

A Conflict of Spaces or of Recognition?

Co-presence in Divided Jerusalem

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The breakdown of the peace accords, the resumption of the Intifada in 2000, and the numerous military incursions that followed marked a new phase in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Today, Jerusalem is a city cut in two by a security barrier—called a wall by the Palestinians—whose conception and ongoing construction was initiated by the State of Israel in 2006. With the decision to build a security barrier cutting Jerusalem in two—separating the Palestinians of East Jerusalem from other Palestinians and from Israeli citizens—Israel created a visible and impermeable border and in so doing, affirmed the spatial delimitation of an enemy territory behind it (Brown 2010). The security barrier acts to redefine a symbolic and spatial *nomos*¹ (Schmitt 2003), and to safeguard the limits between Israel and the surrounding world: a world conceived as a threat.

In this context of separation, studies of the Israel-Palestine conflict for the most part operate under a theory of simple domination: a primary relation between dominators (Israeli) and those who are dominated (Palestinians), where transgression and resistance can only be understood as interiorization or some continuation of power by which the subject is stripped of subjectivity, thus making it impossible for a communal world to exist. The exteriorization of power assumes that no description of relations is possible that is unrelated to government techniques, to juridical means of exception from the common law, to modes of exclusion that operate through enclosure within Palestinian enclaves, or else the symbolic violence of the Israeli state.

The approach elaborated here is different. It proposes to consider the reality of separation through the observation of Jerusalem and its bor-



Figure 9.1. Confrontation in Jerusalem: Mt. of Olives and East Jerusalem (photo by Sylvaine Bulle).

ders and walls. Without discounting the real constraints that have been created by the wall and its limits, this approach also considers subtle interactions between segmented populations (Israeli and Palestinian, Jewish and Arab) and the ways in which these interactions shape links between these social worlds. We will thus highlight examples of acts of communication and the mechanisms actors use to continue exchange at the edges of Jerusalem and between Jerusalem and the Palestinian territories. These operations may seem improbable or minor. But is it possible to find a model of balanced justice that assumes this state of facts, and the possibility of exchanging within a space that is fragmented and conflictual? Does not the vision of a politics of co-presence offer an alternative to theories and abstract political scenarios in the search for a solution to the spatial and inter-community conflict of Jerusalem?

Co-presence or Separation? Holding onto Contiguity at Any Price

What is this security barrier called a wall in the case of East Jerusalem? It is a militarized and social frontier. Certain people find themselves within

the limits of Jerusalem (on the “good” side of the wall, within the perimeter of the Municipality of Jerusalem). They benefit from their status as residents of Jerusalem, a kind of socio-economic citizenship—providing Israeli social rights to education, health, the right to live and circulate—even if the accordance of residency has been considerably limited since the creation of the barrier. Family reunification is difficult. Residency status can be taken away from Palestinians from Jerusalem who leave the territory. The *de facto* acquisition of residency status for a wife and children no longer applies.² On the other side of the wall stretches a gray zone. In this zone, despite being a dependent part of Jerusalem, residents are now under the control of Palestinian institutions, and as such, lack the possibility of exchange with those who find themselves on the opposite side of the wall. The wall has thus instituted a *within* and a *without*; it has redefined social relations and fixed an internal limit to the Palestinian community by distinguishing those who are included and those who are shut out, deprived of their rights at the periphery of the city.

Rather than aiming here to make an argument about the nature of Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem—the exercise or not of the “state of exception” (Agamben 1998)—this chapter shows how different interactions exist along the barrier and how these interactions coexist with the idea of enclosure itself. These situations provide ways to think about the politics of separation, modes of thinking that do not operate through a strict vision of vertical power as it is understood in radical critical theory (in political science or geography).³ What I would like to examine is less a theory of exception (defined as the suspension of rights and of the frontier between *within* and *without*) and more a theory of heteronomy (Simmel 1999). Heteronomy is usually defined as influence over one’s will, *i.e.*, less than full autonomy. For Simmel, however, heteronomy has a dual face: it is a form of interdependence, defined by both autonomy and constraint, and this may be figured by spatial frontiers. The tension between the two polarities of freedom and constraint may be seen as structural (Simmel says “grammatical”) elements of social life. In Simmel’s reasoning, parts are isolated from the whole while still belonging to that whole. Individuals or groups, even if they are confined by physical boundaries, react to each other because there is a totality of meaningful effects that both emanates from and influences them. The everyday constraint on autonomy is also a theory of contiguity or co-presence.

In their approach to social theory, the sociologists of the Chicago School (Grafmeyer and Joseph 1984) also emphasized this aspect and define what they call an “urban mentality.” For Wirth and Park, a citizen is understood as a person who is able to communicate, able to distrib-

ute attention, and to live at the same time in several worlds, between or among multiple spheres of belonging. By extension—and as Simmel (1971) emphasizes—the most significant aspect of the metropolis lies in this contiguity or co-presence upon which urban life is erected. Despite its division, co-presence also defines the city Jerusalem. The physical “contiguity” of different communities (Jews, Arabs, and other minorities) gives the city its psychological and aesthetic foundation. The atmosphere of the city depends upon different lifestyles that intersect at every street corner—between customers and merchants, or in other casual encounters—generating unexpected exchanges, conversations, and emotions. The atmosphere of the city emerges both from the possibility of such encounters and from their realization. The city is a place where such encounters *can* occur, and its atmosphere emerges from the fact of their occurrence. Conversely, however, the very interdependence of parts of the city defined as hostile to each other may engender fear, anticipation, and other emotions caused by the threat of violence and the permanent conflict and division. In other words, it is the fact that Palestinians and Israelis interact and move in the city despite the wall that both creates the city as “Jerusalem” and also lays the groundwork for fear. The military presence and erection of the security fence inside the borders of Jerusalem give to its metropolitan life a new significance but do not end that life altogether.

Paradoxically, it is because the foundations of exchange, of neighborhoods, or of existence itself are threatened that the texture of the urban exchanges appears, i.e., the texture of the city. These are the particularly intense urban exchanges of a divided and militarized city. Spatial confinement creates practical ordeals through which an individual measures himself in relation to his environment. It is in the most problematic of conditions that this research makes sense, when individuals affected and troubled by events (Boltanski 2009; Dewey 2005) work to resolve the enigma of their own lives.

To achieve this, it is useful as a sociologist to turn to ethnographic research that may give us insight beyond a first general impression of the constraints of the wall. Ethnography enables us to see the ways that actors use various principles and resources to resolve the problems of their everyday lives in the face of enclosure and thereby how they assert the plurality of their forms of existence and action. We see here that people are not only subject to the barrier and its enforced separation but that they also have critical and reflexive capacities. They work to continue their existence. Within the regime of enclosure, they use an eclecticism of relationships and actions to access primary goods: housing, labor, mobility, education, and domestic production. We can only touch on a

few of the actions—some superficial, others more profound—through which the confined individual (in this case a Palestinian) reconsiders his or her universe and sometimes his or her relation to the Other (the Israeli).

Excursus Outside the Boundaries: Workers, Residents and Merchants as “Transfugees”

For the citizens of East Jerusalem, the political model of separation and security implies a new definition of territorial belonging, of exchange, and of mobility. The separation wall has been complete since 2009 and has become the residents’ visual and existential horizon. It puts into place a new type of challenge that is no longer a test of force (by military control) but a challenge to reality—through administrative control and new mechanisms for exchange and circulation. The wall has become a frontier. Crossing through the wall is only possible at one of thirteen checkpoints that are regulated and controlled by the Israeli military administration, which also carries out exacting and regular patrols from the watch-stations situated along the wall. To enter Jerusalem, Palestinian residents or workers must have special work permits⁴ that are contingent on certain civic, familial, or security-based criteria and also on the economic needs of Israel (in the case of workers).

By describing a within and a without, the separation wall has redefined social relations, erased advantages and privileges, weakened the capacities of individuals to move about, and brought internal fractures to light. Since the completion of the security barrier, Jerusalem as a place of work has become inaccessible, despite the active trade and extensive job and knowledge networks that existed in the preceding period. The judicial and physical separation has considerably reduced the personal connections that once existed between Palestinians and Jews or among Palestinians from Jerusalem, while informal transactions have been curtailed. Despite this, maintaining exchanges with Israel or the Territories remains a priority for Palestinians. It is necessary to differentiate superficial engagements that are created for instrumental ends—the search for work or for business—and those that are longer lasting where the person’s ontology, as well as the ontology of the group, is itself destabilized. In all cases, the interactions comprise practical, situated actions that allow actors to meet.

Restaurant owners and shopkeepers situated at the limit of the wall are an instance of those who must develop concrete transactions and strategies to continue their trade. An example would be the shopkeepers

in the city of A-Ram, situated at the limit of the security barrier, near the main entry and exit checkpoint to East Jerusalem (Qalandiya). This checkpoint forms a true buffer zone with Israel and is particularly constraining for people entering the West Bank (where Israeli settlements are located) but also for the Palestinians of Jerusalem who continue to pursue activities or have family in Palestine. All crossings at this checkpoint—cars, trucks, pedestrians—are verified.⁵ Workers hailing from the Territories who are authorized to make the crossing into Jerusalem are particularly scrutinized. These workers are not able to use their personal vehicles and must be in possession of a work or residence permit. Despite the closed and rigid character of these security measures, many interactions take place around the checkpoint, creating a public spectacle where every act is visible to those taking part, including those of the Israeli military personnel charged with controlling the frontier. The area surrounding the checkpoint forms a microeconomic space with the presence of small shopkeepers offering their services: we find coffee and water from the nearby refugee camp al-Amari, restaurants, taxis. All are interested in maintaining their economic interests despite the rarefied nature of the exchanges between Jerusalem and the zones located on the other side of the security barrier, which itself has become an impassable frontier.

One example is striking: the ritual undertaken by certain restaurants to “deliver” to checkpoints in order to maintain their commercial activities. This concerns, for example, restaurant owners situated near the security barrier (A-Ram), who have created links to a Jewish or Arab clientele within Jerusalem who previously frequented these restaurants and have been deprived of this possibility by this newly constructed segment of the barrier. This is the case for Elias, a resident of Jerusalem who chose the site for his restaurant only several months before the erection of the barrier at A-Ram. His pizzeria, known for the quality of its products, is now hidden and inaccessible. Elias’ movement has also been limited, and his restaurant lost many potential clients. Nevertheless, the young entrepreneur found a way to counteract this loss of business. Armed with a strong network of relations with Jewish and Christian Israelis and with Palestinian families from the Old City, he is able to deliver his pizzas to these privileged clients. Sensitive to Elias’ economic situation, they make the journey specially to buy his products at the Qalandiya checkpoint. Pizza delivery, like a well-honed choreography, takes place in the presence of military personnel who closely watch the exchange.

The “delivery” of merchandise, of meals, is an urban experience that creates interactions within public space. The physical environment is mobilized, while communication between partners in the exchange, Israelis

and Palestinians, takes place within neutral and interstitial spaces such as checkpoint parking areas (Qalandiya and Bethlehem). In the case of these “deliveries”—or of certain micro-commercial activities that take place along frontiers, in a space of surveillance—sovereign space relaxes or transforms into a space of civility based on the conversation and ordinary acts (oral exchanges, food exchanges). These types of exchanges, which continue despite the divide and the growing hostility between the two communities, make it possible to stabilize relations between actors.

Take, for example, the case of farmers of Bethlehem and Hebron, who arrive every morning at the gates of East Jerusalem to sell their products. Their portals to the outside world (Jerusalem and Israel)—the checkpoint crossings to Bethlehem—are only possible because of a chain of tolerance and the support of different partners. In certain cases, their excursions require the complicity of military personnel, because the farmers do not legally have access to Israeli territory or to Jerusalem. The officers close their eyes to foodstuffs transported in sacks, baskets and blouses, and give the farmers the right to enter the capital clandestinely. In turn, Palestinian boutique owners in Jerusalem agree to keep or stock the farmers’ products. The farmers themselves, often elderly, spend the night in the back of the shops, in the doorways of shops, in residences in the Old City or in public spaces.⁶ Concern for the common decency of the Other has made it possible to establish this chain of acts that links individuals otherwise divided socially and geographically, differentiated one from another in terms of their status as citizens.

The consolidation of exchanges in the workplace is also striking. Lacking Jerusalem-resident status, ever more difficult to come by, or else without permits to work or freely circulate that require drastic measures to obtain, it is difficult for businesses and job-seekers to develop contacts. In part because of the increasingly complex nature of legal immigration procedures, maintaining access to work is almost impossible without the aid of formal or informal networks that assist with border crossings between Jerusalem and the West Bank. For a Palestinian to acquire a job, for example in Jerusalem or in Israel, requires that he or she go through an organized network—with companies based in Jerusalem or in Israel that have contacts with the military administration—to negotiate a permit or to sell products or services in Israel.

Permits are rare, depending entirely on a vertical organization between employees, employers, and the Israeli administration: a liberal state model where economic interests—and corruption—combine with military interests. Parallel to the official network of entrepreneurs, other types of practices are developing. They can be understood as a possible response to the coercion that is placed upon Palestinians wanting to

work in Israel—despite the fact that Palestinian institutions symbolically forbid Palestinians from doing so in the name of the boycott and of the “White Intifada,” the call for a sustained, nonviolent campaign of Palestinian resistance. Informal practices that deal with work and the crossing of the wall are indissociable from a horizontal chain of confidence between employees and employers or within a controlled community.

Then there is an entirely different clandestine organization that shuttles people through the wall with organized passage points or with ladders that make it possible to climb over. These activities imply complicit neighbors, people to organize shuttling back and forth—passers—and an entire way of thinking that leads to the creation of temporary neighborhood communities of passers (Druze, Arab Israelis), businesses, and neighbors. The interactions vary from a paid barrier crossing service to simply the aid of the neighbors—for example, watching for the arrival of the police. This leads to coordination between the various actors—that is to say, communication skills. Of course, these interactions are rarer than the everyday transactions described earlier, and they develop only in situations where the illicit crossings are a last resort. The relationship that links these individuals is built within space through connections and fleeting agreements.

“We just want to live,” repeat day-workers, residents of A-Ram, Bir Nabala, or Bethlehem. Their voluntary actions take shape in a world of suffering. To stake one’s life by crossing the security barrier means risking prison for a salary, putting one’s family in peril with illegal actions, and risking the judgment of those close to you or of the community. The latter is especially problematic in the case of Palestinian workers in the Israeli settlements—a type of work strongly forbidden by the Palestinian authorities⁷—and also in the case of intelligence cooperation with the military regarding counterfeit work certificates. Palestinians from Jerusalem or the Territories working intermittently on the construction or cleaning of the security barrier are also taking great risks.

These workers’ excursions into an “enemy” world are, by all accounts, linked to the economic motivations of the two parties. Employers have access to labor that is flexible, easily managed, and readily available, and the employee sees the opportunity for Israeli work as a means to better his condition. These workers may also invoke a moral justification for this excursion and the “collaboration” it entails. For example, he may speak of his own victimhood and the instrumentalization of judicial and economic resources of the “Israeli enemy” as a political act of resistance. In most cases, the workers are blind to moral and political divergences, or to communitarian or cultural differences between them and their employers, instead revealing mutual understandings based on confidence

and common interest.⁸ But the regime of forced connections with the Other through labor and business may also lead to a moral and social duplicity. The workers, moving between one world and another, modulate their rhetoric and appearance based on whether they are inside their communities, outside, or between several sets of juridical and political norms—for instance, situations in which they must recognize the State of Israel or not). The actors can also be destabilized in terms of their relation to their own community by entering into contacts with other norms during the period of transaction. They can also destabilize the grammar of their own community—by betraying their own patriotism.

If we take, for example, the case of Palestinian workers, Bedouins, workers in the formal and informal sector of the industrial complexes in Mishor Adumim and in the Jordan Valley, perceived indignity and humiliation often reappear in these workers' statements and are linked to their labor conditions (low salaries, no social rights, and no vacation days). And it is through these injustices that certain workers today get in touch with humanitarian organizations to defend their basic rights and to benefit from the same working conditions as Israelis. By turning to the courts and to workers' aid associations with their demands and with the discrimination they face, they implicitly recognize Israeli law and the presence of Israeli interlocutors, such as Israeli legal aid associations. Thus, contact with the adversary in the name of the defense of basic rights but also with a certain liberal individualism would suggest the renunciation of the principles of a Palestinian resistance that is founded on non-contact and the boycott of enemy interlocutors in the name of group solidarity. Encounters with outside partners (lawyers, NGOs, courts), the confidence these meetings create and the feeling of being defended, lead these workers to experience a certain distance from their own community. Their families, on the other hand, may feel embarrassed by these public efforts and the disobedience to their own group's rules that they imply.

Situational Exchanges

We could also cite a second case that speaks of a less superficial engagement with the renegotiation of collective norms through individual choice: Palestinians who settle in Jewish quarters called Israeli settlements because they are built outside of the frontier of 1967. These urban Jewish districts (like Pisgat Zeev) are populated with religious Jews (often Hasidim) or National Religious (Zionist) and were the first to be built outside of the Green Line. They are home to several hundred Pal-

estinians. Thirteen hundred of the 42,000 residents of Pisgat Zeev are Arab. Very close to Pisgat Zeev, on French Hill, one person out of six is Arab out of a population of 7,000. Finally, in Neve Yaakov, there are six hundred Arabs out of 20,000.⁹

There are two motivations for this phenomenon. The first is what many perceive as the necessity of retaining their Jerusalem residence permit. In such cases, persons who were residents of Jerusalem before the erection of the wall have left what is now the Palestinian side to relocate to an area where they can retain their residency.¹⁰ The wave of returning Palestinians inside the limits of East Jerusalem has been an important factor in skyrocketing real estate prices.¹¹ As a result, Palestinians concerned with conserving their rights sought out apartments in the first settlements in East Jerusalem such as Pisgat Zeev. This rental activity creates transactions with a network of real estate agents—Jewish—that are more or less discrete, and a redeployment of communitarian movements that are more or less accepted: Palestinians turn up in cafes and in malls located in Jewish neighborhoods and more or less also in public spaces. The recent public nature of identity has been the source of some incidents: verbal abuse and mutual violence in the shopping malls, protest posters fixed to synagogue walls, the intimidation of Jewish real estate agents selling land to Arabs. The press and activists for Israeli religious rights often speak out about a troubling menace: the turning back of Jewish repopulation through Arab settlement. “The Jews are leaving and the Arabs returning,” announced a community Israeli newspaper,¹² as if the latter were imitating the former through a reconquest of the space, ethnicity, and real estate of Jerusalem.

But another type of more individual mobility exists: Palestinians who already live within the perimeter of Jerusalem and make the choice to live in the Jewish districts at the entry of East Jerusalem. Here we find an example of pluralism that is expressed by the decision to maintain a social life outside of one’s own community. Decisions to leave Arab neighborhoods to attempt to integrate into quarters such as Pisgat Zeev or Ramot become a choice that speaks to concerns for a way of life: a desire for social ascension that also makes it possible to benefit from the cultural, educational and health facilities of Israeli Jews, judged to be better than those in Arab neighborhoods. Such decisions to settle in Jewish districts are discrete and remain unpublicized among their community because they cannot be argued in terms of necessity.¹³ On the one hand, middle-class and professional Palestinians—for instance, office-workers, professors, or doctors working in Israeli hospitals—make a pragmatic and subjective choice to settle within Jewish districts that may be seen as betrayal by their own family and community. On the other hand,

the diversity within a Jewish neighborhood imposes rules of civility. We find ourselves here within the public rules of “civil inattention” (Goffman 1971) that define a mode of living together based on an indifference toward communitarianism and respect for private life.¹⁴

The last example comes from the Jerusalem tramway that was put into service in the spring of 2012. It crosses the city from northeast to southwest, through Israeli neighborhoods created in 1948 and into the city center. It runs parallel to the Old City, crossing Arab quarters, and ending in colonies that are at the frontier of 1967. The tramway project led to important ideological controversies: it was denounced as an instrument of Zionism, a consolidation of the annexation of Jerusalem, and as a political project destined to achieve the unification of Jerusalem by serving the residents of the settlements. Nevertheless, the project can be understood as a kind of laboratory for the study of the city as mosaic—the open city. We note the high participation of Arab citizens and the network’s utilization by a mixed group of inhabitants: frequent tram users are Orthodox religious Jews as well as young and old Palestinians. Circulation is a moment of civility and diversity, a moment where a public space is created that breaks up communitarian divisions. Mobility is a place of contiguity and a personal or collective test where the voyagers have to show their ability to be face to face.¹⁵ Here we find again the notion of “civil inattention” and of reserve. The social order of the tramway functions through a minimum amount of tact and a visual courtesy that operate as a kind of poor interaction (Joseph 1997) or civil inattention. The oxymoron suggests that the importance of the superficial exchange is having a social function that guarantees civility. It requires participants in a situation that is public and delicate because of its intercommunal nature to not presume the Other has hostile intentions and to not manifest feelings of discomfort or shame. This visual courtesy also enables a superficial sociability to take shape. Within the tram, we speak several languages and we identify different ways of being—religious first of all, secular, Jewish, Arab, tourist, and foreigner—without a communitarian hierarchy, which is exactly the definition of a public space. This mode of transportation of course makes it possible to cross the city and also implies collective surveillance, vigilance, and a certain confidence between groups. Circulation is thus the means through which ephemeral ways of living together are understood. From this point of view, the tram is a success in that it does not lead to incidents of conflict or violence, as if it is able to engender that which diplomacy has itself been unable to create.

Such examples give us the contours of temporary communities of confidence—within economic activity, or public space—that are created in

situations where people simply come together, without affirmations of belonging. All these situations require communication and informal exchange and show the potentiality of the city of Jerusalem itself, despite the political situation, to elucidate a theory of interdependence that is both political and sociological. From such cases, we open up several potential questions related to contiguity and hospitality in divided cities such as Jerusalem.

For a Theory of Minimal Co-presence as Sociological and Political Frame

Rebecca Bryant, in the introduction to this volume, makes a subtle distinction in approaches to coexistence. While the term “coexistence” is often used in general, historical, and even diplomatic terms, without practical considerations, she asks what coexistence means at the level of quotidian interactions. She suggests everyday diplomacy as a way to expand spaces, relations inside a constructive ambiguity, considering the potential self-transformation of identities and places. Bryant, in her introduction, speaks of the necessity of a constructive ambiguity of the boundaries of belonging as a language allowing the parties to overcome the issues about which they were at first irreconcilable.

In a previous chapter, Anita Bakshi discusses Simmel’s notion of the stranger as descriptive of relations between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in the Nicosia marketplace. These were the relations of shopkeepers with customers, of traders with clients, and of neighboring traders within the marketplace. In a city whose neighborhoods were mostly ethno-religiously divided, the marketplace became one of the few spaces where interactions occurred that are today remembered as “coexistence.” Although those relations for the most part were not able to survive the fracturing of violence, they were the basic foundation for interaction outside one’s group in the context of a relatively divided society.

In Jerusalem, institutions, habits, and the recurrence of geopolitical conflict have put into place a closed, east to west, functioning of neighborhoods that reflect the hardening of identities. The disordered, chaotic, hyper-dense, and walled-in space of East Jerusalem evokes a painful geopolitical history. Enclaves, the wall, and the refugee camps mark places of minority life excluded from municipal politics. They form what Oren Yiftachel calls “gray spaces”:

The concept of “gray space” refers to developments, enclaves, populations and transactions positioned between the “lightness” of legality/

approval/safety and the “darkness” of eviction/destruction/death. Gray spaces are neither integrated nor eliminated, forming pseudo-permanent margins of today’s urban regions, which exist partially outside the gaze of state authorities and city plans. (Yiftachel 2009: 243)

However, even within the confines of these gray spaces, and even in the context of growing hatred, it is difficult to overlook the physical and spatial interdependence that is the basis or has been the basis of relations.

We know that Jerusalem was always a cosmopolitan city, and that until recent wars its Arab and Jewish populations had spaces for interaction. In the early twentieth century, Jerusalem was home to cosmopolitan cafes, interactions between Arab and Jewish intellectuals and activists, and a certain atmosphere of bilingualism that characterizes the “spirit” of many cities. The sociologist Salim Tamari (2008) has shown that subsequent wars, nationalism, and sometimes the destruction of public spaces have removed this urbanity. But does this assessment privilege certain forms of sociality over others? Can or should the pluralist city exist in a context of conflict and tension?

Paradoxically, the material manifestation of the Israeli-Palestinian or Israeli-Arab conflict in the divided city of Jerusalem allows consideration of the positive aspects of coexistence. Even inside the divided city, citizens are not constrained to a trajectory on the basis of communal affinity. Citizens weave a path, encounter obstacles and opportunities. They travel in “foreign” areas, and necessarily encounter Others. Being Jewish or Arab—not to mention a member of the *mizrahim* (Eastern) or Ethiopian minorities, for example—today refers to a particular condition, that of identification with a neighborhood, a mosque, a synagogue, a part of the occupied city. Yet the real city does not coincide with the illusion of harmonious communities locked inside their own territories. Instead, the character of the city is also one of dissonance—what Bryant in the introduction, citing Laura Ring, refers to as “bearing tension”—where laboring to surmount obstacles and overcome potential conflict is also part of what it means to live together in the city.

This “moral crossing” or co-presence, I claim, is an organizing principle of civil life that can be not only understood as an urban phenomenon but also deployed as a philosophical principle. I consider co-presence as a sociological and political method that exceeds the metaphor of a “mosaic” of communities and their territories, and one that may help us think about the sources for a regeneration of urban dynamics. What, then, are the features of a notion of co-presence? The first is understanding the city as a milieu for acquaintance where the stranger might be seen less as a foreigner—a representative or custodian of a community—and

more as a smuggler. The stranger as smuggler crosses spatial and moral regions using bilingualism, resourcefulness, and skills of cultural translation. As a type of “everyday diplomacy,” it requires self-transformation, but it does not have the connotation of the diplomat as emissary.

A second element is the porosity of the city, which encourages all sorts of interaction, including the right to intrusion and mobility. The latter includes intercultural circulation, guaranteeing mixing, with the possibility of leaving the community to which one belongs (Park 1967). Co-presence occurs, for instance, through the circulation of people, and the choice to live in different areas. The spatial entanglement, the dependence of Palestinians on the Israeli job market, and the need for economic trade between the two parts of the city or of the Territories make relations necessary. And this physical contiguity in Jerusalem has, in the very near past, resulted in an ensemble of relations.

The city of Jerusalem could be viewed as one that encourages interaction—in the image of the journey of the tramway, a crossing of multiple worlds, near and far, those by which the individual reconsiders his or her universe of belonging. It is the replacement of communitarian links by social relations that create a form of positive urban interaction. Co-presence, then, is possible within the open city, a form of sociality not structurally determined, but rather dependent upon circulation, chance meetings, and superficial exchanges. Only social interaction (what Bryant in this volume calls everyday diplomacy) can break the rigidity of closed groups and of ethnic circles bound by familiarity, making it possible to decrease hostilities.

In other words, following the sociologists of the Chicago School, we might say that the city needs more sociality and less society: that is to say, less collective treatment of social realities by institutions. The idea of co-presence puts emphasis on living together as a practice rather than as an ideal. Rather than ideals or ideologies, co-presence is a matter of tact. It assumes that citizens in the public space present themselves with distance and reserve, as suggested in the notion of civil inattention. In Jerusalem, tact may be seen in the case of tram transportation that crosses various districts of the Palestinian neighborhoods, caught between the Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem. Mobility can be seen as a test of citizens’ capacities to interact in public, to demonstrate some communicative competences.¹⁶

A third, normative element of co-presence is pluralism, understood here not as a juridical frame but as pragmatic governance. Pluralism in this sense begins with the encouragement of mobility and a politics of contact. The capacity to visit, as both a moral and social virtue, assures the possibility of meetings between individuals. This kind of co-presence,

still existing, does not erase frontiers, but it marks forms and spaces of contiguities. They must be understood as moments of relational contiguity and of the presence between people, beyond the threshold of rupture. This is the pluralism of hospitality, of being open to the other while also recognizing scales of sovereignty (see Bryant this volume; also Joseph 1997).¹⁷

Sociologically, such practical efforts already exist in Jerusalem even if they are rare. They appear in the social mixity of adjacent neighbors—for instance, in Pisgat Zeev—and in associations made possible by property and social diversity. Politically, in the absence of a common governance in Jerusalem—the PLO and the Palestinian political parties all refuse any kind of representation in local political bodies—some associations (Jews and Arabs) create common cause through common associations.¹⁸ In East Jerusalem (Beit Hanina), shopkeepers, residents, and property-owners, already engaged in the maintenance of exchanges, progressively make up a shared community. Such practices in turn create a *habitus* (Bourdieu 1980) that may be mobilized for other politics. Such uncommon “communities of confidence” are rare and discrete but demonstrate the potential for an idea of coexistence that includes conflict and tension within sociality and that allows us to think differently about forms of urban governance (Lofland 1998).

Conclusion

Individual and ethnographic portraits have shown us forms of interaction even within the most extreme conditions of division and polarization. Viewed not from the perspective of an ideal model of coexistence but rather from its actual practice, we see that small acts of respect for the Other—the exercise or not of domination, of courtesy, of civility—may be able to construct a livable space, creating a place for people, while at the same time helping to build a shared life. This is a minimalist portrait of what Bryant refers to as the “labor of peace,” depending not on the active maintenance of neighborly relations but instead on ordinary civility. It is this form of “peace building”—the constraints of ordinary civility—that I claim are central in the context of hostility where cultural and communitarian influences are strong.

The Palestinian philosopher Sari Nusseibeh¹⁹ reminds us that the future of Jerusalem, and more broadly speaking the treatment of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, depends on “new ideas” (Nusseibeh 2011). Here I have addressed not the practice of coexistence per se, but rather its necessity and pragmatics in a non-ideal world (Anderson 2010). I also



Figure 9.2. East Jerusalem (photo by Sylvaine Bulle).

suggest, however, that such a pragmatic approach to living together may form the basis for a politics beyond the communitarian, based on socio-economic rights and an equality of spaces. This vision of justice is based not on control of institutions but on spatial contiguity and social respect on the neighborhood scale. From a sociological perspective, it is not improbable that ordinary politics may make it possible to achieve a more equitable city. It requires that violence disappear so that democracy can take its place.

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Notes

1. According to Schmitt, the *nomos* is a kind of juridical order based on a territorial delimitation of the nation.
2. The demographic policy of Israel aims first of all to limit the presence and the social cost of Palestinians in East Jerusalem. The capital has 765,000 people, 495,000 of whom are Jewish (65 percent), half living in the eastern section, and 270,000 Arabs (35 percent), almost entirely Palestinians in East Jerusalem. Furthermore, 80,000 Palestinians currently have permanent resident status in Jerusalem but do not live within the municipal limits of the capital. The Israeli administration is currently controlling the situation by ending residence status for married persons whose partners come from the Territories but live abroad.
3. See for instance Graham (2010); Weizman (2003); and Azoulay and Ophir (2005).
4. Based on the needs of certain sectors open to Palestinians, such as construction (approximately 60,000 authorized and legal workers) and according to the demographic equilibrium objective in Jerusalem between the Jewish populations (70 percent) and Arabs (30 percent) for requests for residence in Jerusalem.
5. Every Palestinian crossing into one of the Palestinian sub-zones is henceforth subject to computer and biometric verification based on a personal dossier that includes information about a person's geographic and family origins and their employer. The management of these checkpoints is under the control of the Israeli Defense Forces and in certain cases is subcontracted to private security firms with contracts with the army. Palestinians hailing from the Territories are not authorized to enter Jerusalem except under exceptional circumstances (sickness or a special permit). Marriages and family reunification between citizens of the Territories and Jerusalem are extremely rare and must fall under specific criteria (birth in Jerusalem, security criteria, children born in Jerusalem).
6. For example, the Damascus Gate, the northwestern gate of the Old City. Analysis is based on surveys in Jerusalem and the West Bank (2009–12).
7. Approximately 25,000 Palestinian workers are employed in the Jewish settlements (Israeli statistic 2011). Israeli settlements are military or civilian implantations built on lands occupied by Israel during and after the 1967 Six-Day War. Such settlements currently exist in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and in the Golan Heights. In the 121 officially recognized settlements in the West Bank live 300,000 Jews; over 300,000 Israelis live in settlements in East Jerusalem. They have their own jurisdictions, law, and regulations due to their extra-territorial status.
8. On this aspect see Hirschman's essay (1970) on the moral economy at the age of capitalism.
9. According to the press.
10. The Palestinians of East Jerusalem, born and residing within the city perimeter benefit from resident status (without citizenship and therefore without

- a passport). They have economic, health and social rights, access to public institutions (hospitals, doctors, social aid), and pay city taxes.
11. Historically, only a few Palestinians inhabitants of Jerusalem live in the western or central areas (except the historical quarters of Beit Safafa, Ein Karem, and the old cities).
 12. Matzav.com (The Online Voice of the Torah Jewry), 2/9/2009. See http://www.thesanhedrin.org/en/index.php/Psak_5769_Av_23.
 13. This also concerns the young Palestinians who choose to study, and sometimes live, at the Hebrew University located on Mt. Scopus, rather than in a Palestinian university.
 14. For Goffman, the notion of civil inattention is an attention not focused on the Other. It consists of showing to the Other that we have understood and are attentive to his or her presence, but without taking notice of the verbal, oral, or gestural habits of the Other, thus without intruding into the life of the Other.
 15. Elaborated by Erving Goffman (1971). The face to face is not only a way we define and interpret for ourselves a situation but also the way we engage ourselves in a course of action.
 16. We can refer here to a recent experience in the tram, in which sixty young Israelis planned a demonstration in which they would speak Arabic while using public transportation in order to encourage contact.
 17. For a philosophical and closed approach, see Derrida (1997).
 18. For example, there is the case of the association that was against the demolition of the ancient village of Lifta situated at the entrance to West Jerusalem. Composed of activists as well as Jewish and Arab residents, the association demanded that the village be listed as a world heritage site in the name of environmental preservation.
 19. Sari Nusseibeh is a Palestinian philosopher and an influential leader who is based in East Jerusalem.

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