

Chapter 2

**POLITICAL FRIENDSHIP AND STATE REPRESSION,
1851–1858**



In 1852, Karl Francke wrote to complain to Max Duncker: “Why you want to practice politics in Berlin at all is unclear to me! I, for my part, prefer to build railroads.”¹ The perceived failure of the Revolutions of 1848/49, and the defeat of German rebels in the First Schleswig War, left many liberals in the German Confederation disillusioned. Francke was by no means alone when he advocated a return to state service and industry.² He participated in a network of political friends that coalesced during the revolutions and the war in Schleswig-Holstein. Network members were moderate liberals, mainly from the ranks of the educated bourgeoisie. Under worsening repression from the German Confederation and its constituent states, they turned away from politics and focused on their professional careers—at least initially.

Political quietism, government harassment, and economic accommodation with state power—these characteristics of German liberalism still dominate most histories of this era.³ Attitudes toward the Prussian state often served as the prime example of this contemporary political mood. Otto von Manteuffel, who had replaced Joseph von Radowitz in December 1850 as Prussian minister president, and Berlin police director Carl von Hinckeldey represented, respectively, the complementary policies of conservative reformism and heavy-handed repression.⁴ Anna Ross has shown that Manteuffel “embraced a pragmatic approach to politics,” which included limited reforms along with the expansion of state programs to assure the long-term stability of Prussian society.⁵ Hinckeldey, meanwhile, deployed spies, ordered confiscations, and issued secret arrest warrants to quash political opposition. Nevertheless, the revolutions had fostered a “fragile, tension-filled consensus about the nature of politics.”⁶ Liberal professors joined lawyers and businessmen, Ross has demonstrated, in trying to work with the Prussian state, thereby offering open-minded conservatives in government, such as Manteuffel, an alternative to reactionaries such as Hinckeldey and his allies at court.⁷ Seen from the perspective of this network of political friends, however,

the avenues of accommodation and cooperation in the 1850s with the Prussian government appear more restricted.

As Janine Murphy has shown for German associational life, “survival in the post-revolutionary period required working within the established legal framework.”⁸ The choices faced by the political friends in the liberal network, however, were more complex than Murphy’s statement suggests. Karl Francke did not content himself with trains. The political friends struggled to adapt to the post-revolutionary framework in Prussia, testing moderate state officials’ openness to negotiating its political boundaries. Network members soon returned to political agitation, but now from the capitals of smaller German states, where post-revolutionary repression was less rigorous.⁹ When the Crimean War (1853–56) intensified in 1854, it offered network members new opportunities to publish their political views. Core members founded the Literary Association (*Literarischer Verein*) in Coburg under the patronage and protection of Duke Ernst II.

This chapter argues in part that bourgeois members sought to include sympathetic German monarchs to spearhead national consolidation. Princely network members, for their part, sought to use their bourgeois friends to increase the political influence and cultural repute of their courts: what they called “dynastic politics.”¹⁰ In the process, both monarchical and non-princely members negotiated what “true” friendship meant for them—reaching across divides of rank and status as Germans in pursuit of the nation-state. The friends also debated how best to achieve that nation-state: To stay in Prussia or go into exile? To remain in academia or enter state service? To broaden the popular appeal of *kleindeutsch* nationalism, or to concentrate on influencing state leaders? These questions presented not just challenges, but also opportunities, to this network of liberal political friends throughout the 1850s. Like many monarchs in Europe, the princes of the smaller German states provided “the almost natural framework for liberalism’s political stabilization.”¹¹

This chapter begins by addressing the development of emotional relationships in the network in the early 1850s as members struggled to overcome revolutionary trauma and post-revolutionary government harassment. It then explores the period after 1853 and how the friends’ used network resources in their professional careers and in the Literary Association. Throughout the 1850s, the friends shaped high politics, pursued professional ambitions, and navigated a hostile sociopolitical landscape through their reciprocal, often charged, emotional relationships.

Political Friendship as Post-Revolutionary Recovery, 1851–1854

The starkest example in the network of mounting official repression against its liberal members was the Prussian state's reaction to Max Duncker's *Vier Monate auswärtiger Politik*, published in 1851.¹² Duncker's brief book was the product of extensive collaboration with Karl Samwer, whose former position in the rebel government of the Duchy of Holstein had granted him access to confidential documents.¹³ Duncker's tract was an indictment of Prussia's final peace negotiations with Denmark. Prussia had maintained military superiority over Denmark, Max Duncker wrote, but in accepting the demands of the other Great Powers, it had failed diplomatically. In the process, Duncker claimed, Prussia had betrayed the German nation and the Holstein rebels. Other network members praised Duncker's piece as a brave intervention against incipient national catastrophe, foremost in Prussia's abandonment of German nationalists in the north, and it was popular in wider liberal circles, too.¹⁴

After publishing *Vier Monate auswärtiger Politik*, Duncker was elected to the new Prussian Landtag, taking his seat among the liberal minority while continuing to run a lottery to fund the last pockets of rebel resistance to Denmark.¹⁵ The book eventually caught the attention of Hinckeldey's Berlin police under the Manteuffel cabinet, and Duncker was charged with treason—an unusually serious indictment against a liberal writer.¹⁶ Unlike the Radowitz ministry of 1850, which sought to co-opt moderate liberals through the Erfurt Union, the new government forced liberals to abandon public criticism. Max and Charlotte Duncker were allowed to travel to Frankfurt and Nuremberg during the trial, an indication that the government hoped they might flee abroad.¹⁷ The new Prussian constitution, which had also established the elected Landtag, abolished pre-censorship, and Max Duncker enjoyed some immunity as a parliamentary deputy.¹⁸ Even so, Charlotte Duncker credited the government's final decision to drop the case to Rudolf Haym's tireless defense of her husband in the press.¹⁹

The initial indictment against Duncker betrayed the intentions of most Confederal governments. Since many German radicals had been driven into exile or arrested by 1850, vocal liberals became the next target of the post-revolutionary police. Without demonstrable subversive actions, however, the Manteuffel government knew it would be unable to convict. Confederal and state police, despite their wide remits to smother dissent, now had to abide by basic constitutional guarantees, and they lacked the resources to monitor and suppress *all* opposition.²⁰ The government therefore adapted older strategies of professional harassment against network members.²¹ In the face of increasing state persecution, the return to the status quo ante bellum in Schleswig-Holstein with the London Protocol of May 1852, led to the political detachment—and despair—of many network members. Nonetheless, 1852 and 1853 were pivotal

in tightening network bonds as the friends struggled against the personal, professional, and political fallout of war and revolution.

Network members traveled frequently in 1852 for reasons that might not be self-evident. Vacations soothed the nerves of members who had been active since March 1848.²² The expansion of railroads in the 1840s and early 1850s increased the speed, and decreased the cost, of travel. Such travel facilitated moderates' intellectual—as well as emotional—process of “stock-taking and reorientation” after the political and personal defeats of the revolution.²³ Trips also helped political dissidents maintain social networks and distanced them from the watchful eyes of local officials.²⁴ The Dunckers, for example, traveled first to Bavaria, then to Karlsruhe and Mannheim. Despite the trips, and a regiment of walks and swims with Karl Mathy, Max Duncker remained, Mathy recorded, visibly “broken and ill-humored.”²⁵ A second visit followed in 1853, when the Dunckers traveled from Halle through the Rhineland, then south. The Dunckers stayed with the Mathys again in Mannheim and Heidelberg. The two couples, whom Haym referred to as the “confidants of confidants,” then set off together for Switzerland.²⁶ After their year of travel, Charlotte Duncker remembered, “the vitality and intimacy of the relations lasted until death.”²⁷

The particular relationship between the Dunckers and Mathys reflected how spousal relationship and bonds between married couples could easily be accommodated by an informal network such as theirs. The variety of emotional connections—from spouses to distant friends—that members formed in the 1840s and 1850s underlaid the network of political friends and made it all the more flexible and resilient during a period of state repression. The Mathys also journeyed to Heidelberg to maintain contact with the politician, publicist, and network mentor, Alexander von Soiron, as well as with the future Baden diplomat Robert von Mohl.²⁸

Karl Samwer and Karl Francke were also on the move in 1852. After the duke of Augustenburg renounced his claim to Schleswig-Holstein as part of the London Protocol, he and his family settled in Gotha. Francke and Samwer lost their jobs in the Holstein government, so the two followed the Augustenburgs into exile in Coburg, where the family exploited their connections to find both men positions in state service.²⁹ The pretender's heir, Friedrich von Augustenburg, had befriended Ernst of Coburg during the war; the duke later filled his diaries with references to evenings and outings with the Augustenburgs.³⁰ Duke Ernst granted Francke a senior position in the Gotha finance ministry, while Samwer initially refused a post as court librarian in Coburg and blamed Droysen for spreading the rumor that he had already accepted the job.³¹ The title of court librarian was a common princely sinecure for academics and artists.³² Samwer eventually accepted a position in the ministry of state in the Coburg government.³³ The office better fit Samwer's previous work in the rebel administration

of Holstein; it also conferred a higher salary and better protection from prosecution in other Confederate states.

Employing Francke and Samwer strengthened Duke Ernst's ties to their political friends outside his small duchy. Network members began to orbit Coburg. Ernst's dynastic bonds and personal relationships with leaders in Weimar, Baden, and Prussia connected other non-princely and princely liberals. With the development of cross-status political friendships, and bourgeois members' entry into state service, the mutual literary and political appreciation between princely and bourgeois members of the 1840s developed into regular gatherings and correspondence. Such cross-status relationships remain an understudied aspect of liberals' accommodation with state power in the 1850s. This neglect perhaps stems from the focus on liberals and democrats who remained in Prussia and had much more fraught relationships with state authorities. Indeed, the less repressive, smaller German states served as the laboratories for these liberals' settlement with state power and shaped how they understood the role of monarchs in German unification. Focusing on specific monarchs and liberals in this period of pre-unification German history helps us better understand how monarchism and liberalism intersected and diverged, and it reveals that a few minor monarchs participated in liberal politics alongside bourgeois and noble figures.

Gustav Freytag's introduction to the duke of Coburg in 1853—the same year Ludwig von Rochau published his *Grundsätze der Realpolitik*—typified the weaving of network connections between liberal literati and reformist monarchs. Duke Ernst already admired Freytag for his fiction, so Samwer and Francke facilitated a personal introduction followed by a sort of political evaluation. Samwer scheduled a private audience between the duke and Freytag, then arranged for Freytag to participate in a “political consultation with a small number of nationalists and free-thinkers” at the duke's residence.³⁴ The personal audience and subsequent political meeting laid the foundation for a relationship between the novelist and the monarch, which they maintained through letters, social calls, and political meetings. Their friendship later proved pivotal for Freytag, and Ernst profited, too, by attracting a literary giant to his tiny realm. Liberal and dynastic politics reinforced each other at the Coburg court.

Freytag and Duke Ernst's correspondence exemplified the difficulties of political friendship between commoner and monarch, together with its mutual benefits. Freytag followed up the initial meeting with a letter praising Ernst's patriotism and offering the duke his literary services.³⁵ The novelist then advanced his views on matters that they had discussed earlier. In doing so, he followed what would become a familiar pattern of providing first political advice, then self-effacement: “These thoughts are partly, however, the kind that His Highness's better insight might refute . . . [they] originate from respectful concern for His Highness's self, for the future of a beautiful, noble human life, which I have learned to love and which I wish, from the bottom of my heart, to see happy.”³⁶

Here Freytag reinterpreted the traditional fealty Ernst expected of subjects and civil servants through the language of friendly concern.³⁷ He highlighted Ernst's divinely ordained rank in repeated references to "His Highness," while undermining that same hierarchy with references to Christian brotherhood and the equalizing power of friendship taken from the Enlightenment, Sentimentalism, and Masonic traditions.³⁸

Tensions between fealty and friendship in these relationships compounded differences in bourgeois and princely members' interpretations of liberalism. They disagreed over the role of monarchy in their ideal nation-state and the rights of educated men to advise and criticize reigning monarchs. Non-princely members often followed the same script as Freytag in their interactions with princely members. After dispensing good wishes and declarations of affection, they offered political reportage, followed by personal advice, concluding with further declarations of friendly concerns. None of this was mere flattery; nor was it selfless. Bourgeois members adapted the language of friendship to make demands on princes, who in turn sought both meaningful emotional connections and risky political favors from their non-princely counterparts.

When the London Protocol ended the First Schleswig War in 1852, network members were scattered across the Confederation. Letters helped them track each other's movements, share feelings, and circulate political information. As a genre, personal letters encouraged emotional reflection and declamation, which were indispensable to maintaining distant connections under state repression.³⁹ Charlotte Duncker recalled that "the lively exchange of thoughts and words between us and the friends at home was not merely about patriotic matters. All of the roots of love and community . . . were nourished with an intimate correspondence—albeit not always an extensive one—and with visits."⁴⁰ Since the eighteenth century, the distance and formality generally required by epistolary relationships had fostered debate and discouraged confrontation.⁴¹ As with European liberals suffering official harassment elsewhere, this reliance on letters kept the network together and encouraged the deepening of personal bonds and political consensus—only later did it prove problematic for the political friends.⁴²

The Dunccker often reported visits from political friends, along with other members' travel plans.⁴³ Karl Mathy, Karl Francke, and Karl Samwer did the same.⁴⁴ Following the movements of others fostered a sense of intimacy when it was hazardous to announce visits in local newspapers. It also helped members imagine the lives of their friends, even as the Confederal police, which Abigail Green has called "essentially the prototype for a German secret police," monitored interstate post and shadowed suspected dissidents through a web of spies and informants.⁴⁵ Sharing their whereabouts, travel plans, and meetings was, for members of the network, an important demonstration of trust.

Letter writers did attempt to obscure information from Confederate authorities in Frankfurt am Main. Network members occasionally transliterated names and phrases into the Greek alphabet.⁴⁶ They thereby concealed possibly damaging information not only from subaltern Confederate agents and servants but also from most women—all groups that had been denied the classical education that elite men enjoyed.⁴⁷ Letter writers also used initials or nicknames: Max Duncker, for instance, was the “Colonel” because of his military training; Christian von Stockmar was the “Old Master,” a reference both to his age and his talent for court intrigue.⁴⁸ Members named mutual friends by profession or location—“our writer,” “our mutual friend in Berlin”—and relayed each other’s letters.⁴⁹ Princes employed messengers and consular officials. Each method bypassed Central Europe’s two official postal systems—the one controlled by the Thurn und Taxis family, and the other by the Prussian government. Members of the network sometimes burned—or were told to burn—incriminating or embarrassing letters.⁵⁰

Despite, or perhaps because of, such subterfuge, the content of most surviving letters written by network members in 1852 and 1853 is dominated by reassurances of friendship and discussion of family or professional difficulties. The female members of the network, Charlotte Duncker and Anna Mathy, were indispensable in the work of sustaining these epistolary bonds. At a time when travel was more burdensome and riskier for network men—because they were bound also by professional duties and monitored by the police—network women traveled more extensively.⁵¹ It may be true that their trips were often confined to family visits and caring for sick relatives. Nevertheless, such gendered roles in caretaking provided opportunities for Charlotte Duncker and Anna Mathy to contact network men to offer political advice or updates on their individual situations.⁵²

Network men also worried about their own health and that of their friends. Concern over the dangers of dust, eyestrain, and overwork was fueled by emerging knowledge about nervous exhaustion.⁵³ Duncker reported alternating periods of exhaustion and glee over his pace of work.⁵⁴ Freytag complained about gastric distress, Droysen got headaches, and Samwer was inexplicably incapacitated for days.⁵⁵ Although seemingly trivial, many bouts of sickness facilitated conversations that often touched on political themes. Illness could incapacitate members at a time when medical treatment remained rudimentary and physicians barely professionalized.⁵⁶ Silences in correspondence might foster serious anxiety as writers waited “day to day” for letters, hoping that their correspondent’s silence was benign.⁵⁷ Life events such as serious illness, death, birth, and anniversaries offered network members opportunities to “once again take up the thread of correspondence,” as Charlotte Duncker wrote.⁵⁸ The refashioning of epistolary bonds was often explicit, particularly when liberals reached out to like-minded individuals from their university lives or revolutionary days.⁵⁹ These letters were

personal, and this quality distinguished them from other forms of letter-writing. Such correspondence not only circulated political and professional information but also acted as an emotional outlet and offered mediated relief for their longing for others.

On a more practical level, breakdowns in postal connections could slow network communication and hamper the discussion of political aspirations in general, although members worked to overcome such barriers. Charlotte Duncker stands out in this regard. She maintained and expanded the avenues of emotional and political communication between her family and the Mathys while Max Duncker was teaching in Halle. When she traveled to a spa in Liederbach, Duncker stopped in Mannheim to spend a few “quiet hours” with the Mathys. She genuinely appreciated their erudite company, writing to her husband that the Mathys were “unspeakably good and friendly, and the longer one is with them, the more one becomes aware of the richness of their life.”⁶⁰ These emotional bonds drew on the Sentimentalist notion of a “union of souls,” as well as Kantian interpretations of Aristotle’s concept of true friendship—friendship, that is, based on equality and selfless love for one’s “second self.”⁶¹ Members of the bourgeoisie, men as well as women, would have been familiar with these connotations.

The Mathys, however, failed to meet the Dunccker’s expectations. For a time, they completely ignored the Dunccker’s letters. Charlotte Duncker reprimanded them for neglecting important emotional duties: “Do you know what difficult times separate us from the brief, beautiful togetherness in Mannheim, behind what dark clouds these bright memories lay?”⁶² Duncker thus combined an insistence on the truth of her feelings with efforts to intensify a feeling of togetherness by revisiting shared memories.⁶³ She then signaled her continued faith in the Mathys’ friendship, asking after their health and entrusting them with news that Max Duncker’s youngest brother had fallen into disrepute. Charlotte Duncker shifted gears again in the letter to endorse a potential political friend whom the Mathys had recommended.⁶⁴ This friend, she explained, seemed to be a “promising element in our party, or at least of our like-minded community; his name is Roggenbach.” In Duncker’s opinion, Roggenbach, despite his youth, was singularly driven to serve the common good; moreover, he “could at the same time look real life and its necessities in the face as a man: clearly and calmly.”⁶⁵ Roggenbach’s value to the network was gender coded: he was a non-academic *man* of action.⁶⁶ This letter is illustrative because it intermingled personal, political, and professional issues in a way that enforced epistolary etiquette, shared sensitive family information, and addressed developments in the wider network.

Exchanges between Rudolf Haym and Max Duncker, Heinrich von Sybel and J.G. Droysen, and Gustav Freytag and Ernst of Coburg adopted similar formulae and language.⁶⁷ Karl Samwer, for instance, reported to Max Duncker on Freytag’s movements in 1853 and arranged group meetings in Coburg, while

adding passive-aggressive comments about Duncker's silence on personal and political developments.⁶⁸ Members' insistence on the flow of news sought to dispel worries among old allies during a period of government repression. It also provided the friends an outlet for personal anxieties and an emotional connection based on shared political experiences that could alleviate longing and loneliness. By the end of 1853, network members also had to determine the reliability of others for illicit political activities.

“Political Agitation and Friendly Intercourse,” 1854–1858

As the 1850s progressed, network members continued to call upon one another to support political projects and their careers.⁶⁹ Relying on the network of political friendship that they had formed over the 1840s and early 1850s, these moderate liberals worked to define the relationship between politics, activism, and a future nation-state. The expansion of the Crimean War sparked new efforts for national unification among German radicals and liberals and strengthened their post-revolutionary embrace of *realpolitik* and cooperation with state power.⁷⁰ Core members quickly discovered, however, that the German states' diplomatic balancing act, between armed neutrality and joining one of the belligerent parties during the war, obliged officials to repress any political activity that they might consider dangerous domestic agitation.

In this climate, in early 1854, Karl Mathy embarked on a journey to Berlin. Along the way, he met Karl Samwer before stopping in Halle to repair his relationship with the Duncckers. In reference to the visit, Mathy told his wife: “We speak of our love, our experiences, of our important plans and expectations, of Europe's critical situation—of war and peace . . .”⁷¹ The trip was not just personal. Such shared memories of intimacy encouraged trust between the couples and underlay their planning of political agitation in the future. Mathy accompanied the Duncckers to Berlin, where they reunited with Samwer and Franz von Roggenbach. Duke Ernst II of Coburg protested, before grudgingly accepting, Samwer's advice not to join his non-princely political friends in the Prussian capital because the duke's presence would attract too much attention.⁷² Returning from Berlin, the friends stopped in Siebleben to visit Gustav Freytag before continuing on to Gotha for a large meeting—at last—with Duke Ernst.⁷³

The subject of this Gotha gathering was likely the Literary Association, suggesting that the increase in liberal periodicals after 1855, which Christian Jansen attributes to the final stages of the Crimean War, had its roots in 1853.⁷⁴ The association, as Andreas Biefang has contended, operated more as an “elite, secret society-like amalgamation” of Old Liberals than as a civic society with open debate and formal leadership.⁷⁵ Most European liberals favored this arrangement over centralized, hierarchical civic associations.⁷⁶ Nevertheless, the Literary

Association reflected the expansion of small circles of transregional liberals who worked to reignite the public discussion of political issues after the 1849.⁷⁷ It also facilitated the continuation of informal connections between moderate liberals from the end of the Revolutions of 1848/49 until the opening of civic life during the New Era.⁷⁸ Political friendship, I argue, facilitated the creation, maintenance, and eventual decline of the Literary Association.

Network members founded the organization in mid-1853 and now hoped to capitalize on popular discontent within the Confederation—particularly among smaller states—with Austro-Prussian prevarication over whether to enter the Crimean War.⁷⁹ The international dimensions of the “Oriental Question,” the antagonism between the Russian and Ottoman Empires, needs no recapitulation here.⁸⁰ Suffice it to say that network members hoped to tie the “German Question” to the war in Crimea.⁸¹ Most believed that Prussia should exploit its diplomatic influence to wring concessions from Austria in Germany in exchange for military support against the Russian Empire. They also wanted to counter *Trias* plans to force the German Great Powers to accept a subsidiary union of smaller states within the Confederation.⁸²

The level of engagement and risk with which each member embraced the Literary Association and its political platform varied greatly. Its activities, such as producing pamphlets and a daily newspaper, were secondary for most bourgeois members, who remained focused instead on scholarship and their careers. Nonetheless, interactions around the association encouraged political organizing, fundraising, and contacts among members of the network.

The Press Committee was a notable part of the Association.⁸³ Few sources from the friends speak to its purpose directly. Gustav Freytag and Max Duncker reported to Duke Ernst on the committee’s expenses in October 1853, requesting that he review and release the relevant funds.⁸⁴ In December 1853, Ernst began passing information to Freytag from his brother, Albert, prince consort to Queen Victoria of the United Kingdom, because the duke wished to counter seemingly unfair portrayals of his brother as excessively pro-German. He contended that Prince Albert was a “true advisor” to the queen and a “complete Englishman.”⁸⁵ Freytag used his connections to unnamed publishers in London to disabuse the British press of the notion that Albert represented only Coburg dynastic politics.⁸⁶ The Press Committee thus endorsed the Coburg dynasty in the popular press as representatives of *kleindeutsch* domestic policies and international diplomacy.

Another goal of the association was to establish a daily newspaper to represent *kleindeutsch* views in Prussia.⁸⁷ Bourgeois network members raised funds for the venture. In 1854, Max Duncker solicited semi-official aid from August von Bethmann Hollweg, a leading liberal in the legislature, a close ally of Prince Wilhelm of Prussia, and a contributor to the moderate-liberal *Preußisches Wochenblatt*.⁸⁸ Founding a periodical with close ties to liberal elements within

the Prussian bureaucracy and court would expand network influence in official circles.⁸⁹ The backers of these activities, in turn, saw an opportunity to sabotage Austrian diplomacy, counter Russian influence at court, and encourage Anglophile opinion.⁹⁰ Karl Francke claimed that “principles have no effect on the prince [of Prussia], so one must give him men who represent principles!”⁹¹ This was a concise statement of the strategy of royal influence that members began to practice in Coburg in 1852.

Although the political friends never fully integrated with the liberal circle around Prince Wilhelm, their contacts with the prince of Prussia’s circle did grow after 1855.⁹² The Stockmar family was key in tending to these budding relationships. Christian von Stockmar (whom Max Duncker and Karl Mathy had befriended at the Erfurt Parliament) and his son, Ernst von Stockmar, worked with the network in the mid-1850s.⁹³ The elder Stockmar had been private secretary to the British prince consort, Albert (Duke Ernst’s brother), and frequently returned to Coburg to nurture the bonds between the branches of the family. Both Stockmars exercised influence over Prince Wilhelm and Princess Augusta of Prussia and had good relationships with King Leopold I of Belgium (Ernst’s uncle) and Queen Victoria (Ernst’s sister-in-law). Ernst also maintained direct contact with Prince Albert, King Leopold, and Princess Augusta in Koblenz.⁹⁴ Christian von Stockmar, for his part, also mentored Robert Morier, his “adopted son” and the British Foreign Office’s Germany expert—though Karl Mathy and Heinrich von Sybel doubted whether Morier could truly grasp German politics as a foreigner.⁹⁵ Coburg dynastic politics expanded alongside the network, facilitating connections between bourgeois members, princes, diplomats, and British agents such as Morier and Joseph Crowe.⁹⁶

Despite these connections, network members were not unanimous in their views on the Crimean War. Karl Mathy wrote to Charlotte Duncker in mid-1854, first to reproach the Dunccker for ignoring his letters, then to claim that the war could never be used to solve the German Question.⁹⁷ The Prussian government could not, Mathy claimed, convince the Austrian government to relinquish its embattled primacy in Germany in return for a guarantee of diplomatic support in other areas of Europe. Political heterodoxy, along with previous violations of the fundamental norm of epistolary reciprocity, prompted the network to punish Mathy with silence.⁹⁸ He continued to share copies of Literary Association writings bound for printing, and he reported that the official post was unsafe for detailed discussion of the association or politics.⁹⁹ Max Duncker had access to intelligence from Prussian diplomats and Guido von Usedom, a member of the *Wochenblatt* group, personal friend of Manteuffel, and senior official in the Prussian foreign ministry.¹⁰⁰ The Dunccker’s refusal to share such intelligence with Mathy strained the network, particularly when knowledge of Prussian diplomatic intentions was vital for their publications for the Literary Association.

Despite his belief that the Crimean War could not foster German national unification, Mathy endorsed the association's efforts to establish a liberal daily. He joined Karl Samwer and Karl Francke in pressuring Max Duncker to travel to Frankfurt in order to find investors for the paper.¹⁰¹ Duncker refused. He also refused ducal invitations to Coburg, citing teaching duties in Halle.¹⁰² Duncker's obstinacy suggests that not all members were willing to risk attracting police attention to support the Literary Association and its projects. Samwer and Francke were Coburg subjects and held state office, which provided some protection from Confederate and Prussian authorities. Academics in the network were often preoccupied with research that they hoped would endear them to government officials as diligent scholars, not revolutionaries. The stalemate continued, and the association's newspaper failed to materialize.

Gustav Freytag worked for the Literary Association while writing *Debit and Credit* and editing the *Grenzboten*. He also mediated between Duke Ernst and bourgeois members outside Coburg.¹⁰³ Despite Freytag's efforts, Ernst complained in May 1854: "I am a man of action, of rapid progress . . . and we good people are creeping after events like snails."¹⁰⁴ He warned that the association slept as the nation risked falling into a *Trias* trap: "It must rain articles. . . . The princes must learn from the people what they ought to do. Where are our agents?"¹⁰⁵ Had this explicitly political letter been intercepted, it would have endangered Freytag. Ernst's bombastic tone toward his "friend" also betrayed the power relations between the writer and the monarch. Finally, the duke understood national politics as a disagreement between pro-Prussian and pro-*Trias* princes, not necessarily as a conflict between liberalism and conservatism or between the *kleindeutsch* and *großdeutsch* positions. When minor German monarchs participated in the movement for national unification, they preferred to do so on their own terms, and at times this attitude created conflict with non-princely activists.

Freytag quickly replied that Duke Ernst's orders had been "partially fulfilled," but there was little more to be done through the daily press—a medium that the network was striving to fund.¹⁰⁶ Freytag reminded his princely friend of the danger facing association agents, network members, and himself. What the duke had described as "tepidness and lack of understanding," Freytag claimed, "is often caution born of necessity." Censorship trials and police confiscation of costly print runs hung over many writers: "Therefore, gracious lord, the best, most forceful articles would not be *as much use* as His Highness hopes, and I would be remiss if I did not emphasize this in excusing our journalists."¹⁰⁷ The writer's filial tone quietly belied the equalizing potential of friendship that Duke Ernst had deployed to pressure Freytag into dangerous activities in the first place. He was not a Coburg subject, nor was he a state official like Samwer or Francke. In a gesture of conciliation, Freytag offered to edit a collection of diplomatic correspondence, which association agents had acquired, as long as they printed it in Gotha. He remarked that, in the meantime, pamphlets by Karl Francke and Max

Duncker would be useful for the association, “since only through Prussian idealism can Prussia itself and Germany be saved. Everywhere else, there are capable men: there alone is a nation—in the making.”¹⁰⁸

The duke of Coburg had already dispatched Karl Samwer to Berlin to secure him a command in the Prussian cavalry—presumably in the event Prussia entered the Crimean War.¹⁰⁹ After Samwer again told the duke to avoid coming to Berlin, the latter bristled: “I do not understand why my presence in Berlin right now should be of little use. . . . I can only be of use to Germany when I am taken into confidence in Berlin and, using my position with my western relatives, counter as much as possible the dangers that Germany *must* get through.”¹¹⁰ Samwer did increase Duke Ernst’s influence in the Prussian capital, but the task was a difficult one for Samwer to navigate as a private person. He relayed sensitive information about the Hohenzollerns’ views on the war and forwarded General Eduard von Bonin’s comments about the unreliability of the other German states (not including Coburg and Weimar, of course).¹¹¹

After less than three weeks in Berlin, Samwer perceived that he had overstayed his welcome. Having strained his personal contacts in the capital, remaining there meant that his “stay would be given the nature of an unofficial mission in the eyes of many people.”¹¹² Duke Ernst dismissed his concerns, and Samwer continued to report from Berlin.¹¹³ A few days later, Samwer reminded Ernst of the need for discretion: “The post is eminently unsafe . . . I probably will not be able to stay here much longer. — I beg His Highness to consider this letter strictly confidential.”¹¹⁴ The custom of widely circulating interesting letters among friends and political allies posed at times more danger than it was worth. As a foreign official without diplomatic accreditation, Samwer’s collection of confidential information could have been deemed espionage. Once again, the duke’s demands had put one of his political friends—this time a state minister—in danger. In fact, publication of information Samwer had sent from Berlin had already been traced back to him.¹¹⁵ Still, Duke Ernst was unmoved, so Karl Samwer remained in Berlin, where he managed to win Prince Wilhelm of Prussia’s support for the Literary Association as a practical means of bypassing police persecution of liberals. Prince Wilhelm believed the association’s “facilities,” such as fliers, pamphlets, and “popular books,” could be useful.¹¹⁶

Duke Ernst kept Samwer in Berlin well into March 1854.¹¹⁷ He acted as the Literary Association’s agent in Prussia, meeting with Max Duncker in Jüterbog—Duncker refused to enter Berlin—to edit one of the duke’s pamphlets. Ernst also passed letters from his brother, Prince Consort Albert, to Samwer: these were to be shared with their “friends.”¹¹⁸ Samwer kept Franz von Roggenbach informed about these matters, and Roggenbach carried memoranda bound for British newspapers for the duke’s review.¹¹⁹ Overall, Samwer’s unofficial mission showcased the flow of information and publications between network members, and it indicated how members managed different levels of

political risk based on status and rank. Samwer was able to serve the duke in these roles longer and more effectively than others because he held a ministerial title, which shielded him to an extent from the police. His appeals to the duke for caution nonetheless demonstrate his anxiety over the resilience of his connections and the duke's reckless handling of intelligence.

As Samwer had feared, network activity in the association did not go unnoticed. Freytag received an anonymous letter in August 1854 warning him not to return to Prussia.¹²⁰ Berlin Police Chief Hinckeldey had arranged in secret for his arrest, but Freytag was likely tipped off by someone in Prince Wilhelm's court.¹²¹ Freytag told only Karl Samwer about the warrant, then pleaded with Ernst for "court office and state citizenship."¹²² A court appointment entailed political protection, and Coburg citizenship would allow Freytag to renounce his Prussian citizenship and, thereby, escape treason charges. In making this appeal to the duke, Freytag noted that Ernst had previously granted asylum to others, "but I never thought that I too would have to grab at the hem of your ducal mantle and beg." He regretted any appearance of "forwardness" in his plea and hoped to preserve their "humane friendship."¹²³ But after these allusions to the Hebrew Bible and Enlightenment tradition, Freytag applied more pressure, musing that facing arrest might be the "manliest" choice. The stratagem worked. Within a fortnight, Ernst named Freytag a ducal councilor. Now a Coburg subject, Freytag enthused to his new sovereign: "You have more or less become the natural protector of German poets."¹²⁴

Freytag soon pressed his advantage, requesting leave to oversee the final printing of *Debit and Credit* and to edit the *Grenzboten* in person in Leipzig. He believed that through "clever use" of the Bavarian railway, he could travel between Coburg and Leipzig and avoid Prussian territory. But he still feared that Hinckeldey, who also sat on the Police Commission of the German Confederation, would have him arrested in Saxony. He put this possibility before the duke in epic fashion: "if you do not, through your intercession, my gracious prince, [prevent] this abduction by the police, it would find no parallel in world history—except perhaps in the rape of Hylas by the Nymphs."¹²⁵ Infusing the letter with flattery disguised as fealty, Freytag appealed to the duke's sovereign vanity. The homoerotic undertones of the Hylas myth likewise underscored both men's attempts to exploit their "union of souls" for individual gain and to advance their common *kleindeutsch* cause through the press.¹²⁶ Freytag's journey to Leipzig was not undertaken solely for literary purposes: Freytag had obtained letters that, he claimed, would be so damaging to senior Prussian officials that the government would consider their publication treason.¹²⁷ If, however, they were published in Leipzig, Freytag asserted, Prussian journalists could legally possess them—and presumably reprint them.

Freytag had already asked the Dunckers to help him establish a "backstairs acquaintanceship" with Wolf Heinrich von Baudissin, a former diplomat in

Danish service and a well-known translator of Shakespeare.¹²⁸ Freytag hoped Baudissin could present his wish to King Johann of Saxony, who had ascended the throne only three months before.¹²⁹ Instead, Duke Ernst appealed directly to his *Trias* opponent, the de facto minister president of Saxony, Friedrich Ferdinand von Beust. Beust promised the duke that Freytag would be safe on Saxon soil as a Coburg courtier.¹³⁰ Key leaders in two rival camps of German nationalism were willing to cooperate to thwart the plans of a mutual enemy in Berlin. In the end, the monarch protected the bourgeois novelist, yet Freytag's exile was itself partly the product of the duke's own recklessness. This was not the only instance in which relations between the bourgeois and princely members of the liberal network remained uneasy.

Some members' evident frustration with German monarchs suggests the pressure bourgeois members of the network felt to adhere to the plans of their princely friends. In late 1855, Karl Francke, exiled Holsteiner and senior official in Coburg, contended that any reform of Confederal authority would only help the middle-sized states and destroy the smaller ones—where exiled members found refuge from the police of the larger German states.¹³¹ Francke blamed the princes for the persecution of his friends and lamented that unification was unimaginable without their support.¹³² Although some monarchs, such as Ernst of Coburg, provided safe haven to liberals, the overall institution of monarchy was a brake on national progress in Francke's view. Indeed, Francke's complaint about the German princes reflected the limits of political accommodation between moderate liberals and state power in the 1850s. There may have been more opportunities of settlement in the smaller states, but the monarchs of the larger states remained intractable on national unification, despite the accommodating attitudes of their ministers toward business interests or the press. It was proving difficult to square the circle of national unification without the risk of political revolution. Francke remained in the minority, however, and members of the network worked to incorporate sympathetic monarchs.

Meanwhile, Duke Ernst expanded his influence by encouraging leaders of other small Confederal states to affiliate themselves with the network. Monarchical status also allowed him to form political friendships with like-minded rulers in Baden and Weimar. These monarchs could in turn call upon powerful relatives in Berlin and St. Petersburg in the movement for a liberal nation-state. The triangular relationship between Grand Duke Carl Alexander of Weimar, Grand Duke Friedrich I of Baden, and Duke Ernst II of Coburg began in the 1830s and 1840s and was solidified in the early 1850s.

These three liberal princes formed and maintained friendships with one another along pathways that ran parallel to those connecting them to their bourgeois friends. Part of the reason for their affinity were their similarities in age, upbringing, and the political history of their respective states and monarchies. The men

were born between 1815 and 1825 into the ruling houses of smaller German states. They knew only the German Confederation as the basis of national political life, and many of the reforms of the absolutist and Napoleonic eras remained in place during their youth. Baden and Weimar had gained written constitutions by the time the three princes were born, and the courts that they called home had reputations for Enlightenment learning and cultural production—Weimar especially. This relatively liberal attitude extended to the princelings' education. They were among the first generation of German dynasts to attend university, where they were placed in the care of liberal professors. The future monarchs thus knew relatively liberal views from birth, including constitutional rule and the freedoms of speech and assembly. The three also became related by marriage and held close ties to the Prussian royal family—among others. Above all, they advocated for *kleindeutsch* unification.

Evidence of political friendship among the three liberal princes can be found in early 1854, in Duke Ernst's letter to Friedrich of Baden, who had become regent in 1852. Ernst began by complaining about the political ineptitude and selfishness of the other monarchs in the German Confederation.¹³³ Friedrich shared Ernst's despair, and the latter responded with an intimate scene in which emotions were the building blocks of political consensus: "For your letter . . . I embrace you whole-heartedly and am delighted to hear views from you that I would gladly inject into all of the German princes."¹³⁴ He then asked Friedrich to help him overcome the political resistance that he encountered from "every corner." The "Russian party" in Berlin, Ernst elaborated, was very active in the press, but he was directing work in the Literary Association to combat them. Friedrich agreed to help.

This letter inaugurated a period of collaboration that lasted through the mid-1860s between the duke of Coburg and the grand duke of Baden on a *kleindeutsch* answer to the German Question. To this end, the monarchs shared memoranda and pamphlets on the Crimean War written by bourgeois network members—for which Ernst often claimed full credit.¹³⁵ Duke Ernst also sold shares to benefit the credit banks underwriting the activities of the Literary Association—his "patriotic stock company."¹³⁶ Grand Duke Friedrich used his dynastic connections to support the association as well. After traveling to Koblenz to visit Prince Wilhelm of Prussia—his father-in-law—Friedrich thanked Wilhelm: "I cannot tell you enough, dearest prince, how happy I felt with you again and how thankfully I recognized that profound trust . . ." with which the prince assured him of his support for "the association."¹³⁷

Grand Duke Carl Alexander of Weimar, for his part, often effused to Duke Ernst about their friendship and their common quest to unify Germany, but he reserved his most passionate remarks for Friedrich of Baden.¹³⁸ By October of 1855, after over a year of assisting Friedrich and Ernst in drafting Confederal reform proposals, Carl Alexander began to use the informal term "friend" with

his fellow liberal monarchs rather than the more formal “cousin.”¹³⁹ Cooperation on political matters, for Carl Alexander, resulted in a more profound feeling of personal attachment. In a letter to Friedrich of Baden, the grand duke of Weimar thanked him for his “goodness and evidence of your friendship” in their shared political work before adding that “even after a long time, I always feel more enamored with you, you know, dear friend, because you feel it: What joy your friendly complaisance, your trust, your goodwill brings me. Your letter proves it, causes it . . . this rare and peculiar unity in maturity of mood and mind.”¹⁴⁰ Such sustained emotional expression was unusual between contemporary German monarchs. This letter suggests how political consensus served as both evidence of—and impetus for—emotional connections reminiscent of the Age of Sentimentality. Such correspondence would then, in turn, encourage further political cooperation and even deeper emotional relationships.

Common political goals and passionate friendships were two sides of the same coin for these three monarchs. They adapted the Sentimentalist vocabulary of the *Seelenbund* to dynastic politics, pursuing complementary goals: furthering the cultural prestige of their own courts and contributing to what they hoped would be a *kleindeutsch* form of national unification. In this way, they adapted dynastic traditions and bonds to the less familiar social and political worlds of bourgeois liberals. This process did not render social rank irrelevant, but the trust and “evidence of friendship” that can be found in the correspondence of monarchs, nobles, and the bourgeoisie supported common political endeavors. The letters above show how emotional expression, infused with narrative allusions to physical intimacy, helped tighten bonds within the liberal network in the mid-1850s. These interactions became even more important after 1859 when network members entered state service. Friendship among liberal nationalists across the status hierarchy, they believed, served the nation.¹⁴¹

Joan Cocks has recently written that “it is a weird and unfortunate fact of political life” that relative material power often determines the success of competing ideas.¹⁴² The leaders of nineteenth-century Prussia were keenly aware of this reality. Notwithstanding these monarchs’ high hopes for the Literary Association in the mid-1850s, Prussian officials were hardly limited to arrest warrants in harassing non-princely members of the network. Professional harassment, threatening liberals’ material security and their associated bourgeois status, was another form. Prussian officials were particularly active in blocking the promotion or hiring of network members at universities. In response, Charlotte Duncker remembered, “the friends were . . . comrades in professional and material hardship, zealous in helping one another.”¹⁴³ The friends derived some income from the articles that they wrote for the association and other periodicals, but their correspondence in the mid-1850s often centered on maintaining an affluent, respectable lifestyle.¹⁴⁴ This concern led Karl Mathy, Max Duncker, and Heinrich von Sybel to seek sta-

ble, better-paying employment with the help of their political friends. Duncker's and Sybel's professional ambitions, compounded by the death of Mathy's son, rendered them mostly unavailable for the Literary Association. The association faded from network correspondence over time: it was dissolved at some point in the late 1850s, though members argued over its remaining funds into the 1860s.¹⁴⁵ The state's power over the material world deeply affected moderate liberals' personal lives and political engagement.

Network members' financial straits were compounded in 1855 by the death of two influential mentors: Alexander von Soiron and Friedrich Bassermann. Soiron had held close ties to parliamentarians in Baden and liberal bureaucrats in Prussia. Bassermann, publisher of the *Deutsche Zeitung*, which Mathy edited in the late 1840s, had forged connections throughout the German-language publishing world. He was also one of the few *großdeutsch* proponents with whom core members affiliated after 1849—natural causes also contributed the post-revolutionary narrowing of the network of political friends. The deaths of Soiron and Bassermann caused sadness among members of the network, especially Max Duncker and Mathy, who had worked closely with Soiron in the Frankfurt Parliament.¹⁴⁶ For Mathy, the death of his last surviving child less than a year later curtailed his engagement with much of the network until 1856. Freytag more or less vanished in 1858, albeit temporarily, as he cared for an ailing brother and his five children.¹⁴⁷

Years earlier, Max Duncker had been candid with his political friends about his decision to turn from politics to academia. Much like the two other Borussian historians, Heinrich von Sybel and J.G. Droysen, Duncker resolved to write history as political commentary.¹⁴⁸ He did so between his acquittal on treason charges in 1852 and the escalation of the Crimean War in 1854.¹⁴⁹ Max Duncker—likely with the aid of his wife, Charlotte Duncker—began work in 1852 on his *Geschichte des Altertums*, a book suggesting that the arch of ancient history bent toward liberalism and nation.¹⁵⁰ Writing history in this period also offered its authors the opportunity to process contemporary traumas such as the failures of 1848/49 and the First Schleswig War.¹⁵¹ Elated over the first volume, Rudolf Haym wrote to Max Duncker that Halle “is, after all, a miserable backwater and a life hardly worth living . . . I happily commend you and feel how glad you must be at the completion of your work . . . You are now, it seems to me, completely untouchable, and to your friends you have become—I say this with no mind to flattery—marvelous.”¹⁵² Network members initially believed that scholarly renown might blunt efforts to block their promotion to full professors. It did not. In 1854, Max Duncker published the second volume of *Geschichte des Altertums*. He sent copies to political friends and potential official patrons alike, and he received favorable reviews.¹⁵³ Nonetheless, he was passed over at Halle for promotion and forced to rely on his father for money from the family publishing house.¹⁵⁴

Halle had been a center for Young Hegelians in the 1840s, but under the influence of Friedrich Eichhorn's ministry of religion and education, Max Duncker and Haym were denied promotion and appointment, respectively. Karl von Raumer now led the Prussian education ministry, and although the Protestant-Romantic orthodoxy of Ludwig and Leopold von Gerlach and Julius Stahl had fallen out of favor, Raumer blocked the promotion and hiring of several liberal professors. Johannes Schulze, Max Duncker's ministerial benefactor in the 1840s, could not advance Duncker's career in the face of such an unsympathetic mood at court. With a suspicious education ministry, an increasingly paranoid king, and enemies in the university senate, Duncker had little chance.¹⁵⁵ He decided to leave.

Max Duncker enlisted network members and affiliates to secure him a call to another university. Two options seemed promising: the University of Greifswald in Prussian Pomerania or the University of Bern. The ministry in Berlin first considered Duncker for the Greifswald professorship.¹⁵⁶ That he was considered at all, as a former Frankfurt liberal and vocal critic of the government during the war with Denmark, indicated an openness within Manteuffel's state ministry to seek accommodation with liberal academics.¹⁵⁷ At Raumer's request, Duncker submitted an "Explanation of My Political Conduct" in October 1855.¹⁵⁸ Much as Haym had done in his "political confession of faith" in 1843, Duncker portrayed his liberal-nationalist agitation in the 1830s and 1840s, his parliamentary activity at Frankfurt, and his support for German rebels in Holstein as expressions of his simple desire to honor Prussia. He had only hoped for a "greater Prussia," he explained, and had therefore supported a Prussian-led Reich. By his own account, Duncker was a Prussian patriot first and a German nationalist second.

Duncker's "confession" satisfied Raumer, who privately offered Duncker the position before suddenly declaring his political contrition unconvincing.¹⁵⁹ What had happened? Duncker's statement had likely reached the king. Friedrich Wilhelm IV, dissatisfied with Duncker's contrition, intervened and demanded a sweeping renunciation. There were several reasons for the royal intercession. The Berlin police knew of the Literary Association and the involvement of Duncker's close friends in the organization. Hence, Hinckeldey's direct access to the king carried weight in the decision.¹⁶⁰ In the midst of the Crimean War and general diplomatic instability, senior leaders had little patience for liberal agitators, calling on state leaders to exploit the raging conflict to advance German national consolidation. Network members credited state authorities with care and coordination in their harassment of political opponents, but, as the king's belated intervention against his own minister suggested, such actions were often the result of conflicts within the notoriously factional Prussian bureaucracy and court.¹⁶¹

The withdrawal of the offered professorial chair in 1856 humiliated Max Duncker. His political friends went to work again to find him a position out-

side Prussia. Freytag offered Charlotte Duncker his condolences shortly after her husband's royal rejection.¹⁶² Freytag was, in part, following orders from his new sovereign, Duke Ernst. He began by expressing Ernst's "heartfelt concern," writing that the duke was "indignant over the pettiness of Berlin and over the affront against someone whom he so values personally."¹⁶³ Freytag then asked whether Duncker might accept a position in Coburg as director of schools because Ernst would enjoy having him nearby. Freytag then transgressed his courtly role: he suggested, as a friend, that Max Duncker decline the duke's offer of employment but accept a dynastic decoration that Ernst also wished to bestow. "[The duke] shares our opinion of the low value of princely decorations," but, Freytag added, because Ernst was a member of their "party," Duncker should accept. He offered a second, related reason: "admittedly, we do want to fence the princes in, in a legal manner, while honoring their legal rights—to which decorations also belong." Bourgeois and princely liberals bonded emotionally and cooperated politically. Yet, complex, cross-status political friendships were difficult to navigate—especially during crises.

After considerable coaching from Samwer, and having secured the consent of the Prussian government, Duncker accepted the "*Verdienstkreuz*" in Coburg.¹⁶⁴ The Prussian cabinet seemed unwilling to offend Duke Ernst further, despite his reputation among German conservatives as an accomplice to liberal and democratic agitators. Additionally, that Max Duncker accepted the decoration from a(n) (in)famously liberal monarch, after having just been denied a promotion for his political activities, speaks to a willingness to resist the Berlin government more openly.

Meanwhile, Heinrich von Sybel had located a potential professorship for Duncker in Bern. Sybel doubted whether Duncker should accept it, considering the meager pay and "the shadow side of a Swiss professorship . . . but there are not just shadows there, in Bern."¹⁶⁵ The dark side of Bern was political. Exiled 48ers in the city, particularly the "Vogt party" of radical democrats led by Carl Vogt, despised moderate liberals as traitors to the revolution.¹⁶⁶ Moving to Switzerland would also fuel official suspicion of Duncker's true political convictions. European liberals faced the "classic dilemma of political moderates"—they were denounced on both sides by conservative officials and radical exiles.¹⁶⁷ So the Dunckers stayed put in Halle. Subsequent promotions were either blocked by government intervention or "partisan" resistance.¹⁶⁸ The couple struggled into 1857, borrowing money from friends and accruing debts as Charlotte Duncker traveled to care for her ailing father.¹⁶⁹

Heinrich von Sybel's experience in 1856 offers a foil to Max Duncker's difficulties. After serving in the Erfurt Parliament, Sybel had returned to Marburg. Despite a range of new publications, however, both his promotion to full professor and a call to Berlin had been denied by the Raumer ministry.¹⁷⁰ Freytag tried to help his beleaguered friend, writing to Duke Ernst in early 1856 that Sybel

planned to visit Coburg on his way to Berlin. In much the same way that Karl Samwer and Karl Francke had introduced Freytag in Coburg, Freytag himself began the ducal introduction by praising Sybel as “respected in our republic of letters as the most significant young historian,” adding: “According to his patriotic convictions, he belongs to our party.”¹⁷¹ Freytag requested an audience for Sybel as a personal favor to Samwer and himself, attaching a review of Sybel’s latest book, which had appeared in Freytag’s *Grenzboten*, to acquaint the duke with his work. Ernst met with Sybel, Samwer, and Freytag in Siebleben.¹⁷² Despite his friends’ efforts, and despite Ernst’s casual suggestion that he teach in Coburg, Sybel accepted a more promising offer in a much larger Confederal state that helped shape his subsequent career.

Through the influence of Leopold von Ranke, his former doctoral supervisor, Sybel was offered a professorship in Munich.¹⁷³ Much like the sovereigns of Weimar and Coburg, King Maximilian II of Bavaria hoped to capitalize on the repressive policies of his neighbors by recruiting aggrieved literati from other parts of the German Confederation. He wished to patronize a new generation of liberal scholars to boost the prestige of his court and the German “cultural nation.”¹⁷⁴ After settling in Munich, Sybel began advising the king—officially on historical scholarship, unofficially on German politics.¹⁷⁵ Yet his courtly and academic positions were unstable from the start, and he depended on the king for his political influence and scholarly budget.¹⁷⁶ Unlike the Coburg court, where Samwer and Freytag served, the much larger Wittelsbach court contained a powerful conservative faction. Sybel complained about the stress caused by the intrigues of the “Ultramontane party” against his role at court and their complaints about his lectures at the University of Munich.¹⁷⁷ More experienced, conservative courtiers often succeeded in blocking Sybel’s access to the royal family entirely.¹⁷⁸

Political Catholicism, what Sybel simply and pejoratively called “Ultramontanism,” had been growing since the 1840s as the Church forfeited more temporal power after the annexation of Church lands and state secularization campaigns.¹⁷⁹ Catholic conservatives resisted what they considered to be the revolutionary threat of German nationalism, civil rights, and especially the secularization of the education system.¹⁸⁰ Like many European liberals and most network members, Heinrich von Sybel held pronounced anti-Catholic and particularly anti-clerical views.¹⁸¹ Protestant liberals in general tended to equate Church influence with reactionary politics and anti-national teachings.¹⁸² To them, Catholic prelates represented a threat to liberal politics in the present, and to the German nation in the future, through their influence over children in the school system.¹⁸³

These difficulties did not prevent some initial success, nor did they stop Sybel’s efforts to exploit his position to aid his political friends. Sybel established a Bavarian historical commission at the king’s invitation.¹⁸⁴ The commission

quickly resolved to establish a journal for liberal historical scholarship, which became the highly influential *Historische Zeitschrift*. Sybel convinced the king to offer an attractive sum to a full-time editor and sent him a volume of Max Duncker's *Geschichte des Altertums* to familiarize the king with Duncker's historiography.¹⁸⁵ Before gaining royal consent, Sybel wrote to Max Duncker, whose career prospects remained dim in 1857, offering him the editorship, 2,000 florins, and an honorary professorship in Munich.¹⁸⁶

Sybel also asked Karl Mathy to help convince Duncker to accept his offer to come to Munich. Mathy was skeptical of the merits of the editorship—and told Duncker as much. Duncker declined Sybel's offer to focus on winning a new academic post in Tübingen.¹⁸⁷ Unbeknownst to Sybel, Christian von Stockmar and Duke Ernst of Coburg had been working to obtain a professorial chair for Duncker at the University of Tübingen in Württemberg. Network members were working at cross-purposes, and Sybel was irate. He also felt unappreciated. He concluded that he needed more allies in Munich to buttress his faltering influence at King Maximilian's court.¹⁸⁸ Munich remained, nevertheless, a better base from which to exert influence on German politics, Sybel told Duncker—better than the small town of Tübingen, in the small kingdom of Württemberg, ruled by a conservative octogenarian king, Wilhelm I.

Undaunted, Sybel next offered the editorship of the nascent *Historische Zeitschrift* to Karl Samwer. Samwer responded that he might consider accepting if the position accompanied a substantially increased salary.¹⁸⁹ Sacrificing his position as a state minister, which itself had been a ducal favor, would be difficult. Samwer added that, although he supported Sybel's work in Munich, his friend's position was too precarious. Samwer had come to prize the political value of his government office.¹⁹⁰ Oscillating between the primacy of praxis and scholarship was common for network members. Sybel also exemplified network intellectuals' attempts to combine their scholarly or literary work with positions as (un)official courtiers. Striking the balance was difficult at smaller courts—as Freytag later discovered—and even more difficult at larger ones.

Max Duncker's and Karl Samwer's rejections of Heinrich von Sybel's job offer did not damage the overall network. In his letters, Sybel blustered about the ungratefulness of his political friends, but he still needed them. Duncker continued to offer Sybel staffing suggestions, articles for the new journal, and leads to possible publishers.¹⁹¹ The network was more resilient in the 1850s, under government repression, than it was during the more tolerant 1860s, partly because members suffered so many setbacks at the hands of conservative state officials and courtiers that placed them in financial and professional need of their friends and allies. Network members' rather disorganized efforts in the 1850s resulted from individual, overlapping campaigns to benefit their political friends, favors that the beneficiaries occasionally declined. Organized campaigns involving the whole network began only when Prince Wilhelm

of Prussia began a regency in place of his incapacitated brother, Friedrich Wilhelm IV.

While Heinrich von Sybel and Max Duncker sought new academic positions, Karl Mathy was preoccupied with his own professional trajectory and a family tragedy. In the years before the death of the Mathys' son, Karl Mathy Jr., in 1856, both Dunccker repeated concerns about his health.¹⁹² Karl Mathy Sr. rarely answered such inquiries, but when he did, he shared his despair over the fact that Karl Jr.'s arduous recoveries repeatedly gave way to a resurgence of the disease (which was likely tuberculosis).¹⁹³ Letters between Anna and Karl Mathy dealt with the impending loss in the last months of Karl Jr.'s life, a period that corresponded with the most emotionally intense phase of their relationship with the Duncckers and the wider network.¹⁹⁴

By the end of 1855, Karl Mathy was exhausted, and his letters answered political questions infrequently.¹⁹⁵ Both Duncckers were uncertain how to address their friends' misfortune. Charlotte Duncker, responsible for preforming more emotional labor, especially dealing with illness, wrote timidly to the Mathys: "In as difficult days as these, in which you are both living now . . . one barely has the courage to address you."¹⁹⁶ Max Duncker, on the other hand, grew increasingly impatient for the re-establishment of the flow of information from southern Germany to which Karl Mathy had better access.¹⁹⁷ The discomfort persisted. Karl Jr. died in March 1856, and the Mathys were devastated. Their correspondence with their closest friends, the Duncckers, and the rest of the network was brought to a halt.¹⁹⁸ Max Duncker handled the delicate situation indelicately. He failed to write to either of the Mathys.¹⁹⁹ The emotional labor fell again to Charlotte Duncker. By 5 April, she had arrived at the Mathys' home to comfort Anna Mathy.²⁰⁰ After she left, Charlotte Duncker continued to console the Mathys in her letters, while attempting to reconnect Karl Mathy and her husband.²⁰¹ The two men met in Thuringia in July. Some weeks later, Max Duncker wrote to Karl Mathy with no mention of family matters, focusing instead on political news that Samwer had provided.²⁰² Duncker and Mathy partly reconciled after the former's abdication of emotional and epistolary etiquette due to Charlotte Duncker's great efforts to repair the rift.

The Mathys soon moved to Gotha at Duke Ernst's invitation.²⁰³ The duke received Karl Mathy as a "fellow countryman" and asked him to oversee the establishment of a new credit bank in Gotha.²⁰⁴ Mathy had worked in commandite banks before, in Mannheim and Cologne, before moving to Berlin, at David Hanseemann's request, to help manage the fledgling Disconto-Gesellschaft.²⁰⁵ Mathy obliged the duke, working in secret to avoid straining diplomatic relations with Prussia.²⁰⁶ Conservative Prussian leaders, particularly King Friedrich Wilhelm IV, regarded credit banks and joint-stock companies with suspicion, and the Manteuffel ministry initially refused to charter joint-stock banks.²⁰⁷

The novel institutions were popular in the business community, however, as a means to raise large sums for costly industrial projects such as railroads, coal mines, and steel mills. Bourgeois investors began accepting more risk than in previous decades.²⁰⁸ Most German liberals, unlike their counterparts in Eastern Europe, endorsed joint-stock companies as a reflection of the principles of self-administration and free markets.²⁰⁹ They also hoped that heightened economic competitiveness, driven by such financial institutions, would hasten industrialization, commercial reform, and eventually the formation of a powerful nation-state. Liberals had previously expressed such hopes about the Zollverein.²¹⁰

In August 1856, Karl Mathy used his influence at the Disconto-Gesellschaft to appoint Max Duncker the company's co-representative to the new Privatbank zu Gotha.²¹¹ Duncker held the position into 1858, and Mathy shared confidential financial reports and meeting minutes with him.²¹² Duncker returned the kindness with silence. "You—wicked man—have left all of my letters and deliveries unanswered," Mathy teased, adding: "I have much, dear Duncker, to tell you. But I cannot write more. . . . The best to your lovely wife from us both, and please answer before the ending of the world—or permit your wife to answer. . . ."²¹³ In a postscript, Mathy admitted that another member of the network, Karl Francke, had just brought word of the Dunccker and their greetings. Network members often maintained contact through other members when they were too busy, too ill, or too lazy to write themselves. The fact that Max and Charlotte Duncker were married members of the same network allowed them to answer each other's letters more readily and endowed their responses with more weight than if another political friend had relayed the message. Married couples made the network of political friends more resilient, as far as men were willing to accept women's participation.

As a show of support for the fledgling enterprise, Charlotte Duncker deposited her family's savings in the Privatbank.²¹⁴ Samwer and Francke received shares. Sybel and Auerbach purchased stock in the bank, as did Ernst and Friedrich of Baden, alongside other network affiliates.²¹⁵ The larger point here is that political friendship was good business. As Sarah Horowitz has argued, sharing money and professional favors between friends was a "clearly defined cultural norm" in the nineteenth century that also provided evidence of love and affection.²¹⁶ Money, politics, and friendship mixed in this network—connecting *Besitz-* and *Bildungsbürgertum*. It was also a much-needed source of income for academics and artists in the face of professional instability. Academics such as Duncker, novelists such as Auerbach, and officials such as Francke thereby participated in the economic accommodation between entrepreneurs and government in the 1850s. New modes of business in turn supported political activism.

Nonetheless, the Gotha credit bank had its detractors in the network. Gustav Freytag opposed joint-stock companies and credit banks as a matter of principle—an antisemitic one.²¹⁷ His obstinacy created some awkwardness

among the other members.²¹⁸ Having heard that Ernst of Coburg was chartering the bank, Freytag protested, reminding the duke of a meeting in which the prosperous writer had “fervently” denounced credit banks—in words fit for a Prussian conservative—as an “appalling racket.”²¹⁹ He asked the monarch to leverage his popularity in Germany to discredit the institutions. Ernst responded, first by ignoring Freytag, then by chastising him for his presumptuousness.²²⁰ Disagreement was tolerated by bourgeois members in the 1850s, but not by monarchs accustomed to deference.²²¹

Sensing his misstep as a courtier, Freytag followed this with a friendly birthday letter to Duke Ernst, writing that he kept a “small celebratory fire” burning in his home outside Gotha in honor of the duke’s birthday.²²² These good wishes led to a brash prognosis: the next year would hold nothing but national weakness. Ernst, Freytag continued, had military, artistic, and political ambitions but lacked “a great consistent purpose.” He continued: “If I retained one wish in my quiet heart, for your happiness and your greatness, it is this: that you might not succeed at so many things . . . not vanish into the national heavens like a shooting star.”²²³ Alternating between admonition and fealty, Freytag criticized the duke’s distractions, which he feared would lead to nervous collapse—a worry Karl Francke shared.²²⁴ Freytag also implied that, by focusing on so many passions, the duke squandered energy he might otherwise devote to his self-appointed role as a leader in the fight for German unification.

The duke of Coburg’s response was measured—at first. “Pick up your best pair of glasses,” he advised, “and take a deep breath, before you hazard to decipher this scrawl: . . . listen, and read!”²²⁵ By referring explicitly to his own handwriting, in an era fixated on the deeper meaning of handwritten communication between friends, the duke signaled bourgeois emotional authenticity and a phantasmic presence by calling on Freytag to imagine his voice.²²⁶ Ernst expounded on the monarch’s (Christian) duty to be all things to all men before insinuating that Freytag was a negligent friend and parochial politician. “You still do not know me . . . You see me little, and previously you did not know me at all,” the duke chided: “I appear to you in the wrong light, and you are less at home in the circles and [social] relations in which I have lived and the study of which has been my life’s work. . . .”²²⁷ Ernst believed that the common cause of German nationalism could reconcile divergent experiences and unequal social rank: “I am a German, like you; I hold national feelings in my heart, like you; I strive alongside you for the ennoblement of our people. . . . I am perhaps less of a theoretician than you. Yet, because of that, I perhaps know the defects of our condition a bit more exactly: I have lived in more general circumstances. . . .”²²⁸ Ernst united all (German) society under his monarchical mantle; Freytag knew only the narrow bourgeois world.

The duke closed by questioning their years of work in the press: “Popularity is a flight of fancy, a caricature that sometimes smiles, sometimes frowns. . . .

What will not bend, must break; but one should not start with the breaking, like the luminaries of the Paulskirche [did].”²²⁹ Duke Ernst admonished Freytag for failing to grasp that national unification could only be achieved by agreement among the monarchs of the German Confederation, not through “the people,” and not through their parliamentary representatives. Ernst the monarch used friendly words to put Freytag the courtier back in his place. With personal wealth and a high public profile through the *Grenzboten* and his fiction, Freytag weathered the storm.

In 1857, still facing unrelenting official harassment, Max Duncker reached a critical point in his career. He agonized over whether to leave Prussia for the full professorship at Tübingen.²³⁰ In a letter with separate sections addressed to each of the Dunckers, Karl Mathy counseled Max to decline the offer: “You can and may only practice Prusso-German politics. Halle was not the best place for that—better than Tübingen, mind you. What is left but to exchange letters with [people in] Berlin . . . ?”²³¹ Mathy warned that he would be of less help to the Dunckers in Gotha than he was when he worked for the Disconto-Gesellschaft in Berlin. Duncker accepted the position in Tübingen anyway, in August 1858, though he still held out hope for another call—to Leipzig.²³² After Duncker accepted the position, Mathy wrote little to him about politics. Much of their correspondence involved gossip—though gossip also kept the lines of communication open.²³³

Max Duncker did correspond from Tübingen with other members of the network, who considered him their “patriotic missionary” to southern Germany.²³⁴ His influence in the network and outside Tübingen remained limited, however. Duncker’s relationship with Rudolf Haym became particularly strained. The two engaged in heated debates over political tactics, with Duncker rebuking him in late 1857 for not supporting an Anglo-Prussian alliance against Austria and Russia emphatically enough in the *Preussische Jahrbücher*.²³⁵ Haym replied in 1858 by complaining that Duncker refused to discuss his new essay on Prussian diplomacy “Die Politik der Zukunft” (“The Politics of the Future”): “Even as I write this, the feeling oppresses me that I should weigh and choose my words in a manner from which you yourself have weaned me.”²³⁶ By referencing his self-censorship, Haym indicated that he and Duncker risked losing the trust and easy conviviality that underlay “true” friendship and political cooperation. Haym continued: “the language of your letter reminds me that the grounds on which we debate are no longer stable, the grounds that . . . gave you the certainty that your broader and more accurate thinking—on political things—would persuade and guide me. . . . That our views differ . . . that, dear Duncker, is not right;—It grieves me bitterly.” If he wanted to practice politics, Haym added, he would work in political circles. But, because Haym edited a journal that also had to be “written and read,” he needed to appeal to a wide audience.²³⁷

What conclusions can we draw from these two examples of disagreement—between Gustav Freytag and Duke Ernst of Coburg, on the one hand, and between Rudolf Haym and Max Duncker, on the other? They both reflected different approaches to the task of organizing a *kleindeutsch* movement. Duncker and Duke Ernst believed in influencing those in power, as did Heinrich von Sybel in Munich and Karl Samwer in Coburg. For them, the road to the nation-state led through the monarchical courts of the German Confederation. For Haym and Gustav Freytag, the campaign had to be much more inclusive. It had to attract southern German liberals and moderate democrats, and it had to rely on the mobilization of German society, not just Prussian elites. Most network members accepted the latter approach during the years of the Literary Association.

Things began to change from 1858 onward. Rumors of a regency in Berlin had floated around the network since late 1857 when the Prussian king suffered another stroke.²³⁸ After Manteuffel privately informed Mathy of an imminent regency in Prussia, Mathy shared the news with the network.²³⁹ Duncker sent a well-timed and well-received copy of his “Die Politik der Zukunft” to Princess Augusta of Prussia. Network intelligence gave him the opportunity to impress the princely court in hopes of a post in a new ministry under Augusta’s husband, the man responsible for destroying the last holdouts of the Revolutions of 1848/1849, Prince Wilhelm. In January 1858, Prince Wilhelm of Prussia assumed temporary power as the king’s health deteriorated. At the beginning of his regency, most core members renewed their belief that monarchs and state ministers, not political idealism or “the people,” were the best means to achieve national unification. The temporary estrangement between the two pairs of network members—Duncker and Haym, Freytag and Ernst—showed how difficult it was for the political friends to devise and agree upon a single political strategy that promised to reach their common goal of national unity. The narrowed network that had largely shunned democrats and *großdeutsch* advocates since 1849 was now presented with a narrow path to national unification.

Conclusion

Between the Agreement of Olmütz in November 1851 and the establishment of the Prussian regency in October 1858, the network of political friends deepened their emotional bonds as they temporarily retreated from political agitation. The ideological alliances and personal connections fostered during the *Vormärz* and the Revolutions of 1848/49 were tested in the aftermath of the revolutions under the repression of conservative governments in the larger Confederal states. By 1852, the network of friends had turned to scholarship or government service, most conspicuously in the small Duchy of Coburg.

The network's retreat from politics was brief. During the Crimean War (1853–56), members saw an opportunity to exploit the international unrest, rallying support for a Prussian-led reconstitution of the German Confederation. Their principal means to this end, initially, was the Literary Association, founded in Coburg in 1853. Willingness to accept personal risk in order to collect and publish illicit political material varied widely between bourgeois and princely members of the network. Duke Ernst was able to expand network influence by enlisting princely political friends and cousins in Weimar and Baden. Nevertheless, Ernst's dealings with his bourgeois political friends demonstrated his reckless disregard of the danger non-princely members faced when they challenged Prussian power. It also showed how thorny it was to navigate cross-status political friendships on the road to the nation-state—friendship proved to be a less equalizing force in liberal politics than network members had assumed.

Members of the liberal network, most notably Max Duncker and Heinrich von Sybel, attempted to accommodate the Manteuffel government by refraining from clandestine political activities and emphasizing their loyalty to Prussia as scholars. Some members of the Manteuffel cabinet were willing to accept this coerced political settlement. In the end, though, the Prussian court rejected their overtures. King Friedrich Wilhelm IV remained the decisive voice in the Prussian state, however much his ministers worked to reform it, and however much the constitution restrained royal power. The ensuing harassment of non-princely network members by Hinckeldey's police and Raumer's ministry of education succeeded in forcing many of these liberals to limit their political fundraising and publishing. Financial vulnerability, caused by professional harassment, left certain key members unwilling to take major risks to support the association or Duke Ernst's "dynastic politics" in the mid-1850s.

This finding supports Andreas Biefang's argument that the Prussian government shifted in the 1850s from open political persecution to more subtle forms of economic harassment against liberals and democrats—even so, the repressive effect, in many cases, remained the same.²⁴⁰ By 1858, the chicanery of Prussian authorities had forced most core members of the liberal network into exile. Considering the liberal political friends' shared experiences, Manteuffel's Prussia, despite its reforms and the nuances of its individual personnel, functioned more like an opportunistic police state in relation to these moderate liberals.

Network members, meanwhile, advocated for a *kleindeutsch* solution to the German Question from Munich, Tübingen, Coburg, and Gotha, but their victories were limited. By sharing the political, professional, and emotional resources of the network, its members helped each other through this period of state harassment. Members disagreed about many things: the Literary Association, the Privatbank zu Gotha, and whether to expand network influence by appealing to reigning monarchs or to the public through the press. Yet, the network held together—a significant achievement in those difficult years.

As the next two chapters show, the political friends leveraged network resources in the 1850s and early 1860s. They continued to cultivate a national—even nationalist—reading public through their writings, while they focused on a strategy that they had developed in the smaller states of the Confederation: counseling state leaders as to how unification might be achieved. The political friends sought political accommodation with Prussia—now ruled by a regent and his moderate-liberal ministers. This strategy, they hoped, would lead to the foundation of a liberal nation-state. In the process, network members helped shape a number of policies and reform proposals that foresaw a different Germany than the Germany of 1815 or 1871.

Notes

1. Karl Francke to Max Duncker, 26 January 1852, *Politischer Briefwechsel*, 51.
2. Francke's plans coincided with the first major industrial boom in the Confederation. See Green, "Political and Diplomatic Movements," 73. Theodore Hamerow argued that members of the German bourgeoisie, having failed to achieve unification in 1848/49, turned their attention to economic expansion and "the creation of material well-being." Hamerow, *Social Foundations of German Unification*, 1: 3–4.
3. See Ross, *Beyond the Barricades*; Brophy, "Political Calculus of Capital," 149–76; Siemann, *Deutschlands Ruhe*.
4. Ross, *Beyond the Barricades*, 17–18, 178, 186; Clark, *Iron Kingdom*, 502–503; Green, "Political and Diplomatic Movements," 72–73; Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 263–64.
5. Ross, *Beyond the Barricades*, 4.
6. Sheehan, *German History*, 717.
7. Ross, *Beyond the Barricades*, 12–13, 4.
8. Murphy, "Contesting Surveillance," 28. See also Dann, ed., *Vereinswesen und bürgerliche Gesellschaft*.
9. Blackburn, *History of Germany*, 172.
10. Gustav Freytag to Duke Ernst II of Coburg, 27 December 1853, *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelty, 13; Woltz, "Staatspolitische Wirken," 10.
11. Burdiel, "Spanish Modernity," 43.
12. [Max Duncker], *Vier Monate auswärtiger Politik* (Berlin: Weit, 1851).
13. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 173; Karl Samwer to J.G. Droysen, 4 January 1850, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. J.G. Droysen, Nr. 73–80, Bl. 7–8.
14. Sybel, for example, celebrated Max Duncker's political sense and polemical power. See Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 143.
15. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 172, 182.
16. As Christian Jansen has noted, treason charges were commonly leveled against democrats and socialists after the dissolution of the "rump" parliament in June 1849. See Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 60–63.
17. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 185, 187–90. Prussian authorities would not have granted the couple passports if they had wanted to keep Max Duncker in Prussia in preparation for an eventual conviction.

18. Thus, in Wolfgang Mommsen's view, the Revolutions of 1848/49 were not entirely unsuccessful. See Mommsen, "German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century," 420–21.
19. GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 187; Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 142.
20. Mulholland, *Bourgeois Liberty and the Politics of Fear*, 50; Nipperdey, *Germany from Napoleon to Bismarck*, 170; Sheehan, *German History*, 722.
21. Blackbourn, *History of Germany*, 175.
22. Schulz, *Normen und Praxis*, 247; Radkau, *Zeitalter der Nervosität*, 27.
23. The term is used by Jörn Leonhard in Leonhard, *Liberalismus*, 514.
24. Christian Jansen argues this in Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 101.
25. BArch, N2184/75, Bl. 104.
26. Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 148.
27. GStAPK, VI. HA, NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 148, 208; Charlotte Duncker to Anna Mathy, 15 October 1853, BArch, N2184/12, Bl. 5–6. Traveling as couples also allowed spouses to reconnect after more than a year of frequent separations.
28. Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 149.
29. Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 150.
30. See SAC, LA A 6898; SAC, LA A 6899; SAC, LA A 6900.
31. Charlotte Duncker to Max Duncker, 27 May 1852, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 9b, Bl. 192–94.
32. For example, Berthold Auerbach received a generous offer from Carl Alexander of Weimar to join his court as a librarian; see Berthold Auerbach to Jakob Auerbach, 21 December 1845, in *Briefe an seinen Freund*, ed. J. Auerbach, 1: 53–54.
33. GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 236. Ernst ruled the duchies of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha in personal union.
34. Quoted in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelty, vi.
35. Freytag to Ernst, 23 April 1853, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelty, 1.
36. Freytag to Ernst, 23 April 1853, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelty, 1–2.
37. Ottokar Lorenz, *Staatsmänner und Geschichtsschreiber*, 325.
38. Hoffmann, "Freundschaft als Passion," 84–85. Many members, including Freytag, Berthold Auerbach and Max Duncker, were also Masons. See also Horowitz, *Friendship and Politics*, 27; Gould, *Origins of Liberal Dominance*, 30; Hoffmann, *Die Politik der Geselligkeit*; Lehmann, "Pietism and Nationalism."
39. J. Habermas, *Strukturwandel*, 66; Bauer and Hämmerle, introduction to *Liebe Schreiben*, 23, 28.
40. GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 292.
41. Goodman, *Republic of Letters*, 96.
42. On epistolary networks among Italian liberals before unification, see Isabella, *Risorgimento in Exile*, 27.
43. For example, see Charlotte Duncker to Max Duncker, 27 May 1852, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 9b, Bl. 192–94; Max Duncker to Karl Mathy, 18 March 1857, BArch, N2184/11, Bl. 22–23.
44. See, for example, Karl Mathy to the Dunckers, 30 July 1856, BArch, N2184/14, Bl. 14; Francke to Karl Mathy, 20 May [1855], BArch, N2184/21, Bl. 16; Samwer to Sybel, 2 March 1857, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Heinrich von Sybel, Nr. 39, Bund I, Bl. 14–15.
45. Green, "Political and Diplomatic Movements," 71; Ross, *Beyond the Barricades*, 186.
46. Jewish German merchants and bankers adopted a similar tactic, writing Yiddish in the Hebrew alphabet, to obscure sensitive information from postal censors. See Stern, *Gold and Iron*, 8, 27.
47. For example, see Rudolf Haym to Max Duncker, 28 May 1858, in *Ausgewählter Briefwechsel*, ed. Rosenberg, 152; Max Duncker to Charlotte Duncker, 26 July 1852, GStAPK, VI. HA

- Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 9a, Bl. 55; Karl Mathy to Charlotte Duncker, 30 May 1856, BArch, N2184/14, Bl. 45; Karl Mathy to Charlotte Duncker, 11 February 1854, BArch, N2184/14, Bl. 49–50.
48. Karl Samwer to Max Duncker, 13 November 1854, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 113, Bl. 14–15. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 247. Francke to Max Duncker, 24 November 1858, in *Politischer Briefwechsel*, ed. Schultze, 77.
 49. N2814/75, Bl. 368; Karl Samwer to Max Duncker 14 July 1853, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 113, Bl. 4–5; Charlotte Duncker to Max Duncker, 25 August 1851, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 9b, Bl. 157.
 50. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 218. See also Horowitz, *Friendship and Politics*, 94–95.
 51. Christian Jansen has noted similar tactics of travel as a form of political organizing among democrats and left liberals that attempted to circumvent the Prussian police and their spies. See Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 101–103. As Gisela Schlientz has noted in the case of France before the Revolution of 1848, “inconspicuous” women travelers often transported politically sensitive letters to avoid official surveillance of the post. See Schlientz, “Verdeckte Botschaften,” 30.
 52. See, for example, Charlotte Duncker to Karl and Anna Mathy, 30 April 1854, BArch, N2184/12, Bl. 11–12.
 53. Schnicke, “Kranke Historiker,” 12–13; Radkau, *Zeitalter der Nervosität*, 25–26. On the uncomfortable working conditions in archives in the nineteenth century, see Smith, *Gender of History*, 119. For a more high-profile example, see the contemporary and historiographical focus on Otto von Bismarck’s mental and psychological health in, for example, Pflanze, “Toward a Psychoanalytic Interpretation of Bismarck”; and Krecklau, “Gender Anxiety.”
 54. Charlotte Duncker to Anna Mathy, 15 October 1853, BArch, N2184/12, Bl. 5–6; Alexander von Soiron to Karl Mathy, 29 July 1854, BArch, N2184/55, Bl. 32–33.
 55. See, for example, Freytag to Ernst, 24 December 1856, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelty, 69–71; Samwer to Max Duncker, [early April 1856], GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 113, Bl. 35.
 56. Sheehan, *German History*, 517–18.
 57. Berthold Auerbach to Karl Mathy, 13 November 1856, BArch, N2184/2, Bl. 6; Auerbach to Karl Mathy, 16 December 1856, BArch, N2184/2, Bl. 7.
 58. Charlotte Duncker to Anna Mathy, 4 December 1855, BArch, N2184/12, Bl. 32; Sybel to Droysen, 18 November 1853, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. J.G. Droysen, Nr. 79, Bl. 61; Francke to Karl Mathy, 25 [February] 1856, BArch, N2184/21, Bl. 20–21.
 59. For example, see Hermann Baumgarten to Max Duncker, 5 May 1852, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 19, Bl. 7; Baumgarten to Max Duncker, April 1854, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 19, Bl. 9.
 60. Karl Mathy to Charlotte Duncker, 18 October 1853, BArch, N2184/14, Bl. 53; Charlotte Duncker to Max Duncker, 24 October 1853, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 9b, Bl. 221.
 61. Garrioch, “From Christian Friendship to Secular Sentimentality,” 16; Siegel, *Entfernte Freunde*, 16–20; Asen, “Zur Verortung von Paaren,” 326–27. See also Mosse, “Friendship and Nationhood,” 355.
 62. Charlotte Duncker to Karl and Anna Mathy, 9 January 1854, BArch, N2184/12, Bl. 9–10.
 63. On the role of shared memory and reminiscing in epistolary relationships, see Siegel, *Entfernte Freunde*, 27; Bauer and Hämmerle, introduction to *Liebe Schreiben*, 23; Fulbrook and Rublack, “Social Self,” 267.
 64. Charlotte Duncker to Karl Mathy and Anna Mathy, 9 January 1854, BArch, N2184/12, Bl. 9–10.

65. Charlotte Duncker to Karl Mathy and Anna Mathy, 9 January 1854, BArch, N2184/12, Bl. 9–10.
66. Roggenbach became acquainted with Francke through the Mathys. He had also gone to Koblenz with Christian von Stockmar to meet the prince of Prussia. See Francke to Droysen, 22 October 1853, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 30, Bl. 70–72.
67. Sybel to Droysen, 18 November 1853, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. J.G. Droysen, Nr. 79, Bl. 61; Rudolf Haym to Max Duncker, 4 April 1852, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 56, Bl. 321; Freytag to Ernst, 26 June 1853, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelty, 5.
68. Samwer to Max Duncker, 2 September 1853, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 113, Bl. 3; Samwer to Max Duncker, 14 July 1853, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 113, Bl. 4.
69. GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 224.
70. Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 270.
71. Karl Mathy to Anna Mathy, 1 February 1854, BArch, N2184/68, Bl. 24–25.
72. Ernst of Coburg to Samwer, 8 February 1854, SAC, LA A 7178, Bl. 8.
73. Karl Mathy to Anna Mathy, 1 February 1854, BArch, N2184/68, Bl. 24–25; BArch, N2184/75, Bl. 191–203.
74. Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 323.
75. Biefang, *Politisches Bürgertum*, 35–36.
76. For instance, see Soper, *Building a Civil Society*, 140–41, 149; Nipperdey, *Organisation der deutschen Parteien*.
77. Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 601.
78. See Biefang, *Politisches Bürgertum*, 35–36.
79. Green, “Political Trends and Movements,” 75–76.
80. See Schulz, *Normen und Praxis*, 296–353; Paul Schroeder, *Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War*.
81. Karl Mathy to Charlotte Duncker, [mid-February] 1856, BArch, N2184/14, Bl. 36–37; Samwer to Max Duncker, 11 February 1855, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 113, Bl. 29–30; Biefang, *Politisches Bürgertum*, 42; Sheehan, *German History*, 862.
82. Freytag to Ernst, 27 December 1853, *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelty, 13–14; Sheehan, *German History*, 860–61. Leading voices in the *Trias*, or the “Third Germany” movement, included Friedrich von Beust and Ludwig von der Pfordten, the de facto minister presidents of Saxony and Bavaria, respectively. On *Trias* reform plans, see Burg, *Die deutsche Trias in Idee und Wirklichkeit*; Flöter, *Beust*; Müller, *Deutscher Bund und deutsche Nation*.
83. Woltz, “Staatspolitische Wirken,” 14. See also Lorenz, *Staatsmänner und Geschichtsschreiber*, 342.
84. Freytag to Ernst, 31 October 1853, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelty, 11.
85. Ernst of Coburg to Freytag, 31 December 1853, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelty, 15.
86. Ernst of Coburg to Freytag, 31 December 1853, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelty, 15–17.
87. Lorenz, *Staatsmänner und Geschichtsschreiber*, 340–42.
88. Samwer to Max Duncker, [1854], GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 113, Bl. 28; Walter, *Heeresreformen*, 391; Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 267; Ross, *Beyond the Barricades*, 11; Behnen, *Preußische Wochenblatt*, 9, 61.
89. Duke Ernst of Coburg had already contacted Bethmann Hollweg in mid-1853 to suggest uniting the *Wochenblatt* party with the “ruins of the Gotha party.” See Behnen, *Preußische Wochenblatt*, 94. See also Ross, *Beyond the Barricades*, 11.
90. Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 266–67; Walter, *Heeresreformen*, 391.
91. Francke to Max Duncker, 14 February 1858, in *Politischer Briefwechsel*, ed. Schultze, 72.
92. By this point, members of the network were either under official suspicion as dangerous liberals or driven into exile. This fact alone might have discouraged the integration of the two

- networks because many *Wochenblatt* members served as state officials and could not risk further exposure to the attacks of archconservatives at court.
93. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 339.
 94. See SAC, LA A 6898; SAC, LA A 6900; SAC, LA A 6901; Hector Bolitho, ed., *The Prince Consort and His Brother*.
 95. Morier, *Memoirs and Letters*, 1: 162–163; Karl Mathy to Max Duncker, 24 November 1858, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 86, Bl. 30–31, 88. On the foreign policy assumptions held at the time by British liberals, see Parry, *Politics of Patriotism*, 9, 14, 59.
 96. On Morier, see also Murray, *Liberal Diplomacy and German Unification*. This strategy also helped Queen Victoria undermine Whitehall's efforts to check royal influence over foreign policy. See Parry, *Politics of Patriotism*, 53–54.
 97. Karl Mathy to Charlotte Duncker, 2 May 1854, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 86.
 98. Goodman, *Republic of Letters*, 18. Although this silence may have represented a form of polite disagreement, it is more likely that it was akin to shunning. Epistolary etiquette stipulated frequent correspondence between friends or family members; silence was impolite. Therefore, an awkward disagreement would have been ignored in a subsequent letter before contact was suspended entirely. Goethe once reminded his readers that when it came to letters, it was better “to write about nothing than to write nothing at all.” Goethe, *Die Wahlverwandtschaften*, 105.
 99. Karl Mathy to Charlotte Duncker, 23 March 1854, BArch, N2184/14, Bl. 17; Karl Mathy to Max Duncker, [1854], GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 86, Bl. 3–4.
 100. Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 271–72.
 101. Karl Mathy to Max Duncker, 25 September 1854, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 86, Bl. 15; Samwer to Max Duncker, 11 September 1854, in *Politischer Briefwechsel*, ed. Schultze, 59; Samwer to Max Duncker, 16 September 1854, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 113, Bl. 9; Samwer to Max Duncker, 18 April 1854, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 113, Bl. 10.
 102. Ernst to Max Duncker, 3 June 1855, SAC, LA A 7178, Bl. 44.
 103. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 219, 238, 247; BArch, N2184/75, Bl. 323; Haym, *Leben Max Duncckers*, 170.
 104. Ernst to Freytag, 16 May 1854, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelтей, 21.
 105. Ernst to Freytag, 16 May 1854, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelтей, 22.
 106. Freytag to Ernst, 18 May 1854, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelтей, 23.
 107. Freytag to Ernst, 18 May 1854, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelтей, 22. Emphasis in the original. See also Ross, *Beyond the Barricades*, 167, 186.
 108. Freytag to Ernst, 18 May 1854, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelтей, 24.
 109. Samwer to Ernst, 13 February 1854, SAC, LA A 7177, Bl. 37–38.
 110. Ernst to Samwer, 8 February 1854, SAC, LA A 7178, Bl. 8.
 111. Samwer to Ernst, 13 February 1854, SAC, LA A 7177, Bl. 37–38; Samwer to Ernst, 14 February 1854, SAC, LA A 7177, Bl. 39–40; Samwer to Ernst, 14 February 1854, SAC, LA A 7177, Bl. 41–44.
 112. Samwer to Ernst, 14 February 1854, SAC, LA A 7177, Bl. 44.
 113. Samwer to Ernst, 20 February 1854, SAC, LA A 7177, Bl. 49.
 114. Samwer to Ernst, 20 February 1854, SAC, LA A 7177, Bl. 50.
 115. Samwer to Ernst, 19 February 1854, SAC, LA A 7177, Bl. 55.
 116. Samwer to Ernst, 18 February 1854, SAC, LA A 7177, Bl. 52–53.
 117. Samwer to Ernst, 26 March 1854, SAC, LA A 7177, Bl. 63–65.
 118. Ernst to Samwer, 26 March 1854, SAC, LA A 7178, Bl. 12. He also ordered Samwer to report to his brother on the mood in the Prussian Landtag.
 119. Samwer to Ernst, 30 March 1854, SAC, LA A 7177, Bl. 77.

120. Freytag to Ernst, 6 August 1854, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelty, 28–29.
121. Freytag to Ernst, 6 August 1854, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelty, 28; Mühlen, *Gustav Freytag*, 130.
122. Freytag to Ernst, 11 September 1854, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelty, 30.
123. Freytag to Ernst, 11 September 1854, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelty, 30.
124. Freytag to Ernst, 23 September 1854, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelty, 32–34.
125. On Hinckeldey and the Confederal police, see Siemann, *Deutschlands Ruhe*, 255–56; Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 69. Freytag to Ernst, 26 November 1854, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelty, 36.
126. Men's service to male monarchs could incorporate elements of same-sex desire. See, for example, Claudia Krecklau's analysis of how Bismarck understood his service to Wilhelm I of Prussia in "Gender Anxiety," 175, 180.
127. Freytag to Ernst, 27 November 1854, SAC, LA A 7397, Bl. 19–25. There was no further discussion between Duke Ernst and Freytag about these supposed letters.
128. Freytag to Ernst, 20 November 1854, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelty, 38. Freytag used the German term "*Hintertreppenbekanntschaft*." Charlotte Duncker was a close childhood friend of the writer Sophie Kaskel, Baudissin's wife. The count and Max became friends through their spouses: GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 78–80.
129. Freytag to Ernst, 26 November 1854, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelty, 38. Johann ascended the Saxon throne in early August 1854 after his brother's accidental death in Tyrol.
130. Friedrich von Beust to Ernst of Coburg, 31 December 1854, SAC, LA A 7397, Bl. 26–27; Mühlen, *Freytag*, 132. Saxony, as a member of the Confederal Police Commission, was responsible for overseeing the Thuringian states. See Biefang, *Politisches Bürgertum*, 35.
131. Karl Francke to Johann Gustav Droysen, 2 November 1855, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. J.G. Droysen, Nr. 30, Bl. 149–51. David Barclay argues that after 1849 the Prussian king was forced to accept a constitution, but this concession accompanied an expansion of state repressive powers with the "regular use" of police spies and increased censorship. See Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 216.
132. Karl Francke to J.G. Droysen, 22 October 1856, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. J.G. Droysen, Nr. 30, Bl. 175–76.
133. Ernst of Coburg to Friedrich of Baden, 27 March 1854, *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 5.
134. Ernst to Friedrich of Baden, 23 April 1854, GAK, FA, Korr. 13, Bd. 13, Doc. 3. A redacted version of the letter can be found in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 8.
135. Ernst to Friedrich of Baden, 23 April 1854; Ernst to Friedrich of Baden, 14 October 1854, in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 8–9, 1: 13.
136. Samwer to Max Duncker, [beginning of 1856], in *Politischer Briefwechsel*, ed. Schultze, 68.
137. Friedrich of Baden to Wilhelm, prince of Prussia, 6 April 1855, in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 37.
138. Carl Alexander of Weimar to Ernst of Coburg, 9 July 1853, SAC, LA A 7018, unfoliated.
139. Carl Alexander of Weimar to Friedrich of Baden, GAK, FA Korr. 13 Bd. 15, Doc. A5.
140. Carl Alexander of Weimar to Friedrich of Baden, GAK, FA Korr. 13 Bd. 15, Doc. A6. References to personal harmony and the Aristotelian melding of souls held both Platonic and sexual connotations: Semanek, "Von 'schönen Stunden,'" 305; Siegel, *Entfernte Freunde*, 16.
141. See Mosse, "Friendship and Nationhood," 355, 360.
142. Cocks, *On Sovereignty*, 12.
143. GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 239–40.
144. Bourgeois status was largely dependent on patterns of "taste" and conspicuous consumption befitting an elite. See Rahden, *Jews and Other Germans*, 24–25; Habermas, *Frauen und Männer*, 68; Kwan, *Liberalism in the Habsburg Monarchy*, 17.

145. See, for example, Freytag to Ernst, 6 March 1861, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelty, 151.
146. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, 148–49, 228; N2184/75, Bl. 257, 273; Haym, *Leben Max Duncckers*, 169; Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 368. Curiously, no surviving letters between these political friends discuss that Bassermann had died by suicide following the failure of the Revolutions of 1848/49.
147. Karl Mathy to Max Duncker, 17 December 1858, BArch, N2184/14, Bl. 74–75; Freytag to Ernst, 10 November 1858, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelty, 103–104.
148. This approach was not exclusive to liberals in nineteenth-century Europe. See Armenteros, *French Idea of History*, 3.
149. Haym, *Leben Max Duncckers*, 146; GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 199. Max Duncker's incorporation of politics into his work in the ivory tower supports Anna Ross's argument that there was "no such thing as a retreat into a depoliticized professional or business sphere." See Ross, *Beyond the Barricades*, 14.
150. See Smith, *Gender of History*, 83–84. Members had followed Gervinus's trial for pronouncing in print on the democratic telos of history: Hübinger, *Georg Gottfried Gervinus*, 194–95, 198–200. Alexander von Soiron represented Gervinus in court.
151. Smith, *Gender of History*, 38, 53.
152. Haym to Max Duncker, 30 March 1852, in *Ausgewählter Briefwechsel*, ed. Rosenberg, 134.
153. Max Duncker to Droysen, 20 May 1855, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. J.G. Droysen, Nr. 27, Bl. 69; Freytag to Max Duncker, 8 April 1854, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 2, Bl. 138–149; BArch, N2184/75, Bl. 200; GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 264.
154. Karl Duncker to Max Duncker, 7 July 1853, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 50–51.
155. Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 237–38.
156. Greifswald was, of course, a Prussian university, but the network presumably chose it because it was farther away and less prestigious than Halle—perhaps Duncker's promotion to full professor there would attract less official scrutiny.
157. Brophy, "Political Calculus of Capital," 152; Ross, *Beyond the Barricades*, 14.
158. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 176, Bl. 1–4.
159. Max Duncker to Droysen, 4 January 1856, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. J.G. Droysen, Nr. 27, Bl. 71.
160. On Friedrich Wilhelm's growing paranoia after 1850, see Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 216. See also the Gerlach brothers' resentment of Hinckeldey's influence and his opposition to their *Kreuzzeitung* in Leopold von Gerlach, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, 1: 652, 1: 783–84, 2: 98, 2: 100–101. Hinckeldey maintained his position until the summer of 1856 when he was killed in a duel.
161. Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 236–37; Clark, *Iron Kingdom*, 396–97, 506.
162. Freytag to Charlotte Duncker, March 1856, *Politische Briefwechsel*, ed. Schultze, 69–70.
163. Freytag to Charlotte Duncker, March 1856, *Politische Briefwechsel*, ed. Schultze, 69–70.
164. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 2, Bl. 175; Samwer to Max Duncker, 16 May 1856, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 113, Bl. 37–38; Karl von Raumer to Max Duncker, 22 December 1856, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 2, Bl. 179. Even dynastic decorations were issued in both standard—i.e., Christian—and "Jewish" versions, which prominent Jewish recipients found discriminatory. See Stern, *Gold and Iron*, 16, 18.
165. Sybel to Max Duncker, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 137, Bl. 6; Sybel to Max Duncker, 7 July 1855, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 137, Bl. 8–9; BArch, N2184/75, Bl. 268.
166. On German radical leaders in Switzerland, see Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 97–99.
167. Rampton, *Liberal Ideas in Tsarist Russia*, 40.
168. Haym, *Leben Max Duncckers*, 169.

169. Charlotte Duncker to Max Duncker, 18 September 1857, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 9b, Bl. 233; Charlotte Duncker to Max Duncker, 7 October 1857, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 9b, Bl. 235.
170. Max Duncker to Karl Mathy, June 1855, BArch, N2184/11, Bl. 15.
171. Freytag to Ernst, 17 March 1856, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelty, 50.
172. Freytag to Ernst, 17 March 1856, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelty, 50; Dotterweich, *Sybel*, 199.
173. Dotterweich, *Sybel*, 85; Lees, *Revolution and Reflection*, 27.
174. Dotterweich, *Sybel*, 245.
175. Sybel therefore performed what Harald Biermann has called a “bridging function” between northern and southern Germany. In the context of the network, Sybel spanned the German regional divide by providing network members in the north with news from the south. See Biermann, *Ideologie statt Realpolitik*, 242.
176. Dotterweich, *Sybel*, 235, 244.
177. Sybel to Max Duncker, 26 June 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 137, Bl. 46–48; Sybel to Max Duncker, 1 September 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 137, Bl. 58–59. On Sybel’s nervous state in Munich, see Schnicke, “Kranke Historiker,” 19.
178. Sybel to Duncker, 26 June 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 137 Bl. 45–48.
179. Borutta, *Antikatholizismus*, 47; Brophy, *Rhineland*, 254–55. See also Herzog, *Intimacy and Exclusion*, 4–5. Dagmar Herzog dates the genesis of organized political Catholicism in Baden, at least, to the 1830s. See also *Maistre and his European Readers*, ed. Armenteros and Lebrun.
180. Borutta, *Antikatholizismus*, 15.
181. Lees, *Revolution and Reflection*, 45–46; Borutta, *Antikatholizismus*, 273, 275; Langewiesche, “Nature of German Liberalism,” 108–109. On anti-clericalism, see Gould, *Origins of Liberal Dominance*, 32.
182. Borutta, *Antikatholizismus*, 14, 73.
183. Clark, “Religion and Confessional Conflict,” 86–93; Borutta, *Antikatholizismus*, 47. See also Healy, *Jesuit Specter*, 3–4, 23, 37–38, 50.
184. Sybel to Droysen, 31 August 1858, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. J.G. Droysen, Nr. 79, Bl. 64.
185. BArch, N2184/75, Bl. 446; GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 264.
186. Sybel to Max Duncker, 29 September 1857 GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 137, Bl. 10–11. See also BArch, N2184/75, Bl. 446.
187. GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 264; N2184/75, Bl. 446.
188. Sybel to Max Duncker, 28 October 1857, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 137, Bl. 12.
189. Samwer to Sybel, 22 July 1856, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Heinrich von Sybel, Nr. 39, Bl. 11–12. Sybel had offered Samwer 4,500 talers.
190. Samwer to Sybel, 22 July 1856, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Heinrich von Sybel, Nr. 39, Bl. 11–12.
191. See, for example, Sybel to Max Duncker, 21 October 1858, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 137, Bl. 17; Sybel to Max Duncker, 7 June 1858, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 137, Bl. 14.
192. GStAPK, VI. HA, NI. Duncker, Max, Nr. 5, Bl. 232–34; Charlotte Duncker’s letters to the Mathys in the few months before Karl Jr.’s death were poignant. See Charlotte Duncker to Anna and Karl Mathy, 4 December 1855–14 April 1856, BArch N2184/12, Bl. 32–56.
193. Karl Mathy to Charlotte Duncker, 14 December 1855, BArch, N2184/14, Bl. 34–35; Karl Mathy to Charlotte Duncker, [mid-]February 1856, BArch, N2184/14, Bl. 36–37.
194. The Mathys’ discussions of Karl Jr. can be found in double-letters written first by Karl Jr. with additions by his mother. See Karl Mathy to Karl Jr. and to Anna Mathy, 5 October 1855, BArch, N2184/14, Bl. 97–98 and Anna Mathy and Karl Jr. to Karl Mathy Sr., 11 July 1855, BArch, N2184/69, Bl. 134–136.

195. In the months before his son's death, only one letter to the Dunccker centered on politics. See Karl Mathy to Charlotte Duncker, 30 May 1856, BArch, N2184/14, Bl. 45.
196. Charlotte Duncker to Anna and Karl Mathy, 30 March 1856, BArch N2184/12, Bl. 49–50.
197. Max Duncker noted the close circle of southern German friends around Mathy from the mid-1840s. See Duncker, "Karl Mathy," 54.
198. See, for example, Berthold Auerbach to Karl Mathy, 13 November 1856, BArch, N2184/2, Bl. 6; Auerbach to Karl Mathy, 16 December 1856, BArch, N2184/2, Bl. 7; Charlotte Duncker to Anna and Karl Mathy, 21 June 1856, BArch, N2184/12, Bl. 62–63.
199. While in mourning, men were expected to express intense emotions to one another in letters. See Horowitz, *Friendship and Politics*, 73.
200. BArch, N2184/75, Bl. 318.
201. See, for example, Charlotte Duncker to Karl Mathy, 11 July 1857, BArch, N2184/12, Bl. 76–77.
202. BArch N2184/75, Bl. 349; Max Duncker to Karl Mathy, 9 August 1856, BArch, N2184/11, Bl. 18–19.
203. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 379.
204. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 379.
205. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 361, 365.
206. BArch, N2184/75, Bl. 327.
207. Brophy, "Political Calculus of Capital," 152–53.
208. Hanseemann once had to cover a 12,000-taler loss at the Disconto-Gesellschaft: Brophy, "Political Calculus of Capital," 166.
209. Brophy, "Political Calculus of Capital," 149–50; Rampton, *Liberal Ideas in Tsarist Russia*, 2–3.
210. See also Huber, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte*, 3: 143–45, 3: 149–50.
211. Karl Mathy to Charlotte Duncker, 15 August 1856, BArch, N2184/14, Bl. 10–11.
212. Karl Mathy to Charlotte Duncker and Max Duncker, BArch, N2184/14, 20 January 1857, Bl. 56–57; Karl Mathy to Max Duncker, 4 August 1857, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 86, Bl. 26. Duncker's move was also risky because the Prussian court resented the establishment of credit banks in neighboring states as a drain on the kingdom's own financial sector.
213. Karl Mathy to Max Duncker, 27 May 1857, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 86, Bl. 20–21.
214. Karl Mathy to Max Duncker, 10 June 1858, BArch, N2184/14, Bl. 71–72.
215. Fanny Lewald to Karl Mathy, 5 June 1857, BArch, N2184/56, Bl. 20–21; Fanny Lewald to Karl Mathy, 22 June 1858, BArch, N2184/56, Bl. 22–23.
216. Horowitz, *Friendship and Politics*, 78–79. See also Brophy, "Political Calculus of Capital," 152; Brophy, "*Salus Publica Suprema Lex*," 124. In its earliest appearance, the term "liberal" was associated with "the financial means to show generosity to others." See Freeden and Fernández-Sebastián, introduction to *In Search of European Liberalisms*, 18.
217. Freytag was apparently involved in a credit bank based in Leipzig, which he liked well enough. See Karl Mathy, Diary Entry, BArch N2184/75, Bl. 313; Freytag to Mathy, 11 November 1856, in *Nach der Revolution*, ed. Jansen. 403–404.
218. BArch, N2184/75, Bl. 332.
219. Freytag to Ernst, 21 April 1856, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelty, 56. See Brophy, "Political Calculus of Capital," 157; Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 227.
220. Freytag to Ernst, 21 April 1856, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelty, 56; Ernst to Freytag, 28 June 1856, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelty, 60–62.
221. Freytag to Ernst, 21 April 1856, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelty, 56.
222. Freytag to Ernst, 21 April 1856, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelty, 57.
223. Freytag to Ernst, 21 April 1856, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelty, 57.
224. Francke to Droysen, 20 March 1856, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. J.G. Droysen, Nr.96, Bl. 163–

63. Ernst was a successful composer in his own right. See Tasler, *Macht und Musik*. Freytag considered Duke Ernst's compositions unwelcome distractions from his work as a German nationalist.
225. Ernst to Freytag, 28 June 1856, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelty, 60.
226. On letters as the embodiments of their authors, see Goodman, *Republic of Letters*, 143. On the role of naturalness and emotional authenticity in bourgeois interpersonal relationships, see Habermas, *Frauen und Männer*, 278; Rebhan-Glück, "Gefühle erwünscht," 68–69. See also Frevert, "Defining Emotions," 25.
227. Ernst to Freytag, 28 June 1856, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelty, 61.
228. Ernst to Freytag, 28 June 1856, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelty, 61.
229. Ernst to Freytag, 28 June 1856, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelty, 62.
230. On Max's deliberations, see Charlotte Duncker to Max Duncker, 28 October 1857, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Duncker, Max, Nr. 9b, Bl. 236; Heinrich von Sybel to Max Duncker, 29 September 1857, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 137, Bl. 10–11.
231. Karl Mathy to Charlotte Duncker and Max Duncker, 20 January 1858, BArch, N2184/14, Bl. 63–64.
232. Gustav von Rümelin to Max Duncker, 18 August 1857, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 2, Bl. 198. The total salary of about 1,900 florins, or 1,200 gulden, was slightly less than what Sybel offered. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 262. On Leipzig, see BArch, N2184/75, Bl. 474.
233. Such gossip included news of Freytag's throat infection and of an actress who was apparently taking Coburg by storm while taking advantage of the duke's finances. See Karl Mathy to Max Duncker, 17 December 1858, BArch, N2184/14, Bl. 74–75. On the social and cultural role of gossip, see Spacks, *Gossip*.
234. Cited in Haym, *Leben Max Duncckers*, 176.
235. Rudolf Haym to Max Duncker, 24 November 1857, in *Ausgewählter Briefwechsel*, ed. Rosenberg, 147. See also: Haym to Max Duncker, 28 May 1858, in *Ausgewählter Briefwechsel*, ed. Rosenberg, 152; Haym to Max Duncker, in *Ausgewählter Briefwechsel*, ed. Rosenberg, 153; Haym to Max Duncker, 5 June 1858, *Ausgewählter Briefwechsel*, ed. Rosenberg, 154–56.
236. Haym to Max Duncker, 5 June 1858, *Ausgewählter Briefwechsel*, ed. Rosenberg, 154.
237. Haym to Max Duncker, 5 June 1858, *Ausgewählter Briefwechsel*, ed. Rosenberg, 155.
238. Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 278–80. Leopold von Gerlach, the king's adjunct and personal confidant, and other members of the court became seriously concerned with the king's health in the summer of 1857. See Leopold von Gerlach, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, 2: 518–20.
239. BArch, N2184/75, Bl. 463.
240. Biefang, *Politisches Bürgertum*, 35.