Although the title of this collective project refers to “shared spaces,” we are for the most part discussing places rather than spaces when we talk of the social aspects of cohabitation and/or antagonism. Places in this context are lived-in spaces or, in more academic terms, sites of inhabitation, while space denotes an area, of general or unlimited extent, indifferently providing the physical setting for such places; hence the Oxford English Dictionary notes that “place” is “a space that can be occupied ... a particular spot or area inhabited or frequented by people; a city, a town, a village.” Spaces are far more easily “shared” than places, if sharing is the correct term to use when referring to coexisting in contiguous space. When suitably organized, entities can move past and around each other in space without effecting significant contact. Movement in shared places, however, entails negotiation, commensality, and at times conflict insofar as persons occupying place not only coexist with each other but are very much aware of the fact of that coexistence. In Michael Sorkin’s fascinating discussion of “traffic” in Giving Ground: The Politics of Propinquity we see a modernist mode of organization that channels persons and vehicles into nonintersecting pathways in order to give priority to unimpeded flow at the expense of relations between entities moving across the same terrain. Counterposed to this Sorkin shows us a more traditional setting in which flow is impeded by repeated intersection and the necessary and mutually aware sharing of place:
and other movement technologies clarify relations between classes of vehicles for the sake of efficient flow. ... The result is a city altogether different from the older Indian cities with their indigenous styles of motion. ... Typically Indian traffic is completely mixed up, a slow-moving mass of cows and pedicabs, motor-rickshaws, trucks and buses, camels and people on foot, the antithesis of "efficient" separation. Motion through this sluggish maelstrom does not proceed so much by absolute right as through a continuing process of local negotiation for the right of passage. (Sorkin 1999: 2)

In the latter case we are shown not only a space occupied by persons and entities but a place in which those inhabiting the terrain are linked together by what he terms "a primal rite of giving ground ... the deference to one's neighbour that urban existence daily demands" (Ibid.). Here, rather than a skein of distinct and mutually disengaged pathways encompassed within a common space we see a place inhabited by a diversity of persons and objects, shared through processes of mutual recognition and accommodation.

I would like to look further at this issue of "giving ground" in the context of shared holy places in the post-Ottoman Mediterranean so as to evaluate how such places are shared, what sorts of situations support that sharing and what sorts of events or developments disrupt it. Sylvaine Bulle's chapter, in this volume, investigates neighborhood and the way that within a neighborhood a multitude of different groups of people are tied together into a community by networks that variously engage them as individuals and groups. Foregrounded by her examination of how shared practices of being in a neighborhood enable both the recognition of the difference of others and the framing of that difference as something beneficial rather than problematic is the issue of whether we can see local communities, and the set of relations that constitute them, as forms of what Bourdieu called habitus. Bourdieu, in the rather dense terminology of his Logic of Practice, writes that

> [t]he conditionings associated with a particular class of conditions of existence produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary to attain them. (Bourdieu 1990 [orig. 1980]: 53)

Practices of interaction and negotiation of place experienced through living in a community imprint themselves in individuals as preconscious
dispositions to act, and interpret, in the future in accordance with those earlier experiences. A person’s dispositions are neither habits nor consciously applied rules but tacit knowledge, often embodied, learned through the “prestigious imitation ... [of] actions which have succeeded and which he has seen successfully performed by people in whom he has confidence and who have authority over him” (Mauss 1979 [orig. 1935]: 101). As Mauss, and Bourdieu after him, make clear, it is this process of internalizing social practices (actions, interpretations, self-presentations) that imposes the social on the individual and that, in effect, maps the neighborhood—and its modes of incorporating and negotiating with internal difference—onto the selves who traverse it. “Giving ground,” recognizing the right of the Other to be in the same place as oneself as well as committing to the rites of negotiating her presence, is a core element of the habitus of neighborhood.

Two ethnographic studies, one on South India and one on the North, exemplify the ways neighborhoods constituted by nominally distinct religious communities (communities that are elsewhere mutually antagonistic) are able to share place peacefully. The first text, Jackie Assayag’s At the Confluence of Two Rivers—Muslims and Hindus in South India (2004), discusses what might be called a situational syncretism whereby Muslims and Hindus are able to celebrate at each others’ religious festivals because, in the course of the communities living together for nearly a millennium, cultural elements that might have in the past been the exclusive properties of distinct communities have become part of an annual cycle of neighborhood practices and thus, in effect, common property:

The religion of Mohammed insinuated itself very gradually in a Hindu environment already segmented by numerous castes, sects and local traditions. This mixture of discreet elements gave rise to many subtle and complex forms of acculturation caused by alteration, addition, superimposition and innovation, which vary from region to region. So by absorbing elements that were no longer either strictly Hindu or Muslim, but may have been the result of an earlier assimilation, these cultural forms allowed movement between systems of action and representation that seemed to be mutually exclusive. (Assayag 2004: 41)

Anna Bigelow’s Sharing the Sacred: Practicing Pluralism in Muslim North India (Bigelow 2010; see also Bowman 2013) treats a seemingly more conscious process of intercommunal cohabitation in the town of Malerkotla, located in the Punjab, a far more conflicted region than Assayag’s Karnataka. Bigelow notes that the town’s cultivated tolerance
might be seen as a response to Malerkotlan residents’ horror of the sectarian cleansing that afflicted the Punjab during Partition (as well as of the violence of subsequent sectarian riots that have taken place in the region over the past few decades) leading to their recognition that “all religious groups are in some regard vulnerable … [making them] cognizant that their wellbeing depends on their positive relations with others” (Bigelow 2010: 10). She, however, demonstrates fulsomely that overt intercommunalism is very much grounded on the town’s “practice of everyday pluralism” (Ibid.: 217) and is a projection of “the vibrant community life in the streets and homes and shrines of a locale” (Ibid.: 223). In each case the “cultural property” of one sectarian community is seen by members of adjacent communities as theirs as well, not because they wish to appropriate it but because, via a process of living with the “owners” of the property and engaging with them in their quotidian lives, that property and the practices surrounding it have come to be seen as common. Whereas in some cases, such as those described by Assayag, sharing is for the most part unconscious because the traces of the ownership of significant elements of cultural property have been effaced by time, in others, as in Bigelow’s Malerkotla, practices of mutual engagement in religious festivals and shrine worship are conscious moves to affirm community solidarities across sectarian borders. In both instances, however, sharing in religious celebrations and festivities is an extension of the *habitus* of a shared communal life.3

This is not, of course, to say that an identical “script” of community response is instilled in all the community’s members by their participation in a neighborhood. While the term “disposition” suggests a tendency to interpret situations and act in response to them in certain ways familiar from past engagements with similar events, Bourdieu’s work, like Mauss’ before it, makes clear that there is “play” in the system of application allowing for accommodating specificities of context, of individuality, and of intention. A disposition is a proclivity rather than an imperative. Part of what accounts for the lability of persons’ responses in communities in general and mixed communities in particular is the multitude of identities at play in any individual’s experience of everyday life. The concept of “situational identities”4 enables us to recognize a multitude of identity contexts existing in even the least complex of societies, and when a community creates complexity to the extent of encompassing multiple ethnic and/or religious identities, the opportunities for a proliferation of identity strategies expands commensurately. At different moments of interaction within the community, different dispositions will be called to the fore. Thus in one instance you might be working with someone as a coworker or in an employee-employer relation whereas in another,
sometimes even contiguous with the first, you might be called on to rep-
resent a family or a religious denomination. Each of these situations will
call on distinct dispositions and may in fact call for enunciating those
dispositions in ways that improvise on previous enactments. What is
important to stress is that none of these enacted identities are primary
other than in situations—some of which will be elaborated below—in
which the primacy of one of those identities is staged as more import-
ant than, and either subsuming or obviating, others. Recognition of the
situatedness of identity articulations allows us to understand the ways
numerous linkages can be made between diverse persons within a com-
community, but also to see that certain events or developments might render
previously amenable identities incommensurate and thus conflictual.

Nonetheless investigation of the character of neighborhood bonds
resonates with Bigelow’s investigation of Malerkotla’s “daily work of
community maintenance” (2010: 122) and indicates that in most in-
stances communities will seek to perpetuate communal cohesion. The
concept of *habitus* makes clear that the degree to which people are who
they are is a consequence of the appropriateness of their learned dispo-
sitions to settings the same as, or not unlike, those in which they im-
bued those dispositions. Radical reworkings of those settings—either
through intercommunal conflict and separation or through migration or
exile—threaten selfhood. There are, of course, circumstances that bring
about the fragmentation of communities, but these often come about
through external influences that, through direct action or the indirect
impact of rumors or propaganda, create distrust and antagonism be-
tween elements of the community (compare Tone Bringa’s film *We Are
All Neighbours* [Bringa 1993]). Left to its own devices a community will
not only celebrate its social arrangement as natural and *heimlich* (home-
like) but may, as in the instances described by Marcel Mauss in his study
of magic, imagine the domain of its everyday life as knitted together by
a skein of connections defying scientific conceptions of cause and effect
and allowing efficacy at a distance through the manipulation of objects
or settings associated via contiguity, similarity, or opposition (see Mauss
1972 [orig. 1950]). Here persons, powers, and things associated in ev-
eryday experience are seen as connected even when literally apart. For
Mauss magic works by laying over the place of the everyday a distort-
ing mirror that not only draws together diffuse elements but also allows
power to operate across its surfaces. “In society there is an inexhaustible
source of diffuse magic…. Everything happens as though society, from
a distance, formed a kind of huge magical conclave around [the magi-
cian]” (Ibid.: 138). For Mauss, rites can bring about “direct, automatic
efficacy, without the presence of differentiated spiritual intermediaries”
so that, in the case of Dayak women engaged in war dances to support their men, who have gone off to battle,

time and space no longer exist; they are on the field of battle. ... Their sensibilities are overwhelmed by the awareness of their existence as a group of women and the social role they are playing in relation to the warriors, an awareness which is translated into sentiments about their own power and the relation of this power with that of their menfolk.

Muslims and Christians in the Monastery of Sveti Bogoroditsa Prechista

I mention this embodied sense of a *habitus* accessible through magic and ritual not so much to explain the mechanisms of how shrine practices can effect cures or the redirection of fortune but to suggest that the powers people imagine as working in and on their world are social powers, imagined in the image of their own experience of the world. Let me expand on this using an ethnographic encounter I had in Kicevo, Macedonia, in April 2006. I had been researching, with the help of Elizabeta Koneska of the National Museum of Macedonia, Muslim and Orthodox Christian uses of Sveti Bogoroditsa Prechista (the church of the Holy Mother of God Most Innocent) outside of Kicevo, itself a mixed Muslim and Christian town. In the course of examining the context of shared shrine practices, we interviewed the imam of the local Sunni mosque. He, trained in the renowned Faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo, responded to our queries about Muslims attending the nearby Sveti Bogoroditsa monastery by asserting strongly that he had never gone there and never would. He nonetheless went on to explain that he would advise members of his congregation to go to the monastery for help with particular problems because “the world of demons, like our world, is made up of Christians and Muslims. When someone is afflicted by a Muslim demon I can deal with the problem, but when someone is troubled by a Christian demon there is nothing I can do, so I send them to the church” (interview Kicevo, 30 April 2006).

What is of interest here, besides the concept of a mirror world of demons that replicates the demography of the lived world, is that—in this local context—the imam seems to see no incommensurability between this vision of the interaction of the demonic and the human worlds and that of a more Orthodox Sunni theology with its considerably more strict definition of domains, borders, and pollutions. However, as I will
show later, when the world of religious orthodoxy impinges upon local practices it disrupts this inter-communalism, asserting property and propriety issues at the expense of sharing. Here, however, relations between the human and the demonic world are analogous to those occurring in the quotidian world of social interaction, and rites and obeisances made in the human world engage an economy or reciprocity with the demonic. Just as the demonic world mirrors the intermixing of Muslim and Christian while maintaining the difference between the two, so too do movements within the ritual space of the church maintain that differentiation, even as Muslims “tap into” Christian rituals to ward off Christian demons.

Sharing the space of the Sveti Bogoroditsa monastery’s chapel does not entail a syncretic blending of identities, just as interacting on the streets and in the markets of Kicevo and its satellite villages does not effect an effacement of sectarian identities (compare Lockwood 1975: especially 195–211). Muslims within the walls of the church seem, on initial observation, to go through the same procedures of reverencing the saints and the sites of power as do the Christians: they circulate through the church, they light candles in front of the icons (particularly those of the iconostasis before which they lay gifts of clothing, towels, and sometimes money), they proceed to the rear left of the church where, like the Christians, they pass a string of cross-inscribed beads over their bodies three times before crawling three times through a passageway beneath a pair of healing icons toward a well from which, in leaving, they take water to splash on their faces and carry home in bottles for healing (see Bowman 2010: 206–9, for a more detailed description). Closer observation reveals that this apparent mimicry is subtly but significantly differentiated. Muslims, holding back from Christian groups, introduce small but important differences of deportment. They do not cross themselves, they bow their heads to but do not kiss the icons, and in praying they silently mouth Muslim prayers while holding their hands close to their chests in front of them with their palms up. Muslims here “work” an environment they know through the social world they share with their Christian neighbors and in so doing both engage in ritual acts that they have learned are efficacious from their neighbors (and their imam) and render appropriate obeisance to the powers resident in the place (the Virgin Mary, the saints, the Mother Superior, and the nuns). At the same time they refuse to violate their own identities by sacrilegiously adopting the signifiers of Christians as though they were their own. Here, in a religious setting we have an interaction analogous to what Sorkin describes in the dense streets of Indian cities—“the continuing process of local negotiation for the right of passage” (Sorkin 1999: 2).
Property and Propriety in Jerusalem’s Church of the Holy Sepulchre

The “sharing” described above—a sharing extending into religious places the same modes of intercommunal mixing one sees in the everyday interactions of neighbors in the streets and workplaces of the region—differs substantially from the types of interactions one sees between strangers in sites they commonly revere, but not “in common.” I will try to resolve that seeming contradiction between “commonly revering” but not “in common” through the use of Slavoj Žižek’s rendering of Saul Kripke’s concept of the “rigid designator” (Kripke 1980). Žižek contends that the name for a phenomenon—the rigid designator—constitutes the ideological experience of the thing rather than the thing itself. Thus it is

the word which, as a word, on the level of the signifier itself, unifies a given field, constitutes its identity. It is, so to speak, the word to which “things” themselves refer to recognize themselves in their unity.... It is not the real object which guarantees as the point of reference the unity and identity of a certain ideological experience—on the contrary it is the reference to a “pure” signifier which gives unity and identity to our experience of historical reality itself. (Žižek 1989: 95–96 and 97; see also Vološinov 1973 [orig. 1929]: 79–80)

Generally, in a world of shared experience, “rigid designators” suffice to indicate objects and experiences common to those sharing that world, subsuming idiosyncrasies of personal experience or contextual application. However where quotidian experience is not shared, identical signifiers may conjure up very different signifieds for the communities using them, and the differences may in fact prove to be incommensurabilities. In earlier examinations of the politics of Palestinian identity before and after Oslo (Bowman 1988, 1994) I wrote of the different ways the name “Palestine” signified both a future homeland and a reunified people to communities in different locales of exile, both outside and inside the borders of historic Palestine. So long as those populations remained isolated from each other those disparities of understanding remained relatively unproblematic, but once Oslo effected a regathering of the Palestinians from the various sites of their dispersion serious conflicts erupted between groups over what Palestine should be, what Palestinians should be like, and who in fact was even truly Palestinian.

Something very similar happens at holy places with constituencies that gather from dispersed locales. Rather than neighbors sharing a sacred place we talk here of strangers coming together in the same space.
The Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem, known to Orthodox Christians as the *Anastasis*, lies at the center of an extended web of narratives dealing with the death and resurrection of Jesus. When I carried out field research on Jerusalem pilgrimage in the early 1980s, the Holy Sepulchre, like other sites throughout the “holy city” of Jerusalem, was visited by pilgrims from twenty-seven distinct Christian denominations (these, for the most part, are further divided into distinct national and linguistic communities) as well as by a multitude of tourists, many from Christian backgrounds but also many non-Christians. Five sects had places within the church—the Greek Orthodox, Catholics, and Armenians occupying the most territory, with the Coptic and Syrian Orthodox holding tiny chapels—while a sixth, the Ethiopians, held two external chapels and a rooftop. Despite that sectarian topography the church was swept daily with crowds of pilgrims and tourists flowing indiscriminately through the corridors and chapels. Such heterodoxy within a limited space could give rise to “traffic problems” (pushing, expressions of hostility, and occasionally fights, usually between individuals not travelling in organized groups), but for the most part conflicts were avoided by what appeared to be spontaneous traffic management. This took place not through “local negotiation” but because groups moving through the church effectively “enclaved” themselves into mobile units flowing past and alongside each other without either engagement or significant recognition (see Bowman 2011: 376–77). These groups, often made up of people coming from the same locale or brought together prior to the visit by an institution or a leader, constituted “in-groups” able not only to insulate themselves from others but also, under the authority of spiritual or secular guides associated with the respective groups, to ensure that their perceptions of the sites and events they encountered confirmed and built upon their expectations. Such a mode of engaging with holy sites protected the integrity of the connection between rigid designators and the experiences they signed while preventing the cognitive dissonance of other’s readings of those shared designators from disrupting that alignment. While individuals within these groups shared with each other an experience of place, they simultaneously related to members of other groups like bodies in space, moving past and around them without effecting significant contact. Thus while this site might nominally be termed a “shared site,” the character of this interaction throws doubt on the applicability of the phrase “shared.”

The relations described above rarely become conflictual because while those involved share the same space they rarely share the same place. For the majority of pilgrims travelling in mobile enclaves the experience of holy places provides an intimate confirmation of the “reality” of those
sites and of the pilgrims’ personal relations to that “reality”; seeing the “real” place, without being forced to acknowledge the dissonance of others’ interpretations of its reality, provides a sense of spiritual ownership that visitors take back to their places of origin.8 “Strangers” do not need literally to own the place because they do not live there. For them it is enough to experience the place and possess the knowledge of its reality.

Relation to place is very different for the monks and priests who move through and live in the immediate vicinity of the church. They see themselves as “owning” the holy sites in a much more literal way, and their conception of property—and of propriety (an etymologically related term)—can but be conflictual when others who are not of the same community have similar claims on the sites and different conceptions of the modes of deportment proper to them. The Franciscan, Armenian, and Greek Orthodox brotherhoods that care for their respective chapels within the building9 are brought into daily, often conflictual, contact with others whose senses of the site’s significance, the legitimacy of its possession, and the appropriateness of ritual activities carried out therein differ on numerous points. Although these men cohabit the Holy Sepulchre and its neighborhood, they do not share locale and dispositions in the ways set out in the opening of this chapter. Jeff Halper describes the monasteries of the Christian Quarter in the late Ottoman period as each enclosing radically different lifeworlds, redolent of the nations of the monks’ origins (Greece, France, Armenia) rather than of Jerusalem (Halper 1984). In many ways, at least in terms of self-sufficiency and ideological closure, the situations in the monasteries have not changed much. These insulated habitus produce literal neighbors who are, in effect, strangers (compare Duru and Bulle this volume). Unlike pilgrims who move past each other in the holy sites as migratory strangers, these hierophants are continuously forced to deal in “their” holy places with the presence of others who see those places as their own. For the monks and priests the holy sites in the “shared” space of the Anastasis or Holy Sepulchre are organically connected to the “pure” cultural spaces of the monasteries, and the presence of others in “their” spaces, much less the attempt of those others to claim the spaces as “their” own, is anathema. Whereas in the above cited situations of urban Indian traffic and Macedonian shrine sharing mutual investment in “common ground” gives rise to generally amenable and decorous ritual processes of negotiation over co-presence, in the Holy Sepulchre quotidian encounters between representatives of the respective churches are only prevented from routinely breaking into open violence by the regimen of the Status Quo, a system of spatial and temporal regulations initially imposed by the Otto-
man state and currently maintained through fear of the open intercommunal warfare and state side-taking that its rejection would provoke.

At the core of this conflict is not a simple issue of property ownership; actual property can—as the tenets of the Status Quo themselves assert—be shared, albeit through complex ritual regimes. We are instead looking at issues more closely tied to propriety, and through that to identity. Monks and priests associated with the Holy Sepulchre are able, when outside of domains demarcated as sacred, to relate to secular locals and even to members of other fraternities in non-conflictual—sometimes even amenable—ways. In contexts where religious identities are foregrounded, however, particularly in the choreographies of movements through the spaces of the holy sites, they become representatives of their particular religious community or, in the terms members of the Greek Orthodox Brotherhood of the Holy Sepulchre in the wake of a fight with Armenian monks over territory referred to themselves, as “defenders of the holy places” (fieldnotes, 31/12/84). In these contexts they, and the places they “protect,” manifest the truth value of their church and its theology; their presence in the places, and the rituals they carry out there, are seen to “suture” their dogma and their orthopraxy toward real Christian revelation. The presence of others carrying out their apostate rituals and asserting their authority in those places constitutes what Laclau and Mouffe term an “antagonism” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 93–148)—literally a radical denial of their own assertions of identity as the sole vehicles of the true church.

In the case of antagonism ... the presence of the ‘Other’ prevents me from being totally myself.... (it is because a peasant cannot be a peasant that an antagonism exists with the landowner who is expelling him from his land). Insofar as there is antagonism, I cannot be a full presence for myself. (Ibid.: 125)

It is in this context that property, and the propriety of liturgical demeanor therein, becomes an issue of overarching concern. Concern with overcoming the antagonism presented by the presence of other belief communities is what motivates the insistence of the various religious communities that they “own” holy places and drives the demands of religious authorities worldwide that shrines and holy places be purged of heterodox practices and persons. The politics of the “rigid designator” is insistence that there is but one signified for the signifier. While this may appear to take the shape of straightforward demands for sole possession and inhabitance of a holy place, beneath that demand is the assertion of the truth value of a core identity and the insistence that no other
representation can lay claim to the place where that identity manifests and celebrates itself. As a Greek monk told Nikos Kazantzakis when he visited the Anastasis in 1927: “this entire church belongs to us, the Orthodox. All the sacred shrines are ours…. [W]e’re going to throw the Armenians out…. Whatever the Latins tell you is a lie. All their shrines are fakes. I hope to God the day comes when we can throw them out” (Kazantzakis 1973: 153).

Sveti Nikola/Hadir Bābā: Simultaneity of Place

The concept of “property” functions in various ways in sites we refer to as “shared.” In the case of Sveti Bogoroditsa Prechista, Muslims attending the monastery’s church do not in any way dispute the Macedonian Orthodox Church’s ownership of the site, visiting and using it with due deference to the nuns who live there. The Mother Superior and the majority of the nuns are in no way threatened by the presence of Muslims in the church, appreciating their generosity (“they give more than the Christians”) and recognizing coexistence within the site as a welcome consequence of the long-term good relations of Muslims and Christians in the nearby town and surrounding countryside11 (see Bowman 2010: 209). In another Macedonian site I have written on, Sveti Nikola in Makedonski Brod, Sufi and Sunni Muslims praying in the church recognize the authority of the Orthodox caretakers, yet simultaneously associate the edifice and the tomb within with the Bektashi saint Hadir Bābā. Relations between the Christian visitors from the town and the Muslim visitors from neighboring settlements are cordial, and lubricated—as at Sveti Bogoroditsa—by the generosity of Muslims whose copious gifts are auctioned off to support the town’s main church. Intriguingly, in the case of Sveti Nikola/Hadir Bābā mutual commitment by both communities to the continued sharing of the site is manifest in the simultaneous display of Sufi and Christian iconography within the church although, as I describe in my study of the site, perceived imbalances of display are able to give rise to aggrievement and potential hostility (Bowman 2010: 203–6). In both instances, as at the shrine of Haider Shaikh in Malerkotla described by Anna Bigelow, the local communities as well as the officiants at the religious sites commit themselves to maintaining forms of intercommunal cooperation in the shrines cognate with those taking place beyond their perimeters. Changes in that wider context of social relations, resulting in a breakdown of conviviality, can fracture that commitment, making way for one or the other community to attempt to force the other from the shrine; such an expulsion would mirror that
effected in the surrounding social world. In other instances religious authorities, often backed by individuals of influence over local members of one or the other local religious community, may exploit frictions or fissures in the local community to push for the “purification” of a shrine. Even, however, in such instances the perceived sanctity of a site may be retained by the general population so that not only might members of the religious and ethnic communities banished from the site return, covertly and sometimes overtly, but also, as relatively amicable intercommunal relations in the surrounding locale are re-established, the site may again begin to be shared (see Bowman 2012: 215–17; see also Hayden this volume).

Shrines such as the Anastasis or Holy Sepulchre are very different insofar as rather than being perceived as properties of the local community (in both the sense of belonging to the local milieu and being characteristic of that social formation) they are presented as standing outside of their immediate context, belonging instead to ideologically constituted communities that may originate, and even reside, at a substantial physical and cultural distance from their literal site. For pilgrims visiting such sites from afar the holy places “belong” to them in a spiritual or devotional sense. They ideologically imagine the place as a spiritual possession that, once witnessed, can be “taken home” with them for meditation and validation, but their desire to literally possess the place rarely extends further than their wish to collect relics (oil, candles, carved olive wood crosses) to metonymically connect them with the place. For resident clergy, however, such holy places not only “belong” to their sects in a spiritual sense but must literally belong to their churches, since possession of the site both confirms their core identities as guardians of the holy places and authorizes and amplifies the sanctity of the site through their provision of appropriate liturgical practices (and their blockage of heterodox practices). Here the presence of others not only presents an integral challenge to their identities but also desecrates the sanctity of that central site (see Hassner 2009). “Tolerance” is anything but toleration in this context as it is in effect no more than enforced cohabitation.

**Strangers and Neighbors**

The distinction between “space” and “place” set out at the opening of this chapter is key to understanding the emergence of antagonism in shared sites. Space, as an encompassing container, is able to hold a number of entities without their having any relation aside from that of con-
tiguity. Place, as a site of inhabitance, can contain differentiated bodies, but these, by sharing place, enter into relations with each other. Thus, on the one hand pilgrim groups, converging on the same holy sites from different places of origin, are able to flow around and past each other, each pursuing their own realizations of their own envisionings of the significance of the sites they temporarily occupy. The “place” each group inhabits is effectively rendered discontinuous with the “places” of others, and interaction is kept minimal and impersonal. On the other hand, neighbors of different sectarian affiliations can meet in local holy places, engaging with each other through media of negotiation and mutual recognition analogous to those they use in their everyday interactions outside of holy ground. Here each group simultaneously occupies the same place and must engage modes of mutual accommodation, rendering that coexistence as non-conflictual and as mutually beneficial as possible. In the instance of the Holy Sepulchre or Anastasis, a situation not unlike others worldwide in which religious powers work to present a site as a pure signifier of an exclusive identity that must be defended from the pollution of other forms of worship, two or more communities attempt to construct, and inhabit (literally and ritually), exclusive places at the same time in coterminous spaces. Such cohabitation is, in terms of their respective discourses, an impossibility, and thus the presence of the other presents a literal antagonism that must either be overcome through expulsion or succumbed to by withdrawal. The “stand-off” that is the current status quo effected by the Status Quo is an ideological impossibility, and the Holy Sepulchre/Anastasis will remain a flashpoint, surrounded by the tinder of cadres of ideologically motivated monks, until either a discursive shift in the respective theologies replaces antagonism with fraternity or one group successfully expropriates and “cleanses” the site.

In the post-Ottoman sphere, where conceptions of “nationalist” identity increasingly impose themselves on domains where “national” identities had served as markers of nominal difference within mixed communities, places that had been shared—whether secular or sacred—are transformed into the exclusive properties of ethno-nationalist groupings. Sharing, or even mixing, is there rendered contentious, and local events in which individuals with different allegiances clash come to be read more widely as indubitable signifiers of irresolvable inter-communal antagonisms. Once such a discursive shift has taken place, and shared sites have been transformed into terrains on which struggles for possession take place, it becomes increasingly impossible to imagine contemporary cohabitation and sharing, and the image of coexistence fades into a utopian fantasy of a distant “Ottoman” past.
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**Notes**


2. The concept of *habitus*, itself a Latin translation of the Greek *hexis*, has a long genealogy stretching back nearly two and a half millennia from Bourdieu’s *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (1977 [orig. 1972]) and *Logic of Practice* (1990 [orig. 1980]) via Mauss’ *Les Techniques du Corps* (1935, see also 1979) and Aquinas’s *Summa Theologica* (la2ae, 49–54) to Aristotle’s *Nichomachean Ethics* (1098b33).

3. See too the essays collected in Albera and Couroucli (2009 and 2012) and Bowman (2012).

4. “Situational identity” is a concept generally assumed to have been generated by, but not specifically used in, Erving Goffman’s theory of the dramaturgical construction of social identity developed in *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (1959). Max Gluckman had, however, elaborated the concept of “situational selection” in 1940 whereby individuals shape their behaviors, in different social contexts, so as to conform to the values and practices of groups they associate with there: “the shifting membership of groups in different situations is the functioning of the structure, for an individual’s membership of a particular group in a particular situation is determined by the motives and values influencing him in that situation. Individuals can thus live coherent lives by situational selection from a medley of contradictory values, ill-assorted beliefs, and varied interests and techniques” (Gluckman 1958 [orig. 1940]: 26).

5. Despite the difference in name the “place” of the crucifixion, tomb (“sepulchre”), and resurrection (“anastasis”) of Jesus is established at the heart of New Testament biblical narratives so that that “place” can be seen to function as a rigid designator even when ideas of its actual location can differ by several hundred meters (as with the Anglican Garden Tomb).
6. The Greek Orthodox Katholicon was, however, normally closed to all but the Greek Orthodox.
7. These strategies were carried out throughout Holy Land pilgrimages and, one suspects, across other forms of organized travel—see Schmidt (1979).
8. Those whose experiences do not live up to their expectations, or in fact seem to refute them, may be impelled to deny that the sites are the “real” sites (either because the real sites are elsewhere or because they have been effaced by time) or may be forced to question their previous assumptions and beliefs.
9. The Coptic, Syrian, and Ethiopian Orthodox, who possess chapels because of historic precedent, are small communities with little political or economic power, and their presence in the church is rarely challenged by the dominant religious communities (although they fight among themselves over the territories they do control; see Bowman 2011: 389–91).
11. Although one university-trained novice, recently relocated to the monastery from Skopje, expressed hostility toward Muslim visitors, claiming they were planning to “steal” the church (Bowman 2010: 209).
12. A salient example is the 1992 destruction by Hindu activists of the Babri Mosque at Ayodhya in order to clear the site for the construction of the Sri Ram Janam Bhumi Temple commemorating the birthplace of Lord Rama (an avatar of Vishnu).

References
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