CHAPTER 6

Ethnic Origin and Ethnicity

In the United States, from the end of the nineteenth century, citizens of German and Irish origin were sometimes disparaged as 'hyphenated Americans'. It was alleged that they hesitated to become '100 per cent' Americans because they still clung to other 'loyalties'. 'Ethnic group' seems to have come into popular use as a more acceptable name for 'hyphenated Americans'.

In *The Social Systems of American Ethnic Groups*, written by W. Lloyd Warner and Leo Srole and published in 1945, the expression 'ethnic group' was used to designate eight cultural minorities of white 'race', resident in Massachusetts, who were on their way to becoming 'one hundred per cent Americans'. The authors made no mention of 'ethnicity'; the first recorded use of that word is dated from 1953, when the sociologist David Riesman referred to 'the groups who, by reason of rural or small-town location, ethnicity, or other parochialism, feel threatened by the better educated upper-middle-class people.'

Whether or not he intended this, Riesman's change from the adjective 'ethnic' to the noun 'ethnicity' implied that there was some distinctive quality in the sharing of a common ethnic origin that explained why people such as those he referred to might feel threatened by upper-middle-class people, who, apparently, did not attach the same significance to their own ethnic origins. They did not count as 'ethnics'.

Census Categories

In the English-speaking world, popular conceptions of 'race' and 'ethnicity' have been powerfully influenced by the requirements of governments when they carry out population censuses, issue passports and visas and compile official records. US censuses have, from
the beginning, employed racial classifications. Starting with the 1910 census, a residual ‘Other’ category was provided, but the enumerators were instructed to enter the person’s ‘race’ based on observation. Much later, in 1975, the Office of Management and Budget made reference to ‘Ethnicity’ as a basis for classifying persons of Hispanic origin in order to monitor compliance with requirements for ‘affirmative action’.

After two years, this circular (A-46), was revised to state that if separate race and ethnic categories were used, the minimum designations were:

a. Race:
   - American Indian or Alaskan Native
   - Asian or Pacific Islander
   - Black
   - White
b. Ethnicity:
   - Hispanic origin
   - Not of Hispanic origin

In the United Kingdom’s census of 1991, residents in England and Wales were required to tick a box to indicate their ethnic group. They were offered seven possibilities: ‘White, Black-Caribbean, Black-African, Black-Other (please describe), Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Chinese, Any other ethnic group (please describe)’, and advised, ‘If the person is descended from more than one ethnic or racial group, please tick the box to which the person considers he/she belongs, or tick the “Any other ethnic group” box and describe the person’s ancestry in the space provided.’

There would have been vehement protests had any more general use been made of the word ‘racial’. As already noted in the introduction, people may be ready to identify themselves with an ethnic group in a census because they understand why they are asked to do so, but they may not identify themselves with that ethnic group in any other circumstances. Initially, there were objections to the introduction of an ethnic question in the UK census, and to the recording of ethnic group when compiling statistics of employment and social housing. What was in question was the nature of an ethnic category and the implications of its recognition. Such a category is not necessarily a social group in practice.
In the United States, the relation between the Hispanic/Non-Hispanic distinction and the official conception of ethnicity is often obscure. Other countries use the category ‘ethnic group’ in whatever way suits them. Whereas in the United States ‘ethnic group’ became a subdivision of race, the government of Sweden chose to legislate against ethnic discrimination in employment; beliefs about ‘racial’ differences might be a ground of that discrimination, or of incitement to public disorder, but there was no recognition of any kind of racial group. In China, sixty-six ethnic groups are recognized. The census of 2010 recorded 1,220,844,520 persons as members of the Han group. The next largest was that of the Zhuang, with 16,926,381. The smallest was that of the Tatar, with 3,556 persons. The Han category was thus nearly twice as numerous as the population of Europe and was nearly four times that of the United States. Persons outside China must wonder about the value of such a large category if it is not subdivided.

For internal or constitutional reasons some states are opposed to the collection of ethnic statistics. Countries founded upon immigration, like Australia and Canada, have been more ready to recognize ethnic differences than European countries that until recently have been more accustomed to emigration. The constitution of France is built on a conception of the republic that will recognize no intermediary between the citizen and the state. No minorities, whether indigenous like the Bretons or the Corsicans, or immigrants like those of North African origin, can be recognized in France. As earlier noted, some African and other states consider it inadvisable to collect ethnic statistics for fear that the figures might exacerbate internal tensions.

Official practice has not been the only source of ethnic categorization. As Europeans explored other world regions and described the peoples they encountered, they often reported the names by which distinctive peoples identified themselves or were identified by others. In Africa they often categorized such groups as ‘tribes’. For English speakers, this usage may have had origins in the King James Bible, with its references to ‘the tribe of Benjamin’ and the like. Since they did not speak of tribes within European countries, some Africans found use of this word disparaging; this might have encouraged the adoption of ‘ethnic group’ in place of tribe.

In the US census of 2010, 2.9 per cent of the total population indicated that they had origins in two or more races, an increase of 32 per cent over the figure recorded ten years earlier. Presumably these respondents wished to reject any implication that only one of their
ethnic origins merited recognition. Given what is known about the distribution of genetic characteristics, it is certain that a far larger percentage of the population could, had they wished, have assigned themselves to the two-or-more category. More may do so as they become accustomed to the availability of this option.

Since many of the Americans with genetic origins in more than one world region will have identified themselves as ‘black’ in the census, it is within this category that changing identification is most to be expected. The political advantages brought in the 1960s by the polarization of the black and white categories may have declined, while it is also possible that many more people may wish to register their rejection of this kind of categorization. Among those who prefer to be identified as of mixed ancestry, many favour the expression ‘multi-racial.’ This still retains a use of the racial idiom.

As mentioned in the introduction, many persons in the United States with multiple ethnic origins have, in the past, found that they could not get others to recognize them as neither black nor white. No third option was available to them. Now there is one. Answering the census question is a mode of self-identification with a community. In sociology it harks back to German notions of Gemeinschaft, and to Max Weber’s questions about how a belief in shared origins can stimulate individuals to engage in collective action.

**Anthropology**

In the English language, the adjective ‘ethnic’ came into use initially to identify a certain kind of social group or category and as an improvement on some questionable uses of the word ‘race.’ It aided the growth of practical knowledge. One stimulus was a book of 1935 that was designed to explain to a popular readership how in Nazi Germany a kind of racial theory with pre-Darwinian origins was being used in a scientifically unjustifiable manner. Julian Huxley and A. C. Haddon maintained that ‘ethnic group’ would be a better name for the physical categories that bore names like Slav, Mediterranean, Nordic and Alpine; they thought it should replace the word ‘race.’ As has also been noted earlier, fifteen years later an expert committee convened by UNESCO advised that ‘it would be better when speaking of human races to drop the term “race” altogether and speak of ethnic groups.’ Both these conceptions were of an ethnic group as a population cate-
gory independent of nations, states and their boundaries. They were intended as corrections of doctrines that claimed to be scientific.

In social and cultural anthropology it was customary to use ‘ethnic group’ as identifying a distinctive people with a common culture evident in their shared history, language and other characteristics. It was a practical classification, not one that presumed that all groups so designated shared a common quality of ‘ethnicity’. That ethnic groups existed was not thought to pose any anthropological problem.

This changed after the publication in 1969 of *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*. In its introduction, the Norwegian anthropologist Fredrik Barth maintained that the existence of an ethnic group depended not upon ‘the cultural stuff’ that its boundaries enclosed, but upon its ability to maintain those boundaries ‘despite a flow of personnel’ across them.\(^6\) Contrary to the prevailing assumption, Barth contended that the existence of ethnic groups did constitute an anthropological problem. Thereafter, while ‘ethnic group’ continued in use as a practical classifier, it also became a kind of concept, though whether it has become a truly etic construct is uncertain. Barth inspired others to study the processes by which ethnic groups were created, maintained and sometimes dissolved. He had identified interesting new explananda.

Since then, social scientists have asked how ethnic boundaries came about, what work went into their maintenance and how they might be changed. Though he was not primarily concerned with ethnic groups as minorities, and their relations with states and with other minorities, Barth’s arguments were extended to these fields. They were valuable in countering deterministic assumptions, in emphasizing the social construction of categories and in highlighting the views, intentions and self-perceptions of individual actors.\(^8\) They helped in the formulation of better research questions. These were not necessarily questions about groups that had their own territory. For example, an author writing from Canadian experience commented on how urban life could offer scope for particular groups to monopolize occupational niches in the urban economy, and how shared ethnic origin could be a resource helping individuals to enter the marketplace.\(^7\)

Barth discussed what he called ‘identity change’ with reference to four cases.\(^6\) One was that of the Yao people on the southern fringe of the Chinese region. The Yao population was increasing by 10 per cent per annum because people from neighbouring groups were adopting Yao farming practices, securing adoption into Yao kin groups and undergoing ritual assimilation. The second example was of Pathans
in Afghanistan who became Baluch, while the third came from the Sudan, where members of the Fur group of hoe agriculturalists were adopting the nomadic cattle-herding life of the Baggara, an Arab people.

The fourth example related to people of Lapp origin in northern Norway, some of whom were (and are) engaged in farming and fishing. They have changed in that their indigenous name, Saami, now has public recognition, and they are changing further by their adoption of many of the values of the Norwegian ethnic majority (for example, in claiming knowledge of other parts of Norway and in taking pride in well-furnished kitchens). Only in private did they speak in Saami, as if in public settings their ethnic identification constituted a stigma. In Barth's terms, they were on their way to assimilation because of the choices they were making. They were choosing the alternatives that, presumably, brought them the greater net benefits.

In African cities where newcomers from different ethnic groups encounter one another and speak a lingua franca, such changes in ethnic boundaries are common. There is a general tendency for ethnic origins to be ranked according to their associated degrees of socio-economic status, and sometimes for their dutifulness in fulfilling religious obligations. A person from a low-ranking group may conceal his or her origins, just as happens in modern industrial societies. A person may try to pass as a member of a favoured ethnic group if he or she stands to gain thereby. Even if the person in question is not conscious of making any calculation of predicted costs and benefits, this supposition may offer a persuasive explanation of 'passing'. It would be in line with the view of social behaviour as exchange, or transactionalism, that Barth pioneered in some of his earlier work.

Any conception of a scale of socio-economic status is founded upon the assumption that social attributes can be compared and that social behaviour will reflect a trade-off between possible gains and losses.

With the approach of self-government, ethnic categories in colonial territories acquired a new significance. 'Nationalist' leaders acted as political entrepreneurs; they advanced their views of the new alternatives that were being opened and recruited supporters. They could recruit most effectively by appealing for support on the basis of shared ethnic origin. They manufactured ethnic consciousness.

This perspective can be employed in the study of the political changes in North America that followed the US Civil Rights movement, and the student activism of 1968. Quite apart from assertions
of a ‘right to be different’, they stimulated a wave of ‘identity politics’ driven by the feminist, gay and lesbian liberation movements in association with demands for recognition made on behalf of ethnic minorities. The latter contributed to the pressure for courses on ‘ethnic studies’ in US universities that expressed the growing self-awareness and radicalization of people of color, such as African Americans, Asian Americans, Latino Americans and American Indians.

In Canada there was a new demand from French Canadians for the constitutional protection of their distinctiveness. In response, the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism recommended support for the cultural contributions of minority groups. From 1971, the expression ‘multiculturalism’ was introduced in Canada as a name for official programmes of cultural maintenance. It was then transplanted to Australia. In Britain it was first used to designate an educational philosophy alternative to that of anti-racism.

Words ending in ‘-ism’ can accommodate many meanings, and so it was with multiculturalism. In an influential commentary on *Multiculturalism and ‘The Politics of Recognition’*, Charles Taylor traced the new demands to conceptions of ‘identity’ as something known subjectively that summed up fundamental features of social being. He said, ‘The thesis is that our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, and that for lack of recognition, a person or group can suffer real damage.’

The demand for recognition was a political claim requiring a political response, but the word ‘identity’ can also be used as a concept in social science. From a policy standpoint, it might be useful to have some measures of the importance of this identity relative to the other identities or priorities of the claimants (quite apart from any consideration of evidence from genetic tests). From a social science standpoint, the concept of identity may have suffered overuse. Thus one important review concluded.

Throughout this book, we have asked what work the concept is supposed to do, and how well it does it. We have argued that the concept is deployed to do a great deal of analytical work – much of it legitimate and important. ‘Identity’, however, is ill suited to perform this work, for it is riddled with ambiguity, riven with contradictory meanings and encumbered by reifying connotations.

Many of these ambiguities arose from failures to specify sufficiently sharply the explananda that were being addressed.
A New Reality?

Reference to ‘ethnic groups’ was soon generalized by observations about ‘ethnicity’. A volume edited by Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan, *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience*, was very influential. It stemmed from a conference that had assembled theoretical and empirical studies of ‘situations in which ethnic groups distinguish themselves’. The chief thrust, however, appears to have been the editors’ concern with the emic construct of ‘ethnicity’ as an explanandum. They wrote: ‘We are suggesting that a new word reflects a new reality and a new usage reflects a change in that reality. The new word is “ethnicity”’. Such a formulation takes the reader back to Weber’s doubts about what this quality might be.

Many of the contributors provided analyses of particular situations that could be explicated by reference simply to ethnic groups and ethnic boundaries; one of them concluded that the ‘term “ethnicity” is clearly a confusing one’. Nevertheless, the editors’ insisted that ‘ethnicity’ was ‘a new reality’; they used the word as the title for the book; their encouragement of the view that the appearance on the political stage of ‘ethnicity’ was to be explained as the product of either primordialism or circumstantialism caught the attention of students of these matters. This formulation guided the course of teaching and research for a quarter-century.

At the time, Glazer and Moynihan’s argument appeared to be a significant and original contribution to sociological knowledge. In retrospect it appears that their influence was, at least in part, negative. The reality that concerned them most was that members of the public, particularly in the United States, were displaying a heightened appreciation of their ethnic origins and were using shared ethnic origin as a basis for mobilization. European immigrants to that country had initially associated with their co-nationals. Later, when they realized that they would not return to live in their countries of origin, their co-nationals became their co-ethnics. The nature of the bond between the settlers had changed. Subsequent discussion centred upon the editors’ question about the source of ethnicity: was it a primordial disposition, or was it a response to circumstances? Most commentators accepted that there was a thing, and that it was correctly identified. They concentrated on its outcome.

The Glazer and Moynihan volume, and the subsequent discussion, would have been different had the objective been to account for the
significance that individuals attributed to their own and others’ ethnic origin in given circumstances. This would have introduced a variable that is not measured when individuals specify an ethnic origin: When is ethnic origin socially relevant? Because they have no measure of within-category variation, those who use official statistics sometimes assume that most members of such a category will behave similarly. Measures of within-category variation are important to the assessment of social change.

The only contributor to query the relation of ethnic origin to national origin (and then only obliquely) was the demographer William Petersen. He wrote:

> What is lacking is a term similar in meaning to the European concept of a nation but applicable to a smaller population – that is, a people, a folk, held together by some or all of such more or less immutable characteristics as common descent, territory, history, language, religion, way of life, or other attributes that members of a group have from birth onward. In earlier writings, I have proposed the term subnation for these units.15

A subnation, in Petersen’s sense, was a national minority that did not seek separation from the state within which its members were citizens. Had Glazer and Moynihan used subnation as the name for a set of individuals who wanted recognition of their distinctive character associated with their origin, and who might, in some circumstances, want a measure of autonomy, the subsequent course of discussion might have taken another direction.

Insofar as this argument held, the conference had to deal with an old reality, not a new one. It should have established stronger connections with scholarly writing about nationalism.

**Nomenclature**

Once a particular name for a category has become accepted it is easier to modify it than to challenge the original, probably unthinking, decision. The name ‘race relations’ now gives way to modifications like ‘ethnic and racial relations’. With this in mind, it can be instructive to return to the conference that led to the 1955 book, *Race Relations in World Perspective*, discussed in chapter 4.

At that time the number one country for the study of race relations was the United States. That was where a theoretical framework had...
been developed. The number two country was South Africa. An Institute of Race Relations had been established in Johannesburg in 1929. There was on-going research. Two contributors to the World Perspective conference had agreed to contribute essays on the historical precedents and the more recent developments in South Africa; while both of them used the expression ‘race relations’ in their titles, they made scant use of it in the essays themselves. The contributor who wrote on the history noted, ‘When people in South Africa talk of “the two races”, they often mean not Black and White, but the Afrikaans-speaking Whites and the English-speaking Whites. For, like the Bantu, the whites have been divided into rival national groups.’ Writing on the currently prevailing situation, the other contributor began with the observation that, in deciding policy, the Whites ‘have altogether overlooked the fact that there are other ethnic groups in the Union.’

Seen from a twenty-first-century standpoint, both authors could have laid aside the idiom of race and written about ethnic groups or subnations. In their generation this would have been difficult because the field of study had been defined as the study of race relations, and there was no conceptual framework for the study of ethnic relations.

At the time of the World Perspective conference, the political situation in South Africa was changing because the National Party government was implementing its plan for apartheid. The preeminent exponent of the plan’s underlying philosophy was Hendrik Verwoerd, a social scientist who had been professor of Applied Sociology and Social Work at the University of Stellenbosch from 1932 to 1937 before he entered politics. He became prime minister in 1958, and served in this position until his assassination eight years later.

From his days as a schoolboy, Verwoerd was preoccupied with what he perceived as the problem of white poverty; he saw this from the perspective of an Afrikaner nationalist. In his sociology lectures, Verwoerd presented an evolutionist perspective taking the form of cultural-historical theory in which black South Africans were part of a completely different civilization. Biological determinism and racial theory played only insignificant parts in his argument. The nature of a people, a volk, was the key element. A careful study of his philosophy has concluded: ‘The fact that Verwoerd saw whites and blacks as belonging to different cultures was not in itself racist, but his perception of each as captive to these cultures was.’

It seems clear that the names ‘ethnic group’ and ‘nationalism’ better represent social categories and sentiment in South Africa both before
What We Now Know about Race and Ethnicity and after the end of apartheid than the nomenclature used at the World Perspective conference. Indeed, it can be argued, with the benefit of hindsight, that the conference itself might well have been on Ethnic Relations in World Perspective. Someone might have maintained that during the nineteenth century, African Americans became an ethnic group. The idiom of race had a place in the study of white attitudes and behaviour, not in the study of the black response to this behaviour. It could have inspired a little book on the strange career of Jim Crow’s creator, the new white ideology and its institutional expression.

A movement to reassess use of the idiom of race could have started in the 1950s, but any attempt to replace it with an idiom of ethnicity would have had to relate ethnic sentiment to national sentiment. There was, and still is, no agreement about how the word ‘nationalism’ is best employed or how it should relate to ethnicity.

The extent of the disagreement may be illustrated by recalling the declaration of a critic of nationalist claims when he asserted, ‘Nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century. It pretends to supply a criterion for the determination of the unit of population proper to enjoy a government exclusively its own, for the legitimate exercise of power in the state, and for the right organization of a society of states.’ This expressed what has been considered an idealist theory of nationalism, making national sentiment a cause of political action and not a result of it. The Eurocentric orientation of that theory has been counterbalanced by the thesis that nations are ‘imagined communities’ and that the sentiment has sources in the cultures of non-European peoples as well.

A radically different diagnosis of the origins of national sentiment was advanced by Ernest Gellner; he portrayed the nation-state as a product of modernity. Gellner’s account was opposed in turn by Anthony Smith who emphasized the ethnic origins of nations. The challenge sparked a lively debate.

Each nation is unique, but forms of government can be classified. Earlier, Hans Kohn had contended that some European states, notably Germany, were founded upon an ethnic conception of the nation, whereas other states, notably France, subordinated notions of a national bond to a doctrine that the state and the citizen were bound by a civic bond. Ethnic nationalism was presented as undemocratic and irrational, civic nationalism as rational and democratic.

In the United States, hyphenate groups could be accounted ethnic; it was a practical way of making sense of the general situation. Like-
wise, groups in Europe could be accounted ethnic because of the association between the ethnic and the national. This is not a universal association. The hyphenate usage was not acceptable to some French Canadians (or Québécois), because of their insistence that they are a nation, not a subdivision of a state that fails fully to recognize their distinctiveness. One writer objects that ‘by using the term ethnic, one is perceived as negating the legitimate right of a national community to self-determination’. A similar argument underlies the position adopted by those African Americans who are known as black nationalists.

In sociology, support has grown for the argument that it is unwise to examine racial distinctions in isolation from ethnic distinctions, or to study ethnic distinctions apart from national distinctions. This was acknowledged when the editors of the *Annual Review of Sociology* for 2009 commissioned a review of sociological writing about ‘ethnicity, race and nationalism’.

The philosophical problems arose with the use of ‘ethnicity’ as a noun, not with its use as an adjective, as in ‘ethnic group’ and ‘ethnic origin’. To write of ‘ethnicity’, as Glazer and Moynihan did, was to represent ethnicity as a thing, to reify it. The reality is that individuals vest ethnic origin with social significance. There are variables here that have not yet been examined systematically.

The US population can now be described as including five pan-ethnic categories, African American, Asian American, European American, Hispanic American and Native American. In some circumstances, new names are needed to differentiate those African Americans and European Americans whose ancestors came to the United States before and after the Civil War from African Americans and Europeans whose origins in the United States are more recent. Some persons, such as Hispanic Americans of European descent, may be able to claim places in more than one panethnic category.

**Sociobiology**

If ethnic identification was to be seen as ‘a new reality’, it was one that depended upon the construction that individuals put upon their social circumstances. This might not be the end of the matter. Pierre L. van den Berghe maintained in 1981 that ethnicity was an extension of kinship, and that the significance attributed to kinship enabled hu-
mans to maximize inclusive fitness in their struggle for a biological future. Social behaviour had a biological foundation. His model then assumed that people behave cooperatively with others to the extent that they share interests, or believe that they do, or that they are coerced into behaving in ways contrary to their interests (in which case they are forced to play the game of minimizing loss rather than maximizing gain).

This thesis has been supported by findings reported from studies of social associations with variations in skin colour. These variations have been measured with spectrometers in thirty-two groups living in every major world region. The results show that sexual selection has been in operation. A lighter complexion increases a woman's opportunities for marriage, as if men, perhaps unconsciously, 'choose women more on the basis of physical characteristics (such as youth, health and body fat) that are linked to reproductive value, while women tend to select men on the basis of male readiness and capacity to invest resources in raising their offspring'. These differences can be accounted for as the outcome of 'a genetically based sexual dimorphism in skin pigmentation'. On the larger scale, they support the conclusion that, to persist, human culture must 'serve the reproductive interests of its flesh and blood carriers'.

The evidence that men and women choose partners on the basis of different characteristics and place a different value upon pigmentation is highly relevant to sociological research, but few sociologists have the technical competence to assess the claim that the sexual dimorphism serves a biological interest. This issue brings up the philosophical difficulties that centre upon the nature of sociological explanation.

The view urged here is that the sociologist's task is to assess whether a perception of a particular shade of skin colour can help account for an observation about observed behaviour.

**Ethnic Origin as a Social Sign**

Any attempt to account for the significance that individuals attribute to their own and others' ethnic origin in given circumstances can well start from the proposition (mentioned earlier) that when two persons meet, either one of them may perceive something about the other that suggests that he or she has a distinctive ethnic or national origin. In Yankee City, as represented by Lloyd Warner, a Yankee might per-
receive someone as Irish-American or Italian-American, subdivisions of what Warner considered a racial category. The same person might perceive another person as Puerto Rican, an ethnic subdivision of the black category, or as Canadian, assigning him or her to a national category. In Marseilles, a French person might perceive another as Corsican or Basque or as Italian, assigning the first two to ethnic categories, and the third person to a national category. In London, a man in a kilt might be assigned to a national category – as a Scot – but to a national category of a kind different from the national category to which an Italian would be assigned, because the United Kingdom can be considered a multinational state. In the East End of London, a man with brown skin, a particular kind of white cap and a long gown might be assigned to a national category, as Bangladeshi, to a religious category, as Muslim, or to an ethnic category, as a Briton of Bangladeshi origin. In chapter 4, Maurice Freedman was quoted as observing, ‘In the study of race relations the student has crossed his pons asinorum when he has learned to define his “races” afresh for each new situation he is called upon to discuss.’ The same principle applies to use of the notion of ethnicity.

The social significance of a sign of minority ethnic origin varies with the kind of ethnic or national majority. In the United States, where everyone is of immigrant origin except persons of Native American descent, a sign of ethnic origin is not necessarily an indicator of recent immigration. In countries like Malaysia, in which members of one group regard themselves as a Staatsvolk, a sign of non-majority ethnic origin indicates someone who is not entitled to Staatsvolk privileges. In Malaysia, as in many countries, a person of minority ethnic origin may be at a disadvantage even though he or she is a citizen.

Sociological research has also described a related kind of situation. In parts of Romania that used to be parts of Hungary, use of the Hungarian language may rouse Romanian suspicions that the persons in question are not behaving as Romanians should. When members of a minority ethnic group want to be part of a different state, signs of their ethnic origin raise issues of interstate relations. For sociological analysis, the significance of ethnic origin in situations that raise questions of interstate relations may need to be treated separately from interethnic relations within states. (Note that here, as elsewhere in this book, ‘state’ refers to the US federal state, not to its constituent components.)
In the United States, however, much sociological research has been directed towards the country's public policy concerns. Prominent among them has been the settlement and assimilation of immigrants and migrant workers from Mexico and other Latin American countries. Research into diaspora processes and into conceptions of identity has sometimes overlapped with this. In general, though, research publications refer mostly to closely related studies without much sense of connection to general and comparative work. This is consistent with the doubts about any claim that racial and ethnic studies constitute a properly conceptualized subfield within the social sciences.

**Comparative Politics**

At the beginning of chapter 4 it was claimed that psychology was the first of the social sciences to build theoretical knowledge about social interaction in general, including black-white interaction, without being dependent upon any concept of race. Economics came next. Sociologists have struggled with the problem for a century, but now, with the creation of comparative politics as a recognized division of political science, they have the support of new and powerful allies. Students of comparative politics bring special skills, such as those needed to make good use of the theory of games, described by Jon Elster as probably 'the most important single advance of the social sciences in the twentieth century'.

The book that best represents this new development is Donald L. Horowitz's *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* of 1985; it made a major contribution to practical knowledge. Horowitz aimed to set out an understanding of the nature of ethnic affiliations, and an explanation of ethnic conflict with a primary focus on severely divided societies in Africa and Asia. The author's approach was 'to get the hands dirty, in the double sense of dealing with the often seamy side of ethnic politics and of looking closely at the details of actual cases.' In particular, he asked what it is about ethnic affiliations that makes them conducive to severe conflict?

The conception of ethnicity he employed did not separate 'race' from 'ethnicity', but embraced 'differences identified by color, language, religion, or some other attribute of common origin' and treated ethnicity as 'functionally continuous with kinship'. The primary con-
cern was with the influence of ethnic affiliation upon state politics, recognizing that ethnic affiliation was not unitary but might include 'subethnic division'. Ethnicity was therefore treated as an explanandum rather than as an explanans, and the conflicts considered were those between mobilized groups. It did not directly discuss variations in the significance attributed to differences of ethnic origin.

While this may well be the best way to advance an 'understanding' of the phenomena in question, no explanation of ethnic conflict can be complete if it does not explain why there can be situations of ethnic contact without conflict, and that ethnic differences do not necessarily lead to collective action by both parties. Any vision of conflict as a group phenomenon is likely to rely on the oversocialized conception of the actor, as a person who always conforms to group expectations.

The strength of *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* lies, as promised, in the analysis of ethnic politics, of the circumstances that inspire military coups and of political measures designed to reduce the likelihood of coups or of secessions. A particular strength of Horowitz's contribution is his exposition of 'constitutional engineering', the possibilities, for example, of reducing conflict within federal states by increasing the number of units that constitute the federation, or by revising their boundaries, by devolution, by preferential policies or by changing the electoral system. For example, under the constitution of Nigeria as it was in 1979, to be elected president a candidate had to secure at least 25 per cent of the vote in two-thirds of the federation's states. This discouraged candidates from trying to pile up votes by appealing to ethnic constituencies.

Research in comparative politics holds out a possibility of bringing an analysis of state and national institutions into the same conceptual framework as the analysis of racial and ethnic relations. A test case is presented by studies of intergroup conflict in India, where distinctions of belief and descent are drawn in ways that parallel distinctions of racial and ethnic origin. There are also puzzling variations, since there is violent conflict between Hindus and Muslims in some cities but not in others. Ashutosh Varshney wondered why eight cities, containing just 18 per cent of India's population, should have accounted for nearly half of the total deaths from Hindu-Muslim urban violence between 1950 and 1995. So he compared the conflict-prone city of Aligarh with the relatively conflict-free city of Calicut. In both cities there were oppositions between Hindus and Muslims, and in both cities committees to prevent violence had been established. They were
effective in Calicut because of the counterbalancing effect of caste divisions among the Hindus and because the interest of the local political elite lay in the prevention of violence. In Aligarh, by contrast, different sections of the elite could gain from Hindu-Muslim conflict.

This study took violence as a criterion for determining when an opposition became a conflict, which would be an undue limitation in the study of some of the conflicts regarded as racial or ethnic. A more general question was raised by Varshney’s readiness to count Hindu-Muslim violence as ethnic conflict (rather than religious conflict). An Indian sociologist, discussing other political conflicts in the Indian subcontinent, has similarly presented them as instances of ‘coping with ethnicity’. There are genuine questions about how the Bangladeshis came to feel themselves a separate people, about why Sikh group consciousness has risen and fallen and about the nature of a Kashmiri identity, but calling them ethnic problems is only a redescription. It does not add to explanation of the processes in question.32

Some questions have a bottom-up character. Why is one category of persons attacked rather than another? After the assassination in 1984, by a Punjabi Sikh, of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, mobs in Delhi attacked Sikhs, but those they attacked were Sikhs from parts of India other than the Punjab, and the victims were not supporters of Punjabi separatism. In the northern Nigerian town of Kano, in 1953 and again in 1966, Ibo settlers from southern regions were attacked, but not Yoruba settlers. The northerners had just as much reason to suspect the political and commercial ambitions of the Yoruba from the southwest as the Ibo from the southeast. Why should one group have been victimized while another remained unharmed?

Many Asian and African states have been challenged by minority movements seeking to secede. Bangladesh and South Sudan were successful. Biafra and many others have been unsuccessful. According to Horowitz, the emergence of such a movement is determined mainly by domestic politics, but whether it will succeed is determined largely by international politics. These issues have been taken further in a study of the policies of European states that have attempted, or might have attempted, to recover lost territory.33 Why, for example, did Armenia in 1991 go to war with Azerbaijan in order to establish a corridor linking up with an Armenian enclave living in Azerbaijani territory? It proved an expensive venture, and the Armenian claim that they have revised their state borders has not been acceptable to other states.
Why did Croatia try to grab portions of Bosnia inhabited by fellow Croats, and Serbia risk so much on behalf of Serbs outside Serbia? If these actions are attributed to nationalism, why did not Hungary try to renegotiate its boundary with Romania to recover some of the territory it lost in 1920? Romania lost Bessarabia in 1939; it later became the independent state of Moldova. Why did not Romania and Moldova reunite after 1989? Why, after the dissolution of the USSR, was not more done to bring the twenty-five millions outside Russia into closer relation with their motherland?

Aggressive attempts to change borders in order to bring co-ethnics back into the nation-state are examples of irredentism. Though they raise practical issues central to the study of comparative politics, any attempt to explain them in theoretical terms as the product of ethnic solidarity raises difficulties of definition. When the issue is one of interstate relations, is it not a matter of national rather than ethnic sentiment?

When, in 1916, the United States declared war on Germany, the change in circumstances forced German Americans to decide whether they were to be members of an ethnic minority loyal to the state in which they resided, or whether they were to be German nationals and accept the possibility that they would be interned for the duration of the war. For practical purposes, a distinction had to be drawn between an ethnic bond and a national bond. Whether there are theoretical purposes for drawing a parallel distinction is not yet certain. The formation of a nation-state is sometimes seen as an outcome of ethnic sentiment among persons who have been citizens of a different state. So long as they were agitating for union with their kin state, they would have been a national minority. If, on the other hand, the government of the state in which they found themselves gave them greater autonomy, secessionist sentiment might decline, and the persons in question might continue as members of an ethnic minority. Such a formulation can guide use of the adjectives ‘ethnic’ and ‘national’, but it does not provide a way of distinguishing between ‘ethnicity’ and ‘nationalism’ if these are thought to motivate behaviour.

Chapter 4 has already introduced the claimed existence of ‘plural’ societies as composed of ethnically and culturally distinctive social categories that do not actively seek to change any territorial borders. In a book titled Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability, Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth A. Shepsle brought the issue into comparative politics. It was cited as the first example of the use
of rational choice theory in the study of race and ethnic relations.36
The authors noted developments in eighteen plural societies in Asia,
Africa, South America, the Middle East, Europe and the Caribbean.
Most were former colonies that became independent after World War
II, but the coverage extended to others, including Belgium, South Af-
rica, Yugoslavia, Lebanon and Northern Ireland. Rabushka and Shep-
sle elaborated a formal model of decision theory, featuring techniques
for the analysis of decision taking. The techniques in question, how-
ever, were applicable in the analysis of all kinds of economy provided
due account was taken of imperfect competition.37
Some authors have proposed the analysis of pluralism without
claiming that there are distinctive plural societies. One table summa-
rizing high, medium and low degrees of pluralism lists the number,
relative size and geographical distribution of ethnic, racial or caste
groups, the clarity and rigidity of their boundaries, together with the
range of institutional autonomy, the multiplication, distinctiveness
and compatibility of institutions, the degree, range and compatibility
of values and the compatibility of membership in distinctive kinds
of social networks.38 Though the differences are real and relevant,
that is not sufficient to make pluralism into an explanatory concept.
The next chapter will argue that many of the divisions are better
explained as the products of social closure by groups pursuing sec-
tional interests.
As a further example of the kinds of contribution that can be
expected from political scientists, reference may be made to David
Laitin's investigations of the relative strength of different social iden-
tifications in promoting the coordination of social action. In a Somali
school he set up a field experiment to test his hypothesis that use of
the Somali language would promote a more egalitarian view of the
relation between a headmaster and a class teacher than would use of
the English language. The results confirmed his hypothesis. In Nigeria
he hypothesized that Yoruba Christians would find authority in the
Christian scriptures and Muslims in their imam's sermons. He found
instead that Yoruba sought no political advantage by appealing to re-
ligious differences, but divided according to ancestral city origin. This
had become the salient dimension of social relations in the southwest
of the country, whereas religion had become the salient dimension in
the north. Laitin's explanation was that individuals had collectively
chosen the dimension that gave them the optimal political returns
within the state's system of resource allocation.39
A sophisticated application of similar techniques was employed in an innovatory study conducted in Kampala, Uganda, by four political scientists. Unlike previous studies, it measured the influence of ethnic identifications instead of deducing their influence from observation, and it produced new findings that went beyond the kind of information previously available. How much use was the concept of ethnicity for the elucidation of these findings?

Members of the public do not always act in accordance with what others believe to be their interests. The Kampala researchers reported that the residents of the poorer neighbourhoods of the town had to cope with major problems of drainage, garbage removal and personal security. Heavy rainfall caused severe flooding, and this was made more serious by the accumulation of refuse in the open drains. The city council failed to keep all the drains clear and to remove all the garbage. Community patrols had once served to deter criminal behaviour, but were no longer funded. The resulting constant threat of theft had reduced the quality of local life. Why then did the residents of many neighbourhoods not themselves organize to remove garbage and restore the community patrols by establishing a neighbourhood watch?

Several earlier studies had reported that cooperative action takes place more readily among socially homogeneous groups. While the Kampala study supported the conclusion that ethnically heterogeneous communities have greater difficulty acting collectively, the researchers concluded that the mere sharing of ethnic origin did not provide a sufficient explanation. They found that underlying the social behaviour they studied there appeared to be a universal norm of reciprocity. The subjects apparently found it easier to develop reciprocal relations with co-ethnics; that helped account for the initiation of collective action.

The researchers drew a random sample of three hundred residents in one neighbourhood. They checked to see if their subjects, given differing amounts of information, could identify other members of their sample ethnically (some could not); they then investigated whether subjects behaved differently in relations with those they believed to be co-ethnics. They differentiated ‘benchmark demographics’ (in which the subject correctly identified the other party with one of the ethnic categories employed by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics) and ‘subjective demographics’ (in which the subject identified the other party in some other way).
They showed subjects photographs of potential partners, offering them rewards if they identified co-ethnics. Then they added an indication of the language spoken by the other party and that person's given and family names to see how much this improved their identifications. They found that some persons and groups could not be easily identified. The findings suggested that the ethnic categories reflected only poorly the social categories that were used in everyday life (the subjective demographics). Sometimes regional origin was more important than ethnic or benchmark origin.

Earlier studies had reported that cooperative action takes place more readily along ethnic lines than across them, and that ethnically heterogeneous communities have greater difficulty acting collectively. To investigate the link between ethnic diversity and ability to cooperate in securing public goods, the researchers took a lead from the Prisoner's Dilemma game. In that game, both players benefit if they cooperate. If one contributes to collective action and the other does not, then the would-be cooperator becomes a 'sucker'. He or she gets little return on the investment, while the other party takes a 'free ride'. Cooperative action by one player alone is not fairly rewarded.

The three hundred subjects attended four sessions in which, motivated by the prospect of significant reward, they played a series of games designed to measure the significance of different possible determinants. Two of the general findings were that co-ethnics engaged more frequently with each other and were more likely to punish each other for failing to cooperate, but some of the detailed findings could not have been predicted in advance and they opened interesting questions for further research.

Other studies had shown that subjects vary in the degree to which they prioritize material gain for themselves. To allow for this, the Kampala subjects were divided into egoists and non-egoists. This was done by use of a version of the Dictator game in which subjects can decide how much of the reward they will distribute and how much they will keep for themselves. This indicated that an egoist was more likely to cooperate with the other player if that player was thought to be a co-ethnic. To find out if this came from an expectation of reciprocity, the researchers gave the players additional information about the identity of the other players. Removal of the condition of anonymity had a significant effect upon the behaviour of the egoists, but none on the non-egoists. The results showed that if co-ethnics cooperate more effectively in producing public goods, it is not simply because
they value more highly the happiness of other group members, care about the same things or simply prefer working with co-ethnics. It is because perceived sharing of ethnic origin can generate strategies that promote cooperation. The subjects themselves recognized that the games they were invited to play mirrored their everyday problems.

If such findings can be confirmed, they will point to an unconscious source of ethnic preferences, one that could not easily have been found by any other research method. It could be the beginning of a progressive research programme. The theory of games opens avenues for the study of conditions favourable to the development of reciprocal relations.

While the authors acknowledged that the significance of ‘ethnicity’ was powerfully influenced by national politics, and were cautious about generalizing their findings, they did not sufficiently question either the nature of what is called ethnicity or what characterizes the circumstances in which a co-ethnic is considered a potential ally.

It looks as if, in Kampala, someone from the same region may be as good an ally as a co-ethnic, but by taking the classification employed by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics as their benchmark, the authors turned down the opportunity to learn more about the logic within the ‘subjective demographics’. Nevertheless this path-breaking research demonstrated that, by tapping unconscious influences, the experimental study of ethnic preferences can contribute new knowledge.

The Current Sociology of Ethnicity

Student texts about ethnicity have not yet caught up with all these developments in research. Most authors take as their point of departure the ordinary language meaning of the word instead of trying to explain the behaviour that is designated by the word. Thus the author of *The Sociology of Ethnicity* focused on the meaning given to the word by fellow sociologists; he stated, ‘Ethnicity is not a thing or a collective asset of a particular group; it is a social relation in which social actors perceive themselves and are perceived by others as being distinct collectivities.’ He presented ‘ethnicity’ as an explanandum rather than an explanans.

The author of a second text perceived a problem of definition when he asked, ‘How are we in principle to distinguish ethnic attachments from kinship, neighbourhood or organizational attachments, for ex-
ample, and how, correspondingly, can we compare different “ethnic” situations? His proposed solution did not consider whether the concept was fit for an accepted purpose. Nor did it address the differentiation of ethnic from national origin. It was to advance a model in which

Ethnicity is a matter of cultural differentiation …
– centrally a matter of shared meanings …
– no more fixed or unchanging …
– as an identification, is collective and … individualized in personal self-identification.42

This is to presume that there is a common element to all the instances in which ‘ethnic attachments’ are noted.

A third author discussed some of the related philosophical difficulties, but concluded that ‘a theory of ethnicity has to be a theory of the contexts in which it is “activated”’. This was an unfortunate metaphor because it suggests that there is a general and distinctive sentiment properly so named.43 Like other authors, he started from the name instead of from an observation. Yet with the worldwide increase in ‘ethnic tourism’, the words ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ are acquiring new meanings that emphasize the exotic.44 The significance of a shared ethnic origin varies from place to place: it is not the same in the United States for hyphenates as it is for North American Indian groups whose special status enables them to open lucrative casino enterprises and to remake themselves in the image of the corporation.45 It is not the same in Quebec as it is in the rest of Canada, or in the African countryside compared with the towns. If, as appears to be the case, there are no problems that can be solved only by using a concept of ethnicity, then ethnicity, like racism, is to be regarded as an emic construct. The social scientist has to look elsewhere for theoretical inspiration.

As has been argued from the beginning of this book, a better strategy is to start from an intellectual problem. This has been exemplified by a study of interpersonal relations in three urban neighbourhoods in Switzerland. The author, Andreas Wimmer, asked, ‘Does ethnicity matter in processes of everyday group formation?’ Without assuming that the residents formed groups based on ethnic origin, he collected information on ethnic origin as he did on other possibly relevant variables.46 His results told him that ‘ethnic-national groups
... do not play ... a central role ... in the social world of our informants. ... They did not divide themselves and others into groups based on ethnicity ... but in accordance with ... a central scheme of order. In considering whether newly arrived residents were treated as 'outsiders', whether they helped keep the courtyard tidy and followed the rules of the building counted for more than their ethnic origin. Thus Wimmer's explanandum was everyday group formation in such neighbourhoods. His explanans was that acceptance reflected conformity to neighbourhood social norms. He has since developed this argument in ways that will be mentioned later.

If a new species of plant or animal is discovered, a description of a type specimen is published in a scientific journal and the type specimen is deposited in a natural history museum where, if necessary, it can be examined by other researchers. Sociologists have no type specimen of 'ethnicity', and cannot reliably differentiate ethnicity from other variables with which it is associated. Though this problem should have been identified after the publication of Glazer and Moynihan's influential volume *Ethnicity* in 1975, it has not yet been properly confronted.

The word 'ethnicity' has no agreed meaning in sociology. If the social sciences were more like botany, there might be greater agreement on how a people, a nation and an ethnic group are to be differentiated and defined. As it is, social science research workers do not address problems of a kind that obliges them to select the best performing concepts. Too many of the authors who have set out to discuss ethnicity - like those who have discussed racism - have started from a word instead of from an explanandum. They might have done better had they differentiated practical and theoretical knowledge. Further experimental research (not necessarily of the kind described here) offers the best hope that someday social scientists may be able to uncover regularities that underlie the expressions employed in ordinary language.

**Notes**

9. The city of Freetown was founded in 1787 within the territory of the Temne ethnic group. A Temne leader who, on Sierra Leone’s independence, became deputy prime minister, described the situation in the mid-1940s as follows: ‘The Temnes in the City were moving rapidly towards detribalization, some becoming Creoles and others Aku and Mandingoes. The first were the educated ones in English and others who were not educated but have come to Freetown to seek jobs. The reason for the exodus from the Temne tribe was the backwardness of the Temnes socially and economically. To be considered favourably was to call yourself a Mandingo, Creole or Aku. This protective measure was adopted in many forms, dress, language and in joining foreign dances. Consequently every bright looking young Temne is lost to the other tribes and the word Temne is associated with the uncivilized people.’ Michael Banton, *West African City: A Study of Tribal Life in Freetown* (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), 165.
Ethnic Origin and Ethnicity


37. Rabushka and Shepsle, *Politics in Plural Societies*, 66, characterize the plural society as one in which ‘ethnic preferences are intense and are not negotiable’. The situation in Java in Furnival’s day was supposed to be the classic example of a plural society, but the re-examination of the evidence by Coppel showed that the ethnic preferences there were negotiable.


43. Steve Fenton, *Ethnicity* (Cambridge: Polity, 2003), 2, 113. Steve Fenton and the present author were close colleagues for twenty-three years. We agree upon many fundamentals but some of our philosophical differences have persisted from the beginning.

44. Sometimes members of indigenous groups present themselves as museum specimens and demand payment for being photographed. Sometimes they need protection from tourism companies. In 2012 the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination inquired of the government of India about complaints that ‘human safaris’ for tourists were being driven through the Jawara Reserve in the Andaman Islands in possible breach of an order of the Supreme Court of India (UN document a/68/18 para 23).
