject matter of the existing Bonn Group was a special case, but that the CSCE consultation could not that easily be taken out of the NATO framework into a smaller circle. Frank’s idea was obviously a non-starter, but symptomatic of growing West German frustration.
During his visit to Washington, Frank also presented West German ideas on general rules for the conduct of East–West cooperation, calling for a realistic approach. ‘One should start with proposals that have a chance of being fulfilled. For example, one cannot demand that the Berlin Wall be torn down.’ In Frank’s view, this gradual approach of realistic steps also applied to the freer movement items.\(^{169}\) Whereas Frank’s interlocutors in the State Department were sceptical of the step-by-step approach, Henry Kissinger in the White House seriously doubted the whole concept of the CSCE and asked Frank openly to explain why the Europeans were insisting on its preparation. Frank pointed out that faced with constant Soviet pressure for a conference it was impossible for the West always just to say ‘no’.\(^{170}\) For the Federal Republic, however, saying ‘no’ was also an important part of the CSCE policy. This defensive approach served the fundamental principle of keeping the German question open.

**In Defence of the Eastern Treaties and Bonn’s Sovereignty**

‘Our goals in the conference were solely defensive’, Günther Dahlhoff, a CSCE desk officer in the *Auswärtiges Amt* in 1969–72, later told the author.\(^{171}\) This was indeed an important characteristic of West German CSCE policy, but by no means the only one. In another interview with the author, Klaus Blech, head of the *Deutschlandpolitik* unit in the *Auswärtiges Amt* from the spring of 1971, more accurately stressed the dual nature of the FRG’s policy on the CSCE. Firstly, it was essential for the Federal Republic to make sure that the ‘last word in the German question had not been spoken’. The German question had to be kept open, and the two-state solution that was about to be formed needed to be understood as a temporary *modus vivendi*. But secondly, assuming a continued division of Europe and Germany, the FRG wanted to spare no efforts in alleviating the consequences of that division for the people, particularly in the two German states.\(^{172}\)

Keeping the German question open had also been the guiding principle of the negotiators in the bilateral treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland. Now that the preparations for the conference were accelerating, Bonn’s CSCE policy also gained a defensive flavour. The accomplishments of the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties had to be protected. Simultaneously, the sovereignty of the FRG, to the extent that the limits posed by the post-war arrangements allowed it, was also increasingly emphasised by the West Germans in the multilateral Western frameworks.

In order to avoid turning the CSCE into a conference about German affairs, the *Auswärtiges Amt* preferred regulating the relevant issues in
advance with the Bonn Group. Two thirds of these questions were relatively unproblematic. When it came to the participation of the GDR in the conference or formulations on European borders in the CSCE context, the interests of the FRG were usually not in conflict with those of the Three Powers. But in the third aspect, the delicate interplay between four-power rights and the ‘principles governing relations between states’, the Auswärtiges Amt was worried.

Von Groll pointed out in September 1971 that it was important not to let the CSCE undermine the four-power rights regarding Berlin and Germany as a whole, but from the West German point of view it was at least equally important to hold on to the ‘full powers of a sovereign state’ guaranteed to the FRG in the ‘general treaty’ in the 1950s.173 In other words, the existing rights of the four powers should not be expanded in the CSCE context at the expense of the FRG, neither accidentally nor consciously. In a Bonn Group meeting in October 1971 the West Germans stressed that a specific confirmation of quadripartite rights at the CSCE, as suggested by the US, could imply that the principles agreed on in the conference would not fully apply to the Federal Republic.174

This was a real concern for the Auswärtiges Amt. In a memorandum to State Secretary Frank in October 1971, Political Director von Staden emphasised that whereas the idea of consultation in a small circle could at first seem attractive, the activity of the Bonn Group in the CSCE context would create the possibility for the three powers to enlarge their influence over the FRG. In von Staden’s view, the essential question for the FRG was whether the engagement of the Bonn Group would help the West Germans strengthen their grip on Euro-Atlantic development or increase the risk of further limits to West German sovereignty.175

For the time being, the FRG was content with keeping the Bonn Group on board, since it ensured that none of the Deutschlandpolitik-related issues were raised by the US, the UK or France in broader Western discussion without a preceding consultation.176 Indeed, the FRG began to see the Bonn Group as a control mechanism for the relationship between the CSCE and Deutschlandpolitik, filtering out statements by the three powers that were seen as in conflict with West German interests.

At the end of October 1971, the Bonn Group agreed that disclaimer texts regarding the participation of the GDR in the conference were ‘highly desirable’. Such a disclaimer, stressing that participation in a conference together with the GDR did not imply its recognition, was to be issued in replies to the conference invitation as well as in remarks at the multilateral preliminary phase and the conference proper. The issue of borders, then again, was to be covered in a separate statement on quadripartite rights and responsibilities – preferably issued jointly with the Soviet Union.177
The Auswärtiges Amt was satisfied with the state of play, since this position safeguarded the necessary flexibility for the FRG.\textsuperscript{178}

In order to reach the goal of integrating the CSCE into West German East–West policy, Frank argued in October 1971, the FRG needed to complement its efforts for more cooperation with a defence of legal positions that would not exclude eventual German unification. It was therefore essential to avoid ending up with multilateral regulations resembling a peace treaty, the more so since such formulations had just been avoided in the bilateral Moscow and Warsaw Treaties.\textsuperscript{179} The key embassies were instructed in detail along these lines. To preserve the specific characteristics of the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties as well as the \textit{modus vivendi} character of the East–West policy of the FRG, the CSCE should only issue a declaration on the renunciation of force, not sign an agreement. An outright recognition of existing borders in Europe, as suggested by the Warsaw Pact, was out of the question.\textsuperscript{180}

In the Bonn Group, the West Germans were increasingly concerned about the reference to borders in a future CSCE. Blech told his colleagues that the FRG’s first preference would be to completely avoid it, but given the level of Soviet insistence, this was unlikely to succeed. If the acceptance of, or respect for, existing borders was to be addressed at the CSCE, the West Germans wanted in some way to transfer the relevant qualifications made in the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties in this respect to the multilateral level, including the letter on German unity. Blech admitted that the Auswärtiges Amt had so far not been able to develop a concept on how this should be done.\textsuperscript{181}

Nevertheless, the standard CSCE background papers in the Auswärtiges Amt were amended with stronger language stating that the important border issues had already been settled in the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties bilaterally and should not be dealt with at a CSCE.\textsuperscript{182} A ‘recognition’ of the status quo borders in Europe was impossible for the FRG, but as a fall-back position ‘respect’ for borders might be conceivable.\textsuperscript{183} The option of a renunciation of violent change of borders was also raised.\textsuperscript{184}

In the beginning of December, the Bonn Group agreed on a new formulation regarding borders, which corresponded perfectly with West German desires. According to the Bonn Group paper, the initial Allied position should be to decline to treat the border issue in a CSCE. If, however, some treatment of the issue in the CSCE texts became unavoidable, ‘utmost care should be given to their formulation in order to avoid the impression of an anticipated peace settlement on the basis of the present territorial status quo’. In particular, the West should agree only to respect, rather than to recognise, the existing borders. Moreover, the Bonn Group suggested, ‘the NATO members together, or the FRG alone, might also wish to consider
the possibility of a separate statement on “German unity” similar to the one delivered to the USSR when the FRG–USSR treaty was signed.185

With the support of the Bonn Group, the defensive West German posture held in the autumn of 1971. The core message was crystallised in State Secretary Frank’s discussions in Washington. As Frank stressed, for the FRG it was essential that the CSCE could not become a substitute for a peace treaty – the issue of the peace treaty as well the final regulation of the German question had to be kept open.186 A gradual and peaceful overcoming of the status quo had to be maintained as an option.187

A New Flow of German Activity

In early November 1971 the Federal Government in Bonn for the first time discussed the CSCE as a separate agenda item in the cabinet meeting, as Foreign Minister Scheel briefed his colleagues about the state of play in Western preparations.188 Scheel’s speaking notes for the cabinet meeting were still remarkably non-committal, stressing that no final positions on the contents of a possible CSCE could at this stage be taken.189 The Auswärtiges Amt wanted to keep its cards close to its chest. This was also apparent in the briefing given to the Bundestag Foreign Policy Committee.190

But in early December 1971 the preparations in Bonn were raised to a completely new level, as the Auswärtiges Amt hosted an inter-ministry meeting on the CSCE, thus for the first time directly including the Chancellery and the Economics and Defence Ministries. The participants agreed that a consolidated position of the Federal Government on the CSCE was needed, and that the preparation of a formal presentation to the cabinet (Kabinettvorlage) should begin immediately.191 At the same time, the personnel arrangements were also given further attention. The Auswärtiges Amt began to consider strengthening its mission in Helsinki with a CSCE expert, since the most significant coordination at any conference was likely to occur on the spot.192

Most importantly, the increased attention given to the CSCE in Bonn was reflected in a remarkable expansion of West German activity in the Western agenda preparations. As its NATO Ambassador had suggested in late 1971, in February 1972 the Federal Republic suddenly adopted an active role on all fronts. In NATO, having submitted a joint paper with the US on the principles guiding relations between states the preceding autumn, the FRG delegation now amended that with a new paper of their own.193 In the same meeting the West Germans also announced their forthcoming contribution on freer movement and cultural relations.194 As far as security issues were concerned, the West Germans again stressed their
strong preference for addressing some elements of military security at a CSCE. Moreover, the NATO discussion on the procedure of the multilateral preparations was already based on West German suggestions. West German initiatives were equally prominent in each of the topics of importance dealt with in the EPC machinery. For example, the discussion on economic cooperation in the ad hoc group in February was guided by the West German working paper on industrial cooperation, which was of particular interest to the FRG.

The UK was astonished by this avalanche of West German contributions. ‘[N]early all the work the Committee has so far done has been based on a succession of German drafts. Inevitably they are considerably amended and this is tiresome for the German delegation but it does ensure certain advantages for the German point of view’, noted the British NATO mission in February 1972. In March, Rodric Braithwaite at the FCO reported being ‘struck by the importance which the Germans attach to the Conference. They seem to regard it as the only way of carrying on the “East/West dialogue” once the present round of Ostpolitik negotiations is finished.’

The exceptional size of the West German bureaucratic effort put into the CSCE gave the FRG a competitive edge, and for others it was increasingly difficult to keep up with the flow of documents from Bonn. Von Groll’s unit in the Auswärtiges Amt had half a dozen officials concentrating entirely on the CSCE, a luxury which other NATO and EPC members did not have at this stage. Braithwaite noted that this explained why ‘it is now the Germans who are making the running in NATO and in the EEC Political Committee in the mass production of memoranda.’ The West Germans had taken the lead in Western preparations.

According to the British view, there were still shortcomings in the West German CSCE policy. In the opinion of FCO officials, a lack of clear political guidance from ministers in the FRG was reflected in contradictory tendencies on the working level, particularly between the ‘hard-faced men’ in the NATO unit of the Auswärtiges Amt as opposed to von Groll’s ‘softies’. Braithwaite said in retrospect that the West Germans were at times so badly organised and at loggerheads in internal rivalries that it was a genuine problem for the UK to find out what they were up to with regard to the CSCE.

Braithwaite’s criticism was of course not fully unfounded. The internal rivalries and conflicting positions of West German officials reflected the magnitude of the change in the foreign policy of the FRG that was in progress. Not everyone in the Auswärtiges Amt agreed on the new course, and individual frustrations were often vented in unofficial discussions with Allied colleagues. However, as unprofessional as this sometimes was, it
did not adversely affect the overall dynamism and direction of West German CSCE policy. Moreover, firmer political guidance was on its way. In the end, as Kenneth Dyson has argued, the political control of the CSCE policy was in fact much closer in the FRG than in the UK.\textsuperscript{204} The preparation for the cabinet presentation on the CSCE, kicked off in December 1971, had taken longer than expected. Originally planned for the cabinet agenda in January, not even first tentative drafts of the material were available before March.\textsuperscript{205} The \textit{Auswärtiges Amt} had at first wanted to give the cabinet a thorough presentation of the conference preparations as well as to receive a negotiating mandate for the CSCE. But in the end, the Chancellery view prevailed, and only a more concise set of guidelines was to be delivered for cabinet approval.\textsuperscript{206} Moreover, von Staden pointed to the danger of leaks, and underscored therefore that all references to tactical considerations were best left out of the guidelines and arguments made only on a factual basis.\textsuperscript{207}

On 25 April 1972, Foreign Minister Scheel sent the first draft of the CSCE guidelines to the Chancellery. In his introduction, Scheel stressed that rather than setting rigid formulas, the idea behind the paper was to provide ‘points of orientation’ for an active West German role in Western preparations as well as in the multilateral East–West negotiations. Moreover, the guiding principle of any West German policy in the CSCE had to be to avoid any commitments that affected the \textit{modus vivendi} character of \textit{Ostpolitik} or could be used to create anything resembling a peace treaty.\textsuperscript{208} Presenting the final CSCE guidelines at the cabinet meeting on 16 May, Scheel stressed that the FRG was not out to provoke anyone at the conference – the West Germans were aiming at genuine improvements, not propaganda events. Naturally, their own interests had to be defended vigorously if necessary.\textsuperscript{209}

The guidelines paper approved by the cabinet on 16 May 1972 laid out the cornerstones of the CSCE policy of the FRG. According to the paper, circumstances were now suitable for a successful CSCE contributing to détente in Europe, a conference in which the Federal Republic would play an active role. The guidelines emphasised four main agenda areas: (1) the principles governing relations between states; (2) military aspects of security; (3) ‘improvement of communication’ or freer movement; and (4) cooperation in various areas.\textsuperscript{210}

The CSCE guidelines declared that the West German preparations continued to be coordinated by the \textit{Auswärtiges Amt}, which was also to lead a new inter-ministry working group on the CSCE, to be set up before the multilateral preparations started.\textsuperscript{211} Already in preparation for the cabinet discussion, the \textit{Auswärtiges Amt} had produced a massive package of documents, elaborating the eighteen-point guidelines paper with fifteen
annexes, all together covering well over one hundred pages. In all, the package revealed an already rather sophisticated stage of preparations for the CSCE, ranging from considerations on individual agenda issues to personnel planning for West German delegations at the multilateral preparations and the CSCE proper.\textsuperscript{212}

The most important agenda items raised in the guidelines will be explored in more detail below. Before moving on to them, however, a few words on the role of the parliamentary opposition in West German CSCE policy are in order. For the conservative wing of the CDU, the whole CSCE project had been seen for a considerable time as a dangerous undertaking for the Western democracies in general and for the Federal Republic in particular, giving the Soviet Union an unprecedented opportunity to increase its influence in Western Europe.\textsuperscript{213} Admittedly, there were also more moderate voices in the ranks of the Christian Democrats.\textsuperscript{214} But the harshest critics were the vocal ones, none more so than the leader of the Bavarian CSU, Franz Josef Strauss, who openly attacked the CSCE policy of the Brandt Government in the Bundestag plenary in February 1972. In response, the Chancellor pointed at the active agenda preparations undertaken within NATO as well as in the EPC. Were the Christian Democrats really questioning the policy of the complete Western Alliance, Brandt asked.\textsuperscript{215}

At the cabinet meeting discussing the CSCE in May 1972, Scheel specifically asked for approval to make the key documents in the CSCE package available to the leadership of the Christian Democrats on the basis of confidentiality.\textsuperscript{216} A few weeks later, in an internal memorandum sent to the CDU leader Rainer Barzel, one of the key foreign policy figures of the party, Georg Kliesing, admitted that although the CSCE was the most dangerous part of Soviet strategy in Europe, the conference could no longer be avoided. Instead of a policy of self-isolation, the CDU needed to try to make the most of the situation. In order to safeguard West German interests, it was an important parliamentary task of the CDU/CSU group to push the Federal Government to give clear answers on its CSCE policy. So far, Kliesing argued, the basic position of the Federal Government was at least unclear, if not outright dubious. For the Christian Democrats, the tendency of the Government to see the CSCE as a continuation of its Ostpolitik and perhaps even as an opportunity to act as a bridge, merging Ostpolitik and Westpolitik, was a ‘disastrous development’.\textsuperscript{217}

In August 1972, Barzel wrote a letter to Scheel, thanking the Foreign Minister for the CSCE material he had sent over, as a result of Barzel’s enquiry to Brandt in June. Barzel criticised Scheel for the omission of ‘freer movement’ from the list of CSCE topics contained in one of the Auswärtiges Amt documents he had received. In Barzel’s view, that item should constantly be pushed to the top of the CSCE agenda by the West Germans.\textsuperscript{218}
In fact, the practice of the Auswärtiges Amt in sending CSCE material to the opposition leader was remarkably restrictive. The documents Barzel received in the summer of 1972 were of a very general and unclassified nature. That had also been the case earlier, when Barzel had asked for briefing material on the CSCE prior to his trip to Moscow in December 1971.219

Indeed, for the CDU it was difficult to engage in an effective opposition policy when it had only a very partial picture of what was going on in the CSCE preparations. Admittedly, the opposition was naturally preoccupied and overstretched with the bilateral Ostpolitik, and could only afford a marginal interest in the future conference at this stage.220 But above all, even during the final stretch before the convening of the multilateral preparatory talks, the CSCE was very much a government issue, prepared by a small bureaucratic circle of officials and diplomats. It was these officials that led the West German surge in the Western preparations of the conference substance in the spring of 1972.

**Peaceful Change, Self-Determination of Peoples and Military Security**

In their NATO contribution in February 1972, the West Germans stressed that a CSCE declaration on principles governing relations between states needed to reflect the real possibilities of improvement of the East–West relationship, manifest the will to détente and promote concrete détente measures in the future. At the same time, two pitfalls had to be avoided – the impression of a substitute peace treaty for Germany and the creation of euphoria in the public opinion of NATO member states. Finally, the declaration needed to find the balance between actively pursuing Western interests in the conference and not unnecessarily hurting the sensitivities of the Warsaw Pact.221

In this working paper on the declaration of principles the FRG for the first time introduced the concept of ‘peaceful change’, which was later to become a central element of the CSCE. The West Germans argued that in combining the necessary respect for basic rights (equality and self-determination of peoples; sovereign equality, territorial integrity and political independence of states; human rights and basic freedoms of individuals) with the principles particularly important for the West (non-interference in internal and external affairs of other states; non-use and non-threat of force; peaceful settlement of disputes), the concept of peaceful change was essential: ‘it should be clear that choice of means to effect peaceful change is up to the parties involved, that coercion is ruled out and that settlement must be between sovereign equals.’
But in spite of this insertion of a potentially dynamic element, the general tenor of the West German working paper was extremely cautious, as witnessed by this section:

The Western draft of a document on the principles of international relations should, for the time being, not contain appeals to general noble values (such as human values, welfare of humanity, elimination of all sources of conflict, solidarity of mankind, etc.) since they would detract from the sober and businesslike approach of the Alliance ...222

This was a particularly controversial paragraph in the West German paper, and not all delegations agreed with it in the SPC discussion.223 Based on the exchange of opinions, the NATO Secretariat circulated a revised version of the West German paper. This new draft was amended with a reference to the borders issue, reflecting West German interests and earlier Bonn Group agreement. If the Warsaw Pact were to press for the inclusion of a statement on borders in the CSCE declaration on principles, the Allies should only agree to it if the formulation was limited to ‘respect’ or ‘inviolability’ instead of ‘recognition’ of borders, if quadripartite rights for Germany as a whole and Berlin were safeguarded, and if Warsaw Pact countries made ‘major counterconcessions on matters of interest to the Allies in other aspects of the negotiations’.224

The Deutschlandpolitik specialists in the Auswärtiges Amt saw the declaration on principles to be of great value to the West, stressing that atmospheric improvements could bring substantive improvements in their wake. From the perspective of the FRG, an important objective at a CSCE was for its agreement on principles to have a ‘stabilising or buttressing’ effect on the inner-German modus vivendi. But in April 1972 the Auswärtiges Amt was firmly opposed to any references in that declaration to the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties – the bilateral treaties needed to remain intact and unaffected by it.225

The NATO work on the CSCE substance in the spring of 1972 culminated in the report of the SPC which was distributed on 16 May. In their introductory notes to the report, Secretary General Joseph Luns and the Chairman of the SPC, Jörg Kastl, admitted that the Council had not been able to reconcile the differences of opinion in a variety of areas. In fact, hardly any of the areas covered in the report were without remaining contentious questions. Luns and Kastl stressed that the need for a consensus was urgent, in particular regarding the overall tactical negotiating approach of NATO.226

Despite the level of disagreement, the SPC report of 16 May managed to give a broad overview of the situation, both in terms of substance and procedure. On substance, the report was divided into nine dossiers – (1)
principles governing relations between states; (2) certain military aspects of security; (3) freer movement of people; (4) freer movement of information and ideas; (5) cultural relations; (6) economic cooperation; (7) cooperation in applied science and technology; (8) cooperation in pure science; and (9) cooperation to improve the human environment – each consisting of a confidential ‘guidelines paper’ for internal use and a more general ‘agenda paper’ for appropriate use with non-Allied governments, supported with relevant documentation. Moreover, the report tackled the questions of procedure and Allied consultations during the multilateral preparations.227

A reading of the SPC report makes it obvious that the West German efforts during the spring of 1972 had paid off. Although a general Allied consensus on the CSCE approach was still distant, numerous West German ideas had been efficiently fed into the NATO document. This was particularly the case in the dossier on ‘principles’, where the West German concerns on quadripartite rights, a substitute peace settlement, and the ‘respect’ or ‘inviolability’ – as opposed to ‘recognition’ – of borders were fully taken into consideration. The concept of peaceful change, introduced by the West Germans in their working paper a few months earlier, was also included.228 The only drawback in the dossier, in the West German view, was the inability of the Alliance to agree on the inclusion of the self-determination of peoples as well as human rights in the list of principles.229

Both principles were of profound importance for the foreign policy of the FRG because of their direct implications for the inner-German relationship. Over the summer of 1972, at the same time as the negotiations for the Basic Treaty started, the Deutschlandpolitik element in the CSCE policy of the FRG became even more dominant. Von Groll stressed that the repercussions from the CSCE on the inner-German problems were of the utmost importance for the Federal Republic. The quintessential question in this respect was, in von Groll’s view, to what extent it would be possible to advance Deutschlandpolitik goals multilaterally through the CSCE.230

Human rights and the right of self-determination were a case in point. When the key officials of the Auswärtiges Amt and the FCO met in Bonn for bilateral Anglo-West German consultations on the CSCE in June, the West Germans again insisted on the inclusion of self-determination and human rights in the declaration of principles. Since this had been one of the unresolved questions in the last SPC report, the West Germans suggested working on it at first trilaterally, in an Anglo-West German-US format. The British agreed to this, although they pointed out that further opposition to the inclusion of self-determination was to be expected from the Turkish and Canadian delegations, with their own minority issues.231 The West Germans followed up this initiative in July, and approached the UK and US delegations in NATO. The West German plan was to draft a joint
paper on ‘principles’, to be tabled before the SPC reconvened to resolve outstanding differences. Both Allies welcomed West German leadership in this issue. West German embassies in Ottawa and Ankara were also instructed to ask directly for Canadian and Turkish support. The main West German argument was that a failure to include self-determination in the declaration of principles would deal a significant blow to the achievements of Ostpolitik, retroactively diminishing the importance of the ‘letter on German unity’.

As it turned out, the West Germans did not succeed in this endeavour before the start of the multilateral talks. But during the actual CSCE, both human rights and the self-determination of peoples were negotiated into the Final Act. Importantly, however, the way in which Bonn addressed the issue in 1972 was illustrative of the new flexibility of West German multilateralism. Depending on the question at hand, suitable ad hoc alliances could be sought out to win over support for West German interests. Although this was not a completely new invention in the diplomatic history of the Federal Republic, as a conscious and consistent West German strategy the forging of issue-driven coalitions within the West was certainly novel.

In the CSCE context, the relationship between the EPC and NATO was an example par excellence of an alliance within an alliance. In 1972, the West Germans were increasingly willing to use the EPC as a means to arrive at consensus in the broader NATO framework. In issues concerning economic cooperation there was a clear-cut division of labour – the EPC outweighed NATO. Therefore, the West German delegation in the EPC ad hoc group pointed out in January that in these questions preference should be given to arriving at common positions within the EPC; coordination with other NATO partners was secondary. But the extent of coordination of European CSCE positions began to cause uneasiness in the North American NATO partners. In response, the West Germans gave assurances that all fears of the EPC consultations disturbing preparations on the NATO track were unfounded. Instead, the two procedures were mutually supportive.

In fact, however, the EPC consultations had already for quite some time exceeded their original mandate which was to focus on issues directly falling within the competence of the EC. In retrospect, a senior French diplomat referred to the EPC as a ‘factory of ideas’ for NATO in the CSCE process. In May 1972, the Auswärtiges Amt admitted as much, noting that the EPC was increasingly also acting as a general ‘clearing house’ for specific European interests and aspects of the complete subject matter of a CSCE, particularly in issues that were controversial in NATO.
The Federal Republic was particularly active in making use of this ‘clearing house’. It was also successful in enhancing the circumstances for it, downgrading the classification of documents concerning NATO preparations for the economic aspects of the CSCE as well as enabling the Commission representatives in the ad hoc group to see confidential NATO documents. The coordination of policies in the EPC and NATO was further facilitated by the fact that participants in the EPC meetings were the very same officials who were responsible for instructing their NATO representatives.

Even with the ascendancy of the EPC, there was still one element of the Western CSCE preparations that was firmly in the hands of NATO – that of military security. As has been pointed out in preceding chapters, the Federal Republic was keen on establishing a strong connection between the CSCE and MBFR. In 1971–72, this aim was vigorously pursued by the Chancellery. While Brandt acknowledged that the specifics of MBFR needed to be addressed in a separate forum, in his meetings with Brezhnev, Pompidou, Heath and Rogers he consistently raised the importance of including elements of military security on the CSCE agenda. The FRG wanted more from the conference than just normalisation of East–West relations and increased trade – at a conference on security one also needed to talk about security. ‘A general disarmament is the ideal’, Brandt told Brezhnev in September 1971. In February 1972, Brandt told Pompidou that the main West German emphasis at the CSCE would be on two points – on the declaration on principles and on the restriction of troop movements. In May, Brandt stressed that he fully agreed with Defence Minister Schmidt on the absolute necessity to discuss MBFR at the CSCE. All of this contradicts Christoph Bluth’s argument about Brandt losing interest in MBFR after the signature of the Eastern treaties.

For Helmut Schmidt, MBFR was particularly important as a Western quid pro quo for the Eastern CSCE. As witnessed in the preceding chapter, Schmidt had earlier argued strongly for keeping the two projects separate. Already in November 1971, however, his US colleague reported a complete turnaround in Schmidt’s position. Now the West German Defence Minister saw a combination of the CSCE and MBFR as a valuable means to ensure French participation in MBFR. This became apparent in the preparation of the CSCE guidelines of the Federal Government in May 1972. The material prepared by the Auswärtiges Amt argued for the need to address ‘certain military aspects of security’, such as principles and criteria for MBFR, at a CSCE. This was not sufficient for Schmidt, who insisted on a last-minute amendment of a more substantial section on MBFR in the guidelines. Scheel accepted this, but pointed out that other NATO members were unlikely to agree to a closer connection between the CSCE and MBFR.
On the working level, the US and France had long been the main opponents of establishing a link between the CSCE and MBFR. Ironically, their motives for this were the reverse of each other – whereas the US was sceptical of the CSCE, France resisted the idea of MBFR altogether. The West German counterargument was that the inclusion of elements of military security on the CSCE agenda would help to avoid the creation of a ‘false sense of security’, resting only on Soviet promises, the renunciation of force and recognition of borders.\(^\text{248}\) In March 1972, first signs appeared that the French might after all be willing to accept the discussion of ‘secondary security policy measures’ at a CSCE.\(^\text{249}\) But the US and West German positions remained far apart.\(^\text{250}\)

This was reflected in the SPC report on the CSCE in May. References in the report to MBFR and confidence-building measures were all extremely non-committal and merely ‘illustrative’ in nature, and there was no agreement on a possible joint MBFR declaration to be issued at the conference.\(^\text{251}\) Nevertheless, the West German NATO Ambassador was confident that consensus on the inclusion of confidence-building measures on the CSCE agenda was within reach.\(^\text{252}\) Accordingly, Scheel continued to push for this in the NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting at the end of May 1972. Scheel pointed out that the Western governments needed to avoid any euphoric tendencies and impressions that the CSCE would make it possible for the West to relax its defence efforts. MBFR and the CSCE should be firmly linked together, and elements of military security needed to be discussed in the CSCE.\(^\text{253}\)

After the meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers, the Auswärtiges Amt noted with satisfaction that the formulations in the final communiqué, referring to ‘the examination at a CSCE of appropriate measures, including certain military measures, aimed at strengthening confidence and increasing stability’ was sufficient to meet the West German demands to have elements of military security discussed at the CSCE.\(^\text{254}\) And indeed, in September 1972 NATO members agreed that advance notification of troop movements and manoeuvres as well as exchange of observers were suitable confidence-building measures to be taken up at the CSCE.\(^\text{255}\) Although differences in opinion between member states still remained on the agenda and guidelines papers for these confidence-building measures, circulated in October, the Federal Republic had successfully managed to include military elements on NATO’s CSCE agenda.\(^\text{256}\)

This was to a large extent due to the persistence of the Chancellery, which by now considered MBFR to be the decisive forum of détente. When Bahr visited Moscow in October 1972, his discussions with Brezhnev and Gromyko, as far as they dealt with the CSCE, were exclusively about the
relationship of the CSCE and MBFR. In Bahr’s view, it was MBFR that was concretely about détente and about safeguarding peace.

Déténte in Europe cannot be solved at a CSCE, because it cannot be done without the reduction of the military potential. ... The improvement of the political atmosphere will make practical decisions in the military area possible. But if these practical decisions do not follow, the political atmosphere will take a turn for the worse again.²⁵⁷

On a more tactical note, Bahr saw the role of the CSCE in this as giving all interested participants an opportunity to have their say about issues of military security. That would in turn make it easier to discuss the hard MBFR issues in a separate, smaller circle.²⁵⁸ This argument had been put forward by the MBFR unit in the Auswärtiges Amt for some time. If the smaller NATO allies, as well as neutral and non-aligned countries, were given the impression that they were not excluded from the development of security policy in Europe, it would be easier de facto to exclude them from the actual MBFR negotiations.²⁵⁹

The strong emphasis given to MBFR in the Chancellery was also visible in Brandt’s reluctance to address one of the quintessential questions of the CSCE, freer movement, in his discussions with Allies. Although his UK and US interlocutors brought up the topic and the issue figured prominently in the speaking notes prepared for Brandt, he preferred to focus on other CSCE issues – cultural relations and the environment on the one hand, and military security on the other.²⁶⁰ On the working level in the Auswärtiges Amt, however, the question of freer movement could not be avoided.

**Freer Movement: Change through Rapprochement?**

Speaking to a Social Democratic audience in February 1972, State Secretary Frank pointed out that while the general CSCE policy of the FRG consisted of avoiding changes to the *modus vivendi* and of striving for more security, cooperation and freedom of movement in Europe, the ‘egoistic core’ of that policy was the improvement of inner-German relations.²⁶¹ Nowhere was this more apparent than in the field of freer movement. In addition to the Deutschlandpolitik connection, freer movement is also an illustrative example of the overall CSCE tactics of the Federal Republic, a cautious approach emphasising long-term evolution instead of short-term revolution.

In the spring of 1972, the correct way to approach freedom of movement in the CSCE framework became a particularly important issue for the FRG. Already at the end of 1971, the Auswärtiges Amt began to pay more attention to the freer movement elements in the CSCE as a potential
development with direct repercussions for Deutschlandpolitik. Agreements on freedom of movement on the European level could turn out to facilitate the desired ‘human relief’ (menschliche Erleichterungen) – the small improvements in people’s daily lives which had been outlined in the Brandt-Stoph meeting in Kassel in 1970 – in the inner-German relationship.\textsuperscript{262}

It was precisely this special relevance for the inner-German situation that led the Federal Republic to argue for a non-confrontational tactical approach in the freer movement question. In the West German view, maximum freedom of movement of people, ideas and information in Europe was an essential long-term goal but one which could only be achieved after a long and probably difficult process. A debate on the principles of freedom of movement at the outset of a CSCE could endanger the whole East–West dialogue. Instead, an improvement of cooperation one step at a time, beginning with concrete issues where agreement was conceivable, was seen as the most promising route to greater freedom of movement in all areas in the long run.\textsuperscript{263}

In January 1972, when challenged by the US, the Auswärtiges Amt defended this position adamantly. The US embassy in Bonn reported that the West Germans ‘stressed their preference for limiting freer movement to cultural exchange at this point, arguing that this served their particular interests vis-à-vis the GDR’. Interestingly, the FRG officials had also expressed their concern that the GDR could use any ‘lowest common denominator’ resolutions on freer movement at a CSCE as a ‘maximum threshold’ in the inner-German relationship.\textsuperscript{264}

The budding controversy with the US over this issue was certainly behind the German decision to begin also addressing it in the EPC framework. In early January 1972 Jürgen Diesel, a deputy head of the political department of the Auswärtiges Amt, had stressed that agenda items related to freer movement should be discussed primarily in NATO.\textsuperscript{265} But leading the West German delegation in the meeting of the EPC sous-comité a week later, Diesel spoke in favour of an intensive discussion of freer movement within the EPC, since NATO had so far not been able to agree on the approach to adopt. At least the Six should speak with one voice on this issue in the NATO framework. Due to its special importance for the inner-German relationship, the topic should not be discredited by introducing controversial questions such as radio jamming or exit visas at the beginning of the CSCE. Instead, cautiousness and patience were called for. Diesel also promised that a West German working paper on freer movement would be prepared in the near future for discussion in the EPC – before its submission to NATO.\textsuperscript{266} As the EPC deliberations continued in February, the French joined the FRG in arguing that the West should not propose freer movement as a specific agenda item of the CSCE. Rather than confronting
the East with that topic early on, it would be better to seek improvements piecemeal when negotiating about cooperation in particular fields.\textsuperscript{267}

For the US, the development of the West German position was worrying. The idea of a working paper on freer movement and cultural relations was a further sign of a continued West German ‘effort to de-emphasize freer movement and stress cultural relations’.\textsuperscript{268} These worries grew during the spring of 1972, although the West Germans gave assurances that the FRG did not wish to remove freer movement from the CSCE agenda. Officials in Bonn argued that it was in the West German interest to have freer movement as a key element of the Western position at the conference – but the best way to do it was to highlight freer movement in the general umbrella declaration on principles and then supplement it by more specific references in each of the various sections on cooperation.\textsuperscript{269}

The US officials were not convinced. The West German position had been marked by ‘hesitation and ambiguity’ to begin with, and was now moving to an even softer direction. If the FRG was prepared to drop freer movement as a specific agenda item altogether, it would put it in direct opposition to the US, which had ‘consistently emphasized concrete issues, not vague declarations’.\textsuperscript{270} Visiting Washington, von Staden maintained that the US, France and the FRG were in complete agreement on substance, only disagreeing on the question of procedures. Although the question of freedom of movement was a problem in every aspect of a CSCE, von Staden argued that at the conference ‘one should start with things that can be done and follow a step-by-step approach’.\textsuperscript{271}

This negotiating approach was something that the FRG argued for across the board. Starting with maximum Western demands of comprehensive scope would be ‘very off-putting to the Soviet side and perhaps lead to negative results’. Instead, the West Germans wanted to begin the conference by keeping options as open as possible. In the British analysis this line resembled the negotiating technique of Bahr, who liked to operate ‘from a position of fluidity’.\textsuperscript{272} The UK embassy saw this ‘Bahr flavour’, now prevalent in the \textit{Auswärtiges Amt}, as aiming ‘to engage in negotiations, to avoid frightening the other side, to see what emerges, and to be committed to pursuing only that which emerges’.\textsuperscript{273} Fascinatingly, in the CSCE context the West Germans were implementing this non-controversial tactical method on two levels – first within the West in order to have NATO then adopt the method for the East–West talks.\textsuperscript{274} Intended as criticism of Bahr, these British observations are astonishingly accurate descriptions of the West German approach.

But the reluctance of the FRG to openly confront the Soviet Union on freer movement was also motivated by a perception of its limited abilities to actively promote change. Publicly, the Federal Government stressed the
positive prospects of an evolutionary development opened up by a CSCE and the principle that an improvement of the situation in divided Europe needed to improve the situation of the divided German nation. But behind the scenes, the West Germans were ‘very conscious of the dangers which might arise if the FRG appeared to be putting German policy before European policy’. And appearances aside, West German leverage was perceived to be limited. This is strikingly clear in a memorandum von Staden sent to Frank in mid-March 1972, worth quoting at length. Although von Staden concluded the passage with a reference to reunification, ‘hoping for long-term changes possibly making it look conceivable’ was hardly a statement for an active policy towards that end. Rather, it was about coming to terms with the status quo that prevailed:

Neither the economic nor the political (let alone the military) potential of the Federal Republic allows us to strive for a change in the political landscape in Central and Eastern Europe. In this respect we have to be static. Therefore, in the relationship to the East and particularly the Soviet Union, we have set ourselves the goal[s], 1) to mitigate the situation in Europe and to make peace more secure through renunciation-of-force treaties and the Berlin arrangement, and 2) to create a climate of security in Europe …, in the hope that 3) long-term changes could relativise systemic antagonisms and make reunification appear conceivable.

Implementing this combination of tactics and strategy on the working level, and encouraged by first experiences from handling the issue in the EPC, the West Germans submitted an updated position paper on freer movement to the EPC sous-comité in March 1972 – over two weeks before tabling the same document in NATO. More explicitly than before, the paper made the argument for the exceptional position of the FRG:

Inadequate freedom of movement is the number one problem of our divided country. It is particularly in this field that it will have to be seen to what extent détente to which we want to contribute with our policy can become a reality. Therefore, none of the other countries participating in a CSCE is so directly affected as the Federal Republic of Germany by the discussion of ‘freer movement’ at the conference.

The paper went on to argue that freer movement was a significant basic element for any real progress in the East–West relationship – and vice versa, progress in the freedom of movement was the most important and concrete yardstick for the achievements in détente and cooperation. Precisely because of the importance of the issue, the West Germans argued, it was essential for the West to approach it in as effective a manner as possible. Instead of confronting the East with rigid demands and ‘spectacular
moves’, the West ought to develop a long-term concept with prospects of tangible and practical results. Rather than focusing on a potentially provocative separate declaration on freer movement, the West would be better advised to include the topic in a general declaration of principles as well as to ensure that the principle of freer movement was an integral part of all areas of East–West cooperation.279

After a lively discussion in the EPC sous-comité, the West German approach found relatively broad support. Most of the EPC members agreed that by formulating the CSCE agenda so as to make it acceptable to the East, the West would also be able to speak freely about freer movement at the conference. In contrast, a polemical approach during the preparations could lead to the complete exclusion of the issue from the CSCE. The West Germans, in turn, supported the French proposal, according to which the freer movement items should be referred to as ‘cultural cooperation, development of contacts between persons and dissemination of information’.280

After the EPC meeting, the West Germans were confident that common ground could be found in the NATO framework.281 But as it turned out, the controversy with the US was anything but over. In late March, the US mission to NATO reported of a ‘potentially troublesome development’ in the EPC, regarding the French proposal to change the titles of the freer movement items. A member of the West German NATO delegation aggravated the situation, constantly telling his US and UK colleagues privately that he felt the instructions from Bonn to support the French in this were misguided, and even encouraging the Allies to lobby Bonn to change the West German position.282

The official West German position presented in NATO, arguing for the need to avoid polemics, led to consternation not only in Washington, but also in the Netherlands and the UK. The Dutch argued that there was ‘no need for us to treat the other side with kid gloves – they would certainly not pull their punches’.283 The British, who referred to the West German position as ‘feebleness’ and ‘an exceedingly wet line’, tried to figure out the motives behind it. ‘It may be that something more substantial (e.g. the hope of some special advantage in inner-German relations) lies behind this attitude. But if so the Germans have not brought their allies into the secret.’284 Later, van Well suggested to a US diplomat in Bonn that supporting the French in the question of the titles of the freer movement items had been a tactical decision, an attempt to pull France deeper into the concept of NATO instead of Franco-Soviet bilateralism.285 This, of course, may have been just a convenient explanation to give to the Americans in order to calm them down.

Nonetheless, apparently the West German effort to win over the EPC members before addressing the issue in NATO had not been such a com-
plete success as the FRG had thought. On 7 April, the West Germans finally circulated their freer movement working paper in NATO. For the US, it confirmed their worst fears about West German willingness to drop freer movement as an agenda item at the CSCE. The stalemate in NATO was further exacerbated by the West German decision to express their reservations on the title as well as the contents of an agenda paper on freer movement circulated by the international secretariat. In a Council meeting on 25 April, the disagreements were voiced more loudly than before, the West German Ambassador favouring as neutral a wording as possible, and the US Ambassador warning the Alliance of the consequences of backing away from its own insistence to deal with freer movement at the CSCE.

In a handwritten remark on the West German report from the meeting, von Groll noted that there was a need for new instructions, stressing that nobody in Bonn wanted to remove the freer movement items from the agenda or reduce their importance. Instead, the question was only about the right way in which to present these issues.

We want to avoid a confrontation in the multilateral preparations, to formulate the topics under the title ‘freedom of movement’ for the agenda in such a way that the other side can also agree to them – otherwise there is a risk that the items will not appear on the agenda at all.

To overcome the difficulties with the US, von Groll’s unit in the Auswärtiges Amt argued that it would be useful to convince the US of the positive broad impact the CSCE would have on détente – on NATO as well as on Deutschlandpolitik. In a further effort to mend fences, the US and the FRG agreed that they would improve their advance consultations on CSCE matters, to avoid situations where the West Germans supported positions known to diverge from US ones without previous warning. In their contacts with the US delegation in Bonn, West German officials continued to emphasise that the freer movement issue ‘should be the centerpiece of discussion at the conference itself, although presented in a non-polemical manner’.

The Auswärtiges Amt also increasingly highlighted the importance of the inner-German aspect of freer movement. Although the FRG wanted to avoid the appearance of pushing purely its own national interests in NATO, it was in repercussions for inner-German relations that the Federal Republic was primarily interested. Concrete progress in the area of freer movement in the CSCE could produce provisions with a binding effect on the GDR, in turn helping to improve the conditions for movement of people between the two parts of Germany. This was the main reason why Bonn wanted to have the topic introduced in a non-controversial manner at the CSCE. ‘It was simply too important to the FRG for it to be handled in
any polemical fashion.’293 Because of the connection with Deutschlandpolitik, the Federal Republic considered even the smallest of improvements in the field of freedom of movement to be better than none at all.294

Moreover, the West Germans were apparently serious about the semantics concerning the freer movement items. Reflecting the discussion in the EPC and NATO, there were last-minute changes in the language on freer movement in the CSCE guidelines of the Federal Government. The original versions proposed by the Auswärtiges Amt had still referred to ‘freedom of movement’.295 But on 12 May, the relevant sections in the final version were replaced with ‘improvement of communication’.296

This question was again addressed in the NATO Council on 10 May. The US and the Netherlands argued for maintaining the old titles of freer movement, whereas France and the FRG, this time supported by the UK and Denmark, called for a less polemical compromise formula, which would also be acceptable to the East – ‘development of contacts between persons’ rather than ‘freer movement of people’, ‘expansion of the dissemination of information’ rather than ‘freer movement of ideas’. The disagreement between the two camps remained unresolved.297

These disagreements notwithstanding, the freer movement dossiers of the SPC report in May did identify a number of specific measures to be covered at the CSCE. Many of these measures also held direct promises for the inner-German relationship, in particular the ‘removal of arbitrary obstacles to the exit of individuals and their families’ and the ‘lifting of restrictions on marriage and the reuniting of families’. Suiting the preferences of the Federal Republic, the need for a gradual approach was underlined. The report also recognised certain limits to which it would be best to adhere:

Not included in the list of measures … is the dismantling of the Berlin Wall, largely because the Allies believe it would be counter-productive to make such a far-reaching proposal during initial multilateral talks. Partly for public opinion purposes, however, the Allies will not wish to overlook the existence of the Berlin Wall, the East’s most graphic and best-known barrier to freer movement of people.

The NATO dossier on the freer movement of ideas and information also strikingly resembled the West German approach, particularly this observation:

[The Allies will need to pursue this proposal with particular sensitivity and a good sense of timing, bearing in mind Western public opinion which will expect us to emphasize the importance of freedom of information. A frontal attack on these repressive practices internally within the East would be unlikely to produce any favourable results. On the other hand, a long-term campaign
of quiet persuasion, suggesting a few modest steps ... to bring the Eastern external practices more in line with generally accepted international behaviour, could lead to significant improvements over the present situation.298

But the question of the titles for the freer movement items on the CSCE agenda was a persistent one. The EPC Political Committee invited the Foreign Ministers to take a stand on the issue in their meeting at the end of May. The West German compromise solution was to maintain the formulation ‘freer movement’ in the catalogue of principles under general human rights and individual basic freedoms, but to use ‘development of contacts’ on the conference agenda and in the titles of the CSCE commissions. No resolution was found, however, and the question was moved on to the NATO Foreign Ministers.299

Prior to the ministerial meeting of NATO, the US had clearly understood Bonn’s argument on avoiding unnecessary polemics on freer movement because of the potential value of the item for the inner-German relationship.300 But this did not change the US view. Secretary of State Rogers underlined that ‘for NATO to compromise on this issue in form or substance and to do so on its own initiative would weaken the Western position on its most advantageous issue in CSCE before the conference even started.’ Rogers himself planned to press Scheel on this at the quadrupartite dinner before the Foreign Ministers’ meeting.301

But Scheel was not prepared to change the West German position. In his speech at the NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting, Scheel underscored that the crucial importance of freer movement, particularly for the FRG, was the reason why it should be ‘discussed as realistically as possible with the aim of securing practical improvements, not as a philosophical dispute’. Insisting on the inclusion of a controversial agenda item on freer movement would be tactically unwise.302

Since both the FRG and the US were persistent in their positions, the question of freer movement remained controversial all the way to the autumn of 1972. On the bilateral West German-US level, during Henry Kissinger’s visit to the Olympic Games in Munich, Scheel and Frank tried to convince him that the West German ‘objective was not to lose the substance but to avoid formulation of the agenda item in such a way as to make it ipso facto unacceptable to the Eastern side’.303

But no agreement was found. As a result, NATO had to enter the MPT without an agreed tactical position on freer movement. The two dossiers on freer movement from May 1972 were not updated in the run-up to the multilateral preparations, and the NATO steering brief for the MPT, issued on 7 November, explicitly referred to internal divisions within the West in this context.304 Consequently, NATO negotiations about the suitable line continued during the Dipoli talks. While this may have been harmful
for the cohesion of the Alliance, it did prevent the worst-case scenario of the FRG – an East–West confrontation about freer movement at the very beginning of the conference preparations. As the CSCE negotiations got under way, the West Germans were able to keep alive their idea of a long-term evolutionary approach to the improvement of personal contacts.

### Berlin as a CSCE Location?

If one searches for case studies reflecting the pursuit of West German national interests in the CSCE preparations, German as the official conference language as well as the seating order at the conference are two obvious – and illuminating – examples. Here I will highlight a third, less known element. A particularly intriguing case in West German CSCE deliberations was the idea of finding a role for Berlin as a CSCE location, either for hosting parts of the actual conference or as a site for a possible permanent body established for the follow-up of the CSCE.

As has been pointed out in Chapter 2 above, Egon Bahr had already in the summer of 1968 toyed with the idea of having the organs of a ‘pan-European security system’ seated in Berlin. Over two years later, in November 1970, the idea surfaced for the first time in the CSCE context, when Bahr, meeting the Romanian Deputy Foreign Minister, suddenly suggested that hosting a permanent CSCE secretariat in Berlin might be a good idea. When asked in which part of the city, Bahr replied: ‘both’.

Later on, the idea was picked up by the US. In March 1971, Secretary of State Rogers raised Berlin as a potentially attractive CSCE site from the Western point of view. Berlin could offer psychological compensation for the gains otherwise made by the East in the conference. Rogers stressed that before tabling the idea in NATO, the issue should be discussed in the Bonn Group. The US embassy in Bonn was instructed accordingly, and in the Bonn Group meeting on 29 April 1971 all participants agreed that the idea of a CSCE in Berlin, hosted by the Berlin Senate, was worth considering.

Von Groll, whom the US embassy had kept well informed in advance, saw the idea in a positive light, but argued that for the time being it was best not to include the non-members of the Bonn Group in the discussion.

This American initiative had focused on the site of the actual conference. But during Brandt’s visit to Washington in June 1971, Bahr returned to his thought of Berlin hosting a permanent body created by the CSCE. Bahr asked for US support for this idea, which would give the city ‘a much needed boost’. The State Department was happy to back the idea, but had doubts of its chances of being approved by the Soviet Union. Brandt’s
handwritten notes for the Crimean meeting with Brezhnev in September 1971 suggest that he had at least been prepared to discuss the idea of Berlin as a site for the permanent body.311 However, no reference to this issue is made in the official West German protocol of the meeting.

Although it would be an overstatement to speak about a campaign in favour of it, in the autumn of 1971 Berlin as a CSCE site was certainly given serious consideration in Bonn – and in Berlin. During his visit to Paris in October, Horst Grabert, the SPD Senator from West Berlin, suggested his city as a potential site either for the CSCE or a follow-up organisation. The French Foreign Minister Schumann reacted with interest but noted that the choice of Berlin might send unwanted signals concerning the status of the city, referring to the potential in claiming its neutral character.312

In the official Auswärtiges Amt view, the whole question of the establishment of a permanent body was premature in the autumn of 1971. The issue should only be addressed in due time at the conference itself.313 But regarding the possibility of Berlin as a venue for the conference or parts of it, the German Foreign Ministry was divided. For Blech’s Deutschlandpolitik unit, the idea was dubious from the start. Although it could bring much needed prestige for the city, the identity of the actual host would be anything but clear. Instead of the FRG, the Three Powers – or even the Four, including the Soviet Union – would be legally responsible for it. This would unnecessarily underline the special status of Berlin and the limited sovereignty of the FRG. Since the idea of sharing the meetings between East and West Berlin was unlikely to succeed, the choice of West Berlin alone could additionally be interpreted as a sign of it being a neutral island, rather than comparable to ‘normal’ cities of the Federal Republic.314

But Blech’s views were contradicted by von Groll. The head of the CSCE unit in the Auswärtiges Amt saw several advantages in holding a part of the CSCE in Berlin – beyond the mere prestige impact it could also ensure correct East German behaviour at the CSCE and increase the overall chances to overcome the division of the city. Von Groll admitted that Berlin was hardly suitable for a spectacular opening of the CSCE, but could well be considered as a site for some of the commissions working on specific items or as the location of a permanent body.315

State Secretary Frank followed von Groll’s suggestion and raised this on his visit to the United States in November 1971. At the end of a discussion at the State Department, Frank offered Berlin, but this time only the Western half of the city, as the location of a permanent machinery of the CSCE. In Frank’s view, West Berlin was still also a suitable candidate for the CSCE proper, as an alternative to Helsinki and Geneva.316 In December, however, von Groll noted that Helsinki was de facto already chosen to be the site of the MPT, whereas Vienna and Geneva were the leading
candidates for the CSCE proper. Although von Groll stressed that the viability of Berlin as an alternative location should be carefully analysed, the idea seemed to die down.\textsuperscript{317}

Enter Egon Bahr. In March 1972, commenting on a Chancellery memorandum on the CSCE state of play, Bahr was disappointed to see that the West German interest in a permanent body to be established by the CSCE was not mentioned. In response, the author of the memorandum referred to an Auswärtiges Amt paper on the continuation of the East–West dialogue after a CSCE, which had been delivered as a West German contribution to the EPC in late February. This paper had decisively opposed the establishment of a single permanent body by the CSCE, since it would prematurely set the new West European institutions in competition with a pan-European body.\textsuperscript{318}

Bahr was not satisfied, and suggested to the Auswärtiges Amt that he should meet with State Secretary Frank to settle the differences. Bahr stressed that a permanent secretariat would be necessary for a continued East–West dialogue after the CSCE. The character of such an East–West mechanism would by its very nature, and due to the participation of the US and Canada, not threaten the institutions of the EC. Moreover, Bahr underscored, the FRG had ‘an interest in getting such a secretariat to Berlin’.\textsuperscript{319}

In his response, von Staden argued that whereas the Auswärtiges Amt was not in principle against establishing a permanent machinery, such a decision should only be taken further down the road, not before it had been established that Western agenda interests were sufficiently represented at the conference.\textsuperscript{320} Internally, von Staden also expressed his concern at being committed by a premature declaration of willingness to have a possible secretariat in Berlin.\textsuperscript{321} Accompanying von Staden in Washington, von Groll told his interlocutors that the FRG strongly favoured the existing Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) as the forum for post-CSCE discussion on East–West cooperation, rather than any new permanent machinery established by the CSCE.\textsuperscript{322}

But Bahr insisted adamantly on Berlin as a site for the possible permanent body. When the early versions of the cabinet presentation on the CSCE guidelines were discussed within the administration in April 1972, Bahr made sure that the Chancellery expressed its reservations accordingly. In general, the Chancellery admitted that there was widespread resistance in the West against establishing new institutions. Nonetheless, it argued, some commissions with limited mandates could continue their work after the CSCE, and Berlin should be an option for hosting them.\textsuperscript{323} Due to the Chancellery intervention, the option of offering Berlin as a location for a possible follow-up institution was explicitly kept open in the final version of the CSCE guidelines.\textsuperscript{324}
The main problem with the candidacy of Berlin was that the general idea of a permanent follow-up institution of a CSCE had at that time no support at all in the West, neither in the EPC nor in NATO. The allies of the FRG saw a permanent body merely as an opportunity for the Soviet Union to meddle in West European affairs. Faced with this situation, von Staden argued in late May 1972 that it would be senseless to continue insisting on such an institution. Slowly, thus, the Berlin idea began to evaporate from the active CSCE policy of the FRG. The conclusion of the Berlin Agreement also played a role here. In retrospect, Bahr explained that Berlin as a CSCE site would have helped to stabilise the city politically. When the quadripartite agreement entered into force, this need for additional stabilisation receded.

Nonetheless, after a new Soviet proposal in October 1972 the question of a permanent body was suddenly again on the agenda. The Auswärtiges Amt was quick to remark that in return for Eastern concessions in other CSCE areas, the West would probably have to reconsider its position in this issue. Von Staden stressed that the West German attitude towards a permanent body was among the most positive ones in the West – not least due to certain national interests concerning the location of such a follow-up organisation. When the Federal Republic entered the CSCE, the Berlin option continued to be available for use in case it was needed.

Avoiding Bilateralism

As we have seen in this chapter, during the years 1971–72 the West German CSCE policy became a truly multilateral affair, diverging on several separate yet parallel routes. The development of the Western CSCE preparations in this increasingly multilateral direction had obviously served the West Germans well. It gave the FRG the opportunity to approach their allies on the most suitable forum and in the most advantageous constellation, depending on the issue. But although a large amount of West German CSCE policy was issue-driven in this sense, there was also an interesting, overarching line of thinking in Bonn, which saw multilateralism as a value in its own right.

The rapid increase in West German CSCE activity on all multilateral fronts was no coincidence. Towards the end of 1971, the Auswärtiges Amt began to see an inherent value in dealing with European questions on a multilateral level. The essential questions of security and cooperation, such as MBFR, principles of relations between states, and freer movement, were already on the European agenda – with or without a CSCE. Without a CSCE, the risk of a dynamic ‘multiplication of East–West bilateralism’ to
tackle these issues was on the rise. The CSCE was a means to steer and limit this development and replace it with an approach that better suited the West German concept – that of controlled and gradual change, with the necessary degree of adaptation. Interestingly, the White House also made similar calculations on the risks of rising bilateralism in the autumn of 1971. To avoid that development, Helmut Sonnenfeldt recommended that the US should be prepared to take the risks inherent in the CSCE, the conference Sonnenfeldt himself referred to as ‘the entire ghastly affair’.

For the West Germans, the CSCE opened anything but ghastly perspectives. Instead, having to a large extent exhausted its bilateral options to promote détente, aiming at joint solutions was the best way forward. In November 1971, this led to a disagreement with the French about the nature of the NATO study on CSCE negotiation approaches. Whereas the French considered the study to have merely an illustrative character, the FRG insisted on developing a common Alliance position for the conference. France insisted on its view that the SPC could only formulate ‘examples’ of Alliance positions, against the US and West German views calling for genuinely harmonised joint NATO positions.

In January 1972, the US proposed that work should be started on drafting general ‘agenda papers’, combining Allied views on each issue potentially on the CSCE agenda, in order to arrive at common Alliance positions in the CSCE. The FRG considered this to be a time-consuming approach and would rather have seen the SPC directly drafting formal texts of CSCE declarations and agreements, since this would have been a more efficient way towards common positions. As a compromise, the SPC decided to address the open questions with a mix of guideline papers, agenda papers and, where appropriate, specific draft texts of declarations.

West German reservations about the concept of ‘agenda papers’ continued all the way until the spring. In late April, the West Germans maintained their general reserve on all of the agenda papers annexed to the SPC report on the CSCE, because the contents of the more operative guideline papers were still unclear. In fact, the West Germans argued that the NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting in late May should reach agreement on the guideline papers and issue a separate declaration setting out the basic
views of NATO on the CSCE. The British FCO considered this to be ‘a very bad idea’: firstly, since such a document would be considered prematurely as the opening bid of the West at the conference, unnecessarily tying their hands before the negotiations had even started; and secondly, because such an Allied consensus would be extremely difficult to arrive at.\(^{338}\)

In the Auswärtiges Amt, the idea of a separate CSCE declaration of NATO Foreign Ministers was taken seriously. In early May 1972, von Groll drafted a proposal for such a declaration, based on the West German CSCE guidelines soon to be presented to the cabinet. The text of the declaration ran along familiar West German lines, presenting the CSCE as a first step of a long-term development rather than as a static element.\(^{339}\) But in the end, lack of support for such a declaration forced the FRG to give up the idea before the Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Bonn. At the same time, the West Germans also lifted their general reservation on the concept of agenda papers, although maintaining their preference for the adoption of NATO guideline papers, to be seen as binding background documents.\(^{340}\)

The SPC report in May 1972 for the first time raised the idea of a ‘steering brief’ of the Alliance, possibly serving as guidance on tactical considerations in the negotiations.\(^{341}\) The Auswärtiges Amt was enthusiastically in favour of this. For such a steering brief, the West Germans argued, it was important to formulate negotiating positions in a fashion that would represent the essential Western interests while at the same time avoiding counter-productive provocations and confrontations.\(^{342}\) In bilateral contacts with the French, the FRG tried to sell the idea of unified Western positions at the CSCE. From the West German perspective, that was particularly important in the case of the declaration on principles, where a joint draft text, agreed by all NATO members, would be an extremely useful point of reference in the negotiations. If the West were to enter the conference without precise expectations and with conflicting opinions, the whole endeavour would be too risky. ‘We need to agree on a common line to take. In view of the multilateral preparations, we need to be clear on what we can or cannot say’, von Staden argued. But the French were adamant, refusing to agree to binding joint positions, let alone common texts.\(^{343}\)

In late May, Scheel strongly urged his NATO colleagues to work out a common negotiating position for the multilateral CSCE preparations.\(^{344}\) This had become a central characteristic of the West German CSCE approach. Accordingly, when the Auswärtiges Amt in June 1972 listed five operative priorities in the preparation of the multilateral talks, Western coordination, as comprehensively as possible, was on the top of the list. The three following priorities were the usual suspects: a catalogue of principles reflecting the specific Deutschlandpolitik interests of the FRG; milit-
tary aspects of security; and communication and exchange, the by now established euphemism for freer movement. Interestingly, the final point on the list signposted the protection of the role of the European Community at the conference as a particular West German priority.345

The role of the EC, and particularly that of the Commission, had been the subject of a long tug-of-war between the FRG and France in the EPC. In the West German view, East–West cooperation could only be successful if the EC participated in the discussion appropriately from the beginning. Whenever the recommendations and decisions issued by the CSCE touched on EC competences, the Community should be represented by the member state holding the Council Presidency.346 The French stubbornly resisted this for a long time as an excessive signal of communality. Finally, in October 1972 the French indicated willingness for a more constructive approach, as they made a proposal for the CSCE agenda, to be agreed as a common EPC position. For the FRG, this was a breakthrough, testifying to the ability of the EPC to arrive at harmonised positions.347

There were also limits to the West German enthusiasm for the EPC. In September 1972 von Staden stressed that one should not move too many elements of the CSCE preparations to the EPC at the expense of NATO, for a simple reason. ‘Our most important ally is not a member of the Ten.’348 On the other hand, von Groll argued that the CSCE preparations in NATO and in the EPC had had a positive impact on the general nature of the US-West German relationship. ‘The Federal Republic is, more than before, valued by the US as an independent and mature partner and an important member in the EC. … The US increasingly sees the Federal Government as the main representative of its interests within the EC.’349 Indeed, the disagreements over freer movement and the tactical CSCE approach had not prevented the development of a more balanced US-West German partnership within the multilateral framework. Rather, the more assertive West German posture, supported by the role of the FRG as a mediator between the EPC and NATO, had probably contributed to it.

But no amount of West German mediation could erase the inherent tension between the EPC and NATO, which flared up again only a few days before the MPT in Helsinki. The Nine finally found common ground on the CSCE agenda proposed in the latest reports of the sous-comité and the ad hoc group.350 But when the EPC members presented their report to the NATO Council on 17 November, it resulted in very sharp exchanges of opinion, with the non-EPC members arguing that the EPC paper deviated from preceding NATO agreements, particularly in the case of freer movement.351 The EPC was therefore once again a step ahead of NATO. As far as the CSCE agenda went, NATO had to enter the MPT in Helsinki without a consolidated position.
Concerning the ability of NATO to reach common CSCE positions in the autumn of 1972, the first genuine test was the disclaimer text regarding the participation of the GDR. In August, the Bonn Group agreed to attempt to persuade other NATO members also to use the disclaimer language in their responses to the Finnish MPT invitation. In October, this disclaimer text, stating that ‘the acceptance of the invitation or participation does not affect the legal position that [the Government] has hitherto adopted in questions arising out of the special situation in Germany’, was finalised in the Bonn Group and presented to the other NATO allies.

After the Finns had extended their invitations on 9 November, however, the Scandinavian NATO members slipped away from the united front, arguing that a reference to the Finnish memorandum of November 1970 would be sufficient and that a separate disclaimer was not necessary. On 13 November the other NATO members agreed to use the Bonn Group disclaimer in their responses, but Denmark, Norway and Iceland declined to do so. This ended the discussion in NATO. The Federal Republic formally accepted the Finnish invitation on 14 November, naturally including the disclaimer in its response.

The first version of the NATO steering brief for the multilateral preparatory talks and the CSCE was circulated by the SPC on 7 November 1972. This ten-page paper was an operative document, drafted in order to assist the representatives of NATO members in the multilateral negotiations – but only as a guide, not as a rule. The steering brief left a reasonable amount of flexibility and full freedom for national decision-making for each government, but highlighted the importance of close consultation between the Allies during the negotiations.

More specifically, the steering brief listed three positive and five defensive aims for the West at the conference. The positive aims were: (1) securing genuine improvements in reducing the barriers within Europe; (2) achieving appropriate confidence-building measures relating to the levels of armed forces in Europe; and (3) increasing the freedom of manoeuvre of the East European countries by reducing the scope of the Brezhnev Doctrine. The defensive aims, meanwhile, were: (1) maintaining Western unity; (2) avoiding unjustified reactions undermining public support for necessary defence efforts; (3) persuading Western public opinion of the need for caution at the CSCE; (4) frustrating any attempts to slow down Western European integration; and (5) refuting Soviet concepts of peaceful co-existence and of the inapplicability of principles of equality and non-interference to relations between states with different political and social systems.

On the tactics to be used at the multilateral preparations, the steering brief closely followed the West German preference to see the prepara-
tions as ‘a step-by-step process which is controlled by governments at all times and which does not follow a fixed timetable’. As to the agenda of the CSCE, further study in NATO was still needed, but the document pointed out that it was probably to the Western advantage to propose an agenda based on four areas – (1) questions of security; (2) principles governing relations between states; (3) freer movement and cultural relations; and (4) economic and technological cooperation. In the closer elaboration on the security elements, the reference to a joint declaration on MBFR was bracketed, since consensus on that West German pet project had not been achieved. As far as freer movement was concerned, the steering brief argued strongly for maintaining it as a separate agenda item, in addition to its being included in statements of ministers, in the declaration of principles, and in all other appropriate agenda items.359

On 16 November, the NATO Council agreed that the delegations in Helsinki would receive the steering brief as guidance before the Foreign Ministers had discussed it in their December meeting. Moreover, the Council agreed that the coordination of the NATO members’ policies in the MPT would continue not only in Brussels but also on the spot in Helsinki, in an ad hoc ‘open-ended group’.360

On the opening day of the multilateral preparations, the NATO Council convened to discuss the draft declaration on principles. Although a considerable amount of time had been spent on its preparation, numerous disagreements remained.361 The revised version of the draft was circulated on 30 November 1972, superseding the earlier NATO dossiers on principles.362 This version of the NATO draft for a ‘Declaration on guiding principles for relations between the states attending the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe’ still contained several square brackets, but was the closest thing to a common position the Alliance had so far produced in the CSCE context.363 There was still work to do, but in terms of avoiding bilateralism, the West Germans had ample reason for satisfaction.

**Conclusion**

By the autumn of 1971, the time when the CSCE could only be regarded as a Soviet propaganda act was definitely over. Since the conference was inevitably going to take place, the West could no longer just ponder defensive reactions to Warsaw Pact initiatives. The CSCE needed to be filled with substantive content, meeting Western interests. In the year leading to the opening of the MPT in Dipoli in November 1972, this was visible in the mounting preparatory work for the CSCE carried out in the West.
With the momentum for the conference growing, prospects for postponing the conference with unilateral linkages rapidly diminished. Accordingly, the Federal Republic decided to settle for the fulfilment of the final multilaterally agreed Western precondition for the CSCE – the conclusion of the Berlin Agreement. Rather than attempting to establish a further precondition for the conference and insisting on a preceding inner-German agreement, the FRG agreed to adapt its bilateral timetable to the multilateral one. Linkage was no longer an option.

Indeed, the decision-makers in Bonn had come to the conclusion that West German interests were most effectively pursued multilaterally, first within the West in preparation of the CSCE, and ultimately in the conference itself. The idea of the CSCE as a long-term process became a guiding principle of the West German approach to the conference. Instead of using the CSCE for polemics in the hope of short-term gains, the Federal Republic wanted to avoid confrontation and engage in cooperation, hoping for small-scale and long-term improvements, not least in the relationship between the two German states. In addition, the accomplishments of bilateral Ostpolitik had to be defended at the conference. The German question needed to be kept open.

Many of the substantive initiatives the Federal Republic made in the Western conference preparations remained unresolved by the time the CSCE participants convened in Finland in November 1972. Over time, however, all of the essential West German ideas found their way into the Helsinki Final Act. In several ways, then, the CSCE was more than a continuation of Ostpolitik by other means. The multilateral CSCE policy was not suddenly invented after the bilateral treaties had been completed – there had been a West German CSCE policy all along. It had gone through an evolution, focusing first on linkage with bilateral negotiations, then on small substantive steps in East–West cooperation and on defending the West German position in the principles governing relations between states. But the essential aim of the West German CSCE policy was constant: it was there to amplify Ostpolitik.

By the onset of the multilateral preparatory talks and the actual conference, the FRG had established itself as a key player within the West. With effective multilateralism, it could influence the position of the Nine and NATO from within. As we will see in the following chapter, its national interests had by no means disappeared. By contrast, when it came to Deutschlandpolitik-related issues at the CSCE, the FRG was now prepared to defend its interests more assertively than before.
Notes

5. Falin had delivered the invitation to Bahr on 1 Sep; the Federal Government made the Chancellor’s acceptance public on 7 Sep 1971. AAPD 1971, doc 301, von Braun (AA) to von Hase (London), Pauls (Washington), Ruete (Paris), 10 Sep 1971.
10. NARA, NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Box 57, Folder 4, Rush (Bonn) to State, 20 Sep 1971.
12. PAAA, B40, 197, IIA4, 9 Sep 1971.
14. On the Finnish ‘German package’ in more detail, see above all Hentilä, Kaksi Saksaa ja Suomi. The suggestion is documented in ULA 1971.
19. NARA, NSC Files, Box H-187, Folder 5, NSSM-138 [2/2], Vest (US NATO) to State, 10 Sep 1971.
22. PAAA, B40, 189, von Groll and Diesel, 16 Sep 1971. See also NARA, RG 59, Box 1706, Vest (US NATO) to State, 29 Sep 1971.
23. AAPD 1971, doc 303, van Well (AA) to Pauls (Washington), 12 Sep 1971. As noted in Chapter 3, Foreign Minister Scheel made a similar suggestion to Gromyko in October 1970, then implying a link between the UN modalities and the multilateral CSCE preparations.
25. PAAA, B150, 238, von Staden to StS, 23 Sep 1971.
27. PAAA, B150, 239, Pfeffer to Dg II B, von Staden, 7 Oct 1971.
28. TNA, FCO 41/888, Jackling (Bonn) to FCO, 27 Sep 1971.
29. PAAA, B150, 238, Blech (AA) to von Staden (Unogerma), 27 Sep 1971; PAAA, B150, 238, von Staden, Gehlhoff (Unogerma) to Blech (AA), 27 Sep 1971.
30. PAAA, B150, 238, Blech (AA) to von Staden (Unogerma), 27 Sep 1971; PAAA, B150, 238, von Staden, Gehlhoff (Unogerma) to Blech (AA), 27 Sep 1971.
32. Brandt, Begegnungen und Einsichten, 510.
37. PAAA, B40, 184, 2 Nov 1971; PAAA, B130, 8040, cabinet meeting, 3 Nov 1971.
41. TNA, FCO 41/892, Audland (Bonn) to James (FCO), 27 Oct 1971. See also NARA, RG 59, Box 1707, Rush (Bonn) to State, 5 Nov 1971.
47. TNA, FCO 41/893, Soames (Paris) to FCO, 17 Nov 1971.
48. TNA, FCO 41/892, Soames (Paris) to FCO, 18 Nov 1971.
52. NARA, NSC Files, Box H-63, Folder 1, SRG Meeting, November 22, 1971, European Security Conference (NSSM 138), Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, 18 Nov 1971.
53. NARA, NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Box 24, Folder 1, Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, 5 Sep 1972.
54. NARA, RG 59, Box 3148, Vest (US NATO) to State, 19 Nov 1971; PAAA, B150, 243, Frank (AA) to Scheel (Moscow), 26 Nov 1971; NARA, Nixon Materials, NSC Files, H-Files, Box H-32, Folder 6, NSC Meeting, CES/MBFR (NATO Ministerial), 12/1/71, HAK Talking Points, 1 Dec 1971; NARA, NSC Files, Box H-32, Folder 6, NSC Meeting, CES/MBFR (NATO Ministerial), 12/1/71, NSSM 138, 1 Dec 1971.
55. NARA, RG 59, Box 3148, Vest (US NATO) to State, 25 Nov 1971.
56. PAAA, B150, 243, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 30 Nov 1971.
57. PAAA, B40, 187, von Groll, 24 Nov 1971. For an earlier reference to von Groll in favour of a more flexible take on the Berlin precondition, see NARA, RG 59, Box 1707, Rush (Bonn) to State, 5 Nov 1971.
58. NARA, RG 59, Box 3148, Vest (US NATO) to State, 25 Nov 1971; NARA, RG 59, Box 1707, Rush (Bonn) to State, 26 Nov 1971; NARA, NSC Files, Box H-187, Folder 5, NSSM-138 [2/2], REUS-42, 3 Dec 1971.
60. TNA, FCO 41/894, Jackling (Bonn) to FCO, 4 Dec 1971.
61. AAPD 1971, doc 422, Pauls (Washington) to AA, meeting Frank-Hillenbrand, 29 Nov 1971.
62. For a convincing US analysis of this domestic German element, see NARA, NSC Files, Box H-187, Folder 5, NSSM-138 [2/2], REUS-42, 3 Dec 1971.

63. PAAA, B150, 244, von Staden to Scheel, 1 Dec 1971; PAAA, B150, 243, von Staden to Scheel, 30 Nov 1971.

64. NARA, NSC Files, Box H-187, Folder 5, NSSM-138 [2/2], REUS-42, 3 Dec 1971.

65. PAAA, B150, 244, van Well (AA) to Natogerma, 2 Dec 1971.

66. See Gill Bennet’s comment in DBPO III/I, 426.

67. TNA, FCO 41/894, Peck (UK NATO) to FCO, 3 Dec 1971.

68. NARA, RG 59 Box 1707, Vest (US NATO) to State, 1 Dec 1971; PAAA, B150, 243, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 30 Nov 1971. See also NARA, RG 59, Box 1707, Watson (Paris) to State, 7 Dec 1971.


70. NARA, RG 59, Box 3148, Rogers to Nixon, 10 Dec 1971.

71. PAAA, B40, 193, von Staden to Frank, 16 Dec 1971.

72. PAAA, B150, 245, Pauls (Washington) to AA, 19 Dec 1971.


74. PA-DBT, 3104 6/3, Prot. 52, 16 Dec 1971.

75. PAAA, B150, 245, Hase (London) to AA, 22 Dec 1971; see also AAPD 1971, doc 452, Sahm, meeting Brandt-Nixon, 29 Dec 1971.

76. ACDP, Nachlass Marx (I-356), K034/2, Marx, 24 Jan 1972.

77. VdDB VI/171, 23 Feb 1972, 9787, 9792.


79. PAAA, B150, 244, Diesel to von Staden, 7 Dec 1971.

80. PAAA, B40, 193, Diesel, 15 Dec 1971; NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 1707, Cash (Bonn) to State, 17 Dec 1971; TNA, FCO 41/894, Statham (Bonn) to FCO, 16 Dec 1971; PAAA, B28, 109307, Diesel to von Staden, 6 Jan 1972; BArch, B136, 6419 (3), Diesel to Natogerma and other embassies, 17 Jan 1972.

81. TNA, FCO 41/1037, Lever (UK NATO) to Ramsey (FCO), 24 Jan 1972.

82. TNA, FCO 41/1039, Hibbert (Bonn) to Brimelow (FCO), 7 Feb 1972; NARA, RG 59, Box 1708, Rogers (State) to US NATO, Bonn, and other embassies, 8 Feb 1972; TNA, FCO 41/1052, Hibbert (Bonn) to FCO, 9 Feb 1972.


84. TNA, FCO 41/1041, Jackling (Bonn) to FCO, 17 Mar 1972.


86. NARA, RG 59, Box 1708, Cash (Bonn) to State, 21 Mar 1972.

87. NARA, RG 59, Box 1708, Cash (Bonn) to State, 27 Mar 1972.

88. TNA, FCO 41/1070, Jackling (Bonn) to FCO and UK NATO, 10 Apr 1972; see also DBPO III/I, doc 8, Braithwaite (FCO) to Allan (Luxembourg), 25 Apr 1972.

89. To be precise, in the final version of the guidelines the prerequisite was ‘an agreed date for the signature’. AAPD 1972, doc 138, 18 May 1972; PAAA, B150, 253, Scheel to Ehmke, 25 Apr 1972.

90. TNA, FCO 41/969, Thomson (UK NATO) to Tickell (FCO), 19 May 1972.


92. Suomi (ed.), Urho Kekkosen päiväkirjat, 258 (Kekkonen’s diary entry on 31 May 1972).

94. TNA, FCO 4/1/69, Jackling (Bonn) to FCO, 30 May 1972.

95. AAPD 1971, doc 442, Scheel (Helsinki) to AA, 14 Dec 1971. See also PAAA, B150, 240, Blech to von Well and von Staden, 28 Oct 1971; NARA, RG 59, Box 2264, Folder 4, Vest (US NATO) to State, 8 Nov 1971.


98. Suomi, Taistelu puolueettomuudesta, 653.


100. UMA, 7B, 11.3, Bilateraaliset keskustelut, Karppinen, 16 Mar 1972.

101. PAAA, B28, 109295, Bazing to planning staff, 26 June 1972.


103. PAAA, B150, 259, von Staden to Frank, 26 July 1972.

104. PAAA, B150, 261, D. Scheel (Helsinki) to AA, 18 Aug 1972.


107. Author’s interview with Bahr. See also Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit, 397; Kilian, Die Hallstein-Doktrin, 355.


110. AAPD 1972, doc 184, van Well to embassies, 26 June 1972.

111. BArch, B136, 6420, Hauber (Helsinki) to AA, 21 July 1972; PAAA, B150, 259, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 25 July 1972.

112. PAAA, B28, 109310, Bazing to Diesel, 4 Aug 1972.


117. PAAA, B150, 262, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 6 Sep 1972.

118. PAAA, B150, 262, van Well (AA) to Natogerma, 7 Sep 1972; PAAA, B150, 262, Hillger, 14 Sep 1972.

119. PAAA, B150, 262, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 8 Sep 1972.

120. AAPD 1972, doc 272, van Well (AA) to Natogerma, 13 Sep 1972.

121. PAAA, B150, 263, Derix, 20 Sep 1972.

122. TNA, FCO 4/1/47, Thomson (UK NATO) to FCO, 14 Sep 1972.


124. AAPD 1972, doc 366, Frank (AA) to Helsinki, 6 Nov 1972.

125. PAAA, B150, 267, von Staden (AA) to Helsinki, 14 Nov 1972.

126. Author’s interview with Bräutigam. See DzD VI/2.

127. AAPD 1971, doc 303, van Well (AA) to Pauls, 10 Sep 1971 (sent on 12 Sep 1971).


130. TNA, FCO 4/1/41, Jackling (Bonn) to FCO, 17 Mar 1972. In fact, the Oslo speech was built around a variety of concepts. In addition to the ‘European peace pact’ Brandt also spoke about the ‘European peace order’, a ‘European partnership for peace’ and even a possible ‘European peace alliance’ (Friedensbund). BWBS, ‘Friedenspolitik in unserer Zeit’, Brandt’s speech in Oslo, 11 Dec 1971.
133. PAAA, B21, 744, von Staden (AA) to embassies, 24 Sep 1971.
135. PAAA, B20, 1601, IIIIE1, 2 Nov 1971.
137. NARA, RG59 (1970–73), Box 1706, Vest (US NATO) to State, 22 Oct 1971.
139. PAAA, B130, 9778, Rüete (Paris) to AA, 15 Nov 1971.
140. PAAA, B150, 241, van Well (AA) to Natogerma, 3 Nov 1971.
141. PAAA, B20, 1601, Trumpf, 11 Nov 1971.
142. PAAA, B40, 184, IIA3, 2 Nov 1971.
143. PAAA, B20, 1601, Herbst, 3 Nov 1971.
144. PAAA, B150, 242, von Groll and Dahlhoff, 18 Nov 1971.
146. PAAA, B150, 237, Diesel (AA) to Natogerma, 6 Sep 1971; NARA, RG 59, Box 2264, Folder 3, Vest (US NATO) to State, 8 Sep 1971.
148. NARA, RG 59, Box 1706, Vest (US NATO) to State, 7 Sep 1971.
149. NARA, RG 59, Box 1706, Rush (Bonn) to State, 16 Sep 1971. For Rogers's instructions, see NARA, RG 59, Box 1706, Rogers (State) to Bonn, 16 Sep 1971.
150. PAAA, B150, 238, IIA3, 17 Sep 1971; AAPD 1971, doc 313, Diesel (AA) to Natogerma, 17 Sep 1971.
151. TNA, FCO 41/897, German Delegation, 21 Sep 1971; NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 2264, Folder 3, Vest (US NATO) to State, 24 Sep 1971.
152. NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 2264, Folder 3, Vest (US NATO) to State, 24 Sep 1971.
153. NARA, RG 59, Box 1706, Cash (Bonn) to State, 14 Oct 1971.
154. PAAA, B150, 238, Boss (Natogerma) to AA, 29 Sep 1971; NARA, RG 59, Box 2264, Folder 3, Vest (US NATO) to State, 29 Sep 1971.
156. NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 2264, Folder 3, Vest (US NATO) to State, 14 Oct 1971.
158. NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 1707, Vest (US NATO) to State, 12 Nov 1971.
162. PAAA, B150, 243, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 24 Nov 1971; PAAA, B150, 243, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 26 Nov 1971; NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 3148, Vest (US NATO) to State, 29 Nov 1971; TNA, FCO 41/894, Peck (UK NATO) to FCO, 29 Nov 1971.
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165. PAAA, B150, 245, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 21 Dec 1971.
167. AAPD 1971, doc 422, Pauls (Washington) to AA, meeting Frank-Hillenbrand, 29 Nov 1971.
168. See Chapter 4 for the idea which the CSCE unit at the Auswärtiges Amt had briefly tossed around a year earlier, of developing a small consultation mechanism for the EPC work on the CSCE, resembling the Bonn Group.
172. Author’s interview with Klaus Blech, 20 Dec 2003.
173. PAAA, B150, 237, von Groll to Dg IIA, IIA1, 13 Sep 1971.
177. NARA, RG59 (1970–73), Box 1706, Rush (Bonn) to State, 29 Oct 1971; TNA, FCO 41/891, Bayne (Bonn) to Ramsey (FCO), 30 Oct 1971.
181. NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 1707, Rush (Bonn) to State, 16 Nov 1971.
185. PAAA, B150, 244, Blech (AA) to Natogerma, 1 Dec 1971; PAAA, B150, 244, van Well (AA) to Natogerma, 3 Dec 1971.
186. AAPD 1971, doc 426, Roth, meeting Frank-Kissinger, 1 Dec 1971.
188. PAAA, B130, 8404, cabinet meeting, 3 Nov 1971.
189. PAAA, B40, 184, IIA3, 2 Nov 1971.
191. PAAA, B150, 244, 3 Dec 1971. Peter Becker has also correctly identified this as an important turning point. He attributes the initiative to State Secretary Frank, who was not present in this particular meeting, which was held during Frank’s visit to Washington. Becker, Die frühe KSZE-Politik, 150–1.
192. PAAA, B150, 244, von Staden to DgIIA, IIA3, 3 Dec 1971.
193. PAAA, B28, 109306, von Groll (AA) to Natogerma, 31 Jan 1972; NARA, RG 59, Box 1707, Goodby (US NATO) to State, 1 Feb 1972.
194. NATOA, AC/119-R(72)9, 9 Feb 1972; NARA, RG 59, Box 1707, Goodby (US NATO) to State, 4 Feb 1972.
195. NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 1708, Vest (US NATO) to State, 8 Feb 1972.
196. NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 1707, Goodby (US NATO) to State, 4 Feb 1972.
197. BArch, B136, 6419, Bd. 3, Poensgen, 23 Feb 1972. For a comprehensive list of EPC working papers, see TNA, FCO 41/1053, 25 Aug 1972.
198. TNA, FCO 41/1040, Thomson (UK NATO) to Tickell (FCO), 18 Feb 1972.
199. TNA, FCO 41/1052, Braithwaite to Tickell, 1 Mar 1972.
200. TNA, FCO 41/1070, Tickell (FCO) to Audland (Bonn), 6 Mar 1972. Admittedly, the US State Department had also set up an inter-agency task force on the CSCE already in late 1971. NARA, NSC H-Files, Box H-229, Folder 4, NSDM-142, Rogers to Nixon, 22 Dec 1971.
201. TNA, FCO 41/1052, Braithwaite to Tickell, 1 Mar 1972. See also TNA, FCO 41/1041, Jackling (Bonn) to FCO, 17 Mar 1972.
202. TNA, FCO 41/1043, Braithwaite (FCO) to Humphries (Ministry of Defence), 26 Apr 1972; TNA, FCO 41/1041, Jackling (Bonn) to FCO, 17 Mar 1972.
203. Author’s interview with Braithwaite.
205. PAAA, B28, 109292, Fischer (BK-Amt) to IIA3 (AA), 29 Mar 1972.
206. BArch, B136, 6419, Bd. 3, Weinstock and Fischer to ALII, ALIV, Focke, Bahr and Ehmke, 17 Apr 1972.
207. PAAA, B28, 109292, Diesel to von Groll, 21 Mar 1972.
208. PAAA, B150, 253, Scheel to Ehmke, 25 Apr 1972.
211. AAPD 1972, doc 138, 18 May 1972. The working group was convened in September 1972, see PAAA, B150, 262, Hillger, 14 Sep 1972.
212. PAAA, B150, 254, Scheel to Ehmke, 9 May 1972.
217. ACDP, I-555, 008/1, Kliesing to Barzel, 30 May 1972. For Kliesing’s discussions about the CSCE in Washington in June 1972, see ACDP, I-555, 007/1, Kliesing, 4 July 1972. More generally, see also Clemens, Reluctant Realists.
221. PAAA, B28, 109306, von Groll (AA) to Natogerma, 31 Jan 1972; NARA, RG 59, Box 1707, Goodby (US NATO) to State, 1 Feb 1972.
222. PAAA, B28, 109306, von Groll (AA) to Natogerma, 31 Jan 1972; NARA, RG 59, Box 1707, Goodby (US NATO) to State, 1 Feb 1972.


225. NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 1709, Cash (Bonn) to State, 26 Apr 1972.


228. NATOA, C-M(72)24(Revised), Volume One, Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 16 May 1972.

229. PAAA, B150, 254, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 12 May 1972; NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 1709, Vest (USNATO) to State, 12 May 1972. See also AAPD 1972, doc 133, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 12 May 1972; NATOA, PO/72/331, 19 May 1972.


231. PAAA, B150, 256, Bazing to Dg II A, von Diesel, 12 June 1972.

232. NARA, RG 59, Box 1710, Kennedy (US NATO) to State, 7 July 1972.

233. AAPD 1972, doc 201, van Well (AA) to Sonnenhof (Ankara) and von Mirbach (Ottawa), 12 July 1972; NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 1710, Hillenbrand (Bonn) to State, 17 July 1972.

234. BArch, B136, 6419 (3), Trumpf, 14 Jan 1972.

235. AAPD 1972, doc 42, Boss (Natogerma) to AA, 22 Feb 1972. One of Kissinger’s aides later complained to the author that the increased EPC coordination made the Europeans extremely inflexible. ‘It was a cumbersome business. Sometimes it felt that it was easier to negotiate with the Soviets.’ Author’s interview with Helmut Sonnenfeldt, 22 Mar 2005.


237. Author’s interview with Jacques Andreani, 7 June 2004.


239. PAAA, B28, 109307, Diesel to von Staden, 28 Mar 1972.

240. PAAA, B21, 746, von Groll to IIA1, IA7, 24 July 1972.


246. PAAA, B150, 254, Scheel to Ehmke, 9 May 1972, Anlage I.

247. BArch, B136, 6419, Bd. 3, von Groll, 15 May 1972; PAAA, B130, 8405, cabinet meeting, 16 May 1972. See also Haftendorn, Sicherheit und Entspannung, 437–9; Müller, Politik und Bürokratie, 300.


249. PAAA, B150, 251, Ruth to Dg II A, von Staden, 22 Mar 1972.

250. NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 1709, Cash (Bonn) to State, 18 Apr 1972.

251. NATOA, C-M(72)24(Revised), Volume One, Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 16 May 1972.

252. AAPD 1972, doc 133, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 12 May 1972.
253. NARA, RG 59, Box 3149, Rogers (Bonn) to State, 30 May 1972; TNA, FCO 41/969, Jack-ling (Bonn) to FCO, 30 May 1972.
259. AAPD 1972, doc 189, Roth to van Well, Frank, 27 June 1972.
262. PAAA, B40, 184, IIA3, 29 Nov 1971.
263. PAAA, B150, 244, IIA3, 13 Dec 1971; PAAA, B1, 516, IIA3, 10 Jan 1972.
264. NARA, RG 59, Box 1707, Rush (Bonn) to State, 22 Jan 1972.
265. PAAA, B28, 109307, Diesel to von Staden, 6 Jan 1972.
267. TNA, FCO 41/1052, Allan (Luxembourg) to FCO, 29 Feb 1972; PAAA, B21, 744, CSCE (72) 6 P.
268. NATOA, AC/119-R(72)9, 9 Feb 1972; NARA, RG 59, Box 1707, Goodby (US NATO) to State, 4 Feb 1972.
269. NARA, RG 59, Box 1708, Cash (Bonn) to State, 9 Mar 1972.
272. TNA, FCO 41/1039, Hibbert (Bonn) to Brimelow (FCO), 7 Feb 1972.
273. TNA, FCO 41/1070, Hibbert (Bonn) to Wiggins (FCO), 5 Apr 1972.
274. TNA, FCO 41/1043, Hibbert (Bonn) to Tickell (FCO), 17 Apr 1972.
275. EA 5/1972, Paul Frank, ‘Zielsetzungen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Rahmen europäischer Sicherheitsverhandlungen’; see also TNA, FCO 41/1043, Hibbert (Bonn) to Tickell (FCO), 18 Apr 1972.
276. TNA, FCO 41/1070, Hibbert (Bonn) to Wiggins (FCO), 5 Apr 1972.
277. PAAA, B150, 251, IIA4, von Staden to Frank, 16 Mar 1972.
282. NARA, RG 59, Box 1708, Earle (US NATO) to State, 31 Mar 1972; TNA, FCO 28/1679, Thomson (UK NATO) to Hibbert (Bonn), 30 Mar 1972; TNA, FCO 41/1042, Thomson (UK NATO) to FCO, 5 Apr 1972; TNA, FCO 41/1042, Thomson (UK NATO) to FCO, 8 Apr 1972.
283. TNA, FCO 28/1679, Staples (UK NATO) to Fall (FCO), 30 Mar 1972.
284. TNA, FCO 28/1679, Thomson (UK NATO) to Hibbert (Bonn), 30 Mar 1972; TNA, FCO 28/1679, Tickell (FCO) to Hibbert (Bonn), 5 Apr 1972.
285. NARA, RG 59, Box 1709, Cash (Bonn) to State, 22 Apr 1972.
286. TNA, FCO 28/1679, Note by the German Delegation (NATO), 7 Apr 1972. In the German archives, the same document is in PAAA, B28, 109310. See also NARA, RG 59, Box 1709, Kennedy (US NATO) to State, 12 Apr 1972.
287. NATOA, AC/119-R(72)31, 10 April 1972.
288. PAAA, B150, 253, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 25 Apr 1972; NATOA, C-R(72)20, 12 May 1972.
289. PAAA, B150, 253, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 25 Apr 1972.
291. NARA, RG 59, Box 1709, Cash (Bonn) to State, 22 Apr 1972.
292. NARA, RG 59, Box 1709, Rogers (State) to Bonn, 27 Apr 1972.
293. NARA, RG 59, Box 1709, Cash (Bonn) to State, 4 May 1972.
297. PAAA, B150, 254, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 12 May 1972; NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 1709, Vest (US NATO) to State, 12 May 1972; See also AAPD 1972, doc 133, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 12 May 1972; NATOA, C-M(72)24(Revised), Volume One, Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 16 May 1972; NATOA, PO/72/331, Secretary General to Permanent Representatives, 19 May 1972.
298. NATOA, C-M(72)24(Revised), Volume One, Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 16 May 1972.
300. NARA, NSC Files, President’s Trip Files, Box 482, Folder 5, 18 May 1972; NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 3148, RES-34, 22 May 1972.
301. NARA, RG 59, Box 3148, Rogers (State) to US NATO, 19 May 1972; PAAA, B150, 255, Bazing to von Grll, Diesel, von Staden, 23 May 1972.
302. NARA, RG 59, Box 3149, Rogers (Bonn) to State, 30 May 1972; TNA, FCO 41/969, Jackling (Bonn) to FCO, 30 May 1972.
303. NARA, NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Box 24, Folder 2, Klein (Berlin) to State, 12 Sep 1972.
304. NATOA, C-M(72)67, Steering Brief for the Multilateral Preparatory Talks and the CSCE, 7 Nov 1972.
305. The story on the seating order is covered in the next chapter. For that, and especially for the role of language, see also Spohr Readman, ‘National Interests’.
307. NARA, RG59 (1970–73), Box 1705, Rogers (State) to US NATO, 24 Mar 1971.
308. NARA, RG59 (1970–73), Box 1706, Rogers (State) to Bonn, 21 Apr 1971; NARA, RG59 (1970–73), Box 1706, Rush (Bonn) to State, 4 May 1971.
310. AAPD 1971, doc 211, meeting Bahr-Hillenbrand, 16 June 1971; NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 2289, Rogers (State) to Bonn, 19 June 1971.


312. PAAA, B150, 240, Blomeyer (Paris) to AA, 20 Oct 1971. Grabert was apparently not aware of the Bonn Group history of the idea, since he underlined to Schumann that Paris was the first capital to be consulted about this.


314. PAAA, B150, 241, Blech to van Well and and von Staden, 3 Nov 1971.

315. PAAA, B150, 241, von Groll to Diesel, van Well, von Staden, 8 Nov 1971. In his handwritten comments on the paper, van Well argued that the development of this idea should be put on hold until ‘our programme (Berlin, FRG-GDR, CSE) is more advanced’. If put into practice immediately, van Well went on, it would only cause ‘unnecessary turbulence’.


318. BArch, B136, 6419, Bd. 3, Dröge to GL II/1, AL II, StS, 2 Mar 1972; BArch, B136, 6419, Bd. 3, Dröge to GL II/1, AL II, StS, 10 Mar 1972. See also NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 1709, Irwin (State) to Bonn, US NATO, 7 Apr 1972.


322. NARA, RG 59, Box 1708, Irwin (State) to Bonn, US NATO, 24 Mar 1972.

323. BArch, B136, 6419, Bd. 3, Weinstock and Fischer to ALII, ALIV, Focke, Bahr and Ehmke, 17 Apr 1972.


325. PAAA, B130, 9778, von Staden to Frank, Scheel, 23 May 1972.


327. PAAA, B150, 265, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 12 Oct 1972.


331. NARA, NSC H-Files, Box H-63, Folder 1, Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, 18 Nov 1971.


333. PAAA, B150, 243, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 24 Nov 1971; PAAA, B150, 243, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 26 Nov 1971; NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 3148, Vest (US NATO) to State, 29 Nov 1971; TNA, FCO 41/894, Peck (UK NATO) to FCO, 29 Nov 1971.


335. NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 1707, Vest (US NATO) to State, 12 Jan 1972.

336. NATOA, 16-1-01/1, AC/119-R(72)4, 25 Jan 1972.

337. NATOA, AC/119-R(72)37, 20 Apr 1972.

338. TNA, FCO 41/969, Lever (UK NATO) to Braithwaite (FCO), 27 Apr 1972; TNA, FCO 41/969, Braithwaite to Tickell, 28 Apr 1972.

340. PAAA, B150, 254, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 12 May 1972; NARA, RG 59 (1970–73), Box 1709, Vest (US NATO) to State, 12 May 1972.
341. NATOA, C-M(72)24(Revised), Volume One, Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 16 May 1972.
343. PAAA, B150, 255, Hansen to Dg I A, von Staden, 30 May 1972.
344. NARA, RG 59, Box 3149, Rogers (Bonn) to State, 30 May 1972; TNA, FCO 41/969, Jackling (Bonn) to FCO, 30 May 1972.
345. PAAA, B28, 109295, Bazing, 12 June 1972.
348. PAAA, B150, 262, Hillger, 14 Sep 1972. The reference to ‘the Ten’ counts in Norway, which in the end did not join the EC.
349. PAAA, B28, 109300, von Groll to Dg21, D2, 19 Oct 1972.
350. PAAA, B150, 268, Lindemann, 20 Nov 1972; TNA, FCO 30/1254, CP(72)57(rev), 9 Nov 1972. See also Möckli, European Foreign Policy, 64–68.
352. PAAA, B150, 261, van Well (AA) to embassies, 17 Aug 1972.
354. PAAA, B150, 267, Boss (Natogerma) to AA, 10 Nov 1972.
355. PAAA, B150, 267, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 13 Nov 1972.
356. PAAA, B150, 267, von Staden (AA) to Helsinki, 14 Nov 1972.
357. NATOA, C-M(72)67, Steering Brief for the Multilateral Preparatory Talks and the CSCE, 7 Nov 1972.
358. NATOA, C-M(72)67, Steering Brief for the Multilateral Preparatory Talks and the CSCE, 7 Nov 1972.
359. NATOA, C-M(72)67, Steering Brief for the Multilateral Preparatory Talks and the CSCE, 7 Nov 1972.
360. PAAA, B150, 268, Krapf (Natogerma) to AA, 16 Nov 1972; NATOA, PO/72/423, Secretary General to Permanent Representatives, 30 Nov 1972.
361. NATOA, C-R(72)57, meeting of the Council held on 22 Nov 1972, 8 Dec 1972.
362. NATOA, PO/72/423, Secretary General to Permanent Representatives, 30 Nov 1972.
363. NATOA, C-M(72)72(Revised), Draft Declaration on Guiding Principles for Relations between the States Attending the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 30 Nov 1972.