POLITICAL FRIENDSHIP

LIBERAL NOTABLES, NETWORKS, AND THE PURSUIT OF THE GERMAN NATION-STATE, 1848–1866

MICHAEL WEAVER

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Political Friendship

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For Andrew

Contents

Figures, Maps, and Tables

Figures

Maps

Tables

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Abbreviations

BArch	Bundesarchiv Berlin
BPH	Brandenburg-Preußisches Hausarchiv–Kaiser Friedrich III., Berlin
FA	Großherzogliches Familienarchiv–Großherzog Friedrich I. von Baden, Karlsruhe
GAK	Generallandesarchiv Karlsruhe
GSA	Goethe- und Schiller-Archiv, Weimar
HA	*Hauptabteilung*
GStAPK	Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin
HStAW	Hauptstaatsarchiv Weimar
LA A	Landesarchiv–Lokat A "Herzogliches Hausarchiv," Coburg
Nl.	*Nachlass*
QdPÖs	*Quellen zur deutschen Politik Österreichs, 1859–1866*, ed. Heinrich Srbik
SAC	Staatsarchiv Coburg

Map 0.1. The German Confederation, 1815–1866. Source: *Germany, 1800–1870*, ed. Jonathan Sperber (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). Used with permission. Additions of Coburg and Weimar by the author.

Introduction

In November 1861, Karl Mathy wrote from Leipzig to his close friend and long-time political ally in Berlin, Max Duncker:

> Far be it from me to ask you to write me pointless letters with contents useless to us both. We are hardly ladies . . . and a bit of gossip from our little circle of friends would be . . . no relief for your [troubled] mind. Ask anything of me, dear Duncker, put my friendship to the test, then you will see indeed whether its colors are true.[1]

Mathy's somewhat prickly and seemingly trivial letter reflected an ongoing shift in the political culture of nineteenth-century Germany. A "New Era" liberal ministry had replaced a post-revolutionary conservative cabinet in Prussia, bringing into state service moderate liberals such as Duncker. The new government struggled, however, to reconcile King Wilhelm I's demands for additional military spending—on an army that swore loyalty to him alone—with the hard-won constitutional right of the legislature to pass the state budget. Duncker had been drifting toward the Crown's position since he had joined the Berlin government two years earlier. Mathy, for his part, insisted on the rights of the Landtag and sharply criticized the liberal ministry.

This book interprets the practice of politics represented in Mathy's letter as a manifestation of what contemporaries sometimes called "political friendship."[2] Political friends shared lasting personal affinities, professional favors, and political beliefs. For these liberals, that meant constitutional monarchy, basic civil rights, and, ultimately, the establishment of a unified *kleindeutsch* nation-state. Political friendship was not only a bilateral relationship; it could also provide the basis for informal networks of personal, professional, and political support. But by asserting in his letter that he and Max Duncker were "hardly ladies," Karl Mathy also threatened to redefine their political relationship: from a friendship founded on—feminized—emotional bonds to an alliance based solely on political utility in a—masculinized—public sphere. His misogynist reprimand suggests that German liberals also policed the boundaries of political life through friendship. Who was entitled to form political friendships?

Other informal networks existed at the time across the political spectrum and across European borders—networks of archconservatives, democrats, and socialists. I contend that what Karl Mathy called their "little circle of friends" represented one such informal network, of moderate liberal notables, formed in the 1840s and 1850s in response to government repression in the German Confederation (1815–66). The liberals in this network often pursued their goals parallel to the structures of centralized civic organizations and burgeoning political parties. They were well-to-do, well educated, and, thus, they thought, well-placed to exert influence in elite social circles. The network included academics, journalists, and artists, as well as monarchs, royal heirs, and government ministers in Baden, Coburg, and Prussia. These figures have long been neglected or forgotten in the historiography on this pivotal period. This study spotlights these bourgeois, noble, and royal activists on the same stage.

The relationships within the network exemplified the intersection of intense emotions with political and professional interests. Core members included Max Duncker, Charlotte Duncker, Karl Mathy, Karl Samwer, Duke Ernst II of Coburg, Franz von Roggenbach, Karl Francke, Heinrich von Sybel, and Gustav Freytag. The second tier of members often interacted personally with many core members and offered the network professional and political favors. This tier included Hermann Baumgarten, Rudolf Haym, Berthold Auerbach, Grand Duke Friedrich I of Baden, Ernst von Stockmar, and Eduard von Tempeltey. Additionally, network affiliates frequently interacted with or assisted core members while sharing their political goals: Alexander von Soiron, Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm of Prussia (future German Emperor Friedrich III), J.G. Droysen, Robert Morier, August von Saucken-Julienfelde, and Grand Duke Carl Alexander of Weimar.

This network of political friendship gave moderate liberals the means to negotiate political compromises—first among themselves, then with conservative governments. The issue at stake in Karl Mathy's letter was, therefore, more than a mere disagreement over budgetary policy: it concerned whether and how liberals should reach accommodations with state power in exchange for the advancement of national unification. It concerned the meaning of liberalism in a period of rapid change and rolling crises. By investigating this network of political friends, I contribute to recent scholarship on the "period of accommodation" between liberals and the state to argue that political friendship was fundamentally important to moderate German liberals' practice of politics during the nineteenth century.

Historiography

In the mid-1970s, Uriel Tal contended that German intellectuals in the nineteenth century faced a "perplexing alternative."[3] They supported industrialization, national cultural renaissance, empirical inquiry, and cosmopolitanism, but so did the leaders of the larger German states, as Tal put it. German intellectuals thus found themselves in an awkward position because they considered themselves "revolutionaries and at the same time supporters of the regime."[4] Although some of Tal's claims about intellectuals in Germany—by which he meant liberal writers and politicians—have since been modified, questions remained about the limits of liberal dissent within a repressive system that also, German liberals believed, formed the last bulwark against a far worse fate: republican revolution and the destruction of property.

Historians have continued to examine the interactions between state and nonstate political actors in Germany between the Revolutions of 1848/49 and the founding of the German Empire in 1871. In the 1980s, Thomas Nipperdey and James Sheehan echoed Uriel Tal, arguing that our understanding of Germany history after 1849 as an era of reaction required revision.[5] Wolfram Siemann soon made a forceful case for the 1850s and 1860s as a distinct "period of upheaval" in Central Europe.[6] For these scholars, the 1850s were not simply a brief, bleak interlude between the stirring Revolutions of 1848/49 and Bismarck's wars of unification. Rather than an antechamber to the Hall of Mirrors, the years between 1848 and 1871 represented a period of social transformation and political settlement in its own right.

Building on these early reappraisals of the 1850s and 1860s, some historians have more recently advanced the thesis that, during this period, moderate democrats, liberals, and conservative officials forged a kind of triangular political accommodation.[7] The first two groups abandoned certain ideological points—civil liberties and parliamentary government, for example—in exchange for economic support from the state, legitimate participation in political life, and, above all, national unification under Prussia. How did this atmosphere of accommodation bear on the lives of moderate liberals? How did they approach post-revolutionary accommodations with state power?

Focusing on associations and networks of left liberals and democrats, Andreas Biefang, Christian Jansen, and a small number of other scholars have argued that a post-revolutionary "negotiation," "accommodation," or "settlement" occurred in German politics. Biefang first explored the role of the relatively small elite of German associational life from the beginning of the New Era in 1858 until the founding of the German Empire.[8] He argues that a tightly circumscribed group of moderate, bourgeois associational leaders, a "practical elite," cooperated across the lines separating moderate democrats from moderate liberals in order to advance *kleindeutsch* unification.[9] On the committees of the Nationalverein,

at the Abgeordnetentage, and in other leading civic organizations, liberals and democrats learned to settle their political differences and seek accommodation with an increasingly illiberal Prussian government. Unlike in the years between 1815 and 1848—the Vormärz—and the 1850s, when bourgeois elites worked mostly in state parliaments and mixed local, regional, and national viewpoints to formulate policy goals, Biefang contends that this bourgeois elite and their organizations represented the emergence of mass politics and hierarchical party structures in the German Confederation.[10]

Biefang analyzes committee protocols and personal letters among this small elite to explain opposition activists' understanding of the ideal form of a future German nation-state and their settlements with Bismarckian realpolitik. Above all, Biefang maintains, rather than succumbing to infighting, liberal and democratic elites created a "basic political structure capable of compromise" and resolving internal disagreements, reaching extensive memberships and the public at large—all in order to advance concrete policies.[11]

Christian Jansen has expanded on Biefang's work, tracking the post-revolutionary lives of liberals and democrats who served in the Frankfurt Parliament in 1848/49. Ultimately, Jansen argues, the democrats who remained in the German Confederation reached grudging accommodations with state power in the 1850s and 1860s to advance *kleindeutsch* unification.[12] Jansen first outlined this settlement in an instructive periodization of post-revolutionary radical action. After the uncertain "transitional years" for democrats and liberals during the Revolutions of 1848/49, the period between 1852 and 1857 represented "the turn to realpolitik" in a public sphere tightly regulated by German governments. Jansen recognizes that the dawn of the New Era in 1858 launched "the reorganizational phase of national-liberal opposition," while Biefang's "transregional organizations," such as the Nationalverein, openly advocated for the foundation of a liberal German nation-state.[13] Overall, liberals and democrats in this period, "through trials and tribulations, with the obligatory schisms and rivalries, but ultimately with astounding success . . . pulled themselves up by their bootstraps."[14] Yet, Jansen's argument does not sketch an important aspect of liberal activity at the time. As the following analysis will show, moderate liberals pulled themselves up by their political bootstraps only with the support of their political friends.

Christian Jansen has also demonstrated the scholarly value of what he calls a "collective history of politics," which considers political actors together in their social and material worlds.[15] He charts political discussion and organization among German democrats and left liberals who did not emigrate after 1849.[16] He contends that as they became more cynical and more skeptical of the political idealism of the Vormärz, they ultimately formed a political "counter elite" who adapted to, and then shaped, the post-revolutionary political culture of Germany.[17] Liberals and democrats both belonged to a broad oppositional milieu

that approached state power as a means to achieve domestic reforms and national unification.[18] Jansen pays particular attention to how material concerns, such as professional income, housing, travel, and social isolation, drove left liberals and democrats to moderate opposition to the conservative monarchical states.[19] This element of Jansen's work also raises interesting questions: did moderate liberals, who were supposedly more amenable to the post-revolutionary German states, suffer similar repression? If so, how did they try to overcome it?

Complementing the work of Jansen and Biefang, historians such as James Brophy, David Barclay, and Anna Ross have studied the role of state leaders in the processes of political accommodation. Their studies explore the creation of horizons of political possibility in the period—in so far as state officials conceived of, and acted on, the possibilities of settlement with liberal businessmen and professionals. These scholars made an important contribution to the question of a post-revolutionary political accommodation in their political histories, which were based largely on government documents, ministerial debates, and commercial policy.

James Brophy has suggested that the 1850s saw "accommodation" on industrial policy between liberal businessmen and the Prussian cabinet under Otto von Manteuffel. Rather than acting as the hatchet men of political reaction, many Prussian state ministers believed that economic growth would increase popular support for the post-revolutionary state and resolidify the legitimacy of the monarchy. Conservative officials compromised with liberals on commercial policy and blocked—or at least blunted—the efforts of archconservative courtiers around the king to erase the gains of the revolutions.[20] David Barclay reached a similar conclusion about state officials' openness to accommodation with moderates on cautious reform during the reign of Friedrich Wilhelm IV.[21] I show, however, that the Manteuffel government was less willing to engage with liberals from the arts and academia (the *Bildungsbürgertum*) than it was prepared to negotiate with liberals from industry and trade (the *Besitzbürgertum*).

Anna Ross has recently and more closely explored the role of the Prussian state in the processes of political accommodation. In Ross's book, Minister President Manteuffel steered a "middle course" between democrats and reactionaries to deliver domestic reforms unseen in Prussia since the Reform Era (1808–19). Ross highlights the major judicial, economic, and press reforms of the Manteuffel cabinet. She argues that these reforms reflected conservatives' willingness to adapt to post-revolutionary constitutional constraints and to extend the reach of the Prussian state into the everyday lives of its subjects.[22] The Manteuffel period also included systematic spying, court intrigue, official corruption, and political persecution—particularly under Carl von Hinckeldey's Berlin police.[23] On balance, however, Ross's account emphasizes the pragmatism, nuance, and shrewd politicking of Manteuffel and other Prussian leaders. This revisionist viewpoint differs from Christian Jansen's portrayal of the persecution

of left liberals and democrats in the German Confederation.[24] Many moderate liberals, I demonstrate, also suffered state harassment for their politics after the revolutions, despite their efforts to seek political and professional accommodation with the Manteuffel government.

This book generally supports the thesis that a significant accommodation occurred between liberals and the state after 1848/49. It also takes the 1850s as a discrete period of societal transition in the German Confederation. But it insists that friendship was central to the political lives of moderate liberals in Germany and thus shaped the boundaries of their accommodation with state power. We must therefore consider friendship alongside the structures of associational life, the political networks of democrats and left liberals, and the policies of state leaders. This network of political friends demonstrated that personal and professional considerations were inseparable from debates about the merits of political cooperation with state leaders—the adaptation of liberalism to realpolitik. It also suggests why so many of the political projects of moderate liberals failed in the 1860s. By studying this network, we can perceive that the process of political accommodation appears more drawn out and emotionally charged than has been portrayed previously. We should thus extend the processes of political accommodation for moderate liberals back into the 1840s. We should also mark 1861 as the point when they began to signal their willingness to accept anti-constitutional rule and national unification by force.[25] This dating is unconventional but well supported by the evidence. Until now, most historians have stressed that 1866 was the year when German liberals succumbed to the lures offered by Bismarck.[26]

Methodology

This book sheds light on these historiographical debates because it is conceived as a "cultural history of politics." Lynn Hunt's history of the French Revolution was one of the first to deploy this methodology.[27] She wrote that "rather than recounting a narrative" of the revolution's politics, she was interested in investigating the underlying cultural assumptions about what constituted politics and what produced a cohesive "revolutionary experience" among groups and individuals.[28] Hunt advocates a reading of the French Revolution that focuses on the "values, expectations, and implicit rules that expressed and shaped collective intentions and actions" and how these cultural conditions were in turn shaped by the "explosive interaction between ideas and reality."[29] This discursive exchange, for Hunt, forms the basis of political culture.

In the 1990s and 2000s, other historians developed this approach further. For them, "the cultural history of politics" was premised on the theoretical assumption, arising from postmodern and communication theory, that percep-

tions of reality—politics included—both derive from and influence discourse. This methodology encourages scholars to investigate how historical actors talked and wrote about politics, as well as how they negotiated the meaning of their political ideals and organized social relations and actions around them.[30] Ute Frevert has argued that the definition of the political versus the apolitical is itself a highly political cultural negotiation.[31] Politics in the past was not separated from art, emotions, or imagination.[32] Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger has meanwhile contended that political units, such as the church, nation, or state, act as "action-inducing fictions that exist through discursive representation."[33]

The notion that politics is inseparable from emotions, personal bonds, or fiction seems almost self-evident.[34] These historians were reacting, however, to an insistence on political history as the arena of Great Men, reasoned debate, and economic competition.[35] Scholars practicing the cultural history of politics argue instead that we should probe the fixity of social categories and show how these changed over time.[36] Both Thomas Mergel and Ute Frevert have advocated for an anthropological approach to historical subjects, albeit without seeking a new kind of historicism.[37]

Using the cultural history of politics to analyze shifting meanings and uses of political friendship among this network of moderate liberals alters our view of the landscape of politics in nineteenth-century Germany. In such a history, we see that the liberals who often rejected political parties and centralized civic associations practiced politics through friendship—it shows how elite Germans "lived liberalism."[38] Historians must consider not just liberals' activities "with explicit relevance to political events" but also their wider personal and professional connections.[39] In doing so, historians can gain a clearer understanding of the processes of accommodation between moderate liberals and conservative officials beyond the realm of clubs, the press, and government. The remainder of this introduction explores in detail the book's guiding analytical categories: the political, the professional, and the personal.

The Political: German Liberalism, German Nationalism

Members of the network premised their pursuit of the nation-state—no matter whether they were in government service or out of it—on moderate liberalism and on a *kleindeutsch* answer to the "German Question." Overall, they were illustrative of the liberalism of their time. Liberalism in Europe and the German Confederation was fluid, and its proponents were divided by status and class differences.[40] Dieter Langewiesche, James Sheehan, and Thomas Nipperdey have noted how liberalism, much like conservatism, remained vague in the years between the Congress of Vienna (1814–15) and the March Revolution of 1848.[41] Many nineteenth-century liberals were members of the bourgeoisie. As

David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley have argued, this elite class, past and present, shared a belief in the rights of private property and the rule of law—these were fundamental to liberalism.[42] Yet, as Blackbourn contends, equating liberalism with the bourgeoisie is too simple.[43] German liberals could hail from the nobility (Roggenbach), from princely families (Ernst of Coburg), or from the business community (Mathy).[44] However, the liberal script almost always included two important aspirations: the emancipation of individuals from status-based society, and the disassociation—at some level—of markets from state cameralism and the guilds.[45] These aspirations, inherited from the Enlightenment, postulated freedoms of speech, association, and religion. Liberals also sought the right of educated and propertied men to full citizenship and representation in elected legislatures with budgetary powers. Their ideal government would be composed of ministers appointed by a monarch within the framework of a written constitution: such ministers would be obliged to defend royal policies before the legislature. This thinking did not preclude, however, beliefs in cultural imperialism and racial hierarchies.[46]

Starting with the Revolution of 1848 and the nationally elected Frankfurt Parliament, liberals in Germany began to clarify their conceptions of liberalism and divide into increasingly coherent groups. Liberals debated how much popular representation was needed in a constitutional state, how much power should be wielded by what type of monarchy, and how accommodation could or should be reached with democrats who favored parliamentary government.[47] Meanwhile, conservatives favored an even more powerful monarchy with strict limits on freedom of the press and association. The eruption of popular violence even before the collapse of the Frankfurt Parliament in 1849 contributed to a fundamental realignment among democrats, liberals, and conservatives. The moderate wings of the three ideological groups sought cooperation to achieve their respective goals of parliamentary government, liberal national unification, and a stable monarchical state. Here lay the genesis of the triangular processes of post-revolutionary accommodation.

Members of the network of political friends belonged, by and large, to the moderate liberal camp: they constituted a younger generation of "Old Liberals," "Gothaer," or "constitutionalists."[48] They were "old" liberals because, during the Vormärz, they had been active in dissenting religious movements, the liberal press, and state legislatures. Most Old Liberals then served in the Frankfurt Parliament or supported the Holstein rebels in the First Schleswig War. The "question" of the incorporation of Schleswig into a future German nation-state absorbed liberals for nearly two decades.[49] In the 1850s and 1860s, they remained committed to constitutional monarchy and a federal nation-state under Prussian leadership.[50] These liberals favored state ministers responsible before the legislature but rejected both parliamentary government and universal suffrage.[51] Unlike democrats, liberals of all stripes tended to see themselves as tribunes of "the peo-

ple," bound, not to their constituencies, but to their own conscience and political judgement.[52] Like moderate liberals in other parts of Europe, the political friends eschewed highly organized civic associations because they thought deferring to associational steering committees might restrain their political autonomy. They also rejected political parties as the vehicles of special interests.[53] Moderate conservatives needed the support of the Old Liberals to buttress state legitimacy after the Revolutions of 1848/49, whereas moderate democrats needed the Old Liberals' blessing to reenter legitimate political life in the 1850s.[54]

There was also a smaller group of "left liberals" from the era of the Paulskirche. They were not democrats, but they were more willing than their Old Liberal confederates to endorse popular legitimacy over monarchical prerogatives as the basis of the state. During the revolutions, they had considered the moderate-liberal "March Ministries" to be overly cautious and too deferential to monarchical authority.[55] These left liberals tended to mix quite easily with moderate democrats at the Frankfurt Parliament and in later civic organizations such as the Nationalverein. After the revolutions, the two groups formed a "counter elite" of politicians and publicists separate from moderate liberal notables and conservative state officials.[56] During the 1830s and early 1840s, many members of the network of political friends who were Old Liberals had held convictions similar to the left liberals and democrats, but by 1849 they had denounced democrats for raising the twin specters of republican revolution and the destruction of private property.

Fundamentally, German liberals, like most European liberals, were monarchists who favored a powerful constitutional monarch overseeing the functioning of the machinery of state.[57] Even among Vormärz democrats, there were few true republicans. The monarchical principle was central to the political culture of nineteenth-century Central Europe: it provided the basis of what was considered acceptable politics.[58] Historians' discussion of liberals' attitudes toward monarchy is often abstract. Yet, many liberals cultivated political friendships with the living embodiments of state power in Germany: flesh-and-blood princes. Exploring these relationships as an aspect of the "modernization" or nationalization of European monarchies reveals a network of political friends that bonded to, debated with, and advised monarchs.[59] After 1849, relationships with individual princes shaped the view among German liberals that national unification could best be achieved through consensus among the monarchs of Germany.

The small group of princely network members often employed their bourgeois and noble counterparts as state officials. It was difficult for members to maintain political friendships across immense status divides, however, partly because princes could rely on powerful dynastic connections to which bourgeois and noble members had only indirect access. Ernst of Coburg was connected to the monarchs of the United Kingdom and Belgium, as well as to leading state

ministers in Austria. Friedrich of Baden and Carl Alexander of Weimar were both sons-in-law of King Wilhelm I of Prussia and had tight family connections to the Russian court. Simply put, non-princely members of the network needed the princes more than the princes needed them. Nevertheless, reinserting monarchs into scholarly conversations about liberal constitutionalism and nationalism shows how bourgeois liberals failed to understand that the liberal princes held a far more authoritarian view of liberal nationalism.[60]

Many of the monarchs who engaged with network members ruled smaller states in the German Confederation. Early German liberalism at the national level was influenced by the political situation in the many small- and medium-sized states.[61] As in southern Europe, regional variations in Central Europe were fed by different experiences of the late Enlightenment, the Napoleonic system, and repression after the establishment of the Confederation in 1815.[62] Place was thus key to individual liberals' political experiences in the Vormärz. Liberals in northern Germany tended to take the United Kingdom as a model of monarchy limited by a powerful parliament. Southern liberals, by contrast, tended to favor institutional models from centralized France, particularly the economic policies and basic civil rights promoted by the July Monarchy and its "citizen-king," Louis-Philippe.[63] The southern German states, moreover, facilitated constitutional experimentation in the Rhenish Confederation (1806–13) and during the early period after Napoleon.

The *Vormärz* was not characterized only by what Gordon Craig called "provincialism and atomization."[64] After the "reading revolution" began in the eighteenth century, print costs declined, literacy grew, and the extensive reading of novels, newspapers, journals, and letters created a small but important German-speaking civil society that transcended state borders.[65] These expanded horizons helped readers establish new understandings of themselves, their politics, and their personal relationships.[66] Rural and poorer folk were not left out of this project either, as *Volkskalender*, broadsheets, and group readings opened a window onto the burgeoning ideological divides among the educated public.[67]

The nation was something many educated Germans, not just bourgeois liberals, were building. *Vormärz* nationalism was rather hazy and locally oriented—most people felt they were Prussian or Coburgers first, for example, then German.[68] Celia Applegate and Abigail Green have addressed state-building at the level of the medium-sized German states, as well as the regional expressions of German nationalism.[69] Nationhood, even as seen from the church steeple, was growing broader and moving toward political unity. Much of the struggle between nationalists in the 1850s and 1860s was over the form and function of a future German nation-state in Central Europe.[70] Would it simply be a consolidated version of the Confederation: a *Staatenbund* or a *Bundesstaat*? Would it be a *Bundesstaat* under the control of Austria, Prussia, or even Bavaria and Saxony? Or would a unified Germany be something else entirely?

Advocates for *Kleindeutschland* ("Little Germany") argued that the nation-state should unite the thirty-nine Confederal states, except Austria, under the Prussian king. Excluding Austria would make Catholics a minority in the new state and cement the power of the Protestant Hohenzollern court and the Prussian government over central affairs. *Großdeutsch*, or "greater German," thinkers were a diverse group. One idea, advanced mainly by southern German nationalists, held that any future Germany must include Austria. They debated among themselves whether the "German" lands of the Archduchy of Austria and the Kingdom of Bohemia should be included, while the Habsburgs kept control over "non-German" lands, such as the Kingdoms of Hungary and Lombardy-Venetia, or if there should be a loose union incorporating the whole Habsburg realm—creating a "Reich of seventy million." Either state of affairs would have given the Austrian government overriding influence in Central Europe; hence, *kleindeutsch* proponents feared that Habsburg control would tarnish the "German-ness" of the new nation-state. Nevertheless, as Christian Jansen has argued, both *klein-* and *großdeutsch* activists shared in a nationalist "cult of unity" and in liberal assumptions about the participation of civil society in government policymaking.[71] They also mixed relatively easily, both socially and politically, before the Revolutions of 1848/49 forced German nationalists to turn ideals into policy.

A third camp proposed the aptly named "Third Germany," or *Trias*, solution. Here, the smaller states would unite around the kings of Saxony and Bavaria to form a federal state within the current Confederation, balancing the rival forces of Austria and Prussia.[72] The proponents of a Third Germany remained divided and mutually suspicious until the 1850s, when Friedrich Ferdinand von Beust led the Saxon government and *Trias* efforts. Beust drafted influential but unsuccessful proposals for Confederal reform in the 1860s, and *Trias* plans were reflected in the Austrian reforms presented to the Frankfurt Fürstentag (Congress of Princes) of 1863. Many small-state monarchs resented the pretensions of the Bavarian king, who in turn suspected the Saxon government of deceit. Nonetheless, the specter of a Third Germany frightened network members and Prussian leaders alike. Liberals in the network tended to favor a federal state under Prussian leadership. By contrast, hardline conservatives tended to favor the inclusion of Austria because they believed that the neo-absolutist Habsburg Empire would marginalize liberals, radicals, and other "revolutionaries" in the new state. Moderate conservatives in the southern states, suspicious of Hohenzollern ambitions, often favored the cautious reforms and the balance of powers that a *Trias* solution might offer Europe.[73]

For many people, the answer to the question of whether Germany should be unified was simply "no." A group of "Greater Prussians" rejected nationalism as the Trojan Horse of plebeian revolution. Many Prussian archconservatives desired the expansion of Prussian power and territory for its own sake. Bismarck

was one of their early tribunes. Clemens von Metternich, Austrian foreign minister and "founding father of the German Confederation," believed that limited political concessions to liberalism were necessary to stabilize the post-Napoleonic order, but he rejected nationalism because it could not provide a stable basis for European politics and was not conducive to maintaining peace.[74] Others, mostly reactionaries seeking the return of personal rule and the society of orders (*Ständestaat*), rejected accommodation with nationalism and liberalism—at least publicly—and fought to return to the pre-Napoleonic status quo.[75]

Despite all the *possible* Germanies, between 1815 and 1866, the German Confederation (Deutscher Bund) remained the basic political and international framework within which members practiced politics and pursued national unification. The Confederation has, until relatively recently, been neglected as a force in Central European society and politics.[76] The Confederation was a loose, defensive alliance of thirty-five sovereign monarchs and four free cities. As the Great Powers at the Vienna Congress had intended, the Prussian and Austrian governments dominated Confederal affairs. The Confederation was meant to buttress Central Europe against France and Russia and facilitate military cooperation among German rulers. Domestically, the Confederation was tasked with suppressing revolution and muzzling political dissent.[77]

The structure of the German Confederation was not set in stone, however. Its constitution allowed amendments by the unanimous consent of the Confederal diet, which was composed of ambassadors representing each monarch and free city. Thus, for example, the prince of Liechtenstein, ruling a tiny state tucked between Switzerland and Austria, could block any reform he found threatening. A smaller "plenum" of the largest states enacted narrower resolutions, but reforms had to pass committee, plenum, and then a vote by all ambassadors.[78] The difficulty of reforming, and especially centralizing, the Confederation was part of Metternich's design.[79] The Confederation remained an institution intended to suppress liberalism, democracy, and revolution, and one of its primary functions became the coordination of police and military activities. Reformist monarchs in any given state would have to convince more than thirty other leaders of the merits of his or his ministers' plan.

There existed in the Confederation no single, unifying school system, church, army, or press. From the March Revolution of 1848 until the Crimean War in the mid-1850s, there was more agreement than conflict among the conservative governments of the larger German states, even as they struggled for national supremacy. In those same years, some smaller states, such as Baden, Coburg, and Weimar, acted as incubators for future political accommodations by bringing leading liberals into official positions. The political unification of Germany would upset the conservative post-Napoleonic order and violate international law, whether in its *kleindeutsch* or *Trias* form. German reformers thus searched for a way to reconcile the monarchical legitimism that underlay the Confederation

with their desires for national consolidation. This was the political context in which the network of liberal, *kleindeutsch* political friends developed.

The Professional: Class, Faith, and Family

How did members' professions and class profiles influence their activities as political friends? The network was relatively homogenous. Most members were men of the bourgeoisie, but some came from the lower nobility and ruling dynasties.[80] None hailed from artisan or peasant families. Princes in the network, such as Duke Ernst II of Coburg and Grand Duke Friedrich I of Baden, were rulers of smaller states. All of the men in this consciously masculine network received some university education. They were overwhelmingly Christians and predominantly Protestants from northern Germany. Few were raised in Prussia, however, and Franz von Roggenbach and Berthold Auerbach, Catholic and Jewish, respectively, were important members from the south. The overall composition of the network reflected the restricted place of women, Jews, and Catholics in the German-speaking public sphere.

The men of the network thus fell into that peculiar sociopolitical category of German society that crystalized around 1850: that of the "notable."[81] Notables (*Honoratioren*) were local or regional elites, generally from the families of the educated or propertied bourgeoisie.[82] Prominent in local politics, notables tended to serve as mayors, city councilors, board members of charitable organizations, or in the local offices of the state bureaucracy. They thus formed a relatively homogenous group that favored consensus and flexible solutions to local issues but maintained a "national rather than parochial orientation" in their worldview.[83] Much of the network's difficulty in reconciling members' liberal ideals with organized action, even their reliance on political friendship for mutual support and political organization, arose from the politics of notables that shaped electoral life well into the German Empire.[84] The network's rise and fall as an informal constellation of notables confirms that even in the mid-1860s, the politics of notables had become a fragile basis for political organization in Germany.[85]

Within their professions, however, the members of the network were relatively diverse. Max Duncker, Heinrich von Sybel, and Hermann Baumgarten were professional historians and professors. Duncker, Sybel, and J.G. Droysen were founders of the "Prussian School" of German nationalist history.[86] They argued, with their friend Heinrich von Treitschke, that the Prussian state and monarchy led the world-historical mission to unite Germany.[87] Political unification would then unfold, they thought, in the realization of personal and national liberty and power: hence their fixation on unity, power, and freedom.[88] Like most European liberals, they believed that the larger the nation-state became, the better placed it would be to protect individual liberty and promote civilizational progress.[89]

Rudolf Haym was a professor of philosophy who taught German literature in the same nationalist vein, contributing to the processes of canon formation and nation-building.[90] Haym was also the long-time editor of the political and historical journal, the *Preußische Jahrbücher*. In the 1860s and 1870s, Sybel became a leading parliamentary voice in the National Liberal Party in Berlin. Sybel and Droysen are more widely acknowledged as foundational figures in the emergence of history as a modern discipline than Max Duncker or Hermann Baumgarten; but Baumgarten had an important influence on Max Weber and Duncker served for many years as political advisor to the Prussian crown prince, Friedrich Wilhelm, before helping draft parts of the North German constitution that were reproduced in the constitution of the German Empire.[91]

Karl Samwer was a trained lawyer and spent most of his life in state administration. He was an advisor and minister to the rebel governments in the Duchy of Holstein during the First and Second Schleswig Wars (1848–51, 1864). He served as a minister to Duke Ernst of Coburg in the intervening years. Karl Francke likewise worked as a finance and foreign minister in the Holstein governments during the First and Second Schleswig Wars and in exile as a high administrator in the Coburg government. Franz von Roggenbach became an unofficial advisor to Friedrich of Baden in 1859 and his leading minister in the early 1860s. Roggenbach was close to the circle of moderates around Wilhelm I of Prussia and Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm. He was also one of Bismarck's most implacable enemies.[92]

Gustav Freytag was the (in)famous bourgeois realist author of *Debit and Credit* and the popular historical series, Bilder aus der deutschen Vergangenheit.[93] Freytag became an antisemite during the German Empire, but in the 1850s and 1860s, he was close friends with fellow writer Berthold Auerbach, a Jewish Württemberger. Auerbach wrote, among many other works, the *Black Forest Village Stories* and published a popular almanac for the common folk. He was more politically aloof than other members, but his courtly and artistic contacts were vital to the network. Auerbach's membership also demonstrated how political friendship could extend to confessional and religious "Others"—if they were liberals.[94]

Charlotte Duncker was the only core female figure among the friends. Married to Max Duncker, she guided him through his rocky political career in the 1850s and 1860s. She also acted as an independent advisor and mediator of favors and political intelligence throughout her life, while also caring for her family's home and health.[95] Charlotte Duncker and her husband were also extremely close to Karl and Anna Mathy—an instance of political friendship between couples. Other women were involved in this liberal network, despite male efforts to exclude them from political discussions. Anna Mathy corresponded with members and arranged political favors, but caring for an ill son, as well as her own precarious health, kept her from participating in politics to the same degree as

Charlotte Duncker. Royal women, such as Crown Princess Victoria of Prussia, Queen Victoria's daughter, granted access to royal audiences, dispensed professional favors, and provided political protection to bourgeois members of the network. Princess Victoria also cultivated relationships with Charlotte Duncker and the wives of other network members.

Finally, Karl Mathy spent time in Switzerland as a political exile in the 1830s before serving as a representative in the Baden legislature in the 1840s. He then worked in the short-lived Reich finance ministry during the Revolutions of 1848/49, was finance minister of Baden in 1865, and, after the Seven Weeks' War of 1866, became the leading minister in the Grand Duchy of Baden. For most of the time that the network existed, however, Mathy was a banker. He helped charter credit banks in Leipzig, Coburg, and Karlsruhe. He also worked under David Hansemann as an early manager in the Disconto-Gesellschaft. Mathy was the businessman of the network, and he participated in the difficult negotiations between liberal business leaders and conservative Prussian officials in the 1850s and 1860s.[96]

The porous borders between academia, business, and state service for these liberals help illustrate Anna Ross's findings about the "blurred boundary between state and civil society" in which bourgeois professional organizations influenced conservative ministerial policy.[97] State repression spared few liberals in the network after 1850, however. The political friends were denied career opportunities, harassed by the police, and eventually driven into exile. Post-revolutionary governments made little distinction between perceived opponents' political, professional, and personal lives. Indeed, such a distinction would have limited the effectiveness of state repression. Network members' halting accommodations with state power in the late 1850s and 1860s, by contrast, led to professional advancement and emotional stability for many of its members.

The Personal: Emotions, Connections, and the Cult of Epistolary Friendship

Friendship in the Vormärz was a broad designation that captured a variety of political and religious hues. The term represented deep personal relations as the framework for political and dissenting religious opinions. It was also a supposedly neutral, private term used by groups of dissenters to avoid state bans on political parties and civic associations.[98] How did (inter)personal relationships affect the development of politics and government affairs in 1850s and 1860s Germany?

Liberals did not form their worldviews in isolation but in conversation with political friends and enemies across Germany. Yet, most historians of politics have overlooked or dismissed the role of emotional relationships.[99] Others have

merely acknowledged the gap before moving on.[100] The concept of political friendship complements existing analyses of liberal and radical publications and organizations in Germany before and after 1848.[101] To understand wider changes in midcentury liberalism and nationalism, one must also focus more squarely on the development and deployment of emotional relationships.

Political friendship was maintained by the exchange of emotional support through letters and personal visits that usually included political discussions. Educated Germans forged personal contacts and political alliances at university, at work, through print media, and in state legislatures. Even as they did so, however, they were also moving through different "emotional communities," mixing feelings, politics, and professional ambition.[102] Personal support among political activists offered what William Reddy has termed an "emotional refuge" from state repression.[103] At the same time, emotional bonds helped individuals adapt to new political arrangements—ideological accommodations with conservative state officials, for instance.

Approaching the topic of political friendship with the tools of cultural history allows me to demonstrate how individuals marshaled emotions in multilateral relationships for expression, manipulation, or assurances of authenticity—political or otherwise. But much like emotion, friendship is notoriously difficult to define.[104] The meaning of both terms changed with the constellation of social expectations built around them.[105] Contemporaries spent a great deal of time and energy trying to decide whether an emotion in a letter, or a friendship, was true. This fact testifies to the importance that they placed on feeling and friendship as metaphors and as criteria against which to gauge political life, especially under state repression.[106] Determining whether an emotion in the past was authentic, however, can be as difficult as determining whether a friendship was true, especially since the two were often intertwined. In some cases, emotions and friendships were performative or manipulative—though that does not preclude affinity or love.

Nevertheless, expressions of emotion and friendships operated in historical discourse in ways that are not unfamiliar to historians. The scholarly study of ghosts, apparitions, and holy visitations suggests how to approach other ephemeral, subjective phenomena. Whether the Virgin Mary actually appeared to Bernadette Soubirous in a grotto near Lourdes, or whether three girls actually saw her in a field outside the German village of Marpingen, is not the crucial point. People believed that these events happened, could have happened, or empirically did not happen, and that is what should interest historians. The way people wrote about apparitions "as a text of sorts" or as a "genre" both reflected and affected an array of social, political, and economic structures—and their negotiation.[107] Projects of modernity, European or otherwise, were predicated on fiction, but fictions have continued to have real effects in the processes of state-building and nation-building—as in much else.[108] The historical agency of

ghosts and apparitions, on the one hand, and emotions and friendships, on the other, are functionally similar discursive phenomena.

How should historians determine which friendships were political friendships? In the context of Restoration France, Sarah Horowitz has considered friendship a useful political category if the individuals involved held mutual concerns beyond political patronage and professional interests.[109] For the purposes of this book, I consider historical subjects to be "political friends" if they exchanged emotional declarations, shared intimate family details or sensitive personal information, carried on political discussions, and called on each other for professional favors and political action. Political friends shared lasting personal affinities, professional favors, and political beliefs. If we remove the component of politics, then we have a friendship in the current understanding of the term. But friendship need not imply political *consensus*. A friendship today might seem more authentic, or admirable, if the two parties hold conflicting political views.

The network on which this study focuses was based on overlapping and often entangled political friendships. To be integrated into the network, a prospective member had to be able to understand the norms of political friendship that had developed from a confluence of historical trends and individual experiences that also included participation in certain civic associations and political events—as chapter 1 shows. To qualify, so to speak, for network memberships, individuals had to share political friendships with most other members and regularly engage in network efforts to provide emotional or material support and advance liberalism and *kleindeutsch* nationalism. Members of the network supported one another when there was considerable risk or no clear personal advantage in doing so. They also shared intimate and potentially damaging personal information and experienced longing for one another that they often expressed in letter-writing. This study counts an individual as a network member if they maintained emotional bonds, political discussion, and the sharing of favors for an extended period—for many members, this lasted for nearly two decades. A few, such as Hermann Baumgarten and Ernst von Stockmar, were active in the network only in its final years due to their relative youth.

As chapter 1 demonstrates, political friendships between *kleindeutsch* liberals and *großdeutsch* nationalists or democrats were generally precluded after the Revolutions of 1848/49. These liberals chose to inhabit a much more homogenous political world after 1849. Other historical figures corresponded with several network members and bonded with them personally, but the surviving historical record—with all its inherent biases—proved insufficient to include them in the network.

Based on these flexible criteria, we can imagine the network of liberal political friends as concentric (table 1.1). The core members of the group, among them the Dunckers, the Mathys, Gustav Freytag, and Ernst of Coburg, were most active and most interconnected personally, professionally, and politically. They

were the primary organizers of network campaigns and some of its longest members. The second tier of members included Berthold Auerbach, Rudolf Haym, and Friedrich of Baden. These members were also deeply involved in the network, its personal connections, and its political and professional projects. They were, however, less likely to take part in day-to-day organizing or maintained bonds with fewer network members. The final ring of the network comprised individuals with whom many network members maintained political contact and with whom a few of them had personal relationships. These network affiliates shared most of its members' political sympathies but lacked personal connections to a majority of its members.

Not all political friendships were the same; the nature of relationships between individual members varied and changed over time. The granular approach of this study highlights the variety of personal, professional, and political experiences that made the network so complex and representative of the moderate liberal milieu. This was a network composed primarily of bourgeois liberals that incorporated lesser nobles and minor monarchs, almost all of whom had similar lived experiences and political convictions and were similar in age. To establish a quantifiable definition of political friendship or network membership would risk obscuring the mutability that was the network's greatest asset before 1859.

The moderate liberals whom I study built their network on this personal-political foundation. Yet, it must be emphasized that theirs was an *informal* network. Recognizing the central importance of informal sociability allows me to explore changing social expectations regarding the gendered role of emotional expression in interpersonal relationships, it opens a window on the development of societal norms, and it shows how educated Germans negotiated the meaning and extent of their accommodations with state power. Following the same individuals through granular episodes over a quarter century allows me to demonstrate how the overlapping emotional and social freight of politics and friendship changed over time. Political friendship first facilitated political cooperation and personal survival; then it helped network members gain important official posts. Eventually, though, it could not bear the weight of emerging mass politics, party politics, and centralized civic life.

Political friendship and informal networks were not unique to these moderate German liberals; they existed in other European states and across the political spectrum in Central Europe.[110] As Margaret Lavinia Anderson has argued in the case of Ludwig Windthorst and the German Center Party, political influence and professional patronage in the nineteenth century were often "no less decisive for being informal."[111] The Prussian conservative milieu was also bound by "close and intensive" personal relationships and family networks.[112] The mixing of personal and political matters in written correspondence helped sustain the early socialist movement in Germany as well.[113] Although other political networks in the German Confederation contained overlapping personal and politi-

cal affinities, they seem to have operated more as patronage and pressure groups dominated by a few senior figures within monarchical courts. Two examples can demonstrate this point.

The so-called *Wochenblatt* group, composed of moderate liberals and moderate conservatives around August von Bethmann Hollweg and aligned with Prince Wilhelm of Prussia, worked to advance their views in the press and to ensure that their affiliates entered or kept influential positions at court and in the Prussian bureaucracy.[114] Their connections to the liberal political friends whom I have studied facilitated the rise of some network members into the Prussian state service and academia. However, the "Wochenblattpartei" remained distinct in the 1850s and soon thereafter faded from view. A second case concerns archconservatives at the Prussian court whose social and political activities coalesced around the brothers Leopold and Ludwig von Gerlach, around the vitriolic conservative journal, *Die Berliner Revue*, and around Hermann Wagener's *Neue Preußische Zeitung* (or "*Kreuzzeitung*").[115] In part because this conservative network did not fade so quickly from view, the role of friendship in the political activities, personal bonds, and internal debates of these networks represents a promising area for future research.

Political friendship was thus historically contingent, and the kind of network that I have chosen to study had deep roots in European history. The Enlightenment paved the way for sentimental culture among elite Europeans in the eighteenth century.[116] Sentimentalist and German classicist writers taught readers to value the "authentic" expression of emotion as a marker of personal cultivation and the key to meaningful relationships beyond status or class.[117] The Enlightenment project of creating an educated, egalitarian public sphere began in the salons, reading circles, and debate clubs of upper-class Europe. This process encouraged the formation of friendship based on shared understandings of the potential of the individual, the inevitability of civil society's liberation from the social order of the Old Regime, and the eventual triumph of rationalism in government, commerce, and religion.[118] Writers believed that nurturing emotional bonds between enlightened individuals would help them build a public sphere in which they could then work to reform the state and society.[119]

By the end of the Napoleonic Wars, nationalism and the goal of the nation-state as the telos of these interpersonal relations began to shape the discourse of educated German-speakers.[120] The proper conduct of emotional relationships among citizens as co-nationals would create a free society and pave the way for national unification. According to this viewpoint, a government that respected individual rights and allowed all citizens to realize their full potential would thereby contribute to the progress of the nation and the state itself. *Bildung* was central to this project. It was the basis of liberal political action, and it remained so.[121] Future network members acquired a shared emotional vocabulary and shared political experiences in the years before the Revolutions of 1848/49.

Taking stock: these political friends constituted a network because core members enforced unwritten rules of interaction, the circulation of information, adherence to political liberalism, and *kleindeutsch* nationalism. If someone neglected to offer appropriate emotional support during times of trouble, failed to correspond at an appropriate level about professional, political, and personal topics, or deviated from the consensus around political methods, they were isolated from the network and its resources. For instance, they were denied access to sensitive information about government plans, professional recommendations, and advice on pivotal life decisions. Divergent political views were considered personal betrayal, just as disappointed emotional expectations were considered political betrayal.

These emotional foundations of liberals' activities are impossible to overlook. For example, Max Duncker's inability to write frequently enough while in government service angered members eager for both political intelligence and emotional support. The network cut off Duncker's access to shared contacts and sources of information due to his early support for Bismarck in the Prussian constitutional crisis—after the network had secured him a government post and helped him fulfill his duties as a court advisor. Political friendship was unable to support a network of mutual political and personal aid in a more open society after 1858, when liberals and democrats revived associational life, expanded party politics, and entered state service. This finding supports Sarah Horowitz's argument that friendship, though useful for political organizing in post-Napoleonic states without formal parties or much civic activity, later proved an unstable foundation for political life in a society marked by freedom of the press, mass politics, and organized civil engagement.[122]

Letter-writing was the primary means through which these political friends tried to maintain their network.[123] After 1850, few members lived in the same place at any given time. Letters were complex sources, part of a *Sattelzeit* "obsession to express oneself" in written correspondence and diaries that adapted fictional aspects from art and literature.[124] They acted as prisms, refracting the boundaries between the political, professional, and personal in the mid-nineteenth century.[125] In this way, letters are simultaneously "ego-documents" that explore social and political identities while offering a window onto the formation of the self "with the 'self' at the intersection of different sets of roles and expectations."[126] Because emotional subjectivity (exploring the self through writing) was central to contemporary letters, they contained a mixture—at times, a seemingly absurd mélange—of requests, communiqués, and fanciful ruminations.[127] Confederal reform proposals, official reports, and draft constitutions were also written and circulated in epistolary form. Not only did letters blur the boundaries between public and private for bourgeois liberals and their noble and princely correspondents; they also integrated politics into emotional exchanges as part of a "cult of epistolary friendship" that shaped contemporary political culture.[128]

As not all friendships were the same, neither was all correspondence alike. When friends exchanged letters, it served a purpose beyond the sharing of information or requesting help; it addressed longing and was expected to carry emotional freight. This feature differed fundamentally from how most historical figures wrote to newspapers or corresponded with institutions. Although (political) friends may have discussed the same political issues in their correspondence as they might have in a periodical, the fact that the addressee was a friend meant the interaction had to respect the rules of friendship as a social institution. The difference between corresponding with or about a friend and other forms of writing also appears in chapter 5, in how some network members wrote scholarly political history while simultaneously producing intensely emotional biographies of dead political friends.[129] The medium was still the book, but its subject and object shaped the text and its reception. Letters between friends traded in a set of norms that were interwoven with other aspects of the letter-writers' lives. In an environment of political repression, this multiplicity bound otherwise isolated individuals and provided both emotional intimacy and political community that later proved difficult to disentangle.

An economy of trust, in which letters served as the main currency, underlay historical actors' political discussions and their views on state and society. Written feelings expressed authenticity and intimacy—trust—to correspondents, and they solicited reassurances and reciprocity in return.[130] Correspondents might misinterpret or disregard political information if it was not accompanied by the right personal touches—particularly in a period of postal surveillance by the state when personal trust and inside knowledge was key to the interpretation of enclosed information.[131] If political discourse was an "intersection between the realm of ideology and the realm of social action,"[132] then it was also an intersection between historical actors mediated through letters and an iteration of the eighteenth-century republic of letters.[133]

Edited volumes of correspondence between public intellectuals, politicians, and state leaders usually exclude what editors consider irrelevant gossip or personal information.[134] Such omissions are often necessary, but relevant political information was not entirely comprehensible to contemporaries without the pages upon pages of everyday and extraordinary expressions of feeling. The erasure of emotion—sometimes taking the form of declamations that seem embarrassingly intense—from elite political liberalism in German Europe stems from contemporaries' insistence on the supposed rationality of politics.[135] But that did not stop them from strategically deploying emotions to boost their political and professional profiles, to alter their relationship to power and politics. We think with our friends, and emotional regimes underlie political ones.[136]

Letters were not the only medium of network communication. Secret and not-so-secret meetings were also important. Members recorded their impressions of these gatherings in diaries and official reports. The political friends also vacationed

or took the waters together in an era when fears of nervous collapse fueled a booming resort economy in Europe.[137] Additionally, princely members often provided a safe haven for political gatherings under post-revolutionary repression. Ernst of Coburg, for example, invited his bourgeois political friends to intimate dinners, hunts, and discussion in smoke-filled parlors. Such relationships between princely and bourgeois members of the network also demonstrated how, through political friendship, liberal elites crafted their program toward the state after 1848.

Book Structure

The first four chapters of the book progress chronologically. The exact beginning of the network is difficult to pinpoint. No one month, or even year, marked the coalescence of the many individual relationships into one network of emotional, political, and professional support. Chapter 1 sketches the outline of the German Confederation before exploring the biographies of network members: their generational background, family status, education, as well as religious and professional identities. The first chapter ends by addressing the acceleration of political encounters and personal bonding during the Revolutions of 1848/49, in the First Schleswig War, and at the Erfurt Parliament (1850).

The restoration of the German Confederation and the end of the First Schleswig War in 1851 drove many members into exile in other Confederal states. Chapter 2 charts the network's development from 1851 through 1858. Gustav Freytag, for example, sought asylum from a Prussian secret arrest warrant in Coburg. Others, such as Max Duncker and Heinrich von Sybel, reentered academia but found their careers blocked by hostile state ministries. I then focus on the case of political friendship between the Mathy and Duncker families. Emotional and professional support from the network proved crucial for its members' material and political survival under post-revolutionary state repression. This was an era when the Prussian government used not only the carrot of reform to attract liberals but also the stick of police harassment to soften them into accommodation with the state.

Chapter 3 examines the political activity of network members beginning with the Prussian regency in 1858 and the war in northern Italy in 1859. At this time, network members began to enter government office. Liberals sought such posts not only to defend the legacy of *their* Revolution in 1848 but also to advance new plans for the monarchical unification of Germany.[138] The peculiar sovereignty of monarchs in the smaller states was the topic of much discussion among German nationalists, including the liberal network. Chapter 3 analyzes members' serious plans to reform the Confederation in the early 1860s, a period of extreme historical contingency. It does so in order to highlight the possible Germanies that liberals envisioned before Bismarck's unification decided the matter. At the

same time, however, a decline in state surveillance opened space within the network for increasingly adversarial debates about specific government policies, particularly during the Prussian constitutional crisis—policies in which members were now imbricated. Some members failed to meet contradictory demands for emotional support and agreement on political strategy. Efforts to limit perceived offenders' access to shared resources showed how core members enforced social norms developed in the 1850s, while undermining the emotional foundations of those very norms.

The shaky foundations of political friendship worsened until the network split into two rival camps. Chapter 4 explores the fault lines within the network. By analyzing a campaign to undermine rival members, it demonstrates how political friends failed to appreciate the new circumstances under which efforts to discipline unorthodox members took place. The chapter then examines the pragmatic rapprochement among network members in late 1863 and early 1864 around the Frankfurt Princes' Congress and the Augustenburg candidacy in the Second Schleswig War. It shows the simultaneous resiliency of political friendship within the network, which could still mobilize around the cause of national unification. Within a year, however, the network split again. Chapter 4 concludes by charting the network's disintegration with the Seven Weeks' War of 1866 and the foundation of the North German Confederation in early 1867.

In the decades after the collapse of the network in 1866, many former members wrote biographies of departed political friends. In chapter 5, the final chapter, I address how four members turned their deceased subjects into sympathetic, semi-fictive characters in order to tell their own story of German unification—reimagining personal pasts as national history. They invented thoughts and feelings for these friends-turned-subjects-turned-characters, presenting to readers biographical fiction as historical fact. In this process—which I term affective characterization—the writers sought to integrate their subjects, themselves, and the network into recent political history. The biographers also used their texts to defend their political choices in the decades before German unification and to insist on their own historical relevance, despite their many failures. Thus, a book that began with network members' common biographies returns to analyze those sources as products of these individuals' desire to write *their* history of pre-unification Germany.

Notes

1. Karl Mathy to Max Duncker, 26 November 1861, BArch N2184/14, Bl. 153.
2. Members adopted this term from the general political discourse of the time to describe their relationships and mutual associates. See, for example, *Gustav Freytag und Heinrich von*

Treitschke, 4; Ernst of Coburg to Freytag, 18 January 1860, *Briefwechsel*, 121–22; Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 384; GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 168. German conservatives also used the term. See, for instance, Leopold von Gerlach, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, 1: 128.

3. Tal, *Christians and Jews in Germany*, 33.
4. Tal, *Christians and Jews in Germany*, 33.
5. Nipperdey, *Germany from Napoleon to Bismarck*, 599; Sheehan, *German History*, 710, 719–22. A similar situation prevailed in the historiography on the UK in the 1850s. See Taylor, *Decline of British Radicalism*, 2.
6. Siemann, *Gesellschaft im Aufbruch*. See also Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 20.
7. Because of their insistence on reform over revolution, questions about the means and ends of liberal accommodation with conservative state power appears in other nineteenth-century European contexts. See, for example, Riall, *Sicily and the Unification of Italy*, 15, 115–16; Rampton, *Liberal Ideas in Tsarist Russia*, 4, 85–86, 186.
8. Biefang, *Politisches Bürgertum*, 17, 21.
9. Biefang, *Politisches Bürgertum*, 17–18.
10. See also Biefang, introduction to *Der Deutsche Nationalverein*, xi; Nipperdey, *Organisation der deutschen Parteien*.
11. Biefang, *Politisches Bürgertum*, 17–18.
12. Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 21, 30, 481, 604.
13. Jansen, introduction to *Nach der Revolution*, xvi.
14. Jansen, introduction to *Nach der Revolution*, xvii.
15. Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 27. Henning Albrecht also provides an example of how to integrate historical actors into their immediate intellectual and political milieus while paying close attention to their influence on national society. See Albrecht, *Antiliberalismus und Antisemitismus*.
16. Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 31, 27.
17. Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 13, 21.
18. Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 21–22.
19. For example, see Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 27, 63–64, 101–103. Based on association charters and police records, Janine Murphy has recently argued that the 1850s represented a "negotiation for survival" that pre-dated the Nationalverein. In the process, associational leaders and state officials reached an implicit détente on the place of politics in civic life. See Murphy, "Contesting Surveillance," 21–22, 24, 35.
20. Brophy, "Political Calculus of Capital," 152–53, 160. See also Brophy, "*Salus Publica Suprema Lex*," 122–51.
21. Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 221.
22. Ross, *Beyond the Barricades*, 48.
23. Ross, *Beyond the Barricades*, 178, 186.
24. See Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 55.
25. Jansen contends that the New Era represented only a "half break" with the repressive policies of the Manteuffel cabinet. See Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 68. Testing this claim in the case of these moderate liberals offers another reason to investigate this process of accommodation into the 1860s and liberals' accommodation with Bismarckian national unification in 1866/67.
26. Liberal "surrender" is often dated even more precisely to the Indemnity Act of September 1866.
27. Hunt, *Politics, Culture, and Class*.
28. Hunt, *Politics, Culture, and Class*, 10–11, 13.
29. Hunt, *Politics, Culture, and Class*, 10–11.
30. Mergel, "Überlegungen," 588–89; Bösch and Domeier, "Cultural History of Politics," 579–80.

31. Frevert, "Neue Politikgeschichte," 14. See also Frevert, *Men of Honour*, 8.
32. Stollberg-Rilinger, introduction to *Was heißt Kulturgeschichte des Politischen*, 10–11.
33. Stollberg-Rilinger, introduction to *Was heißt Kulturgeschichte des Politischen*, 14.
34. See the canonical Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.
35. See Frevert, "Neue Politikgeschichte," 13–14; Smith, *Gender of History*, 59, 98.
36. Frevert, "Neue Politikgeschichte," 24; Mergel, "Überlegungen," 592; Bösch and Domeier, "Cultural History of Politics," 581.
37. Mergel, "Überlegungen," 588. For an earlier call for a more anthropological historical methodology, see Nipperdey, ed., *Gesellschaft, Kultur, Theorie*. On questions of pastness and distance, see Lowenthal, *Past Is a Foreign Country*.
38. Hadley, *Living Liberalism*, 3. See also Kwan, *Liberalism and the Habsburg Monarchy*, 1–2; Langewiesche, "Anfänge der deutschen Parteien," 356.
39. Leonhard, *Liberalismus*, 33.
40. See Riall, *Sicily and the Unification of Italy*, 14–15, 25; Rampton, *Liberal Ideas in Tsarist Russia*, 1, 4, 186; Gould, *Origins of Liberal Dominance*, 2, 5; Kwan, *Liberalism in the Habsburg Monarchy*, 4, 8; Isabella, *Risorgimento in Exile*, 25–26.
41. Langewiesche, *Liberalismus in Deutschland*, 13–15; Sheehan, *German Liberalism*, 5; Nipperdey, *Germany from Napoleon to Bismarck*, 254–55; Blackbourn, *History of Germany*, 97–98; Leonhard, "Formulating and Reformulating," 84; Kwan, *Liberalism in the Habsburg Monarchy*, 4. Conservatives remained divided into supporters of corporatist monarchy and more "statist" conservatives who embraced reforms that increased the presence of the state in everyday life. The Gerlach brothers and Otto von Manteuffel were leading representatives of these camps, respectively. See Leopold von Gerlach, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, 1: 97, 2: 645, 2: 749. See also Achtelstetter, *Prussian Conservatism*, 1–2.
42. Blackbourn and Eley, *Peculiarities of German History*, 18; Leonhard, "Formulating and Reformulating," 82–83.
43. Blackbourn, *History of Germany*, 97.
44. On different status and class-based forms of liberalism, see Koselleck, *Preußen zwischen Reform und Revolution*; and Kocka, *Industrial Culture and Bourgeois Society*; Woltz, "Staatspolitische Wirken," 7–29; Scheeben, *Ernst II*; Müller, *Our Fritz*.
45. See Langewiesche, "Nature of German Liberalism," 100–101.
46. See, for instance, Paul Pfizer's notion of the "instinct for freedom" in Pfizer, "Liberal," in *Staats-Lexikon*, 1st ed., 9: 713–14, 717–18. See also, Kwan, *Liberalism in the Habsburg Monarchy*, 4, 7; Fitzpatrick, *Liberal Imperialism in Germany*; Guettel, *German Expansionism*; Pitts, *Turn to Empire*.
47. For a classic regional study on this topic, see Langewiesche, *Liberalismus und Demokratie in Württemberg*.
48. Christian Jansen and Andreas Biefang have both distinguished in useful ways between democrats and liberals in the post-1848 era. See *Politisches Bürgertum*, 47, 248–49; Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 15–16. See also, Kwan, *Liberalism in the Habsburg Monarchy*, 32.
49. See, for example, Wippermann, "National-Politische Bewegung," in *Staats-Lexikon*, 3rd ed., 10: 370. See also chapters 1 and 3.
50. Biefang, *Politisches Bürgertum*, 47.
51. Biefang, *Politisches Bürgertum*, 47.
52. Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 15.
53. Biefang, "Introduction," xix; Kwan, *Liberalism in the Habsburg Monarchy*, 31. In this way, they differed little from other European liberals in their view on centralized party politics. See Parry, *Politics of Patriotism*, 36, 84; Soper, *Building a Civil Society*, 140–41, 143.
54. Ross, *Beyond the Barricades*, 13; Biefang, *Politisches Bürgertum*, 44.
55. Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 15–16.

56. Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 14, 21.
57. Levinger, *Enlightened Nationalism*, 195; Lees, *Revolution and Reflection*, 22; Hirschhausen, *Liberalismus und Nation*, 118–19. See also Parry, *Politics of Patriotism*, 52–54; Gould, *Origins of Liberal Dominance*, 7, 125; San Narciso, Barral-Martínez, Armenteros, introduction to *Monarchy and Liberalism in Spain*, 1–3.
58. Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 8; Levinger, *Enlightened Nationalism*, 9–10.
59. On the adaptation of monarchies to the demands of the nineteenth century, see Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 4–7; Müller, *Our Fritz*; Møller, "Domesticating a German Heir," 131; Paulmann, "Searching for a 'Royal International'," 145–77.
60. Frank Lorenz Müller's work is exemplary in this regard. See Müller, *Our Fritz*; Müller, *Royal Heirs*. A focus on German monarchs as persons who interacted personally with liberals is absent from Brian Vick's and Harald Biermann's otherwise outstanding studies of pre-unification politics and nationalism. See Vick, *Defining Germany*; Biermann, *Ideologie statt Realpolitik*.
61. On this point, see Kaschuba, "Zwischen Deutscher Nation und Provinz," 84–85; Walker, *German Home Towns*, 325.
62. Riall, *Sicily and the Unification of Italy*, 12.
63. Lees, *Revolution and Reflection*, 15–16.
64. Craig, *Politics of the Unpolitical*, 144.
65. As Dena Goodman argues in the context of the French Enlightenment, "The epistolary genre became the dominant medium of creating an active and interactive reading public." Goodman, *Republic of Letters*, 137. See also Brophy, "Common Reader," 126–28.
66. J. Habermas, *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit*, 69; R. Habermas, *Frauen und Männer*, 345–46, 355.
67. Brophy, *Rhineland*; Applegate, "Mediated Nation."
68. On the fluidity of Vormärz nationalism, see Vick, *Defining Germany*, 41, 48–49. See also Langewiesche, "Nature of German Liberalism," 97–98, 106.
69. Applegate, *Nation of Provincials*; Green, *Fatherlands*. See also Ashton, *Kingdom of Württemberg and the Making of Germany*; Fenske, *Der liberale Südwesten*; Rogosch, *Hamburg im Deutschen Bund*.
70. On the *longue durée* of this debate, see Langewiesche, *Nation, Nationalismus, Nationalstaat*; Langewiesche, introduction to *Föderative Nation*.
71. Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 407. Dieter Langewiesche has contended that nationalists of all stripes shared the assumption that a new nation-state would "become an instrument of progress." See Langewiesche, "Nature of German Liberalism," 110.
72. Flöter, *Beust*; Burg, *Die deutsche Trias in Idee und Wirklichkeit*. See also Wiens, *Imperial German Army*.
73. In the 1860s, these southern conservatives participated in the Deutscher Reformverein alongside *großdeutsch* advocates. The association worked to popularize *Trias* reform plans and counter the public presence of the pro-Prussian Deutscher Nationalverein.
74. Siemann, *Metternich*, 438, 557.
75. Berdahl, *Politics of the Prussian Nobility*, 5–6.
76. Jürgen Müller's first monograph remains the best work on the Confederation as a national institution: Müller, *Deutscher Bund und deutsche Nation*. See also Gruner, *Der Deutsche Bund, 1815–1866*; Müller, *Der Deutsche Bund*; Bentfeldt, *Der deutsche Bund als nationales Band*. The recent historical focus on the Confederation as a meaningful (transnational) political structure reflects similar work on the even looser structure of the Holy Roman Empire. For example, see Stollberg-Rilinger, *Emperor's Old Clothes*; Wilson, *Heart of Europe*. Efforts to discover a historical precedent for the European Union may partly explain the new demand for books on the subject.
77. See Siemann, *Der "Polizeiverein" deutscher Staaten*; and Siemann, *Deutschlands Ruhe*. The

institutions of the German Confederation have been included in re-evaluations of the repressive powers of conservative governments in the Vormärz and after 1849. See de Graaf et al., *Securing Europe after Napoleon*; and Schulz, *Normen und Praxis*. Chapters 1 and 2 address the limitations of state repression.

78. "Bundesakte," in *Dokumente*, ed. Huber, 86.
79. Siemann, *Metternich*, 439–40; Müller, *Deutscher Bund und deutsche Nation*, 34–35.
80. Marc Mulholland designated the social group in question, from industrialists to those who offered "services certified by educational qualification, such as doctors, lawyers, and other professionals." Mulholland, *Bourgeois Liberty and the Politics of Fear*, 3–4. Jürgen Kocka describes the two component groups of the *Bürgertum* as the *Bildungsbürgertum*—those with an academic degree who live off that certification, that is, civil servants, professors, lawyers, physicians, etc.—and the *Wirtschaftsbürgertum* or *Besitzbürgertum*—those who participated in commerce and owned capital, such as merchants, bankers, and manufacturers. Kocka, *Industrial Culture and Bourgeois Society*, 192–93.
81. Blackbourn and Eley, *Peculiarities of German History*, 253. The political class of the notable was also present outside of Germany, of course, but it seemed to have held less sway over national politics. See, for example, Soper, *Building a Civil Society*, 142.
82. Blackbourn and Eley, *Peculiarities of German History*, 19.
83. Blackbourn and Eley, *Peculiarities of German History*, 253, 259–60.
84. See, for example, Anderson, *Practicing Democracy*; Retallack, *Notables of the Right*. See also Langewiesche, "Anfränge der deutschen Parteien," 356; Nipperdey, *Organisation der deutschen Parteien*.
85. Biefang, *Politisches Bürgertum*, 17–18.
86. White, *Content of the Form*, 83.
87. Lees, *Revolution and Reflection*, 41.
88. Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*.
89. See, for example, English Liberals in Parry, *Politics of Patriotism*, 28.
90. See Ansel, *Prutz, Hettner und Haym*.
91. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 211, Bl. 41–46, 57–70; Craig, *Germany*, 13.
92. See, for example, Heyderhof, ed., *Im Ring der Gegner Bismarcks*.
93. On Freytag's fiction and nonfiction, see Applegate, "Mediated Nation," 33–50; Ping, "Gustav Freytag," 605–30.
94. On the complexity of integration and Jewish-Christian friendships, see Rahden, *Jews and Other Germans*, 7, 87–89.
95. Sarah Horowitz has examined the role of networks of elite women in Restoration France in bridging political divides between men. See Horowitz, *Friendship and Politics*, 81, 88.
96. Such relationships and activities represent a neglected point of contact between German *Bildungs-* and *Besitzbürgertümer* prior to unification. See Brophy, "Political Calculus of Capital," 152–53; Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 218, 221; Ross, *Beyond the Barricades*, 12. See also Hull, *Sexuality, State, and Civil Society*.
97. Ross, *Beyond the Barricades*, 14. Gordon Craig also challenged the supposedly apolitical attitude of German writers from Goethe to G.G. Gervinus. See Craig, *Politics of the Unpolitical*.
98. See Graf, *Politisierung*, 24–25; Garrioch, "From Christian Friendship to Secular Sentimentality," 167–68, 171–72.
99. Rosenwein, "Worrying About Emotions," 821.
100. Personal relations between liberals are largely absent from Harald Biermann's study of *kleindeutsch* liberals' foreign policy, with the important exception of his discussion of the weight of "trauma" from 1848/49 on liberal leaders. See Biermann, *Ideologie statt Realpolitik*.
101. For some of the members' published political writings, see Rosenberg, *Die nationalpolitische Publizistik Deutschlands*.

102. Rosenwein, "Worrying About Emotions," 842. See also Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities*.
103. Reddy, *Navigation of Feeling*, 121, 124–25, 129; Boddice, *History of Emotions*, 77.
104. See Horowitz, *Friendship and Politics*, 8, 20–21. See also Borutta and Verheyen, introduction to *Präsenz der Gefühle*, 11–12, 20–21.
105. See, for example, Siegel, *Entfernte Freunde*.
106. Horowitz, *Friendship and Politics*, 113; Frevert, "Defining Emotions," 25.
107. Blackbourn, *Marpingen*, 4, 7–8; Harris, *Lourdes*, xviii.
108. See Tanaka, *New Times in Modern Japan*; Ivy, *Discourses of the Vanishing*.
109. Horowitz, *Friendship and Politics*, 16–17, 113.
110. As Till van Rahden notes, investigating individual political friendships as part of a network with regional and national goals might introduce micro history to the discussion of bourgeois liberalism in order "to trace the multilayered and contradictory mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion and to analyze the interaction of several dimensions of relations . . ." Rahden, *Jews and Other Germans*, 16, 86. See also Stollberg-Rilinger, introduction to *Was heißt Kulturgeschichte des Politischen*, 21; Dann, *Nation und Nationalismus*, 14, 20; Horowitz, *Friendship and Politics*.
111. Anderson, *Windthorst*, 3. A "circle of friends and competitors" played a major role in Republican women's organizing in the nineteenth-century United States, allowing women to participate in partisan politics despite their being disenfranchised. See Gustafson, *Women and the Republican Party*, 81–82.
112. Achtelstetter, *Prussian Conservatism*, 8–9.
113. Welskopp, "Vernetzte Vereinslandschaften," 105–106.
114. See Behnen, *Das Preußische Wochenblatt*.
115. Ross, *Beyond the Barricades*, 29; Albrecht, *Antiliberalismus und Antisemitismus*; Hahn, *Die Berliner Revue*. See also Leopold von Gerlach, *Denkwürdigkeiten*; Ernst Ludwig von Gerlach, *Aufzeichnungen*.
116. Koschorke, *Körperströme*, 100.
117. Habermas, *Frauen und Männer*, 251–52; Frevert, "Defining Emotions," 14; Heinrich, *Leben Lesen*, 31, 145.
118. Habermas, *Frauen und Männner*, 247–49; Graf, *Politisierung*, 47–48.
119. Joskowicz, *Modernity of Others*, 63–66; Gall, "Liberalismus und 'bürgerliche Gesellschaft,'" 340.
120. Mosse, "Friendship and Nationhood," 355, 360.
121. Bollenbeck, *Bildung und Kultur*, 107, 216; Langewiesche, *Liberalismus in Deutschland*, 68; Altgeld, *Katholizismus, Protestantismus, Judentum*. Belgian liberals maintained a similar criterion: "capacity." See Gould, *Origins of Liberal Dominance*, 34.
122. Horowitz, *Politics of Friendship*, 3.
123. Reddy, *Navigation of Feeling*, 128; Horowitz, *Politics of Friendship*, 11, 93–95.
124. Habermas, *Frauen und Männer*, 23–26, 276–78; French, *German Women as Letter Writers*, 18; Horowitz, *Friendship and Politics*, 67; J. Habermas, *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit*, 66–67; Hämmerle and Saurer, introduction to *Briefkulturen und ihr Geschlecht*, 12; Koschorke, *Körperströme*, 194–95; Fulbrook and Rublack, "Social Self," 264, 267.
125. Habermas, *Frauen und Männer*, 31; Cook, *Epistolary Bodies*, 16–17.
126. Fulbrook and Rublack, "Social Self," 268.
127. Habermas, *Frauen und Männer*, 247–48; Koschorke, *Körperströme*, 208; Goodman, *Republic of Letters*, 17–18. Falko Schnicke argues that historians' letters were an informal space for posing and clarifying methodological issues in the development of history, defining history as a discrete discipline. See Schnicke, "Kranke Historiker," 14.
128. Reddy, *Navigation of Feeling*, 128; Hämmerle and Saurer, introduction to *Briefkulturen und ihr Geschlecht*, 14; Cook, *Epistolary Bodies*, 6.

129. See chapter 5.
130. Friendship was key to the rebuilding of trust among the politically active in France who had become "atomized" during the revolutionary and Napoleonic eras. See Horowitz, *Friendship and Politics*, 2–3, 5, 22, 42–43, 68.
131. Frevert, "Defining Emotions," 25.
132. Matthew Levinger makes this claim in *Enlightened Nationalism*, 11.
133. Friendship was also crucial to the French republic of letters. See Goodman, *Republic of Letters*, 2–3.
134. Excellent collections of liberal political correspondence, which exclude much "personal" material, include *Im Ring der Gegner Bismarcks*; *Nach der Revolution 1848/49*; Sybel, *Briefwechsel*; Oncken, ed., *Großherzog Friedrich*.
135. Rosenwein, "Worrying about Emotions," 821; Frevert, "Defining Emotions," 3–4. Early socialists also blurred private and political matters in their correspondence and reports. See Welskopp, "Vernetzte Vereinslandschaften," 108–109. This understanding of "rational" politics was also highly gendered. See, for example, Kreklau, "Gender Anxiety," 174.
136. Reddy, *Navigation of Feeling*, 121, 129; Arendt, *Life of the Mind*.
137. Radkau, *Zeitalter der Nervosität*, 13–14. German academics were devoted observers of their own and others' health. See Schnicke, "Kranke Historiker," 11–13.
138. Langewiesche, *Liberalismus in Deutschland*, 83–85; Ross, *Beyond the Barricades*, 15.

Chapter 1

Friendly Preconditions

This chapter focuses on the prerequisites for political friendship in the network of moderate liberals. It addresses members' experiences from the period of Restoration Germany through the Revolutions of 1848/49 to the "Punctation" at Olmütz in 1850, as well as their family, religious, educational, professional, and early political lives. Class subsumes many of these overlapping categories. Separating the social, political, and religious strands is difficult in a liminal period when the meaning of liberalism, the bourgeoisie, and conservatism remained blurry.[1] Yet, investigating the nascent boundaries of class and oppositional politics shows how, by the late 1840s, shared experiences at home, at university, and in their early professional careers had laid the foundations for the network of political friends. Their early biographies are important because they formed the basis for the later system of social and political expectations in the network. As Michael Freeden and Javier Fernández-Sebastián have argued, liberalism "also reflected a series of shared political and personal experiences" that rested on social norms and material means.[2]

The network was composed of a relatively small, scattered, and homogenous elite. Their situation reflects those of Christian Jansen's democratic networks and Andreas Biefang's activist bourgeoisie in the 1850s and 1860s.[3] Network members were overwhelmingly university-educated men from bourgeois, Protestant homes.[4] Most were raised in northern Germany and went on to study and later work primarily there. The political friends predominantly attended Prussian universities, then entered journalism, academia, or government service. Two were novelists. There were, however, variations from this norm. Franz von Roggenbach, for instance, was a southern German from a Catholic noble family tied to the Baden court.[5] Duke Ernst II of Coburg and Charlotte Duncker also stood apart from the otherwise middle-class and masculine profile of the network. Yet, adherence to liberalism was essential. By the early 1840s, all members identified as German nationalists and constitutional monarchists, although most had contacts in radical circles until the Revolutions of 1848/49.[6] Network mem-

bers represented the "Old Liberals" and "Gothaer" after 1849 before they split themselves between the German Progressive Party, founded in 1861, and the National Liberal Party, founded in 1867.[7]

This chapter proceeds chronologically. It first offers a brief consideration of the German Confederation as the basic political structure in which the future political friends grew up and spent much of their adult lives. I then outline the future members' bourgeois family environments before addressing their time at university, where they encountered new friends, liberal doctrines, and state repression.[8] Chapter 1 moves on to cover their early careers in the civil service, academia, and the press in the 1840s. In this era of the Restoration, the political friends found fresh opportunities for socializing and publishing, despite government harassment, forming individual relationships that they wove together in the late 1840s to create the network. The final part of this chapter explores members' shared experiences from the March Revolution of 1848 until the Olmütz agreement of November 1850. These years forced these liberals to clarify their political convictions, deepen their personal relationships, and form the network in order to overcome the personal, political, and professional challenges of both late Restoration and Revolutionary Central Europe.

The Basis of the German Confederation

The creation of the German Confederation in 1815 offered the thirty-five remaining monarchs of the former Holy Roman Empire and Napoleon's Rhenish Confederation something new: de jure as well as de facto sovereignty.[9] The Confederal Constitution recognized their full rights and guaranteed the independence of their associated states.[10] The Confederation was formally a union of monarchs and four free cities, not a confederation of German states as such.[11] It was foremost an agreement among sovereign princes, the reigning, legitimate dynasts in collegial compact. The preamble of the constitution reiterated the centrality of princely rule dei gratia as signatories anointed the new Confederation "In the name of the most Holy and Indivisible Trinity."[12] These monarchs drew their power directly from their special relationship to God. Sovereignty and just rule through Christian grace was the legal foundation of Confederal states and the bonds between confederates. This doctrine rejected the Enlightenment and revolutionary principle that a monarch derived power from the people or the constitution.[13]

Despite such proclamations, the German Confederation remained in many ways a late example of the "layered and divided sovereignty" common to early modern empires.[14] The Confederal Constitution remained incomplete. Signatories expanded the treaty in 1819–20 in the Vienna Final Act.

The Final Act described the Confederation as "a union of German sovereign princes and free cities under international law, for the preservation of the independence and inviolability of Confederal states, and for the maintenance of the internal and external security of Germany."[15] Signatories stressed state independence at the expense of the national unity previously emphasized in the Confederal Constitution: the monarch was the protector of the state, not the state itself.[16] This shift would seem to support Thomas Nipperdey's argument that the Confederation favored the conceptualization of sovereignty and independence in states, minimizing the princes.[17] The Final Act indeed emphasized state independence, and though the term "*Verein*" hinted at future unification, the term also implied the free consent and collegial orientation of a monarchical club. State independence depended upon a ruler's sovereign status. If the former ceased, so must the latter.

Nevertheless, part of the princes' sovereignty lay in their right to cede the exercise of some prerogatives to central organs for national security. Would-be reformers of the German Confederation worked to exploit this exception in the 1860s. The Final Act transferred some diplomatic and military functions to the Confederation, such as the right to send and receive Confederal ambassadors and to organize and command shared military efforts.[18] The will of the leaders of the Great Powers to maintain the balance of power obliged individual monarchs to defend each other's territories within Confederal borders and to participate in "executions" against those in violation of the Confederation's laws. Confederates were also prohibited from concluding foreign military alliances against one another and were obliged to finance the Confederation's frontier fortresses.[19] Laws regarding military cooperation, however, remained incomplete in the Final Act. Leaders eventually ironed out the military details in 1821 with the Confederal Military Constitution.

Individual monarchs' prerogatives were *paralleled* in Confederal diplomatic powers and *shared* in a complex sense by Confederal military obligations. Monarchs were restricted, however, by the Final Act, though Article 53 forbade most Confederal interference in state institutions.[20] Since conservative leaders such as Clemens von Metternich and Friedrich Wilhelm III of Prussia increasingly imagined the Confederation as a bulwark against liberal reforms and revolution, the Final Act included some key requirements for internal politics.[21] According to the Constitution of 1815, each state was obliged to implement a constitution and to establish a representative body, at least along the lines of the estates of the Old Regime.[22] The Final Act reiterated this requirement with important caveats. For one, sovereign princes had to "arrange" for a constitution. In the wording of the agreement, state constitutions became the free gift of a monarch to his subjects, rather than an agreement between ruler and ruled.[23] Power flowed from God to His ordained representative on earth, and then through the monarch to his institutions and to His/his subjects. As lordly

gifts—in the divine and monarchical sense—constitutions could be altered or revoked at will by monarchs.[24]

Confederal monarchs ostensibly had to grant constitutions, but Confederal law circumscribed their freedom to cede prerogatives to representative assemblies.[25] Although a sovereign prince could only lend certain rights to an elected chamber, these undefined rights were never fully ceded. The monarch merely presented his decisions to the estates for their "assistance."[26] The ideal elected assembly was advisory, and again the monarch demonstrated his sovereignty by choosing to share some of his rights. State constitutions could not hinder the exercise of monarchical power, particularly in the fulfillment of Confederal obligations, nor could state assemblies usurp the princes' ultimate powers—above all, their military command.[27] The granting of constitutions in most German states was not entirely reactive, however; constitutions created some space for political debate and limited interactions between elected representatives and princely governments.[28] The German Confederation thus functioned in so far as its monarchs were willing to cooperate—an arrangement on which liberals later hung their hopes for national consolidation. This monarchical order underlay political life in the individual states of Central Europe, where it aimed to forestall revision and revolution. Nevertheless, on the ground, society was changing. The early lives of the future members of the network reflected this interplay between order and innovation in the years before 1848.

Bourgeois Homes and *Bildung*

The mentors of the network were generally older and more experienced courtiers or state parliamentarians; the core and secondary members of the network tended to be younger. Among their mentors, Christian von Stockmar, a Coburg éminence grise, was born in 1787, and Alexander von Soiron was born in 1806. Core members, such as Karl Samwer, Karl Mathy, and Max Duncker, were born between 1806 and 1818. Common memories and lore from the Napoleonic Wars helped bind the political friends. For example, Mathy was apparently kicked by a Russian cavalry horse at the age of four as tsarist troops passed through Mannheim.[29] His biographer, Gustav Freytag, later implied that this incident sparked Mathy's nationalism. Members born in the 1820s, such as Roggenbach and Baumgarten, knew only the Restoration, though they lived in a German Confederation suffused with bloodless images of a just and Romantic war against Napoleon.[30]

Place of birth was also important for the future group of political friends because most of their families stayed put. Many were raised in northern Germany, although only Heinrich von Sybel, Gustav Freytag, and Max Duncker were born in Prussia. Despite the pro-Prussian goals of the future network, most members spent their youth outside the Hohenzollern realm. The sizeable minority of

mostly southern Germans, such as Mathy, Baumgarten, and Roggenbach, suggests that, although a liberal Prussophile was rather rare in Stuttgart or Freiburg, northerners integrated their southern compatriots into the network with relative ease. Both groups nevertheless spent much of their careers downplaying German regional diversity in favor of a standardized, Prussian-led image of the nation. Sybel and Duncker's Borussian histories, as well as Freytag's fiction and nonfiction, exemplified this strand of liberal-nationalist thought in the network.[31]

Many of the friends grew up in mixed border areas. Francke and Samwer hailed from an area that became synonymous with national strife: Schleswig-Holstein. Grievances against the Danish government and Danish nationalism emerged in the 1840s as German speakers faced hiring discrimination and university quotas.[32] Freytag spent time in Breslau, but otherwise the small Silesian border town of Kreuzburg anchored his early life. His family was upper middle class and deeply Protestant. Freytag interpreted childhood memories of hearing Polish, encountering members of the *szlachta*, and witnessing Catholic popular piety to create a stereotype of indigent, superstitious Poles, whom he saw as antithetical to rational Protestantism and German-ness.[33]

Sybel was born to a Protestant family of pastors and civil servants in the confessionally mixed Rhine Province. The Protestant Sybels benefited from anti-Catholic discrimination in the new Prussian province. The majority of Rhineland judges and high civil servants were Protestants and, particularly in the 1820s and 1830s, imported from the east.[34] The family hosted a circle of local intellectuals and officials, and Sybel's father was ennobled in 1831.[35] In majority-Catholic Baden, under a Protestant monarchy, Mathy's family was Protestant. His father was granted a professorship and was later appointed a court preacher—both signs of royal favor.[36]

Thus, many future friends were surrounded by confessional and national conflict from their childhoods through adulthood. Church–state conflict over episcopal appointments, school oversight, and "mixed" marriages ignited as much conflict in the Prussian Rhineland—for example, the Holy Robe controversy of the 1840s—as it did in Baden.[37] Confessional and political conflict in the Prussian Rhineland and Posen (Poznań) during the 1830s agitated liberals and worried state ministers. The most spectacular case was the "Cologne Troubles" and their reverberations in Posen from 1837 to 1841; in both instances, the Prussian government imprisoned, without trial, the respective Catholic archbishops.[38]

Despite the fact that confessional struggle surrounded members of the future network as young people, their later political friendships accommodated confessional and religious heterogeneity—perhaps because they were otherwise so similar. Many members had personal stories of religious diversity, either from mixed families or from living in confessionally mixed areas. Some members' families had converted to Protestantism. Mathy's father had been a Jesuit priest before converting and marrying Mathy's mother.[39] Max Duncker's mother came from

Berlin's Jewish elite and converted to marry Duncker's father, cofounder of the eponymous Duncker & Humblot publishing house.[40] Such conversions reflected the porosity of religious barriers within the German bourgeoisie in the *Vormärz*. Not until 1867 was there negative reference to Duncker's "Jewish history."[41] Berthold Auerbach considered himself a "German of the Jewish faith" and lifelong proponent of the Jewish Reform movement.[42] His religious identification became remarkable to other members only in the 1860s, although references to the "Jewishness" of his wife were not uncommon beforehand.[43] Franz von Roggenbach and Alexander von Soiron's Catholicism was invisible in network correspondence. Both remained in the Church despite incessant confessional conflict in Baden, particularly the disputes with Catholics in the state legislature that ended Roggenbach's ministry in 1865.[44] Early experiences of cultural diversity were common among German-speaking liberals in Austria, as well.[45]

It is not possible here to review Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish iterations of the Enlightenment and nineteenth-century *Bildung*.[46] The key point is that domestic religiosity in the liberal spirit of the Enlightenment infused members' childhoods.[47] Liberal interpretations of religious injunction were combined with strict self-control, study, and the cultivation of proper manners, in which women took the leading domestic role.[48] The ideal domestic role of the father reflected political beliefs about the role of the monarch in the state—both acted as guarantors of social harmony and progress within the limits of established (male) authority. Many German liberals explicitly made this connection between the *Hausvater* and *Landesvater*.[49] Mathy's Kant-reading father, for instance, taught his son the moral imperatives of work and of national devotion.[50] Max Duncker grew up in a Pietist household that valued prayer and hard work—*ora et labora*—providing a stern introduction to the middle-class insistence on competition, achievement, and good manners in a "life by rules."[51] Enlightenment individualism melded with Romantic notions of national community to teach that each citizen's domestic cultivation of piety, morality, and patriotic feeling was a victory for the nation, the state, and society.[52] Most political friends, among them Haym, Duncker, Sybel, and Mathy, underwent a process of emotional subject formation in Protestant *Innerlichkeit* and Pietism's imperative of personal and later patriotic renewal, developing an affective vocabulary for later political friendships.[53] Both literature and religion provided members of the educated elite with their emotional vocabulary.[54] After this exposure to bourgeois domestic religiosity, many future members supported rationalist dissenting movements in the 1840s.

Widespread print media was central to self-cultivation through extensive private reading.[55] Network members were avid readers: with and without their parents' consent, their reading subjects ranged widely. There were boundaries, of course: girls were considered morally imperiled readers, while middle-class adults considered novels a threat to boys' formal education in Latin and Greek, as well as to the moral lessons supposedly entombed in them.[56] Yet Walter Scott

sparked many members' historical imaginations and fascination with the medieval past. Mathy, Sybel, and both Dunckers mentioned reading Scott as children.[57] Walter Scott's historical fiction, echoing Herder's theories, was predicated on the dramatic rise, fall, and restoration of nations.[58] *Bildungsromane* and popular histories asked readers to imagine their lives as coterminous with the nation, conflating individual (mis)education with the future of the nation-state.[59] The legacy of Sentimentalism, as well as *Sturm und Drang* and Romantic fiction, also pressed readers to evaluate and seek "authentic" emotions as plot devices in the proper development of persons and nations.[60] German nationalists thus adapted Romantic religiosity and the Weimar classicists' interpretation of friendship to connect their individual emotional relationships to the expansion of a liberalism that incorporated feelings of religious brother- and sisterhood.[61]

Three brief examples illustrate some deviations from the norms outlined above. Berthold Auerbach was born Moses Baruch in 1812 in Nordstetten. Most Black Forest Jews gained basic rights only in the 1840s, and they remained prohibited from resettling until 1862.[62] Anti-Jewish violence was common, such as in the "Hep Hep" riots of 1819 and during the revolutions of 1830 and 1848.[63] Auerbach's small hometown inspired his famous *Black Forest Village Stories*. His father was a trader, and his maternal grandparents were innkeepers. The family embraced some tenets of the Haskalah, and his paternal grandfather had been a rabbi—the profession for which Auerbach initially trained.[64] Auerbach's parents reserved Torah study for the young Auerbach, sending him to yeshiva at thirteen. After failing to pay tuition, Auerbach transferred to *Gymnasien* in Karlsruhe then Stuttgart, where he began using the name Berthold.[65] Although he faced Judeophobia and antisemitism throughout his life, access to the Christian education system gave Auerbach the basis on which to form friendships with Christian German liberals—even prejudiced ones. On that basis, Auerbach's Jewishness was accepted, or at least ignored, by his Christian friends.[66]

Charlotte Duncker was born Charlotte Gutike in Halle in 1819. She grew up in an educated, middle-class household. Gendered conceptions of education, however, disadvantaged her in later network interactions. Her father was a prominent professor at Halle, and Duncker received an education conforming to Biedermeier notions of girlhood. She was tutored in French, piano, voice, and handicrafts—skills that men believed would make women charming hostesses and diligent wives.[67] Duncker, however, yearned for lessons in history and geography. She was able to study furtively alongside her brother while he was tutored at home. Like young Freytag and Auerbach, Charlotte Duncker also wrote fiction.[68] Since men generally considered women's published writing inappropriate, her work was kept private.[69] Duncker struggled in the 1850s to overcome this exclusion from formal education, which also threatened her political friendships.

Born in a castle in the Thuringian Forest in 1818, Ernst II of Coburg had a very different childhood from that of Auerbach and Charlotte Duncker, but

one similar to those of Friedrich of Baden and Carl Alexander of Weimar. Despite the beginnings of the embourgeoisement of royal families in the early nineteenth century, young princes continued to be taught that they were qualitatively different people.[70] They were anointed by God to rule one day, and this special connection underlay their families' claims to legitimate power in Restoration Europe. Family life was, by bourgeois standards, distanced. Rigid tutoring and court coaching trained child-dynasts for future roles as divine-right monarchs, state administrators, generals, or suitable marriage partners. The legacy of "enlightened" absolutism, however, demanded academic tutoring approximating that of bourgeois boys.[71] Ernst had daily lessons in modern languages, history, math, and geography before being sent to university. Yet, as in his tutoring and military instruction, Ernst remained a person apart from the more meaningful relationships developing between young commoners. Tension between princely members' station and their longing to build intimate political friendships with non-princely liberals created difficulties in the network for years.

Although they shared similar upbringings, these individuals were not predestined to be liberals or friends. Their first direct interaction with liberal and nationalist organizing occurred at university. After finishing *Gymnasium*, the future political friends went on to spend time—and often a very long time—at university. A university education was crucial to proper *Bildung* and the social skills that liberals believed would lead to a society of free persons who could then found a nation-state.[72] Major centers such as Heidelberg and Berlin drew the well-to-do from across German-speaking Europe and beyond. Many members studied similar subjects, at similar times, and in similar places. When they began meeting at university in the late 1830s and 1840s, the political friends shared assumptions and outlooks from their childhoods. They also had their first encounters with the power of the German states.

These young men entered university as members of a fast-expanding *Bildungsbürgertum* at the height of state repression after 1815. At a time when only a quarter of graduates from a *Gymnasium*—already an elite milieu—entered university, admittance nonetheless doubled in the 1820s before declining in the 1830s and 1840s.[73] Many university students hoped to join overcrowded official bureaucracies or university faculties. The wait for a salaried position in the Prussian judiciary at the time was about nine years, and professorial prospects were not much better.[74] The Vienna Final Act and the Karlsbad Decrees of 1819 curtailed freedom of the press and association, expanded censorship, banned student fraternities, and established a Central Investigation Commission in Mainz to root out popular dissent.[75] The "Six Acts" of 1832 banned free speech and political association after the Hambach Festival, in which many students and professors participated.[76] Austrian foreign minister Clemens von Metternich and King

Friedrich Wilhelm III of Prussia sought to limit university professors' ability to endorse civil rights or question the legitimist state as bureaucratic liberalism fell into official disfavor.[77]

This authoritarian attitude spread to larger Confederal states, such as the Kingdom of Hanover. In 1837, the "Göttingen Seven" of liberal professors, led by Friedrich Dahlmann, denounced King Ernst Augustus in the press after he unilaterally suspended the constitution. The university dismissed all seven of the professors, and the Hanoverian government forced three—Dahlmann among them—into exile.[78]

These official efforts notwithstanding, even the most powerful states lacked the human and material resources to suppress all dissent.[79] Although new laws showcased the repressive power of many German states, their alternating promulgation, softening, abolition, and reinstatement suggests an uneven process in which monarchs and state ministers entered strategic compromises with post-Napoleonic liberalism—however limited or impermanent.[80] Revolutions in France and Saxony in 1830, along with the first English Reform Bill and the establishment of a Belgian constitutional monarchy in 1832, kindled educated Germans' hopes for reform, and particularly for the introduction of constitutions.[81] The granting of constitutions in German states during and after the Napoleonic era, mainly in southern lands such as Baden, spurred the political visions of liberals and democrats across the German Confederation. They debated the ideal form and content of written constitutions well into the Revolutions of 1848/49 and beyond: did sovereignty spring from the monarch or "the people," who were "the people," what civil rights should they enshrine, what powers should be assigned to the monarchy or to an elected legislature, should suffrage be universal or restricted to the propertied and educated?

The leading generation of network members received their education under the repression and the hopes of the 1830s. Max Duncker went to the University of Berlin in 1830. Heinrich von Sybel also attended Berlin in 1834. Freytag entered university in Breslau in 1836 before heading to Berlin as well. Berthold Auerbach was admitted to Tübingen in 1832. Karl Mathy, the oldest of the core cohort, went to Heidelberg in 1824. Karl Samwer and Karl Francke attended the German-speaking University of Kiel, then under Danish rule, in the mid-1830s. Ernst of Coburg and Friedrich of Baden attended the universities of Bonn and Heidelberg in the late 1830s and early 1840s. Bonn was Prussia's university for Catholics at the time and likely provided Friedrich with an opportunity to appeal to the Catholic majority of his future realm. The younger generation, including Hermann Baumgarten and Ludwig Ägidi, began much later, meeting older members as academic and political mentors. Rudolf Haym, for instance, attended the University of Halle only in 1839. He then studied in Berlin before returning to Halle to work under Max Duncker, who became his life-long political mentor.[82]

It is indicative of confessional patterns that none of the network members attended universities in majority-Catholic states or studied outside the Confederation. Most future members had little exposure to southern Germany. Their connections south of the Main remained few well into the 1860s, making Mathy and Baumgarten crucial nodes in the sharing of network resources. Sybel moved to Munich in the 1850s at the invitation of the Bavarian king but failed to coax anyone else along. Most members, conversely, passed through Berlin or Bonn at some point. Prussia—and the Prussian higher education system—offered the future members shared experiences. It is unclear if the choice of Prussian universities reflected a pre-existing preference, or if it fed their belief in the national mission of Prussia—perhaps it was simply the sheer size and repute of Prussian higher education. Future network members' accumulation of social capital, including shared institutional experiences and memories, was thus concentrated in majority-Protestant universities in the north. They remained, like their liberal counterparts in other parts of Europe, relatively confined to familiar cultural spaces.[83]

Pivotal to the network friends' early political socialization were student fraternities.[84] These institutions began in the Napoleonic era as nationalist social and political clubs. German leaders tended to view fraternities—and student societies in general—as hotbeds of political unrest.[85] Exploiting the assassination of the conservative playwright and publicist August von Kotzebue in 1819, the Karlsbad Decrees outlawed fraternities. Nevertheless, Auerbach joined a Tübingen fraternity. Mathy joined one in Heidelberg that fought with an unnamed "Borussian" fraternity, fostering interpersonal hostilities down to 1848. Mathy and Francke became "*Verbindungsgenossen*" in the same fraternity.[86] Duncker was also a *Burschenschaftler*. The fraternities of Auerbach's days were calmer and bristled less than those of the German Empire.[87] Focusing instead on ostensible equality among members, earlier fraternities cultivated "symbolic friendship" through communal drinking, fraternal kissing, and patriotic singing in order to advance German unification.[88] Max Duncker happily recorded that Mathy, though a serious student, "was also no spoilsport at wine and patriotic song."[89] Many of these student organizations were not radical in the democratic or socialist sense. Instead, they advocated for liberal constitutionalism.

Student fraternities developed alongside shooting, singing, and reading clubs with nationalist overtones in the *Vormärz*.[90] The Hambach Festival of 1832, organized by southern German republicans, was the most spectacular gathering that included such nationalist clubs; it functioned as a "rallying ground for radical liberalism."[91] Fraternity members, including Mathy, counted among the reported 20,000 participants.[92] The intersection in fraternities of homosocial camaraderie and political organization reappeared in 1848 around the Frankfurt Parliament.

That most members of the network had belonged to a fraternity demonstrated the early entanglement in Central Europe of civic associations, friendship,

political organizing, and the realm of notable politics. From their teenage years, elite men formed bonds inside and around clubs and associations that offered personal fulfillment while providing political training and a model for organizing. Networks of political friendship, with their enforcement of behavioral norms and, especially after 1858, their policing of political conformity, were a refraction of the cautious, relatively disorganized associational life of the *Vormärz*. Because fraternities provided an early introduction to this form of political culture, it was likely difficult for individuals to separate their friendships completely from the structures of clubs and associations. State power nonetheless forced contemporaries to deinstitutionalize these personal bonds and concentrate political organization in personal networks—networks of political friendship, for some.[93]

But the nineteenth century was not always "a blissful age for bourgeois associations," as James Sheehan has contended.[94] Some future members paid dearly for fraternity membership. Württemberg police arrested Auerbach for participating in a Tübingen fraternity, and an arrest on political charges barred him from taking the state rabbinical exam.[95] Max Duncker was arrested in Berlin in 1837 for his fraternity membership and oppositional writing. A Prussian court sentenced him to six years in prison and a life-long ban on holding state office, which the king commuted to just six months in the fortress-prison of Köpenick outside Berlin.[96] Compared to the experiences of democratic and socialist activists, however, the imprisonment of liberals remained relatively rare.[97] Auerbach and Duncker were exceptional among the political friends in that regard—perhaps because of their Jewish backgrounds. A more common government strategy was to deny liberals professional positions or promotions, or to force them into exile. This became the preferred form of harassment after 1849, but governments had learned to use it in the *Vormärz*.[98]

Future political friends also found intellectual and political stimulation with professors who adapted their traditional privileges to speak publicly—on academic matters—to criticize state policies indirectly. Contact with Hegel and Hegelian thought profoundly affected their thinking and other political activists who later interacted with the network.[99] Future members, from Duncker to Sybel to Haym, integrated Hegelian thinking into their politics and scholarship, especially the philosopher's faith in the world-historical role of the (Prussian) state in the realization of human and German potential. Although none joined the radical republican "Young Hegelians," many of their professional difficulties in the 1840s sprang from their advocacy of rationalist dissenting movements and later associations with the radical publicist Arnold Ruge in Halle.

Kant had also exerted a major intellectual influence on the future political friends—as he, alongside Hegel, did on many European liberals.[100] Even so, network members' treatment of the Königsberg philosopher in their biographies tended to associate reading Kant with revelations of religious rationalism, and this epiphany, they remembered, to feelings of national belonging among

their parents' generation.[101] Kant urged readers to consider their emotions as a "property of the soul" mediating "between cognition and appetite."[102] The friends reportedly internalized this rather ethereal Kantianism as children before studying Hegel at university. The shift among these liberals—from Kantian individualism and rationalism to Hegel's illiberal emphasis on the power of a quasi-mystical state over individual freedoms—reflected, perhaps, that they considered domestic *Bildung* (Kant) indispensable for young people, but, once individuals joined public life at university, they had to sublimate their personal desires to the interests of the state (Hegel).

Above all, scholarly pursuits prepared future members for careers in the "free professions" and civil service. With few exceptions, they studied classical philology, law, and philosophy. Haym studied philosophy and theology, though his real interests lay in literary history—and radical politics. Mathy studied state commerce and finance—*Kammerwissenschaft*—signaling a desire to join the state bureaucracy.[103] Thanks to the methodological pioneering of Niebuhr and Ranke, history was becoming a discrete discipline, although no German universities offered permanent history seminars until the 1850s.[104] The historians of the network, such as Duncker and Sybel, therefore studied at a time when history was still strongly associated with theology and jurisprudence.[105] Some friends pursued their childhood interest in the Middle Ages at university. Freytag and Duncker studied medieval documents alongside ancient authors. Under Ranke's supervision, Sybel wrote his thesis on Middle High German texts.[106]

Future network members from princely families attended lectures on history, philosophy, and law, which exposed them to the formative university experiences of non-princely members. None earned a degree, thus deviating from the network bourgeois norm. Except for the banker Mathy, the writer Auerbach, and the state bureaucrats Roggenbach, Francke, and Samwer, all others passed doctoral examinations. Gustav Freytag, Max Duncker, and Heinrich von Sybel habilitated. Members were, therefore, not only university-educated but highly educated. Aspiring scholars were expected to study at multiple universities to experience different modes of thought and to apprentice with as many experts as possible. Duncker, for instance, attended the University of Bonn during his one-year military training. He returned to Berlin to take his doctoral degree in July 1834 and then went to Halle for his *Habilitation*.[107]

Another formative part of future members' university lives was contact with advisors and integration into networks of professional and political patronage. Both Sybel and Duncker attended the historian Leopold von Ranke's lectures in Berlin. Sybel became his doctoral student and eventual critic: he disagreed with Ranke's conservative emphasis on the empirical facts of history.[108] In Berlin, Max Duncker made the important acquaintance of Johannes Schulze, a state secretary in the Prussian ministry of culture and education, who advanced Duncker's career in the 1840s.[109]

Some university connections linked bourgeois and princely figures. Franz von Roggenbach and Friedrich of Baden studied under the young historian, Ludwig Häusser, in Heidelberg.[110] Prince Friedrich Wilhelm of Prussia (the future Emperor Friedrich III) and Friedrich of Baden studied in Bonn under the liberal historian and exiled Hanoverian, Friedrich Dahlmann, and the conservative jurist, Clemens Perthes.[111] In Bonn, the future emperor began a lifelong friendship with Friedrich von Augustenburg, future claimant to the thrones of Schleswig-Holstein.[112] In the *Vormärz*, it seemed safe to place princelings under the guardianship of liberal academics. Ernst and Friedrich were royal heirs, so university study was meant to expose them to the ethos of academia and provide a measure of—closely monitored—independence outside monarchical courts.

Between University and National Assembly

Because many network members, such as Gustav Freytag, Heinrich von Sybel, and Rudolf Haym, pursued doctorates and the *Habilitation*, separating their university education from their early professional careers is unproductive. The aspiring academics among them were expected to work as private lecturers or secondary school teachers, habilitate, and then secure "extraordinary" (non-tenured) professorships. Others, such as Karl Mathy, Karl Samwer, and Karl Francke, became unpaid assessors and entry-level bureaucrats.

Karl Mathy's life after university differed from the experience of other academic members. After completing his studies in Heidelberg, he began a sort of *Wanderjahr* in May 1828. He set off for Paris after reading an open letter by Capodistrias, president of the nascent Greek state, calling on men of "honor" and "morals" to gather under his banner. The head of the leading Greek support committee in Paris, however, questioned young Mathy's financial resources and his legal status in Baden. He told Mathy that the Greek nation needed no more intellectuals.[113] Mathy decided to stay in Paris for three months to practice his French, go to the theater, and watch parliamentary debates.[114] When he ran out of money, he returned to Mannheim on foot.[115]

This brief episode points to three aspects of *Vormärz* liberalism. First, Mathy's travels in France reflected a general preference among southern liberals for French government models, namely, centralized, parliamentary government, and French answers to post-revolutionary social challenges.[116] Second, Mathy's passion for other national struggles was shared by many *Vormärz* liberals. Greek independence, buoyed by intensely Romantic images of ancient Greece from Hölderlin to Byron, captured the imaginations of many educated Europeans—and some peasants and artisans.[117] German national sympathies extended to Poland as well, especially during the November Uprising of 1830.[118] Most other members started university shortly after the 1832 crackdown on free speech and association, but,

even then, pan-nationalism was waning. The anti-Slavic and anti-Danish rhetoric of the Frankfurt Parliament exemplified this shift.[119] Third, Karl Mathy's trip to Paris was exceptional because he left Germany to enlist in the Hellenic army. The other political friends did not want to fight other nations' battles.

In the late 1830s and 1840s, more shared experiences brought the liberal political friends together. Liberal euphoria over the ascension in 1840 of King Friedrich Wilhelm IV of Prussia soon faded as it became clear his affection for his subjects would not translate into a constitution.[120] The "Hungry Forties" also witnessed riots, food shortages, crop failures and crime waves, intensifying the "social question" and middle-class fears of pauperism and desperate mobs.[121]

Members reacted to these developments in literary, historical, and political journals, often to supplement their meager incomes as private lecturers and low-level bureaucrats. Max Duncker's father published his earliest historical essays and studies. Freytag started to concentrate on writing plays as he understood that the Prussian state would not condone his academic career. He remained a private lecturer in Breslau until 1843 while on the hunt for venues to stage his plays and cultivating contacts with Carl Alexander of Weimar. Mathy met Auerbach in the 1830s, and by 1845, the former's home in Baden hosted a close circle of political friends that included Alexander von Soiron, Baden parliamentarian and publicist, and Auerbach.[122] Mathy also introduced Auerbach to the Dunckers in the early 1840s. Auerbach also grew close to Freytag, and he befriended Carl Alexander, who offered to make him a court librarian—a sinecure that the writer declined.[123]

During the 1840s, the friends helped each other write and publish works that they believed contributed to the education of a liberal and nationalist citizenry. In 1843, Auerbach produced the first collected volume of the *Black Forest Village Stories* to great acclaim. German nationalists believed Auerbach's book reflected the advent of a truly German form of literary realism that focused on rural folk and undermined the influence of what Freytag called "French *Salonkram*."[124] Mathy reportedly helped Auerbach find a publisher for his prose debut after the former had spent five years in exile in Switzerland for smuggling political literature.[125] In 1847, Mathy cofounded the liberal, pro-Prussian *Deutsche Zeitung* with Soiron, G.G. Gervinus, and Friedrich Bassermann. Mathy acted as the newspaper's editor until 1849.[126] He also wrote for *Das Buch für Winterabende*, a popular Rhenish almanac meant to induct the rural populace into the ranks of a liberally minded German nation.[127] Auerbach and Freytag published similar works in the 1850s: the successful *Deutscher Volks-Kalender* and Bilder aus der deutschen Vergangenheit.[128]

Meanwhile, Sybel began writing historical and political pamphlets.[129] Max Duncker contributed to the Young Hegelian Arnold Ruge's *Hallische Jahrbücher*. He eventually became editor in 1845 and expanded the platform for his liberal friends, Sybel and J.G. Droysen.[130] A year before the revolution, Freytag

became the editor of the eminently liberal cultural and political journal, *Die Grenzboten*.[131] Non-princely members sent princes books and articles in hopes of receiving audiences, patronage, and political protection in return.[132] Auerbach's stories, for instance, endeared him to members of the Baden and Prussian royal families.[133] While he entered the good graces of powerful princes in the 1840s, Auerbach also corresponded with radical political thinkers such as Moses Hess, Ferdinand Freiligrath, and Karl Marx—even contributing to the former's *Rheinische Zeitung*.[134] Such interactions presaged the political friends' later reliance on each other for political intelligence, local information, and presenting their publications to state leaders. More broadly, these connections between liberals, democrats, and socialists reflected the porousness of oppositional political boundaries in the *Vormärz*. Members of the network cut most of their ties to democrats and socialists, as they did with many *großdeutsch* activists during the Revolutions of 1848/49.

In their professional lives in the early 1840s, network members began to work as private lecturers and professors.[135] For example, Max Duncker was appointed to an extraordinary professorship in *Staatswissenschaft* in 1842 after the intervention of his patron, Johannes Schulze.[136] Schulze wanted to counter the influence of the conservative, right-Hegelian professor, Heinrich Leo, and his allies at the Hohenzollern court: the Gerlach brothers and Julius Stahl, whose politics were influenced by the Protestant neo-orthodox "Awakening" movement and *ständisch* ideology.[137] The young Duncker was, therefore, an unwelcome addition to the faculty, foisted on them by a faction of the education ministry. Duncker's low salary underlined the limits of his patron's power. This situation also meant Duncker faced intermittent ministerial harassment from Schulze's rivals in reimbursement disputes and the withdrawal of lecturing privileges.[138]

At that time in the early 1840s, the young professionals began getting married. Max Duncker and Charlotte Gutike met in 1837. They married a few years later, after Duncker received a docent position at Halle. Through Charlotte Duncker's father, the marriage provided valuable connections to the educated elite of the city, to salons, and especially to middle-class dissenting circles.[139] The small university town in Prussian Saxony was a center of religious dissent.[140] The Dunckers began working in 1843 with the rationalist, Protestant reformers, the "Friends of Light." The Lichtfreunde stood at the intersection of political, social, and theological movements and, some historians have argued, represented one of the first "mass" middle-class movements.[141] The Lichtfreunde's loose collection of religious and political objectives and organizing represented the "preliminary" development of party politics in the *Vormärz* across German society.[142] It also echoed interrelated conflicts within Catholicism, Protestantism and Judaism between novel forms of rationalist religiosity and state-backed orthodoxy.[143] The Lichtfreunde had a cousin in the Deutschkatholiken, with whom Auerbach sym-

pathized, just as he supported Jewish liberals' Reform movement, which sought to answer the attacks of rational Christian theologians on Jewish theology and religious practice.[144] The Lichtfreunde and Deutschkatholiken also maintained extensive contacts to other progressive movements, such as the Kindergarten movement, which state officials regarded as an ideological threat to the next generation.[145]

Although neither Duncker formally joined the Lichtfreunde, both remained active in their circles. Max Duncker gave historical lectures supporting their demands for expanded suffrage, presbyterian congregations, and women's rights.[146] He traveled to Köthen in 1844 to deliver a lecture on the Reformation to thousands of assembled Lichtfreunde.[147] Fiery speeches at the event seemed to threaten the theological underpinnings of the "Christian state" that was embraced by King Friedrich Wilhelm IV and his politically conservative, religiously orthodox advisors.[148] The Prussian government, after some royal prevarication, classified the Lichtfreunde as a political organization and banned their meetings in 1845.[149] In short, religious and political dissent were inseparable across the political spectrum, contributing to the liminal nature of both liberalism and conservatism in the *Vormärz*.[150]

Working to habilitate in Halle, Rudolf Haym associated with dissenters and described the "church liberalism" of the 1840s as a "training school for politics."[151] Charlotte Duncker remembered that 1846 was "full of political-religious agitation; Lichtfreunde-liberal was the hallmark."[152] The religiosity of the group and its relative gender equality influenced Duncker's political outlook and tendency to represent political differences in religious terms into the 1860s. The Lichtfreunde, much like the future network, allowed women to participate, but leadership remained male.

As in other parts of Europe, shared experiences of state harassment provided another basis for liberals' friendships and ambivalence toward state power.[153] Yet, because of family wealth and political connections—or the lack thereof—official chicanery affected members differently. The Prussian education ministry could harass Freytag or Sybel, for instance, but they could weather the storm financially.[154] Rudolf Haym lacked such resources. He therefore petitioned the education ministry under Friedrich Eichhorn in 1845 for an appointment as a docent.[155] Eichhorn was an occasional ally of the Gerlach brothers and a staunch opponent of the Lichtfreunde and Deutschkatholiken.[156]

Anticipating a hostile reception to his petition, Haym strained in his "confession" to separate his current scholarship from his former radicalism: ". . . now, in my seasoned years, I hold abstract interference in the workings of an enlightened government to be folly and hubris . . ." He disavowed *Praxis*, Strauss's biblical criticism, and Hegel, all of which had been foundational to his involvement with the Lichtfreunde. He promised to focus instead on satisfying "the needs of the soul and demands of life" in Halle, where "Hegelian philosophy has dug its roots

in the deepest." He went so far as to state that these roots needed to "be fought and, where possible, annihilated." Haym closed by assuring the Prussian education minister of his fervent wish to serve the state and its official church.

The letter brimmed with irony, and Eichhorn—unsurprisingly—was unimpressed. He denied the request. Harassed and impoverished, Haym worked as a journalist for, among others, Ruge's and Duncker's *Hallische Jahrbücher*.[157] Financial, professional, and political precarity shaped members' professional experiences from the beginning. Official harassment and material uncertainty returned with the state conservativism of the 1850s, despite network members' efforts to placate ministerial authorities. Duncker, for example, sent a similarly unsuccessful "political confession" to Minister of Education Karl von Raumer in the early 1850s in which he claimed to be a Prussian patriot rather than a German nationalist. Members' anguish over choosing between praxis or theory, government service or scholarship, likewise shadowed the political friends into the 1860s. The episode also suggests that, as early as the 1840s, at least one member of the liberal network sought a limited détente with conservative state leaders.

A final episode from Halle illustrates the entanglement of early political friendships and state harassment.[158] In February 1845, Berthold Auerbach came to the city to deliver a guest lecture on German literary history. By then well acquainted with the Dunckers, he stayed with them. One of his lectures apparently inspired some students to criticize the national and constitutional failures of the Prussian government and their university. Auerbach was barred from further lecturing. His auditors responded with a supportive demonstration outside the Duncker home. Halle authorities, incensed by such open insubordination, demanded that Duncker provide the names of the student organizers.[159] Professor Duncker refused. He also refused to provide details from Auerbach's lectures or his current whereabouts.[160] Sensing mutiny in the ranks, university authorities threatened to jail Duncker and Auerbach until they turned in their students. Duncker refused again. The Prussian minister of education, Friedrich Eichhorn, then intervened. He warned Duncker that his refusals were "evidence of a certain lawlessness"—a dangerous inclination for a young academic.[161] Fresh correspondence ensued between Duncker and the university until the latter finally relented, but not before chastising the uncooperative historian.

This episode captures some of the difficulty of *Vormärz* political life for liberals who sought to combine their public professions with political agitation. Auerbach's talk must have been approved by university or municipal authorities because the ability to lecture publicly remained circumscribed until 1848.[162] The education ministry and the wider Prussian government considered Auerbach and Duncker politically suspect—they were associates of the Lichtfreunde and the radical publicist Ruge—but evidently not suspect enough to censor. The University of Halle, however, would not abide rabble-rousing among its stu-

dents. The rector's letters to Duncker blasted his failure as a state official to assist the university judge.[163] That the relevant authorities sought the students involved in the patriotic protest, rather than the professor and the novelist, indicated that they respected Duncker's limited right to free speech as an academic. Auerbach was banned from lecturing, but he was neither a Prussian nor an academic. From the university's point of view, it was the students' fault for extrapolating contemporary political meaning from the lecture. Duncker, for his part, refused to aid in the suppression of fellow nationalists. He leveraged what little power he had to protect his students and his friend—at no small risk to his career.

The University of Halle never pursued Auerbach or fired Duncker. The reason for the decision is unclear, though the university likely received signals from Duncker's benefactor in the education ministry to stop. Auerbach had also won admirers at the Hohenzollern court, demonstrating the political value of princely patronage, even in the period of the Restoration.[164] The threads of ministerial authority and personal patronage tangled into a knot in Halle. Duncker showed that political friendship—and his coterminous moral duty to the nation—superseded his obligations as a state official.

Meanwhile, Heinrich von Sybel had found an extraordinary professorship in Marburg before moving to Bonn. He and Max Duncker collaborated on a number of journal articles in the mid-1840s, some historical, others contemporary, but all of them political.[165] Through the Dunckers, Sybel met Karl Mathy. Hermann Baumgarten also became one of Max Duncker's devotees in Halle at the time.[166] Duncker mentored Ludwig Ägidi as well, who became his unofficial amanuensis in the 1860s.[167] Roggenbach began his studies in 1843 before the Mathys introduced him to the network in the 1850s. Princely members such as Ernst of Coburg and Friedrich of Baden completed their university experiences and served as active officers in their state militaries. They continued to follow liberal cultural affairs and politics, receiving copies of non-princely members' books and articles. Taking stock: most political friends had met each other in the 1830s and 1840s and had begun to cooperate on political and literary activities. In 1848, the friends nurtured their individual relationships into a network that worked to advance members' individual and collective goals.

The Revolutions of 1848/49 and the First Schleswig War

The Revolutions of 1848/49 have been well studied. Interpretations have ranged from a condemnation of the Paulskirche delegates, whose bickering hampered the historical turn to freedom and democracy, to an insistence that the parliament's Reich constitution was a "nation-state on paper," a model for the German Empire and the Weimar Republic.[168] Historians have, however, largely neglected the contemporaneous war in Schleswig-Holstein led by the Prussian

army against Denmark.[169] The conflict occasioned many network members' first meetings with new friends and foes alike. With the dispersal of the Frankfurt Parliament in May 1849, network members focused even more of their attention on Schleswig-Holstein. After the collapse of the Erfurt Union, the political friends returned home or went north to witness the last days of the war. Nebulous mutual personal connections and vague nationalist and political commonalities began to coalesce and intertwine in Frankfurt, Kiel, and Erfurt, weaving together the emotional and political framework that subsequently sustained the network.

The revolutions began in Palermo in January in 1848.[170] The major spark for Central Europe, however, came from Paris in February, when crowds forced the Orléanist citizen-king to flee to Britain. When news reached the German Confederation in March, the discontented urbanites and rural folk of the "Hungry 40s" took to the streets with political demands. Within a few weeks, Central Europe was experiencing massive demonstrations, open fighting in cities, including Berlin, Vienna, and Dresden, and widespread unrest in the countryside. Liberals demanded national unification, recognition of civil rights, and constitutional government. Peasants sought to abolish remaining manorial dues and noble police powers, while artisans fought for just prices and checks on industrial competitors. Most rulers resisted their more conservative advisors' pleas to crush the crowds, partly because they could not count on their soldiers to fire. The king of Bavaria and grand duke of Hesse were forced to abdicate to younger dynasts; the Austrian emperor soon followed suit. The thirty-odd crowned heads of the Confederation consented to elections to a national assembly in Frankfurt, which was tasked with drafting the first constitution of a united Germany.

Karl Mathy, Max Duncker, and Rudolf Haym were elected by universal manhood suffrage to the Frankfurt Parliament.[171] Mathy represented the area around Konstanz, a hotbed of radical republicanism under Gustav von Struve and Friedrich Hecker. Mathy spent much of his time shuttling between Frankfurt and his "Lake District" trying to dissuade his constituents from armed rebellion.[172] He also earned the ire of radicals early on by ordering the arrest in Karlsruhe of Joseph Fickler, a republican leader, before he could leave to join Hecker's republic in Konstanz, and for censoring democratic publications.[173] August von Saucken-Julienfelde, a noble landowner and future network affiliate and ally of the Dunckers, also became a deputy. Heinrich von Sybel failed to win election to the parliament, although he sat in the Frankfurt "pre-parliament." He remained in the city as an observer. Duncker traveled to Frankfurt via Berlin, where he witnessed the revolution in March. In Berlin, he met Augusta, princess of Prussia and future German empress, with whom he continued to correspond thereafter.[174] J.G. Droysen, professor of history at Kiel and leading Holstein rebel, was elected and worked on the committee that drafted the Reich constitution.[175] Mathy's mentor Alexander von Soiron, whom Duncker "idolized," also served in

the parliament.[176] Karl Francke arrived at Frankfurt as an envoy of the German nationalist government in Schleswig-Holstein.[177]

Unlike in their youth, network members traveled through German lands with relative speed. The liberal delegate Karl Biedermann needed "just" twenty-four hours to reach Frankfurt from Leipzig: the railroad ended at Eisenach, so he covered the remaining stretch by coach.[178] The Revolutions of 1848/49, unlike those of the 1820s or 1830s, were a "mass political experience" in Central Europe, partly because of the new speed of communication and travel.[179] At Frankfurt, network members found a host of 799 patriotic—and not so patriotic—delegates, with some of their families along for the trip.[180] The free city also hosted the Confederal diet and state ambassadors from across Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands.

The Frankfurt Parliament thus provided a mélange of national, social, and political groups, although most of the parliamentarians were members of the educated bourgeoisie.[181] Nobles, wealthy farmers, innkeepers, and merchants—the traditional wielders of power in the countryside—were present, albeit in smaller numbers than urban, university-educated *Honoratioren*.[182] Only seven delegates were peasants or artisans.[183] Frankfurt was an opportunity for public intellectuals and regional politicians from vast geographic distances—and much smaller social distances—to meet personally. The 1840s had seen national and regional congresses of state legislators and certain professions, but no comparable gathering had ever convened before. Karl Mathy was so enthused that he exclaimed: "I live here, not among men, but rather among angels, and I sleep in a temple of fairies."[184]

Most representatives had not held elected office before. This fact, combined with the sheer number of delegates, resulted in hectic, rowdy first weeks. Nascent political parties formed, named after the inns at which delegates coalesced, as deputies realized who shared their basic political views.[185] At first, these clubs were relatively fluid. As many as 25 percent of deputies belonged to no club; others switched or drifted between multiple factions.[186] Most network members belonged to the "center-right" Casino or, less commonly, the "center-left" Württemberger Hof. In these smoke-filled inns, delegates and their allies discussed the business of the parliament and the particulars of committee work—not unlike their experience in fraternities. Nonetheless, the clubs remained informal constellations.[187] They lacked clear organization, codified leadership roles, written platforms, and disciplined voting behavior.[188] This attitude reflected the situation in most pre-existing state legislatures. Political parties were outlawed in most German states into the 1860s—even in progressive Coburg—and liberals throughout Europe—even in parliamentary Britain—tended to regard organized parties as vehicles of special interests against the common good.[189] Liberal parliamentarian and diplomat Robert von Mohl, for example, considered party membership a sign of an "unfinished political education."[190]

The Frankfurt Parliament made initial strides in abolishing onerous holdovers from the Restoration: manorial dues, bans on association, and pre-censorship of the press, for instance. Stalemate soon ensued, however. It began over constitutional questions as ideological lines hardened and the revolution stopped at the throne.[191] Liberals, in general, and network members, in particular, did not wish to destroy the existing monarchical order of things in Germany, but rather to "purge it of abuses and turn its power toward liberal aims."[192] Network members and their political allies rejected the policies of the counter elite of educated, middle-class democrats and socialists.[193] The liberal political friends had admired many of these men before the revolution, when they had a common enemy in Confederal repression. But network members, who had once supported the Deutschkatholiken in the *Vormärz*, now despised the "theater cashier and prophet" Robert Blum for his dangerous republicanism.[194]

Moderate liberals' rejection of democrats had begun earlier, in 1847, at the Offenburg and Heppenheim assemblies, where democratic leaders such as Hecker and Struve declared their succession from southern German liberalism.[195] This attitude continued into the 1850s, when liberals denounced leading democrats as irresponsible revolutionaries and chose to try to reconcile instead with conservative state leaders. In 1848, however, most liberals felt greater distrust for the nobles and state officials on the far right, considering them legitimists hostile to any constitutional restrictions on monarchy, hostile to the abolition of inherited privilege, and especially hostile to German unification.[196] These elements had been responsible for liberals' harassment, imprisonment, and exile in the *Vormärz*. Radical delegates, for their part, considered liberals cautious and doctrinaire, but still fellow travelers on the road to popular legitimacy and parliamentary government, though few democrats wished to abolish monarchy.[197] And conservatives barely tried to differentiate between liberals, democrats, and socialists: all were revolutionaries endangering the Christian state and monarchy.[198]

The members of the network shared the liberal, constitutional monarchist position concentrated in the moderate Paulskirche political groupings. They were members of socially homogenous political clubs: in the case of the center-right Casino, for example, 75 percent of its members were professors.[199] The rest were literati, publicists, or held other occupations reflecting the "overpopulation" of academia in the 1830s and 1840s.[200] Duncker and Mathy were too young to take leading public roles at the parliament, although both were influential within the Casino itself.[201] The two also found new mentors at the Frankfurt Parliament.[202] Both Duncker and Mathy admired the leading moderate, parliament president Heinrich von Gagern. Duncker became Gagern's protégé in late 1848. Mathy likewise supported Gagern and joined the provisional national government in 1848 as an undersecretary of state in the finance ministry.[203] These relationships affected their choices during the revolution and their professional prospects in the 1850s and 1860s.

The combination of relative youth, lack of access to official government positions, and understudy roles with more senior Old Liberals meant that network members were reluctant to deliver speeches or lead their unruly factions in the Paulskirche. This situation was common among their generation, placing them in the ranks of what Christian Jansen has called historical "*Mit- und Zuarbeiter*."[204] Karl Mathy, apart from his work in the Reich finance ministry, avoided the parliamentary spotlight in Frankfurt. His anti-democratic reputation made him very unpopular in Baden, and, at the parliament, he avoided openly associating with causes.[205] Max Duncker and Rudolf Haym likewise shunned speaking.[206] Members' later biographers stressed their quiet, contemplative roles at the parliament.[207] Nonetheless, the friends worked on difficult political questions, conferred at clubs, and observed debates on the Paulskirche floor—important schooling in political action and social networking.

Like the aristocratic Congress of Vienna, the informal social world surrounding the parliament influenced members' future political friendships and outlooks.[208] The months between the March Revolution of 1848 and the Olmütz agreement in November 1850 accelerated liberal network-building as the revolution forged a pan-Confederal, bourgeois political elite.[209] The housing shortage alone—in a small city inundated with parliamentary delegates, government officials, and journalists—compelled new arrivals to share homes and rooms. Duncker stayed with the historian and parliamentarian Karl Hagen, for example.[210] Mathy managed to find his own room. Family connections and personal contacts from university years helped delegates defray the cost of living in Frankfurt—a luxury denied less fortunate delegates. Network members fondly remembered the social contacts they nurtured through paying social calls, literary readings, and informal political discussions.[211] After conflict in June over the election of a princely "Imperial Administrator" (*Reichsverweser*) ended with the parliament's election of Archduke Johann of Austria, debates on civil rights had become "so sterile and boring," Rudolf Haym reported, that "almost half the parliament left the Paulskirche to tramp around in the streets or the pubs."[212] Delegates' increasing comfort with parliamentary work was accompanied by frustration and boredom.

But then tensions exploded in September of 1848. Popular uprisings in town and country threatened property and frightened liberals into deferring to state governments and moderate conservatives against democrats and socialists. September marked the decline of the parliament's demands on the individual German governments and the increase of state power.[213] Haym recorded a telling incident in September. Crowds surrounded the Paulskirche, insulting the parliamentarians and singing the republican "*Heckerlied*." Haym decamped with about 80 other moderates to the Englischer Hof inn. But the crowds were not so easily calmed, Haym implied. Robert Blum, a parliamentary delegate and leading republican, had reportedly arrived at the "headquarters of the left" to whip up the common folk, and by eleven o'clock that evening an angry crowd

besieged Haym and company at their inn: "Suddenly, whistling in front of the windows. Thereupon the throwing of stones. Every pane in the great hall is shattered. Eventually, they try to break in." The liberals managed to barricade the doors. "We are besieged for half an hour. Finally, the military appears." Haym then reported that troops dispersed the crowds and freed the beset moderates.[214]

The scene is instructive in two ways. First, it highlights radicals' discontent with the slow-moving, moderate progress of the revolution represented by Paulskirche liberals. Revolutionary violence erupted in August and September in Berlin, Dresden, and swaths of rural Silesia, Baden, and the Palatinate. This conflict reached Haym and his associates directly on that night in September. The fear apparent in Haym's letter to the former Prussian finance minister, David Hansemann, also vilified democratic leaders such as Blum. Political alliances between constitutional liberals and democrats in the *Vormärz* were frayed in 1848/49 by the need to codify earlier ideals into a constitution. Second, the beleaguered liberals were only saved from the—allegedly—enraged mob by troops under the command of Confederal princes. The revolution threatened property and liberal constitutionalism; the monarchical state intervened to protect both. Liberals in other parts of Europe reacted to mass disturbances in a similar fashion.[215] Leading Prussian conservatives, such as Leopold von Gerlach and Julius Stahl, now saw a chance for cooperation with moderate liberals to preserve the monarchical state.[216] By 1849, Max Duncker expressed his new faith that conservatism might indeed lead "the people" to embrace a powerful state as a guarantee of social stability.[217] Already, network members' slow accommodation with conservative officials appeared on the horizon.

Outside Frankfurt, members' loved ones followed these events and participated in political organizing. But network women also faced expectations that militated against their participation in events. Charlotte Duncker and Anna Mathy stayed in Halle and Mannheim, respectively. They kept in close contact with their spouses in Frankfurt despite their schedule of committee meetings, parliamentary debates, and social calls.[218] Female members of the network, apart from providing emotional labor and working in socially acceptable charitable societies, became local managers of news from the Paulskirche.[219] The emotional and political were deeply intertwined, yet their expression was confined to private correspondence dealing with public issues through a medium that encouraged debate rather than confrontation.[220] Letters also served as an emotional outlet for stressed and overworked political friends in 1848/49, as they did in the years of reaction and crisis in the 1850s and 1860s. For men and women alike, emotional labor was necessary when all levels of society were obsessed with protecting their "nerves."[221]

Network members who served as delegates in Frankfurt expressed private disbelief at the slow progress of the parliament. Max Duncker remarked in August 1848 that, "Since Sunday, we have again experienced the most remarkable

things, and the worst is, we have been held up considerably by insolence and stupidity."[222] He blamed this souring on the radicals: a disrespectful and uneducated rabble. The abbreviated style of Duncker's letters hint at his frustration. He was overworked and tormented by social and political worries.[223]

Berthold Auerbach exemplified another category of Germans who were largely excluded from the parliament but for a different reason.[224] Auerbach's Jewish faith precluded his election to a Black Forest district, although a handful of important Jewish Germans, such as Johann Jacoby and Gabriel Riesser, were elected.[225] Auerbach suffered a deep personal loss that also distanced him from many of the events of 1848. His wife, Auguste, had recently had a son, and Auerbach admitted, "it often seems to me as if I were living inside a balloon, and the great events of the world, which had so absorbed me, lay far, far below."[226] But Auguste Auerbach grew ill and soon died. Depressed, Berthold Auerbach left for Breslau where for months, he confided in his cousin: "My most precious wish every morning and every evening is that I would die; and if it were not for my child, I would certainly have fallen on the Vienna barricades . . . I cannot write anything to you about politics. I would have to reach too deep."[227] For Auerbach, the year 1848 represented personal loss first, then political trauma. Events influenced members of the network differently, depending on their religious, gendered, or personal position. This disparity in both access to parliamentary politics and family emotional obligations affected future standing in the network. Auerbach, like Charlotte Duncker, often played a smaller role, partly because of his exclusion from formative experiences shared among the other political friends.

Meanwhile, renewed popular violence in Berlin and the rural southwest in April and May 1849 recalled for liberals the specter of mob violence and the destruction of property from September 1848.[228] On the anniversary of the March Revolution, Charlotte Duncker wrote: "the times when I looked forward to this day's return with a beating heart are over . . ."[229] Frankfurt moderates struggled to convince enough democrats and conservatives to approve the new imperial constitution. It guarantied civil rights, such as freedom of speech and association, abolished estate privileges, and established an elected legislature under a federal, Hohenzollern monarchy. The new Reich excluded the Habsburg lands after the Austrian government had retaken Vienna in November and expressed its hostility toward the Frankfurt Parliament by arresting Julius Fröbel and executing Robert Blum, both famous democratic deputies. The vote for a *kleindeutsch* state also marked the departure of the liberal political friends from much of their collaboration with *großdeutsch* activists. The parliament agreed to offer the imperial title to the Prussian king at the last minute. Heinrich von Gagern, with a deputation that included Max Duncker, traveled to Berlin to offer the Prussian king the new dignity. Friedrich Wilhelm IV rejected the "crown from the gutter," the "dog collar" of a godless revolution.[230] In short: Frankfurt was a joyous, then exhaust-

ing, and finally disappointing experience for members of the liberal network and their contacts throughout Germany.[231]

Max Duncker returned to Frankfurt long enough to pack his things. The Prussian government recalled him with the rest of the "Prussian" delegates in May 1849.[232] Instead of returning to Prussia as ordered, Duncker accompanied Heinrich von Gagern to Holstein and stayed to report from Kiel and Rendsburg for Haym's *Konstitutionelle Zeitung*.[233] It was in Schleswig-Holstein that Duncker and Gagern began to address each other with *Du*.[234] This intimate form of address was common among the political friends. Mathy was summoned by a liberal Baden government in May 1849 to head the finance ministry in Karlsruhe. The grand duke dismissed Mathy three days later in order to form a conservative cabinet.[235] The "rump" Stuttgart Parliament then decamped in June 1849 to establish a republic in Baden. Prince Wilhelm of Prussia, liberals' hope for the future, destroyed the leftover legislature with regular troops whose allegiance to the king and state benefits were more persuasive than the revolutionaries' words.[236] But soon after the dissolution of the Frankfurt Parliament, Schleswig-Holstein dominated the political friends' attentions and anxieties more than the bloodshed unleashed by Prince Wilhelm in the south.

The First Schleswig War followed the initial stages of the February and March Revolutions of 1848 in Europe. The separate duchies of Schleswig and Holstein were held in personal union by the Danish monarch. The Danish king, as duke of Holstein, was a member of the German Confederation. The Duchy of Schleswig, however, was not a member of the Confederation. Yet, a series of arcane treaties beginning in the fifteenth century bound Schleswig to Holstein. Holstein, to the south, was overwhelmingly German-speaking, while a large Danish-speaking minority inhabited Schleswig.[237] German and Danish nationalism, influenced by the growing connection of cultural to political unity, increased tensions between Kiel and Copenhagen. The centralizing impulses of absolutizing monarchy and growing "Eider Dane" nationalism led government ministers in Copenhagen to advocate for the incorporation of Schleswig into the Danish state. It also led, German nationalists claimed, to official discrimination against German speakers.[238] Two popular rumors concerned the posting of Danish-speaking pastors to German-speaking parishes and Danish doctors to state hospitals and asylums—questions of economic, religious, and social importance for bourgeois Germans.[239]

But it was bad timing and an old-fashioned dynastic dispute that provided the spark to the powder keg on the Elbe. When King Frederick VII of Denmark ascended the throne in January 1848, it was clear he would not produce a male heir. This situation meant that the Elbe duchies, governed by Salic law, would pass to a male, "German" branch of the House of Oldenburg as the Danish crown moved down a female line.[240] The government in Copenhagen balked at

the idea of losing Schleswig, Danes, and associated tax revenues. State ministers renewed pressure on the king to incorporate Schleswig. News of the February Revolution in Paris reached Kiel in March, and German nationalist leaders went to Copenhagen to demand more autonomy and an end to the incorporation of Schleswig. The Danish government rejected the idea, igniting armed rebellion in Holstein. The Confederal diet, still active despite popular unrest in Germany, asked the Prussian army to lead the "execution" in Holstein in support of the rebel Augustenburg pretender. Saxon troops and German nationalist volunteers from across Central Europe joined the Holstein rebels as well. Scandinavian nationalists from Sweden-Norway volunteered for the Danish side. The United Kingdom and the Russian Empire monitored the conflict as a possible threat to Baltic shipping and Danish territorial integrity.[241] This crisis, then, was a European one, which made the stakes all the higher in the eyes of network members.

Many of the future friends who did not meet in Frankfurt did so in Kiel. Duke Ernst, now the reigning sovereign of Coburg, fought in the war as a cavalry officer.[242] It was the only major battlefield experience that the self-styled military and renaissance man had before the Seven Weeks' War of 1866. Duke Ernst befriended the disputed Augustenburg duke of Schleswig-Holstein during the fighting in 1848 and 1849. He then grew close to the duke's heir, Prince Friedrich von Augustenburg. Ernst also met the lawyer Karl Samwer and the former envoy to the Frankfurt Parliament, Karl Francke. Both worked in the rebel government. Max Duncker befriended the three men from Holstein at this time as well. In 1850, Charlotte Duncker was glad her husband was working in Schleswig-Holstein because there, "at least Germany's *immediate* national future will be decided . . ."[243]

It is unclear whether Max Duncker met Duke Ernst in Kiel, or if they met later through Gustav Freytag. Whatever the case, Duncker knew of, and reported on, the prince's military exploits in the First Schleswig War. Ernst's service bestowed nationalist credentials on the duke as it did for the Prussian commander, Eduard von Bonin. Duncker's private and public reporting from Kiel from 1849 likewise boosted his profile as a journalist, making him one of the leading local contacts for moderate liberals and network members in Schleswig-Holstein. Alexander von Soiron solicited articles from Max Duncker, as well as from Gagern through Mathy, to rally their "party" to the war effort.[244] Nevertheless, Duncker felt homesick and despondent in Kiel.[245] In August 1850, Charlotte Duncker longed for her spouse, and in that frame of mind she proclaimed a gendered, subordinated relationship to politics that she later rejected: "All my politics are . . . really only longing for you. When you are here, you are my newspaper and my point of view."[246]

Schleswig-Holstein marked the beginning of many common network political activities. The Dunckers, Karl Mathy, and Freytag raised funds in the various societies that advanced the Holstein cause. Max Duncker ran a pro-Holstein

lottery, while Charlotte Duncker worked in the Halle Schleswig-Holstein assistance society.[247] She received more intelligence from her spouse from Kiel, which she shared in Halle, repaying him in cigar shipments.[248] Rudolf Haym took over the editorship of the moderate liberal *Konstitutionelle Zeitung* and worked to publish pro-Schleswig articles at Max Duncker's behest.[249] Soiron also passed information to Haym.[250] Robert Morier, a British diplomat who soon became the foreign office's expert on German affairs, met network members after Droysen recommended his English translations of pro-Holstein publications to Samwer.[251] Droysen also fed Duncker and Francke information from Prussia.[252] Much like German liberals' work for the Greek national struggle, their activities remained civilian, though Duncker was a trained *Landwehr* officer.[253] These individuals focused on more "respectable" tasks, such as fundraising, journalism, or recruiting for rebel units.

Max Duncker continued to work from Kiel and toured northern Germany as a "missionary" to raise funds.[254] The tide had turned against the rebels, however, as the United Kingdom and Russian Empire intervened to restore the status quo. Prussia signed an armistice with Denmark in mid-1850. Overcome, Max Duncker begged Mathy to intensify fundraising for field hospitals and materials so that Holstein could continue the fight without Prussia. Duncker considered the armistice unnecessary, arguing that the smaller states must undermine the agreement: "Haste and fervor are necessary to save the duchies from the bitter feeling that they must enter the decisive struggle abandoned by Germany."[255] Francke confided in Mathy, whom he addressed with *Du*, that new funds from the smaller German states would hardly meet the five million talers needed to continue the war.[256]

Network members' hopes for victory in Schleswig-Holstein and for salvaging national unification after Frankfurt diminished in the ensuing weeks. In August 1850, Francke composed a gloomy thank-you letter to Rudolf Haym: "You are fighting with the weapon of the spirit . . . for a cause that we defend with the sword . . . Your success, our success, is doubtful, but one thing remains certain: If we win, you are owed one of the most beautiful laurels!"[257] Yet, official tolerance was over for Haym's newspaper and its campaign against the armistice with Denmark. The Berlin police threatened Haym with deportation and the cancellation of his pre-paid postage for the newspaper. He considered these threats a "brazen attempt at intimidation, a surrogate for earlier confiscations with which [they] already burned their fingers. For my part, I threatened Herr Hinkeldey [*sic*] with publication."[258] Haym then pleaded with Max Duncker for more lead articles to sustain the paper. The circulation of political information, professional favors, and emotional support in the face of state repression became the hallmark of network activity in the 1850s.[259]

The political friends' attempts to scuttle the Prussian peace effort also presaged liberals' selective opposition to conservative governments in the 1850s and

1860s. They supported the suppression of radical leaders and plebeian mobs, but they opposed the German governments' failure in Schleswig-Holstein as *the* national issue. This attitude resurfaced during the Second Schleswig War (1864), when disputes over the rights of the Augustenburg family fractured the network. Shared traumas from reporting on, fighting in, fundraising for, and, ultimately, suffering defeat in Holstein haunted members. The war was, therefore, key to the formation of the network of liberal political friends. It also shaped members' conceptions of national and state power and the supposed national mission of Prussia—and liberal nationalism in Germany, in general.

While war still raged in the north, the political friendships forged in Frankfurt and Kiel underlay the gathering of many network members in Gotha in 1850 under the protection of Duke Ernst II of Coburg. This "after-parliament," a reconvening of 130 moderate liberals who had served in Frankfurt, was the origin of the vaguely pejorative moniker "Gothaer."[260] Those who met in Gotha rarely used the term themselves. Perhaps it smacked of particularism and carried a whiff of conspiracy, an implication that their opponents likely relished. The meeting also received curiously cursory treatment in members' biographies. Yet, it was in Gotha that the remaining constitutional liberals of the Paulskirche announced their support for uniting Prussia, Saxony, Hanover, Bavaria, and many of the small German states in a modest version of the "Reich-on-paper" of 1849.[261] It also represented their first post-revolutionary accommodation with conservative state power for the sake of national unification.[262]

The so-called Alliance of the Three Kings (Dreikönigsbund) formed in May 1849 after the kings of Prussia, Bavaria, and Hanover agreed to establish a federal *kleindeutsch* nation-state. The Prussian minister president, Joseph von Radowitz, a moderate conservative general, had pushed the plan since the demise of the Frankfurt Parliament.[263] The allied monarchs called for elections across the German states to a new parliament in Erfurt tasked with voting on a federal constitution heavily influenced by the Reich constitution of 1849. It granted considerable power to the Prussian monarch and restricted voting to the three-class system introduced in Prussia. King Maximilian II of Bavaria and King Georg V of Hanover had stipulated, however, that they would support the Erfurt Union only if every German state—besides Austria—agreed to join. Unanimous acceptance of the union never materialized, partly due to pressure from a resurgent Austrian monarchy that had recently defeated the Hungarian Revolution with Russian soldiers. The Bavarian and Hanoverian kings withdrew in February 1850, and the Erfurt Union lost much of its appeal outside liberal circles.[264]

Despite their shared vision for a *kleindeutsch* nation-state, reactions to the union varied widely across the network of political friends. Like many moderate

liberals, Alexander von Soiron insisted that the union was promising—it still included twenty-six of thirty-six German states. It remained the last best hope for national political unity. But he also acknowledged the continued mistrust toward the enterprise, even among Prussian leaders.[265] Karl Mathy, a subject of Baden, felt differently. He complained to the liberal politician Franz Buhl: "How lucky you are to be a loyal subject of the Wittelsbachs . . . [they] do not belong to the Dreikönigsbund that unites us small [states] in one sack!"[266] Max Duncker and Heinrich von Sybel, elected to the new parliament, held out hope for a positive outcome from the assembly.[267]

Compared to Frankfurt, network members' memories of the Erfurt Parliament were dim. Most had already met, and like the Gotha "after-parliament," the event served to bind the political friends more tightly together. Arriving in Erfurt in March 1850, Duncker was reunited with his old classmate Otto von Bismarck.[268] Christian von Stockmar and Maximilian von Schwerin, later a minister in the New Era cabinet and an ally of the Dunckers, were also delegates.[269] Karl Samwer, Karl Mathy, and Karl Francke were present, too.[270] After democrats and socialists had boycotted the election because of its restrictive voting system, the Union Parliament presented little more than an opportunity for liberals to settle old scores with Prussian archconservatives.[271]

The Erfurt Union was threatened from within Germany by the Austrian government, and from without by St. Petersburg, Paris, and London, whose governments favored the restoration of the status quo in Germany. Radowitz faced opposition from the king, traditionalists at the Hohenzollern court, and rivals within his own ministry.[272] Domestic political problems in the reactionary Electorate of Hesse sharpened relations between the Prussian and Austrian cabinets. By November 1850, the Austrian government induced the Prussian king to sign the "Punctation" at Olmütz, canceling the Erfurt project and calling a conference to determine the future of Germany. The Radowitz ministry collapsed, the Erfurt parliamentarians were recalled, and the full restoration of the German Confederation seemed imminent. Anna Ross has argued that Olmütz represented the true end of the revolutions.[273] The next chapter suggests that, although hopes for national unification were shattered, a desperate hope for national victory in Schleswig-Holstein persisted.

Conclusion

In the 1830s and 1840s, the liberal political friends cultivated shared experiences and memories that formed the foundation of their network. These commonalities began with their upbringing in educated, bourgeois homes. There, the future members of the network were exposed to Enlightenment rationalism, Romantic nationalism, and intense religiosity: in short, to *Bildung*. University education

was universal among network men. Princely political friends were among the first generation of German monarchs to study at universities, although none earned a degree. Fraternities facilitated the first shared political experiences for many network men, influencing them for decades.

After university, most chose academic careers or entered the civil service. In the 1840s, Auerbach and Max Duncker interacted with the dissenting Lichtfreunde and defied government authorities when it meant protecting fellow nationalists. Many members had their earliest encounters with organized liberal and democratic politics within the context of rationalist religious dissent. Nevertheless, as Rudolf Haym's "confession" to the Prussian ministry of education demonstrated, poorer members were often forced in the 1840s to try to compromise with conservative officials. By the 1850s, Confederal governments had honed the economic means of repression, turning them on more and more members of the moderate-liberal network.

Partly to supplement their meager incomes as university docents and new professionals, network members contributed to the expanding market for periodicals. Haym, Heinrich von Sybel, Hermann Baumgarten, and Karl Mathy, for instance, published in popular almanacs and bourgeois journals in the 1840s. They adopted both genres to advocate for moderate, constitutional liberalism and a Prussian-led Germany. Although liberal politics in the *Vormärz* remained confined to print and state legislatures, publishing introduced future political friends to like-minded peers and princes, whom they met in person in 1848 for the first time. This small, Confederal public sphere prepared the ground for 1848 by forging contacts between liberals, democrats, and some socialists. It also hosted the relatively free mixing of German nationalists of both the *klein-* and *großdeutsch* persuasions. The political world of the *Vormärz* proved as inclusive as it was vague.

These bonds across the spectrum of political opposition and nationalist activism unraveled only later in the decade. The Revolutions of 1848/49 and the First Schleswig War left behind potent memories and bitter resentments. Shared experiences at the Paulskirche, the Gotha "after-parliament," and the Erfurt Parliament shaped network members' interactions with practical politics into the 1860s. The political friends socialized, debated, and slogged through parliamentary labors. Overall, most members were reluctant—or were not asked—to play major roles. In April 1849, the king of Prussia rejected the imperial dignity, dashing the political friends' hope for national unity under the auspices of the Frankfurt Parliament.

Nevertheless, most members of the network were elected to the Erfurt Parliament of 1850, where they endorsed the Prussian cabinet's authoritarian revision of the Reich constitution of 1849. They then found themselves defending a conservative government in Berlin against archconservatives opposed to the union. Having already scorned democrats and *großdeutsch* ideals at Frankfurt, the

liberals in Erfurt demonstrated to Prussian officials their willingness for political accommodation to drive national unification in the form of a *Kleindeutschland*. After the formal collapse of the Erfurt Union at Olmütz in November 1850, many German liberals believed that Prussia had once again betrayed its mission to unite Germany "from above."[274]

Meanwhile, war continued in the north. All network members followed it closely. Karl Francke and Karl Samwer participated in the rebel Holstein government, and Duke Ernst of Coburg fought with German volunteers. Political friends to the south, particularly Max and Charlotte Duncker, Karl Mathy, and Rudolf Haym, raised funds for the rebel war effort and worked in the press to undermine the official peace process. The Schleswig-Holstein Question consolidated the network and later intensified members' feeling that the revolutions had failed. Members' fierce resistance to Prussian peace efforts showed that these moderate liberals could support conservative officials at the Erfurt Parliament while denouncing them as traitors to Holstein in the press. The decisive consideration for these moderate liberals was whether a conservative government could achieve *kleindeutsch* unification.

By January 1851, the political friends were scattered across the German Confederation. Conservative governments in Prussia, Austria, Hanover, and many of the small states had defeated the remaining forces of liberalism and radicalism. Many democratic and socialist leaders fled to Switzerland or France, some to Britain or the United States. The liberal political friends chose to remain in Germany. They spent much of the early 1850s processing the defeats, disappointments, and traumas of the revolutions. The network was essential to this process as members supported each other emotionally, professionally, and

Table 1.1. Network Members and Affiliates. Created by the author to illustrate overall findings.

Core Members	Members	Affiliates
Charlotte Duncker	Ludwig Ägidi	Friedrich Bassermann
Max Duncker	Berthold Auerbach	Carl Alexander of Weimar
Ernst II of Coburg	Hermann Baumgarten	J.G. Droysen
Karl Francke	Friedrich I of Baden	Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm of Prussia
Gustav Freytag	Rudolf Haym	Robert Morier
Karl Mathy	Anna Mathy	August von Saucken-Julienfelde
Franz von Roggenbach	Ernst von Stockmar	Alexander von Soiron
Karl Samwer	Eduard von Tempeltey	Christian von Stockmar
Heinrich von Sybel		Crown Princess Victoria of Prussia

Table 1.2. Key Biographical Data. Created by the author using material from: Deutsche Biographie, Historische Kommission bei der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/home; Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz; Bundesarchiv, Berlin; Staatsarchiv Coburg.

Name	Birth	First University	Primary Profession	Death
Berthold Auerbach	1812, Württemberg	1832, Tübingen	Fiction writer	1882, France
Charlotte Duncker (née Gutike)	1819, Prussia	N/A	N/A	1890, (?)
Max Duncker	1811, Prussia	1830, Berlin	Professor/Historian	1886, German Empire
Ernst II of Coburg	1818, Coburg	1837, Bonn	Monarch	1893, German Empire
Friedrich I of Baden	1826, Baden	184(?), Bonn	Monarch	1907, German Empire
Karl Francke	1805, Schleswig	1824, Göttingen	State Administrator	1870, German Empire
Gustav Freytag	1816, Prussia	1835, Breslau	Fiction writer	1895, German Empire
Rudolf Haym	1821, Prussia	1839, Halle	Professor/Literary Historian	1901, Austro-Hungarian Empire
Karl Mathy	1807, Baden	1824, Heidelberg	Banker	1868, Baden
Franz von Roggenbach	1825, Baden	1843, Heidelberg	Landowner/State Administrator	1907, German Empire
Karl Samwer	1819, Holstein	1838, Kiel	Lawyer/State Administrator	1882, France
Heinrich von Sybel	1817, Prussia	1834, Berlin	Professor/Historian	1895, German Empire



Figure 1.1. Major Network Connections. Created by the author to illustrate overall findings.

politically against dogged state harassment. Yet revolution had also taught conservative monarchs in Germany—and their ministers—to value "public opinion" and the influence of liberal and nationalist elites.[275] As the next two chapters show, the network of political friends recovered and began to explore this opportunity within a much narrowed social and political field.

Notes

1. On conservative innovation and accommodation to the post-Napoleonic world, see Berdahl, *Politics of the Prussian Nobility*, 5–6, 11; Levinger, *Enlightened Nationalism*, 164–65; Ross, *Beyond the Barricades*, 10.
2. Freeden and Fernández-Sebastián, introduction to *In Search of European Liberalisms*, 12, 18.
3. Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 18; Biefang, *Politisches Bürgertum*, 21; Mulholland, *Bourgeois Liberty and the Politics of Fear*, 14, 40; Kocka, *Industrial Culture and Bourgeois Society*, 193.
4. The bourgeoisie organized production, as capitalists, or they provided services certified by educational qualification, such as doctors, lawyers, and other professionals. See Mulholland, *Bourgeois Liberty and the Politics of Fear*, 3–4.
5. Roggenbach's father had served as Baden's war minister and mentored its future grand duke, Friedrich I, in military matters. See Gall, *Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 64.

6. Like the term "bourgeoisie," the term "liberal" remained "vague and imprecise" until the 1840s: Sheehan, *German Liberalism*, 5; Gall, "Liberalismus und 'bürgerliche Gesellschaft,'" 324. Liberalism in other European countries remained similarly broad, see also: Isabella, *Risorgimento in Exile*, 25–26; Rampton, *Liberal Ideas in Tsarist Russia*, 1; Hadley, *Living Liberalism*, 1, 3, 10; Kwan, *Liberalism and the Habsburg Monarchy*, 4, 8.
7. They mostly belonged to the center-right at the Frankfurt Parliament, the Gothaer of 1849, the Old Liberal, and the Progressive Party of the Prussian Landtag in the 1860s. Biefang counted Mathy, Sybel, Baumgarten, Duncker among the "Old Liberals." Biefang, *Politisches Bürgertum*, 47. Jansen described the "*Konstitutionellen*" as moderate liberals willing to work with the monarchies against revolution: Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 14–15.
8. Bourgeois society in Germany fully emerged during the Restoration. Members' families contributed to that slow process. See Nipperdey, *Germany from Napoleon to Bismarck*, 223; Habermas, *Frauen und Männer*, 7–12.
9. De facto territorial sovereigns, such as the king of Prussia or the elector of Bavaria, were not legally sovereign within the bounds of the Holy Roman Empire. Depending on the opinion of the particular estate, either the emperor himself or the empire as a corporate body was the single sovereign entity binding together princes, cities, and ecclesiastical bodies. See Stollberg-Rilinger, *Holy Roman Empire*, 19–20, 102–103.
10. "Deutsche Bundesakte vom 8. Juni 1815," in *Dokumente*, ed. Huber, 84–85.
11. "Deutsche Bundesakte," in *Dokumente*, ed. Huber, 84–85; "Schlußakte der Wiener Ministerkonferenz vom 15. Mai 1820," in *Dokumente*, ed. Huber, 91.
12. "Deutsche Bundesakte," in *Dokumente*, ed. Huber, 84.
13. Protestant princes were also the heads of their respective state churches. This situation added another layer of religious justification for monarchial rule.
14. See Benton, *Search for Sovereignty*, 279–80.
15. "Schlußakte," in *Dokumente*, ed. Huber, 91.
16. The signatories of the Final Act, and particularly the Austrian foreign minister Clemens von Metternich, hoped it would halt what they considered dangerous civil reforms in the newly expanded Confederal states such as Baden.
17. Nipperdey, *Germany from Napoleon to Bismarck*, 304–305.
18. "Schlußakte," in *Dokumente*, ed. Huber, 98. The diet accredited a Confederal ambassador only once: for the London Conference of 1864 to negotiate an end to the Second Schleswig War. The Saxon minister president, Friedrich Ferdinand von Beust, received the honor.
19. "Bundesakte," in *Dokumente*, ed. Huber, 87; "Schlußakte," in *Dokumente*, ed. Huber, 96, 98.
20. "Schlußakte," in *Dokumente*, ed. Huber, 98.
21. Leonhard, *Liberalismus*, 287–88; Siemann, *Metternich*, 439–40.
22. "Bundesakte," in *Dokumente*, ed. Huber, 87. There was confusion about the nature of this provision during negotiations in Carlsbad in 1819. See Siemann, *Metternich*, 605–608.
23. "Schlußakte," in *Dokumente*, ed. Huber, 1: 98; Nipperdey, *Germany from Napoleon to Bismarck*, 304–305. Debates over whether constitutions were the monarch's gift or a necessary contract between ruler and ruled wracked Restoration France and the Prussian court in the 1850s, as well.
24. Confederal monarchs therefore remained the active artificers of the clockwork of state, in the absolutist sense. See Stollberg-Rilinger, *Der Staat als Maschine*.
25. Both Mecklenburg grand duchies remained without constitutions until World War I. The liberal Duchy of Coburg only received a constitution in 1852. See Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 40.
26. "Schlußakte," in *Dokumente*, ed. Huber, 99.
27. Confederal monarchs would later test these boundaries at either end of the political

spectrum—in liberal Baden and archconservative Electoral Hesse. For developments in the liberal "*Musterstaat*" of Baden, see Gall, *Liberalismus als regierende Partei.*

28. Vick, *Congress of Vienna*, 233.
29. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 18.
30. Bourgeois and literary depictions of war were changing at this time. See Hewitson, *Absolute War*, 99, 104, 122. After 1815, however, governments in Germany also worked to repress the revolutionary aspects of nationalism and popular mobilization from understandings of war. Experiences of the Napoleonic Wars and their legacy had a lasting and at times divisive effect on German liberalism. See Leonhard, *Bellizismus und Nation*, 420; Dann, *Nation und Nationalismus*, 68–70.
31. Applegate, "Mediated Nation," 46.
32. Carr, *Wars of German Unification*, 36–37.
33. Travel did not necessarily lead to cosmopolitanism and tolerance. For a later example of the well-traveled chauvinists of the Pan-German League, see Chickering, *We Men Who Feel Most German*, 127.
34. Brophy, *Rhineland*, 258.
35. Borutta, *Antikatholizismus*, 275.
36. University professors were equal to *Regierungsräte* in the Prussian state bureaucracy. See Koselleck, *Preußen zwischen Reform und Revolution*, 425.
37. On confessional conflict in the Prussian Rhineland, see Blackbourn, *Marpingen*; N. Freytag, *Aberglauben im 19. Jahrhundert*; Brophy, *Rhineland*, 216–17, 254–58.
38. Borutta, *Antikatholizismus*, 270–72; Brophy, *Rhineland*, 254–55.
39. Duncker, "Mathy," 45; Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 7.
40. Haym, *Leben Max Duncker's*, 4; GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 8, 10. See also Hertz, *Jewish High Society in Old Regime Berlin*.
41. Karl Mathy to Max Duncker, 28/29 May 1867, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 3, Bl. 255–56.
42. Skolnik, *Jewish Pasts, German Fictions*, 28–29; Schlüter, *Auerbach*, 47–49.
43. Gustav Freytag to Ernst of Coburg, 3 August 1858, GSA 19/339 [unfoliated].
44. On *Vormärz* religious and confessional conflict in Baden, see Herzog, *Intimacy and Exclusion.* See also Gall, *Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 311, 321.
45. Kwan, *Liberalism in the Habsburg Monarchy*, 14.
46. For a detailed examination of this connection, see Heschel, *Abraham Geiger and the Jewish Jesus*; Altgeld, *Katholizismus, Protestantismus, Judentum*. On the semantic weight of the terms, see also Bollenbeck, *Bildung und Kultur*, 101, 216–20.
47. Belief in the ecumenical power of liberalism and *Bildung* militated against party identifications, political organizing, and made *Bildung* a refuge from both authoritarian states and the working classes. See Sheehan, *German Liberalism*, 18.
48. Perrot, "The Family Triumphant," 4: 134; Habermas, *Frauen und Männer*, 120, 232–33, 242.
49. See, for example, Rotteck, "Monarchie," in *Staats-Lexikon*, 1st ed., ed. Rotteck and Welcker, 10: 658; and popular reactions to the Coburg military convention discussed in chapter 3. On the Enlightenment roots of the bourgeois notion of a modern state of *Hausväter*, see Gall, "Liberalismus und 'bürgerliche Gesellschaft,'" 329–32.
50. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 7, 11; Duncker, "Mathy," 45.
51. Blackbourn, "German Bourgeoisie," 9–10. For a concise overview of the earlier historiography on Pietism, see Lehmann, "Pietism and Nationalism."
52. Karl Biedermann later wrote, for instance, that "Tribes are a product of nature, nations are a product of culture." See Biedermann, "Nation," in *Staats-Lexikon*, 3rd ed., ed. Rotteck and Welcker, 10: 317. For example, this notion of *Bildung* shared similarities with liberal concep-

tions of "character" in the UK and acceptable "cultural patterns" in Mexico. See Hadley, *Living Liberalism*, 7, 9; Schaefer, *Liberalism as Utopia*, 15–17.

53. Haym, *Leben Max Duncker's*, 8; GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 5. Furger, *Briefsteller*, 13, 26; Koschorke, *Körperströme*, 11–12. On Pietism, see Sheehan, *German History*, 476–77; and Lehmann, "Pietism and Nationalism," 41–45. On the emotional, religious vocabulary of German nationalism, see Hoover, *Gospel of Nationalism*.
54. Sheer, "Topographies of Emotion," 34.
55. Kocka, *Industrial Culture and Bourgeois Society*, 108.
56. Habermas, *Frauen und Männer*, 234–36; Clarke, *Rise and Fall of the Woman of Letters*, 5–7; Smith, *Gender of History*, 9, 73–74.
57. Habermas, *Frauen und Männer*, 158. On members' (early) reading habits, especially their consumption of novels and historical works, see Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 21, 23; Haym, *Leben Max Duncker's*, 8–9.
58. Daniel Fulda, "Telling German History," 196, 198–99; Pott, "Zur Kulturgeschichte des Deutschlandsbildnis bis zur Romantik," 66–67.
59. Heinrich, *Leben Lesen*, 14, 44; Kaiser, *Social Integration and Narrative Structure*, 9; Frevert, *Men of Honour*, 137; Gössmann and Roth, introduction to *Poetisierung—Politisierung*, 14; White, *Content of the Form*, 9–10; Dann, *Nation und Nationalismus*, 16–17. Almanacs and calendars popular among less educated Germans often contained anecdotes and stories that were structured like miniature *Bildungsromane*. See Brophy, "Common Reader," 154.
60. Frevert, "Defining Emotions," 13–14, 26–28; Gössmann, "'Ich bin ein deutscher Dichter,'" 21, 24.
61. Mosse, "Friendship and Nationhood," 355, 360; Habermas, *Frauen und Männner*, 247–48, 251–52. See also Pfizer, "Liberal," in *Staats-Lexikon*, 1st ed., ed. Rotteck and Welcker, 9: 713.
62. Joskowicz, *Modernity of Others*, 15.
63. Herzog, *Intimacy and Exclusion*, 9.
64. Schlüter, *Auerbach*, 11, 48; Kaiser, *Narrative and Social Integration*, 36.
65. Schlüter, *Auerbach*, 11–12, 48; Sorkin, *Transformation of German Jewry*, 141.
66. Uriel Tal argued that this attitude among Christian Europeans stemmed from the Enlightenment notion that if Jews embraced rationalist theology and civic emancipation, Jewish difference would eventually disappear, or at least become irrelevant to public life. See Tal, *Christians and Jews in Germany*, 16–17.
67. Twellmann, *Die Deutsche Frauenbewegung*, 5–6.
68. See Charlotte Duncker's surviving poems and stories in GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 245 [unfoliated].
69. French, *German Women as Letter Writers*, 49. Bonnie Smith has contended that some women in the early- to mid-nineteenth century were "momentarily lionized" for their writings but that this praise should not conceal women's exclusion from an expanding public sphere. See Smith, *Gender of History*, 40.
70. Müller, *Our Fritz*, 7; Fritz, "Education and the Rituals of Monarchy in the Kingdom of Württemberg," in *Sons and Heirs*, ed. Müller and Mehrkens, 76, 85.
71. Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm was the first Hohenzollern heir to be sent to university: Müller, *Our Fritz*, 66.
72. Vick, *Defining Germany*, 17. Vick's formulation is not unlike Sheehan's encapsulation of bourgeois identity cited above: Sheehan, *German Liberalism*, 5.
73. Koselleck, *Preußen zwischen Reform und Revolution*, 440, 443.
74. Koselleck, *Preußen zwischen Reform und Revolution*, 438–40.
75. Härter, "Security and Transnational Policing," 200–207; Brophy, "Common Reader," 141. Unlike the Confederal Polizeiverein (1851–1866), the commission employed its own

investigators and staff, who reported directly to the Confederal diet. The arrest and prosecution of suspected dissidents, however, remained a state prerogative. The commission was replaced in 1833 by a Central Investigating Agency in Frankfurt until 1843.

76. Church, *Europe in 1830*, 54.
77. Siemann, *Metternich*, 590–91, 597–600. There was a tinge of paranoia to the two leaders' thinking. They believed, like many state officials, that secret, international networks of radical nationalists were plotting to overthrow Restoration governments through assassination, sabotage, and open revolution.
78. For a critical re-evaluation of this infamous episode, see See, *Die Göttinger Sieben*.
79. Judson, *Habsburg Empire*, 106.
80. De Graaf and Vick, introduction to *Securing Europe after Napoleon*, 17.
81. Lees, *Revolution and Reflection*, 11.
82. Ansel, *Prutz, Hettner und Haym*, 56; Biermann, *Ideologie statt Realpolitik*, 169.
83. See, for example, Riall, *Sicily and the Unification of Italy*, 115.
84. Ute Frevert has estimated that 60–75 percent of students at Heidelberg, for instance, belonged to at least one student society. See Frevert, *Men of Honour*, 90.
85. Frevert, *Men of Honour*, 97–98.
86. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 26–27.
87. See Zwicker, *Dueling Students*.
88. Frevert, *Men of Honour*, 91–93. See also Sheehan, *German History*, 406–407, 444. Sheehan, *German History*, 406–407, 444; Mosse, "Friendship and Nationhood," 351–67.
89. Duncker, "Mathy," 46.
90. Dieter Langwiesche has argued that *Vormärz* bans on political parties resulted in a "cryptopoliticization" of fraternities and other civic associations. See Langewiesche, "Anfänge der deutschen Parteien," 328.
91. Mommsen, "German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century," 415.
92. Barclay, "Political Trends," in *Germany, 1800–1870*, ed., Sperber, 48; Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 61.
93. See, for example, Nipperdey, "Verein als soziale Struktur in Deutschland."
94. Rahden, *Jews and Other Germans*, 64.
95. Sorkin, *Transformation of German Jewry*, 142; Katz, "Berthold Auerbach," 218.
96. Haym, *Leben Max Duncker's*, 34.
97. Lees, *Revolution and Reflection*, 10, 23.
98. Sheehan makes this connection between liberals' professional and political frustrations: Sheehan, *German Liberalism*, 21.
99. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 16. On the general enthusiasm for the Hegelian conception of history among the future members, especially Duncker, Sybel, Freytag, Auerbach, and Haym, see Ansel, *Prutz, Hettner und Haym*, 65; Clark, *Iron Kingdom*, 432–34; Rose, *German Question/Jewish Question*, 226. Lees contends that Haym broke with Hegelian thinking in the 1850s: Lees, *Revolution and Reflection*, 35–37.
100. See Rampton, *Liberal Ideas in Tsarist Russia*, 11–12, 15–16; Kwan, *Liberalism in the Habsburg Monarchy*, 15; Leonhard, "Formulating and Reformulating," 74–75.
101. See, for example, Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 7, 11, 14; Duncker, "Mathy," 20, 45.
102. Frevert, "Defining Emotions," 18, 20.
103. Duncker, "Mathy," 52, 61; Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 41, 364.
104. Lees, *Revolution and Reflection*, 49; Smith, *Gender of History*, 75.
105. Lees, *Revolution and Reflection,* 48.
106. Dotterweich, *Sybel*, 85.
107. Haym, *Leben Max Duncker's*, 22; GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Dunker, Nr. 5, Bl. 20, 49.
108. Dotterweich, *Sybel*, 85; Lees, *Revolution and Reflection*, 40–41.

109. It seems that the "*verwaltungstechnische Liberalität*" of the Prussian bureaucracy seeped out to universities well after the end of reform in 1821: Koselleck, *Preußen zwischen Reform und Revolution*, 419.
110. Gall, *Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 64.
111. Gall, *Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 64; Müller, *Our Fritz*, 66.
112. Hewitson, *Nationalism in Germany*, 337.
113. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 31–33.
114. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 34–35; Duncker, "Mathy," 46–47.
115. Duncker, "Mathy," 46.
116. Lees, *Revolution and Reflection*, 15–16.
117. See Hauser, *Anfänge bürgerlicher Philhellenismus*. Support for Greek national independence was especially pronounced in southwestern Germany, where Mathy spent his youth.
118. Brophy, "Common Reader," 145.
119. See Vick, *Defining Germany*.
120. Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 52.
121. Sheehan, *German Liberalism*, 29–31; Barclay, "Political Trends," in *Germany, 1800–1870*, ed., Sperber, 54.
122. Duncker, "Mathy," 54.
123. Kaiser, *Narrative and Social Integration*, 37. Freytag was a witness to his second marriage: Mühlen, *Gustav Freytag*, 82. Berthold Auerbach to Jakob Auerbach, 21 December 1845, in *Briefe an seinen Freund*, ed. J. Auerbach, 1: 53–54.
124. Rose, *German Question/Jewish Question*, 232; Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 217. Freytag's nationalist hopes for the *Stories* reflected liberal insistence on German as the sole language of state, especially in 1848. Many German liberals disdained French as the language of the aristocracy: Vick, *Defining Germany*, 25, 128. Walker argues that Auerbach's stories contributed to the "cult of provincialism" in their sylvan village idyll: Walker, *German Home Towns*, 325.
125. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 227.
126. Hirschhausen, *Liberalismus und Nation*, 11, 118–20.
127. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 217; Brophy, *Rhineland*, 44. In the Rhineland, newspaper circulation was small compared to the massive popularity of calendars that also addressed public matters: Brophy, *Rhineland*, 52. See also Brophy, "Common Reader."
128. Brophy, *Rhineland*, 29; Skolnik, *Auerbach*, 43; Applegate, "Mediated Nation," 34, 44.
129. Lees, *Revolution and Reflection*, 43.
130. Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 63; Sybel to Max Duncker, 20 October 1843, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 202, Bl. 145. Droysen kept Max Duncker informed of events in Holstein and contributed to the *Hallische Jahrbücher* from 1845: Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 63.
131. Ping, "Gustav Freytag," 607.
132. See also Klessmann, ed., *Mein gnädigster Herr! Meine gütige Korrespondentin!*; Ivy York Möller-Christensen and Ernst Möller-Christensen, eds., *Mein edler, theurer Großherzog!*
133. Rose, *German Question/Jewish Question*, 233; Sorkin, *Transformation of German Jewry*, 140. Max Duncker also acted as his liaison to the court of the Prussian crown prince in the 1860s: GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 15. Whereas critiques of the works of Heinrich Heine, Ludwig Börne, and Ferdinand Lassalle often focused on their Jewishness, this was rarely the case in contemporaries' reviews of Auerbach's work. See Katz, "Berthold Auerbach," 216.
134. Katz, "Berthold Auerbach," 220–221.
135. German-speaking university faculty rankings ranged from docent, to extraordinary professor, to ordinary professor. Docents (or private lecturers) were usually unpaid, while professors were salaried members of the state civil service. Extraordinary professors were paid—but rarely very

well. There was also an "honorary professor" status, which many members requested when they entered government because it allowed them to keep their lecturing privileges.

136. Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 54–55. The discipline of *Staatswissenschaft* was broad enough in the *Vormärz* to encompass lectures and seminars the topics of which ranged from sheep breeding to constitutionalism: Lees, *Revolution and Reflection*, 50–51. For Schulze's role in Dunckers appointment, see Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 58.
137. Ansel, *Prutz, Hettner und Haym*, 51–52; Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 70; Levinger, *Enlightened Nationalism*, 175–76; Ross, *Beyond the Barricades*, 29, 33; Ernst Ludwig von Gerlach, *Aufzeichnungen*, 1: 228. See also Achtelstetter, *Prussian Conservatism*, 27, 31.
138. Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 65.
139. Family was central to social and economic connections in German cities of all sizes. See Evans, "Family and Class in the Hamburg," 134.
140. Weir, *Secularism and Religion*, 25.
141. Dieter Langewiesche argues that the Lichtfreunde and Deutschkatholiken offered early liberalism "organizational backing." See Langewiesche, *Liberalismus in Deutschland*, 38; Weir, *Secularism and Religion*, 6–7; Graf, *Politisierung*.
142. Brophy, *Rhineland*, 6; Borutta, *Antikatholizismus*, 24.
143. Joskowicz, *Modernity of Others*, 22.
144. Weir, *Secularism and Religion*, 6; Joskowicz, *Modernity of Others*, 3, 140; Heschel, *Abraham Geiger and the Jewish Jesus*, 15–17, 22.
145. See Rahal, "Garden for the Future," 91–92, 98–107.
146. Ansel, *Prutz, Hettner und Haym*, 53. Rather than following episcopal authority or the direction of a local priest or pastor, individual presbyterian congregations are governed by an assembly of elected elders.
147. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 118; Weir, *Secularism and Religion*, 6, 37.
148. Graf, *Politisierung*, 49–50; Weir, *Secularism and Religion*, 58–60; Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 85. The Christian state relegated non-Christians to second-class citizenship, even after the constitution of 1850 granted Jews formal legal equality. See Rahden, *Jews and Other Germans*, 13. Romantic writers, their notions underlying the Prussian conservatives' Christian state, had long rejected Jewish emancipation. See Joskowicz, *Modernity of Others*, 95–96.
149. Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 93–94; Weir, *Secularism and Religion*, 51; *Ernst Ludwig von Gerlach*, 1: 441–42.
150. Herzog, *Intimacy and Exclusion*, 4.
151. Qtd. in Langewiesche, *Liberalismus in Deutschland*, 38; Ansel, *Prutz, Hettner und Haym*, 60–62.
152. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 118.
153. See, for example, Soper, *Building a Civil Society*, 16.
154. Mühlen, *Freytag*, 28.
155. Haym to Eichhorn, 30 September 1845, in *Ausgewählter Briefwechsel*, ed. Rosenberg, 27–30.
156. Weir, *Secularism and Religion*, 45; Barclay, *Frederick William VI*, 93. See also Leopold von Gerlach, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, 1: 82, 1: 91, 1: 127.
157. Hans Rosenberg, introduction to *Ausgewählter Briefwechsel*, ed. idem, 7.
158. Rudolf Haym retells the tale in his biography of Duncker. See Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 65. Auerbach chose not to share the incident with his cousin and confidant, at least not in published letters. See J. Auerbach, ed., *Briefe an seinen Freund*, 50–54. Friedrich Eichhorn's letter indicated the incident took place in February: Eichhorn to Duncker, 13 April 1845, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 2, Bl. 66.
159. Unidentified letter to Max Duncker, March 1848, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 2, Bl. 57; Friedrich Eichhorn to Max Duncker, 13 April 1845, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 2, Bl. 66.

160. Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 65; Eichhorn to Duncker, 13 April 1845, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 2, Bl. 66.
161. Eichhorn to Duncker, 13 April 1845, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 2, Bl. 66.
162. This right was restricted in 1819 by ending the exemption of universities and the Academy of Sciences from censorship: Koselleck, *Preußen zwischen Reform und Revolution*, 416.
163. Eichhorn to Duncker, 13 April 1845, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 2, Bl. 66. Many German universities retained Old-Regime powers to arrest and imprison students well into the nineteenth century.
164. Rose, *German Question/Jewish Question*, 232.
165. Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 63.
166. Baumgarten went on to mentor Max Weber. See Blackbourn, "German Bourgeoisie," 25; Blackbourn and Eley, *Peculiarities of German History*, 258.
167. See Ägidi's correspondence with the Dunckers in GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 12.
168. Taylor, *Course of German History*, 71; Hewitson, *Nationalism in Germany*, 5, 352. Most historians fall somewhere in the middle. Pieter Judson contends that the revolutionaries of 1848 in the Habsburg Empire worked to create the very nation they claimed to represent; nationalism was distinctly urban as peasants ascribed themselves to no nation. See Judson, *Habsburg Empire*, 213–14. For Brian Vick, liberals realized in 1848 that they did not speak for the entire nation. See Vick, *Defining Germany*, 2. Christian Jansen sees 1848 not only as a political upheaval but also as the beginning of a long period of sociopolitical change in the German Confederation. See Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 23.
169. Hewitson sees it as a "major border dispute," but in Vick's work, the issue becomes a node for debates over civil rights, masculine national honor, and language policy. It clarified liberals' theoretical understanding of the German nation-state and its place in Europe: Hewitson, *Nationalism in Germany*, 346; Vick, *Defining Germany*, 177.
170. Levinger, *Enlightened Nationalism*, 214.
171. Mark Hewitson writes that only about 75 percent of the male population was eligible to vote for National Assembly delegates. Turnout was relatively low, especially in Saxony and Holstein, where it stood at about 40 percent. State governments interpreted the assembly's rules about voter eligibility to exclude swaths of non-taxpayers. See Hewitson, *Nationalism in Germany*, 33; Langewiesche, "Anfänge der deutschen Parteien," 331–32.
172. Duncker, "Mathy," 55; Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 248–49.
173. Rosenberg, ed., *Ausgewählter Briefwechsel*, 124. Mathy had marched under the same banner—literally—with Hecker in 1843 to celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of Baden's constitution. See Bettelheim, *Berthold Auerbach*, 156.
174. Haym, *Leben Max Duncker's*, 86, 88; Curtius to Max Duncker, 21 December 1848, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 2, Bl. 109. Duncker had little success with the princess.
175. Biermann, *Ideologie statt Realpolitik*, 30–31.
176. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, 148–49.
177. Vick, *Defining Germany*, 143.
178. Biedermann, *Mein Leben und ein Stück Zeitgeschichte*, 1: 321.
179. Sperber, *European Revolutions*, 255.
180. Blackbourn gives the number as 812: Blackbourn, *History of Germany*, 11. Sheehan counted 799 delegates: Sheehan, *German History*, 677.
181. Indeed, though the Revolution of 1848/49 has been described as the beginning of mass politics and revolution, Frankfurt liberals considered educated, propertied men "*das Volk*." Vick, *Defining Germany*, 149.
182. Sheehan, *German History*, 676; After 1848/49, these university educated "*Faktionseliten*" still dominated popular nationalist organizations in the 1860s, such as the Nationalverein. See Biefang, *Politisches Bürgertum*, 300–301. Sperber argues that liberalism remained a "movement

of notables," although during the Revolution it could still appeal to some artisans and farmers: Sperber, *European Revolutions*, 180.

183. Blackbourn, *History of Germany*, 111.
184. Cited in Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 255. The flowery language sounds much more like Freytag, however.
185. Langewiesche, "Anfänge der deutschen Parteien," 332–33.
186. Sheehan, *German History*, 679.
187. Although Sperber argues that revolutionary political clubs were initially chaotic, harkening back to debate clubs hosting divergent views, they later coalesced into groups capable of political action: Sperber, *European Revolutions*, 158–60. Hewitson sees these clubs as a prelude to mass political parties: Hewitson, *Nationalism in Germany*, 24.
188. Dieter Langewiesche has contended that the clubs exercised considerable influence over their members, and some even had written statues with defined punishments for noncompliance; however, this power was never formalized. See Langewiesche, "Anfänge der deutschen Parteien," 333–34.
189. Langewiesche, "Anfänge der deutschen Parteien," 326–27, 356; Woltz, "Staatspolitische Wirken," 24; Parry, *Politics of Patriotism*, 36; Hadley, *Living Liberalism*, 1; Gould, *Origins of Liberal Dominance*, 6–7; Soper, *Building a Civil Society*, 143, 146–47.
190. Cited in Sheehan, *German History*, 679.
191. Sperber, *European Revolutions*, 115.
192. Sheehan, *German Liberalism*, 41.
193. This was Christian Jansen's term for the left wing of the Paulskirche in *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 21.
194. Clemens von Metternich, cited in Weir, *Secularism and Religion*, 52.
195. Leonhard, *Liberalismus*, 449, 463–64; Mommsen, "German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century," 416–18.
196. Lees, *Revolution and Reflection*, 109; Blackbourn, "German Bourgeoisie," 13.
197. Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 256–57.
198. Lees, *Revolution and Reflection*, 87; Albrecht, *Antiliberalismus und Antisemitismus*, 44. See also Schwentker, *Konservative Vereine und Revolution in Preussen*. The year 1848 also represented an important moment in the development of conservative movements. The *Kreuzzeitung*, for instance, was founded in 1848 and largely defined itself in opposition to liberal politics. See Leonhard, *Liberalismus*, 457–58.
199. Like the radicals Hecker and Struve, members of the Casino also tried to distance themselves from the Francophile, southern German liberalism of the *Vormärz*. For these moderate liberals, southern German demands for legislative power went too far, rather than not far enough, as radical leaders had it. See Leonhard, *Liberalismus*, 467.
200. Lees, *Revolution and Reflection*, 10. See also Koselleck, *Preußen zwischen Reform and Revolution*, 438–40.
201. Brian Vick notes, however, that Duncker led the Frankfurt "Prussian party" with Droysen. See Vick, *Defining Germany*, 129.
202. Vick, *Defining Germany*, 11.
203. Duncker, "Mathy," 57.
204. See Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 27. Stefan Zweig first explored the notion that the secondary characters in history are often the most representative of their times. See Zweig, *Joseph Fouché*, 12.
205. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 281; Haym to David Hansemann, 6 June 1848, in *Ausgewählter Briefwechsel*, ed. Rosenberg, 43.
206. Rosenberg, introduction to *Ausgewählter Briefwechsel*, ed. idem, 9. Some older liberals, such as G.G. Gervinus, also shunned open debates. See Engehausen, "Georg Gottfried Gervinus," 19.

207. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 255; Max Duncker, "Mathy," 57; Haym, *Leben Max Duncker's*, 86.
208. On the centrality of informal politicking at the Vienna Congress, see Vick, *Congress of Vienna*, 7–8, 14, 66, 149–50.
209. Christian Jansen contends that no Germany-wide political elite existed before 1848. See Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 20.
210. Charlotte Duncker to Max Duncker, 9 January 1849, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 9b, Bl. 49.
211. Karl Biedermann felt that the friendships forged in Frankfurt were especially "intimate, lasting, and unchanging." See Biedermann, *Mein Leben und Ein Stück Zeitgeschichte*, 1: 389.
212. Haym to his parents, 6 July 1848, in *Ausgewählter Briefwechsel*, ed. Rosenberg, 50–51. The title has often been translated as "Imperial Regent" as well, although the term "administrator" carries less princely freight than regent and emphasizes the technocratic connotations that these liberals perhaps had in mind.
213. Barclay, "Political Trends," in *Germany, 1800–1870*, ed. Sperber, 60–61.
214. Haym to David Hansemann, 17 September 1848, in *Ausgewählter Briefwechsel*, ed. Rosenberg, 59–60.
215. See, for example, Riall, *Sicily and the Unification of Italy*, 116–17.
216. Leonhard, *Liberalismus*, 458.
217. Leonhard, *Liberalismus*, 466.
218. It took about thirty-six hours for a letter to reach Frankfurt from Halle: Charlotte Duncker to Max Duncker, 9 January 1849, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 9b, Bl. 49. The Dunckers communicated daily. The average level of correspondence between separated spouses in the nineteenth century, according to Perrot, was about every two to three days. See Perrot, "Family Triumphant," 4: 131.
219. For example, see Max Duncker to Charlotte Duncker, 20 December 1848, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 9a, Bl. 6–7; Charlotte Duncker to Max Duncker, 21 January 1849, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 9b, Bl. 86–87. It is unclear whether Charlotte Duncker worked in a gender-segregated charitable society, as most charitable groups were, especially in 1848/49: Frevert, *Women in German History*, 69–70, 75.
220. Goodman, *Republic of Letters*, 96.
221. Radkau, *Zeitalter der Nervosität*, 13–14.
222. Max Duncker to Charlotte Duncker, 9 August 1848, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 9a, Bl. 5–6.
223. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 157.
224. On debates about the emancipation of the Jews and the rights of Jewish men, along with the general consensus on the ineligibility of women for formal political participation, see Vick, *Defining Germany*, 80–81, 213.
225. Rose, *German Question/Jewish Question*, 232; Green, "1848 and Beyond," 344–46.
226. Berthold Auerbach to Jakob Auerbach, 5 March 1848, in *Briefe an seinen Freund*, ed. J. Auerbach, 64.
227. Berthold Auerbach to Jakob Auerbach, 5 November 1848, in *Briefe an seinen Freund*, ed. J. Auerbach, 66–67.
228. Sperber, *European Revolutions*, 117–20; Sheehan, *German History*, 706–707. This fear sprang from older liberal fears that "beyond the established ranks of the nation were those shadowy and hostile groups which force society into chaos." Sheehan, *German Liberalism*, 47.
229. Charlotte Duncker to Max Duncker, 29 May 1849, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 9b, Bl. 106.
230. Blackbourn, *History of Germany*, 122.
231. On the traumatic legacy of 1848/49 for German liberals, see Walter, *Heeresreformen*, 394; Biermann, *Ideologie statt Realpolitik*, 34–35.

232. [Karl von?] Kamptz to Max Duncker, 16 May 1849, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 2, Bl. 123. The Prussian government's authority to recall "its" delegates was dubious.
233. Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 126–27.
234. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 147.
235. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 272–73.
236. Sperber, *European Revolutions*, 249.
237. These were the languages of the educated, largely urban bourgeoisie and country nobles. Holstein was overpopulated with the latter, particularly in the "Grafeneck." Rural people tended to speak dialects between Low German and Danish. See also Carr, *Wars of German Unification*, 35–39.
238. Vick, *Defining Germany*, 147.
239. This sort of discrimination—both perceived and real—infuriated network members into the 1860s. Ernst of Coburg, for instance, collected flysheets from 1863/64 depicting nationalist and rebel anger at a supposedly corrupt officialdom—and at Danish-speaking pastors, in particular: SAC, LA A 7215, Bl. 35–37.
240. For details on the Schleswig-Holstein dispute, see Konrad, *Baden und die schleswig-holsteinische Frage*.
241. The Russian emperor, Nicholas I, was also involved because he was the head of the House of Oldenburg. The Kiel Canal had not yet been built, so shipping still passed between the Danish islands.
242. Woltz, "Staatspolitische Wirken," 3.
243. Charlotte Duncker to Max Duncker, [early August 1850], GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 9b, Bl. 132.
244. Soiron to Mathy, 5 December 1849, BArch, N2184/55, Bl. 4–5.
245. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 157.
246. Charlotte Duncker to Max Duncker, 31 August 1850, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 9a, Bl. 138. Charlotte Duncker echoed here the bourgeois notion of men as "*Lehrmeister ihrer Frauen*." Habermas, *Frauen und Männer,* 339. Duncker simultaneously interpreted politics as a matter of familial cooperation and thereby claimed a limited space for herself in political deliberations, much as the wives of male historians participated in historical research and writing in the nineteenth century. See Smith, *Gender of History*, 83.
247. The Schleswig-Holstein foreign office formally thanked Max Duncker for his steadfast service to the cause in the fall of 1850: Department [*sic*] der auswärtigen Angelegenheiten to Max Duncker, 27 October 1850, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 2, Bl. 138; GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, 182. Charlotte Duncker to Max Duncker, 31 August 1850, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 9a, Bl. 138.
248. For example, see Max to Charlotte Duncker, 19 August 1850, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 9a, Doc. 32; Max to Charlotte Duncker, 28 August 1850, 28 August 1850, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 9a, Doc. 34.
249. Max Duncker to Haym, 2 July 1850, in *Ausgewählter Briefwechsel*, ed. Rosenberg, 91–92.
250. Soiron to Haym, 18 July 1850, in *Ausgewählter Briefwechsel*, ed. Rosenberg, 94.
251. Samwer to Droysen, 6 April 1850, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. J.G. Droysen, Nr. 73, Bl. 38–39.
252. Max Duncker to Droysen, 22 May 1850, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. J.G. Droysen, Nr. 27, Bl. 57; Francke to Droysen, 29 January 1850, GStAPK, VI. HA J.G. Droysen, Nr. 30, Bl. 6.
253. Duncker trained as a volunteer officer in an Uhlan regiment: GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 20.
254. Haym reported that he went to Halle through the Rhineland and then back to Kiel in 1850: Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 125. Max Duncker wrote about conducting "business" in Hamburg and Bremen: Max Duncker to Karl Francke, 9 July 1850, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. J.G. Droysen, Nr. 27, Bl. 60–64.

255. Max Duncker to Karl Mathy, 3 June 1850, BArch, N2184/11, Bl. 1–3; Max Duncker to "Hochgeehrter Herr," 3 July 1850, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 177, Bl. 36–39.
256. Karl Francke to Karl Mathy, 13 August 1850 and 27 October 1850, BArch N2184/21, Bl. 1–4 and Bl. 5.
257. Francke to Haym, 2 August 1850, in *Ausgewählter Briefwechsel*, ed. Rosenberg, 96.
258. Haym to Max Duncker, 25 August 1850, *Ausgewählter Briefwechsel*, 99.
259. Ross, *Beyond the Barricades*, 4, 18, 168–69.
260. Wippermann, "National-Politische Bewegung," in *Staats-Lexikon*, 3rd ed., ed. Rotteck and Welcker, 10: 378.
261. Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 30, 224–25.
262. Sheehan, *German History*, 713.
263. Hewitson, *Nationalism in Germany*, 47.
264. See Sheehan, *German History*, 712–15.
265. Soiron to Mathy, 4 November 1849, BArch N2184/55, Bl. 7–8. Soiron addressed Mathy with *Du* by January 1850, highlighting the acceleration of friendship-building among future members during the revolution: Soiron to Mathy, 17 January 1850, BArch N2184/55, Bl. 22–23.
266. Mathy to Peter Buhl, 3 November 1849, qtd. in *Nach der Revolution*, ed. Jansen, 45.
267. Mathy to Charlotte Duncker, 16 April 1850, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 86, Bl. 2; Charlotte Duncker to Hermann Baumgarten, 27 June 1849, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 19, Bl. 1–2.
268. Haym, *Leben Max Duncker's*, 116–17; Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 339; Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 25 September 1862, GStAPK, BPH, Rep. 52 J. 88, Bd. 1, Bl. 469–72.
269. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 339.
270. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 339.
271. Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 225; Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 201.
272. Barclay, *Frederick William IV,* 185–87; Ross, *Beyond the Barricades*, 45–46; Sheehan, *German History*, 712–15; Leopold von Gerlach, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, 1: 320–21, 1: 384, 1: 501–502.
273. Ross, *Beyond the Barricades*, 47.
274. Langewiesche, *Liberalismus in Deutschland*, 65.
275. Hewitson, *Nationalism in Germany*, 4.

Chapter 2

Political Friendship and State Repression, 1851–1858

In 1852, Karl Francke wrote to complain to Max Duncker: "Why you want to practice politics in Berlin at all is unclear to me! I, for my part, prefer to build railroads."[1] The perceived failure of the Revolutions of 1848/49, and the defeat of German rebels in the First Schleswig War, left many liberals in the German Confederation disillusioned. Francke was by no means alone when he advocated a return to state service and industry.[2] He participated in a network of political friends that coalesced during the revolutions and the war in Schleswig-Holstein. Network members were moderate liberals, mainly from the ranks of the educated bourgeoisie. Under worsening repression from the German Confederation and its constituent states, they turned away from politics and focused on their professional careers—at least initially.

Political quietism, government harassment, and economic accommodation with state power—these characteristics of German liberalism still dominate most histories of this era.[3] Attitudes toward the Prussian state often served as the prime example of this contemporary political mood. Otto von Manteuffel, who had replaced Joseph von Radowitz in December 1850 as Prussian minister president, and Berlin police director Carl von Hinckeldey represented, respectively, the complementary policies of conservative reformism and heavy-handed repression.[4] Anna Ross has shown that Manteuffel "embraced a pragmatic approach to politics," which included limited reforms along with the expansion of state programs to assure the long-term stability of Prussian society.[5] Hinckeldey, meanwhile, deployed spies, ordered confiscations, and issued secret arrest warrants to quash political opposition. Nevertheless, the revolutions had fostered a "fragile, tension-filled consensus about the nature of politics."[6] Liberal professors joined lawyers and businessmen, Ross has demonstrated, in trying to work with the Prussian state, thereby offering open-minded conservatives in government, such as Manteuffel, an alternative to reactionaries such as Hinckeldey and his allies at court.[7] Seen from the perspective of this network of political friends, however,

the avenues of accommodation and cooperation in the 1850s with the Prussian government appear more restricted.

As Janine Murphy has shown for German associational life, "survival in the post-revolutionary period required working within the established legal framework."[8] The choices faced by the political friends in the liberal network, however, were more complex than Murphy's statement suggests. Karl Francke did not content himself with trains. The political friends struggled to adapt to the post-revolutionary framework in Prussia, testing moderate state officials' openness to negotiating its political boundaries. Network members soon returned to political agitation, but now from the capitals of smaller German states, where post-revolutionary repression was less rigorous.[9] When the Crimean War (1853–56) intensified in 1854, it offered network members new opportunities to publish their political views. Core members founded the Literary Association (Literarischer Verein) in Coburg under the patronage and protection of Duke Ernst II.

This chapter argues in part that bourgeois members sought to include sympathetic German monarchs to spearhead national consolidation. Princely network members, for their part, sought to use their bourgeois friends to increase the political influence and cultural repute of their courts: what they called "dynastic politics."[10] In the process, both monarchical and non-princely members negotiated what "true" friendship meant for them—reaching across divides of rank and status as Germans in pursuit of the nation-state. The friends also debated how best to achieve that nation-state: To stay in Prussia or go into exile? To remain in academia or enter state service? To broaden the popular appeal of *kleindeutsch* nationalism, or to concentrate on influencing state leaders? These questions presented not just challenges, but also opportunities, to this network of liberal political friends throughout the 1850s. Like many monarchs in Europe, the princes of the smaller German states provided "the almost natural framework for liberalism's political stabilization."[11]

This chapter begins by addressing the development of emotional relationships in the network in the early 1850s as members struggled to overcome revolutionary trauma and post-revolutionary government harassment. It then explores the period after 1853 and how the friends' used network resources in their professional careers and in the Literary Association. Throughout the 1850s, the friends shaped high politics, pursued professional ambitions, and navigated a hostile sociopolitical landscape through their reciprocal, often charged, emotional relationships.

Political Friendship as Post-Revolutionary Recovery, 1851–1854

The starkest example in the network of mounting official repression against its liberal members was the Prussian state's reaction to Max Duncker's *Vier Monate auswärtiger Politik*, published in 1851.[12] Duncker's brief book was the product of extensive collaboration with Karl Samwer, whose former position in the rebel government of the Duchy of Holstein had granted him access to confidential documents.[13] Duncker's tract was an indictment of Prussia's final peace negotiations with Denmark. Prussia had maintained military superiority over Denmark, Max Duncker wrote, but in accepting the demands of the other Great Powers, it had failed diplomatically. In the process, Duncker claimed, Prussia had betrayed the German nation and the Holstein rebels. Other network members praised Duncker's piece as a brave intervention against incipient national catastrophe, foremost in Prussia's abandonment of German nationalists in the north, and it was popular in wider liberal circles, too.[14]

After publishing *Vier Monate auswärtiger Politik*, Duncker was elected to the new Prussian Landtag, taking his seat among the liberal minority while continuing to run a lottery to fund the last pockets of rebel resistance to Denmark.[15] The book eventually caught the attention of Hinckeldey's Berlin police under the Manteuffel cabinet, and Duncker was charged with treason—an unusually serious indictment against a liberal writer.[16] Unlike the Radowitz ministry of 1850, which sought to co-opt moderate liberals through the Erfurt Union, the new government forced liberals to abandon public criticism. Max and Charlotte Duncker were allowed to travel to Frankfurt and Nuremberg during the trial, an indication that the government hoped they might flee abroad.[17] The new Prussian constitution, which had also established the elected Landtag, abolished pre-censorship, and Max Duncker enjoyed some immunity as a parliamentary deputy.[18] Even so, Charlotte Duncker credited the government's final decision to drop the case to Rudolf Haym's tireless defense of her husband in the press.[19]

The initial indictment against Duncker betrayed the intentions of most Confederal governments. Since many German radicals had been driven into exile or arrested by 1850, vocal liberals became the next target of the post-revolutionary police. Without demonstrable subversive actions, however, the Manteuffel government knew it would be unable to convict. Confederal and state police, despite their wide remits to smother dissent, now had to abide by basic constitutional guaranties, and they lacked the resources to monitor and suppress *all* opposition.[20] The government therefore adapted older strategies of professional harassment against network members.[21] In the face of increasing state persecution, the return to the status quo ante bellum in Schleswig-Holstein with the London Protocol of May 1852, led to the political detachment—and despair—of many network members. Nonetheless, 1852 and 1853 were pivotal

in tightening network bonds as the friends struggled against the personal, professional, and political fallout of war and revolution.

Network members traveled frequently in 1852 for reasons that might not be self-evident. Vacations soothed the nerves of members who had been active since March 1848.[22] The expansion of railroads in the 1840s and early 1850s increased the speed, and decreased the cost, of travel. Such travel facilitated moderates' intellectual—as well as emotional—process of "stock-taking and reorientation" after the political and personal defeats of the revolution.[23] Trips also helped political dissidents maintain social networks and distanced them from the watchful eyes of local officials.[24] The Dunckers, for example, traveled first to Bavaria, then to Karlsruhe and Mannheim. Despite the trips, and a regiment of walks and swims with Karl Mathy, Max Duncker remained, Mathy recorded, visibly "broken and ill-humored."[25] A second visit followed in 1853, when the Dunckers traveled from Halle through the Rhineland, then south. The Dunckers stayed with the Mathys again in Mannheim and Heidelberg. The two couples, whom Haym referred to as the "confidants of confidants," then set off together for Switzerland.[26] After their year of travel, Charlotte Duncker remembered, "the vitality and intimacy of the relations lasted until death."[27]

The particular relationship between the Dunckers and Mathys reflected how spousal relationship and bonds between married couples could easily be accommodated by an informal network such as theirs. The variety of emotional connections—from spouses to distant friends—that members formed in the 1840s and 1850s underlaid the network of political friends and made it all the more flexible and resilient during a period of state repression. The Mathys also journeyed to Heidelberg to maintain contact with the politician, publicist, and network mentor, Alexander von Soiron, as well as with the future Baden diplomat Robert von Mohl.[28]

Karl Samwer and Karl Francke were also on the move in 1852. After the duke of Augustenburg renounced his claim to Schleswig-Holstein as part of the London Protocol, he and his family settled in Gotha. Francke and Samwer lost their jobs in the Holstein government, so the two followed the Augustenburgs into exile in Coburg, where the family exploited their connections to find both men positions in state service.[29] The pretender's heir, Friedrich von Augustenburg, had befriended Ernst of Coburg during the war; the duke later filled his diaries with references to evenings and outings with the Augustenburgs.[30] Duke Ernst granted Francke a senior position in the Gotha finance ministry, while Samwer initially refused a post as court librarian in Coburg and blamed Droysen for spreading the rumor that he had already accepted the job.[31] The title of court librarian was a common princely sinecure for academics and artists.[32] Samwer eventually accepted a position in the ministry of state in the Coburg government.[33] The office better fit Samwer's previous work in the rebel administration

of Holstein; it also conferred a higher salary and better protection from prosecution in other Confederal states.

Employing Francke and Samwer strengthened Duke Ernst's ties to their political friends outside his small duchy. Network members began to orbit Coburg. Ernst's dynastic bonds and personal relationships with leaders in Weimar, Baden, and Prussia connected other non-princely and princely liberals. With the development of cross-status political friendships, and bourgeois members' entry into state service, the mutual literary and political appreciation between princely and bourgeois members of the 1840s developed into regular gatherings and correspondence. Such cross-status relationships remain an understudied aspect of liberals' accommodation with state power in the 1850s. This neglect perhaps stems from the focus on liberals and democrats who remained in Prussia and had much more fraught relationships with state authorities. Indeed, the less repressive, smaller German states served as the laboratories for these liberals' settlement with state power and shaped how they understood the role of monarchs in German unification. Focusing on specific monarchs and liberals in this period of pre-unification German history helps us better understand how monarchism and liberalism intersected and diverged, and it reveals that a few minor monarchs participated in liberal politics alongside bourgeois and noble figures.

Gustav Freytag's introduction to the duke of Coburg in 1853—the same year Ludwig von Rochau published his *Grundsätze der Realpolitik*—typified the weaving of network connections between liberal literati and reformist monarchs. Duke Ernst already admired Freytag for his fiction, so Samwer and Francke facilitated a personal introduction followed by a sort of political evaluation. Samwer scheduled a private audience between the duke and Freytag, then arranged for Freytag to participate in a "political consultation with a small number of nationalists and free-thinkers" at the duke's residence.[34] The personal audience and subsequent political meeting laid the foundation for a relationship between the novelist and the monarch, which they maintained through letters, social calls, and political meetings. Their friendship later proved pivotal for Freytag, and Ernst profited, too, by attracting a literary giant to his tiny realm. Liberal and dynastic politics reinforced each other at the Coburg court.

Freytag and Duke Ernst's correspondence exemplified the difficulties of political friendship between commoner and monarch, together with its mutual benefits. Freytag followed up the initial meeting with a letter praising Ernst's patriotism and offering the duke his literary services.[35] The novelist then advanced his views on matters that they had discussed earlier. In doing so, he followed what would become a familiar pattern of providing first political advice, then self-effacement: "These thoughts are partly, however, the kind that His Highness's better insight might refute . . . [they] originate from respectful concern for His Highness's self, for the future of a beautiful, noble human life, which I have learned to love and which I wish, from the bottom of my heart, to see happy."[36]

Here Freytag reinterpreted the traditional fealty Ernst expected of subjects and civil servants through the language of friendly concern.[37] He highlighted Ernst's divinely ordained rank in repeated references to "His Highness," while undermining that same hierarchy with references to Christian brotherhood and the equalizing power of friendship taken from the Enlightenment, Sentimentalism, and Masonic traditions.[38]

Tensions between fealty and friendship in these relationships compounded differences in bourgeois and princely members' interpretations of liberalism. They disagreed over the role of monarchy in their ideal nation-state and the rights of educated men to advise and criticize reigning monarchs. Non-princely members often followed the same script as Freytag in their interactions with princely members. After dispensing good wishes and declarations of affection, they offered political reportage, followed by personal advice, concluding with further declarations of friendly concerns. None of this was mere flattery; nor was it selfless. Bourgeois members adapted the language of friendship to make demands on princes, who in turn sought both meaningful emotional connections and risky political favors from their non-princely counterparts.

When the London Protocol ended the First Schleswig War in 1852, network members were scattered across the Confederation. Letters helped them track each other's movements, share feelings, and circulate political information. As a genre, personal letters encouraged emotional reflection and declamation, which were indispensable to maintaining distant connections under state repression.[39] Charlotte Duncker recalled that "the lively exchange of thoughts and words between us and the friends at home was not merely about patriotic matters. All of the roots of love and community . . . were nourished with an intimate correspondence—albeit not always an extensive one—and with visits."[40] Since the eighteenth century, the distance and formality generally required by epistolary relationships had fostered debate and discouraged confrontation.[41] As with European liberals suffering official harassment elsewhere, this reliance on letters kept the network together and encouraged the deepening of personal bonds and political consensus—only later did it prove problematic for the political friends.[42]

The Dunckers often reported visits from political friends, along with other members' travel plans.[43] Karl Mathy, Karl Francke, and Karl Samwer did the same.[44] Following the movements of others fostered a sense of intimacy when it was hazardous to announce visits in local newspapers. It also helped members imagine the lives of their friends, even as the Confederal police, which Abigail Green has called "essentially the prototype for a German secret police," monitored interstate post and shadowed suspected dissidents through a web of spies and informants.[45] Sharing their whereabouts, travel plans, and meetings was, for members of the network, an important demonstration of trust.

Letter writers did attempt to obscure information from Confederal authorities in Frankfurt am Main. Network members occasionally transliterated names and phrases into the Greek alphabet.[46] They thereby concealed possibly damaging information not only from subaltern Confederal agents and servants but also from most women—all groups that had been denied the classical education that elite men enjoyed.[47] Letter writers also used initials or nicknames: Max Duncker, for instance, was the "Colonel" because of his military training; Christian von Stockmar was the "Old Master," a reference both to his age and his talent for court intrigue.[48] Members named mutual friends by profession or location—"our writer," "our mutual friend in Berlin"—and relayed each other's letters.[49] Princes employed messengers and consular officials. Each method bypassed Central Europe's two official postal systems—the one controlled by the Thurn und Taxis family, and the other by the Prussian government. Members of the network sometimes burned—or were told to burn—incriminating or embarrassing letters.[50]

Despite, or perhaps because of, such subterfuge, the content of most surviving letters written by network members in 1852 and 1853 is dominated by reassurances of friendship and discussion of family or professional difficulties. The female members of the network, Charlotte Duncker and Anna Mathy, were indispensable in the work of sustaining these epistolary bonds. At a time when travel was more burdensome and riskier for network men—because they were bound also by professional duties and monitored by the police—network women traveled more extensively.[51] It may be true that their trips were often confined to family visits and caring for sick relatives. Nevertheless, such gendered roles in caretaking provided opportunities for Charlotte Duncker and Anna Mathy to contact network men to offer political advice or updates on their individual situations.[52]

Network men also worried about their own health and that of their friends. Concern over the dangers of dust, eyestrain, and overwork was fueled by emerging knowledge about nervous exhaustion.[53] Duncker reported alternating periods of exhaustion and glee over his pace of work.[54] Freytag complained about gastric distress, Droysen got headaches, and Samwer was inexplicably incapacitated for days.[55] Although seemingly trivial, many bouts of sickness facilitated conversations that often touched on political themes. Illness could incapacitate members at a time when medical treatment remained rudimentary and physicians barely professionalized.[56] Silences in correspondence might foster serious anxiety as writers waited "day to day" for letters, hoping that their correspondent's silence was benign.[57] Life events such as serious illness, death, birth, and anniversaries offered network members opportunities to "once again take up the thread of correspondence," as Charlotte Duncker wrote.[58] The refashioning of epistolary bonds was often explicit, particularly when liberals reached out to like-minded individuals from their university lives or revolutionary days.[59] These letters were

personal, and this quality distinguished them from other forms of letter-writing. Such correspondence not only circulated political and professional information but also acted as an emotional outlet and offered mediated relief for their longing for others.

On a more practical level, breakdowns in postal connections could slow network communication and hamper the discussion of political aspirations in general, although members worked to overcome such barriers. Charlotte Duncker stands out in this regard. She maintained and expanded the avenues of emotional and political communication between her family and the Mathys while Max Duncker was teaching in Halle. When she traveled to a spa in Liederbach, Duncker stopped in Mannheim to spend a few "quiet hours" with the Mathys. She genuinely appreciated their erudite company, writing to her husband that the Mathys were "unspeakably good and friendly, and the longer one is with them, the more one becomes aware of the richness of their life."[60] These emotional bonds drew on the Sentimentalist notion of a "union of souls," as well as Kantian interpretations of Aristotle's concept of true friendship—friendship, that is, based on equality and selfless love for one's "second self."[61] Members of the bourgeoisie, men as well as women, would have been familiar with these connotations.

The Mathys, however, failed to meet the Dunckers' expectations. For a time, they completely ignored the Dunckers' letters. Charlotte Duncker reprimanded them for neglecting important emotional duties: "Do you know what difficult times separate us from the brief, beautiful togetherness in Mannheim, behind what dark clouds these bright memories lay?"[62] Duncker thus combined an insistence on the truth of her feelings with efforts to intensify a feeling of togetherness by revisiting shared memories.[63] She then signaled her continued faith in the Mathys' friendship, asking after their health and entrusting them with news that Max Duncker's youngest brother had fallen into disrepute. Charlotte Duncker shifted gears again in the letter to endorse a potential political friend whom the Mathys had recommended.[64] This friend, she explained, seemed to be a "promising element in our party, or at least of our like-minded community; his name is Roggenbach." In Duncker's opinion, Roggenbach, despite his youth, was singularly driven to serve the common good; moreover, he "could at the same time look real life and its necessities in the face as a man: clearly and calmly."[65] Roggenbach's value to the network was gender coded: he was a non-academic *man* of action.[66] This letter is illustrative because it intermingled personal, political, and professional issues in a way that enforced epistolary etiquette, shared sensitive family information, and addressed developments in the wider network.

Exchanges between Rudolf Haym and Max Duncker, Heinrich von Sybel and J.G. Droysen, and Gustav Freytag and Ernst of Coburg adopted similar formulae and language.[67] Karl Samwer, for instance, reported to Max Duncker on Freytag's movements in 1853 and arranged group meetings in Coburg, while

adding passive-aggressive comments about Duncker's silence on personal and political developments.[68] Members' insistence on the flow of news sought to dispel worries among old allies during a period of government repression. It also provided the friends an outlet for personal anxieties and an emotional connection based on shared political experiences that could alleviate longing and loneliness. By the end of 1853, network members also had to determine the reliability of others for illicit political activities.

"Political Agitation and Friendly Intercourse," 1854–1858

As the 1850s progressed, network members continued to call upon one another to support political projects and their careers.[69] Relying on the network of political friendship that they had formed over the 1840s and early 1850s, these moderate liberals worked to define the relationship between politics, activism, and a future nation-state. The expansion of the Crimean War sparked new efforts for national unification among German radicals and liberals and strengthened their post-revolutionary embrace of realpolitik and cooperation with state power.[70] Core members quickly discovered, however, that the German states' diplomatic balancing act, between armed neutrality and joining one of the belligerent parties during the war, obliged officials to repress any political activity that they might consider dangerous domestic agitation.

In this climate, in early 1854, Karl Mathy embarked on a journey to Berlin. Along the way, he met Karl Samwer before stopping in Halle to repair his relationship with the Dunckers. In reference to the visit, Mathy told his wife: "We speak of our love, our experiences, of our important plans and expectations, of Europe's critical situation—of war and peace . . ."[71] The trip was not just personal. Such shared memories of intimacy encouraged trust between the couples and underlay their planning of political agitation in the future. Mathy accompanied the Dunckers to Berlin, where they reunited with Samwer and Franz von Roggenbach. Duke Ernst II of Coburg protested, before grudgingly accepting, Samwer's advice not to join his non-princely political friends in the Prussian capital because the duke's presence would attract too much attention.[72] Returning from Berlin, the friends stopped in Siebleben to visit Gustav Freytag before continuing on to Gotha for a large meeting—at last—with Duke Ernst.[73]

The subject of this Gotha gathering was likely the Literary Association, suggesting that the increase in liberal periodicals after 1855, which Christian Jansen attributes to the final stages of the Crimean War, had its roots in 1853.[74] The association, as Andreas Biefang has contended, operated more as an "elite, secret society-like amalgamation" of Old Liberals than as a civic society with open debate and formal leadership.[75] Most European liberals favored this arrangement over centralized, hierarchical civic associations.[76] Nevertheless, the Literary

Association reflected the expansion of small circles of transregional liberals who worked to reignite the public discussion of political issues after the 1849.[77] It also facilitated the continuation of informal connections between moderate liberals from the end of the Revolutions of 1848/49 until the opening of civic life during the New Era.[78] Political friendship, I argue, facilitated the creation, maintenance, and eventual decline of the Literary Association.

Network members founded the organization in mid-1853 and now hoped to capitalize on popular discontent within the Confederation—particularly among smaller states—with Austro-Prussian prevarication over whether to enter the Crimean War.[79] The international dimensions of the "Oriental Question," the antagonism between the Russian and Ottoman Empires, needs no recapitulation here.[80] Suffice it to say that network members hoped to tie the "German Question" to the war in Crimea.[81] Most believed that Prussia should exploit its diplomatic influence to wring concessions from Austria in Germany in exchange for military support against the Russian Empire. They also wanted to counter *Trias* plans to force the German Great Powers to accept a subsidiary union of smaller states within the Confederation.[82]

The level of engagement and risk with which each member embraced the Literary Association and its political platform varied greatly. Its activities, such as producing pamphlets and a daily newspaper, were secondary for most bourgeois members, who remained focused instead on scholarship and their careers. Nonetheless, interactions around the association encouraged political organizing, fundraising, and contacts among members of the network.

The Press Committee was a notable part of the Association.[83] Few sources from the friends speak to its purpose directly. Gustav Freytag and Max Duncker reported to Duke Ernst on the committee's expenses in October 1853, requesting that he review and release the relevant funds.[84] In December 1853, Ernst began passing information to Freytag from his brother, Albert, prince consort to Queen Victoria of the United Kingdom, because the duke wished to counter seemingly unfair portrayals of his brother as excessively pro-German. He contended that Prince Albert was a "true advisor" to the queen and a "complete Englishman."[85] Freytag used his connections to unnamed publishers in London to disabuse the British press of the notion that Albert represented only Coburg dynastic politics.[86] The Press Committee thus endorsed the Coburg dynasty in the popular press as representatives of *kleindeutsch* domestic policies and international diplomacy.

Another goal of the association was to establish a daily newspaper to represent *kleindeutsch* views in Prussia.[87] Bourgeois network members raised funds for the venture. In 1854, Max Duncker solicited semi-official aid from August von Bethmann Hollweg, a leading liberal in the legislature, a close ally of Prince Wilhelm of Prussia, and a contributor to the moderate-liberal *Preußisches Wochenblatt*.[88] Founding a periodical with close ties to liberal elements within

the Prussian bureaucracy and court would expand network influence in official circles.[89] The backers of these activities, in turn, saw an opportunity to sabotage Austrian diplomacy, counter Russian influence at court, and encourage Anglophile opinion.[90] Karl Francke claimed that "principles have no effect on the prince [of Prussia], so one must give him men who represent principles!"[91] This was a concise statement of the strategy of royal influence that members began to practice in Coburg in 1852.

Although the political friends never fully integrated with the liberal circle around Prince Wilhelm, their contacts with the prince of Prussia's circle did grow after 1855.[92] The Stockmar family was key in tending to these budding relationships. Christian von Stockmar (whom Max Duncker and Karl Mathy had befriended at the Erfurt Parliament) and his son, Ernst von Stockmar, worked with the network in the mid-1850s.[93] The elder Stockmar had been private secretary to the British prince consort, Albert (Duke Ernst's brother), and frequently returned to Coburg to nurture the bonds between the branches of the family. Both Stockmars exercised influence over Prince Wilhelm and Princess Augusta of Prussia and had good relationships with King Leopold I of Belgium (Ernst's uncle) and Queen Victoria (Ernst's sister-in-law). Ernst also maintained direct contact with Prince Albert, King Leopold, and Princess Augusta in Koblenz.[94] Christian von Stockmar, for his part, also mentored Robert Morier, his "adopted son" and the British Foreign Office's Germany expert—though Karl Mathy and Heinrich von Sybel doubted whether Morier could truly grasp German politics as a foreigner.[95] Coburg dynastic politics expanded alongside the network, facilitating connections between bourgeois members, princes, diplomats, and British agents such as Morier and Joseph Crowe.[96]

Despite these connections, network members were not unanimous in their views on the Crimean War. Karl Mathy wrote to Charlotte Duncker in mid-1854, first to reproach the Dunckers for ignoring his letters, then to claim that the war could never be used to solve the German Question.[97] The Prussian government could not, Mathy claimed, convince the Austrian government to relinquish its embattled primacy in Germany in return for a guarantee of diplomatic support in other areas of Europe. Political heterodoxy, along with previous violations of the fundamental norm of epistolary reciprocity, prompted the network to punish Mathy with silence.[98] He continued to share copies of Literary Association writings bound for printing, and he reported that the official post was unsafe for detailed discussion of the association or politics.[99] Max Duncker had access to intelligence from Prussian diplomats and Guido von Usedom, a member of the *Wochenblatt* group, personal friend of Manteuffel, and senior official in the Prussian foreign ministry.[100] The Dunckers' refusal to share such intelligence with Mathy strained the network, particularly when knowledge of Prussian diplomatic intentions was vital for their publications for the Literary Association.

Despite his belief that the Crimean War could not foster German national unification, Mathy endorsed the association's efforts to establish a liberal daily. He joined Karl Samwer and Karl Francke in pressuring Max Duncker to travel to Frankfurt in order to find investors for the paper.[101] Duncker refused. He also refused ducal invitations to Coburg, citing teaching duties in Halle.[102] Duncker's obstinacy suggests that not all members were willing to risk attracting police attention to support the Literary Association and its projects. Samwer and Francke were Coburg subjects and held state office, which provided some protection from Confederal and Prussian authorities. Academics in the network were often preoccupied with research that they hoped would endear them to government officials as diligent scholars, not revolutionaries. The stalemate continued, and the association's newspaper failed to materialize.

Gustav Freytag worked for the Literary Association while writing *Debit and Credit* and editing the *Grenzboten*. He also mediated between Duke Ernst and bourgeois members outside Coburg.[103] Despite Freytag's efforts, Ernst complained in May 1854: "I am a man of action, of rapid progress . . . and we good people are creeping after events like snails."[104] He warned that the association slept as the nation risked falling into a *Trias* trap: "It must rain articles. . . . The princes must learn from the people what they ought to do. Where are our agents?"[105] Had this explicitly political letter been intercepted, it would have endangered Freytag. Ernst's bombastic tone toward his "friend" also betrayed the power relations between the writer and the monarch. Finally, the duke understood national politics as a disagreement between pro-Prussian and pro-*Trias* princes, not necessarily as a conflict between liberalism and conservatism or between the *kleindeutsch* and *großdeutsch* positions. When minor German monarchs participated in the movement for national unification, they preferred to do so on their own terms, and at times this attitude created conflict with non-princely activists.

Freytag quickly replied that Duke Ernst's orders had been "partially fulfilled," but there was little more to be done through the daily press—a medium that the network was striving to fund.[106] Freytag reminded his princely friend of the danger facing association agents, network members, and himself. What the duke had described as "tepidness and lack of understanding," Freytag claimed, "is often caution born of necessity." Censorship trials and police confiscation of costly print runs hung over many writers: "Therefore, gracious lord, the best, most forceful articles would not be *as much use* as His Highness hopes, and I would be remiss if I did not emphasize this in excusing our journalists."[107] The writer's filial tone quietly belied the equalizing potential of friendship that Duke Ernst had deployed to pressure Freytag into dangerous activities in the first place. He was not a Coburg subject, nor was he a state official like Samwer or Francke. In a gesture of conciliation, Freytag offered to edit a collection of diplomatic correspondence, which association agents had acquired, as long as they printed it in Gotha. He remarked that, in the meantime, pamphlets by Karl Francke and Max

Duncker would be useful for the association, "since only through Prussian idealism can Prussia itself and Germany be saved. Everywhere else, there are capable men: there alone is a nation—in the making."[108]

The duke of Coburg had already dispatched Karl Samwer to Berlin to secure him a command in the Prussian cavalry—presumably in the event Prussia entered the Crimean War.[109] After Samwer again told the duke to avoid coming to Berlin, the latter bristled: "I do not understand why my presence in Berlin right now should be of little use. . . . I can only be of use to Germany when I am taken into confidence in Berlin and, using my position with my western relatives, counter as much as possible the dangers that Germany *must* get through."[110] Samwer did increase Duke Ernst's influence in the Prussian capital, but the task was a difficult one for Samwer to navigate as a private person. He relayed sensitive information about the Hohenzollerns' views on the war and forwarded General Eduard von Bonin's comments about the unreliability of the other German states (not including Coburg and Weimar, of course).[111]

After less than three weeks in Berlin, Samwer perceived that he had overstayed his welcome. Having strained his personal contacts in the capital, remaining there meant that his "stay would be given the nature of an unofficial mission in the eyes of many people."[112] Duke Ernst dismissed his concerns, and Samwer continued to report from Berlin.[113] A few days later, Samwer reminded Ernst of the need for discretion: "The post is eminently unsafe . . . I probably will not be able to stay here much longer. — I beg His Highness to consider this letter strictly confidential."[114] The custom of widely circulating interesting letters among friends and political allies posed at times more danger than it was worth. As a foreign official without diplomatic accreditation, Samwer's collection of confidential information could have been deemed espionage. Once again, the duke's demands had put one of his political friends—this time a state minister—in danger. In fact, publication of information Samwer had sent from Berlin had already been traced back to him.[115] Still, Duke Ernst was unmoved, so Karl Samwer remained in Berlin, where he managed to win Prince Wilhelm of Prussia's support for the Literary Association as a practical means of bypassing police persecution of liberals. Prince Wilhelm believed the association's "facilities," such as flysheets, pamphlets, and "popular books," could be useful.[116]

Duke Ernst kept Samwer in Berlin well into March 1854.[117] He acted as the Literary Association's agent in Prussia, meeting with Max Duncker in Jüterbog—Duncker refused to enter Berlin—to edit one of the duke's pamphlets. Ernst also passed letters from his brother, Prince Consort Albert, to Samwer: these were to be shared with their "friends."[118] Samwer kept Franz von Roggenbach informed about these matters, and Roggenbach carried memoranda bound for British newspapers for the duke's review.[119] Overall, Samwer's unofficial mission showcased the flow of information and publications between network members, and it indicated how members managed different levels of

political risk based on status and rank. Samwer was able to serve the duke in these roles longer and more effectively than others because he held a ministerial title, which shielded him to an extent from the police. His appeals to the duke for caution nonetheless demonstrate his anxiety over the resilience of his connections and the duke's reckless handling of intelligence.

As Samwer had feared, network activity in the association did not go unnoticed. Freytag received an anonymous letter in August 1854 warning him not to return to Prussia.[120] Berlin Police Chief Hinckeldey had arranged in secret for his arrest, but Freytag was likely tipped off by someone in Prince Wilhelm's court.[121] Freytag told only Karl Samwer about the warrant, then pleaded with Ernst for "court office and state citizenship."[122] A court appointment entailed political protection, and Coburg citizenship would allow Freytag to renounce his Prussian citizenship and, thereby, escape treason charges. In making this appeal to the duke, Freytag noted that Ernst had previously granted asylum to others, "but I never thought that I too would have to grab at the hem of your ducal mantle and beg." He regretted any appearance of "forwardness" in his plea and hoped to preserve their "humane friendship."[123] But after these allusions to the Hebrew Bible and Enlightenment tradition, Freytag applied more pressure, musing that facing arrest might be the "manliest" choice. The stratagem worked. Within a fortnight, Ernst named Freytag a ducal councilor. Now a Coburg subject, Freytag enthused to his new sovereign: "You have more or less become the natural protector of German poets."[124]

Freytag soon pressed his advantage, requesting leave to oversee the final printing of *Debit and Credit* and to edit the *Grenzboten* in person in Leipzig. He believed that through "clever use" of the Bavarian railway, he could travel between Coburg and Leipzig and avoid Prussian territory. But he still feared that Hinckeldey, who also sat on the Police Commission of the German Confederation, would have him arrested in Saxony. He put this possibility before the duke in epic fashion: "if you do not, through your intercession, my gracious prince, [prevent] this abduction by the police, it would find no parallel in world history—except perhaps in the rape of Hylas by the Nymphs."[125] Infusing the letter with flattery disguised as fealty, Freytag appealed to the duke's sovereign vanity. The homoerotic undertones of the Hylas myth likewise underscored both men's attempts to exploit their "union of souls" for individual gain and to advance their common *kleindeutsch* cause through the press.[126] Freytag's journey to Leipzig was not undertaken solely for literary purposes: Freytag had obtained letters that, he claimed, would be so damaging to senior Prussian officials that the government would consider their publication treason.[127] If, however, they were published in Leipzig, Freytag asserted, Prussian journalists could legally possess them—and presumably reprint them.

Freytag had already asked the Dunckers to help him establish a "backstairs acquaintanceship" with Wolf Heinrich von Baudissin, a former diplomat in

Danish service and a well-known translator of Shakespeare.[128] Freytag hoped Baudissin could present his wish to King Johann of Saxony, who had ascended the throne only three months before.[129] Instead, Duke Ernst appealed directly to his *Trias* opponent, the de facto minister president of Saxony, Friedrich Ferdinand von Beust. Beust promised the duke that Freytag would be safe on Saxon soil as a Coburg courtier.[130] Key leaders in two rival camps of German nationalism were willing to cooperate to thwart the plans of a mutual enemy in Berlin. In the end, the monarch protected the bourgeois novelist, yet Freytag's exile was itself partly the product of the duke's own recklessness. This was not the only instance in which relations between the bourgeois and princely members of the liberal network remained uneasy.

Some members' evident frustration with German monarchs suggests the pressure bourgeois members of the network felt to adhere to the plans of their princely friends. In late 1855, Karl Francke, exiled Holsteiner and senior official in Coburg, contended that any reform of Confederal authority would only help the middle-sized states and destroy the smaller ones—where exiled members found refuge from the police of the larger German states.[131] Francke blamed the princes for the persecution of his friends and lamented that unification was unimaginable without their support.[132] Although some monarchs, such as Ernst of Coburg, provided safe haven to liberals, the overall institution of monarchy was a brake on national progress in Francke's view. Indeed, Francke's complaint about the German princes reflected the limits of political accommodation between moderate liberals and state power in the 1850s. There may have been more opportunities of settlement in the smaller states, but the monarchs of the larger states remained intractable on national unification, despite the accommodating attitudes of their ministers toward business interests or the press. It was proving difficult to square the circle of national unification without the risk of political revolution. Francke remained in the minority, however, and members of the network worked to incorporate sympathetic monarchs.

Meanwhile, Duke Ernst expanded his influence by encouraging leaders of other small Confederal states to affiliate themselves with the network. Monarchical status also allowed him to form political friendships with like-minded rulers in Baden and Weimar. These monarchs could in turn call upon powerful relatives in Berlin and St. Petersburg in the movement for a liberal nation-state. The triangular relationship between Grand Duke Carl Alexander of Weimar, Grand Duke Friedrich I of Baden, and Duke Ernst II of Coburg began in the 1830s and 1840s and was solidified in the early 1850s.

These three liberal princes formed and maintained friendships with one another along pathways that ran parallel to those connecting them to their bourgeois friends. Part of the reason for their affinity were their similarities in age, upbringing, and the political history of their respective states and monarchies. The men

were born between 1815 and 1825 into the ruling houses of smaller German states. They knew only the German Confederation as the basis of national political life, and many of the reforms of the absolutist and Napoleonic eras remained in place during their youth. Baden and Weimar had gained written constitutions by the time the three princes were born, and the courts that they called home had reputations for Enlightenment learning and cultural production—Weimar especially. This relatively liberal attitude extended to the princelings' education. They were among the first generation of German dynasts to attended university, where they were placed in the care of liberal professors. The future monarchs thus knew relatively liberal views from birth, including constitutional rule and the freedoms of speech and assembly. The three also became related by marriage and held close ties to the Prussian royal family—among others. Above all, they advocated for *kleindeutsch* unification.

Evidence of political friendship among the three liberal princes can be found in early 1854, in Duke Ernst's letter to Friedrich of Baden, who had become regent in 1852. Ernst began by complaining about the political ineptitude and selfishness of the other monarchs in the German Confederation.[133] Friedrich shared Ernst's despair, and the latter responded with an intimate scene in which emotions were the building blocks of political consensus: "For your letter . . . I embrace you whole-heartedly and am delighted to hear views from you that I would gladly inject into all of the German princes."[134] He then asked Friedrich to help him overcome the political resistance that he encountered from "every corner." The "Russian party" in Berlin, Ernst elaborated, was very active in the press, but he was directing work in the Literary Association to combat them. Friedrich agreed to help.

This letter inaugurated a period of collaboration that lasted through the mid-1860s between the duke of Coburg and the grand duke of Baden on a *kleindeutsch* answer to the German Question. To this end, the monarchs shared memoranda and pamphlets on the Crimean War written by bourgeois network members—for which Ernst often claimed full credit.[135] Duke Ernst also sold shares to benefit the credit banks underwriting the activities of the Literary Association—his "patriotic stock company."[136] Grand Duke Friedrich used his dynastic connections to support the association as well. After traveling to Koblenz to visit Prince Wilhelm of Prussia—his father-in-law—Friedrich thanked Wilhelm: "I cannot tell you enough, dearest prince, how happy I felt with you again and how thankfully I recognized that profound trust . . ." with which the prince assured him of his support for "the association."[137]

Grand Duke Carl Alexander of Weimar, for his part, often effused to Duke Ernst about their friendship and their common quest to unify Germany, but he reserved his most passionate remarks for Friedrich of Baden.[138] By October of 1855, after over a year of assisting Friedrich and Ernst in drafting Confederal reform proposals, Carl Alexander began to use the informal term "friend" with

his fellow liberal monarchs rather than the more formal "cousin."[139] Cooperation on political matters, for Carl Alexander, resulted in a more profound feeling of personal attachment. In a letter to Friedrich of Baden, the grand duke of Weimar thanked him for his "goodness and evidence of your friendship" in their shared political work before adding that "even after a long time, I always feel more enamored with you, you know, dear friend, because you feel it: What joy your friendly complaisance, your trust, your goodwill brings me. Your letter proves it, causes it . . . this rare and peculiar unity in maturity of mood and mind."[140] Such sustained emotional expression was unusual between contemporary German monarchs. This letter suggests how political consensus served as both evidence of—and impetus for—emotional connections reminiscent of the Age of Sentimentality. Such correspondence would then, in turn, encourage further political cooperation and even deeper emotional relationships.

Common political goals and passionate friendships were two sides of the same coin for these three monarchs. They adapted the Sentimentalist vocabulary of the *Seelenbund* to dynastic politics, pursuing complementary goals: furthering the cultural prestige of their own courts and contributing to what they hoped would be a *kleindeutsch* form of national unification. In this way, they adapted dynastic traditions and bonds to the less familiar social and political worlds of bourgeois liberals. This process did not render social rank irrelevant, but the trust and "evidence of friendship" that can be found in the correspondence of monarchs, nobles, and the bourgeoisie supported common political endeavors. The letters above show how emotional expression, infused with narrative allusions to physical intimacy, helped tighten bonds within the liberal network in the mid-1850s. These interactions became even more important after 1859 when network members entered state service. Friendship among liberal nationalists across the status hierarchy, they believed, served the nation.[141]

Joan Cocks has recently written that "it is a weird and unfortunate fact of political life" that relative material power often determines the success of competing ideas.[142] The leaders of nineteenth-century Prussia were keenly aware of this reality. Notwithstanding these monarchs' high hopes for the Literary Association in the mid-1850s, Prussian officials were hardly limited to arrest warrants in harassing non-princely members of the network. Professional harassment, threatening liberals' material security and their associated bourgeois status, was another form. Prussian officials were particularly active in blocking the promotion or hiring of network members at universities. In response, Charlotte Duncker remembered, "the friends were . . . comrades in professional and material hardship, zealous in helping one another."[143] The friends derived some income from the articles that they wrote for the association and other periodicals, but their correspondence in the mid-1850s often centered on maintaining an affluent, respectable lifestyle.[144] This concern led Karl Mathy, Max Duncker, and Heinrich von Sybel to seek sta-

ble, better-paying employment with the help of their political friends. Duncker's and Sybel's professional ambitions, compounded by the death of Mathy's son, rendered them mostly unavailable for the Literary Association. The association faded from network correspondence over time: it was dissolved at some point in the late 1850s, though members argued over its remaining funds into the 1860s.[145] The state's power over the material world deeply affected moderate liberals' personal lives and political engagement.

Network members' financial straits were compounded in 1855 by the death of two influential mentors: Alexander von Soiron and Friedrich Bassermann. Soiron had held close ties to parliamentarians in Baden and liberal bureaucrats in Prussia. Bassermann, publisher of the *Deutsche Zeitung*, which Mathy edited in the late 1840s, had forged connections throughout the German-language publishing world. He was also one of the few *großdeutsch* proponents with whom core members affiliated after 1849—natural causes also contributed the post-revolutionary narrowing of the network of political friends. The deaths of Soiron and Bassermann caused sadness among members of the network, especially Max Duncker and Mathy, who had worked closely with Soiron in the Frankfurt Parliament.[146] For Mathy, the death of his last surviving child less than a year later curtailed his engagement with much of the network until 1856. Freytag more or less vanished in 1858, albeit temporarily, as he cared for an ailing brother and his five children.[147]

Years earlier, Max Duncker had been candid with his political friends about his decision to turn from politics to academia. Much like the two other Borussian historians, Heinrich von Sybel and J.G. Droysen, Duncker resolved to write history as political commentary.[148] He did so between his acquittal on treason charges in 1852 and the escalation of the Crimean War in 1854.[149] Max Duncker—likely with the aid of his wife, Charlotte Duncker—began work in 1852 on his *Geschichte des Altertums*, a book suggesting that the arch of ancient history bent toward liberalism and nation.[150] Writing history in this period also offered its authors the opportunity to process contemporary traumas such as the failures of 1848/49 and the First Schleswig War.[151] Elated over the first volume, Rudolf Haym wrote to Max Duncker that Halle "is, after all, a miserable backwater and a life hardly worth living . . . I happily commend you and feel how glad you must be at the completion of your work . . . You are now, it seems to me, completely untouchable, and to your friends you have become—I say this with no mind to flattery—marvelous."[152] Network members initially believed that scholarly renown might blunt efforts to block their promotion to full professors. It did not. In 1854, Max Duncker published the second volume of *Geschichte des Altertums*. He sent copies to political friends and potential official patrons alike, and he received favorable reviews.[153] Nonetheless, he was passed over at Halle for promotion and forced to rely on his father for money from the family publishing house.[154]

Halle had been a center for Young Hegelians in the 1840s, but under the influence of Friedrich Eichhorn's ministry of religion and education, Max Duncker and Haym were denied promotion and appointment, respectively. Karl von Raumer now led the Prussian education ministry, and although the Protestant-Romantic orthodoxy of Ludwig and Leopold von Gerlach and Julius Stahl had fallen out of favor, Raumer blocked the promotion and hiring of several liberal professors. Johannes Schulze, Max Duncker's ministerial benefactor in the 1840s, could not advance Duncker's career in the face of such an unsympathetic mood at court. With a suspicious education ministry, an increasingly paranoid king, and enemies in the university senate, Duncker had little chance.[155] He decided to leave.

Max Duncker enlisted network members and affiliates to secure him a call to another university. Two options seemed promising: the University of Greifswald in Prussian Pomerania or the University of Bern. The ministry in Berlin first considered Duncker for the Greifswald professorship.[156] That he was considered at all, as a former Frankfurt liberal and vocal critic of the government during the war with Denmark, indicated an openness within Manteuffel's state ministry to seek accommodation with liberal academics.[157] At Raumer's request, Duncker submitted an "Explanation of My Political Conduct" in October 1855.[158] Much as Haym had done in his "political confession of faith" in 1843, Duncker portrayed his liberal-nationalist agitation in the 1830s and 1840s, his parliamentary activity at Frankfurt, and his support for German rebels in Holstein as expressions of his simple desire to honor Prussia. He had only hoped for a "greater Prussia," he explained, and had therefore supported a Prussian-led Reich. By his own account, Duncker was a Prussian patriot first and a German nationalist second.

Duncker's "confession" satisfied Raumer, who privately offered Duncker the position before suddenly declaring his political contrition unconvincing.[159] What had happened? Duncker's statement had likely reached the king. Friedrich Wilhelm IV, dissatisfied with Duncker's contrition, intervened and demanded a sweeping renunciation. There were several reasons for the royal intercession. The Berlin police knew of the Literary Association and the involvement of Duncker's close friends in the organization. Hence, Hinckeldey's direct access to the king carried weight in the decision.[160] In the midst of the Crimean War and general diplomatic instability, senior leaders had little patience for liberal agitators, calling on state leaders to exploit the raging conflict to advance German national consolidation. Network members credited state authorities with care and coordination in their harassment of political opponents, but, as the king's belated intervention against his own minister suggested, such actions were often the result of conflicts within the notoriously factional Prussian bureaucracy and court.[161]

The withdrawal of the offered professorial chair in 1856 humiliated Max Duncker. His political friends went to work again to find him a position out-

side Prussia. Freytag offered Charlotte Duncker his condolences shortly after her husband's royal rejection.[162] Freytag was, in part, following orders from his new sovereign, Duke Ernst. He began by expressing Ernst's "heartfelt concern," writing that the duke was "indignant over the pettiness of Berlin and over the affront against someone whom he so values personally."[163] Freytag then asked whether Duncker might accept a position in Coburg as director of schools because Ernst would enjoy having him nearby. Freytag then transgressed his courtly role: he suggested, as a friend, that Max Duncker decline the duke's offer of employment but accept a dynastic decoration that Ernst also wished to bestow. "[The duke] shares our opinion of the low value of princely decorations," but, Freytag added, because Ernst was a member of their "party," Duncker should accept. He offered a second, related reason: "admittedly, we do want to fence the princes in, in a legal manner, while honoring their legal rights—to which decorations also belong." Bourgeois and princely liberals bonded emotionally and cooperated politically. Yet, complex, cross-status political friendships were difficult to navigate—especially during crises.

After considerable coaching from Samwer, and having secured the consent of the Prussian government, Duncker accepted the "*Verdienstkreuz*" in Coburg.[164] The Prussian cabinet seemed unwilling to offend Duke Ernst further, despite his reputation among German conservatives as an accomplice to liberal and democratic agitators. Additionally, that Max Duncker accepted the decoration from a(n) (in)famously liberal monarch, after having just been denied a promotion for his political activities, speaks to a willingness to resist the Berlin government more openly.

Meanwhile, Heinrich von Sybel had located a potential professorship for Duncker in Bern. Sybel doubted whether Duncker should accept it, considering the meager pay and "the shadow side of a Swiss professorship . . . but there are not just shadows there, in Bern."[165] The dark side of Bern was political. Exiled 48ers in the city, particularly the "Vogt party" of radical democrats led by Carl Vogt, despised moderate liberals as traitors to the revolution.[166] Moving to Switzerland would also fuel official suspicion of Duncker's true political convictions. European liberals faced the "classic dilemma of political moderates"—they were denounced on both sides by conservative officials and radical exiles.[167] So the Dunckers stayed put in Halle. Subsequent promotions were either blocked by government intervention or "partisan" resistance.[168] The couple struggled into 1857, borrowing money from friends and accruing debts as Charlotte Duncker traveled to care for her ailing father.[169]

Heinrich von Sybel's experience in 1856 offers a foil to Max Duncker's difficulties. After serving in the Erfurt Parliament, Sybel had returned to Marburg. Despite a range of new publications, however, both his promotion to full professor and a call to Berlin had been denied by the Raumer ministry.[170] Freytag tried to help his beleaguered friend, writing to Duke Ernst in early 1856 that Sybel

planned to visit Coburg on his way to Berlin. In much the same way that Karl Samwer and Karl Francke had introduced Freytag in Coburg, Freytag himself began the ducal introduction by praising Sybel as "respected in our republic of letters as the most significant young historian," adding: "According to his patriotic convictions, he belongs to our party."[171] Freytag requested an audience for Sybel as a personal favor to Samwer and himself, attaching a review of Sybel's latest book, which had appeared in Freytag's *Grenzboten*, to acquaint the duke with his work. Ernst met with Sybel, Samwer, and Freytag in Siebleben.[172] Despite his friends' efforts, and despite Ernst's casual suggestion that he teach in Coburg, Sybel accepted a more promising offer in a much larger Confederal state that helped shape his subsequent career.

Through the influence of Leopold von Ranke, his former doctoral supervisor, Sybel was offered a professorship in Munich.[173] Much like the sovereigns of Weimar and Coburg, King Maximilian II of Bavaria hoped to capitalize on the repressive policies of his neighbors by recruiting aggrieved literati from other parts of the German Confederation. He wished to patronize a new generation of liberal scholars to boost the prestige of his court and the German "cultural nation."[174] After settling in Munich, Sybel began advising the king—officially on historical scholarship, unofficially on German politics.[175] Yet his courtly and academic positions were unstable from the start, and he depended on the king for his political influence and scholarly budget.[176] Unlike the Coburg court, where Samwer and Freytag served, the much larger Wittelsbach court contained a powerful conservative faction. Sybel complained about the stress caused by the intrigues of the "Ultramontane party" against his role at court and their complaints about his lectures at the University of Munich.[177] More experienced, conservative courtiers often succeeded in blocking Sybel's access to the royal family entirely.[178]

Political Catholicism, what Sybel simply and pejoratively called "Ultramontanism," had been growing since the 1840s as the Church forfeited more temporal power after the annexation of Church lands and state secularization campaigns.[179] Catholic conservatives resisted what they considered to be the revolutionary threat of German nationalism, civil rights, and especially the secularization of the education system.[180] Like many European liberals and most network members, Heinrich von Sybel held pronounced anti-Catholic and particularly anti-clerical views.[181] Protestant liberals in general tended to equate Church influence with reactionary politics and anti-national teachings.[182] To them, Catholic prelates represented a threat to liberal politics in the present, and to the German nation in the future, through their influence over children in the school system.[183]

These difficulties did not prevent some initial success, nor did they stop Sybel's efforts to exploit his position to aid his political friends. Sybel established a Bavarian historical commission at the king's invitation.[184] The commission

quickly resolved to establish a journal for liberal historical scholarship, which became the highly influential *Historische Zeitschrift*. Sybel convinced the king to offer an attractive sum to a full-time editor and sent him a volume of Max Duncker's *Geschichte des Altertums* to familiarize the king with Duncker's historiography.[185] Before gaining royal consent, Sybel wrote to Max Duncker, whose career prospects remained dim in 1857, offering him the editorship, 2,000 florins, and an honorary professorship in Munich.[186]

Sybel also asked Karl Mathy to help convince Duncker to accept his offer to come to Munich. Mathy was skeptical of the merits of the editorship—and told Duncker as much. Duncker declined Sybel's offer to focus on winning a new academic post in Tübingen.[187] Unbeknownst to Sybel, Christian von Stockmar and Duke Ernst of Coburg had been working to obtain a professorial chair for Duncker at the University of Tübingen in Württemberg. Network members were working at cross-purposes, and Sybel was irate. He also felt unappreciated. He concluded that he needed more allies in Munich to buttress his faltering influence at King Maximilian's court.[188] Munich remained, nevertheless, a better base from which to exert influence on German politics, Sybel told Duncker—better than the small town of Tübingen, in the small kingdom of Württemberg, ruled by a conservative octogenarian king, Wilhelm I.

Undaunted, Sybel next offered the editorship of the nascent *Historische Zeitschrift* to Karl Samwer. Samwer responded that he might consider accepting if the position accompanied a substantially increased salary.[189] Sacrificing his position as a state minister, which itself had been a ducal favor, would be difficult. Samwer added that, although he supported Sybel's work in Munich, his friend's position was too precarious. Samwer had come to prize the political value of his government office.[190] Oscillating between the primacy of praxis and scholarship was common for network members. Sybel also exemplified network intellectuals' attempts to combine their scholarly or literary work with positions as (un)official courtiers. Striking the balance was difficult at smaller courts—as Freytag later discovered—and even more difficult at larger ones.

Max Duncker's and Karl Samwer's rejections of Heinrich von Sybel's job offer did not damage the overall network. In his letters, Sybel blustered about the ungratefulness of his political friends, but he still needed them. Duncker continued to offer Sybel staffing suggestions, articles for the new journal, and leads to possible publishers.[191] The network was more resilient in the 1850s, under government repression, than it was during the more tolerant 1860s, partly because members suffered so many setbacks at the hands of conservative state officials and courtiers that placed them in financial and professional need of their friends and allies. Network members' rather disorganized efforts in the 1850s resulted from individual, overlapping campaigns to benefit their political friends, favors that the beneficiaries occasionally declined. Organized campaigns involving the whole network began only when Prince Wilhelm

of Prussia began a regency in place of his incapacitated brother, Friedrich Wilhelm IV.

While Heinrich von Sybel and Max Duncker sought new academic positions, Karl Mathy was preoccupied with his own professional trajectory and a family tragedy. In the years before the death of the Mathys' son, Karl Mathy Jr., in 1856, both Dunckers repeated concerns about his health.[192] Karl Mathy Sr. rarely answered such inquiries, but when he did, he shared his despair over the fact that Karl Jr.'s arduous recoveries repeatedly gave way to a resurgence of the disease (which was likely tuberculosis).[193] Letters between Anna and Karl Mathy dealt with the impending loss in the last months of Karl Jr.'s life, a period that corresponded with the most emotionally intense phase of their relationship with the Dunckers and the wider network.[194]

By the end of 1855, Karl Mathy was exhausted, and his letters answered political questions infrequently.[195] Both Dunckers were uncertain how to address their friends' misfortune. Charlotte Duncker, responsible for preforming more emotional labor, especially dealing with illness, wrote timidly to the Mathys: "In as difficult days as these, in which you are both living now . . . one barely has the courage to address you."[196] Max Duncker, on the other hand, grew increasingly impatient for the re-establishment of the flow of information from southern Germany to which Karl Mathy had better access.[197] The discomfort persisted. Karl Jr. died in March 1856, and the Mathys were devastated. Their correspondence with their closest friends, the Dunckers, and the rest of the network was brought to a halt.[198] Max Duncker handled the delicate situation indelicately. He failed to write to either of the Mathys.[199] The emotional labor fell again to Charlotte Duncker. By 5 April, she had arrived at the Mathys' home to comfort Anna Mathy.[200] After she left, Charlotte Duncker continued to console the Mathys in her letters, while attempting to reconnect Karl Mathy and her husband.[201] The two men met in Thuringia in July. Some weeks later, Max Duncker wrote to Karl Mathy with no mention of family matters, focusing instead on political news that Samwer had provided.[202] Duncker and Mathy partly reconciled after the former's abdication of emotional and epistolary etiquette due to Charlotte Duncker's great efforts to repair the rift.

The Mathys soon moved to Gotha at Duke Ernst's invitation.[203] The duke received Karl Mathy as a "fellow countryman" and asked him to oversee the establishment of a new credit bank in Gotha.[204] Mathy had worked in commandite banks before, in Mannheim and Cologne, before moving to Berlin, at David Hansemann's request, to help manage the fledgling Disconto-Gesellschaft.[205] Mathy obliged the duke, working in secret to avoid straining diplomatic relations with Prussia.[206] Conservative Prussian leaders, particularly King Friedrich Wilhelm IV, regarded credit banks and joint-stock companies with suspicion, and the Manteuffel ministry initially refused to charter joint-stock banks.[207]

The novel institutions were popular in the business community, however, as a means to raise large sums for costly industrial projects such as railroads, coal mines, and steel mills. Bourgeois investors began accepting more risk than in previous decades.[208] Most German liberals, unlike their counterparts in Eastern Europe, endorsed joint-stock companies as a reflection of the principles of self-administration and free markets.[209] They also hoped that heightened economic competitiveness, driven by such financial institutions, would hasten industrialization, commercial reform, and eventually the formation of a powerful nation-state. Liberals had previously expressed such hopes about the Zollverein.[210]

In August 1856, Karl Mathy used his influence at the Disconto-Gesellschaft to appoint Max Duncker the company's co-representative to the new Privatbank zu Gotha.[211] Duncker held the position into 1858, and Mathy shared confidential financial reports and meeting minutes with him.[212] Duncker returned the kindness with silence. "You—wicked man—have left all of my letters and deliveries unanswered," Mathy teased, adding: "I have much, dear Duncker, to tell you. But I cannot write more. . . . The best to your lovely wife from us both, and please answer before the ending of the world—or permit your wife to answer. . . ."[213] In a postscript, Mathy admitted that another member of the network, Karl Francke, had just brought word of the Dunckers and their greetings. Network members often maintained contact through other members when they were too busy, too ill, or too lazy to write themselves. The fact that Max and Charlotte Duncker were married members of the same network allowed them to answer each other's letters more readily and endowed their responses with more weight than if another political friend had relayed the message. Married couples made the network of political friends more resilient, as far as men were willing to accept women's participation.

As a show of support for the fledgling enterprise, Charlotte Duncker deposited her family's savings in the Privatbank.[214] Samwer and Francke received shares. Sybel and Auerbach purchased stock in the bank, as did Ernst and Friedrich of Baden, alongside other network affiliates.[215] The larger point here is that political friendship was good business. As Sarah Horowitz has argued, sharing money and professional favors between friends was a "clearly defined cultural norm" in the nineteenth century that also provided evidence of love and affection.[216] Money, politics, and friendship mixed in this network—connecting *Besitz-* and *Bildungsbürgertum*. It was also a much-needed source of income for academics and artists in the face of professional instability. Academics such as Duncker, novelists such as Auerbach, and officials such as Francke thereby participated in the economic accommodation between entrepreneurs and government in the 1850s. New modes of business in turn supported political activism.

Nonetheless, the Gotha credit bank had its detractors in the network. Gustav Freytag opposed joint-stock companies and credit banks as a matter of principle—an antisemitic one.[217] His obstinacy created some awkwardness

among the other members.[218] Having heard that Ernst of Coburg was chartering the bank, Freytag protested, reminding the duke of a meeting in which the prosperous writer had "fervently" denounced credit banks—in words fit for a Prussian conservative—as an "appalling racket."[219] He asked the monarch to leverage his popularity in Germany to discredit the institutions. Ernst responded, first by ignoring Freytag, then by chastising him for his presumptuousness.[220] Disagreement was tolerated by bourgeois members in the 1850s, but not by monarchs accustomed to deference.[221]

Sensing his misstep as a courtier, Freytag followed this with a friendly birthday letter to Duke Ernst, writing that he kept a "small celebratory fire" burning in his home outside Gotha in honor of the duke's birthday.[222] These good wishes led to a brash prognosis: the next year would hold nothing but national weakness. Ernst, Freytag continued, had military, artistic, and political ambitions but lacked "a great consistent purpose." He continued: "If I retained one wish in my quiet heart, for your happiness and your greatness, it is this: that you might not succeed at so many things . . . not vanish into the national heavens like a shooting star."[223] Alternating between admonition and fealty, Freytag criticized the duke's distractions, which he feared would lead to nervous collapse—a worry Karl Francke shared.[224] Freytag also implied that, by focusing on so many passions, the duke squandered energy he might otherwise devote to his self-appointed role as a leader in the fight for German unification.

The duke of Coburg's response was measured—at first. "Pick up your best pair of glasses," he advised, "and take a deep breath, before you hazard to decipher this scrawl: . . . listen, and read!"[225] By referring explicitly to his own handwriting, in an era fixated on the deeper meaning of handwritten communication between friends, the duke signaled bourgeois emotional authenticity and a phantasmic presence by calling on Freytag to imagine his voice.[226] Ernst expounded on the monarch's (Christian) duty to be all things to all men before insinuating that Freytag was a negligent friend and parochial politician. "You still do not know me . . . You see me little, and previously you did not know me at all," the duke chided: "I appear to you in the wrong light, and you are less at home in the circles and [social] relations in which I have lived and the study of which has been my life's work. . . ."[227] Ernst believed that the common cause of German nationalism could reconcile divergent experiences and unequal social rank: "I am a German, like you; I hold national feelings in my heart, like you; I strive alongside you for the ennoblement of our people. . . . I am perhaps less of a theoretician than you. Yet, because of that, I perhaps know the defects of our condition a bit more exactly: I have lived in more general circumstances. . . ."[228] Ernst united all (German) society under his monarchical mantle; Freytag knew only the narrow bourgeois world.

The duke closed by questioning their years of work in the press: "Popularity is a flight of fancy, a caricature that sometimes smiles, sometimes frowns. . . .

What will not bend, must break; but one should not start with the breaking, like the luminaries of the Paulskirche [did]."[229] Duke Ernst admonished Freytag for failing to grasp that national unification could only be achieved by agreement among the monarchs of the German Confederation, not through "the people," and not through their parliamentary representatives. Ernst the monarch used friendly words to put Freytag the courtier back in his place. With personal wealth and a high public profile through the *Grenzboten* and his fiction, Freytag weathered the storm.

In 1857, still facing unrelenting official harassment, Max Duncker reached a critical point in his career. He agonized over whether to leave Prussia for the full professorship at Tübingen.[230] In a letter with separate sections addressed to each of the Dunckers, Karl Mathy counseled Max to decline the offer: "You can and may only practice Prusso-German politics. Halle was not the best place for that—better than Tübingen, mind you. What is left but to exchange letters with [people in] Berlin . . . ?"[231] Mathy warned that he would be of less help to the Dunckers in Gotha than he was when he worked for the Disconto-Gesellschaft in Berlin. Duncker accepted the position in Tübingen anyway, in August 1858, though he still held out hope for another call—to Leipzig.[232] After Duncker accepted the position, Mathy wrote little to him about politics. Much of their correspondence involved gossip—though gossip also kept the lines of communication open.[233]

Max Duncker did correspond from Tübingen with other members of the network, who considered him their "patriotic missionary" to southern Germany.[234] His influence in the network and outside Tübingen remained limited, however. Duncker's relationship with Rudolf Haym became particularly strained. The two engaged in heated debates over political tactics, with Duncker rebuking him in late 1857 for not supporting an Anglo-Prussian alliance against Austria and Russia emphatically enough in the *Preußische Jahrbücher*.[235] Haym replied in 1858 by complaining that Duncker refused to discuss his new essay on Prussian diplomacy "Die Politik der Zukunft" ("The Politics of the Future"): "Even as I write this, the feeling oppresses me that I should weigh and choose my words in a manner from which you yourself have weaned me."[236] By referencing his self-censorship, Haym indicated that he and Duncker risked losing the trust and easy conviviality that underlay "true" friendship and political cooperation. Haym continued: "the language of your letter reminds me that the grounds on which we debate are no longer stable, the grounds that . . . gave you the certainty that your broader and more accurate thinking—on political things—would persuade and guide me. . . . That our views differ . . . that, dear Duncker, is not right;—It grieves me bitterly." If he wanted to practice politics, Haym added, he would work in political circles. But, because Haym edited a journal that also had to be "written and read," he needed to appeal to a wide audience.[237]

What conclusions can we draw from these two examples of disagreement—between Gustav Freytag and Duke Ernst of Coburg, on the one hand, and between Rudolf Haym and Max Duncker, on the other? They both reflected different approaches to the task of organizing a *kleindeutsch* movement. Duncker and Duke Ernst believed in influencing those in power, as did Heinrich von Sybel in Munich and Karl Samwer in Coburg. For them, the road to the nation-state led through the monarchical courts of the German Confederation. For Haym and Gustav Freytag, the campaign had to be much more inclusive. It had to attract southern German liberals and moderate democrats, and it had to rely on the mobilization of German society, not just Prussian elites. Most network members accepted the latter approach during the years of the Literary Association.

Things began to change from 1858 onward. Rumors of a regency in Berlin had floated around the network since late 1857 when the Prussian king suffered another stroke.[238] After Manteuffel privately informed Mathy of an imminent regency in Prussia, Mathy shared the news with the network.[239] Duncker sent a well-timed and well-received copy of his "Die Politik der Zukunft" to Princess Augusta of Prussia. Network intelligence gave him the opportunity to impress the princely court in hopes of a post in a new ministry under Augusta's husband, the man responsible for destroying the last holdouts of the Revolutions of 1848/1849, Prince Wilhelm. In January 1858, Prince Wilhelm of Prussia assumed temporary power as the king's health deteriorated. At the beginning of his regency, most core members renewed their belief that monarchs and state ministers, not political idealism or "the people," were the best means to achieve national unification. The temporary estrangement between the two pairs of network members—Duncker and Haym, Freytag and Ernst—showed how difficult it was for the political friends to devise and agree upon a single political strategy that promised to reach their common goal of national unity. The narrowed network that had largely shunned democrats and *großdeutsch* advocates since 1849 was now presented with a narrow path to national unification.

Conclusion

Between the Agreement of Olmütz in November 1851 and the establishment of the Prussian regency in October 1858, the network of political friends deepened their emotional bonds as they temporarily retreated from political agitation. The ideological alliances and personal connections fostered during the *Vormärz* and the Revolutions of 1848/49 were tested in the aftermath of the revolutions under the repression of conservative governments in the larger Confederal states. By 1852, the network of friends had turned to scholarship or government service, most conspicuously in the small Duchy of Coburg.

The network's retreat from politics was brief. During the Crimean War (1853–56), members saw an opportunity to exploit the international unrest, rallying support for a Prussian-led reconstitution of the German Confederation. Their principal means to this end, initially, was the Literary Association, founded in Coburg in 1853. Willingness to accept personal risk in order to collect and publish illicit political material varied widely between bourgeois and princely members of the network. Duke Ernst was able to expand network influence by enlisting princely political friends and cousins in Weimar and Baden. Nevertheless, Ernst's dealings with his bourgeois political friends demonstrated his reckless disregard of the danger non-princely members faced when they challenged Prussian power. It also showed how thorny it was to navigate cross-status political friendships on the road to the nation-state—friendship proved to be a less equalizing force in liberal politics than network members had assumed.

Members of the liberal network, most notably Max Duncker and Heinrich von Sybel, attempted to accommodate the Manteuffel government by refraining from clandestine political activities and emphasizing their loyalty to Prussia as scholars. Some members of the Manteuffel cabinet were willing to accept this coerced political settlement. In the end, though, the Prussian court rejected their overtures. King Friedrich Wilhelm IV remained the decisive voice in the Prussian state, however much his ministers worked to reform it, and however much the constitution restrained royal power. The ensuing harassment of non-princely network members by Hinckeldey's police and Raumer's ministry of education succeeded in forcing many of these liberals to limit their political fundraising and publishing. Financial vulnerability, caused by professional harassment, left certain key members unwilling to take major risks to support the association or Duke Ernst's "dynastic politics" in the mid-1850s.

This finding supports Andreas Biefang's argument that the Prussian government shifted in the 1850s from open political persecution to more subtle forms of economic harassment against liberals and democrats—even so, the repressive effect, in many cases, remained the same.[240] By 1858, the chicanery of Prussian authorities had forced most core members of the liberal network into exile. Considering the liberal political friends' shared experiences, Manteuffel's Prussia, despite its reforms and the nuances of its individual personnel, functioned more like an opportunistic police state in relation to these moderate liberals.

Network members, meanwhile, advocated for a *kleindeutsch* solution to the German Question from Munich, Tübingen, Coburg, and Gotha, but their victories were limited. By sharing the political, professional, and emotional resources of the network, its members helped each other through this period of state harassment. Members disagreed about many things: the Literary Association, the Privatbank zu Gotha, and whether to expand network influence by appealing to reigning monarchs or to the public through the press. Yet, the network held together—a significant achievement in those difficult years.

As the next two chapters show, the political friends leveraged network resources in the 1850s and early 1860s. They continued to cultivate a national—even nationalist—reading public through their writings, while they focused on a strategy that they had developed in the smaller states of the Confederation: counseling state leaders as to how unification might be achieved. The political friends sought political accommodation with Prussia—now ruled by a regent and his moderate-liberal ministers. This strategy, they hoped, would lead to the foundation of a liberal nation-state. In the process, network members helped shape a number of policies and reform proposals that foresaw a different Germany than the Germany of 1815 or 1871.

Notes

1. Karl Francke to Max Duncker, 26 January 1852, *Politischer Briefwechsel*, 51.
2. Francke's plans coincided with the first major industrial boom in the Confederation. See Green, "Political and Diplomatic Movements," 73. Theodore Hamerow argued that members of the German bourgeoisie, having failed to achieve unification in 1848/49, turned their attention to economic expansion and "the creation of material well-being." Hamerow, *Social Foundations of German Unification*, 1: 3–4.
3. See Ross, *Beyond the Barricades*; Brophy, "Political Calculus of Capital," 149–76; Siemann, *Deutschlands Ruhe*.
4. Ross, *Beyond the Barricades*, 17–18, 178, 186; Clark, *Iron Kingdom*, 502–503; Green, "Political and Diplomatic Movements," 72–73; Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 263–64.
5. Ross, *Beyond the Barricades*, 4.
6. Sheehan, *German History*, 717.
7. Ross, *Beyond the Barricades*, 12–13, 4.
8. Murphy, "Contesting Surveillance," 28. See also Dann, ed., *Vereinswesen und bürgerliche Gesellschaft*.
9. Blackbourn, *History of Germany*, 172.
10. Gustav Freytag to Duke Ernst II of Coburg, 27 December 1853, *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 13; Woltz, "Staatspolitische Wirken," 10.
11. Burdiel, "Spanish Modernity," 43.
12. [Max Duncker], *Vier Monate auswärtiger Politik* (Berlin: Weit, 1851).
13. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 173; Karl Samwer to J.G. Droysen, 4 January 1850, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. J.G. Droysen, Nr. 73–80, Bl. 7–8.
14. Sybel, for example, celebrated Max Duncker's political sense and polemical power. See Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 143.
15. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 172, 182.
16. As Christian Jansen has noted, treason charges were commonly leveled against democrats and socialists after the dissolution of the "rump" parliament in June 1849. See Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 60–63.
17. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 185, 187–90. Prussian authorities would not have granted the couple passports if they had wanted to keep Max Duncker in Prussia in preparation for an eventual conviction.

18. Thus, in Wolfgang Mommsen's view, the Revolutions of 1848/49 were not entirely unsuccessful. See Mommsen, "German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century," 420–21.
19. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 187; Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 142.
20. Mulholland, *Bourgeois Liberty and the Politics of Fear*, 50; Nipperdey, *Germany from Napoleon to Bismarck*, 170; Sheehan, *German History*, 722.
21. Blackbourn, *History of Germany*, 175.
22. Schulz, *Normen und Praxis*, 247; Radkau, *Zeitalter der Nervosität*, 27.
23. The term is used by Jörn Leonhard in Leonhard, *Liberalismus*, 514.
24. Christian Jansen argues this in Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 101.
25. BArch, N2184/75, Bl. 104.
26. Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 148.
27. GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 148, 208; Charlotte Duncker to Anna Mathy, 15 October 1853, BArch, N2184/12, Bl. 5–6. Traveling as couples also allowed spouses to reconnect after more than a year of frequent separations.
28. Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 149.
29. Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 150.
30. See SAC, LA A 6898; SAC, LA A 6899; SAC, LA A 6900.
31. Charlotte Duncker to Max Duncker, 27 May 1852, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 9b, Bl. 192–94.
32. For example, Berthold Auerbach received a generous offer from Carl Alexander of Weimar to join his court as a librarian; see Berthold Auerbach to Jakob Auerbach, 21 December 1845, in *Briefe an seinen Freund*, ed. J. Auerbach, 1: 53–54.
33. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 236. Ernst ruled the duchies of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha in personal union.
34. Quoted in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, vi.
35. Freytag to Ernst, 23 April 1853, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 1.
36. Freytag to Ernst, 23 April 1853, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 1–2.
37. Ottokar Lorenz, *Staatsmänner und Geschichtsschreiber*, 325.
38. Hoffmann, "Freundschaft als Passion," 84–85. Many members, including Freytag, Berthold Auerbach and Max Duncker, were also Masons. See also Horowitz, *Friendship and Politics*, 27; Gould, *Origins of Liberal Dominance*, 30; Hoffmann, *Die Politik der Geselligkeit*; Lehmann, "Pietism and Nationalism."
39. J. Habermas, *Strukturwandel*, 66; Bauer and Hämmerle, introduction to *Liebe Schreiben*, 23, 28.
40. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 292.
41. Goodman, *Republic of Letters*, 96.
42. On epistolary networks among Italian liberals before unification, see Isabella, *Risorgimento in Exile*, 27.
43. For example, see Charlotte Duncker to Max Duncker, 27 May 1852, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 9b, Bl. 192–94; Max Duncker to Karl Mathy, 18 March 1857, BArch, N2184/11, Bl. 22–23.
44. See, for example, Karl Mathy to the Dunckers, 30 July 1856, BArch, N2184/14, Bl. 14; Francke to Karl Mathy, 20 May [1855], BArch, N2184/21, Bl. 16; Samwer to Sybel, 2 March 1857, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Heinrich von Sybel, Nr. 39, Bund I, Bl. 14–15.
45. Green, "Political and Diplomatic Movements," 71; Ross, *Beyond the Barricades*, 186.
46. Jewish German merchants and bankers adopted a similar tactic, writing Yiddish in the Hebrew alphabet, to obscure sensitive information from postal censors. See Stern, *Gold and Iron*, 8, 27.
47. For example, see Rudolf Haym to Max Duncker, 28 May 1858, in *Ausgewählter Briefwechsel*, ed. Rosenberg, 152; Max Duncker to Charlotte Duncker, 26 July 1852, GStAPK, VI. HA

Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 9a, Bl. 55; Karl Mathy to Charlotte Duncker, 30 May 1856, BArch, N2184/14, Bl. 45; Karl Mathy to Charlotte Duncker, 11 February 1854, BArch, N2184/14, Bl. 49–50.

48. Karl Samwer to Max Duncker, 13 November 1854, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 113, Bl. 14–15. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 247. Francke to Max Duncker, 24 November 1858, in *Politischer Briefwechsel*, ed. Schultze, 77.
49. N2814/75, Bl. 368; Karl Samwer to Max Duncker 14 July 1853, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 113, Bl. 4–5; Charlotte Duncker to Max Duncker, 25 August 1851, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 9b, Bl. 157.
50. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 218. See also Horowitz, *Friendship and Politics*, 94–95.
51. Christian Jansen has noted similar tactics of travel as a form of political organizing among democrats and left liberals that attempted to circumvent the Prussian police and their spies. See Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 101–103. As Gisela Schlientz has noted in the case of France before the Revolution of 1848, "inconspicuous" women travelers often transported politically sensitive letters to avoid official surveillance of the post. See Schlientz, "Verdeckte Botschaften," 30.
52. See, for example, Charlotte Duncker to Karl and Anna Mathy, 30 April 1854, BArch, N2184/12, Bl. 11–12.
53. Schnicke, "Kranke Historiker," 12–13; Radkau, *Zeitalter der Nervosität*, 25–26. On the uncomfortable working conditions in archives in the nineteenth century, see Smith, *Gender of History*, 119. For a more high-profile example, see the contemporary and historiographical focus on Otto von Bismarck's mental and psychical health in, for example, Pflanze, "Toward a Psychoanalytic Interpretation of Bismarck"; and Kreklau, "Gender Anxiety."
54. Charlotte Duncker to Anna Mathy, 15 October 1853, BArch, N2184/12, Bl. 5–6; Alexander von Soiron to Karl Mathy, 29 July 1854, BArch, N2184/55, Bl. 32–33.
55. See, for example, Freytag to Ernst, 24 December 1856, in *Briefwechsel,* ed. Tempeltey, 69–71; Samwer to Max Duncker, [early April 1856], GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 113, Bl. 35.
56. Sheehan, *German History*, 517–18.
57. Berthold Auerbach to Karl Mathy, 13 November 1856, BArch, N2184/2, Bl. 6; Auerbach to Karl Mathy, 16 December 1856, BArch, N2184/2, Bl. 7.
58. Charlotte Duncker to Anna Mathy, 4 December 1855, BArch, N2184/12, Bl. 32; Sybel to Droysen, 18 November 1853, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. J.G. Droysen, Nr. 79, Bl. 61; Francke to Karl Mathy, 25 [February] 1856, BArch, N2184/21, Bl. 20–21.
59. For example, see Hermann Baumgarten to Max Duncker, 5 May 1852, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 19, Bl. 7; Baumgarten to Max Duncker, April 1854, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 19, Bl. 9.
60. Karl Mathy to Charlotte Duncker, 18 October 1853, BArch, N2184/14, Bl. 53; Charlotte Duncker to Max Duncker, 24 October 1853, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 9b, Bl. 221.
61. Garrioch, "From Christian Friendship to Secular Sentimentality," 16; Siegel, *Entfernte Freunde*, 16–20; Asen, "Zur Verortung von Paaren," 326–27. See also Mosse, "Friendship and Nationhood," 355.
62. Charlotte Duncker to Karl and Anna Mathy, 9 January 1854, BArch, N2184/12, Bl. 9–10.
63. On the role of shared memory and reminiscing in epistolary relationships, see Siegel, *Entfernte Freunde*, 27; Bauer and Hämmerle, introduction to *Liebe Schreiben*, 23; Fulbrook and Rublack, "Social Self," 267.
64. Charlotte Duncker to Karl Mathy and Anna Mathy, 9 January 1854, BArch, N2184/12, Bl. 9–10.

65. Charlotte Duncker to Karl Mathy and Anna Mathy, 9 January 1854, BArch, N2184/12, Bl. 9–10.
66. Roggenbach became acquainted with Francke through the Mathys. He had also gone to Koblenz with Christian von Stockmar to meet the prince of Prussia. See Francke to Droysen, 22 October 1853, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 30, Bl. 70–72.
67. Sybel to Droysen, 18 November 1853, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. J.G. Droysen, Nr. 79, Bl. 61; Rudolf Haym to Max Duncker, 4 April 1852, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 56, Bl. 321; Freytag to Ernst, 26 June 1853, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 5.
68. Samwer to Max Duncker, 2 September 1853, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 113, Bl. 3; Samwer to Max Duncker, 14 July 1853, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 113, Bl. 4.
69. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 224.
70. Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 270.
71. Karl Mathy to Anna Mathy, 1 February 1854, BArch, N2184/68, Bl. 24–25.
72. Ernst of Coburg to Samwer, 8 February 1854, SAC, LA A 7178, Bl. 8.
73. Karl Mathy to Anna Mathy, 1 February 1854, BArch, N2184/68, Bl. 24–25; BArch, N2184/75, Bl. 191–203.
74. Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 323.
75. Biefang, *Politisches Bürgertum*, 35–36.
76. For instance, see Soper, *Building a Civil Society*, 140–41, 149; Nipperdey, *Organisation der deutschen Parteien*.
77. Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 601.
78. See Biefang, *Politisches Bürgertum*, 35–36.
79. Green, "Political Trends and Movements," 75–76.
80. See Schulz, *Normen und Praxis*, 296–353; Paul Schroeder, *Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War*.
81. Karl Mathy to Charlotte Duncker, [mid-February] 1856, BArch, N2184/14, Bl. 36–37; Samwer to Max Duncker, 11 February 1855, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 113, Bl. 29–30; Biefang, *Politisches Bürgertum*, 42; Sheehan, *German History*, 862.
82. Freytag to Ernst, 27 December 1853, *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 13–14; Sheehan, *German History*, 860–61. Leading voices in the *Trias*, or the "Third Germany" movement, included Friedrich von Beust and Ludwig von der Pfordten, the de facto minister presidents of Saxony and Bavaria, respectively. On *Trias* reform plans, see Burg, *Die deutsche Trias in Idee und Wirklichkeit*; Flöter, *Beust*; Müller, *Deutscher Bund und deutsche Nation*.
83. Woltz, "Staatspolitische Wirken," 14. See also Lorenz, *Staatsmänner und Geschichtsschreiber*, 342.
84. Freytag to Ernst, 31 October 1853, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 11.
85. Ernst of Coburg to Freytag, 31 December 1853, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 15.
86. Ernst of Coburg to Freytag, 31 December 1853, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 15–17.
87. Lorenz, *Staatsmänner und Geschichtsschreiber*, 340–42.
88. Samwer to Max Duncker, [1854], GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 113, Bl. 28; Walter, *Heeresreformen*, 391; Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 267; Ross, *Beyond the Barricades*, 11; Behnen, *Preußische Wochenblatt*, 9, 61.
89. Duke Ernst of Coburg had already contacted Bethmann Hollweg in mid-1853 to suggest uniting the *Wochenblatt* party with the "ruins of the Gotha party." See Behnen, *Preußische Wochenblatt*, 94. See also Ross, *Beyond the Barricades*, 11.
90. Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 266–67; Walter, *Heeresreformen*, 391.
91. Francke to Max Duncker, 14 February 1858, in *Politischer Briefwechsel*, ed. Schultze, 72.
92. By this point, members of the network were either under official suspicion as dangerous liberals or driven into exile. This fact alone might have discouraged the integration of the two

networks because many *Wochenblatt* members served as state officials and could not risk further exposure to the attacks of archconservatives at court.

93. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 339.
94. See SAC, LA A 6898; SAC, LA A 6900; SAC, LA A 6901; Hector Bolitho, ed., *The Prince Consort and His Brother*.
95. Morier, *Memoirs and Letters*, 1: 162–163; Karl Mathy to Max Duncker, 24 November 1858, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 86, Bl. 30–31, 88. On the foreign policy assumptions held at the time by British liberals, see Parry, *Politics of Patriotism*, 9, 14, 59.
96. On Morier, see also Murray, *Liberal Diplomacy and German Unification*. This strategy also helped Queen Victoria undermine Whitehall's efforts to check royal influence over foreign policy. See Parry, *Politics of Patriotism*, 53–54.
97. Karl Mathy to Charlotte Duncker, 2 May 1854, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 86.
98. Goodman, *Republic of Letters*, 18. Although this silence may have represented a form of polite disagreement, it is more likely that it was akin to shunning. Epistolary etiquette stipulated frequent correspondence between friends or family members; silence was impolite. Therefore, an awkward disagreement would have been ignored in a subsequent letter before contact was suspended entirely. Goethe once reminded his readers that when it came to letters, it was better "to write about nothing than to write nothing at all." Goethe, *Die Wahlverwandtschaften*, 105.
99. Karl Mathy to Charlotte Duncker, 23 March 1854, BArch, N2184/14, Bl. 17; Karl Mathy to Max Duncker, [1854], GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 86, Bl. 3–4.
100. Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 271–72.
101. Karl Mathy to Max Duncker, 25 September 1854, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 86, Bl. 15; Samwer to Max Duncker, 11 September 1854, in *Politischer Briefwechsel*, ed. Schultze, 59; Samwer to Max Duncker, 16 September 1854, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 113, Bl. 9; Samwer to Max Duncker, 18 April 1854, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 113, Bl. 10.
102. Ernst to Max Duncker, 3 June 1855, SAC, LA A 7178, Bl. 44.
103. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 219, 238, 247; BArch, N2184/75, Bl. 323; Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 170.
104. Ernst to Freytag, 16 May 1854, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 21.
105. Ernst to Freytag, 16 May 1854, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 22.
106. Freytag to Ernst, 18 May 1854, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 23.
107. Freytag to Ernst, 18 May 1854, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 22. Emphasis in the original. See also Ross, *Beyond the Barricades*, 167, 186.
108. Freytag to Ernst, 18 May 1854, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 24.
109. Samwer to Ernst, 13 February 1854, SAC, LA A 7177, Bl. 37–38.
110. Ernst to Samwer, 8 February 1854, SAC, LA A 7178, Bl. 8.
111. Samwer to Ernst, 13 February 1854, SAC, LA A 7177, Bl. 37–38; Samwer to Ernst, 14 February 1854, SAC, LA A 7177, Bl. 39–40; Samwer to Ernst, 14 February 1854, SAC, LA A 7177, Bl. 41–44.
112. Samwer to Ernst, 14 February 1854, SAC, LA A 7177, Bl. 44.
113. Samwer to Ernst, 20 February 1854, SAC, LA A 7177, Bl. 49.
114. Samwer to Ernst, 20 February 1854, SAC, LA A 7177, Bl. 50.
115. Samwer to Ernst, 19 February 1854, SAC, LA A 7177, Bl. 55.
116. Samwer to Ernst, 18 February 1854, SAC, LA A 7177, Bl. 52–53.
117. Samwer to Ernst, 26 March 1854, SAC, LA A 7177, Bl. 63–65.
118. Ernst to Samwer, 26 March 1854, SAC, LA A 7178, Bl. 12. He also ordered Samwer to report to his brother on the mood in the Prussian Landtag.
119. Samwer to Ernst, 30 March 1854, SAC, LA A 7177, Bl. 77.

120. Freytag to Ernst, 6 August 1854, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 28–29.
121. Freytag to Ernst, 6 August 1854, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 28; Mühlen, *Gustav Freytag*, 130.
122. Freytag to Ernst, 11 September 1854, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 30.
123. Freytag to Ernst, 11 September 1854, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 30.
124. Freytag to Ernst, 23 September 1854, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 32–34.
125. On Hinckeldey and the Confederal police, see Siemann, *Deutschlands Ruhe*, 255–56; Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 69. Freytag to Ernst, 26 November 1854, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 36.
126. Men's service to male monarchs could incorporate elements of same-sex desire. See, for example, Claudia Kreklau's analysis of how Bismarck understood his service to Wilhelm I of Prussia in "Gender Anxiety," 175, 180.
127. Freytag to Ernst, 27 November 1854, SAC, LA A 7397, Bl. 19–25. There was no further discussion between Duke Ernst and Freytag about these supposed letters.
128. Freytag to Ernst, 20 November 1854, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 38. Freytag used the German term "*Hintertreppenbekanntschaft.*" Charlotte Duncker was a close childhood friend of the writer Sophie Kaskel, Baudissin's wife. The count and Max became friends through their spouses: GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 78–80.
129. Freytag to Ernst, 26 November 1854, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 38. Johann ascended the Saxon throne in early August 1854 after his brother's accidental death in Tyrol.
130. Friedrich von Beust to Ernst of Coburg, 31 December 1854, SAC, LA A 7397, Bl. 26–27; Mühlen, *Freytag*, 132. Saxony, as a member of the Confederal Police Commission, was responsible for overseeing the Thuringian states. See Biefang, *Politisches Bürgertum*, 35.
131. Karl Francke to Johann Gustav Droysen, 2 November 1855, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. J.G. Droysen, Nr. 30, Bl. 149–51. David Barclay argues that after 1849 the Prussian king was forced to accept a constitution, but this concession accompanied an expansion of state repressive powers with the "regular use" of police spies and increased censorship. See Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 216.
132. Karl Francke to J.G. Droysen, 22 October 1856, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. J.G. Droysen, Nr. 30, Bl. 175–76.
133. Ernst of Coburg to Friedrich of Baden, 27 March 1854, *Großherzog Friedrich,* ed. Oncken, 1: 5.
134. Ernst to Friedrich of Baden, 23 April 1854, GAK, FA, Korr. 13, Bd. 13, Doc. 3. A redacted version of the letter can be found in *Großherzog Friedrich,* ed. Oncken, 1: 8.
135. Ernst to Friedrich of Baden, 23 April 1854; Ernst to Friedrich of Baden, 14 October 1854, in *Großherzog Friedrich,* ed. Oncken, 1: 8–9, 1: 13.
136. Samwer to Max Duncker, [beginning of 1856], in *Politischer Briefwechsel*, ed. Schultze, 68.
137. Friedrich of Baden to Wilhelm, prince of Prussia, 6 April 1855, in *Großherzog Friedrich,* ed. Oncken, 1: 37.
138. Carl Alexander of Weimar to Ernst of Coburg, 9 July 1853, SAC, LA A 7018, unfoliated.
139. Carl Alexander of Weimar to Friedrich of Baden, GAK, FA Korr. 13 Bd. 15, Doc. A5.
140. Carl Alexander of Weimar to Friedrich of Baden, GAK, FA Korr. 13 Bd. 15, Doc. A6. References to personal harmony and the Aristotelian melding of souls held both Platonic and sexual connotations: Semanek, "Von 'schönen Stunden,'" 305; Siegel, *Entfernte Freunde*, 16.
141. See Mosse, "Friendship and Nationhood," 355, 360.
142. Cocks, *On Sovereignty*, 12.
143. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 239–40.
144. Bourgeois status was largely dependent on patterns of "taste" and conspicuous consumption befitting an elite. See Rahden, *Jews and Other Germans*, 24–25; Habermas, *Frauen und Männer*, 68; Kwan, *Liberalism in the Habsburg Monarchy*, 17.

145. See, for example, Freytag to Ernst, 6 March 1861, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 151.
146. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, 148–49, 228; N2184/75, Bl. 257, 273; Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 169; Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 368. Curiously, no surviving letters between these political friends discuss that Bassermann had died by suicide following the failure of the Revolutions of 1848/49.
147. Karl Mathy to Max Duncker, 17 December 1858, BArch, N2184/14, Bl. 74–75; Freytag to Ernst, 10 November 1858, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 103–104.
148. This approach was not exclusive to liberals in nineteenth-century Europe. See Armenteros, *French Idea of History*, 3.
149. Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 146; GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 199. Max Duncker's incorporation of politics into his work in the ivory tower supports Anna Ross's argument that there was "no such thing as a retreat into a depoliticized professional or business sphere." See Ross, *Beyond the Barricades*, 14.
150. See Smith, *Gender of History*, 83–84. Members had followed Gervinus's trial for pronouncing in print on the democratic telos of history: Hübinger, *Georg Gottfried Gervinus*, 194–95, 198–200. Alexander von Soiron represented Gervinus in court.
151. Smith, *Gender of History*, 38, 53.
152. Haym to Max Duncker, 30 March 1852, in *Ausgewählter Briefwechsel*, ed. Rosenberg, 134.
153. Max Duncker to Droysen, 20 May 1855, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. J.G. Droysen, Nr. 27, Bl. 69; Freytag to Max Duncker, 8 April 1854, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 2, Bl. 138–149; BArch, N2184/75, Bl. 200; GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 264.
154. Karl Duncker to Max Duncker, 7 July 1853, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 50–51.
155. Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 237–38.
156. Greifswald was, of course, a Prussian university, but the network presumably chose it because it was farther away and less prestigious than Halle—perhaps Duncker's promotion to full professor there would attract less official scrutiny.
157. Brophy, "Political Calculus of Capital," 152; Ross, *Beyond the Barricades*, 14.
158. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 176, Bl. 1–4.
159. Max Duncker to Droysen, 4 January 1856, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. J.G. Droysen, Nr. 27, Bl. 71.
160. On Friedrich Wilhelm's growing paranoia after 1850, see Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 216. See also the Gerlach brothers' resentment of Hinckeldey's influence and his opposition to their *Kreuzzeitung* in Leopold von Gerlach, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, 1: 652, 1: 783–84, 2: 98, 2: 100–101. Hinckeldey maintained his position until the summer of 1856 when he was killed in a duel.
161. Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 236–37; Clark, *Iron Kingdom*, 396–97, 506.
162. Freytag to Charlotte Duncker, March 1856, *Politische Briefwechsel*, ed. Schultze, 69–70.
163. Freytag to Charlotte Duncker, March 1856, *Politische Briefwechsel*, ed. Schultze, 69–70.
164. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 2, Bl. 175; Samwer to Max Duncker, 16 May 1856, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 113, Bl. 37–38; Karl von Raumer to Max Duncker, 22 December 1856, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 2, Bl. 179. Even dynastic decorations were issued in both standard—i.e., Christian—and "Jewish" versions, which prominent Jewish recipients found discriminatory. See Stern, *Gold and Iron*, 16, 18.
165. Sybel to Max Duncker, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 137, Bl. 6; Sybel to Max Duncker, 7 July 1855, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 137, Bl. 8–9; BArch, N2184/75, Bl. 268.
166. On German radical leaders in Switzerland, see Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 97–99.
167. Rampton, *Liberal Ideas in Tsarist Russia*, 40.
168. Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 169.

169. Charlotte Duncker to Max Duncker, 18 September 1857, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 9b, Bl. 233; Charlotte Duncker to Max Duncker, 7 October 1857, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 9b, Bl. 235.
170. Max Duncker to Karl Mathy, June 1855, BArch, N2184/11, Bl. 15.
171. Freytag to Ernst, 17 March 1856, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 50.
172. Freytag to Ernst, 17 March 1856, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 50; Dotterweich, *Sybel*, 199.
173. Dotterweich, *Sybel*, 85; Lees, *Revolution and Reflection*, 27.
174. Dotterweich, *Sybel*, 245.
175. Sybel therefore performed what Harald Biermann has called a "bridging function" between northern and southern Germany. In the context of the network, Sybel spanned the German regional divide by providing network members in the north with news from the south. See Biermann, *Ideologie statt Realpolitik*, 242.
176. Dotterweich, *Sybel*, 235, 244.
177. Sybel to Max Duncker, 26 June 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 137, Bl. 46–48; Sybel to Max Duncker, 1 September 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 137, Bl. 58–59. On Sybel's nervous state in Munich, see Schnicke, "Kranke Historiker," 19.
178. Sybel to Duncker, 26 June 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 137 Bl. 45–48.
179. Borutta, *Antikatholizismus*, 47; Brophy, *Rhineland*, 254–55. See also Herzog, *Intimacy and Exclusion*, 4–5. Dagmar Herzog dates the genesis of organized political Catholicism in Baden, at least, to the 1830s. See also *Maistre and his European Readers*, ed. Armenteros and Lebrun.
180. Borutta, *Antikatholizismus*, 15.
181. Lees, *Revolution and Reflection*, 45–46; Borutta, *Antikatholizismus*, 273, 275; Langewiesche, "Nature of German Liberalism," 108–109. On anti-clericalism, see Gould, *Origins of Liberal Dominance*, 32.
182. Borutta, *Antikatholizismus*, 14, 73.
183. Clark, "Religion and Confessional Conflict," 86–93; Borutta, *Antikatholizismus*, 47. See also Healy, *Jesuit Specter*, 3–4, 23, 37–38, 50.
184. Sybel to Droysen, 31 August 1858, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. J.G. Droysen, Nr. 79, Bl. 64.
185. BArch, N2184/75, Bl. 446; GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 264.
186. Sybel to Max Duncker, 29 September 1857 GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 137, Bl. 10–11. See also BArch, N2184/75, Bl. 446.
187. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 264; N2184/75, Bl. 446.
188. Sybel to Max Duncker, 28 October 1857, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 137, Bl. 12.
189. Samwer to Sybel, 22 July 1856, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Heinrich von Sybel, Nr. 39, Bl. 11–12. Sybel had offered Samwer 4,500 talers.
190. Samwer to Sybel, 22 July 1856, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Heinrich von Sybel, Nr. 39, Bl. 11–12.
191. See, for example, Sybel to Max Duncker, 21 October 1858, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 137, Bl. 17; Sybel to Max Duncker, 7 June 1858, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 137, Bl. 14.
192. GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Duncker, Max, Nr. 5, Bl. 232–34; Charlotte Duncker's letters to the Mathys in the few months before Karl Jr.'s death were poignant. See Charlotte Duncker to Anna and Karl Mathy, 4 December 1855–14 April 1856, BArch N2184/12, Bl. 32–56.
193. Karl Mathy to Charlotte Duncker, 14 December 1855, BArch, N2184/14, Bl. 34–35; Karl Mathy to Charlotte Duncker, [mid-]February 1856, BArch, N2184/14, Bl. 36–37.
194. The Mathys' discussions of Karl Jr. can be found in double-letters written first by Karl Jr. with additions by his mother. See Karl Mathy to Karl Jr. and to Anna Mathy, 5 October 1855, BArch, N2184/14, Bl. 97–98 and Anna Mathy and Karl Jr. to Karl Mathy Sr., 11 July 1855, BArch, N2184/69, Bl. 134–136.

195. In the months before his son's death, only one letter to the Dunckers centered on politics. See Karl Mathy to Charlotte Duncker, 30 May 1856, BArch, N2184/14, Bl. 45.
196. Charlotte Duncker to Anna and Karl Mathy, 30 March 1856, BArch N2184/12, Bl. 49–50.
197. Max Duncker noted the close circle of southern German friends around Mathy from the mid-1840s. See Duncker, "Karl Mathy," 54.
198. See, for example, Berthold Auerbach to Karl Mathy, 13 November 1856, BArch, N2184/2, Bl. 6; Auerbach to Karl Mathy, 16 December 1856, BArch, N2184/2, Bl. 7; Charlotte Duncker to Anna and Karl Mathy, 21 June 1856, BArch, N2184/12, Bl. 62–63.
199. While in mourning, men were expected to express intense emotions to one another in letters. See Horowitz, *Friendship and Politics*, 73.
200. BArch, N2184/75, Bl. 318.
201. See, for example, Charlotte Duncker to Karl Mathy, 11 July 1857, BArch, N2184/12, Bl. 76–77.
202. BArch N2184/75, Bl. 349; Max Duncker to Karl Mathy, 9 August 1856, BArch, N2184/11, Bl. 18–19.
203. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 379.
204. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 379.
205. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 361, 365.
206. BArch, N2184/75, Bl. 327.
207. Brophy, "Political Calculus of Capital," 152–53.
208. Hansemann once had to cover a 12,000-taler loss at the Disconto-Gesellschaft: Brophy, "Political Calculus of Capital," 166.
209. Brophy, "Political Calculus of Capital," 149–50; Rampton, *Liberal Ideas in Tsarist Russia*, 2–3.
210. See also Huber, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte*, 3: 143–45, 3: 149–50.
211. Karl Mathy to Charlotte Duncker, 15 August 1856, BArch, N2184/14, Bl. 10–11.
212. Karl Mathy to Charlotte Duncker and Max Duncker, BArch, N2184/14, 20 January 1857, Bl. 56–57; Karl Mathy to Max Duncker, 4 August 1857, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 86, Bl. 26. Duncker's move was also risky because the Prussian court resented the establishment of credit banks in neighboring states as a drain on the kingdom's own financial sector.
213. Karl Mathy to Max Duncker, 27 May 1857, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 86, Bl. 20–21.
214. Karl Mathy to Max Duncker, 10 June 1858, BArch, N2184/14, Bl. 71–72.
215. Fanny Lewald to Karl Mathy, 5 June 1857, BArch, N2184/56, Bl, 20–21; Fanny Lewald to Karl Mathy, 22 June 1858, BArch, N2184/56, Bl. 22–23.
216. Horowitz, *Friendship and Politics*, 78–79. See also Brophy, "Political Calculus of Capital," 152; Brophy, "*Salus Publica Suprema Lex*," 124. In its earliest appearance, the term "liberal" was associated with "the financial means to show generosity to others." See Freeden and Fernández-Sebastián, introduction to *In Search of European Liberalisms*, 18.
217. Freytag was apparently involved in a credit bank based in Leipzig, which he liked well enough. See Karl Mathy, Diary Entry, BArch N2184/75, Bl. 313; Freytag to Mathy, 11 November 1856, in *Nach der Revolution*, ed. Jansen. 403–404.
218. BArch, N2184/75, Bl. 332.
219. Freytag to Ernst, 21 April 1856, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 56. See Brophy, "Political Calculus of Capital," 157; Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 227.
220. Freytag to Ernst, 21 April 1856, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 56; Ernst to Freytag, 28 June 1856, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 60–62.
221. Freytag to Ernst, 21 April 1856, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 56.
222. Freytag to Ernst, 21 April 1856, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 57.
223. Freytag to Ernst, 21 April 1856, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 57.
224. Francke to Droysen, 20 March 1856, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. J.G. Droysen, Nr.96, Bl. 163–

63. Ernst was a successful composer in his own right. See Tasler, *Macht und Musik*. Freytag considered Duke Ernst's compositions unwelcome distractions from his work as a German nationalist.
225. Ernst to Freytag, 28 June 1856, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 60.
226. On letters as the embodiments of their authors, see Goodman, *Republic of Letters*, 143. On the role of naturalness and emotional authenticity in bourgeois interpersonal relationships, see Habermas, *Frauen und Männer*, 278; Rebhan-Glück, "Gefühle erwünscht," 68–69. See also Frevert, "Defining Emotions," 25.
227. Ernst to Freytag, 28 June 1856, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 61.
228. Ernst to Freytag, 28 June 1856, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 61.
229. Ernst to Freytag, 28 June 1856, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 62.
230. On Max's deliberations, see Charlotte Duncker to Max Duncker, 28 October 1857, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Duncker, Max, Nr. 9b, Bl. 236; Heinrich von Sybel to Max Duncker, 29 September 1857, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 137, Bl. 10–11.
231. Karl Mathy to Charlotte Duncker and Max Duncker, 20 January 1858, BArch, N2184/14, Bl. 63–64.
232. Gustav von Rümelin to Max Duncker, 18 August 1857, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 2, Bl. 198. The total salary of about 1,900 florins, or 1,200 gulden, was slightly less than what Sybel offered. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 262. On Leipzig, see BArch, N2184/75, Bl. 474.
233. Such gossip included news of Freytag's throat infection and of an actress who was apparently taking Coburg by storm while taking advantage of the duke's finances. See Karl Mathy to Max Duncker, 17 December 1858, BArch, N2184/14, Bl. 74–75. On the social and cultural role of gossip, see Spacks, *Gossip*.
234. Cited in Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 176.
235. Rudolf Haym to Max Duncker, 24 November 1857, in *Ausgewählter Briefwechsel*, ed. Rosenberg, 147. See also: Haym to Max Duncker, 28 May 1858, in *Ausgewählter Briefwechsel*, ed. Rosenberg, 152; Haym to Max Duncker, in *Ausgewählter Briefwechsel*, ed. Rosenberg, 153; Haym to Max Duncker, 5 June 1858, *Ausgewählter Briefwechsel*, ed. Rosenberg, 154–56.
236. Haym to Max Duncker, 5 June 1858, *Ausgewählter Briefwechsel*, ed. Rosenberg, 154.
237. Haym to Max Duncker, 5 June 1858, *Ausgewählter Briefwechsel*, ed. Rosenberg, 155.
238. Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 278–80. Leopold von Gerlach, the king's adjunct and personal confidant, and other members of the court became seriously concerned with the king's health in the summer of 1857. See Leopold von Gerlach, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, 2: 518–20.
239. BArch, N2184/75, Bl. 463.
240. Biefang, *Politisches Bürgertum*, 35.

Chapter 3

Political Friendship in Power, 1858–1862

In the 1850s, the network of liberal political friends had cooperated to overcome personal, political, and professional challenges. They suffered police harassment and professional discrimination, and most core members had been forced into exile by 1858. As James Brophy and Anna Ross have shown, however, government repression in Prussia had its limits.[1] There was enough room between the claims and the realities of official power in the 1850s for conservative state leaders and moderate liberals to seek accommodation—on some points. In the mid-1850s, network members tried to participate in this process. Their reasoning was that if they could gain influence over princes and government ministers, they could convince these leaders to enact domestic reforms and achieve national unification. The Prussian government often rebuffed the political friends' efforts, but it did not entirely foreclose the prospect of future cooperation.

In October 1858, it seemed that the political friends had a new opportunity to test this reasoning. The establishment of a permanent regency in Prussia under Prince Wilhelm and his circle of moderate advisors ended Otto von Manteuffel's conservative cabinet and marginalized the archconservative courtiers around the ailing king, Friedrich Wilhelm IV.[2] Many liberals believed that a "New Era"—marked by the rule of law, constitutional rights, and a desire for national unity—had dawned.[3] The network of political friends sought office in Prussia because they thought that the prince regent and his allies from the "*Wochenblatt* party" would continue on the course of moderate liberalism and constitutional monarchy that they had advocated since the mid-1850s.[4] Once they had made gains in Berlin and Karlsruhe, network members advanced their most concrete plans for *kleindeutsch* unification under a constitutional, Hohenzollern monarchy. In their plans, these pro-Prussian liberals engaged with the wider nationalist movement in Germany—particularly with the ideas of the *Trias*.

The monarchical principle was central to the political culture of nineteenth-century Central Europe, to most European liberals, and to the network of political friends, providing the basis of what was considered political legitimacy.[5] Yet,

as the political theorist Joan Cocks has suggested, the terms of political vocabulary are "also problems and possibilities in themselves . . . intellectual puzzles without definitive solutions"; further, she contends that attempts to define "any of these terms will spark its own revision, refinement, extension, or counter-conceptualization."[6] Most liberals who called for the formation of a German nation-state in the 1850s and 1860s envisioned a powerful constitutional monarch overseeing the machine of state.[7] The network members sought to use monarchy to reconcile the legitimism of the eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries with calls for a constitutional nation-state. Members of the network participated in the nineteenth-century transition from the monarch's primacy as dynast to the monarch's primacy as a member of the nation and representative of the state.[8] They thereby worked to build a "modernized," national monarchy on the political foundations of the past, and their projects offer a glimpse of an imagined nation-state and national monarchy very different from the German Empire founded in 1871.[9]

Princely and non-princely members' efforts to reach this goal demonstrated their assumptions about the relationship between monarchy, sovereignty, and nationalism in a rapidly changing Central Europe. How network members approached monarchy in this context in the 1860s was closely connected to their belief that smaller monarchs could "sacrifice" their prerogatives to a centralizing nation-state but still retain their individual sovereignties—as acknowledged at the Congress of Vienna and codified in the Confederal Constitution.[10] Sovereignty had become, in the words of the seminal liberal encyclopedia, the *Staatslexikon*, "the cardinal question of modern constitutional law."[11] Network members and Confederal leaders therefore endeavored to locate the source of sovereignty and determine whether it sprang from the nation, the state, or the monarch himself.[12] Could legitimate monarchy be adapted to national demands? Could many monarchs lend their prerogatives to a single national executive, without threatening the stability of Germany and Europe?

In network thinking, sovereignty sprang from the body of the monarch through his special relationship to the Christian God. He could, however, allow his sovereignty to be collected by a central authority for the good of the nation—that is, to the executive of a new nation-state.[13] To ensure the princely purity of this system, a fellow monarch would then administer, through a national government, the prerogatives of the other reigning princes in judicial, diplomatic, and military matters. Reformers asserted that this sort of collective national monarchy would not diminish the individual princes, nor would it threaten the associated independence of their respective states. It would not violate international law by destroying the Confederation, nor would it summon the specter of republican revolution by defacing monarchy. German monarchs would remain—paradoxically—free sovereigns, despite substantial restrictions on their military and diplomatic authority. Like other European liberals, the

political friends believed they could achieve reform without revolution and win over conservatives.[14] Network members' reform plans sparked controversy across the Confederation, however, and met decisive resistance from its conservative leaders, who advocated different understandings of monarchy and nation.

Liberal hopes in the New Era were soon disappointed. Factionalism within the Auerswald-Hohenzollern cabinet, which represented only a subsection of Old Liberals, and the resistance of a resurgent "conservative Fronde" at court, halted domestic and Confederal reform in 1861.[15] Prince Regent Wilhelm's campaign to force a massive military spending bill through the Prussian legislature ignited a constitutional crisis that divided liberals in the Landtag and the network. Despite their detailed plans, members of the network were forced to choose between backing the prince regent (from 1861, King Wilhelm I) or endorsing the breakaway liberal-nationalist opposition in the Landtag: the German Progressive Party (Fortschrittspartei).[16] Bismarck's appointment in 1862 as minister president, or better, "minister of conflict," further exacerbated tensions in the Prussian legislature, within the German Confederation, and among the political friends.[17] If debates among network liberals in the 1850s had been aimed at forging consensus, in the early 1860s, they were becoming adversarial.

The next two chapters analyze disagreements in the network between 1858 and 1867 that often involved the scope of liberal accommodation with post-revolutionary conservative government. Because the friends were now directly involved in state policymaking, the larger political narrative of this period becomes more important to the story of the liberal network. Tensions in the network reflected tensions in German society during a transformative period characterized by increased press activity, heated debates over constitutional rule, organized nationalist agitation, and war. Under these circumstances, the political friends asked themselves: where could liberals seek accommodation with conservative leaders before they ceased to be liberals? How should they guide government policy in an era of crisis toward domestic reform and national unification? Who could still be regarded as a political friend?

In this chapter, we explore how this network of moderate liberals worked through these and other thorny questions as both friends and political activists at the height of their official influence. The first part examines network efforts to secure official influence in Prussia between 1858 and 1862. I then analyze two concrete examples of what the network planned to do in this more favorable environment, in Franz von Roggenbach and Friedrich I of Baden's Confederal reform plans of 1859–1860, and in the Coburg military convention of 1861. The chapter closes by assessing the re-emergence in September 1862 of debates in the network over the limits of accommodation with state power in pursuit of the nation-state—and the limits of political friendship.

Entering the New Era, 1858–1860

In early 1858, Prince Wilhelm of Prussia, brother to the incapacitated King Friedrich Wilhelm IV, established a temporary regency.[18] This regency awakened among German liberals an enthusiasm similar to that which had greeted Friedrich Wilhelm IV's ascension in 1840.[19] Within months, the establishment of a permanent regency became unavoidable for the cabinet of Otto von Manteuffel and the ailing king's courtiers. The prince regent began a "purge" of his brother's conservative advisors and state ministers, among them the Gerlach brothers, Julius Stahl, and eventually Manteuffel himself.[20] Network members mobilized to acquire posts in an incoming moderate-liberal ministry, achieving their greatest success between 1858 and 1862. There seems to have been no debate among the political friends over the merits of seeking office in the state that had so recently hounded most of them into exile. Prussia remained their ideal vehicle for national unification, and it would be led by moderate-liberal ministers with whom the network had forged contacts a few years earlier.

In March 1858, Karl Mathy, Karl Francke, and August von Saucken met secretly with Duke Ernst in Gotha to weigh Max Duncker's chances of entering Prussian service in the New Era.[21] One month later, Rudolf von Auerswald summoned Duncker to Berlin from his self-imposed exile in Württemberg.[22] Auerswald became the de facto leader of the new cabinet in June 1858 under the aegis of Karl Anton von Hohenzollern, a mediatized relative from the Catholic branch of the Prussian royal family.[23] Auerswald had served as lord mayor of Königsberg in the early 1840s and governor of the Prussian Rhineland between 1850 and 1851. He had also nurtured powerful contacts at Prince Wilhelm's court in Koblenz and the royal court in Berlin.[24]

Auerswald and Hohenzollern had already engaged with network members in the mid-1850s, as part of the *Wochenblatt* group's interactions with the Literary Association.[25] Both held moderate liberal views such as those found in the prince regent's November Program (1859), wherein Wilhelm called for Prussia's "moral conquest" of Germany and the end of reactionary religious and political policies.[26] Like network members, New Era leaders favored constitutional rule, brakes on the power of the state bureaucracy, and German unity. Ominously, the November Program also referred to the need for a greatly expanded army and the prince regent's belief that the state should remain autonomous from popular demands.[27] The gap between the royal intent of the program and its reception by many liberals—network members included—foreshadowed the disagreement and disappointment among the political friends about the course of the New Era.

In 1859, Hohenzollern, Auerswald, and August von Bethmann Hollweg were hoping for reform, searching for moderates to replace officials from the Manteuffel ministry and counter the remaining conservative courtiers around

the so-called *Kreuzzeitung* (*Neue Preußische Zeitung*) and the *Berliner Revue*.[28] Auerswald offered Max Duncker two possible roles in which, he claimed, Duncker could retain his "freedom."[29] The first option was appointment as legation councilor (*Legationsrat*) in the foreign office, a mid-level post in a prestigious ministry. The second option was to become director of the Central Press Office (Zentralpreßstelle), which Manteuffel had established in the mid-1850s as part of his policy of "press management."[30] The press office oversaw official and semi-official dailies, distributed pro-government articles, and dealt with privately owned periodicals across the Confederation.[31]

The network prepared the ground for Max Duncker's rising prospects. August von Saucken, J.G. Droysen, Ernst of Coburg, and Christian von Stockmar all recommended Duncker at the prince regent's court, and Duncker had managed to put his political writings before the prince and princess of Prussia at opportune moments.[32] As in the 1850s, certain friends counseled both Max and Charlotte Duncker on whether to move to Berlin to await an official offer. Karl Samwer and Gustav Freytag, for example, supported the move. Both considered it an opportunity to expand network influence that likewise offered Max Duncker the possibility of gaining a more powerful position later.[33] Karl Mathy, on the other hand, who was closest to the Dunckers, considered both options too uncertain to warrant Duncker sacrificing the professorship at Tübingen.[34] Hermann Baumgarten went further by asserting that it would be futile to work with Confederal leaders to achieve national unification.[35]

Charlotte Duncker, for her part, believed that her husband accepting a post in Berlin was necessary politically to serve Prussia and thereby Germany, despite the fact that he would have to sacrifice his scholarly endeavors.[36] She advised her spouse to accept only the role as legation councilor if he wanted to gain influence over the prince regent.[37] As head of the press office, Duncker would be overshadowed by senior officials and his independence would be diminished. The press appointment was a difficult "half position," Charlotte Duncker pointed out, because "the prince certainly prefers to listen—in his own way—to a legation councilor more than a professor." She added that a long memorandum from a diplomat would be more "agreeable to [the prince's] Prussian heart," especially if Duncker also comported himself as "a military man."[38]

Charlotte Duncker recognized more clearly than most other members that uniformed officers and diplomats held more sway with Wilhelm, the "prince general," than did professors and publicists.[39] She therefore combined her roles as spouse and political friend to advise her husband to adapt to courtly society, which was dominated by noble officers and elite civil servants; otherwise, Max Duncker's counsel, however wise it might be, would be ignored by the prince regent. Charlotte Duncker had learned from Heinrich von Sybel's experience in Munich. Max Duncker ultimately chose to settle in Berlin before receiving an official offer with the blessing of the government in Stuttgart, leaving Charlotte

Duncker behind to close the house.[40] She only joined him a few months later, after completing her household duties. Because of her gendered role as wife and manager of the household, Duncker was unable to help her spouse and fellow network member while he adjusted to Berlin, except through her letters.

When Max Duncker, disregarding his spouse's advice, finally accepted the position of director of the Central Press Office in early 1859, the prince regent granted him the coveted title of privy state councilor (*Geheimer Regierungsrat*) and an honorary professorship. Duncker worked immediately to exploit his access to Rudolf von Auerswald and Karl Anton von Hohenzollern for the network. He passed letters and memoranda to the cabinet from Duke Ernst of Coburg, who wished particularly to improve his relationship with the Hohenzollern dynasty. Ernst made Duncker responsible for softening his views for the ministers' consideration. One such view held that the prince regent should accept an imperial crown from a possible summit of pro-Prussian monarchs.[41] Duncker likewise shared memoranda and letters from Heinrich von Sybel, Karl Samwer, Karl Mathy, and Hermann Baumgarten with New Era leaders.[42] Independent of her spouse, Charlotte Duncker circulated letters between Duke Ernst, Mathy, Samwer, and Auerswald in order to expand network influence.[43] Far-flung members, such as Baumgarten and Sybel, also asked the Dunckers to send news about the Berlin cabinet and the prince regent's intentions.[44]

Demands for political news and access to state leaders showed how highly network members rated their influence, even after limited successes. Yet Duncker's appointment was time-consuming, his duties and bureaucratic rank unclear. Charlotte Duncker later recalled that her husband's new post required a difficult balancing act, "mediating between public opinion in Germany and the Prussian government."[45] In practice, Max Duncker had to synthesize reports from each government ministry for syndicated articles in official and semi-official papers. He reported daily to the state ministry on the mood in the German press toward Prussia, while advising state ministers and the prince regent on public relations, even though his rank and official duties did not grant him the right to royal audiences or direct access to ministers. He was technically a central office manager in the foreign office—hardly someone with his hands on the levers of power.[46]

To make matters worse, the Dunckers had political enemies in high places: Foreign Minister Alexander von Schleinitz and his undersecretary, Justus von Gruner, most notably, along with "traditional" opponents among conservative courtiers and journalists such as Hermann Wagener and the Gerlachs—who accused Max Duncker of persecuting their *Kreuzzeitung*.[47] This situation was the result of peculiar circumstances. The press office was less than five years old when Duncker took over, so its place in the byzantine structure of the Prussian bureaucracy remained unclear. The Hohenzollern court was renowned for its factionalism and the vendettas between branches of the state bureaucracy.[48] Above all,

the New Era cabinet, whose public image Duncker was tasked with minding and defending, seemed positively lethargic in the face of these obstacles.

Max Duncker was kept extremely busy—perhaps intentionally so—by Gruner and Schleinitz. He left day-to-day management of his staff to an assistant so he could focus on his reports to the prince regent and his ministers, especially after the outbreak of the Second Italian War in April 1859.[49] The war created tensions among German leaders over whether to aid the Habsburg Empire against the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia and its powerful ally, the Second French Empire. Though obliged to defend Confederal territory, leaders of the smaller German states argued that the center of the conflict, Lombardy, lay beyond the borders of the Confederation and thus was not their concern. The Austrian cabinet, led by Karl von Buol, hoped to press Confederal troops—particularly Prussian contingents—into the war. Network members, like many German liberals, felt conflicted.[50] They considered Piedmont-Sardinia's attack on the anti-national Habsburg Monarchy to be a war of national unification akin to their own *kleindeutsch* project.[51] To them, an Austrian defeat in Italy meant a Prussian victory in Germany. It also appeared "to offer conclusive proof that a liberal-constitutional system was the only viable one for Italy," and German liberals hoped that this conclusion might prove convincing on their side of the Alps.[52] Yet, network members also feared that, after defeating Austria, Napoleon III might ally with Denmark to launch a simultaneous invasion of the Rhineland and Holstein.[53]

Max Duncker thus worked under a range of professional pressures in a tense international climate. On the one hand, his unwavering public support for the Auerswald-Hohenzollern cabinet endeared him to its leaders.[54] Through Rudolf von Auerswald's and Christian von Stockmar's introductions, Duncker became acquainted in 1860 with the future heir to the Prussian throne, Prince Friedrich Wilhelm (later Emperor Friedrich III), writing political reports to the prince alongside his official duties.[55] On the other hand, when Charlotte Duncker began to handle much of her husband's personal correspondence, freeing him to focus on official duties, this arrangement angered network members who expected direct replies from Max Duncker: they incorrectly assumed that Charlotte Duncker was less informed.[56] Such members hoped to leverage the Dunckers' new connections in Berlin to acquire more positions for other members. Max Duncker, overwhelmed by official duties, responded with silence.[57] A tension began to emerge in the network between personal friendship and political opportunism.

Berthold Auerbach's prospects also rose as the New Era dawned. His experiences at the monarchical courts of Coburg and Berlin, and the reactions of his political friends, demonstrated how political friendship in the network reflected German liberals' anxieties over religious difference. In the summer of 1858, Duke Ernst II

of Coburg told Gustav Freytag and Karl Mathy that he wished to meet the celebrated author of the *Black Forest Village Stories*—over champagne. Freytag granted his sovereign's wish.[58] He confided that Auerbach's current life was a "jumble." Auerbach's second wife, Nina Auerbach (née Landesmann), was deeply unhappy, the Auerbach's son was sick, and so the family had decamped to take the waters in Kösen.[59] Freytag dispatched Mathy, Auerbach's "oldest acquaintance," to Kösen to suggest that the novelist consider meeting the duke, then join his court. Auerbach agreed to an audience with Ernst and insisted on bringing his spouse along to Gotha. Freytag felt the need to warn the duke that Nina Auerbach was a "pretty but Jewish woman."[60] He then divulged that Auerbach lived on 2,000 talers per year, which the duke might match or exceed "to enroll him under Your Highness's banner."[61]

Accompanied by Freytag, the Auerbachs traveled to Gotha. Berthold Auerbach went to the duke's court alone, where he made "a very good impression," despite at first declining to dine with the ducal family.[62] The invitation was a sign of favor from the duke, and the presence of a Jew at his table was a clear signal that Ernst rejected customs discouraging contact between Christians and Jews.[63] The duke then invited Auerbach to spend the night at his palace. Sitting for hours by the window in his room, Auerbach mused that "it occurred to me over and over how I used to be a poor, gloomy lad at 'shul' in Hechingen, and what a wonderful mystery life is."[64]

After leaving yeshiva in Hechingen, Auerbach had been educated in the Christian *Gymnasium* and university system, and he became a staunch German nationalist. He also wrote fiction meant to endear rural folk to his educated co-nationals.[65] Auerbach had long advocated for ecumenism through nationalism and Enlightenment ethics, which, he believed, could be conveyed through any "reformed" religion. He supported the Reform movement in Judaism that sought to unite "enlightened" Jews and Christians as Germans.[66] Auerbach had thus found the "proper" basis to form a personal relationship with the duke, to participate in the Enlightenment logic behind Freytag's emphasis on the equalizing power of "true" friendship among educated citizens and members of the nation.[67]

But the Auerbach family remained subject to quiet contempt; the network was not isolated from the wider ambivalence toward Jewishness and Jewish emancipation among Christian liberals.[68] Freytag's parenthetical reference to Nina Auerbach's Jewishness as a negative quality betrayed an element of what Fritz Stern called "behind-the-back-antisemitism" in the network of political friends.[69] This attitude was common among Christian elites in nineteenth-century Germany. Freytag maligned his friend's Jewishness through backhanded compliments about his wife. Freytag likewise equated the "traditional," "irrational" aspects of religion to women—another common practice in the nineteenth century, particularly among members of the Christian and Jewish bourgeoisie.[70] More

importantly, though, the subtext of Freytag's remark was that Nina Auerbach was both sexually alluring and spiritually repellent, just as the "uncanny" bourgeois Jew was perceived by Christian counterparts as outwardly appealing but essentially alien.[71] Much as he did in his fiction-writing, Gustav Freytag tapped into misogynist, Judeophobic, and antisemitic codes about Jews, and particularly Jewish women, which he did not need to elucidate to the duke in his letter.[72] The prejudiced words of the bourgeois novelist and the more accepting actions of the prince demonstrated how political friendship facilitated moments of both inclusion and exclusion for Jewish Germans.[73]

Network princes shared artistic interests among themselves and competed to recruit intellectuals, regardless of religious identification. Berthold Auerbach befriended Duke Ernst of Coburg after the meeting and made contacts within the Hohenzollern family in Prussia. He also attended court balls in Weimar, beaming that he and Grand Duke Carl Alexander had "truly become friends."[74] The Auerbachs then traveled to Gotha to visit Freytag. Duke Ernst hosted the couple at balls and dinners. Berthold Auerbach became convinced of Ernst's noble character, describing him as "a brave, free-thinking man," with whom he spent "many pleasant hours with cigars."[75] Smoking cigars and giving them as gifts were important points of homosocial camaraderie for network men—smoking was forbidden for elite women—and both practices were often recorded in letters and diaries.[76] These cross-status, inter-faith interactions were remarkable, especially in Auerbach's case, given the general exclusion of Jews from elite society in the German Confederation, and later in Imperial Germany.[77]

With the dawn of the New Era, Berthold Auerbach decided to sidestep his political friends' campaign to induct him into the Coburg court. Max Duncker, whom Auerbach had contacted to endorse the *kleindeutsch* "Eisenach Program" of the newly established Deutscher Nationalverein, wanted to bring him to Berlin.[78] Although network members criticized the "staggering" and "stagnation" of the Auerswald-Hohenzollern ministry, they held out hope that, by attracting more members to Berlin, they could enhance their official standing, offset the influence of the conservative military officers around the king, and rouse the cabinet from its apparent lethargy.[79] Auerbach, for his part, recorded his desire "to go from loneliness into the forest of men [in Berlin]. . . . It is a great joy to me to have my old friend Max Duncker here. . . . We are living in faithful old camaraderie . . . [and] everything feels as if it were in the making: full of promise for the future."[80] Auerbach's rosy appraisal stemmed perhaps from his aloofness from day-to-day politics. He focused instead on literature as a form of political service to the foundation of the future nation-state.[81] By contributing to the spread of German culture and (liberal) nationalism, Auerbach believed, he was helping to lay the groundwork for national unification.

Max Duncker obtained audiences for Auerbach with Prussia's leading state ministers Rudolf von Auerswald and Karl Anton von Hohenzollern. The latter,

Auerbach recorded, greeted him as a "fellow countryman." They then spent hours talking before Auerbach decided to send the royal minister copies of his books.[82] Carl Alexander of Weimar, Auerbach's newest patron, introduced him to his sister, Princess Augusta, and her husband, Prince Regent Wilhelm of Prussia.[83] The Hohenzollerns subsequently invited Auerbach to tea at least five times.[84] This royal reception amazed the self-conscious Auerbach, as he confided in his cousin: "I cannot describe how it feels whenever I think back on my past, afflicted life that is now so distinguished by honor and joy." More importantly, Auerbach continued, Prussian leaders chose to honor him openly—as a writer, a Jew, and a southern German liberal.[85]

Auerbach knew that his experience at court in Coburg and in Berlin signaled official favor, not only for himself but also for the network and the wider *kleindeutsch* movement. Despite all this, he feared that the attention that he received in Berlin might suddenly vanish. The Dunckers' power extended only so far, and the fickleness of royal patronage had not escaped him, either.[86] After many meetings and the approval of the royal family, Auerswald offered Auerbach a position as personal librarian to the prince regent. Auerswald insisted that the post would leave the author time to write. He believed that burdening Auerbach with official duties would be tantamount to a "theft from the nation."[87]

As in Coburg, Auerbach was skeptical about the benefits Auerswald's offer would bring: "I am accustomed to dreaming, and here everything is wide awake." Auerbach was doubtful "that I, the writer, the Jew, should reach such a distinguished position, that my life's necessities should be assured, and especially that my sons will be Prussians, belonging to the state of the future, and that I can smooth their way through life."[88] In the end, Auerbach declined the offer. He wished to preserve his independence—he claimed. In this way, Auerbach favored the informal patronage, rather than formal employment, common in the republic of letters of the eighteenth century.[89]

Berthold Auerbach's sudden rise during the New Era was all the more remarkable because in the 1840s his writing had been censored as dangerously democratic. Prussian leaders now sought to recruit a former associate of Karl Marx, Friedrich Hecker, as well as Ferdinand Freiligrath.[90] Auerbach had moved to the political center since 1848, and an accommodating, moderate-liberal government moved to promote him into elite society. Yet, taking a position at the Prussian court, which other members of the network understood as purely a political and social move, carried additional weight for Auerbach as a Jewish German. Auerswald's offer made Jewish integration into contemporary, Christian-dominated society and a future nation-state seemed attainable to him. Auerbach's Christian political friends failed to appreciate, however, the tremendous social obstacles that he would have to overcome in high society, particularly those generated by conservatives who attacked him in the press as a "court Jew."[91] Ultimately, Auerbach rejected taking part personally in his political friends'

approach to national unification through state influence. To a southern German and member of a religious minority, this path to the nation-state seemed narrow. He believed that he could do more good for the nation through literature than by serving the Hohenzollern family.

While Max Duncker was grasping for a promotion in Berlin and Auerbach was considering his options in northern Germany, Heinrich von Sybel's experience in Munich also demonstrated how, after winning official appointments, network members struggled to exert political influence at larger, royal courts. In 1859, after only a few years in Bavaria, Sybel was fighting against Catholic leaders to maintain his place at court. His position in Munich had been so undermined, he told Max Duncker, that he could not risk participating in the nascent *Süddeutsche Zeitung*.[92] Associating with a liberal periodical, Sybel insisted, would destroy his relationship with King Maximilian II.[93] He had already sacrificed participation in "day-to-day politics" in favor of scholarship and teaching in order to enhance the "culture of the land" and his own "intellectual life." Sybel's recently published volume of the *Geschichte der Revolutionszeit* offered a liberal reading of the French Revolution and Revolutionary Wars.[94] These tasks, he claimed, were useful against hostile Ultramontane elements in the kingdom.[95] Sybel nonetheless entreated Duncker to have Auerswald intervene with Maximilian to reestablish his access to the monarch.[96] Despite his amenable, scholarly behavior and Duncker's efforts, Sybel remained isolated. The choice between scholarship and praxis was a false one, and Catholic opponents balked at Sybel's advocacy of pro-Prussian liberalism in any form.[97] After all, history to leaders of political Catholicism across Europe simply meant "experimental politics."[98]

Although he remained unwilling to participate directly in contemporary politics, Sybel still endeavored to keep his political friends in Berlin abreast of the mood in Munich toward France and Austria.[99] He also passed news to Hermann Baumgarten, who had accepted a professorship at the polytechnical school in Karlsruhe. Baumgarten conveyed Sybel's views and news to Duncker, as well.[100] Duncker, for his part, shared news with Sybel from Karl Samwer in Coburg and forwarded Sybel's letters to the Prussian crown prince and king.[101] These contacts caused Sybel's clerical enemies to denounce him as a missionary of "Gotha-ism" and "Prussian-dom," alienating him further from the king.[102] Although the Peace of Villafranca (July 1859) had ended the Second Italian War, the intensifying constitutional crisis in Prussia soon overshadowed Sybel's previously stated concerns: he wanted to re-enter politics.[103]

In 1861, network members presented Sybel with two options to leave Bavaria: a professorial chair at the University of Heidelberg in Baden, or a chair at the University of Bonn in the Prussian Rhineland. Competing campaigns by different network members to do Sybel a professional favor ended up undermining the network's overall ability to cooperate on national politics. After years as

an unofficial advisor on German politics to Grand Duke Friedrich I of Baden, Franz von Roggenbach joined Friedrich's cabinet as foreign minister in May 1861.[104] This appointment was the result of lobbying by Duke Ernst of Coburg, Grand Duke Carl Alexander of Weimar, Karl Samwer, and Karl Anton von Hohenzollern (the latter at Max Duncker's behest).[105] Roggenbach suggested that, since Sybel wanted to leave Bavaria, Friedrich should bring the Borussian historian to Heidelberg.

Friedrich agreed. Roggenbach arranged for an audience between the grand duke and Sybel in early 1861. After the successful meeting, Sybel sent Friedrich some of his lectures and offered to ship him the next volume of his *Geschichte der Revolutionszeit*. In the accompanying letter, Sybel then shifted to politics, warning the monarch that "the more slowly and uncertainly our German affairs develop, the more . . . truly princely and truly patriotic sentiments are revitalized; I have the pleasure to see [this] in you at every moment."[106] Then, referring to the French Revolution—a national rebellion against royal despotism, in his eyes—Sybel implied that ignoring the German Question would only encourage revolution. Confederal princes had to cooperate with moderate liberals if they wanted to preserve their thrones. By mixing assurances of faithful service and political advice in a single letter, Sybel pursued a strategy often deployed by other network members when using their influence as best they could. He used written correspondence to solidify his impressions of the audience arranged by a trusted network intermediary. Sybel's assurances of political consensus and his references to shared memories of physical togetherness also underwrote trust and relationship-building through letter-writing in the network.

Despite this promising interaction, Sybel ultimately accepted an offer from the University of Bonn, not Heidelberg. Though Sybel had rejected the grand duke of Baden's offer, Friedrich nevertheless tried to use Sybel to expand his unofficial influence. After learning that Sybel had accepted the professorship in Bonn, Friedrich wrote to him, offering to arrange an audience with King Wilhelm of Prussia, wherein Sybel could thank the king for the appointment and share his impressions of Munich and his views on the German Question, all in order to "strengthen the king in his good intentions."[107] Friedrich also offered to introduce Sybel to Rudolf von Auerswald, August von Bethmann Hollweg, and his brother-in-law, the Prussian crown prince, who, Friedrich believed, needed "the right men" around him.[108] Sybel declined. Neglecting his teaching obligations in Bonn so early in his tenure, he replied, would be irresponsible—besides, he was suffering from an eye infection.[109] Sybel then offered to provide the grand duke with a draft proposal to the Confederal diet, denouncing its lack of progress on national consolidation.[110] Sybel sought to guide the grand duke's German policy without taxing his own connections by representing Friedrich in Berlin. For his part, the grand duke sought to patronize Sybel in order to bolster his contacts in Berlin, where he and Roggenbach were attempting to gain acceptance of their

coolly received Confederal reform proposal.[111] The two network members found themselves at cross purposes, and correspondence between them ceased.

The interaction between Heinrich von Sybel and Friedrich of Baden demonstrated once more the difficulty of cross-status political friendship and how members often exhausted network resources by pursuing separate—and even competing—campaigns of influence. Franz von Roggenbach and Grand Duke Friedrich wanted to recruit Sybel for the University of Heidelberg to spread pro-Prussian views in Baden, whereas Duke Ernst of Coburg and Max Duncker wanted to send Sybel to Bonn to increase their *kleindeutsch* influence at Prussia's majority-Catholic university. For his part, Berthold Auerbach rejected network efforts to secure him a position at the Coburg and Hohenzollern courts, partly because other network members had ignored the particular resistance that he faced as a Jew among Christian elites. It was not simply the work of the court positions that threatened to overwhelm Auerbach, but also the social environment. In contrast, Max Duncker's entry into the New Era government, and his reassignment to the more influential role as political advisor to the Prussian crown prince, were successful because the network united around a single strategy to advance Duncker's political career. To be sure, disorganization and misunderstandings undermined otherwise successful network efforts in the early 1860s. Nevertheless, the three cases—of Duncker, Auerbach, and Sybel—demonstrate how German monarchs and ministers worked to recruit network literati as part of the slow, uneven accommodation between individual post-revolutionary governments and moderate *kleindeutsch* liberals. In the meantime, the New Era ministry continued, laden with the expectations of liberals and *kleindeutsch* nationalists. Network members perceived from their new places of influence an opportunity to advance concrete plans for a liberal, *kleindeutsch* unification of Germany.

Reforming the German Confederation

The New Era government presented the liberal political friends with not only employment opportunities, but also challenges about how to implement their idea of a peaceful, liberal unification of Germany through monarchical consensus. While they advanced their political, personal, and professional positions, the friends also cooperated to advance detailed plans for the reform of the German Confederation. The most important plans for national consolidation were developed by network members Grand Duke Friedrich of Baden and Duke Ernst of Coburg, whom the influential *Staatslexikon* lauded as the only "German princes who openly endorse the efforts of the German national party."[112] War between Austria, France, and Piedmont-Sardinia in 1859, combined with the dramatic expansion of liberal press activity since 1856, spurred network members to more

concerted efforts to think through the role of monarchs in national consolidation.[113] The endeavors of these popular liberal monarchs and their political friends often dealt with their hope for a collective national monarchy through consensus among Confederal leaders. The network presented Confederal leaders with grand plans for political consolidation, before settling for a piecemeal approach to their ideal form of monarchical unification.

Network members in Baden planned a sweeping reform of the German Confederation that challenged the foundations of monarchical sovereignty in Central Europe. Although Franz von Roggenbach only joined Friedrich I of Baden's cabinet in 1861, he had already exerted considerable influence over the grand duke for years.[114] Roggenbach and Friedrich's conception of the relationship between monarchical sovereignty and command, between the person of the monarch and the exercise of military power, later informed Duke Ernst's convention with the Prussian king. With the lingering euphoria around the Prussian New Era marred by tensions between the German states over whether to aid Austria in the coming war in Italy, Roggenbach believed that it was an opportune moment to present his plan for *kleindeutsch* unification.[115] In March 1859, he enclosed his *Bundesreformplan* in a private letter to the grand duke of Baden. Roggenbach argued three main points: that his federation could be established without jeopardizing the post-Napoleonic international order, that this new federal government could exercise its power legitimately, and, ultimately, that it could reach deep into the everyday affairs of its constituent states and individual citizens.

The preamble of Roggenbach's reform proposal reviewed the foundation of the German Confederation in 1815. In his view, the Confederation was the imperfect product of a European attempt to compensate the mediatized "deprived sovereigns" of the Rhenish Confederation.[116] Austria, Prussia, and, above all, the victimized smaller monarchs "freely" entered the Confederation to preserve their prerogatives.[117] The Germany that the revolution and Napoleonic troops left behind was legally unstable, politically splintered, and diplomatically precarious, "an invariably attractive prize," Roggenbach lamented, "poised next to much more powerful neighbors."[118] The smaller states feared their neighbors and sought guarantees for their freshly acquired territory and sovereignty. The German Confederation obliged.

Roggenbach argued that the goals of the Confederation—the safety and independence of Germany—were not necessarily wrong, but that Austro-Prussian wrangling had encouraged the smaller states to pursue their narrow interests at the expense of national unity.[119] Failures to cooperate between the two German Great Powers during the Crimean War, and particularly during the Second Italian War, underscored this situation and discredited the Confederation in the eyes of Baden's diplomats.[120] Austria received the lion's share of blame from Roggenbach, however, because the national diversity of the Habsburg Monarchy allegedly bred

conflict that was exacerbated by its precarious Italian holdings.[121] Austria, he felt, had entered the Confederation simply to drag the rest of Germany into Austrian wars. Prussia, on the other hand, had entered the Confederation to avoid abandoning Germany to the influence of anti-national Austria.[122] Roggenbach continued that Prussia could maintain its position as a Great Power without the Confederation, whereas Austria required Confederal guarantees to prop up its "artificial monarchy."[123] The other states (particularly those of the *Trias*) watched and exploited what power they had to advance their petty interests. Roggenbach wanted to break this dynamic.

Roggenbach's contentions must be contextualized carefully. His emphasis on the national duty of a Protestant, all-German Prussia to unite the German states and banish Catholic Austria was common among northern German liberals after 1848–49.[124] Roggenbach's emphasis on the supposedly natural right of the Prussian state to unify Germany, too, was common legitimating rhetoric among pro-Prussian liberals and anti-revolutionaries in general.[125] The "artificiality" of the multinational Habsburg Monarchy served as a foil, underscoring the bourgeois naturalization of a single, paternalistic Prussian sovereign over the German nation. Each nation, Roggenbach believed, should have one monarch, one head of the body politic. The Habsburg emperor could not rule over a German nation-state because he ruled other nationalities, each presumably with the right to a national monarchy. Roggenbach's insistence on the naturalness of this situation reflected liberals' insistence that Germany's national unification and its turn to constitutional monarchy did not mean revolution and republicanism.[126]

The Austrian Empire persisted only as a parasite on the German national body, Roggenbach believed. To him, the Confederation and its main exploiter, Austria, were dangers to national security and hindrances to the internal development of the commerce and culture essential to national progress in the liberal worldview.[127] Roggenbach also employed a notion that was common among supporters of Prussia across the political spectrum: Prussia was the only masculine state among the otherwise feminine lands of German-speaking Europe.[128] The embodiment of the vigorous, martial state—the "natural" warrior king of Prussia—was, thus, the only German prince with claim to the title. The rest, for Roggenbach, were either scheming gingerbread princes or antique giants.[129]

To resolve the Austrian question and attempt to appeal to *großdeutsch* nationalists, Roggenbach outlined a complex treaty system. The agreement that he proposed, to be signed by Prussia and the other Confederal *states* with Austria, would ultimately become a "Treaty of Guarantees and Alliance," guarding Austrian territory after the peace of Villafranca (1859), providing military support against internal disturbances, and assuring the Austrian government of the continued goodwill of Prussian leaders.[130] The rest of the states would then sign a treaty with Prussia in which they agreed to form a new federation that would centralize most diplomatic, military, and commercial powers into a new "Federal

Authority," but the sacrifice of individual sovereignties had to be "sharply limited."[131] Roggenbach contended that the essence of state sovereignty would not be reduced; it would simply be "exercised" differently. "States" would exercise their sovereignty by sacrificing their rights to a central authority—sovereignty itself would not diminish in member states. It would still spring from the individual polities and simply flow to a federal executive.

Roggenbach proceeded to fill in the details. States would surrender international diplomacy and wartime military command to the Federal Authority. They would also place their governments, officials, and citizens under the jurisdiction of a federal court and enact state laws to conform with a new federal constitution.[132] The final provision was already in force with the Confederal prohibition against constitutions and laws at odds with its own constitution. Other provisions, however, such as ministerial responsibility and the wide jurisdiction of a federal court, were new—notwithstanding antecedents in the Reich Constitution of 1849, and even in the institutions of the Holy Roman Empire.[133] The Federal Authority would also create currency, station federal agents in any state, declare war and peace, hear complaints from citizens against individual states, and adjudicate disputes between individual states at the federal court.[134] The Federal Authority would have the ability to arrest, try, convict, imprison, and execute *anyone* accused of "federal treason" on its own authority and with its own officials.[135]

Roggenbach clearly assigned agency to states and nations, which was a common feature of midcentury liberal thinking.[136] He eschewed mentioning monarchs in much of the preamble and the more sweeping articles of his draft. Roggenbach may have proclaimed that Prussia saves, and Austria schemes—this was one of his bolder claims—but his level of abstraction deserves attention because he did not write of state ministers or monarchs. This choice of words was part of a broader political impulse in Europe, circulating since the Enlightenment, to break the image of the monarch as God's anointed head of politics and society. Liberals sought to substitute the people of the nation—here, bourgeois men—as the leading historical actors who would steer the state through deliberation in the legislature, service as responsible state ministers, and expertise as advisors to pliant princes.[137] The (nation-)state was sovereign, not the monarch.[138] Yet German liberals needed the princes to accept this iconoclastic campaign if they hoped to found a liberal nation-state without revolution. Network members' understanding of sovereignty flowing to a nationalized monarchy was revolutionary in the context of the Confederal Constitution.[139] Roggenbach refused to acknowledge the implications of his proposal for individual sovereigns because, in the end, he needed their consent. Perhaps believing that state leaders would eventually see reason and cede power to a federal state, Roggenbach delayed discussing the near absolutist demands of his future federation on Confederal princes to later sections of his draft.[140]

The confusion over where power actually resided in the new "federation" came fully into view in the final sections of Roggenbach's proposal, where he had to explain the role of the Prussian king in his plan to create a new federal power. He remarked toward the end of the draft that the old Confederation would not disappear.[141] The dissolution of the Confederation of 1815 would violate international treaties, turning Roggenbach's reform into an international revolution. Roggenbach argued, therefore, that Confederal laws would remain in force in Austria, as well as in the Danish and Dutch Confederal states, but would cease to apply to the states of the new federation with Prussia. Thus, Roggenbach found a premodern answer to a modern legal complexity: he embraced anomaly.[142] He contended that the federation would be the legal successor of the Confederation and guarantor of its international obligations.[143] This supposed compromise with international legality was a convoluted borrowing from the *Doppelbund* of *Trias* thinking in which the smaller German states would form a new, "narrower" federation within the old, or "wider," Confederation with Austria and Prussia.[144] Yet, unlike the double Confederation of the *Trias*, the Roggenbach federation would somehow reside within the shell of the old Confederation. He emphasized that his federation would be a "convention of sovereign *states*," whereas the basis of the Confederation was agreement between sovereign *monarchs*.[145] States, in effect, entered the Confederation behind their monarchs. Yet, in Roggenbach's federation, the states themselves formed the union. He tried to reconcile the influence of southern German liberals' openness to popular sovereignty—who argued that the princes were representatives of the state—with a more conservative understanding of monarchy.[146] A union of states could not be a member of a monarchical compact such as the Confederation, unless it was ruled by a single sovereign, not an abstract Federal Authority or "leading federal power."[147]

Which state—or better, who—was the "leading power" of the federation? "The king of Prussia," Roggenbach declared, "exercises all rights and powers that are allocated to the Federal Authority. . . ."[148] A federation of states would not be headed by one state but by the Crown of the most powerful state. Roggenbach unknowingly created this dissonance by ascribing agency and authority first to states, then to monarchs, then to the Federal Authority. He sowed confusion about the legitimacy of the federal government and ruffled legitimist feathers across Germany. Roggenbach argued that sovereignty flowed from the monarch to the states, then from the states back to the Federal Authority. Constituent sovereignties would collect for the king to deploy as head of the Federal Authority and monarch of the largest state. The point of Roggenbach's seemingly contradictory line of authority from many individual princes to one national monarch was that monarchical sovereignty remained, at the federal level, in the hands of a prince. The king of Prussia would also have the right to call and dismiss the State and National Councils—bodies of the federal legislature akin to the British Commons and House of Lords. He could also pardon felons and oversee all areas

touching on federal authority.[149] Other monarchs would, thus, have no hope of opposing Prussian power if the National Council were prorogued. The Prussian king would wield complete military and diplomatic powers, the hallmarks of nineteenth-century monarchical sovereignty, whereas constituent monarchs and the people's representatives would exercise only indirect influence over the executive in the bicameral legislature.[150]

Roggenbach's proposal also addressed the problem of a future war. After the completion of the treaties forming the basis of the federal constitution, the constituent states would sign a new federal war constitution.[151] It would provide the basis on which states would reach individual military conventions with Prussia. Again, the *states* of Germany, meaning their monarchs, would reach identical agreements with the king of Prussia. There would be no singular treaty between all other states and Prussia that would elide the notion on which Roggenbach insisted: that sovereignties would flow into the reservoir of the Federal Authority individually to be dispensed by the person of the Prussian king.[152]

The new war constitution and subsequent military conventions would provide the Federal Authority with "the exclusive right to organize and legislate, along with the supervision of the German army."[153] The Federal Authority, vested abstractly in the Prussian Crown and embodied literally in the person of the Prussian king, would have the power to appoint, in wartime, all corps commanders, divisional commanders, and general staffs.[154] What would disappear in Roggenbach's plan was the assignment of officers—a sovereign prerogative and important tool in monarchical patronage and international relations. Apart from the diplomatic right to declare war and peace, the Federal Authority would control state army contingents tasked with responding to external and internal "threats."[155] The vagueness of the term "threats" likely signaled that the new federation would fulfill the international obligations of the old Confederation: to suppress rebels and revolution. The Federal Authority would allow the king to reach into individual states and shape the final, and, increasingly, the first instance of civil suppression.[156] Thus, monarchs would surrender control of their armies, as well as a major part of their police forces, to the Prussian king.

Questions of officer appointments and military justice proved difficult to settle. Suffice it to say here that this proposal stepped indelicately on an important institution—military command—through which monarchs interacted with the nobility. That relationship represented a bastion of royal service to the state, particularly in Prussia.[157] More traditional monarchs balked at such interference, as did some liberals: both groups feared this change might shift control of internal policing to the Junker-dominated Prussian army. Roggenbach's new Federal Authority might thereby affect the daily affairs and privileges of every citizen-subject in every state: judicially, through a federal court; legislatively, through the directly elected National Council; and executively, through the supreme military command of the Prussian king.

The plan demonstrated that Roggenbach and his liberal political friends, after years of difficult accommodations with conservative state power, were still pursuing a strategy that hinged on persuading Germany's monarchs and state ministers to form a *kleindeutsch* nation-state. However, like most network members, Roggenbach either failed to understand what monarchy meant to most German leaders or understood but failed to offer a vision that appealed to *großdeutsch* nationalists or Prussian conservatives. Roggenbach did not consider democrats, whose notions of monarchy were as unappealing to moderate liberals as moderate liberals' collective national monarchy was to conservatives. In their need to convince Confederal leaders to accept their advice, the political friends faced a narrow path to national unification.

In the wake of the Italian War of 1859, Grand Duke Friedrich of Baden incorporated nearly all of Franz von Roggenbach's draft into his government's draft proposal of 1860–61, which he and Roggenbach circulated to other members of the network.[158] Roggenbach reported to Max Duncker that he and Friedrich of Baden had received mixed messages about the plan from both the Prussian foreign ministry and the prince regent, though both remained open to reform originating from a smaller state.[159] Nevertheless, Roggenbach admitted that a Baden plan would still likely be met with skepticism.[160] He mobilized Duncker and other network members for a second time to sound out the Prussian government discreetly about its members' receptiveness to a Baden proposal to the Confederal diet.[161]

Although King Wilhelm had initially endorsed a general Baden outline for Confederal reform, the detailed proposal's official reception in Berlin was cool.[162] Max Duncker's inability to gauge the attitude of the Prussian government toward reform demonstrated his lack of influence at the highest levels and failure to coordinate within the network. In a memorandum to the crown prince in May 1861, Duncker referred to fears in the Wilhelmstraße that the crown prince would fall prey to "fantastical plans" through his connections with Baden, especially after Roggenbach's appointment as foreign minister.[163] High officials in Prussia regarded the Baden government in general, and Roggenbach in particular, as sources of dangerously fanciful reformism.[164] Albrecht von Bernstorff, Prussia's new foreign minister, worried that Friedrich and Roggenbach's reformed Confederation "would be more republican than monarchical."[165] Nevertheless, Bernstorff did incorporate a few of Roggenbach's proposals into his reply to *Trias* unification plans in December 1861.[166]

These Prussian officials, however, merely restated their ruler's sentiments. In an earlier letter to Friedrich of Baden, Wilhelm had criticized the "theorizing small states," arguing that the lesser states should simply join him against the possibility of French invasion.[167] "Theorizing" among leaders of the smaller states meant Confederal reform, and the Prussian king challenged the legitimacy of

his son-in-law's efforts. Wilhelm also tapped into fears among German liberals that their efforts might be dismissed by rivals as "childish *Projectmacherei*."[168] The limits that Grand Duke Friedrich's plans would place on Wilhelm's own rights were too tight. The king therefore suggested submission to Prussia as a *temporary* defensive measure against France. The smaller princes would have to surrender their sovereignty on Wilhelm's terms, not their own.

Taking stock, we can see that Friedrich of Baden and Franz von Roggenbach, unlike most Prussian leaders, located sovereignty in the machinery of state, meaning here constitutional, parliamentary government. In this way, Roggenbach reinterpreted absolutist-era reformers, such as Carl Svarez, who considered an ideal monarch to be the "principal of civil society," what Hobbes called the state's "artificial soul," and what the Prussian Allgemeines Landrecht called the "head *within* the state."[169] Sovereignty inhered in the monarch, but his place inside the apparatus of state suggested that the monarch's God-given prerogatives were contained and administered by the state. Once national unification was achieved, the king merely had to be there in the system, not active in its direction.[170] Roggenbach adopted the king of Prussia as the legitimating ghost *within* the machine of his liberal, federal government. In his proposal, sovereignty would be collected in the nation-state to serve practical ends: first, because it would transfer agency from monarchs to states; and second, because those states, now governed constitutionally, would help realize national unification. Roggenbach adapted liberal notions of monarchs as necessary agents of historical progress who would be overcome with the foundation of a centralized nation-state.[171] Conservative leaders were unlikely to accept such a premise at all: they insisted that states were emanations of the monarch's divine-right sovereignty; they were not independent agents in themselves. For them, sovereignty could only be lent so far. Otherwise, the princes themselves might disappear, and republican revolution might deluge the conservative monarchical order of post-Napoleonic Europe.

Roggenbach and Friedrich of Baden's attempt at Confederal reform foundered on the views of the leaders of larger Confederal states, whose understanding of monarchy fueled their continuing suspicion of sweeping reforms. In the face of such opposition, network members began to understand that a gradual approach to national consolidation was more realistic. By September 1860, Karl Mathy had already asked Charlotte Duncker to see whether Berlin would be willing to entertain a commission within the Zollverein to develop Confederal reforms.[172] The others restricted themselves to altering the Confederal War Constitution, which had become an important topic among German liberals, to the benefit of the Prussian monarchy.[173] They seem to have concluded that military authority, the keystone of monarchical power, should be their focus.[174] Nevertheless, certain aspects of Roggenbach's ambitious Federal Authority would find modest expression in a treaty Duke Ernst of Coburg concluded with Prussia in 1861.

Shortly after Austria's military defeat in Italy in 1859, Duke Ernst II of Coburg signaled—on his own initiative—his willingness to sacrifice his sovereignty for national unity. He explained to Grand Duke Friedrich of Baden: "For me, it is only about the people making sure which of the German princes boldly take the important questions of the day in their hands and are capable of breaking out of their miscellaneous dynastic interests."[175] Confederal intractability on reform during the Italian War of 1859 had frustrated Duke Ernst. He stated that with "the complete lack of goodwill among most of the Confederal governments, it seemed necessary for me to take a practical step to effect a solution to the questions in my admittedly limited sphere of power."[176] Ernst's focus on the "lack of goodwill" among the German governments indicated the network's continued, though diminishing, faith in princely consensus to achieve national goals.[177] Duke Ernst sought to advance *kleindeutsch* unification and demonstrate his readiness to relinquish his rights for the "common good." In his subsequent military convention with Prussia, Duke Ernst disavowed Roggenbach and Friedrich of Baden's sweeping reforms, which Wilhelm of Prussia had dismissed as "theoretics." Yet, the convention sparked controversy not because it was practical but because it was highly symbolic.

Coburg and Prussian officials signed the military convention in June 1861, at the same time the Prussian government introduced War Minister Albrecht von Roon's hotly disputed army bill to the Landtag. That bill ignited years of constitutional struggle over the right of the legislature to review military spending and divided liberals.[178] The agreement drew on traditions of informal military cooperation between smaller German governments and the Prussian army.[179] The preamble of the convention acknowledged that the king of Prussia and the duke of Coburg accepted the treaty because they were firmly convinced that Germany had to strengthen its common military capacities.[180] They therefore pleaded with other governments to bind themselves to one of the German Great Powers to promote military cooperation and national consolidation.

The question of sovereignty and its transferability emerged immediately. The document was filed as a military agreement between the Coburg government and the government of Prussia.[181] In reality, it was an agreement between monarchs as commanders, not an agreement between state governments. What was framed as a modern agreement between states for the German nation was a translation of traditional princely consensus-building in the Holy Roman Empire.[182] The distinction was important, especially when the more conservative monarchs and state ministers challenged the convention. They did so because it curtailed monarchical prerogatives, not state power as such, just as they had the Baden reform plans a year earlier.

The convention provided that the Prussian king, as supreme commander of the Prussian army, would accept the financial and material upkeep of the Coburg Confederal military contingent.[183] In exchange, the duke of Coburg

would become a Prussian general in command of the Coburg contingent: "His Highness the duke stands in relation to the contingent as a commanding general, and His Highness will approach all relevant general edicts, regulations, ordinances [*sic*] through the Royal War Ministry."[184] The Prussian army would train Coburg troops to Prussian standards. All uniforms, riding equipment, and other materiel would become Prussian military property. The signatories took pains to portray the armies as united in personal union with the Prussian king, but the implementation of Prussian state laws and military standards represented the de facto incorporation of Coburg troops into the Prussian army.

The Prussian king and his laws held sway in this convention. In his role as commanding officer, the duke had to communicate with the king through the war ministry. The duke of Coburg could no longer, technically, communicate with the king as an equal sovereign and confederate. At best, Duke Ernst became an unusual kind of subordinate. Yet, was supreme command—military sovereignty—shared between the king and the duke? Did this division alter the essence of the duke's divine-right prerogatives, the independence of his duchies, and the foundations of political legitimacy in Central Europe?

As in Roggenbach's reform plan, the implications of the duke's sovereign "sacrifice" became clearer in the details. The king of Prussia, as the new supreme Coburg commander, exercised important rights that stood between the reigning duke and his subject-citizens—in the field and at home. The king could now engage with individual Coburg subjects at the most consequential levels—those of material support and court rulings. The convention also codified extra-Confederal Prussian police powers in a smaller German state. The absolutist campaign to abolish the social and legal barriers between the monarch and his subject-citizens, as a hallmark of princely power and state hegemony, resorted in the convention to an early modern "layering" of princely sovereignty.[185] The duke's flowed to the Prussian king, as it would have in Roggenbach's reform proposal.[186] Yet, once the duke's sovereign rights passed to the king, they could not easily be retracted.

For one thing, the Prussian king had to approve senior officers' appointments within the Coburg contingent and could reassign officers at will, though the duke's preferences would be given the "most feasible deference."[187] Officers, doctors, and paymasters were freed of all ducal taxes and obliged to pay into Prussian pension schemes and widow-orphan funds. More importantly, Coburg troops would swear an oath of allegiance to the king of Prussia.[188] By pledging themselves to the Prussian king as if they were Prussian subjects, Coburgers swore to obey a foreign leader over their own monarch. Coburg officers, doctors, and paymasters also had to obtain the Prussian king's consent before accepting foreign military honors. In a society that prized decorations and understood the powerful relationships they represented, these Coburgers had to apply to a power beyond their own ruler.[189]

The insistence on the king of Prussia's control over officers, doctors, and paymasters matched Roggenbach's fixation in his reform proposal on regulating the relationship between the monarch, as supreme commander, nobles, and bourgeois citizen-soldiers. Nobles and a noble ethos continued to dominate officer corps, especially in Prussia, well into the 1860s—and beyond.[190] The army was the traditional institution through which territorializing monarchies coopted local nobles, and through which nobles expected to influence high politics and gain access to the monarch.[191] However, paymasters—army bureaucrats, basically—and doctors were more likely to be middle-class professionals. The Prussian king gained the right to insert himself between the duke and his most "important" subjects through the institution that most projected monarchical prestige and political power.

The providence of the Prussian king extended broadly into areas of military justice. He not only exercised all martial prerogatives for Prussian subjects assigned to the Coburg contingent, but he was also the final arbiter over life and death for Coburg soldiers. The duke retained the right of first review in cases involving units or individual enlisted men. In cases involving officers, doctors, and paymasters, the king of Prussia would rule by consensus with the duke. For officers convicted of civil offenses, the king and the duke had to reach a consensus on pardons. For officers convicted of military crimes, only the Prussian king could grant pardons. At the highest level of military justice, only the king of Prussia could spare lives or reverse ducal decisions.

The king of Prussian could likewise intervene in the administration of the Coburg duchies through the deployment of the army for internal policing. The convention stated that the duke of Coburg maintained full control over his now-Prussian contingent in whole or part for "policing purposes."[192] The contingent, however, might contain Prussian soldiers and officers who would take part in quelling possible unrest in Coburg. When confronting "armed tumults," the Coburg contingent had to proceed according to Prussian riot ordinances and state sedition laws. The duchies were also obliged to pass legislation conforming to Prussian laws against civil unrest. Coburgers would be treated like Prussians, as the Prussian army mixed in foreign politics with the highest measure of violence and without Confederal execution orders. This innovation well exceeded the limited jurisdiction of the Confederal diet to discipline state officers serving in its contingents.[193] The overriding mandate of the German Confederation—to quash revolutionary activity—passed to the Prussian king. The duke of Coburg, much as Franz von Roggenbach and Friedrich of Baden had in their reform proposals, embraced anomaly, and "divided sovereignty" in his pursuit of the nation-state.[194]

What is historically important is that Duke Ernst sought to set an example for the other German monarchs who, liberals knew, were reluctant to surrender their "particularist sovereignty."[195] He wanted to show how they too could "sacrifice"

their personal sovereignty, their supreme judicial authority and monopoly on violence, to a larger monarch to advance German national security and the eventual realization of the nation-state.[196] In dividing his sovereignty, Ernst combined a deeply religious, eschatological estimation of sacrifice to the liberal idea that the nation-state was the end-station of historical progress. The duke's part in this relationship, however, remained vague and precarious. As a senior Prussian officer, he submitted himself to the possibility of court martial, imprisonment, or even execution. He was subject to another monarch, but as sovereign he remained the origin of Coburg legal authority and the embodiment of his states' connection to the Confederation. This contradiction was not lost on Ernst's contemporaries.

In a letter to Grand Duke Carl Alexander of Weimar in July 1861, Friedrich of Baden appraised Duke Ernst's military convention with Prussia from two perspectives. On the one hand, Friedrich thought the convention represented a convenient solution to problems facing smaller states—Friedrich likely meant the financial burden of maintaining Confederal contingents. On the other hand, Friedrich believed that, in the context of *kleindeutsch* conflict with *Trias* advocates, such extra-Confederal agreements might cause disintegration in the nationalist camp. He warned Carl Alexander that "We should not give our opponents the opportunity to engage us with our own weapons, and so we must cautiously measure our forces, and only then, if we have prepared the field, join battle."[197] Friedrich was concerned, not with the idea of Ernst's submission to Prussian power, but with its timing. Network members still hoped to push *kleindeutsch* reforms through the Confederal diet. Any convention that could be construed as mediatization undermined their credibility among the smaller states.

Other monarchical reactions were more dramatic. Duke Bernhard II of Saxe-Meiningen, Ernst's Thuringian neighbor, found Duke Ernst's convention unforgivable. The duke had not consulted the other members of their dynasty—which included the ever-suspicious Bernhard—before relinquishing a portion of his sovereignty.[198] Ernst's decision could not be considered simply personal. Since he was a reigning monarch, his decision affected all dynasts as potential heirs. It threatened their presumptive majesty. Bernhard regarded the current monarch as a custodian of the Crown, and Ernst could not relinquish any rights of said Crown without the consent of its possible heirs.[199]

King Georg V of Hanover, notoriously jealous of his prerogatives and opposed to any changes to Confederal law, captured the attitude of the most conservative German monarchs in reacting to news of the Coburg-Prussian compact.[200] He warned Emperor Franz Joseph of Austria against splitting the leadership of Confederal forces between himself and Prussia, reminding the emperor that infringing on monarchs' supreme command would be like laying "an axe to the roots of the individual princes' sovereignty." Georg continued: "One of the major elements of sovereignty is, as you know, military authority . . . without it, the sovereign princes would be mere vassals or satellites of both Great Powers."[201] His

arboreal metaphor hints at a conception of monarchy and the state as products of a divinely ordained cosmos, of natural development—this thinking was popular among German conservatives.[202] For the king of Hanover, without overall command, even the rulers of middle German states would lose their sovereignty and suffer mediatization. The duke of Coburg's convention, therefore, threatened the basis of European society. If the legitimate order were upset, it would only invite revolution and social chaos. Preserving divine-right monarchy, as well as the independence of the smaller German states, outweighed national interests for King Georg.

Other leaders in the middle states expressed Georg's negative assessment in more menacing terms. For Friedrich Ferdinand von Beust, de facto minister president of Saxony and a leading voice in the *Trias* movement, the duke's convention with the king of Prussia revealed the latter's desire to dominate the smaller German states.[203] An Austrian diplomat recorded that Beust said that, although the military convention benefited an already powerful Prussia, it did not affect the "unviability" of the small states, "since they are often really a caricature of state political life . . ."[204] Beust's statement not only expressed *Trias*'s interests in mediatizing smaller neighbors; it also conflated military authority with the raison d'être of reigning monarchs and the "viability" of the countries they ruled—a variation on the Hanoverian king's legitimist argument. Since Ernst of Coburg had surrendered his military sovereignty, he and his state could no longer enjoy any independence.

Network members also reported rumblings about Duke Ernst's political activities as a Prussian general, further illustrating how contemporaries struggled to understand the concept of a sovereign Prussian duke-general. Max Duncker wrote to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm of Prussia, pointing to the convention with Coburg as one of the all-too-few successes of the New Era ministry.[205] Duncker admitted, however, that in its own right, the convention signified little: more conventions needed to follow between Prussia and Waldeck-Pyrmont, Altenburg, and Weimar. The Saxon and Meiningen governments had contested the agreement, he added, but the French government might also oppose the treaty. Duncker alluded here to "*Rheinbündlerei*," or the cooperation of German princes with Napoleon I in the Rhenish Confederation (1806–13), in the shared interests of France and the middle states.[206] Max Duncker deemed objections from Paris and Dresden to be auspicious signs: whatever angered the enemy in France and the particularists in Saxony must be good for Prussia and, therefore, good for Germany.

In the late 1880s, Duke Ernst argued in his memoirs that a prince's first duty was to maintain German national strength in Europe.[207] A monarch's loyalty was to the conceptual nation and not to his population as such. This understanding, based on hindsight, contrasts with how the duke often based his legitimacy on a direct, personal connection to each of his subjects.[208] Ernst alluded to this con-

tradiction when he described dissent in Coburg over union with the Prussian king. He reported cries such as, "The *Landeskinder* are being sold to the king of Prussia!"[209] The *Landesvater* (father of the land) derived his position from the patriarchal protection of his *Landeskinder* (children of the land). Submission to another monarch upset widespread notions of the "family state" and unsettled bourgeois members' expectations of "manly" monarchs in control of themselves, their families, and their *Landeskinder*. This charge was especially loaded for German liberals, such as Ernst, because they imagined monarchical authority as the "natural" historical outgrowth of, and contemporary analog to, the authority of the family patriarch.[210]

Duke Ernst's fiat diplomacy also clashed with liberal ideas about citizen participation—of the propertied and educated—in major government decisions and reflected his insistence on deference from his liberal political friends in other areas of organizing. Ernst defended the convention as a "good patriotic sacrifice," if a rather paternalistic one.[211] His subjects had to submit to Prussia and Germany by *his* decree. The goal of the nation-state triumphed over the traditional duties of the monarchical patriarch and the consideration a liberal ruler owed his citizen-subjects—and his political friends. As Ernst described reactions to his pact in his memoirs, King Georg of Hanover and Friedrich von Beust, like the disgruntled Coburgers, cared more about the realities of uniforms and courts martial than the fiction of the nation. Duke Ernst also claimed retrospectively that he had agreed to a temporary measure to cede only a small portion of his monarchical prerogative.[212] Indeed, the duke's two duchies together had only about 150,000 inhabitants spread over less than 2,700 square kilometers. Its Confederal contingent provided a reserve of about 1,800 troops. In the fraught climate of the Confederation at this time, however—with mounting fears of French invasion from the west, Danish inroads from the north, and Italian attack from the south—most Confederal leaders were unlikely to applaud the convention when it involved military matters and smacked of mediatization.

Duke Ernst thus attempted to overcome the tradition of noisy independence among the smaller German states, but he remained a part of a Central European system that required legal and military authority to be united in a fully sovereign *Landesvater*. He had to maintain his monopoly on violence and its expression in military matters. Nevertheless, it is important to note again that the duke's prerogatives were not ceded to the Prussian state. They were surrendered to the *person* of the Prussian king. Duke Ernst's sacrifice for the good of the German nation, though couched in modern phrases, was an agreement between princely commanders—the very foundation of the German Confederation. Duke Ernst and King Wilhelm thus adapted post-Napoleonic legitimism to the cause of national consolidation.

Other members of the network imagined the Coburg convention as an example for other smaller states in the 1860s. Indeed, Weimar had drafted a similar

agreement, and, by 1864, Altenburg and Waldeck-Pyrmont had concluded military conventions with the Prussian king.[213] In 1866–67, the Coburg military compact served as a model for military agreements that provided a crucial foundation for the North German Confederation.[214] The conceptual complexity of the agreement could not obscure the fact that Prussia was arrogating power in the Confederation. Most Confederal monarchs rejected Ernst's model for the peaceful consolidation of German military power. Both the liberal network's grand and piecemeal efforts in the early 1860s to achieve national unification had failed to attract much support in the halls of power. The political friends soon faced greater problems and harder decisions.

The End of the New Era and the Limits of Accommodation

Even as network members in the smaller states developed serious plans for national unification and enjoyed some limited successes, Max Duncker's position in Berlin remained vulnerable. Charlotte Duncker and Karl Mathy noted that although Max Duncker's nerves had been damaged by working in the Central Press Office, he had continued to impress Auerswald and Hohenzollern with his apologias for the cabinet. Unfortunately, he had also neglected requests for news and favors from core network members such as Heinrich von Sybel and Karl Francke.[215] Duncker also failed to quash scathing articles in the conservative press against Duke Ernst and his extended family in London.[216] Network members outside the Prussian government were further dissatisfied with its lack of reform and the prince regent's insistence on his royal prerogatives over the constitutional rights of the Prussian Landtag.[217] Charlotte Duncker was left to repair network relations, emphasizing the friends' common "political religion" and their long history of mutual support.[218]

Max Duncker managed to please state officials and political friends alike in June 1860 at a meeting in Baden-Baden between select Confederal monarchs and Napoleon III. Just one year after defeating the Austrians in Italy, the French emperor had requested a personal meeting with the Prussian prince regent, Wilhelm, on Confederal territory. To avoid the impression that the Prussian government was considering an alliance with Napoleon and to demonstrate German unity, Wilhelm invited other major Confederal monarchs to join him. *Kleindeutsch* advocates lauded Wilhelm's demonstration of Hohenzollern power and influence in the Habsburgs' absence—evidence of his "moral conquest" of Germany as Baden reform plans languished.

Despite his position in the Press Office and the unclear chain of command, Duncker exercised considerable influence on the Prussian delegation.[219] Meetings between Napoleon III and Wilhelm were cordial but non-committal. Princes from the small German states shadowed the separate meetings between

the French, Bavarian, and Baden monarchs to dispel any appearance of "*Rheinbündlerei*."[220] Duncker conferred regularly with Wilhelm and Auerswald, and the former accepted Duncker's draft for his closing speech almost word for word.[221] In the final meeting at Baden-Baden, Confederal leaders, foreshadowing the Fürstentag of 1863, issued a vague declaration about monarchical unity and the need to consolidate the Confederation. Network reactions to the summit were mixed. Ernst of Coburg, for one, was upset that he had not initially been invited.[222]

Max Duncker quickly capitalized on his improved standing. In January 1861, King Friedrich Wilhelm IV died, and the prince regent ascended the throne as King Wilhelm I, bolstering his symbolic and legal authority.[223] Writing to the new king in early 1861, Duncker decried the burdens associated with his Press Office position. He had to contend with the effects for the government of Wilhelm's decision at the start of the New Era to relax restrictions on the press—a key policy for liberals. Defending the "state administration" from "bitter criticism" in the domestic press had exhausted his energies, Duncker claimed.[224] Duncker gently tendered his resignation, adding that he still wanted to serve his sovereign but would not presume to tell Wilhelm how to use his civil servants. Making an important distinction, Duncker adopted the formal language of fealty to the Prussian Crown, not necessarily expressing loyalty to Wilhelm as a person. The latter was how bourgeois members tended to interact with network princes. Political friendship was socially leveling, but minor monarchs seemed more approachable compared to the fearsome image of the powerful, older king.[225]

It was not long before Duncker was able to leverage his previous service to the Prussian government, his acquaintance with the crown prince, and the decisive intervention of Auerswald, Hohenzollern, and Duke Ernst of Coburg. The result was Duncker's appointment as political advisor to King Wilhelm's only son, Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, in June 1861.[226] This time, Duncker raced to outmaneuver his critics. He immediately began restricting access to the crown prince by mandating a new routine, reminiscent of Freytag's plans in the 1850s to insulate Duke Ernst from unwelcome distractions. Duncker felt compelled by the "difficult and manifold duties that these times will place on His Royal Highness" to tutor the prince in regal deportment, considering it a "matter of conscience."[227] Claiming that he wanted only to preserve the crown prince's strength and energy, but actually in order to gain influence over him, Duncker advised Friedrich Wilhelm to avoid direct involvement in most issues and limit his audiences to those with written applications only—in effect, ceding control over his schedule to his advisor.[228]

Max Duncker, like Gustav Freytag, implemented the liberal theory that monarchs, properly tutored in "correct political perception" and "true political virtue," would enact liberal policies.[229] Duncker's particular emphasis on upright behavior reflected German liberals' belief that the fall of the Bourbon monarchy

during the French Revolution—leading to the Terror—was occasioned by a population resentful of royal immorality and government waste.[230] In the view of bourgeois liberals, princes differed little from the poor in their need for tutelage in the manners of moral politics.

In practice, Max Duncker's main duty was to brief the crown prince on political developments through regular reports on domestic, Confederal, and international politics.[231] Before Max Duncker's formal appointment as advisor to the crown prince, both Dunckers had shared publications by their political friends, such as Sybel and Auerbach, with the crown prince, along with memoranda and reports by Duke Ernst of Coburg, Karl Samwer, Franz von Roggenbach, and Friedrich of Baden.[232] The principal subjects that Max Duncker himself broached with the royal heir were the constitutional crisis, the consolidation of the Confederation, and the goals of the teetering New Era ministry.

In his reports, Duncker supported the Prussian Crown in its conflict with the Landtag; he believed that the army budget and associated taxes on previously exempt East-Elbian estates would undermine noble power and thereby political conservatism in Prussia—to the advantage of liberal reformers.[233] Duncker also believed that an expanded army could better protect the Confederation from potential Danish and French aggression, lessen Russian influence at court, and thereby speed *kleindeutsch* unification. Here, Duncker differed from most network members who resented royal claims on the remaining rights won during the Revolutions of 1848/49.

Max Duncker did adhere to orthodox opinion within the network on the second topic: only Confederal monarchs could accomplish the peaceful unification of a liberal *Kleindeutschland* because Trias projects were dangerous.[234] Members favored a British-style parliament with associated limits on royal power for the future state. The crown prince agreed with liberals on responsible ministers—at the time—and embraced a bourgeois lifestyle in public.[235] On the third point, Duncker defended his patrons in the New Era until Hohenzollern and Auerswald had both resigned by early 1862. The Prussian constitutional crisis had intensified considerably, and the dispute over the new military budget pitted the legislative power of the purse against the most potent aspect of monarchical sovereignty: military command.[236] The crisis was crucial to the fracturing of the network after the collapse of the New Era government. A caretaker cabinet followed under Adolf zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, whose leading rule was taken over by that of August von der Heydt, a long-serving trade minister and moderate, statist conservative.[237]

With the downfall of the New Era cabinet, Max Duncker recommended ministerial replacements to the crown prince from among his political friends.[238] In early 1862, Duncker began to present Otto von Bismarck as someone to break the gridlock that had brought down Hohenzollern and Auerswald. He had been in contact with Bismarck from at least December 1861 regarding German pol-

itics.[239] Duncker reported to the crown prince that if the king did not promote the moderate-liberal foreign minister, Albrecht von Bernstorff, a Bismarck ministry would be preferable to the current, "half-hearted" Heydt cabinet.[240] Duncker quickly claimed that, barring the formation of a new liberal ministry, Bismarck's appointment would represent "an important win" for both the Prussian legislature and the Crown.[241] He also advised Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm that Bismarck should receive invitations to crown councils, and he enthused over Bismarck's plan to create new professorships—tangible boons to Duncker's political friends.[242]

After Bismarck assured King Wilhelm that he could deliver military reform without a majority in the Prussian Landtag, the king appointed him minister president on 23 September 1862.[243] The new minister president received Duncker two days later "with memories of our classmate camaraderie," and the hope "that our new relationship will never lack the openness of that old companionship."[244] Duncker praised Bismarck's ministry to the crown prince, whose wife and mother distrusted the new leader.[245] He then asserted that Bismarck was "on the road to a liberal, national policy—on a military road," that was. Duncker made this claim even though Bismarck had been appointed to break liberal parliamentary resistance to the proposed military budget at all costs.[246] Bismarck's so-called liberal foreign policy—by which Duncker meant a path to *kleindeutsch* unification—led him to impute goodwill to Bismarck's domestic policy toward the legislature. In Duncker's view, Bismarck "seriously wants rapprochement," with the king's consent. Bismarck's standing with the king, Duncker declared, was far better than Heydt's or Auerswald's had ever been.[247]

Here—and this point merits emphasis—Duncker made one of German liberalism's earliest accommodations with Bismarck's anti-parliamentarianism in exchange for national unification. He endorsed the primacy of German unity over Prussian constitutional freedoms. Duncker turned right for avowedly liberal reasons, he claimed, and sought to steer the crown prince toward the policies of the "white revolutionary" by emphasizing national potentiality over domestic reality.[248] Nonetheless, after the collapse of the New Era cabinet, Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm exercised little influence over his father, the king.[249] Perhaps Duncker believed that creating some sort of understanding between Bismarck and the crown prince might increase the latter's influence.

More importantly, Max Duncker undergirded his evaluation of Bismarck with shared memories of boyhood camaraderie. Both the liberal advisor and the conservative minister assumed personal feeling reflected political agreement or at least an avenue to accommodation—a budding political friendship, Duncker hoped.[250] According to the logic of political friendship, if Duncker held any fond memories of Bismarck, there had to be a common outlook resulting from that emotional affinity. Bismarck, who was skilled at the manipulation of emotion for political ends, likely considered Duncker yet another representative of misguided

"*Geheimrathsliberalismus*"—a persuasive emissary to liberals in the legislature, but ultimately someone with dangerous, divisive notions of political reform.[251]

Most core members of the network, including Franz von Roggenbach, Karl Samwer, Gustav Freytag, and Duke Ernst of Coburg, had no personal connection to Bismarck. Moreover, they saw in him an unrepentant reactionary from 1848 and their days at the Erfurt Parliament.[252] Duncker's rejection in 1863 of the network consensus against Bismarck angered these members, particularly Samwer and Ernst, and the relative openness of the 1860s gave network members more opportunities to vent their frustrations and less reason to tolerate recalcitrant political friends. Samwer and Duke Ernst began undermining Duncker's position with the crown prince in favor of Ernst von Stockmar, son of the recently deceased Christian von Stockmar.[253] After Duncker had endorsed the second dissolution of the Prussian Landtag in mid-1863, Samwer seethed with anger: "I have buried Max Duncker. . . . I consider him merely an apostate, admittedly a very stupid apostate, but after all a conscious enemy of that cause for which we fought alongside him for years."[254] Samwer felt Duncker had betrayed him and the network personally and politically. He painted this betrayal in militantly religious hues, hoping other members would join him in finally "burying" Duncker.[255] Max Duncker's accommodating of liberalism to the Prussian state and its conservative leaders was denounced with unusual vengeance.

Karl Samwer also condemned Duncker to social isolation for his political heresy. Samwer's religious language suggested the totalizing power of political worldviews for some liberals in the Christian—especially Protestant—vocabulary that German nationalists had adopted.[256] The members of the network had combined their influence to place a leading member near the heart of Prussian power, to mold the royal heir and future emperor, but now Duncker's policy positions had taken an unsettling turn to the right. Even Rudolf Haym, who generally supported Duncker, conceded: "For a long time, I have had no hope for a political springtide. Never have we suffered such a betrayal of the state, [this] dangerous, extremely hazardous, maniacal reaction."[257] Above all, the conflict between Duncker and Samwer represented an early example of the divisions between liberals over how many constitutional rights should be exchanged for national unification. Instead of dating to the end of the 1860s, as Jörn Leonhard has contended, the case of Max Duncker's "apostacy" places the emergence of this schism in the early 1860s.[258] Network members reflected this process in their internal struggles to define the limits of liberal accommodation to state power in pursuit of national unification. Constitutional monarchy was the common ground on which Duncker and Samwer had built their political friendship from the Revolutions of 1848/49 onward, the surest road to a liberal German nation-state. Now it was crumbling beneath their feet.

Conclusion

The network of moderate liberals reached the peak of its official influence in the early 1860s. The beginning of the New Era in 1858 under Prince Regent Wilhelm and his cabinet fueled members' hope that domestic reform and a responsive Prussian monarch would lead the "moral conquest" of the German Confederation and found a *Kleindeutschland*. The decline of state repression after 1858, marked by the uneasy accommodation between moderate liberal professionals and conservative state officials, allowed members of the network to leverage their shared resources: many were able to enter state service and higher professional posts in Prussia and Baden. Once in these positions, the political friends worked to advance *kleindeutsch* ideals by advising monarchs and their ministers.

Network members' negotiations with state leaders in the early 1860s were exemplified by Max Duncker, Berthold Auerbach, and Heinrich von Sybel. Duke Ernst II of Coburg, Karl Samwer, and Gustav Freytag sought to exploit their new connections in Berlin to advance network policies. Grand Duke Friedrich I of Baden named Franz von Roggenbach to the foreign ministry. Many core members thus became imbricated in the decision-making of larger, more powerful, and more complex courts and cabinets. Their roles obliged network members to defend unpopular government policies, and this sowed conflict within the network.

At the same time, the new influence of network members allowed them to develop serious plans for Confederal reform and military consolidation under Prussia. Between 1858 and 1863, network members endeavored to locate the sources of sovereignty in the German Confederation. They accepted that sovereignty sprang from each monarch through his special relationship with the Christian God. Divine sanction undergirded the legal sanction of Confederal and state laws and dynastic regulations. Network members and Confederal leaders then identified monarchs' supreme military command as *the* expression of this sovereignty. The Confederal Constitution and Vienna Final Act obliged monarchs to maintain control over the instruments of state violence. The essence of Confederal monarchs' sovereignty had to remain unaltered; otherwise their states would risk losing the independence ascribed to them. To many Confederal leaders, diminishment of princely prerogatives threatened the legitimacy of monarchical rule in Europe and invited revolution.

Franz von Roggenbach and Friedrich I of Baden's Confederal reform plans showed that network notions of negotiated unification rested on the establishment of a collective national monarchy. Their proposal demonstrated their idea that individual princes' prerogatives could be combined in a single "Federal Authority" with far-reaching powers. They assured anyone who would listen that the shifting of judicial, diplomatic, and military prerogatives would not tarnish

the essence of the monarchs' sovereignty. Sovereignties would be lent to a central authority, yes, but the ultimate wielder of federal power would be the king of Prussia. Roggenbach and the grand duke made few appeals to *großdeutsch* nationalists—and even fewer to democrats—and most conservative leaders outside the network largely rejected the liberal image of lending and collecting. They argued that, in reality, monarchical sovereignty could not be transferred, could not leave its source, without losing its essence and destabilizing Central Europe.

Duke Ernst II of Coburg responded to this challenge by signing a military convention with the king of Prussia. He ceded overall command of his troops to the king and became a commanding general in the Prussian army. A foreign leader now held sway over the lives and deaths of Coburg subjects through courts martial and laws against civilian unrest. Duke Ernst portrayed the agreement as a selfless act of patriotism, a roadmap to German unity for other Confederal princes to follow. Sacrificing military supremacy was, for Ernst, a valiant expression of national devotion. Conservative Confederal leaders disagreed vehemently. For them, Ernst's convention was a betrayal of monarchical legitimacy that questioned the very foundation of state independence. In the early 1860s, the liberal political friends' contradictory argument that monarchs could share their sovereignty with a federal state while remaining sovereign in the eyes of international treaties and the Confederal Constitution persuaded few German princes.

With the end of their reform plans and start of the Prussian constitutional crisis in 1861, members outside Berlin decried the perceived inaction of New Era ministers with whom the Dunckers had become close. These members were disappointed with the prince regent, soon to become King Wilhelm I, who intended to rule as a warrior king, not reign as a parliamentary monarch. Bismarck's appointment as Prussian minister president in September 1862 divided the network into two camps. The first camp, around Max Duncker, believed that a powerful king at the head of an expanded army was the surest means to deter foreign invasion and build Prussia's national prestige. This combination, they held, would hasten the peaceful formation of a liberalizing nation-state under Hohenzollern hegemony. Members in the second camp, who coalesced around Duke Ernst and Karl Samwer, disagreed with this view. To them, Bismarck was a reactionary who had no intention of forging a nation-state. The two camps went on to engage in increasingly adversarial debates with each other, and eventually accusations of personal and political betrayal flew between them. As the next chapter demonstrates, political friendship failed to facilitate political organization in a rapidly changing society. In their simultaneous division and unity, fragility and resilience, the network of political friends can nevertheless tell us much about German liberalism on the edge of the nation-state.

Notes

1. Brophy, "Political Calculus of Capital," 152–53; Ross, *Beyond the Barricades*, 4. See also Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 8–9, 221; Clark, "After 1848," 171–97.
2. Ross, *Beyond the Barricades*, 194–95.
3. Langewiesche, *Liberalismus in Deutschland*, 88.
4. Behnen, *Preußische Wochenblatt*, 9.
5. Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 8; Levinger, *Enlightened Nationalism*, 9–10; Gould, *Origins of Liberal Dominance*, 4, 7; see San Narciso, Barral-Martínez, and Armenteros, introduction to *Monarchy and Liberalism in Spain*, 2–4; Fillafer, "Habsburg Liberalism and the Enlightenment Past," 42–43; Achtelstetter, *Prussian Conservatism*, 6.
6. Cock, *On Sovereignty*, 11.
7. Levinger, *Enlightened Nationalism*, 195; Lees, *Revolution and Reflection*, 22. See also Stollberg-Rilinger, *Der Staat als Maschine*, 20.
8. Møller, "Domesticating a German Heir to the Danish Throne," 131; Paulmann, "Searching for a 'Royal International,'" 145–77.
9. Møller, "Domesticating a German Heir to the Danish Throne," 131.
10. The willingness of many individual monarchs to relinquish their sovereignty for national consolidation undercuts Christian Jansen's claim that the voluntary surrender of princely prerogatives belonged to the realm of the "undoable" in the German Confederation of the 1860s. See Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 471.
11. Held, "Souveräntät [*sic*]" in *Staats-Lexikon*, 3rd ed., 13: 442–43. The same entry defined sovereignty as a changeable state with nothing above or comparable to it. In a more contemporary context, Joan Cocks has defined sovereignty in its simplest form as "the power to command and control everything inside a physical space." Cocks, *On Sovereignty*, 2.
12. Michael Broers and Robert M. Berdahl, for example, contend that political philosophy in Restoration Europe was preoccupied with the origin of sovereignty—whether it came from the monarchs or the people. See Broers, *Europe after Napoleon*, 15; Berdahl, *Politics of the Prussian Nobility*, 5–7.
13. I use "he" to describe the typical German monarch because women could not reign under Salic law.
14. Riall, *Sicily and the Unification of Italy*, 15, 113; see Rampton, *Liberal Ideas in Tsarist Russia*, 85–86; Gould, *Origins of Liberal Dominance*, 6.
15. Biefang, "National-preußisch oder deutsch-national," 370; Langewiesche, *Liberalismus in Deutschland*, 89.
16. See Biefang, "National-preußisch oder deutsch-national," 370–76; Langewiesche, *Liberalismus in Deutschland*, 93–95; Sheehan, *German History*, 101; Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 378.
17. Gall, *Bismarck*, 1: 197.
18. Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 178–80.
19. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 383; Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 185; GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 287–288; Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 52; Blackbourn, *History of Germany*, 177.
20. Hamerow, *Restoration, Revolution, Reaction*, 240.
21. GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 290; BArch, N2184/75, Bl. 483–84; SAC, LA A 6900 [unfoliated].
22. GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 310; Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 193.
23. In the Holy Roman Empire and the German Confederation, mediatization was the incorporation of a self-ruling prince and his lands into the territory of another ruler. Mediatized princes (*Standesherren*) generally retained their estates, certain legal privileges, and local police

powers. Major waves of mediatization occurred toward the end of the Holy Roman Empire and the Napoleonic period in Germany (1803–1814), when more than 200 German states were absorbed by the remaining 39 that joined the German Confederation. On the contested place of the mediatized princes in the German Confederation, see Gollwitzer, *Standesherren*.

24. Sheehan, *German History*, 476–77, 863; Börner, *Wilhelm I.*, 109.
25. See chapter 2 and Behnen, *Preußische Wochenblatt*.
26. Huber, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte*, 3: 273–74; Biermann, *Ideologie statt Realpolitik*, 80–81; Börner, *Wilhelm I*, 130–31; Nipperdey, *Germany from Napoleon to Bismarck*, 621–22.
27. Leopold von Gerlach, for instance, defined public opinion as "nothing other than the opinions of the people one fears." See Gerlach, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, 2: 72.
28. On the *Kreuzzeitung* and *Berliner Revue*, see Bussiek, *Mit Gott für König und Vaterland!*; Albrecht, *Antiliberalismus und Antisemitismus*; Hahn, *Die Berliner Revue*. See also Leopold von Gerlach, *Denkwürdigkeiten*; Ernst Ludwig von Gerlach, *Auszeichnungen*.
29. Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 195; GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 310.
30. Ross, *Beyond the Barricades,* 167; Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 261; Clark, *Iron Kingdom*, 508–509.
31. For such directives, see Rudolf von Auerswald to Max Duncker, 4 September 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 18, Bl. 5–6; Auerswald to Max Duncker, 1860, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 18, Bl. 17. On the Prussian Press Office, see also Huber, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte*, 3: 171.
32. Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 191–92; Karl Mathy to Max Duncker, 22 February 1859, in *Politischer Briefwechsel*, ed. Schultze, 85; Augusta of Prussia to Max Duncker, 16 October 1858, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 2, Bl. 202; Max Duncker to J.G. Droysen, 6 June 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. J.G. Droysen, Nr. 27, Bl. 75–76.
33. Samwer to Max Duncker, 26 July 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl Max Duncker, Nr. 113, Bl. 46–49; Gustav Freytag to Charlotte Duncker, 30 November 1858, in *Politischer Briefwechsel*, ed. Schultze, 125.
34. Karl Mathy to Max Duncker, 8 April 1858, BArch, N2184/14, Bl. 76–79; Karl Mathy to Charlotte Duncker, 27 April 1859, BArch, N2184/14, Bl. 81–82; Charlotte Duncker to Anna and Karl Mathy, 15 May 1859, BArch, N2184/12, Bl. 106–108; GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 310, 315.
35. See Max Duncker to Hermann Baumgarten, 10 June 1858, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 19b, Bl. 7–9.
36. Charlotte Duncker to Max Duncker, 14 April 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 9b, Bl. 284–85.
37. Charlotte Duncker to Max Duncker, 14 April 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 9b, Bl. 284–85.
38. Charlotte Duncker to Max Duncker, 15 April 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 9b, Bl. 286–87.
39. On Prince Wilhelm of Prussia's predilection for all things military, see Walter, *Heeresreformen*, 200–201, 205–206. Wilhelm was also known as the "Grapeshot Prince" (*Kartätschenprinz*) because of his leading role in the brutal suppression of Baden rebels in 1849.
40. Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 196; GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 315–16.
41. Ernst of Coburg to Max Duncker, 24 May 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 72 [unfoliated]; Max Duncker to Ernst [draft], 16 July 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 72; Max Duncker to Ernst, 21 July 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 72; GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 316.
42. Karl Anton von Hohenzollern to Max Duncker, 22 April 1860, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 62, Bl. 24; GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 325–27; Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 3 July 1861, GStAPK, BPH, 52 J 88, Bd. 1, Bl. 126–27;

Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 15 July 1861, GStAPK, BPH, 52 J 88, Bd. 1, Bl. 139; Karl Mathy, Diary Entries, BArch, N2184/75, 539, 567, 583; Max Duncker to Hermann Baumgarten, [25 July] 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 19b, Bl. 19–20; Max Duncker to Baumgarten, 25 January [1860], GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 19b, Bl. 27–28; Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 211–12; Müller, *Our Fritz*, 7, 63.

43. For example, see Charlotte Duncker to Karl Mathy, 20 September 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 86, Bl. 37; Karl Mathy to Charlotte Duncker, 21 September 1860, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 86, Bl. 35–36; Charlotte Duncker, 9 August 1859, BArch, N2184/12, Bl. 117–119; Samwer to [Charlotte Duncker], 10 April 1862, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 113, Bl. 55–56.
44. See Hermann Baumgarten to Max Duncker, 2 April 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 19, Bl. 13–14; Heinrich von Sybel to Max Duncker, 25 December 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 137, Bl. 62.
45. GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 319.
46. Alexander von Schleinitz to Max Duncker, 4 August 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 3, Bl. 8–9. His title was "*Leiter der Zentralpreßstelle*."
47. GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, 321–22; Biermann, *Ideologie statt Realpolitik*, 102; Leopold von Gerlach, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, 2: 668.
48. Clark, *Iron Kingdom*, 396–67, 506; Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 237.
49. On the Central Press Office, see *Preußens Pressepolitik*, eds. Holtz and Neugebauer.
50. Langewiesche, *Liberalismus in Deutschland*, 89–91. Duke Ernst of Coburg, for example, argued that Confederal contingents should provide "armed mediation" in favor of Austria in order to defeat the "revolutionary despotism" of Napoleon III. See Rosenberg, *Die nationalpolitische Publizistik*, 1: 67–68. Hermann Baumgarten suggested the war might be used to bolster Prussian leadership among the middle states, resist French imperialism, and curry favor with Britain. See again Rosenberg, *Nationalpolitische Publizistik*, 1: 34–35, 1: 45.
51. Leonhard, *Bellizismus und Nation*, 579–80; Wippermann, "National-Politische Bewegung," in *Staats-Lexikon*, 3rd ed., 10: 387.
52. Riall, *Sicily and the Unification of Italy*, 2.
53. Sybel to [Baumgarten], GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 137, Bl. 69–70; Memorandum to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, mid-November 1860, GStAPK, BPH 52J 88 Bd. I, Bl. 42–50; Blackbourn, *History of Germany*, 181; Max Duncker to Friedrich of Baden, 15 January 1861, GAK, FA Korr. 13 Bd. 17, Doc. 1. See also Siemann, *Gesellschaft im Aufbruch*, 253. The situation in Schleswig-Holstein was never far from the minds of German liberals.
54. Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 198, 264. Hohenzollern and Duncker remained friends for years after the collapse of the New Era ministry: see GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 62. Alexander von Schleinitz to Max Duncker, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 3, Bl. 8–9.
55. See, for example, Max Duncker's reports and memoranda to the crown prince, GStAPK, BPH Rep. 52J 88, Bd. 1, Bl. 4–12a, 22–36, 42–50.
56. Samwer to Charlotte Duncker, [1860?], GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 113, Bl. 57–59. Bonnie Smith has explored how the wives of historians in the nineteenth century were active participants in their husbands' scholarly correspondence, research, and writing. Charlotte Duncker adapted this custom to epistolary politicking. Smith, *Gender of History*, 83–85.
57. Karl Mathy to Gustav Freytag, 11 June 1860, BArch, N2184/22, Bl. 6–7; Karl Mathy to Max Duncker, 26 November 1861, BArch, N2184/12, Bl. 153.
58. BArch, N2184/75, Bl. 503; Freytag to Ernst of Coburg, 3 August 1858, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 97–99.

59. Freytag to Ernst of Coburg, 3 August 1858, *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 98–99; Berthold Auerbach to Jakob Auerbach, 29 August 1858, in *Briefe an seinen Freund*, ed. J. Auerbach, 110.
60. Freytag to Ernst of Coburg, 3 August 1858, GSA 19/339 [unfoliated]. Tempeltey removed the antisemitic comment from the published version of the letters. See Freytag to Ernst, 3 August 1858, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 97–99.
61. Freytag to Ernst, 3 August 1858, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 97–99.
62. BArch, N2184/75, Bl. 506.
63. Even the wealthy, powerful Rothschild and Bleichröder families suffered slights against their Jewishness because close social contact with Jews "remained potentially debasing" for elite Christians. See Stern, *Gold and Iron*, 16. For more on Jewish-Christian social isolation, see Kaplan, *Jewish Middle Class*; Baader, *Gender, Judaism, and Bourgeois Culture*.
64. Berthold Auerbach to Jakob Auerbach, 28 February/1 March 1859, *Briefe an seinen Freund*, ed. J. Auerbach, 114.
65. Kaiser, *Social Integration and Narrative Structure*, 36, 43; Schlüter, *Auerbach*, 12.
66. See Heschel, *Abraham Geiger and the Jewish Jesus*, 3–4, 11. On Christian dissenting movements, see also Weir, *Secularism and Religion*; Graf, *Politisierung*.
67. David Garrioch, "From Christian Friendship to Secular Sentimentality," 16; Siegel, *Entfernte Freunde*, 16–20; Asen, "Zur Verortung von Paaren," 326–27.
68. Stoetzler and Achinger, "German Modernity, Barbarous Slavs and Profit-Seeking Jews," 741; Herzog, *Intimacy and Exclusion*, 54–56, 82–83.
69. Stern, *Gold and Iron*, 465.
70. Kaplan, *Jewish Middle Class*, 3–4, 8, 60, 117; Baader, *Gender, Judaism, and Bourgeois Culture*, 72.
71. Jensen, *Gebildete Doppelgänger*, 334; Heschel, *Abraham Geiger and the Jewish Jesus*, 17; Tal, *Christians and Jews in Germany*, 16–17, 32, 163.
72. Stoetzler and Achinger, "German Modernity, Barbarous Slavs and Profit-Seeking Jews," 748. Shulamit Volkov has argued that antisemitism represented a "cultural code" by the time of the German Empire. Volkov, "Antisemitism as a Cultural Code," 243–64. On the images of Jews in Christian Europe, see Livak, *Jewish Persona in the European Imagination*.
73. David Sorkin has argued that Auerbach represented the epitome of "the full integration to which German Jewry aspired," but Auerbach's relationship with his Christian political friends shows the limits of their willingness to accept Jewish difference. See Sorkin, *Transformation of German Jewry*, 154–55.
74. Berthold Auerbach to Jakob Auerbach, 28 February/1 March 1859, in *Briefe an seinen Freund*, ed. J. Auerbach, 114.
75. Berthold Auerbach to Jakob Auerbach, 28 February/1 March 1859, in *Briefe an seinen Freund*, ed. J. Auerbach, 114.
76. See, for instance, Karl Samwer to Heinrich von Sybel, 14 January 1860, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Heinrich von Sybel, Nr. 39, Bl. 20–21; Freytag to Ernst of Coburg, 18 July 1855, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 42; Berthold Auerbach to Jakob Auerbach, 19 February 1860, in *Briefe an seinen Freund*, ed. J. Auerbach, 128.
77. Jensen, *Gebildete Doppelgänger*, 67. See also Bajohr, "*Unser Hotel ist judenfrei*"; Clark, "Religion and Confessional Conflict," 83–105.
78. Auerbach to Max Duncker, 5 September 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 15, Bl. 1–3; Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 338; Blackbourn, *History of Germany*, 182–83. On the Nationalverein, see Biefang, ed., *Der Deutsche Nationalverein*; Na'aman, *Der deutsche Nationalverein*.
79. Samwer to Sybel, 8 December 1860, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Heinrich von Sybel, B I. Nr. 39, Bl. 16–17; Karl Mathy to Max Duncker, 21 September 1860, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max

Duncker, Nr. 86, Bl. 35–36; Karl Mathy to Gustav Freytag, 11 June 1861, BArch, N2184/22, Bl. 6–7; Sybel to Max Duncker, 9 November 1860, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 137, Bl. 128–129; Roggenbach to Max Duncker, 29 May 1861, in *Politischer Briefwechsel*, ed. Schultze, 282; GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 356; Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 231. By 1861, the Prussian king's main advisors were all deeply conservative military officers: Gustav von Alversleben, Edwin von Manteuffel, and Albrecht von Roon. Pflanze, *Bismarck*, 1: 156–57; Walter, *Heeresreformen*, 396, 450–41.

80. Berthold Auerbach to Jakob Auerbach, 19 February 1860, in *Briefe an seinen Freund*, ed. J. Auerbach, 128.
81. Skolnik, *Jewish Pasts, German Fictions*, 28–29; Rose, *German Question/Jewish Question*, 225–26.
82. Berthold Auerbach to Jakob Auerbach, 19 February 1860, in *Briefe an seinen Freund*, ed. J. Auerbach, 128; Berthold Auerbach to Rudolf von Auerswald, 2 March 1860, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Rudolf von Auerswald, Nr. 21 [unfoliated].
83. Berthold Auerbach to Jakob Auerbach, 19 February 1860, in *Briefe an seinen Freund*, ed. J. Auerbach, 128; Berthold Auerbach to Jakob Auerbach, 18 March 1860, in *Briefe an seinen Freund*, ed. J. Auerbach, 129.
84. Berthold Auerbach to Jakob Auerbach, 19 February 1860, in *Briefe an seinen Freund*, ed. J. Auerbach, 128; Rose, *Jewish Question/German Question*, 232.
85. Berthold Auerbach to Jakob Auerbach, 19 February 1860, in *Briefe an seinen Freund*, ed. J. Auerbach, 128.
86. Auerbach to Max Duncker, 22 March 1860, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 15 [unfoliated]; Auerbach to Max Duncker, n.d. ("3 o'clock in the afternoon"), GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 15.
87. Berthold Auerbach to Jakob Auerbach, 18 March 1860, in *Briefe an seinen Freund*, ed. J. Auerbach, 128–29.
88. Berthold Auerbach to Jakob Auerbach, 18 March 1860, in *Briefe an seinen Freund*, ed. J. Auerbach, 128–29.
89. Berthold Auerbach to Jakob Auerbach, 30 March 1860, in *Briefe an seinen Freund*, ed. J. Auerbach, 131; Goodman, *Republic of Letters*, 21.
90. Bettelheim, *Berthold Auerbach*, 116, 132, 156, 158, 160, 197; Katz, "Berthold Auerbach," 220–21.
91. Rose, *German Question/Jewish Question*, 233; Schlüter, *Auerbach*, 14–15.
92. Karl Mathy and Duncker had been funneling private and old Literary Association funds to Karl Brater, editor of the new daily. See Karl Mathy to Max Duncker, 19 March 1860, BArch, N2184/14, Bl. 122; Karl Mathy to Max Duncker, 25 April 1860, BArch, N2184/14, Bl. 125; Karl Mathy to Max Duncker, 9 June 1860, BArch, N2184/14, Bl. 125–126; Karl Mathy to Max Duncker, 4 July 1860, BArch, N2184/14, Bl. 128; Karl Mathy to Max Duncker, 16 May 1861, BArch, N2184/14, 143; Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 206.
93. Sybel to Max Duncker, 19 August 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 137, Bl. 56–57. King Maximilian read Sybel's memoranda closely between 1859 and 1861. See Dotterweich, *Sybel*, 369.
94. Sybel, *Geschichte der Revolutionszeit*. Sybel also read to the king from Freytag's work: see Sybel to Freytag 19 February 1862, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Heinrich von Sybel, Nr. 14, Bl. 40.
95. Sybel to Max Duncker, 1 September 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 137, Bl. 58–59.
96. Sybel to Max Duncker, 12 April 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 137, Bl. 18.
97. Julius Ficker, an influential, *großdeutsch* Catholic historian, attacked Sybel in the press for his anti-Austrian reading of the Holy Roman Empire. Their ongoing debate over the proper interpretation of the importance of the old empire to German nationhood became known as

the "Sybel-Ficker controversy." See, for example, Rosenberg, *Nationalpolitische Publizistik*, 1: 343–44.

98. Joseph de Maistre, qtd. in Armenteros, *French Idea of History*, 2–3. Maistre was central to the formation of political Catholicism in Europe. See also Armenteros and Lebrun, introduction to *Maistre and His European Readers*, 8.
99. For example, see Sybel to Max Duncker, 26 June 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 137, Bl. 45–48; Sybel to Max Duncker, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 137, Bl. 63–65; Sybel to Max Duncker, 21 February 1860, VI HA Nl Max Duncker, Nr. 137, Bl. 66–67.
100. Baumgarten to Max Duncker, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 19, Bl. 11–12; Baumgarten to Max Duncker, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 19, Bl. 17–18; Max Duncker to Baumgarten, 1 April 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 19b, Bl. 5–6.
101. Max Duncker to Sybel, 24 July 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 137, Bl. 51–52. See Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 15 July 1861, GStAPK, BPH, 52J 88, Bd. 1, Bl. 135–46.
102. Sybel to Max Duncker, 31 December 1860, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 137, Bl. 100–101.
103. Biermann, *Ideologie statt Realpolitik*, 81; Sybel to Max Duncker, 14 December 1860, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 137, Bl. 98–99.
104. Gall, *Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 64, 114–22, 169–70. See also "Der Bundesreformplan des Freiherrn v. Roggenbach," in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 116–53.
105. Franz von Roggenbach to Max Duncker, 25 August 1860, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 104, Bl. 9–16; Ernst of Coburg to Friedrich of Baden [copy], 6 May 1861, GAK, FA Korr. 13 Bd. 13, Bl. B11; Carl Alexder to Friedrich of Baden, 16 May 1861, GAK, FA Korr. 13, Bd. 15, Doc. A38; Karl Anton von Hohenzollern to Friedrich of Baden, 19 April 1861*, Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 251–53.
106. Sybel to Friedrich of Baden, 5 May 1861, GAK, FA Korr. 13 Bd. 33, Doc. 1.
107. Friedrich of Baden to Sybel, [early] November 1861, GAK, FA Korr. 13 Bd 33, Doc. 5.
108. Friedrich of Baden to Sybel, [early] November 1861, GAK, FA Korr. 13 Bd 33, Doc. 5.
109. Sybel to Friedrich of Baden, 9 November 1861, GAK, FA Korr. 13, Bd. 33.
110. Sybel to Friedrich of Baden, 9 November 1861, GAK, FA Korr. 13, Bd. 33.
111. Gall*, Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 211, 213–14.
112. Wippermann, "National-Politische Bewegung," 389.
113. Biermann, *Ideologie statt Realpolitik*, 90; Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 323.
114. As a child, Friedrich of Baden's military tutor had been Roggenbach's father. Friedrich and the younger Roggenbach had both attended Heidelberg University. See Gall, *Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 64.
115. Gall, *Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 116; Müller, *Deutscher Bund und deutsche Nation*, 276–77.
116. "Der Bundesreformplan des Freiherrn v. Roggenbach," in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 116.
117. "Der Bundesreformplan," in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 118.
118. "Der Bundesreformplan," in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 116.
119. Indeed, as Wolfram Siemann argues, this diarchy was key to the Confederation's design. See Siemann, *Metternich*, 440.
120. Müller, *Deutscher Bund und Deutsche Nation*, 281–82.
121. "Der Bundesreformplan," in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 117–18.
122. "Der Bundesreformplan," in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 118.
123. "Der Bundesreformplan," in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 122.

124. Vick, *Defining Germany*, 81, 141, 161; Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 100.
125. The progress toward the telos of the nation-state was also part of the natural unfolding of history for most liberals. See Hewitson, *Nationalism in Germany*, 39. See also Langewiesche, "Nature of German Liberalism," 98–99.
126. The idea of the natural progression of politics and society was key to Enlightenment thought and early liberalism. See Gall, "Liberalismus und 'bürgerliche Gesellschaft,'" 329–32, 340; and Langewiesche, "Nature of German Liberalism," 98.
127. "Der Bundesreformplan," in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 117–19; Lees, *Revolution and Reflection*, 128. See also Huber, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte*, 3: 143–45, 3: 149–50.
128. Kreklau, "Gender Anxiety," 174.
129. Theodore Hamerow described the small Thuringian states as "Gingerbread principalities" in *Social Foundations of German Unification*, 1: 305.
130. "Der Bundesreformplan," in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 123; Gall, *Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 116.
131. "Der Bundesreformplan," in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 122–23.
132. "Der Bundesreformplan," in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 131, 1: 133, 1: 137–39, 1: 141, 1: 149–51.
133. See footnotes to "Bundesakte" and "Schlußakte" in *Dokumente*, ed. Huber.
134. "Der Bundesreformplan," in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 143, 1: 140, 1: 145–46, 1: 149.
135. "Der Bundesreformplan," in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 139.
136. Vick, *Defining Germany*, 61.
137. Max Duncker contended as much in 1858 and 1859. He argued that the monarch's sovereign powers were the surest means to advance unification, as long as the prince was surrounded by experienced advisors. See Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 186–87.
138. See, for example, Held, "Souveränetät" in *Staats-Lexikon*, 3rd ed., 13: 444–45.
139. Joan Cocks has asked what happens to sovereignty if it can flow or drain away: Cocks, *On Sovereignty*, 26. A partial answer might be found in national political consolidation in the nineteenth century.
140. Gall, *Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 121. Roggenbach claimed, shortly after he submitted his draft, that the individual princes must lead national consolidation, lest revolution ensue. For him, the "German Question" was largely a dynastic question; the success or failure of national unification rested with its princes. See Franz von Roggenbach to Friedrich of Baden, 26 November 1859, in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 157.
141. "Der Bundesreformplan," in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 135.
142. Benton, *Search for Sovereignty*, 4.
143. "Der Bundesreformplan," in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 133, 1: 135.
144. Müller, *Deutscher Bund und Deutsche Nation*, 155–57. See also Flöter, *Beust*, 20–21; Burg, *Die deutsche Trias in Idee und Wirklichkeit*.
145. "Der Bundesreformplan," in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 124. My emphasis.
146. See, for example, Rotteck, "Liberalismus," in *Staats-Lexikon*, 1st ed., 10: 670–71; Held, "Monarchie," in *Staats-Lexikon*, 3rd ed., 10: 174.
147. Roggenbach ignores the question of what the role of the four city states would be in this union. He may have assumed they would be mediatized during the process of unification by one of their neighboring states.
148. "Der Bundesreformplan," in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 142.
149. Gall, *Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 117. Here, Roggenbach shared British liberals' conviction in the 1850s and 1860s that their ideals "were so powerful and progressive that they would win out in Europe without recourse to war." See Parry, *Politics of Patriotism*, 9.
150. Gall, *Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 118.

151. The new constitution had the same name in the German as the Confederal document, itself a development of the seventeenth-century Imperial War Constitution of the Holy Roman Empire. On the Holy Roman variant, see Stollberg-Rilinger, *Holy Roman Empire*, 59.
152. "Der Bundesreformplan," in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 130.
153. "Der Bundesreformplan," in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 131.
154. "Der Bundesreformplan," in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 138.
155. "Der Bundesreformplan," in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 138.
156. Craig, *Prussian Army*, 83; Walter, *Heeresreformen*, 197, 232.
157. Walter, *Heeresreformen*, 232; Berdahl, *Politics of the Prussian Nobility*, 3.
158. Friedrich of Baden sent copies of the plan to Carl Alexander of Weimar, Duke Ernst, the Hansa cities, and "unimportant Waldeck." See, for example, Morier, *Memoirs and Letters*, 1: 243–46; Franz von Roggenbach to Max Duncker, 20 September 1860, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 104, Bl. 17–20; Carl Alexander of Weimar to Friedrich of Baden, 21 July 1860, *Großherzog Friedrich*, 1: 86; Heinrich von Sybel to Friedrich of Baden, 17 November 1861, GAK, FA Korr. 13, Bd. 33, unfoliated.
159. Franz von Roggenbach to Max Duncker, 25 August 1860, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 104, Bl. 9–16.
160. Franz von Roggenbach to Max Duncker, 25 August 1860, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 104, Bl. 9–16.
161. Franz von Roggenbach to Max Duncker, 25 August 1860, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 104, Bl. 9–16.
162. Pflanze, *Bismarck*, 1: 148.
163. Memorandum to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm of Prussia, 6 May 1861, GStAPK, BPH 52J 88, Bd. 1, Bl. 80–82.
164. Biedermann, "Nation," in *Staats-Lexikon*, 3rd ed., 6: 389, 6: 391.
165. Albrecht von Bernstorff to Albert von Flemming, 11 November 1861, in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 299–300.
166. Sheehan, *German History*, 875; Flöter, *Beust*, 351–52.
167. Wilhelm of Prussia to Friedrich of Baden, 1 January 1860, *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 176–77.
168. The term comes from the anonymous entry for "Parteien," in *Staats-Lexikon*, 3rd ed., 11: 311.
169. Koselleck, *Preußen zwischen Reform und Revolution*, 28–30. Emphasis in original. For a summary of the role of the Hobbesian prince, see Cocks, *On Sovereignty*, 33.
170. Roggenbach's suggestion here approximated the parliamentary monarchy favored by German democrats rather than the powerful constitutional monarch usually supported by moderate liberals.
171. For example, see Pfizer, "Fürst," in *Staats-Lexikon*, 1st ed., 6: 202; Pfizer, "Liberalismus," in *Staats-Lexikon*, 1st ed., 9: 713. Pfizer's thinking—and that of most European liberals—was bound up with European imperialism and its "civilizing mission." Liberals imagined a hierarchy of peoples based on European definitions of technological, cultural, and political "development." See also Fitzpatrick, *Liberal Imperialism in Germany*.
172. Karl Mathy to Charlotte Duncker, 21 September 1860, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 86, Bl. 35–36.
173. For example, see Heinrich von Sybel to Max Duncker, 1 January 1861, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 202, Bl. 102–105; Franz von Roggenbach to Max Duncker, 11 February 1862, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 104, Bl. 29–30. For Sybel's idea of a national *Volksvertretung* to reform the Confederal Constitution: Charlotte Duncker, Diary Entry, [mid-January] 1861, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 244, Bl. 45–47. See the exhaustive entry for the Confederal War Constitution in the *Staatslexikon*: Zarachiä, "Bundeskriegsverfassung," in *Staats-Lexikon*, 3rd ed, 4: 482–521.

174. By April 1861, Friedrich of Baden had likewise limited his reform proposals to the centralized military command of the Confederation. See Friedrich of Baden to August Lamey, 7 April 1861, GAK, 52 Lamey Nr. 1, Doc. 16.
175. Ernst of Coburg to Friedrich of Baden, 5 December 1860, in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 239.
176. Quoted in Scheeben, *Ernst II.*, 123. Ernst had also shared drafts of the convention with Carl Alexander of Weimar and his officials. See HStAW, Nl. Bernhard von Watzdorf, Nr. 145, Bl. 13–17.
177. Duke Ernst's assumptions about princely solidarity and rule by consensus drew on notions of princely collegial consensus as the basis for decision-making in the Holy Roman Empire. See Stollberg-Rilinger, *Holy Roman Empire*, 17, 31, 56–57.
178. Walter, *Heeresreformen*, 225–26; Biermann, *Ideologie statt Realpolitik*, 130.
179. Walter, *Heeresreformen*, 95.
180. Coburg-Prussian Military Convention, 1 June 1861, SAC, LA A 7314.
181. SAC, LA A 7314.
182. See Stollberg-Rilinger, *Holy Roman Empire*, 17, 31, 56–57.
183. Clark, *Iron Kingdom*, 504; Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 20.
184. SAC, LA A 7314.
185. Benton, *Search for Sovereignty*, 280.
186. On questions of mobile sovereignty, see Cocks, *On Sovereignty*, 26; Benton, *Search for Sovereignty*, 287–89.
187. SAC, LA A 7314.
188. Coburgers, like Prussian soldiers, would have to take an oath to obey the Prussian monarch, not the Prussian constitution. The Prussian king alone pledged to uphold the constitution: Walter, *Heeresreformen*, 394.
189. For examples of member appraisals of dynastic decorations, see Gustav Freytag to Charlotte Duncker, March 1856, in *Politischer Briefwechsel*, ed. Schultze, 69–70. Berthold Auerbach explicitly connected the wearing of decorations to public endorsement of the bestowing monarch. He also discusses the honor and the joy that a Coburg order brought him in Berthold Auerbach to Jakob Auerbach, 20 December 1861, *Briefe an seinen Freund*, ed. J. Auerbach, 212.
190. Walter, *Heeresreformen*, 198; Craig, *Prussian Army*, 83.
191. On army officers' loyalty to princely commanders, see Frevert, *Men of Honour*, 39–40, 42.
192. SAC, LA A 7314.
193. See Zarachiä, "Bundeskriegsverfassung," in *Staats-Lexikon*, 3rd ed, 4: 503–504.
194. On overlapping sovereignties and uneven territoriality in premodern European empires, see Benton, *Search for Sovereignty*, 4, 30, 279–80.
195. Zarachiä, "Bundeskriegsverfassung," *Staats-Lexikon*, 3rd ed, 4: 483, 4: 515.
196. Ernst, *Aus meinem Leben*, 116.
197. Friedrich of Baden to Carl Alexander of Weimar, 18 July 1861, in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 267–68. Friedrich's martial phrasing also indicates the centrality of military imagery to princely conceptions of political conflict, and especially intra-Confederal disputes over the possible form of national unification.
198. Report from Austrian envoy to Saxony, Joseph von Werner, 16 July 1861, *QdPÖs*, 1: 749–50. Many of the Thuringian dukes belonged to the Ernestine branch of the House of Wettin, the head of which was king of Saxony.
199. This notion echoed medieval conceptions of kingship, where the king acted as the legal guardian of the Crown and its inalienable rights, obligations, and properties. See Kantorowicz, *King's Two Bodies*.
200. Margaret Lavinia Anderson has written that Georg V of Hanover "considered himself king by

divine right, and public policy, the will of God, revealed to him through prayer." Georg had also carried out a coup in 1855 in which he abolished the state constitution. See Anderson, *Windthorst*, 67, 74–76.

201. King Georg V of Hanover to Emperor Franz Joseph of Austria, 3 July 1860, *QdPÖs*, 1: 329.
202. Radicals, liberals, and apparently princes chose nature metaphors in order to "naturalize" their particular politics. See Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 256–57; and Gall, "Liberalismus 'und bürgerliche Gesellschaft,'" 329, 340.
203. Beust was technically "*Vorsitzender des Gesamtministeriums*" and, as such, first among equals. On Beust's reform plans, see Flöter, *Beust*.
204. Report from Joseph von Werner, 27 June 1861, *QdPÖs*, 1: 732.
205. Max Duncker to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 2 January 1861, GStAPK, BPH Rep. 52J 88, Bd. 1, Bl. 37.
206. For examples of *Rheinbündlerei* accusations by network members, see Karl Mathy to Max Duncker, 16 May 1861, BArch, N2184/12, Bl. 143; Max Duncker, Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 9 December 1864, GStAPK, BPH 52J, Bd. 2, IV., Bl. 187; GStAPK, BPH 52 F I. Nr. 7a, Bd. 1 [unfoliated]; Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, Diary Entry, 14 May 1861, GStAPK, BPH 52 F I. Nr. 7a, Bd. 1. Karl Mathy to Charlotte Duncker, 13 November 1860, BArch, N2184/12, Bl. 130–131.
207. Ernst, *Aus meinem Leben*, 53.
208. Scheeben, *Ernst II.*, 17.
209. Ernst, *Aus meinem Leben*, 116.
210. Rotteck, "Monarchie," in *Staats-Lexikon*, 1st ed., 10: 658.
211. Ernst, *Aus meinem Leben*, 116.
212. Ernst, *Aus meinem Leben*, 115.
213. HStAW, Nl. Bernhard von Watzdorf, Nr. 145, Bl. 2–9.
214. On the establishment of the North German Confederation, see Ernst von Stockmar to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm of Prussia, 17 December 1866, GStAPK, BPH Rep. 52 EII. Nr. 2. [unfoliated]. Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm thought, after the conclusion of the armistice with Austria and its allies in 1866, that governments allied with Prussia should sign military conventions with Prussia in the Coburg mold: Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, War Diary 1866 Entry, 24 July 1866, GStAPK, BPH Rep. 52 F I. Nr. 13. For Baden, see Hermann Baumgarten to Max Duncker, 3 July 1861, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 19, Bl. 17–18. For Braunschweig: Heinrich von Sybel to Max Duncker, 7 July 1861, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 137, Bl. 122–23. See also chapter 2 in Wiens, *Imperial German Army*.
215. For example, see Sybel to Max Duncker, 11 May 1861, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 137, Bl. 119; Francke to Ernst of Coburg, 20 March 1861, in *Politischer Briefwechsel*, ed. Schultze, doc. 351.
216. Ernst von Stockmar to Max Duncker, 28 July 1861, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 136, Bl. 1–3; Charlotte Duncker to Karl Mathy, 19 July 1859, BArch, N2184/12, Bl. 114–115; BArch, N2184/76, Bl. 7–9.
217. Walter, *Heeresreformen*, 146–52, 228, 393; Clark, *Iron Kingdom*, 513–17; Sheehan, *German History*, 877–79.
218. For example, see Charlotte Duncker to Karl Mathy, 29 March 1861, BArch, N2184/12, Bl. 140–41.
219. GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 244, Bl. 17–18.
220. Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 213–14. For examples of *Rheinbündlerei* accusation, see Freytag to Ernst, 30 January 1860, *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 132; Karl Mathy to Max Duncker, 16 May 1861, BArch, N2184/12, Bl. 143; Sybel to Max Duncker, 7 July 1861, GStAPK, VI.

HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 137, Bl. 122–123; Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm of Prussia, Diary Entry, 14 May 1861, GStAPK, BPH 52 F I. Nr. 7a, Bd. 1.

221. GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 345; Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 214–15.
222. Ernst of Coburg to Friedrich of Baden, 12 June 1860, GAK, FA Korr. 13 Bd. 13, Doc. 11; Carl Alexander of Weimar to Friedrich of Baden, 21 July 1860, in *Großherzog Friedrich*, 1: 191. Haym wrote that Ernst eventually attended. See Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 214.
223. Prince Wilhelm once argued to August von Saucken that, as regent, he held limited powers because his brother was still king: August von Saucken to Charlotte Duncker, 8 February 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 117, Bl. 15. According to Leopold von Gerlach, Friedrich Wilhelm IV had left a note at his death asking his brother not to swear the required oath to the constitution. See Leopold von Gerlach, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, 2: 786.
224. Max Duncker to William of Prussia, 14 March 1861, GStAPK, BPH 52J 88, Bd. 1, Bl. 55–58.
225. Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 206.
226. Auerswald to Max Duncker, 14 June 1861, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 3, Bl. 46; GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 358, 360; Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 237. Freytag told Mathy that Samwer was hurt that Duncker had taken the post from him: see BArch, N2184/76, Bl. 27.
227. Max Duncker to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm of Prussia, 7 October 1861, GStAPK, BPH 52J 88, Bd. 1, Bl. 15–17.
228. On the fear of nervous exhaustion in the nineteenth century, see Radkau, *Zeitalter der Nervosität*, 13–14.
229. Held, "Monarchie," in *Staats-Lexikon*, 3rd ed., 10: 177.
230. "Parteien," in *Staats-Lexikon*, 3rd ed., 11: 315.
231. The reports numbered in the hundreds: see GStAPK, BPH, 52J 88, Bd. 1–3.
232. For instance: Reports to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, GStAPK, BPH, 52J 88 Bd. 1, Bl. 80–82, 135–46, 394–95, 444–47, 482–83; Max Dunker to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 2 November 1861, GStAPK, BPH, 52J 88 Bd. 1, Bl. 233; Max Dunker to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 1 February 1862, GStAPK, BPH, 52J 88, Bd. 1, Bl. 288; Reports to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, GStAPK, BPH, 52J 88, Bd. 2, Bl. 47–52, 74, 116–17, 217–21, 336–37, 348–49, 473–78, 520; Reports to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, GStAPK, BPH, 52J 88, Bd. 3, 274–81, 331.
233. Memorandum to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 15 November 1860, GStAPK, BPH, 52J 88, Bd. 1, Bl. 22–36.
234. Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, GStAPK, BPH, 52J 88, Bd. 1, Bl. 180–85.
235. Müller, *Our Fritz*, 10–11, 64, 119–200.
236. Walter, *Heeresreformen*, 225, 393. The influential sixteenth-century jurist, Jean Bodin, described sovereignty simply as the "perpetual power to command." Qtd. in Cocks, *On Sovereignty*, 30.
237. Sheehan, *German History*, 878; Ross, *Beyond the Barricades*, 38; Brophy, "*Salus Publica Suprema Lex*," 124, 127–28. Heydt supported what Dieter Langewiesche has called "the conservative Fronde" against liberal ministers during the New Era. See Langewiesche, *Liberalismus in Deutschland*, 89. See also Pflanze, *Bismarck*, 1: 156–57.
238. BArch, N2184/75, Bl. 583.
239. Max Duncker to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 11 December 1861, GStAPK, BPH, 52J 88, Bd. 1, Bl. 264–65.
240. Max Duncker to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 15 March 1862, GStAPK, BPH, 52J 88, Bd. 1, Bl. 333–37.
241. Reports to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 16/30 April 1862, GStAPK, BPH, 52J 88, Bd. 1, Bl. 360–65.

242. Telegram, 12 June 1862, GStAPK, BPH, 52J 88, Bd. 1, Bl. 397; Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, GStAPK, BPH 52J 88, Bd. 1, Bl. 406–409.
243. Pflanze, *Bismarck*, 1: 168; Börner, *Wilhelm I.*, 160.
244. Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 17 July 1862, GStAPK, BPH, 52J 88, Bd. 1, Bl. 469–72.
245. See *Im Ring der Gegner Bismarcks*, ed. Heyderhoff; *Letters of the Empress Frederick*, ed. Grey.
246. Gall, *Bismarck*, 1: 197; Pflanze, *Bismarck*, 1: 169, 1: 178; Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 25 September 1862, GStAPK, BPH 52J 88, Bd. 1, Bl. 469–72.
247. Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 29 September 1862, GStAPK, BPH 52J 88, Bd. 1, Bl. 475–76; Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 10 October 1862, GStAPK, BPH 52J 88, Bd. 1, 480–81. See also, Börner, *Wilhelm I.*, 164.
248. Gall, *Bismarck*; Hewitson, *Nationalism in Germany*, 281, 336.
249. Müller, *Our Fritz*, 150; Börner, *Wilhelm I.*, 155–56.
250. Duncker's assumption drew on what David Barclay has identified as "patterns of friendship and political sentiment" among German elites since the Napoleonic Wars. See Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 68.
251. Leonhard, *Liberalismus*, 285–86; Pflanze, *Bismarck*, 1: 199. Claudia Kreklau has argued that Bismarck employed "emotional blackmail" throughout his political career. See Kreklau, "Gender Anxiety," 171. Dierk Walter argues that the first months of Bismarck's tenure were marked by earnest negotiations between parliamentary liberals and the new cabinet on the army bill. Bismarck likely hoped that Max Duncker would prove useful in this initial, conciliatory approach. See Walter, *Heeresreformen*, 448.
252. Samwer to Ernst of Coburg, 25 February 1864, SAC, LA A 7212, Bl. 166–68; Samwer to Ernst of Coburg, 22 September 1865, SAC, LA A 7220, 35–36; Freytag to Ernst of Coburg, 31 December 1864, *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 199. Samwer also believed that Bismarck was always "half-drunk." See Pflanze, *Bismarck*, 1: 198.
253. On the renewal of the campaign against Max's influence on the crown prince of Prussia, see Charlotte Duncker to Max Duncker, 3 February 1864, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Duncker, Max, Nr. 9b, Bl. 316. Freytag indicted Duncker to Mathy as well: Karl Mathy to Gustav Freytag, 17/19 June 1863, BArch, N2184/22, Bl. 32–34.
254. Karl Samwer to Karl Mathy, 10 August 1863, BArch, N2184/22, Bl. 45–46.
255. One example of the high regard with which Karl Mathy was held by the group is Freytag to Ernst of Coburg, 30 January 1860, *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 133. For Haym's representation of the Samwer-Duncker conflict over Bismarck's policy, see Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 311.
256. See, for example, Hoover, *Gospel of Nationalism*; Kaiser, *Pietismus und Patriotismus*.
257. Haym to Max Duncker, 9 April 1863, *Ausgewählter Briefwechsel,* ed. Rosenberg, 212.
258. Leonhard, *Liberalismus*, 516. Dagmar Herzog has argued, however, that this sort of reaction to political challenges was essential to German liberalism since at least the 1820s—what Leonhard calls the "incubation period" of liberalism—at least when it touched on Jewish emancipation or women's rights. See Herzog, *Intimacy and Exclusion*, 4; Leonhard, *Liberalismus*, 251–52.

Chapter 4

Political Friendship and Political Crisis, 1863–1866

The network of liberal political friends found themselves in a precarious position in 1863. The New Era in Prussia had ended, and the network's *kleindeutsch* reform plans had failed to take root. Worse still, the political friends had become bitterly divided over whether to seek accommodation with the new minister president of Prussia, Otto von Bismarck, in their pursuit of the German nation-state. The decline of the network was slow, halting, and shaped by crises beyond the control of its members. These moderate liberals tried to the end to manage personal conflict, political disagreement, and international crisis as political friends. Their insistence on this faltering form of political organization at a time of rapid social, political, and personal change helps explain the simultaneous resilience and fragility of German liberalism at midcentury.

Network members had failed to reach a united position toward King Wilhelm I of Prussia and Bismarck's anti-constitutional government. But this failure was not theirs alone. The king's army bill divided liberals across Prussia and the German Confederation. The split in the Prussian Landtag between conciliatory liberals and members of the new German Progressive Party sowed discord among liberals for years. Yet, the animosity generated by this fracture became untenable in the network because political friendship remained their primary mode of political organization at the Confederal level. If deliberations among network liberals in the 1850s had been aimed at forging consensus under heavy state repression, the less repressive 1860s provided the space for their debates to become factional and adversarial.[1] Not content to ostracize Max Duncker for his Bismarckian sympathies, rival members of the network leveraged powerful connections to try to force him from office. Instead, they ignited an international scandal: the "Danzig Affair" of 1863. The fallout highlights the volatility of political friendship in an era marked by a more open public sphere in Central Europe.

In the same year, political friendship proved resilient as members of the liberal network won Karl Mathy an appointment as a senior official in the Grand

Duchy of Baden. His new sovereign, Friedrich I of Baden, then traveled in the summer of 1863 to Frankfurt am Main and the last peaceful meeting of Confederal leaders. There, the princely members of the network once again advanced their idea that a collective national monarchy could legally replace the "layered" sovereignty of the German Confederation and its member states.[2] They found, to their chagrin, that *Trias* rivals had repurposed this idea for their own ends. The results of the Frankfurt Fürstentag, or "Congress of Princes," disillusioned non-princely members of the network. Many began to ask themselves whether national unification through the reasoned debate and peaceful agreement of Germany's monarchs remained preferable—or even possible. Both political friendship and negotiated monarchical unification relied on mutual trust, open communication, and compromise.

Both princely and bourgeois members of the network managed a fleeting show of solidarity at the start of the Second Schleswig War in early 1864. Brian Vick has convincingly argued that the fate of the conflict in Schleswig-Holstein in 1848–49 was crucial to German liberals' vision of a future nation-state.[3] The same holds true for liberals' reaction to war in 1864. Network members shelved their differences and participated in the massive popular mobilization in Germany to support the Holstein rebels.[4] Members of the network initially focused their efforts on the "Augustenburg candidacy" for the ducal thrones. They came to see an Augustenburg victory in Kiel as synonymous with a liberal victory in Berlin. Yet, as the fate of the Elbe duchies and the Augustenburg cause became uncertain, network members retreated into their previous camps. In the 1850s, faith in the transcendental power of both monarchy and friendship had helped German liberals temper disagreements over political practice, but by the mid-1860s, the two only exacerbated their policy disputes. Strife between members only worsened, until the Seven Weeks' War of 1866 heralded the end of the network of political friends.

This chapter proceeds chronologically from 1863 to 1867. This period exemplifies the instability of political friendship as a form of political organization in societies defined by centralized civic associations, loosened press restrictions, and emergent party politics.[5] I first focus on members' fortunes in Baden, as well as their misfortunes in Prussia, in the first half of 1863. Shortly thereafter, network monarchs gathered with their fellow princes in the Confederal capital to hammer out an agreement on national consolidation. I analyze the fierce debates between Confederal leaders at the Frankfurt Fürstentag over the relationship between monarchical sovereignty and national unity. This chapter's final section unravels the process of détente and disintegration in the network from the start of the Second Schleswig War (1864) to the formation of the North German Confederation in 1867.

From Karlsruhe to Danzig

While Max Duncker fueled controversy with his embrace of Bismarck in Berlin, other members worked to expand network influence in Karlsruhe. Franz von Roggenbach retained his position as foreign minister and Grand Duke Friedrich I's favorite in Baden's liberal government, despite the failure of his proposals in the early 1860s to reform the German Confederation. But Roggenbach faced additional problems: the head of Baden's cabinet, Anton von Stabel, and pro-Austrian diplomats rejected his *kleindeutsch* projects, while Roggenbach clashed with August Lamey, the interior minister, over laws regarding the Catholic Church.[6] Why had the mood in Karlsruhe warmed toward Vienna?

During the Prussian constitutional crisis, Habsburg Austria's liberal reputation rose as that of Hohenzollern Prussia declined. Recovering from defeat in the Italian War of 1859, Emperor Franz Joseph's cabinet, under Anton von Schmerling and Bernhard von Rechberg, issued the "October Constitution" of 1860, followed by the "February Patent" of 1861.[7] With these two documents, Austrian leaders turned the Habsburg Monarchy into a constitutional state.[8] Reforms included the establishment of a Reichsrat, reduced imperial authority, and greater autonomy for the empire's constituent Crown Lands.[9] These developments appealed to *Trias* leaders in the middle German states who favored closer economic and political cooperation with Vienna to foil Prussian hegemony in the Zollverein.[10] They also believed that a moderate Austrian cabinet might eventually support a "*Doppelbund*" of unified *Trias* states within the Confederation.[11] Increased associational life, loosened press restrictions, and revitalized local councils fostered "a real sense of optimism" among the monarchy's liberals.[12] The Austrian reforms, particularly Schmerling's brand of state liberalism, likewise appealed to north German liberals disaffected with a Prussian government embroiled in a long-running constitutional crisis.[13]

Envoys from Baden began to participate in *Trias* meetings in Würzburg; they did so as welcome, if somewhat suspect, members of the informal coalition.[14] The grand duke flirted with the *Trias* idea for two reasons. Many Baden politicians, especially those with pronounced anticlerical views, believed that Catholic Austria funded political Catholicism in Baden and obstructed the secularization of schools and civil marriages.[15] Closer diplomatic relations with the Austrian emperor might curtail such interference and help Grand Duke Friedrich reach a favorable compromise with Pope Pius IX and Catholic political leaders in Baden.[16] On the other hand, other network members, among them Ernst of Coburg, Karl Mathy, and Franz von Roggenbach, feared that *Trias* advocates in Baden might coax the grand duke away from Prussia in 1863, just when Bismarck was dashing hopes of Prussia's "moral conquest" of Germany. Members mobilized to help Roggenbach find Mathy a senior position in Karlsruhe, where

he could exert influence as a liberal, an advocate of *Kleindeutschland*, a Baden patriot, and an expert on the Zollverein.

Karl Mathy had served in Baden's state bureaucracy before—in the 1830s and 1840s. To punish Mathy for his service to the Reich government of 1848–49 and to Baden's liberal cabinet of 1850, Grand Duke Friedrich's predecessor had revoked his civil servant status.[17] Having settled in Gotha after the death of their son, Karl and Anna Mathy moved again in 1860 to Leipzig to work in a credit bank.[18] There, the Mathys became especially close to Gustav Freytag and his wife, Emilie Freytag (née Scholz). Roggenbach's influence, the easing of Confederal repression, and the current grand duke's liberal sympathies resulted in the reinstatement of Mathy's civil servant status in late 1862.[19] Roggenbach and Duke Ernst then recommended Mathy to Grand Duke Friedrich, who soon asked him to join his government.[20] After consulting with other members, Mathy accepted a position as head of the grand ducal domains: this was an influential post that granted Mathy direct access to the monarch and an overview of his finances.[21]

Mathy arrived in Karlsruhe at the beginning of 1863 and quickly settled into his role. By all accounts, he was the most realistic and business-savvy of the network friends—perhaps because he was one of the few non-academics and non-artists.[22] Mathy soon forged a personal relationship with the grand ducal family. Regularly, he strolled with the grand duke and duchess through the palace gardens and dined with their family before retiring with Grand Duke Friedrich to discuss trade and German politics.[23] On official letterhead, Mathy communicated with his political friends in Saxony, Coburg, and Prussia, joining Roggenbach and Hermann Baumgarten in keeping them aware of the popular political mood in Baden.[24] Mathy also moved to establish a credit bank in Mannheim, similar to his work in Coburg, but this time in competition with the Rothschild family, whose Frankfurt relatives served as bankers to the German Confederation.[25]

Duke Ernst of Coburg was particularly pleased with Mathy's performance. It enhanced Ernst's contacts in Baden with Grand Duke Friedrich, who was a fellow in-law of the Hohenzollerns. For Ernst and Friedrich, Karl Mathy's appointment demonstrated mutual trust and friendship. Princely network members' circulation of bourgeois political friends as candidates for state office had been common in the 1850s, and the strategy worked in the larger states into the mid-1860s. However, once in office, bourgeois network members' positions were often vulnerable, as the cases of Heinrich von Sybel and Max Duncker showed in chapter 3. Network influence only reached so far into the halls of power—especially in Berlin.

Two related episodes from 1863 exemplified the network's delicate attempt to balance service to the Prussian state with appeals to the political vision of Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm. These were the "Danzig Affair" and the subsequent publication of critical letters between King Wilhelm and his son. Both stemmed

from the king's attack on the constitutional role of the Landtag, his disinterest in the national project, and the crown prince's own wish to participate in the new space for public politics. In each case, Ernst of Coburg, Karl Samwer, and Gustav Freytag exploited Max Duncker's vulnerability, eventually shattering his relationship with the crown prince. The fallout then ensnared princely and non-princely network members from both camps in an international scandal.

In the summer of 1863, the crown prince and princess went to visit the Prussian port city of Danzig (Gdańsk). The crown prince inspected local naval elements and delivered a speech to the townspeople on the role of the monarchy in Prussia, reminding his listeners of the need for a free press and the legislature's right to approve the state budget.[26] The speech echoed the position of the Progressive Party on the matter and the voices of anti-Bismarck network members around the duke of Coburg.[27] Why did he engage in such a public reprimand of his father's policies? The crown prince had been collecting British newspaper clippings since March that outlined how he should act to alter the regime in Prussia. Shortly before his speech in Danzig, the crown prince had learned, not from his political advisor, Max Duncker, but from a provincial newspaper, that the king had issued an edict restricting the oppositional press.[28] Duncker supported the content of the speech and praised the crown prince's "manly independence"; yet, to August von Saucken he seethed that those who had pressured Friedrich Wilhelm to speak out had acted irresponsibly.[29]

The crown prince's seemingly presumptuous speech enraged the king. Wilhelm chastised his son for disrespect before threatening to court-martial and imprison him. Bismarck intervened and managed to convince King Wilhelm that the conflict was best "blunted, ignored, and hushed up."[30] Bismarck then blamed Max Duncker for failing to anticipate the fallout from the speech. Duncker had surrendered the crown prince, Bismarck charged, to the influence of British diplomats and Coburg agents—namely, Robert Morier and Duncker's new rival, Ernst von Stockmar.[31] The crown prince defended himself to king, counselor, and minister alike, accusing his father of endangering the monarchy by embroiling himself in the constitutional crisis.[32] The crown prince preferred a reigning, parliamentary monarch to a ruling, semi-constitutional monarch. He also piqued the Prussian king's sense of dynastic duty with reference to legitimism: Wilhelm held the Crown as its custodian and was behaving recklessly. In this episode, the Prussian king and crown prince continued the Hohenzollern tradition of father-son conflict.[33] Yet, the enduring scandal was also a very contemporary one. The conflict was less a clash of personalities between father and son and more a dispute over the very form of the Prussian state, the meaning of a monarch's duty, and—in liberals' thinking—the future of the German nation-state.

Despite Bismarck's best efforts, the situation worsened as sensitive documents flowed between network members and into the public realm. Ernst von Stockmar sent Friedrich of Baden copies of three letters between the king and the crown

prince. Queen Augusta of Prussia had asked him to forward them to Grand Duke Friedrich with instructions to return them to the crown prince through the former New Era minister, Karl Anton von Hohenzollern.[34] Stockmar sent the grand duke of Baden at least four more letters and other "writings," which he duly read and returned.[35] Sections of the correspondence soon appeared in the British *Times* and began to circulate in German newspapers. The relationship between the Prussian king and his heir deteriorated. The former threatened to discharge the latter from the army, but Bismarck managed to dissuade the king despite Crown Princess Victoria, even though Bismarck resented what he saw as the constant interference of Queen Augusta and Victoria's family in London.[36] The crown prince complained to his friend and brother-in-law, Friedrich of Baden: "What a difficult conflict those couple of words at Danzig city hall have cost me, as did the correspondence with the king, of which you are already aware . . . My position is terribly mortifying—grave."[37] The crown prince retreated into "sullen passivity" publicly, but his diaries indicate that he continued to challenge the king privately on constitutional issues.[38]

Roggenbach, the foreign minister of Baden, believed that the crown prince's misstep in Danzig had turned into a "blunder" that further decreased his influence in Berlin.[39] Roggenbach wrote to his sovereign and political friend, Grand Duke Friedrich, to express his concern that, although the letters had been published without the crown prince's consent, the "indiscretion" had clearly been organized as part of a wider "attack plan." Roggenbach had gathered as much from Gustav Freytag, who had detailed Stockmar and Samwer's involvement in the plot. Charlotte Duncker and Rudolf Haym likewise held "the group of friends gaggled around Duke Ernst" responsible for the convoluted plot to undermine Duncker and buttress Progressives in the legislature simultaneously.[40] Bismarck, the king, and the crown prince all accused Duncker of leaking the letters, which he denied.[41]

Publication of the royal letters transformed the Danzig "episode" from a family dispute into a national scandal.[42] King Wilhelm next accused his son-in-law, Friedrich of Baden, of leaking the documents. In doing so, Wilhelm reinterpreted the boundary between private and public, dynasty and state, by translating bourgeois notions of privacy to the ruling family. He nevertheless faced the reality that the type of monarchical state that he favored rendered such distinctions moot. The persons of the king and the crown prince were indistinguishable from their dynastic roles and state functions, and that political metaphor was indispensable to "generating favorable sentiments of adhesion" toward monarchies across nineteenth-century Europe.[43] Members heard that dissonance.[44] Friedrich responded gravely that he had indeed read, but not copied, the letters; they were "foreign property." Feeling that the Prussian king had maligned his monarchical dignity and his personal character, Friedrich asked to "leave the question unanswered whether I myself have contributed to this catastrophe."[45]

Dynastic networks and the European press turned what the king and Bismarck chose to consider a father-son squabble into an international incident. The embarrassing situation reflected an important struggle over the basic role of monarchy in Prussia and in a future nation-state. The crown prince championed the views of the majority of network members who favored parliamentary rule in the name of a constitutionally limited sovereign. King Wilhelm, Bismarck, and Max Duncker read "modern" monarchy differently, adapting bourgeois family norms—that family disputes should remain private—to protect the public political image of king and country.[46] The intra-network conflict had partially backfired. True, Duncker's reputation had suffered, but rather than boosting the crown prince's official influence, the affair left him isolated. Overall, the episode highlighted not only the disruptive power of the otherwise limited network but also its members' tendency toward factionalism and self-sabotage after 1862. Members of the network failed to appreciate the high stakes of taking personal political feuds into a public realm that had been greatly expanded during the New Era. A few months after the Danzig Affair, in August 1863, disagreement over the role of monarchy in Germany, as well as in a potential *Kleindeutschland*, resurfaced at the last peaceful gathering of Confederal leaders at Frankfurt am Main.

The Frankfurt Fürstentag (1863)

Not only did questions about the relationship between nation and monarchy reappear in Frankfurt, but intriguing aspects of Duke Ernst's concessions in the Prussian military convention (chapter 3) also resurfaced in debates about the foundations of sovereignty in Central Europe. This section tracks some of the disputes between princes attending the Frankfurt Fürstentag in 1863 from the perspective of princely members of the network. These disputes highlighted German princes' divergent interpretations of their roles and their sovereignty. Opponents of the network and their plans for *kleindeutsch* unification now echoed network members' idea that sovereignty could be collected in a central authority for the sake of national consolidation—not to form a *Kleindeutschland*, though. The final failure of the congress demonstrated the continuing divisions within the Confederation despite years of reform efforts and nearly constant threats from abroad.

Julius Fröbel, a radical '48er turned Austrian official, devised the original idea for the Fürstentag summit that eventually reached high officials in the Austrian government.[47] The receipt of an invitation shocked princely network members like "a bolt out of the blue."[48] Duke Ernst II of Coburg nonetheless remembered the "fearful anxiety" over whether every state would be represented. He reported that he tried, along with Grand Duke Friedrich I of Baden and Grand Duke Carl

Alexander of Weimar, to convince Prussia to send a delegation—likely headed by the crown prince, if not the king.[49] Network members worried that without a Prussian presence, conservative sovereigns would dominate the conference. Bismarck, characteristically, sensed an Austrian ploy. He also understood that, without the presence of the Prussian king, the other German princes who did answer the call would be unable to reach any major agreements. King Wilhelm I of Prussia, at Bismarck's behest, rejected the initial invitation to Frankfurt.

Shortly after the other German leaders gathered in Frankfurt am Main on 15 August 1863, disagreements arose between them concerning their notions of monarchy and nation.[50] At the opening session, Emperor Franz Joseph, sitting in a raised chair to signal his status as a first among equals, called for national consolidation and presented his Confederal reform proposal, which, in a new development, was published in the press two days later.[51] The king of Bavaria immediately objected that, without Prussia, such a reform plan would be worth little. This regal exchange set off a round of bickering between Confederal rulers.[52] The grand duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin proposed that a prince be sent personally to ask Wilhelm to attend. The kings of Saxony and Bavaria eagerly supported the motion, as did Friedrich of Baden.[53] For a moment, the goals of the *Trias* and *kleindeutsch* reformers aligned. According to Roggenbach, *Trias* rulers feared that, if the Habsburg emperor succeeded, they would be forced into a reformed Confederation and "full subjugation under Austria."[54] The monarchs of the smaller states were afraid of mediatization by both Austria or Prussia. For his part, Friedrich of Baden wanted the Prussian king to join the congress so that it could reach major reforms. The German princes eventually dispatched King Johann of Saxony to meet personally with Wilhelm, who at that time was taking a cure in Baden-Baden. After many emotional theatrics, Bismarck managed to persuade the king to decline the second invitation.[55] Network monarchs therefore participated in the conference without their ideal leader.

Informal diplomacy surrounded the daily meetings of the German princes in Frankfurt and shared similarities with the behavior of delegates to the National Assembly of 1848–49 that suggested the diffusion of democratic norms among Confederal leaders. Factions formed early on, representing a "left" wing, a "right," and a "cautious center," with each holding increasingly isolated faction meetings.[56] The main scenes of conflict took place at formal sessions, however.[57] Debates were especially bitter between King Johann of Saxony, who otherwise tried to play a mediating role between the princes, and Grand Duke Friedrich of Baden, who, according to a Coburg source, refused to align with any of the princely factions—in proper moderate-liberal fashion.[58] Even so, these two monarchs were also leading representatives of competing *Trias* and *kleindeutsch* solutions; therefore, they had arrived at the Fürstentag with plenty of policy positions in their baggage. The most significant struggle occurred on 24 August, when Johann advocated for a directory of five princes to head a new Confederal

executive.[59] This directory would relegate the tens of duchies and grand duchies to a single seat.[60] So intense was the indignation in the room that the duke of Braunschweig was moved to shouting, stamping his feet, and pounding on the table.[61]

Liberal monarchs made a counterproposal. The grand duke of Oldenburg suggested that Austria, Prussia, and Bavaria should have permanent seats on the directorate, and that the other two positions should be elected periodically by the other princes.[62] This arrangement would have undermined the middle-state monarchs' position in the new Confederation, and Johann's, in particular. Unsurprisingly, Johann was irate. He argued that only kings should be given precedence (the *Trias* states included the kingdoms of Saxony, Bavaria, Württemberg, and occasionally Hanover). Johann's proposal would have given the monarchs of the *Trias*, based on feudal title, disproportionate representation in the new executive. Friedrich countered that the assembled sovereigns had no reason to stand on such distinctions of rank; they should all be considered equal representatives of their states.[63] Friedrich implicitly leveraged Confederal guarantees of monarchical sovereignty, regardless of title. But even the seating arrangements of the room reflected a longstanding debate among German princes over rank and precedence.[64] The monarchs sat around a large, round table in a large, round hall. Yet, the emperor sat on his raised chair, flanked by the kings of Bavaria and Saxony, and the other princes literally radiated outward from his seat "according to rank."[65] Friedrich of Baden's legal references to monarchical equality rang hollow within a chamber organized to obscure that very fact.

Grand Duke Friedrich's position also reflected a shift among many German liberals in considering the relationship between the monarch and state. After the shock of popular violence during the Revolutions of 1848/49, German liberals abandoned the idea of the monarch as the embodiment of the *Gesamtpersönlichkeit*, or "total personality," of the state—and thus of the future nation-state. They chose instead to portray the monarch as an emanation of the state, responsible for assuring social stability and historical continuity in the face of inevitable progress.[66] Monarchs thereby served the state in its heavily freighted mission of civilization. For most German liberals, including the political friends, this monarchical system would lead almost by necessity to national unification. Yet, progress in Frankfurt was neither natural nor easy. The assembled princes could not consider national unity without first defining their own sovereignty.

The early conflict at the congress over rank and power highlights the divergent ideas of sovereignty held by a liberal network monarch such as Friedrich, whose state had a solid parliamentary base, and a more conservative ruler, such as Johann, whose state was more reliant on dynastic tradition. The kings of Saxony, Bavaria, and Württemberg formed a bloc that intended to translate their titles into real political power in a reformed Confederation. The "lower-ranking" princes sought to minimize their subordination based on accidents of

history—or Napoleonic largesse.[67] Friedrich of Baden directly criticized feudal rank in favor of monarchs' modern equality as representatives of their people—a position Johann could never endorse. Put simply: Friedrich represented the state; Johann was the state.[68]

At the same time, Friedrich of Baden adapted a conservative notion of sovereignty that moderate liberals had embraced after 1848 to defend their legal safe havens in the smaller German states. Sovereignty could not be quantified by population, wealth, or land area. It was essentially qualitative—all sovereigns were equal.[69] The concept of monarchical sovereignty proved as malleable in the hands of princes as it did in those of bourgeois activists.

Considering the princes' infighting, Friedrich of Baden concluded on 25 August that there could be no reform but only the strengthening of appeals from *Trias* leaders or Austria. A final argument occurred toward the end of the conference when Emperor Franz Joseph, frustrated by what he regarded as the obstinacy of the myriad monarchs and distancing himself from his own government's reform plan, concluded that "whoever does not vote with us, is our enemy."[70] Grand Duke Friedrich rejected the emperor's dark pronouncement. He indicated that the princes needed to sacrifice their sovereignty for the "communal good," for German unity and security.[71] Friedrich once again expounded on German monarchs' national duty to trade *individual* power for *collective* glory, a notion the Austrian emperor evidently found frustrating. Anything short of the complete reorganization of the Confederation, Friedrich then declared, would be a mere stopgap. Franz Joseph responded that Friedrich should have brought these ideas up beforehand. Friedrich retorted that he had, many times, in his letters. A general argument ensued, and the meeting disintegrated.[72] The conference concluded on 1 September after this last, uncomfortable session.

The Fürstentag was a "glamorous event" that also exposed deep division within the German Confederation.[73] The princes of Germany attempted to deploy monarchical pageantry at the national level to convince the public of their mutual affection and capacity for compromise. They displayed neither of those qualities. Duke Ernst of Coburg believed that the failure of the Fürstentag dispelled the myth of camaraderie among the German princes (a myth, not coincidently, that was the foundation of the Confederation). The leaders of Germany had sat together in discussion, free from the interference of advisors and state ministers, but they had still left Frankfurt empty-handed. In an aside to Franz Joseph during the conference, Duke Ernst admitted: "I very much dread that the German princes will never again see themselves assembled in Frankfurt without a sword in hand!"[74]

Friedrich of Baden was cautiously optimistic. In a letter to Franz Joseph of Austria, he thanked the emperor for his invitation to the Fürstentag before reminding Franz Joseph of the need for sacrifices for German unity.[75] With this

motif of sacrifice—so prominent in network rhetoric and among European liberals—Friedrich tried to prod the emperor into concessions that would foster German unification.[76] Yet, according to Friedrich's preferred model, Franz Joseph would not be part of that unified Germany.

The Congress of Princes elicited mixed reactions in the German public sphere. The pro-Austrian Reformverein praised the event as a "patriotic deed" and as a promising foundation for constitutional reform in Germany. The pro-Prussian Nationalverein derided the results of the summit as wholly inadequate for national unity and personal freedom.[77] Bourgeois members of the network across the Confederation shared the latter sentiment. For Karl Mathy, the congress was thus a vaguely Holy Roman throwback that implied both national supremacy and the "Caesarism" of Napoleon III.[78] This viewpoint accorded with Roggenbach's idea of an "artificial" Austria and its antiquated emperor, outlined in his reform proposal of 1860. Mathy considered the Fürstentag merely a disingenuous Austrian attempt at damage control in Germany.[79] Max Duncker likewise believed that the Austrian government intended to exploit the conference to delay the renewal of the Zollverein until the smaller states voted to admit the Habsburg lands.[80] Such an expansion would loosen the Prussian grip on Confederal trade, especially north of the Main. Clearly, many northern German liberals questioned the new liberalism and nationalism of the Austrian government.

For his part, Gustav Freytag worried that the failures of the Fürstentag would directly affect his political friend and patron, Ernst of Coburg. Freytag advised the duke in December 1863 against becoming the protector of the local Thüringer Verein.[81] If Ernst associated with the movement now, Freytag thought, he might appear to be its leader. Freytag warned that associating himself with the club could ultimately lead to another "fiasco" and, the novelist concluded, "I do not want Your Highness to sit himself down in a collapsing house again."[82] The last "fiasco" was Ernst's involvement in the "collapsing" reform movement and its culmination at the Frankfurt Fürstentag in 1863. By December of that same year, and with the renewal of the Schleswig-Holstein crisis, the hopes for a collegial reform of the Confederation and the political consolidation of the German nation seemed finished. Couched in the language of friendly concern, Freytag sought to prevail upon Duke Ernst to guard his now shaky reputation in liberal Germany—a reputation that network members needed to preserve in order to ensure their own access to the duke's political connections.

Ultimately, non-princely network members were both surprised by, and suspicious of, the sudden efforts of the Austrian cabinet in the Fürstentag of 1863. They remained unsurprised, however, by its lack of tangible results. Reform based on monarchical consensus, the preferred strategy of network members since at least 1858, had failed yet again. Their hope for national unification through princely consensus dimmed further. Bourgeois members' grumblings from the

1850s about princely unreliability and ineptitude continued to reverberate after 1863. Perhaps the monarchs of Germany's smaller states would not become the framers of the nation-state after all? Tension between network members' liberalism and monarchism grew, and their belief wavered in the transcendental power of friendship and monarchy to achieve nationalist goals. Most members of the liberal network became increasingly dismissive of monarchs from the small states, while a few began to question the European consensus about the centrality of monarchy to liberalism and nation.[83] But "traditional" monarchy and "modern" nationalism were not so easily separated in nineteenth-century Europe. Two months later, King Frederick VII of Denmark died. The demise of the Danish king reignited the national conflict over Schleswig-Holstein and reconciled rival network members—for a time.

From Schleswig-Holstein to the North German Confederation, 1864–1867

Network members were elated over the possibilities for German national unification that they saw in the monarchical future of Schleswig-Holstein. In pursuit of these possibilities, the network paused their factional attacks on one another. Members supported the claim of a network affiliate, Friedrich von Augustenburg, to the thrones of the three Elbe duchies and campaigned to win Confederal and international recognition for the "Augustenburg candidacy." Political consensus within the network soon faltered after Austro-Prussian victories over Denmark and the occupation of the Elbe duchies in early 1864. Members disagreed about whether the duchies should be ruled by the reliably liberal Augustenburg or annexed by the autocratic Prussian king. For some, Bismarck's Prussia might finally unite Germany—perhaps by force.[84] But Augustenburg promised to rule constitutionally with a parliamentary government, to create a "Gotha on the Elbe," Bismarck quipped.[85] Questions of dynastic legitimacy mixed uncomfortably with hopes for future unification, and such questions were never swept from the table between 1864 and 1866. Faced with these challenges, the network finally collapsed in June 1866 when members found themselves on different sides of the "German Civil War."[86]

A brief rehearsal of the conflict in Schleswig-Holstein, discussed in chapter 1, is needed to understand how German leaders and network members behaved during the crisis in the 1860s. The three duchies of Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg had been held in personal union by Danish monarchs since the middle of the fifteenth century. With the death of King Frederick VII in November 1863, the male line of the Danish royal house ended, replaced in Denmark by Christian IX, a relative from a female line. Because the German Confederation

recognized only the rule of Salic inheritance, King Christian could not inherit the throne in Holstein or Lauenburg.[87] Complicating matters further, Schleswig, which lay outside the Confederation, was fused through a series of historical treaties to Holstein, which lay within it.[88] The Augustenburgs, next in line through a junior male branch in Holstein, had sold their claims in the London Protocol of 1852 as a means to end the First Schleswig War (1848–51). The signatories of that treaty—Russia, the UK, France, Austria, Prussia, and Sweden-Norway—had also guaranteed Danish territorial integrity.[89]

The German Confederation, as a legal body, was not party to the London Protocol. Copenhagen's campaigns to promote the Danish language and Danish civil servants in Schleswig-Holstein had sown anti-Danish sentiment among its educated German populations and in the German Confederation.[90] Friedrich von Augustenburg, presenting himself as a German prince and German nationalist, argued that his father's renunciation of the ducal thrones in 1852 did not apply to him: the elder Augustenburg, he asserted, lacked the authority to alter other dynasts' divinely ordained rights to the duchies. Friedrich von Augustenburg therefore left for Kiel in December 1863.[91] His appeal to the Confederal diet to recognize his claims found fertile soil, particularly among the *Trias* governments and network princes. But backing the Augustenburg candidacy meant war with Denmark and perhaps the other signatories of the London Protocol.

King Christian of Denmark decreed that he intended to retain the duchies. In response, the Confederal diet in Frankfurt am Main voted in December 1863 for an "execution"—that is, an invasion to restore Confederal law. Saxon and Hanoverian contingents were ordered to occupy Holstein and install Confederal commissioners, whereas the Prussian and Austrian armies joined the war without the request of the diet.[92] Network members exchanged letters praising the execution and decrying Copenhagen's disregard for the ancient law of Salic descent and the German nation itself.[93] Their embrace of Augustenburg remained cool, however.[94] They expressed little enthusiasm for the candidate himself, though they endorsed the liberal style of government and the cause of German nationalism that he seemed to represent.[95]

Friedrich von Augustenburg found his first and most ardent supporters among network monarchs in Baden, Weimar, and Coburg. He had been living with his family in Gotha since 1851. There, in November 1863, he had already recruited a small army as the Danish king's health worsened.[96] Duke Ernst of Coburg cooperated with his princely political friends, the grand dukes of Baden and Weimar, to supply the Augustenburg government with staff and materiel.[97] He virtually built Augustenburg a cabinet headed by veteran Holstein rebels and network members, Karl Samwer and Karl Francke.[98] When Augustenburg arrived in Kiel on 30 December 1863, without the consent of the German Confederation, he established a government.[99] Once installed in Kiel, Samwer led the rebel foreign office, and Francke oversaw the Holstein finances. Samwer

also used his legal training to create propaganda flyers and pamphlets conflating Augustenburg legitimism with German nationalism.[100] Samwer and Francke's legal authority remained unsure, however. Perhaps because of this situation and the lessons of the First Schleswig War, the Francke and Samwer families stayed behind in Coburg, and both men remained officials in Coburg service. Duke Ernst merely agreed to Samwer and Francke's secondment to Kiel.[101] The two submitted detailed reports to Ernst on the course of the war throughout 1864, including the movements of Austro-Prussian forces and Augustenburg's moods and journeys.[102]

In his enthusiasm for Augustenburg, Duke Ernst also dispatched a new confidant, Eduard von Tempeltey, to report from Schleswig-Holstein. Tempeltey relayed intelligence about Prussian military plans from one "Lt. Becker" and met with the Prussian crown prince at field command.[103] Nevertheless, Prussian gendarmes soon arrested the unaccredited Coburg courtier and expelled him from Holstein. Duke Ernst demanded that Max Duncker protest the expulsion to King Wilhelm and Adalbert von Schleinitz, the local commander.[104] He considered it an attack on the Augustenburg candidacy and an insult to his sovereign right to monitor a Confederal execution. Duncker did nothing except report the duke's outrage to the crown prince. It was not easy for Duke Ernst to control bourgeois members when they served in a more powerful court. For his part, Duncker was likely unwilling to tend to Ernst of Coburg's wounded pride after the latter's role in the Danzig Affair.

A few days later, to Duncker's "greatest astonishment," Tempeltey returned to Kiel—this time with accreditation as a ducal envoy. Prussian troops apprehended and deported him again.[105] Duncker warned the Prussian crown prince that nothing could damage the Augustenburg cause more "than this semblance of solidarity between Kiel and the 'princely member of the Progressive Party,' as our official newspaper puts it. . . . All the animosity against the duke of [Coburg] will now be transferred to [Augustenburg]."[106] A third Tempeltey appearance could only heighten fears of a Kiel–Coburg axis among Prussian conservatives, including Bismarck and the king, which Samwer later confirmed.[107] Despite their détente around the Augustenburg candidacy, network members disagreed on how best to support their candidate.

Augustenburg's claims to the Elbe duchies were welcomed unequivocally in Baden. Grand Duke Friedrich and Augustenburg shared liberal views, and Roggenbach and Samwer had close ties through the network. Baden, represented by Robert von Mohl at the Confederal diet in Frankfurt, began representing Augustenburg as well. In a letter to Friedrich of Baden, Augustenburg assured him: "I will never forget that it was you and the duke of Coburg who first backed me when I had to step out, virtually against the world, to fulfill my God-given duty."[108] Carl Alexander of Weimar, for his part, promised to impress on his relatives in Berlin and St. Petersburg the legitimacy of Augustenburg's claims.[109]

Max and Charlotte Duncker considered the conflict an opportunity for the Prussian crown prince to endear himself to the king after the debacle over his comments in Danzig.[110] Max Duncker suggested that Friedrich Wilhelm join the Prussian command in Rendsburg; he would be considered a warrior-prince defending Germany, appealing to court conservatives and the liberal press alike. Combat experience would also raise the prince's standing at crown councils, particularly when negotiations began with Denmark.[111] The crown prince traveled to the Prussian field headquarters in February 1864 to assist Field Marshal Friedrich von Wrangel—who had led Prussian troops against Napoleon I, against Denmark in the First Schleswig War, and against rebels in Baden in 1848.[112] By most accounts, Friedrich Wilhelm outshone Wrangel, who appeared senile.[113] The crown prince took over most important decisions, though the king continued to favor Wrangel.[114] Max Duncker spent a week with the crown prince in Holstein before returning to Berlin to report on developments there and at the diet in Frankfurt. Although Duncker was the crown prince's "only trusted source" of news, Friedrich Wilhelm ignored most of his advisor's counsel.[115]

In the early months of the war, Charlotte Duncker feared that King Wilhelm and Bismarck might ultimately guarantee Danish territorial integrity, leaving the Elbe duchies under Copenhagen's control to avoid a wider war in Europe. Despite her husband's limited influence, Charlotte Duncker argued in a letter to Max Duncker that Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm should upset the traditional dynastic obedience that a prince owed the king if it served the interests of the nation.[116] In doing so, Duncker illustrated not only network members' separation of monarchs from supreme military command after 1860, but also the accommodation of traditional family and monarchical roles to nationalist demands. She argued that the crown prince "is first crown prince, second general."[117] Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm should, she implied, set aside the obedience he owed the king as an officer and intervene, as Wilhelm's son and heir, against Bismarck's anti-national machinations. Duncker thus argued that the crown prince should do his dynastic *and* filial duty and turn the king from the "evil" and "sin" of national betrayal.[118] Friedrich Wilhelm's primary duty, in Duncker's view, was his national duty to incorporate Schleswig-Holstein—political error became an offense against God. He was first a German, second a Hohenzollern prince, and only then a Prussian general. Duncker imagined this hierarchy, of course, at a time when monarchs and their presence in medals, portraiture, and *Residenzstädte* were inseparable from military uniforms and soldiers.[119]

Writing to her spouse, Charlotte Duncker buttressed her position by deploying the language of family solidarity. The son owed the father unbiased counsel; he was to tell him hard truths, Duncker suggested, because Wilhelm's policy decisions in 1864 might haunt Friedrich Wilhelm in his future role as Hohenzollern *Hausvater* and Prussian *Landesvater*. This view of family obligations accorded

closely with more traditional conceptions of monarchy advanced by conservatives such as Duke Bernhard of Meiningen and King Georg V of Hanover. Echoing the crown prince's own assertions during the Danzig Affair of 1863, Duncker held that King Wilhelm was the current custodian of the Prussian Crown and could not tamper with or jeopardize it without consulting its possible heirs. Friedrich Wilhelm, as his anointed successor, had every right to intervene in the machine of state if he believed the Crown was in danger. Likewise, as a son, it was his duty to warn his father of threats to the family. The crown prince had already taken this approach in Danzig—with disastrous results.

Duncker brought together ideas about the early modern dynastic state, post-Napoleonic legitimism, and German nationalism. The Hohenzollerns' family fortunes were still tied to that of the Prussian state, as they would have been one hundred years earlier. But now, for a liberal network member such as Charlotte Duncker, the fortunes of the Hohenzollern family were synonymous not only with the Prussian state, but also with a future German nation-state. Duncker developed this language to legitimize her nationalization of the crown prince of Prussia. She combined traditional conceptions of family and monarchy for national ends: namely, wresting Schleswig-Holstein from its internationally recognized relationship with Denmark and allowing it to pass to a future German nation-state under the Prussian monarchy.

The Dunckers did not have to wait long for developments in the north. By March 1864, Prussian leaders convinced the Austrian emperor to order his contingents into Denmark proper, beyond the borders of the German Confederation and beyond the remit of its execution. Prussian troops stormed the redoubts at Dybbøl (Düppel) in April, ending Danish resistance in Jutland.[120] The battle eventually became an important episode in Prussian and German nationalist mythology. Members across the network waxed lyrical about the daring of Prussian troops fighting for the German nation under heavy fire and taking heavy casualties.[121] Such victories did little to dispel the crown prince's doubts about the political ends of the war for Prussia and for Germany.[122] He had been Augustenburg's close friend since their time together at the University of Bonn.[123] Bismarck and King Wilhelm had labeled Augustenburg a liberal rabble-rouser, and the Augustenburgs had few friends among other Prussian conservatives.[124] The king had also forbidden his son to meet with Friedrich von Augustenburg while fighting in Holstein, so in May 1864, the crown prince met his friend in secret in Hamburg.[125] Augustenburg's opportunity to acquire the northern duchies seemed to be fading—it was not even possible for an old friend to associate with him publicly.

Austrian and Prussian military successes caused controversy over how to exploit these victories in the German Confederation, in the network, and internationally. Some foreign signatories to the London Protocol were alarmed at the rapid

advance of Austrian and Prussian troops against Danish defenses in Schleswig. In the diplomatic tradition of the Concert of Europe, the British government convened a conference in London to resolve the conflict peacefully. As in the First Schleswig War, British leaders feared the possible loss of Danish control of the Baltic straits. Napoleon III of France, by contrast, perceived an opportunity to challenge the territorial status quo and to wring concessions from the Prussian king in the Rhineland in exchange for the Elbe duchies.

The London conference of May 1864 was the only time the Confederal diet exercised its right to send its own ambassadors instead of relying on envoys from the individual states. Leaders of the middle-sized German states, chief among them Baden, Bavaria, and Saxony, feared that the Great Powers, whose leaders questioned the German and Augustenburg causes, would sacrifice both for individual gain.[126] These critics of the Confederation, now concerned about a potential national defeat in Holstein, favored exploiting the few sovereign powers of an institution that they wished to replace. After some debate, the Confederal diet voted to accredit Friedrich von Beust, *Trias* leader and de facto minister president of Saxony, as its representative.[127] Beust's election by his traditional pro-Prussian opponents testified to the unifying power of the conflict in Schleswig-Holstein among German nationalists. Nonetheless, Beust arrived late to London and largely followed positions advanced by Austrian and Prussian negotiators.[128] The delegates produced reams of partition proposals for Schleswig, which the Danish delegation rejected, confident of eventual British or Russian support.[129] Fighting resumed in June 1864. Prussian forces landed on the Danish island of Als at the end of the month, defeating the Danish troops who had been evacuated there.

These further Prussian victories caused network members to disagree further over how best to exploit them. The political friends retreated into their separate camps—around the Dunckers in Berlin and Duke Ernst in Coburg. Rudolf Haym endorsed the incorporation of the duchies into Prussia.[130] Duncker, following signals from Bismarck, advocated for the annexation of the duchies as "well-earned" rewards for the Prussian army and evidence of the king's assertion that an expanded army, free from parliamentary interference, would drive Prussian expansion and thus German political consolidation.[131]

Above all, Max Duncker wanted the duchies to become Prussian. The people of Schleswig and Holstein, he reported to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, would prefer a king to a duke.[132] Instead of continuing to insist on the dynastic rights of Augustenburg—a presumptive monarch—Duncker argued to Friedrich Wilhelm—another presumptive monarch—that he and the crown prince should, for the sake of national expansion, bypass the reliably liberal Augustenburg in favor of a Prussian king embroiled in a constitutional conflict with the Landtag. This regal swap could only be justified, Duncker continued, by the "consent of the populace."[133]

In his next report, Max Duncker admitted that the majority of the duchies' inhabitants continued to consider Augustenburg their legitimate ruler, and he wondered how they could be convinced otherwise.[134] Duncker concluded that the people of Schleswig-Holstein would, after due consideration, vote for the Prussian king. The king was more glorious and powerful—more national—than a mere duke. Should they not, Duncker contended in a subsequent report that Prussia had already "earned" Schleswig-Holstein through "substantial sacrifices of money and men."[135] Duncker mixed the power of feudal rank with the radical idea that the people should choose their ruler. Like *Trias* monarchs at the Fürstentag, Duncker contended that monarchical rank should correspond to national power. He differed only in his suggestion of a plebiscite to confirm the change in the status of Schleswig-Holstein.

For a German liberal such as Max Duncker, citizen-subjects in Holstein might be permitted to choose their monarch, but monarchical government was non-negotiable.[136] Should Holsteiners reject the rational choice of the Prussian king, Duncker argued that the Prussian government retained the right to incorporate the Elbe duchies as compensation for its wartime sacrifices for the German nation. Should the more liberal option of a referendum fail, Bismarck's more authoritarian option would suffice. Duncker's cynical development of monarchism resided somewhere at the intersection of the legitimist emphasis on the rootedness of monarchical dignity, monarchy by the grace of liberal constitutionalism, and monarchy by popular election. The person of the monarch became an interchangeable figure. For Duncker, the state and nation would prevail in Schleswig-Holstein, regardless of who oversaw it—better that the monarchical figure wore a more impressive crown. Impressed by the Prussian king's monarchical grandeur, Duncker ultimately advocated, in characteristically abstract terms, for plebiscitary monarchy as a strategy to ensure the ascension of compliant crowned heads and thereby the advancement of national unification—a strategy increasingly endorsed by the network's bourgeois liberals.

Max Duncker's suggestion also reflected efforts among moderate liberals to adjust to Bismarckian realpolitik by recycling aspects of left liberalism before 1848. In the 1830s, Karl von Rotteck contended in the hugely influential *Staats-Lexikon* that it was absurd to consider the state as the God-given property of one dynasty.[137] Instead, the southern German parliamentarian argued, monarchical succession was subject to law as determined by the legislature. Duncker hoped to bypass the duchies' legislatures and the Augustenburg dynasty to reach "the people" of Schleswig-Holstein with a plebiscite directly to legitimize their annexation to the Hohenzollern Crown. Duncker attempted to reconcile Bismarckian realpolitik with the more radical liberalism of his *Vormärz* youth. The former won out. Max Duncker chose to prize national unification over the monarchical *Rechtsstaat* at the core of German liberalism.[138]

Unsurprisingly, the crown prince ignored Duncker's Bonapartist proposal and later lectured him on the role of the legitimate sovereign and the loyalty that he owed his friend, Augustenburg.[139] Duncker, the bourgeois counselor, was willing to sacrifice a princely political friend in Augustenburg for what he saw as national progress. Friedrich Wilhelm, the crown prince, was not.[140] The two diverged fundamentally over the role of monarchy and the dispensability of political friends on the road to unification. National unity now overrode political friendship for Max Duncker: not so for Friedrich Wilhelm. Such differences of outlook percolated and threatened to boil over in network relations.

The rest of the network, including Ernst of Coburg, Friedrich of Baden, Karl Samwer, Gustav Freytag, and Heinrich von Sybel, continued to back Augustenburg and his vision of a liberal, parliamentary Schleswig-Holstein. They saw as reasonable, however, the sacrifice of ducal prerogatives to Prussia—namely, rights to military roads and the Kiel naval base.[141] After all, Prussian leaders had concluded similar arrangements with Coburg and Weimar.[142] Friedrich von Augustenburg, however, was determined to defend his hypothetical prerogatives. Like most monarchs of the German Confederation, he refused to make major concessions for national ends if those ends were synonymous with Prussian ones. Augustenburg's hard line began to alienate more and more members of the *kleindeutsch* network as Austro-Prussian success mounted.

The Danish, Prussian, and Austrian parties signed a preliminary peace in August 1864. King Christian IX of Denmark renounced his claim on the duchies during final negotiations in Vienna. Although victory in the north caused euphoria among German nationalists, the peace did not ease tensions between the Augustenburg and annexationist camps of the network because the question of inheritance remained open.[143] Ernst of Coburg extended Samwer's and Francke's "leave" to serve Augustenburg in Kiel. Samwer and Francke, however, were eager to return home to Coburg, well aware of Austro-Prussian hostility to the Augustenburg candidacy. War costs for the fledgling Holstein government had exceeded sixty million talers, and Francke felt the pressure.[144] Augustenburg instead requested another extension of their leave from Duke Ernst in Coburg.[145] Francke had refused to consider a second extension before Augustenburg implored Duke Ernst to convince Francke to stay in Holstein alongside Samwer.[146] Without direct pressure from Ernst, the bourgeois network members working closest with Augustenburg were now unwilling to continue the fight. Once again, Duke Ernst had put his non-princely political friends at risk to advance his interests against all odds.

In the final Treaty of Vienna of October 1864, the king of Denmark transferred the three duchies to the custody of the Austrian and Prussian sovereigns. The Second Schleswig War had ended, and Schleswig-Holstein became an "internal" German matter. The parties to the London Protocol accepted the secession of the duchies to Austria and Prussia, whose leaders would determine the validity of the

many, and increasingly tenuous, claims on the duchies.[147] Augustenburg turned to Ernst of Coburg and Friedrich of Baden, imploring them as old friends to continue their support.[148] Roggenbach reported that the Prussian king had suggested that Samwer leave Augustenburg's service. Wilhelm considered Samwer's constitutional proposals incompatible with the conditions under which Prussia might "return" the duchies; Bismarck distrusted both Samwer and Francke on the basis of their association with Coburg alone.[149]

Disregarding his political friends, Duke Ernst again prioritized dynastic politics: Francke and Samwer stayed in Holstein through the winter of 1864. Alongside Bismarck, Max Duncker openly promoted annexation to the Prussian crown prince and king.[150] Non-princely members of the network, regardless of their camp, understood more quickly than their princely counterparts that the fate of the duchies would not be decided in Kiel and Frankfurt, but rather in Berlin and Vienna.

Meanwhile, the fortunes of network members in government remained unstable. In Baden, Karl Mathy's standing with the grand duke grew as Roggenbach's withered. By the winter of 1864, along with the setbacks for the Augustenburg candidacy, Roggenbach faced domestic challenges from political Catholicism with implications for his diplomatic portfolio. The grand duke and the Stabel cabinet were debating Catholic leaders in the legislature over such contested institutions as schools and marriage.[151] Roggenbach rejected compromise with the Catholic Church on what he considered the state's mission to spread secular thought, respect for the Protestant ruling house, and German nationalism. Much as they did in the Italian states, poor relations with the Church in Germany in this period sowed conflict between liberal ministers and monarchs in their pursuit of national unification.[152]

Roggenbach declared to his sovereign and political friend in January 1865 that he would not pursue policies against him. In a gesture of fealty, Roggenbach conceded that he could not contradict the grand duke's wishes. "To the contrary," he wrote, "I believe that the sovereign and prince always holds the right to contradict his counselors."[153] Cooperation between minister and monarch was essential—with due deference to the latter over the will of parliament. However, Roggenbach implied that he would not support misguided domestic policy touching on essentials of Enlightenment liberalism, namely, the separation of church and state and the supposed threat of Catholicism to national unification. On the one hand, Grand Duke Friedrich, who favored compromise with the Vatican, had been lauded in the pages of the *Staats-Lexikon* for his faith in representative government, devotion to national unity, and hostility toward the pope. On the other hand, Franz von Roggenbach, whose appointment the encyclopedia had praised, now rejected compromising liberal ideals for political expediency or to placate a political friend.[154]

Friedrich did not accept Roggenbach's resignation until September 1865 after the signing of the Gastein Convention in August of that year.[155] He then appointed a pro-Habsburg diplomat, Ludwig von Edelsheim, as Roggenbach's replacement, signaling his displeasure with Prussia's resistance to Augustenburg.[156] The liberalizing Austrian government maintained its appeal to disaffected *kleindeutsch* princes, despite the bruising debates at the Fürstentag two years earlier. Grand Duke Friedrich's diplomatic maneuver also demonstrated the willingness of most network members to seek cooperation with formerly antagonistic state governments if it seemed to promote German unification—or at least counter conservative leaders in Prussia. Both princely and non-princely members of the network differed little from other German liberals. Compared to the more repressive years of the 1850s, however, the 1860s offered liberals new public venues to vent political disagreements and avenues to pursue national consolidation. They no longer needed to compromise with those who advocated accommodation with the Austrian government or Bismarck. Network members more quickly turned away from old political friends with whom they now disagreed—or actively worked against them. The political friends no longer needed the emotional, professional, and political support that the network provided in the face of official repression. The increasingly antagonistic debate among liberals over whether national unification should be pursued at any cost eventually drove the political friends and the network apart.

But for now, the network held together, and core members lamented Roggenbach's resignation.[157] Network influence was nevertheless preserved, in part, by the additional favor that the grand duke bestowed on Karl Mathy, who had remained relatively aloof from the network debate over Augustenburg.[158] Mathy and Roggenbach had become close during their time in the Baden government, so the latter maintained some access to state plans.[159] The grand duke, before he accepted Roggenbach's resignation, invited Mathy, head of ducal domains, to balls and audiences.[160] Friedrich told Mathy that he appreciated his friendship with Roggenbach and hoped that he might also earn Mathy's love.[161] Mathy's appointment was promising because Friedrich could trust him and eventually befriend him. The grand duke appointed Mathy trade minister in 1864, a pivotal post given hopes in Baden for national unification through the Zollverein Parliament, the legislating body of the customs union.[162] In mid-1865, Mathy was awarded a Baden dynastic decoration.[163] Political friendship as a foundation for political organization was crumbling, but its mechanisms continued to operate.

Emotional attachment, professional development, and political consensus—political friendship—were intertwined in the minds of the monarch and his bourgeois advisor. In the context of the mid-1860s, however, the love between Franz von Roggenbach and Friedrich of Baden failed to reconcile their policy positions. Friedrich counted on political friendship to prepare the ground for an

emotionally and politically fruitful relationship with Mathy at the same time it crumbled beneath his feet with Roggenbach. The grand duke continued to rely on political friendship to facilitate political cooperation when it no longer could. In this way, he differed little from the rest of the liberal network.

At the same time, from the winter of 1864–65 onward, the Austrian and Prussian governments argued over their Elbe custodianship. The focus of this study now falls mainly on princely members of the network, reflecting the marginalization of non-princely members without government positions. Critical decisions, particularly diplomatic ones, remained largely the purview of princes and state ministers. The later relegation of smaller, network monarchs, along with the Prussian crown prince, also highlighted the decline of dynastic diplomacy in the nineteenth century as state cabinets determined the parameters of monarchs' diplomatic choices—particularly in Prussia, where Bismarck had consolidated his power over the king.

In mid-1865, the Austrian and Prussian monarchs reached a compromise on their northern condominium at Bad Gastein. Schleswig would be administered by a Prussian commissioner, Holstein by an Austrian commissioner. Austria's control of Holstein meant that the new Austrian foreign minister, Alexander von Mensdorff-Pouilly, and the emperor exploited geography to obstruct contiguous Prussian control from Königsberg to Kiel. The Prussian king, meanwhile, purchased the oft-forgotten Duchy of Lauenburg—technically an annexation as claims still awaited arbitration.[164] Many liberals, including the pro-Augustenburg network members around Ernst of Coburg, considered Gastein a betrayal of liberalism and the German nation.[165] The increased concessions that King Wilhelm of Prussia now demanded from Augustenburg in exchange for recognizing his ascension remained similar to the prerogatives that Duke Ernst had "sacrificed" in a military convention with the king in 1861. Such concessions were also far less than the rights his *kleindeutsch* political allies wanted to trade for national unification. Augustenburg refused.[166]

Because of the tensions exacerbated by the Gastein agreement, network members faced the likelihood of war within the Confederation. The Prussian government complained about Austrian failures to pay war costs, which Bismarck desperately needed to cover, and instigated disputes over naval installations and military roads in Holstein.[167] Reactions to the Austro-Prussian rivalry varied. Members close to Duke Ernst, such as Roggenbach and Freytag, decried the suggestion of a German war, criticizing Bismarck's violations of the Gastein Convention and King Wilhelm's continued disregard for the constitution.[168] By contrast, the Dunckers, Rudolf Haym, Karl Mathy, and even Karl Francke favored war. In their view, it would assure the annexation of Schleswig-Holstein to Prussia, the destruction of Austrian influence in Germany, and, they hoped, *kleindeutsch* unification.[169]

At least since their debates at the Frankfurt Parliament, German liberals had developed a more bellicose approach to the question of national unification.[170] The outcome of a war between Austria and Prussia, however, was deemed by most network members to be too uncertain to risk one. Despite the aggrandizement of Prussian military power at Dybbøl and Als, it seemed unclear to most commentators whether the Prussian army—untested against another Great Power since 1815—could defeat the reformed Austrian military.[171] Members feared that a Prussian defeat would discredit not only King Wilhelm's arguments for the army budget but also the appeal of *kleindeutsch* policy.[172] After years of vilifying Austrian intentions, pro-Prussian princes Ernst of Coburg and Friedrich of Baden remained sympathetic toward the cautiously reformist cabinet in the Hofburg. Furthermore, many members of the network considered armed conflict with their Austrian confederates akin to civil war. National unification through monarchical agreement—guided by bourgeois advisors—remained some members' preferred path to the nation-state after years of disappointment in their princely political friends.

In 1865–66, therefore, network monarchs pursued closer ties to Austria in order to deter Prussian aggression. Although Roggenbach's successor, Ludwig von Edelsheim, attempted to join the *Trias* states, leaders such as Friedrich von Beust and Ludwig von der Pfordten were suspicious of advances from a long-time *kleindeutsch* rival. Karl Mathy also worked consistently to undermine Edelsheim's pro-Austrian efforts.[173] Friedrich strengthened his dynastic connections to Austria, nonetheless, by allowing a prince of Baden to serve in the Habsburg army.[174] On 9 April 1866, the Prussian envoy to the Confederal diet, Karl Friedrich von Savigny, called for, among other reforms, an elected Confederal parliament, something neither conservative *Trias* leaders nor the Austrian government could accept.[175] Bismarck understood that Beust and other middle-state leaders would not condone popular representation at the national level—it smacked of 1848.[176] For them, only the expansion of the existing model of the diet as a congress of state envoys was permissible. Stalemate was thus assured. At that point, Duke Ernst noted that war was the only conclusion.[177]

In mid-May 1866, leaders from the smaller German states attempted to form a neutral bloc.[178] Decades of infighting precluded such a union. Duke Ernst of Coburg recalled the situation at the time: "In the circles of these statesmen, one played with fire. In Bavaria, Württemberg, Hanover, and even in Baden, utter confusion reigned."[179] There was little hope of armed neutrality. Friedrich of Baden received mixed messages about a possible war from both Bismarck and Max Duncker. While the latter prevaricated, the former told him sarcastically that he might place himself under French protection.[180] Duke Ernst raced to Baden to advocate for the neutrality of the smaller German states, but he found the grand duke and his ministers despondent.[181] In June 1866, Mathy resigned his cabinet post in protest after Friedrich of Baden joined Austria and the Confederation against Prussia.[182]

Although he had placed his army under Prussian control in 1862, Duke Ernst attempted to limit his involvement in the coming fratricidal conflict. Responding to Carl Alexander of Weimar's question of whether he planned to take up his command in the Prussian army, Ernst replied that he would fulfill his office if it "came to blows"; otherwise, he planned to stay in Coburg.[183] Ernst worked to persuade Carl Alexander, who thought the war would solve no political problems whatsoever, to journey to Dresden to plead for peace.[184] Ernst was suspicious of King Wilhelm's belligerence and Bismarck's diplomatic intentions.[185] His friendly and family ties to the Austrian foreign minister, Mensdorff, further complicated Duke Ernst's role as both a Prussian officer and an independent monarch.[186] The duke forwarded Mensdorff letters from Berlin showing what he saw as the Prussian king's dependence on Bismarck, as well as arguing that Mensdorff should call a summit between the Prussian and Austrian monarchs, but the two did not meet.[187] In short, network princes failed to prevent a war that none of them wanted.

In early June, Savigny in Frankfurt announced that the Prussian king considered his obligations to the German Confederation void. The Confederation effectively collapsed, and the princely members of the fractured network found themselves on different sides of the conflict. Because of his convention with King Wilhelm of Prussia, Duke Ernst of Coburg joined the war against Austria and his political friends in Baden. Carl Alexander of Weimar was the only network monarch who remained neutral, despite his own military agreement with Prussia. He managed to avoid mobilization only after the intervention of powerful relatives in Berlin and St. Petersburg.[188]

After months of suspense, the non-princely political friends abandoned their fates to a war over which they had no control. Freytag wrote a letter to Duke Ernst of Coburg that exemplified how individual network members continued to rely on political friends to cope with dangerous political climates. Freytag feared the worst for the Prussian army.[189] He comforted Duke Ernst from Leipzig, now an enemy city, with a vision sketched in Romantic-nationalist hues:

> I see clearly three people sitting beneath the thorn trees of Rosenau, a bit older than now, as many long years have since passed. And I am one of these, gray haired, with a not very becoming paunch, and in a new federal state under my dear lord and lady, true steadfast friends. I lay my final novel at their feet, as I did the first one ten years before. And Your Highness once more remarks on the sunny landscape below. And the duchess says, in her affectionate way: the world has changed, but we stayed true.[190]

The world had indeed changed, but so had the political friends.

The war that would decide the fate of Central European politics began on 14 June 1866. Historiographical naming practices regarding the conflict reflect assumptions about the Confederation and the goals of the belligerents. Calling

it the "Austro-Prussian War" overlooks the fact that the two Great Powers brought—or dragged—most of their confederates into battle. The war was formally an execution against the Prussian king; the constitution of the German Confederation prohibited secession without the unanimous approval of the diet.[191] Downplaying the Confederation, an admittedly byzantine body, also reflects Borussian historians' dismissal of the institution.[192] The term "German Civil War" captures the national hues of the conflict—some members described the conflict as a "fratricidal war" (*Bruderkrieg*).[193] Yet *civil* war (*Bürgerkrieg*) overstates the Confederation as a national political unit. "German" in the context of the German Confederation was more a "geographic expression" than a statement of nationalism. "The German War" was the phrase Theodor Fontane used as the title of his book on the subject. It expresses the Germanization of the Confederation—its lack of non-German monarchs after 1864—as well as the national parameters in which many educated contemporaries thought. Yet, it marginalizes the Italian alliance in Bismarck's strategy because his plans hinged on a near simultaneous attack on Austrian Venetia from the south.[194] The "Seven Weeks' War" conveys little more than its relative brevity, but it has the merit of sidestepping these divisive questions.

The Seven Weeks' War finalized the collapse of the network. Karl Mathy and Hermann Baumgarten were in Karlsruhe, Gustav Freytag had retreated to Leipzig, the Dunckers stayed in Berlin, while the crown prince led Prussian troops in Bohemia. The conflict exacerbated network divisions over the reliability of Prussian national leadership and the rightful heir to Schleswig-Holstein. It also cut lines of communication between belligerent states and slowed correspondence within them. The friends complained of waiting weeks for letters—Baumgarten and Mathy received no news from their friends in other German states during the war.

The Battle of Königgrätz (Sadová) on 3 July 1866 was a decisive defeat for Austria. Major engagements ended by late July after further Prussian victories, and Bismarck was eager to make peace before the intervention of the United Kingdom or Russia, or a possible French invasion of the Rhineland. The Peace of Prague was signed on 23 August 1866.

The armistice did not rule out a last gasp of the intrigue that had been central to network campaigns in the 1860s. Armchair geopoliticking was common among network members and German liberals in general, especially in times of military triumph—or boredom.[195] During the liminal period between the end of the Seven Weeks' War, in August 1866, and the foundation of the North German Confederation, in January 1867, many German thrones seemed vulnerable.[196] It remained unclear in the months immediately following the Battle of Königgrätz whether Prussia would annex the Kingdom of Saxony, or whether it would tap a more pro-Prussian dynast to ascend the throne in Dresden. Advisors around Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm floated the candidacies of

Carl Alexander of Weimar, the king of Prussia himself, and apparently another eligible prince.[197]

Gustav Freytag wrote to Duke Ernst II of Coburg with an interesting proposition. He began by explaining that, because Saxony had fought against Prussia, it now faced the choice between a major dynastic change or annexation. Ernst should, therefore, ascend the Saxon throne: "I consider this takeover a difficult and perhaps dangerous affair, as it concerns my dear lord himself, but it can nonetheless become a patriotic duty."[198] Freytag reported that he had hinted at this possibility in the *Grenzboten.* He then warned Duke Ernst not to approach the Prussian government directly; rather, Ernst should wait for the Prussian government to approach him with the scheme. Freytag claimed on good authority that Bismarck had rejected the annexation of Saxony. The Prussian minister president would, therefore, have to demand the Saxon king's abdication. The day before, Freytag had written to Albrecht von Stosch to appraise Prussian attitudes toward Saxony and told Stosch to deploy all his influence in Berlin against the Saxon ruling family: "Saxony must become Prussian."[199]

Duke Ernst's dubious candidacy reflected earlier network efforts to procure better positions for members—this time a bourgeois member sought a promotion for a princely counterpart. More importantly, Freytag endeavored to replace a legitimate monarch with the barest dynastic justification for national ends. Ernst was distantly related to King Johann of Saxony, who was the head of the House of Wettin. Ernst's own House of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha belonged to the Ernestine branch of the Wettin line. Freytag believed he could exploit this dubious connection to make Duke Ernst's royal promotion appealing even to more scrupulous leaders. This plan indicates that Freytag was willing to pay lip-service to legitimist thinking if it meant the advancement of national unification under Prussia.

Although he admitted the scheme might endanger Duke Ernst, this was a risk Freytag was willing to take. The failure of princely reform in the early 1860s seems to have encouraged bourgeois network members to consider their princely political friends as malleable expedients in their quest for the nation-state. The cooling of many political friendships with Bismarck's ascension in late 1862 may have obliged non-princely members to try to exploit their princely counterparts—a reversal of how princely members often put their non-princely friends into risky situations. Freytag's plan failed, however. He was unable to bend dynastic politics, or Duke Ernst, to his nationalist will.

Eduard von Tempeltey—Coburg privy councilor and repeat expellee from Holstein—felt compelled to insert a note on the topic in the relevant ducal archival folder. He claimed that Duke Ernst "attached no weight whatsoever" to Gustav Freytag's proposal, and there was no reply to Freytag's proposition in Ernst's papers.[200] Tempeltey's claim is not airtight. As early as 1854, Karl Francke had written to J.G. Droysen and reported that Karl von Bunsen had told

Guido von Usedom—this kind of thirdhand knowledge was standard network fare—that the "duke of Coburg is said to be striving to become king of Saxony. . . ."[201] Whatever Ernst's ambitions might have been, discussion of replacing the king of Saxony with the duke of Coburg predated 1866. So, Duke Ernst's candidacy was not entirely a product of overheated armchair diplomacy; rather, it reflected a pattern among network members after 1862. Monarchs and monarchy could be handled differently to fit the changing political mood, as long as monarchical means served national ends. For Freytag, Ernst's ascension to the Saxon throne was a compelling idea because it would install a liberal monarch and network member bound to the Prussian crown through the Coburg military convention. Royal Saxony would become Prussian, either through annexation or through a monarch willing to sacrifice his newly acquired prerogatives to Prussian-led unification. In September 1866, German national unity aligned uncomfortably with what remained of the network's political friendships.

After fierce debates with the crown prince and Bismarck's repeated warnings, King Wilhelm of Prussia disregarded the principle of legitimacy, already undermined by his rejection of Augustenburg, and annexed "only" Electoral Hesse, the Kingdom of Hanover, the Duchy of Nassau, and the Free City of Frankfurt.[202] The Habsburg realm escaped annexations but not indemnities. In Austria, "the severing of the institutional and political link with other German-speaking states . . . was psychologically traumatic" and led to the reorganization of the country into the Austro-Hungarian Empire.[203] Freytag failed, and Saxony remained Saxon—somewhat.

More important for members of the former network was the founding of the North German Confederation. This new Confederation comprised a newly expanded Prussia and the remaining states north of the Main—including the Kingdom of Saxony and half of the Grand Duchy of Hesse. The other half of Ducal Hesse and the southern states of Baden, Württemberg, and Bavaria were obliged to conclude secret, offensive-defensive military treaties with the new Confederation but rejected forming their own confederation that could preserve some form of Austrian influence over German affairs.[204]

Prussian leaders' drafting of the North German constitution lasted until January 1867. King Wilhelm left the initiative to Bismarck.[205] It granted wartime military, as well as full-time diplomatic, powers to the king of Prussia, who acted concurrently as Confederal president. The Prussian minister president—Bismarck—served concurrently as Confederal chancellor. Monarchs of the non-Prussian states kept control over most domestic matters, such as taxation, education, and justice. They also were represented by envoys in an upper house (Bundesrat) of the North German parliament. The votes allotted to an expanded Prussia and its allies meant that, effectively, any veto from the upper house had to have Prussian backing. A lower house, or Reichstag, was elected by universal male suffrage as



Map 4.1. The Creation of the German Empire. Source: *Germany, 1800–1870*, ed. Jonathan Sperber (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). Used with permission.

part of Bismarck's plan to undercut liberal opposition.[206] Confederal ministers would not be responsible before the legislature but only before the Prussian king as president of the Confederation.[207] For *kleindeutsch* liberals, this answer to the German Question was only a partial answer—though much of the North German Confederation's constitution was copied into its Imperial successor in 1871.[208]

In the hectic months between the Peace of Prague and passage of the constitution of the North German Confederation in April 1867, friendships between many individual members were rekindled. Yet, the network of mutual support never recovered, and the political friends found new positions largely on their own. Former members shifted their focus to the capital of the new Confederation in Berlin, away from the smaller states, where most of them had gathered since 1850. Friedrich of Baden asked Karl Mathy to form a pro-Prussian government in September 1866.[209] He obliged. Friedrich and Mathy strove to join the North German Confederation, but Bismarck and King Wilhelm objected, arguing that Baden's membership would be seen as a provocation given its long border with Napoleon III's France.[210] Mathy served as the leading state minister in Karlsruhe until his untimely death in 1868.

Max Duncker's position as advisor to the crown prince of Prussia had not recovered from the Danzig Affair, and he exerted little influence over peace nego-

tiations.[211] In recognition of Duncker's support since 1862, Bismarck appointed him civil governor of the newly annexed Electorate of Hesse, soon to be reorganized as part of the Prussian province of Hesse. He tasked Duncker with coopting the local civil service and ensuring the smooth transition of power.[212] Duncker succeeded in maintaining order, but real power lay with the regional military commander.[213] Temporary appointment to the defunct electorate ultimately provided little more than a dignified exit for Duncker from the crown prince's service. Duncker was also allowed to assist the Prussian government with drafting the new Confederal constitution.[214] He then became director of the Prussian State Archives. Charlotte Duncker maintained contact with the Mathys and the Hayms, and the couples rekindled their friendship in late 1866. The Dunckers' relationship with Freytag, Ernst of Coburg, and Karl Samwer remained cool. Whereas physical distance, and mainly epistolary communication, had produced emotional intimacy and political organization during the years of official harassment in the 1850s, physical distance between scattered network members in the mid-1860s only deepened their divisions.[215]

Duke Ernst, for his part, spent much of the second half of 1866 trying to convince the Prussian king to pay for his war costs.[216] Samwer and Karl Francke ended their secondments in Kiel and returned to Coburg. Gustav Freytag, whose scheme had failed to install Ernst as king of Saxony, turned his affections to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm of Prussia, who had offered the novelist his patronage.[217] Duke Ernst accused Freytag of abandoning him for a more powerful political friend, but their relationship recovered.[218] Heinrich von Sybel praised Bismarck's national victories after Bismarck admitted pro forma in September 1866 that he had indeed governed unconstitutionally for the last four years.[219] Most former network members, like most Prussian liberals, accepted Bismarck's contrition as expressed in this Indemnity Act.[220] Many German liberals realized that, after the conflict over the army bill, the defeat of the Augustenburg candidacy, and the Prussian victory in the Seven Weeks' War, winning Landtag elections and serving as privy councilors did not necessarily translate into political power.[221]

Feelings of vicarious accomplishment and relief pervaded network members' correspondence and diaries, and the pro-Bismarck members were magnanimous in victory toward their former political friends who had resented Bismarck—but, as the next chapter shows, not for long.[222] Although they considered the North German Confederation only a stepping stone to eventual unification with the south, they accepted its constitution, despite misgivings about parliamentary oversight and the lack of reform in its hegemonic state, Prussia. They believed, like many European liberals, that "larger political units . . . could extend freedom and civilization further and better than small ones."[223] The former political friends believed that a key step on the road to German unification was now complete. This belief partly explains why the complex and often uncoordinated net-

work faded: it no longer seemed necessary. Their failure in the 1860s to uphold the emotional bonds that had supported the network contributed to their lack of influence at the highest levels in 1866.

The smaller-state monarchs, whom non-princely members had striven to include in the network, were powerless to affect the course of international politics in the months before the Seven Weeks' War. The liberal network's campaign of official influence through princely political friends failed. Their primary political objective, national unification, had been appropriated by Bismarck and the Prussian state. This left the network of political friends with little choice but to acquiesce to Bismarck's vision. In turn, they were left with feelings of personal betrayal and a troubled history of selective resistance to state power and spare successes in the pursuit of the German nation-state. Some former network members worked in subsequent decades to remake this challenging past into their own version of German national history.

The network of liberal political friends had grown brittle during the 1860s, but it took years for it to break—years in which liberals failed to rally around a specific set of policies that could offer a popular alternative to Bismarckian politics. Because these moderate German liberals, like most European liberals, eschewed collective action through centralized civic associations and organized political parties, political friendship had to bear the heavy burden of their increasingly acrimonious debates.[224] In this context, friendship proved an unstable foundation for politics, much as it had in other parts of Europe.[225] Faced with an expanding public sphere and an anti-constitutional government, moderate German liberals looked backward for answers—and found few.

Conclusion

The naming of Otto von Bismarck as Prussian minister president in September 1862 drove a wedge among the political friends and divided the German liberal movement. Members of the network reacted in two general ways to the ideological danger and national promise of cooperation with the Prussian government. One camp wished to continue the accommodation with conservative state power that they had begun in the 1850s with Otto von Manteuffel's cabinet. Members such as Max and Charlotte Duncker supported Bismarck's plans to strengthen the Prussian military at the expense of the Landtag—if it meant domestic liberalization and national unification. The other camp, based around Duke Ernst of Coburg, deemed engagement with the anti-constitutional Prussian government a betrayal of liberalism and the German nation.

Despite acquiring additional influence in Baden with Karl Mathy's entry into the grand duke's service, the political friends turned on one another in public, undermining their political appeal to leaders in Prussia. The factional campaign

in the summer of 1863 against Max Duncker culminated in the Danzig Affair and the publication of damning royal correspondence. The ensuing scandal highlighted disagreements over the meaning of monarchy and nation in Prussia and the explosive potential of network members' efforts to direct state policy and punish their rivals. No longer confined to censored publications and secret deliberations, the liberal political friends failed to appreciate a new media landscape in which their efforts to punish personal rivals could cause massive damage.

By the summer of 1863, the idea that the layered sovereignty of the German Confederation could be transformed into a collective national monarchy had gained new adherents, as demonstrated by the debates at the Frankfurt Fürstentag.[226] Much like network members, *Trias* reformers sought to channel individual powers into a central, national executive. But *Trias* leaders hoped to create an executive that would privilege their kingly rank over the equality of all sovereigns, regardless of title—the view advanced by network princes. The *Trias* proposal undermined the already fragile basis of the Confederation, a collegial institution of equal sovereigns. It also confounded network members' *kleindeutsch* assumption that smaller monarchs would eventually disappear into a federal state. The majority of Germany's monarchs had no intention of relinquishing control.

The failure of their earlier Confederal reform proposals and the German princes' equivocations at the Fürstentag caused non-princely members of the network to question their monarchical political friends' ability to lead the way to the nation-state. Bourgeois members began to suggest how to deal with those monarchs who would not cooperate with network plans. The mechanism of collective national monarchy failed to advance the sort of peaceful unification that the liberal friends had planned. In the end, it was not the goodwill or consensus of thirty-five monarchs that answered the German Question, but the force of arms.

The death of the king of Denmark in December of 1863 threw a dynastic match into the nationalist powder keg in Schleswig-Holstein. The euphoria shared by network members, occasioned by the renewed conflict with Denmark in the Second Schleswig War, encouraged reconciliation and cooperation. The network reunited around the Augustenburg candidacy as a symbol of liberal nationalism. Yet, military victories and diplomatic wrangling soon divided the network once again and produced new thinking about the place of monarchy and loyalty in national unification. Charlotte Duncker repurposed traditional familial and legitimist language to reprioritize a crown prince's duty to the nation above dynasty and state. Max Duncker went much further a few months later: he advocated for a plebiscitary monarchy to draw the Elbe duchies into Prussia and a future German nation-state.

The Treaty of Vienna in 1864 ended the conflict, and the Gastein Convention of August 1865 divided the duchies between Austria and Prussia. At this point,

most members had become disillusioned with the Prussian state and its supposed mission to unify Germany. The Seven Weeks' War of 1866 dealt the final blow to the fractured network. The defeat of Austria and the German Confederation allowed the creation of the Prussian-dominated North German Confederation. Members accepted this partial realization of their *kleindeutsch* vision.

In January 1867, the political friends shifted their focus to the new seat of federal power in Berlin. The emotional, professional, and political structure of their community collapsed with the German Confederation. Political friendship could no longer support an informal network at the national level. Failing emotional bonds exacerbated the already mediated influence of both princely and non-princely members at the highest levels of German and European politics. The peculiar character of the *network* of political friends had vanished with the Confederation, although many individual relationships persisted. Almost all members of the network embraced Bismarck's plan for the North German Confederation, and later the German Empire, because by 1866 they had come to prioritize national unity over consensus, the rule of law, and old friends. This difficult reality was one of many that network members worked to overcome in their auto/biographical writings after 1867—the topic of the next and final chapter. It documents the afterlife of the network in order to demonstrate the concerted effort of network members to defend their political choices in the pre-unification period. They did so by turning memories of their deceased political friends into their own history of German national unification.

Notes

1. What Vanessa Rampton has called European liberals' "inclination to deliberate," as well as their rejection of "social collectives" as the basis for political action, served to solidify this network under state repression in the 1850s. See Rampton, *Liberal Ideas in Tsarist Russia*, 7.
2. See Benton, *Search for Sovereignty*, 2, 4, 280, 285–86.
3. Vick, *Defining Germany*, 142–43, 177.
4. Carr, *Wars of German Unification*, 48–49, 73; Biermann, *Ideologie statt Realpolitik*, 166–67.
5. Horowitz, *Friendship and Politics*, 3, 156–59.
6. On some of Roggenbach's disagreements with Lamey, see Gall, *Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 138, 154, 297.
7. See Huber, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte*, 3: 378–82.
8. Huber, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte*, 3: 381; Kwan, *Liberalism and the Habsburg Monarchy*, 27–28.
9. Judson, *Habsburg Empire*, 221, 257–58. See also Judson, *Exclusive Revolutionaries*, 74, 79–83, 96–98; Fillafer, "Habsburg Liberalism and the Enlightenment Past," 43; Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 369–70.
10. Friedrich von Beust was less enthused about the project, however, because it threatened Saxon

trade interests with Prussia. Flöter, *Beust*, 369, 371, 377. The admission of the Habsburg Monarchy to the Prussian-led Zollverein was paused in 1851 at the end of the "Zollverein Crisis." See Müller, *Deutscher Bund und deutsche Nation*, 147–48.

11. Flöter, *Beust*, 364–65.
12. Kwan, *Liberalism and the Habsburg Monarchy*, 27–28.
13. Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 320–21.
14. Baden's interest in the *Trias* generally depended on how (un)responsive Prussian leaders were. See, for example, Gall, *Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 255–56; Report from *Legationsrat* Zulauf, 15 March 1866, *QdPÖs*, 5: 270; Report from Zulauf, 26 October 1865, *QdPÖs*, 5: 85–86.
15. Sheehan, *German History*, 896. On the conflict over the Church laws in Baden, see also Gall, *Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 287–311.
16. The chances for a favorably liberal concordant between Karlsruhe and Rome seemed small, however, given Pius's refusal to compromise with Italian liberalism. See Riall, *Sicily and the Unification of Italy*, 120–21.
17. Duncker, "Mathy," 61; Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 350.
18. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 385.
19. Gall, *Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 376.
20. BArch, N2184/76, Bl. 7–9.
21. Gall, *Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 376.
22. Freytag to Ernst of Coburg, 30 January 1860, *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 132; Ernst of Coburg to Freytag, 31 January 1860, *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 133; GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 148; Duncker, "Mathy," 45.
23. BArch, N2184/76, Bl. 134, 166, 191, 199–200, 202–203, 212, 218, 223, 250, 265, 273, 289, 354.
24. See, for example, Karl Samwer to Karl Mathy, 23 June 1863, BArch, N2184/52, Bl. 41–42; BArch, N2184/76, Bl. 191–93, 223, 247, 257, 277, 301, 333.
25. BArch, N2184/76, Bl. 136, 144; Stern, *Gold and Iron*, 15.
26. Börner, *Wilhelm I.*, 171–72; Müller, *Our Fritz*, 70–71; Craig, *Politics of the Prussian Army*, 166.
27. See "Grundungsprogramm der deutschen Fortschrittspartei," in *Deutsche Parteiprogramme*, ed. Treue, 3rd ed., 52–53.
28. Pflanze, *Bismarck*, 1: 203–205; Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm's press clippings, GStAPK, BPH, Rep 52 F I. 7c [unfoliated].
29. Max Duncker to August von Saucken, 16 June 1863, in *Politischer Briefwechsel*, ed. Schultze, 352–53.
30. Quoted in Pflanze, *Bismarck*, 1: 206.
31. Max Duncker to Bismarck, 17 July 1863, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 211, Bl. 22; GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 436–38; Morier, *Memoirs and Letters*, 1: 343. Liberal leaders in the UK, for their part, considered Queen Victoria and her prince consort overly sympathetic to "autocratic continental regimes" and tried to limit their influence over foreign policy. See Parry, *Politics of Patriotism*, 53–54.
32. Saucken told Duncker that the crown prince and princess were upset with his reaction to the speech. See August von Saucken to Max Duncker, 19 June 1863, in *Politischer Briefwechsel*, ed. Schultze, 354.
33. Clark, "Fathers and Sons," 19, 34. See also Müller, *Royal Heirs*.
34. Ernst von Stockmar to Friedrich of Baden, 8 June 1863, GAK, FA Korr. 13 Bd. 33, Doc. 1.
35. Ernst von Stockmar to Friedrich of Baden, 12 June 1863, GAK, FA Korr. 13 Bd. 33, Doc. 2; Ernst von Stockmar to Friedrich of Baden, 17 June 1863, GAK, FA Korr. 13 Bd. 33, Doc. 3; Ernst von Stockmar to Friedrich of Baden, 8 June 1863, GAK, FA Korr. 13 Bd. 33, Doc. 4.
36. Walter, *Heeresreformen*, 166; Kreklau, "Gender Anxiety," 181–82.

37. Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm to Friedrich of Baden, 16 June 1863, in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 349.
38. Müller, *Our Fritz*, 6. See also, Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm's diaries, GStAPK, BPH Rep. 52 F I. 7c.
39. Roggenbach to Friedrich of Baden, 14 July 1863, GAK, FA Korr. 13, Bd. 30, Bl. 67.
40. GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 436; Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 301.
41. Max Duncker to Bismarck, 17 July 1863, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 211, Bl. 22; GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 436–38.
42. Wilhelm of Prussia to Friedrich of Baden, 30 July 1863, in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 354.
43. See San Narciso, Barral-Martínez, and Armenteros, introduction to *Monarchy and Liberalism in Spain*, 3.
44. Roggenbach to Friedrich of Baden, 21 June 1863, in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 351.
45. Friedrich of Baden to Wilhelm of Prussia, 5 August 1863, in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 357. Friedrich's relationship to his father-in-law remained tense until late 1863: Wilhelm of Prussia to Friedrich of Baden, 14 November 1863, in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 452.
46. On the relationship between, sexuality, power, and expectations of privacy, see Hull, *Sexuality, State, and Civil Society in Germany*.
47. Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 434; Lorenz, *Staatsmänner und Geschichtsschreiber*, 253. In late 1848, the Frankfurt deputies Fröbel and Robert Blum were arrested by the Austrian army for treason. Fröbel was pardoned and sent into exile; Blum was shot. Fröbel was a complicated person with an adventurous past. Though he was also a complex thinker, he insisted fundamentally on the role of the (national) state over individual interests—not unlike many liberals. But he also believed Germans acted as "*Hauptkulurträger*" in an epic struggle against the Slavic "East" and particularly the Russian Empire. See Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 414–15.
48. Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm of Prussia to Grand Duchess Luise of Baden, 12 August 1863, GAK FA N 1563, Doc. 8. See also See Ernst's invitation, SAC, LA A 7200, Bl. 37–38; Huber, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte,* 3: 421–22.
49. Ernst, *Aus meinem Leben*, 303.
50. Huber, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte*, 3: 423; Müller, *Deutscher Bund*, 351.
51. Note on the Fürstentag [likely in Tempeltey's hand], SAC, LA A 7200, Bl. 154. The proceedings conformed to parliamentary rules of order, without the presence of any stenographers or state officials, save Biegeleben. On the Habsburg emperor's reform proposal, see Müller, *Deutscher Bund*, 351–53; Flöter, *Beust*, 416.
52. Frankfurt Princes' Conference: Notes of the Grand Ducal Cabinet Secretary, Baron Ungern-Sternberg, in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 396–97.
53. Ernst, *Aus meinem Leben*, 312.
54. Report from Austrian envoy to Baden, Josef von Pilat, 18 September 1863, in *QdPÖs*, 3: 300.
55. Pflanze, *Bismarck*, 1: 189–90. According to Christopher Clark, Bismarck's emotional outbursts were calculated performances to force the Prussian king to accept his advice. See Clark, *Iron Kingdom*, 520. On Bismarck's ambiguous gender identity and emotional strategies, see Kreklau, "Gender Anxiety." On the political power and historical use of performative feeling, see Frevert, *Gefühlspolitik*.
56. Unidentified note on the Fürstentag, SAC, LA A 7200, Bl. 154–55.
57. Notes of Grand Ducal Cabinet Secretary, in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 402–405.
58. Note on the Fürstentag, SAC, LA A 7200, Bl. 155.
59. Flöter, *Beust*, 416–17. This directory was a reworked version of an Austrian proposal.
60. The other seats would be held by Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, and Saxony.

61. Notes of Grand Ducal Cabinet Secretary, in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 410.
62. Notes of Grand Ducal Cabinet Secretary, in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 411.
63. Notes of Grand Ducal Cabinet Secretary, in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 411.
64. The situation in Frankfurt was a distant reflection of the infamous feuds between Holy Roman princes over precedence—and particularly seating arrangements. See Stollberg-Rilinger, *Emperor's Old Clothes*.
65. Note on the Fürstentag, SAC, LA A 7200, Bl. 154.
66. For example, compare Pfizer, "Liberal" in *Staats-Lexikon*, 1st ed., 9: 719; Held, "Monarchie," in *Staats-Lexikon*, 3rd ed., 10: 174, 10: 177.
67. Ernst, *Aus meinem Leben*, 324.
68. This distinction calls into question Markus Prutsch's assertions about the conflation of personal and state authority in post-Napoleonic German monarchism. See Prutsch, *Making Sense of Constitutional Monarchism*.
69. See Held, "Souveräntät," in *Staats-Lexikon*, 3rd ed., 13: 444–45.
70. Flöter, *Beust*, 419; Notes of Grand Ducal Cabinet Secretary, in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 439.
71. Notes of Grand Ducal Cabinet Secretary, in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 439.
72. Notes of Grand Ducal Cabinet Secretary, in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 444.
73. This is the term used in Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 441.
74. Ernst, *Aus meinem Leben*, 335.
75. Friedrich of Baden to Franz Joseph of Austria, 29 August 1863, *QdPÖs*, 3: 284.
76. Isabella, *Risorgimento in Exile*, 2, 14.
77. Müller, *Deutscher Bund*, 356–57; Huber, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte*, 3: 426. On the Reformverein, see Real, *Der Deutsche Reformverein*.
78. Karl Mathy to Gustav Freytag, 9 August 1863, BArch, N2184/22, Bl. 32–34. See also, Müller, *Deutscher Bund*, 351.
79. Karl Mathy to Julius Jolly, 17 August 1863, GAK, 52 Jolly, Nr. 41, Doc. 2.
80. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 459.
81. Note on the Fürstentag, SAC, LA A 7209, Bl. 157–58.
82. Gustav Freytag to Ernst of Coburg, 14 December 1863, SAC, LA A 7209, Bl. 157–58.
83. San Narciso et al., introduction to *Monarchy and Liberalism in Spain*, 1–4; Parry, *Politics of Patriotism,* 9, 54; Isabella, *Risorgimento in Exile*, 22.
84. The Second Schleswig War (1864) was the first of Bismarck's three "wars of unification." On the role of war in German national unification, see Showalter, *Wars of German Unification*; and Carr, *Wars of German Unification.*
85. Note, "Unterredung mit Bismarck," 19 May 1864, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 211, Bl. 31–34.
86. See Retallack, "After the 'German Civil War,'" 200; Hewitson, *People's War*, 255, 260, 415.
87. Women could not inherit under Salic law. This provision had ended personal union between Hanover and the UK in 1837, when Queen Victoria ascended the British throne.
88. Carr, *Wars of German Unification*, 35–36.
89. Each state was separately obligated to defend Denmark, and they were not collectively responsible for the guarantee nor responsible to one another.
90. For anti-Danish propaganda circulated between network members, see SAC, LA A 7215, Bl. 7, 35–37, 39, 41; GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 207 [unfoliated].
91. Augustenburg issued a proclamation to "his" subjects in mid-November 1863, asserting his claims: see SAC, LA A 7208; Friedrich von Augustenburg to Ernst of Coburg, telegram, 1 December 1863, SAC, LA A 7209, Bl. 43. Already in November 1863, Ernst referred to Augustenburg as duke of Schleswig-Holstein: SAC, LA A 6905. See also Carr, *Wars of German Unification*, 48; Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 310.

92. Müller, *Deutscher Bund*, 364.
93. For example, see Ernst of Coburg to Freytag, 16 December 1863, *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 187; Francke to Max Duncker, 2 January 1864, in *Politischer Briefwechsel*, ed. Schultze, Doc. 458; Max Duncker to Charlotte Duncker, 4 February 1864, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 9a, Bl. 59; GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 244, Bl. 142–43; BArch, N2184/76, Bl. 186, 188, 191.
94. According to Andreas Biefang, disregard or dislike for Augustenburg as a candidate was common among German liberal organizations. The Nationalverein and German Progressive Party in Prussia also remained committed, he argues, not to the legitimacy of Augustenburg's claims or his personality, but to ending Danish rule in Schleswig-Holstein. See Biefang, *Politisches Bürgertum*, 313–14.
95. Mathy called Augustenburg "the pretender." BArch, N2184/76, Bl. 191. Freytag did praise Ernst's trip to Paris in March 1864 to seek Napoleon III's support for Augustenburg: Freytag to Ernst of Coburg, 25 March 1864, *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 189; SAC, LA A 6909. Freytag soon came to see Augustenburg as a liability. See Freytag to Ernst of Coburg, 5 June 1864, SAC, LA A 7214, Bl. 73–75. See also Biermann, *Ideologie statt Realpolitik*, 179. The political friends likely considered Augustenburg a mere vehicle for national liberation in Holstein and, by creating a new, liberal middle state in the north, a stepping stone to *kleindeutsch* unification.
96. Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, GStAPK, BPH 52J 88, Bd. 2, Bl. 22–25. Ernst had also ordered 30,000 uniforms for an obscure purpose: Karl Francke to Ernst of Coburg, 21 December 1863, SAC, LA A 7209, Bl. 177.
97. Müller, *Deutscher Bund*, 362.
98. Ernst, *Aus meinem Leben*, 26–27.
99. Augustenburg's move was illegal, but the two Confederal commissioners in Holstein ignored it, even though Austria and Prussia called for his expulsion. See Carr, *Wars of German Unification*, 73; Gall, *Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 256.
100. See, for example, SAC, LA A 7215, Bl. 41.
101. Friedrich von Augustenburg to Ernst of Coburg, 10 August 1864, SAC, LA A 7215, Bl. 56–58; Augustenburg to Ernst of Coburg, 26 September 1864, SAC, LA A 7216, Bl. 5–8.
102. See Francke to Ernst, telegram, 1 February 1864, SAC, LA A 7210, Bl. 153; Samwer to Ernst of Coburg, 25 February 1864, SAC, LA A 7212, Bl. 166–68; Francke to Ernst of Coburg, 4 April 1864, SAC, LA A 7213, Bl. 30; Samwer to Ernst of Coburg, 5 April 1864, SAC, LA A 7213, Bl. 35–36; Samwer to Ernst of Coburg, 19 May 1864, SAC, LA A 7214, Bl, 44–47.
103. Eduard von Tempeltey to Ernst of Coburg, 1 May 1864, SAC, LA A 7213, Bl. 84; Tempeltey to Ernst of Coburg, 7 May 1864, SAC, LA A 7213, Bl. 101; Tempeltey to Ernst, 13 May 1864, SAC, LA A 7214, Bl. 15; GStAPK, BPH, 52 F I. Nr. 9, Bl. 18, 39.
104. Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 16 February 1864, GStAPK, BPH, 52J 88, Bd. II, Bl. 124.
105. Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 20 February 1864, GStAPK, BPH, 52J 88, Bd. II, Bl. 138.
106. Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 19 February 1864, GStAPK, BPH, 52J 88, Bd. II, Bl. 133–34.
107. Biermann, *Ideologie statt Realpolitik*, 182; Karl Samwer to Ernst of Coburg, 25 February 1864, SAC, LA A 7212, Bl. 116–18. On official Prussian disdain for Augustenburg, see Karl Friedrich von Savigny to Bismarck, 24 April 1864, *Karl Friedrich von Savigny*, 834–36.
108. Friedrich von Augustenburg to Friedrich of Baden, 22 November [1863], GAK, FA Korr. 13, Bd. 15. For an edited version of the letter, see Augustenburg to Friedrich of Baden, 22 November 1863, in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 456.
109. Carl Alexander of Weimar to Ernst of Coburg, 28 March 1864, SAC, LA A 7213, Bl. 14–15.

110. GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 536.
111. Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 25 February 1864, GStAPK, BPH, 52 J 88 Bd. II, Bl. 150–52.
112. Crown prince's war diary, 1864, GStAPK, BPH, 52 F I. Nr. 9, Bl. 6–10, 15; Clark, *Iron Kingdom*, 526.
113. GStAPK, BPH, 52 F I. Nr. 9, Bl. 34.
114. GStAPK, BPH, 52 F I. Nr. 9, Bl. 132, 148.
115. Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm to Max Duncker, 5 May 1864, in *Politischer Briefwechsel*, ed. Schultze, 377; GStAPK, BPH 52 F I. Nr. 9, 197–98; Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 323, 332, 335.
116. This sort of filial piety was only the ideal, of course. The Prussian royal family was particularly prone to father-son conflict. For a brief overview of the phenomenon, see Clark, "Fathers and Sons," 19–37.
117. Charlotte Duncker to Max Duncker, 3 February 1864, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 9b, Bl. 317. Max Duncker had expressed a similar separation of the roles of the crown prince in 1863, but he argued that Friedrich Wilhelm had a family duty to warn his father against escalating the constitutional crisis that superseded his duty as heir to the throne. See Max Duncker, Report, 16 May 1863, GStAPK, BPH 52J 88, Bd. 2 III, Bl. 36–38. Freytag likewise told Ernst that military leadership was just one way for a monarch to serve the German nation: Gustav Freytag to Ernst of Coburg, 24 June 1856, *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 58–59.
118. Charlotte Duncker to Max Duncker, 3 February 1864, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 9b, Bl, 317. Duncker's terminology reflected a form of sacralized nationalism that presented Germans as God's chosen people and infused political debates with Pietist eschatological imperatives. See Lehmann, "Pietism and Nationalism," 52–53. See also Hoover, *Gospel of Nationalism*; Kaiser, *Pietismus und Patriotismus*.
119. Karl Mathy, for instance, noted the strange emptiness of the *Residenzstadt* of Baden after the grand duke and most of the army had left for maneuvers. See Karl Mathy to Anna Mathy, 14 September 1865, BArch, N2184/68, Bl. 234. The presence of military men in the Prussian court and government was especially pronounced. See Walter, *Heeresreformen*, 206, 231, 468–69; Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 62. On the wider historical role of monarchs in the military, see also Kantorowicz, *Götter in Uniform*.
120. Walter, *Heeresreformen*, 161.
121. For example, see August von Saucken to Charlotte Duncker, [July 1864], GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 117, Bl. 54–55.
122. GStAPK, BPH 52 F I. Nr. 9, Bl 222–27, 260; Karl Mathy to Charlotte Duncker, 9 July 1864, BArch, N2184/12, Bl. 174–74.
123. Hewitson, *Nationalism in Germany*, 337.
124. Samwer to Ernst of Coburg, 25 February 1864, SAC, LA A 7212, Bl. 166–68; Ernst Ludwig von Gerlach, *Aufzeichnungen*, 1: 525.
125. Samwer to Ernst of Coburg, 19 May 1864, SAC, LA A 7214, Bl. 46; GStAPK, BPH, 52 F I. Nr. 9, Bl. 290–91.
126. Flöter, *Beust*, 448–49.
127. Beust, *Aus drei Viertel-Jahrhunderten*, 1: 353–55; Flöter, *Beust*, 448–51.
128. Flöter, *Beust*, 451, 454; Müller, *Deutscher Bund*, 363, 367.
129. Sheehan, *German History*, 892; Flöter, *Beust*, 452–53.
130. Biermann, *Ideologie statt Realpolitik*, 191.
131. Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 10 June 1864, GStAPK, BPH, 52J. 88, Bd. II, Bl. 453–56.; Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 14 May 1864, GStAPK, BPH, 52J. 88, Bd. II, Bl. 422–23. According to William Carr, Bismarck had already decided on annexation in February. See Carr, *Wars of German Unification*, 70.

132. Max Duncker, Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 14 May 1864, GStAPK, BPH 52J. 88, Bd. II, Bl. 422–23.
133. Max Duncker, Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 14 May 1864, GStAPK, BPH 52J. 88, Bd. II, Bl. 422–23.
134. Max Duncker, Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 19 May 1864, GStAPK, BPH 52J. 88, Bd. II, Bl. 424–26.
135. Max Duncker, Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 10 June 1864, GStAPK, BPH 52J. 88, Bd. II, Bl. 453–56.
136. Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 8; Lees, *Revolution and Reflection*, 22; Levinger, *Enlightened Nationalism*, 9–10, 195.
137. Leonhard, "Formulating and Reformulating," 81; Rotteck, "Legitimität," in *Staats-Lexikon*, 1st ed., 9: 645–46.
138. Leonhard, "Formulating and Reformulating," 82–83.
139. Max Duncker, Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 22 July 1865, GStAPK, BPH 52J. 88, Bd. III, Bl. 274–80. On the long-standing friendship between Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm and Friedrich von Augustenburg, see Hewitson, *Nationalism in Germany*, 337. Bonapartism, in the understanding of contemporary German liberals, meant an authoritarian monarchy ruling with the consent of the masses through regular plebiscites. For them, it implied rabble-rousing attacks on the political preeminence of educated and propertied elites, disregard for the rule of law, social instability, and, finally, a sort of tyranny of the unwashed masses—similar to liberals' critiques of "radical" democracy. See Karl von Rotteck's description of the monarchy of Napoleon I in Rotteck, "Legitimität," in *Staats-Lexikon*, 1st ed., 9: 644–45.
140. On the idiosyncratic—and frequently exaggerated—liberalism of Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, who later became Emperor Friedrich III, see especially Müller, *Our Fritz*, 10, 63–64.
141. On Freytag's position, see Biermann, *Ideologie statt Realpolitik*, 192.
142. See SAC, LA A 7314; HStAW, Nl. Bernhard von Watzdorf, Nr. 145, Bl. 2–9.
143. On the reality of the war versus contemporary perceptions, see Walter, *Heeresreformen*, 70–72.
144. Francke sent the duke of Coburg the Augustenburg government's accounting of seized Danish assets and war costs in the Elbe duchies; see Francke to Ernst of Coburg, 10 August 1864, SAC, LA A 7215, Bl .61–101.
145. Friedrich von Augustenburg to Ernst of Coburg, 10 August 1864, SAC, LA A 7215, Bl. 56–58; Samwer to Ernst of Coburg, 22 September 1865, SAC, LA A 7220, Bl. 35–36; Samwer to Ernst of Coburg, 19 November 1865, SAC, LA A 7221, Bl. 51–52.
146. Friedrich von Augustenburg to Ernst of Coburg, 10 August 1864, SAC, LA A 7215, Bl. 56–58; Augustenburg to Ernst of Coburg, 26 September 1864, SAC LA A 7216, Bl. 5–8.
147. The Russian emperor, Grand Duke Peter of Oldenburg, and the ruler of little Schwarzenburg-Sonderhausen held claim to parts or all of Schleswig-Holstein. See note to Nr. 109, 19 November 1863, *Die auswärtige Politik Preußens*, 4: 169.
148. Augustenburg to Ernst of Coburg, 11 December 1864, SAC, LA A 7217, Bl. 54–57.
149. Roggenbach to Friedrich of Baden, 11 September 1864, GAK, FA A Korr. 13, Bd. 30, Bl. 92. An edited version of the letter printed as Roggenbach to Friedrich of Baden, 11 September 1864, in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 471. Samwer had often met with Wilhelm in the 1850s. For example, see Samwer to Ernst of Coburg, 13 February 1854, SAC, LA A 7177, Bl. 37–38; Samwer to Ernst of Coburg, 14 February 1854, SAC, LA A 7177, Bl. 39–40; Samwer to Ernst of Coburg, 14 February 1854, SAC, LA A 7177, Bl. 41–44. "Unterredung mit Bismarck, 19 May 1864," GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 211, Bl. 31–34. Karl Francke had also interacted in the 1850s with Bismarck and the conservative "Camarilla"

around King Friedrich Wilhelm IV of Prussia. See Leopold von Gerlach, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, 2: 655–56.

150. Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, GStAPK, BPH, 52J 88, Bd. II, Bl. 424–26; Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, GStAPK, BPH 52J. 88, Bd. II, Bl. 453–56.
151. Gall, *Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 281–87; Sheehan, *German History*, 896–97.
152. See, for example, Riall, *Sicily and the Unification of Italy*, 114.
153. Roggenbach to Friedrich of Baden, 6 January 1865, in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 477.
154. See Biedermann, "Nation," in *Staats-Lexikon*, 3rd ed., 6: 389, 6: 391.
155. Karl Mathy, Diary Entry, BArch, N2184/76, Bl. 308; Langewiesche, *Liberalismus in Deutschland*, 318–22.
156. Roggenbach had supported Edelsheim's career since at least 1861. See Roggenbach to Friedrich of Baden, 5 March 1861, GAK, FA A 13 Bd. 30, Doc. 28.
157. Duncker, "Mathy," 65; Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 399–400; Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm to Luise of Baden, 20 October 1865, GAK, FA N 1563; Baumgarten to Max Duncker, 22 April 1866, BArch, N2013/6, Bl. 27–28.
158. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 398–99.
159. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 395–96. See also Baumgarten to Sybel, 16 October 1864, BArch, N2013/28, Bl. 124–25; Baumgarten to Sybel, 8 October 1865, BArch, N2013/28, Bl. 147–48. See also Gall, *Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 179.
160. For these court balls and private meetings, see BArch, N2184/76, Bl. 199–200, 202–203, 212, 218, 254, 265, 270, 273.
161. BArch, N2184/76, Bl. 199–200.
162. Hewitson, *Nationalism in Germany*, 254; Duncker, "Mathy," 65. Mathy had written in 1858 that the economic development in the Confederation would lead inexorably to political unity. See Rosenberg, *Die nationalpolitische Publizistik*, 1: 8.
163. BArch, N2184/76, Bl. 303.
164. The Prussian government paid its Austrian counterpart 2.5 million Danish reichstalers for the duchy. See Stern, *Gold and Iron*, 65.
165. Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 518.
166. GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 244, Bl. 165–69; "Unterredung mit Bismarck, 19 May 1864," GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 211, Bl. 31–34; Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, GStAPK, BPH, 52J 88 Bd. 2 III., Bl. 274–81.
167. Gall, *Bismarck*, 1: 271, 1: 273–75; Stern, *Gold and Iron*, 44.
168. Freytag to Ernst of Coburg, 16 January 1866, *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 204–205; Freytag to Ernst of Coburg, 20 June 1866, *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 209–10; Berthold Auerbach to Jakob Auerbach, 28 April 1866, *Briefe an seinen Freund*, ed. J. Auerbach, 1: 240.
169. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 398–99; Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 350–51; Karl Mathy to Charlotte Duncker, [December 1864], BArch, N2184/14, Bl. 181–82; Francke to Max Duncker, 10 May 1865, in *Politischer Briefwechsel*, ed. Schultze, 391. Apparently Duncker had earned Bismarck's ire for his overly aggressive attitude toward Austria. See Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm to Luise of Baden, 26 May 1865, GAK, FA N 1563, Bl. 18.
170. Vick, *Defining Germany*, 48–49, 62; Biermann, *Ideologie statt Realpolitik*, 41, 106–107; Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 347.
171. Gall, *Bismarck*, 1: 275; Walter, *Heeresreformen*, 58.
172. Sheehan, *German History*, 900.
173. Gall, *Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 348–49.
174. Report from *Legationsrat* Zulauf, 15 March 1866, *QdPÖs*, 5: 270.
175. Carr, *Wars of German Unification*, 133–34; Müller, *Deutscher Bund*, 378; Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 424.

176. There was also disagreement between the governments of the middle states over whether the Prussian proposal merited a serious consideration. See Flöter, *Beust*, 474–77.
177. Ernst, *Aus meinem Leben*, 493; Carl Alexander of Weimar to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 27 February 1866, GStAPK, BPH, Rep. 52 F I. Nr. 17, Bl. 5–6; Friedrich of Baden to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 10 April 1866, GStAPK, BPH, Rep. 52 F I. Nr. 17, Bl. 46–51.
178. Flöter notes the threat Austro-Prussian dualism posed to "the sovereignty and security of the German middling and small states." The smaller-state conference, the scene of Edelsheim's wishful politicking, is perhaps a representation of this fear of Great Power cooperation. See Flöter, *Beust*, 313.
179. Ernst, *Aus meinem Leben*, 510.
180. Friedjung, *Struggle for Supremacy in Germany*, 192.
181. Ernst, *Aus meinem Leben*, 529; BArch, N2184/76, Bl. 359–61.
182. BArch, N2184/76, Bl. 361–62. Members believed that Friedrich still cherished pro-Prussian views but refused to overrule his cabinet.
183. Conversation with Ernst of Coburg, 29 May 1863, *Quellen zur Geschichte des Weimarer und Berliner Hofes*, ed. Steglich, 1: 79.
184. Carl Alexander of Weimar to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 27 February 1866, GStAPK, BPH, 52 F I. Nr. 17, Bl. 5–6.
185. Ernst of Coburg to Mensdorff, 8 October 1865, *QdPÖs*, 5: 69.
186. See SAC, LA A 7221, Bl. 7–14; SAC, LA A 7224, Bl. 24–25, 46–51.
187. Ernst of Coburg to Mensdorff, 28 March 1866, *QdPÖs*, 5: 381.
188. HStAW, Nl. Bernhard von Watzdorf, Nr. 145, Bl. 2–9.
189. Ping, "Gustav Freytag," 609.
190. Freytag to Ernst of Coburg, 20 June 1866, *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 210.
191. See "Deutsche Bundesakte vom 8. Juni 1815" and "Schlußakte der Wiener Ministerkonferenz vom 15. Mai 1820," in *Dokumente zur deutschen Verfassungsgeschichte*, ed. Huber, vol. 1; Hewitson, *People's War*, 255. The Duchy of Limburg, a possession of the Dutch king on the western edge of the Confederation, was the only state to withdraw legally.
192. See Siemann, ed., *Der 'Polizeiverein' deutscher Staaten*; Bentfeldt, *Der deutsche Bund als nationales Band*; Burg, *Die deutsche Trias in Idee und Wirklichkeit*; Müller, *Deutscher Bund*; Flöter, *Beust*.
193. Retallack, "After the 'German Civil War,'" 200; Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 389; Sheehan, *German History*, 899; Hewitson, *People's War*, 255, 260, 415; Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm to Ernst of Coburg, 26 March 1866, SAC, LA A 7224, Bl. 38; Friedrich of Baden's war diary of 1866, GAK, FA N 1063, S. 13.
194. Sheehan, *German History*, 905–906.
195. Biermann, *Ideologie statt Realpolitik*, 23, 26, 106–108; Biefang, *Politisches Bürgertum*, 298.
196. In one instance, Grand Duchess Alice of Hesse-Darmstadt asked her brother-in-law, Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm of Prussia, to intervene on her behalf to avoid the possibility of Prussian annexation. See Alice von Hessen-Darmstadt to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 6 August 1866, GStAPK, BPH Rep. 52 F I. Nr. 17, Bl. 247–48.
197. On the complexity of the situation in royal Saxony, along with the Weimar and Wilhelmine candidacies, see Retallack, "After the 'German Civil War,'" 206–208.
198. Gustav Freytag to Ernst of Coburg, 9 September 1866, SAC, LA A 7397, Bl. 84–85.
199. Gustav Freytag to Albrecht von Stosch, 8 September 1866, *Freytags Briefe an Albrecht von Stosch*, ed. Helmolt, 12.
200. Eduard von Tempeltey, Note, SAC, LA A 7397, Bl. 82.
201. Karl Francke to Johann Gustav Droysen, 1 July 1854, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. J.G. Droysen, Nr. 30, Bl. 139.

202. Gall, *Bismarck*, 301–303; Leonhard, *Bellizismus und Nation*, 601; Craig, *Germany*, 11–12. Alice of Hesse-Darmstadt feared Prussian leaders might annex the section of Hesse-Darmstadt north of the Main. See Alice of Hesse-Darmstadt to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm of Prussia, August 1866, GStAPK, BPH, Rep. 52 F I. Nr. 17, Bl. 247–48.
203. Kwan, *Liberalism and the Habsburg Monarchy*, 52–53.
204. See Huber, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte*, 3: 598–601; Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 559; Walter, *Heeresreformen*, 92.
205. Börner, *Wilhelm I.*, 195–96.
206. Pflanze, *Bismarck*, 1: 341, 343; Huber, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte*, 3: 654.
207. Mommsen, "German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century," 423–24.
208. Craig, *Germany*, 13. The North German constitution also lacked a bill of rights and left unclear whether the source of sovereignty in the Confederation sprang from the Prussian monarch or from the legislature. See Hewitson, *Nationalism in Germany*, 364–65. Geoff Eley has argued that the period between 1866 and 1871 "hinged on an uneasy compromise" between liberals and the Bismarckian state—this compromise was long in the making. See Eley, "Bismarckian Germany," 10–11.
209. BArch, N2184/76, Bl. 386–87; Mathy to Friedrich of Baden, 14 September 1866, GAK, FA Korr. 13 Bd. 28, Doc. 1A; Duncker, "Mathy," 66; Gall, *Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 374, 379. Lothar Gall places Mathy's ministerial call much earlier, in late June 1866.
210. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 410, 416–17; Duncker, "Mathy," 66–69; BArch, N2184/76, Bl. 405; Gall, *Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 385–88.
211. GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 543, 581; GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 244, Bl. 178; Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 358.
212. Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 396; GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 583, 591; GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 212 [unfoliated].
213. Huber, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte*, 3: 591.
214. See Duncker's draft constitutions in GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 211, Bl. 41–46, 57–70; Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm's copies in GStAPK, BPH, Rep. 52 E II. Nr. 2 [unfoliated]. See also Pflanze, *Bismarck*, 1: 337.
215. Goodman, *Republic of Letters*, 96. For a critique of the assumption that emotional and physical proximities are inherently linked, see Gammerl, "Felt Distances," 199.
216. Ernst of Coburg to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 29 December 1866, GStAPK, BPH, Rep. 52 E II. Nr. 2 [unfoliated]. Ernst's efforts were part of a wider reaction among the rulers of the small states against the expensive military requirements of the incipient North German constitution. See Börner, *Wilhelm I.*, 198.
217. Müller, *Our Fritz*, 90.
218. Ernst of Coburg to Gustav Freytag, 12 December 1866, SAC, LA A 7399, Bl. 3–8.
219. The Indemnity Act also retroactively legalized the Prussian government's collection of taxes since 1862. See also Eley, "Bismarckian Germany," 10–11.
220. Pflanze, *Bismarck*, 1: 328–30; Siemann, *Gesellschaft im Aufbruch*, 254; Craig, *Germany*, 9–10. Jörn Leonhard has argued that Prussian Landtag deputies, fearing a possible French invasion, chose national security over constitutional rights by accepting the Indemnity Bill. See Leonhard, *Bellizismus und Nation*, 603.
221. Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 481; Mommsen, "German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century," 422–23.
222. BArch, N2184/76, Bl. 395–96; Karl Mathy to Max Duncker, 12 November 1866, BArch N2184/14, Bl. 194–95; Karl Mathy to Gustav Freytag, 14 October 1866, BArch N2184/22, Bl. 49–50; Freytag to Ernst of Coburg, 5 January 1867, *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 211.
223. Parry, *Politics of Patriotism*, 28.

224. Rampton, *Liberal Ideas in Tsarist Russia*, 7–8; Soper, *Building a Civil Society*, 143. See also Gould, *Origins of Liberal Dominance*, 7.
225. See Horowitz, *Friendship and Politics*, 3, 156–59.
226. Benton, *Search for Sovereignty*, 280.

Chapter 5

Personal Pasts as National History

> Who hasn't experienced it: how the most indisputable facts of our time are being concealed or perverted, and with that, history faked.
> —Berthold Auerbach, *Tagebuch aus Wien* (1849)[1]

For decades after the liberal network's collapse, its former members tried to define for posterity the meaning of political friendship and liberals' political choices before 1867. In doing so, they refashioned their deeply personal memories into didactic national history. This chapter analyzes the published and unpublished auto/biographical writings of Gustav Freytag, Max Duncker, Charlotte Duncker, and Rudolf Haym.[2] Freytag and Max Duncker authored separate accounts of Karl Mathy's life after his untimely death in 1868. In the late 1880s, Charlotte Duncker and Rudolf Haym began intertwined biographies of the recently deceased Max Duncker.[3] Chapter 1 drew on these texts to reconstruct the social backgrounds and interactions of network members during the *Vormärz*. This chapter is less about the subjects' historical lives than about how and why their four biographers attempted to integrate their deceased subjects into their history of German national unification. It engages "with the manner in which the imaginations and fantasies of the past stamp their imprint on what liberals can think, utter and write . . ."[4]

Although these biographers chose different forms and framing devices in their respective works, they nonetheless advanced similar claims about the past, the nature of political friendship, and the value of network activities to the nation before 1867. Their approach—what I call "affective characterization"—sought to achieve three related goals. First, the writers sought to "relive" or commune with the past by continuing political friendships with their deceased subjects. This dialogic desire, in turn, obliged them to create dynamic characters from static—dead—biographic subjects.[5] Second, the biographers created fictional thoughts and (inter)actions for their subjects as characters that they then used to make authoritative—and revisionist—political claims about the past. Third,

the biographers incorporated a didactic goal. Each writer offered readers sympathetic portrayals of their subjects as historical figures who struggled for the nation and suffered to achieve a liberal German nation-state.[6] Repurposing the "didactic liberalism" of the pre-unification period, the four biographers hoped that their readers would emulate the liberal ideals and bourgeois social mores of their deceased subjects in the present.[7]

The historical interaction between nation and narration has relevance for historians eager to explore how contemporaries conceived of their own place in a future political homeland—especially those who, like our subjects, wrote so much about each other.[8] Fictional narrative forms influenced how the authors chose to tell the history of the nation and their political friends.[9] Intellectuals' emphasis on the clear distinction between the real and unreal, between the imagined (superstition) and the scientifically verifiable (fact), gathered much of its force in the eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth century, that is, during the network biographers' period of education and early adulthood. From the Enlightenment came liberals' demand for the clear progression of events in the form of a linear narrative. From Sentimentalism came liberals' association of emotion with authenticity and individual subjectivity. From Romantic nationalism and the legacy of Pietism came liberals' eagerness to integrate individual emotional experience and social progress into a single, national story.[10] Most conspicuously for network members—but certainly not for them alone—national history became the main lens through which to understand and organize individual lives and their own memories into narrative forms.[11] An emotional narrative element was key because it allowed the four biographers first to captivate readers, prompting them secondarily to accept, reject, or ignore the authors' claims and characterizations. Before a text asked its readers for an emotional reaction, a political judgment, or any kind of activism, it asked them to keep reading.[12]

This final chapter is divided into two parts. The first part explores the form and narrative framing of each auto/biographical work under consideration. It begins with Gustav Freytag's biography of Karl Mathy, published in 1869, which reads like a bourgeois national epic.[13] Freytag's imaginative biography was followed in 1875 by Max Duncker's more rigorous biographical essay on Mathy.[14] After Max Duncker died in 1886, his life story was soon taken up by Charlotte Duncker in nearly 1,200 pages of unpublished biographical "sketches" from his life.[15] Rudolf Haym relied heavily on Charlotte Duncker's sketches to publish his own "friendly" biography of her late husband a couple of years later. In the process, Haym nearly erased Charlotte Duncker from the network's story and their national history. The second part of this chapter addresses the content of the four texts.[16] In each text, the biographers imagined foreign and domestic settings to illustrate the intermingling of politics, *Bildung*, and morality in their subjects' formative experiences during the *Vormärz*. The biographers narrated

major events in their subjects' lives, first, in order to connect with their subjects emotionally through their character development, and second, to propagate their interpretations of network activities and political friendship before 1866. The chapter concludes by examining how the biographers depicted rifts within the network under the shadow of Bismarck.

The Forms of Network Biography

Soon after Karl Mathy's early death in 1868 from heart disease, Anna Mathy asked Gustav Freytag to write a biography of her late spouse. Freytag set to work quickly, using few written sources.[17] In December 1869, he informed Heinrich von Treitschke that the book would soon appear and asked him to forgive its many failings.[18] He told Treitschke not to let the final product "displease him": "It had to be written without sufficient materials, and therefore a sort of filling of the thin record was attempted with general observations about human life."[19] Freytag's frequent depictions of Mathy's imagined feelings and thoughts, descriptions of geographic settings and their effect on his mood and political convictions, resulted partly from this effort to fill the empty spaces left by the alleged paucity of sources.[20] Freytag manipulated disparate materials to fit his own assumptions about "life in general." He wanted, then, to create a "readerly" biography for Mathy's surviving friends and unknown readers alike.[21] The process showed how Freytag thought a human life should look in the pursuit of national ideals.

"A different and larger concern," Freytag later confided in Treitschke, "lay in the biographer's obligation regarding unanswered political questions." He added that "there was no writing the book without a few [political] indiscretions. Therefore, it was difficult to be measured."[22] Freytag was alluding to the biographer's obligation to address current political issues through the past life of their subject. The book appeared in 1869, that is, two years after the Prussian government had incorporated the German states north of the Main River into the North German Confederation. Austria had been defeated, but the largely Catholic states of southern Germany remained outside the Confederation. Because national unification remained incomplete for Freytag and many other liberals, his biography of Mathy virtually demanded a didactic form.

Freytag's authorial "indiscretions" were likely his portrayal of Mathy's illegal political activities in the 1830s and 1840s. Although they fit into the narrative of righteous resistance to Metternich and his reactionary policies, particularly his suppression of oppositional associations and the press, Mathy's deeds still carried a whiff of *kleindeutsch* radicalism that was unwelcome in the political climate of 1869. After the accommodation of most moderate liberals with moderate conservatives in the 1850s and 1860s, Freytag wanted to mitigate Mathy's transgressions—not to mention his own—with sympathetic treatment of his

semi-fictional biographical character. Although he liberally mixed fact and fiction, Freytag avoided the traps of becoming an unreliable narrator or jeopardizing reception of his book as authoritative history; he simply presented his fiction as objective fact.[23]

The book had an important purpose beyond recording Mathy's life, doing a favor for Anna Mathy, or providing a gift to their mutual political friends. The character of Karl Mathy that Freytag constructed was a prototype for the southern German patriot and Protestant striving for national unification under Prussian leadership. Freytag replicated this project in his popular Bilder aus der deutschen Vergangenheit (1859–67). Each individual who was featured in these vignettes (*Bilder*) represented an expression of a single national soul.[24] Indeed, Freytag told Duke Ernst II of Coburg in 1868 that it was a joy "to write [Mathy's] life" because it "is in many respects typical of the political and social development of the nation after 1830."[25] The biography was more persuasive because of the author's emotional attachment to his subject, Freytag implied. He also shared this emotional aspect of the writing process with Ernst to narrow the duke's possible reactions to the book, not least because Freytag had mostly ignored Ernst's role in the former network.

Freytag explained to Duke Ernst that his biographical excursion into contemporary history aimed to show that it was not a single man, nor a particular "passage of arms," that had created the North German Confederation: many individuals had participated in the "spiritual struggle" for the nation.[26] Germans needed to be reminded, Freytag believed, of the importance of the work of liberal nationalists—of his political friends—before Bismarck's wars decided the matter.[27] Freytag contended that the "spiritual" or cultural battle for Germany—in his mind against conservatives, Catholics, Jews, and Poles—was as glorious as Bismarck's geopolitical triumphs.[28] German history became, for Freytag, one long story of the political education of the (Protestant) bourgeoisie.[29] He wrote Mathy's biography as part of his larger project to edify young Germans with the non-martial national feats of his generation of middle-class men.[30] Through his Bilder and his Mathy biography, Freytag tried to reconcile German regional diversity into a single, bourgeois, *kleindeutsch* model.[31]

This singular definition of German-ness fed into Freytag's effort to remind liberal nationalists that the work of unification remained incomplete. The conclusion of Freytag's book was therefore a thinly veiled call for the admission of Baden into the North German Confederation. The author even implied that Bismarck, who had refused to accept the grand duchy's inclusion for fear of provoking Napoleon III and alienating the other southern German states, had pushed Mathy into an early grave.[32] Mathy's life's work was left unfinished, and Freytag urged the reader to help complete it.

Treitschke was very pleased with Freytag's biography: "I would have never thought that so much could be made from such sparse material."[33] He expressed

how "proud" and "joyful" the book made him, although he felt Freytag had treated the southern Germans too gently.[34] Treitschke conceded that the biographer's "diplomatic reserve" was important, "if the book is to work and endear the image of our friend" to Germans in the south as it had to those in the north.[35] Treitschke recognized the propaganda value that the "image" of Mathy could have south of the Main in coaxing southerners into accepting the Confederation or joining a reconfigured Germany in the future. Treitschke admitted, however, that most readers in Baden would never forgive the "sins" of Mathy's "character."[36] Still, Freytag characterized Mathy as an exemplary patriot in almost every way: an advocate of *Kleindeutschland*, a moderate liberal, a supporter of the Zollverein, a constitutional monarchist, and someone tightly integrated into a network whose members endorsed Prussian leadership in the quest for the nation-state.[37] In Treitschke's eyes, Freytag had accomplished the biographer's task by distilling Mathy's life into a convincing example of national, world-historical meaning. This distillation was more a conjuring act than rigorous historical biography, however, as Freytag admitted.[38]

In 1875, Max Duncker published an essay on Karl Mathy in the *Badische Biographieen.* The *Biographieen* series was part of the modern project of claiming past figures for the national canon. Integrating Mathy into Baden's history also included him into one of many regional variations on German national identity.[39] The *Biographieen*, like other encyclopedias, might have been found in the home of any family in Baden with claims to *Bildung*. Unlike Freytag's biography, however, which followed Mathy's life over hundreds of pages, Duncker's biography comprised fewer than twenty-five pages.

The essay appeared shortly after the collapse in 1873 of the financial and emotional "euphoria of the founding years" of the German Empire.[40] A severe economic depression, combined with a general sense of crisis among ruling circles, intertwined with the Prussian state's *Kulturkampf* against the Catholic Church and fears of the growing influence of social democracy.[41] Protestant and Jewish liberals tended to view the *Kulturkampf* as a war for national cultural unity against Catholic Germans, and liberals' attitudes toward socialists represented a more intense form of their rejection of democrats and radicals after 1848.[42] Although Duncker had served in the Prussian government under Bismarck and helped draft the constitution of the North German Confederation, he emphasized to his readers, as Freytag had in 1869, that it was not just generals and conservative state leaders who were responsible for German unification.[43]

Max Duncker framed his essay by drawing the reader's attention to a portrait of Mathy hanging in the halls of the Reichstag. It stood, he wrote, "between the images of Arndt and Stein, of Uhland and W[ilhelm] von Humboldt." He continued: "out of [a] round frame a profile sets itself apart; its powerful curved forehead, its penetrating eyes and calmly closed lips express decisive will and

tenacious vigor: it is the portrait of Karl Mathy."[44] Duncker conspicuously placed the image of Mathy in the pantheon of German intellectuals and civilian reformers. He argued that these men—Mathy included—belonged in the Reichstag because they had prepared the national project with patience, warm hearts, and cool heads.[45] Housed in a symbol of parliamentarianism, the images of these famous men helped legitimize the nation-state, newly expanded to include the southern states of Germany.

Duncker's description also conjured up a detailed, mournful, and sympathetic image of Mathy alongside other ghosts of the German national past. Mathy now appeared less ethereal: his physical features became markers of a moral life, reflecting the fascination in the nineteenth century with physiognomy and processing emotional trauma through reimagining "the body and details of physical appearance."[46] Duncker elucidated Mathy's traits: a "curved" forehead (representing a large and powerful brain), prominent eyes (to perceive and investigate the world), and "calmly closed lips" (the organ of self-expression under rational control). Duncker's emotional relationship to the portrait of his friend—likewise a phenomenon in network letter-writing—worked to enliven readers' mental image of Mathy. Duncker seems to have found a Romantic, melancholic comfort in pondering, then repurposing, Mathy's portrait.[47] Indeed, what Tobias Heinrich has identified as the re-enforcing interaction between biography and portraiture was demonstrated by Max Duncker in his essay.[48] Both media sought to encapsulate and preserve for posterity the objectified life of an individual. From the drawn body to the written life of a national hero, Duncker worked as a biographer to make this interplay visible and legible to readers. He also sought to teach readers how best to mourn a friend and fellow patriot.[49]

Max Duncker completed his framing device by emphasizing how dearly the loss of Karl Mathy was felt in 1868—by his friends and the nation. Like Moses and the Promised Land, Duncker implied, Mathy's "tragic fate" was that he did not live to see 1871, though he foiled French designs on Baden by helping to pave the way for the grand duchy's entry into a unified Germany.[50] In this sense, for Duncker, the death of Karl Mathy both prepared and presaged the (re)birth of the German Empire.

The third text considered here is Charlotte Duncker's auto/biographical sketches based on the life of her deceased husband, Max Duncker. Although Duncker had previously written brief biographical letters to Treitschke on specific themes, she wrote the majority of the sketches from the mid-1880s to help Rudolf Haym produce a published biography.[51] Duncker's initial decision to write biography in letter form reflected societal pressure on women to restrict their writing to epistolary correspondence, an appropriately feminized form of writing.[52] She also drew on the legacy of "amateur" women historians excluded from the male-dominated realm of institutionalized historiography.[53] Duncker's sketches grew longer and

more autobiographical as she attempted to burst the traditional bounds of letter-writing for women as a private, domestic experience.

Charlotte Duncker's narration generally took the form of blocks of text after formal salutations, meant to signal that her reflections would develop as an extended letter—what Haym called "*Aufzeichnungen*."[54] Haym had asked that she proceed chronologically in this form through the "Duncker archives" so he could see a whole year before him in one "go."[55] Ritual self-abasement about the inadequacy and partisanship of her depictions often framed Duncker's narrative and emphasized her place as a storyteller, rather than a scholarly biographer or critic. A typical example of such humility read: "Honored friend[,] I am continuing to tell you what I know [and] how experiences were for me."[56] Duncker assured Haym that she was not analyzing her late husband's papers. Rather, she retold events as they seemed *to her*. She thereby indicated that, as a woman, she accepted that her direct experiences provided material that required the interpretation and corrections of an educated man—Haym—before they might be suitable for publication.[57]

These editorial interactions between Charlotte Duncker and Rudolf Haym began in the second sketch, which covered Max Duncker's childhood home and extended family. As Duncker's sketches developed into a critical life-and-times biography of her spouse over hundreds of pages, Haym added marginalia and other markup, engaging with her writing in an increasingly serious manner. An early example of this editing centered on Duncker's summary of her husband's studies at the University of Berlin. She wrote that Max Duncker attended lectures by the French historian Jules Michelet and heard Hegel's lectures on "Philosophy and History" and the "Philosophy of Religion."[58] Haym crossed out Charlotte Duncker's description of the Michelet lectures, writing "false" in pencil before drawing question marks after her reference to Hegel's lectures.[59] The veracity of Duncker's description cannot be determined beyond doubt, but the more important point here is Haym's interaction with her writing. Haym strained to correct her, especially concerning Max Duncker's academic history and personal interaction with Hegel, who was the patron saint of many European liberals and most scholars in the network, including Haym.[60] He sought to protect what he saw as the true story of Max Duncker's formative years—indeed, those of his entire milieu—from the misremembering of Charlotte Duncker.

Haym's marginalia and underlining continued throughout each sketch.[61] At the beginning of sketch IX, covering 1849, Charlotte Duncker included a bibliography.[62] She worked from that point on to professionalize her auto/biographical writing. She adopted the conventions of academic history, namely, practicing the organized and critical engagement with (mainly) written sources. She also began to divide her sketches into sections that separated personal life from political activity—private from public matters. Particularly in descriptions and analysis of political developments in the 1850s and 1860s, Duncker placed dates and

references to letters and other documents in the margins to support her claims.[63] At times, she relegated events in her husband's personal and professional life to bullet points in the sketches for the years after 1852, saving space for her own analysis of Prussian and German politics.[64]

The organization of Charlotte Duncker's work seemed at first to fit the auto/biographic genre of the "relational memoir," in which life stories are mediated through subjects' interactions with friends, family, and other influential figures.[65] However, her later arrangement of political analysis and narrative tended to focus on distinct historical developments rather than interactions with specific people. Max Duncker was the titular protagonist of Charlotte Duncker's auto/biographical narrative, but in sketches from the late 1850s onward she focused on her own analysis.[66] The personal relationships between Karl Mathy or Max Duncker and their supporting characters—be they parents, grandparents, friends, or adversaries—were nodes that Charlotte Duncker used to connect individual experience to the movement of national history. Her organizational strategy ran counter to the prevailing method adopted by most of the other network biographers. They tended to position political places and events as the backdrop for their characters' (inter)actions: encounters in exile, on trains or in the street, at legislative assemblies, or at furtive meetings around Duke Ernst in Gotha. Charlotte Duncker did the reverse.

Duncker's unusual treatment of events resulted from the dictates of a public sphere that hushed women's voices. She was obliged to limit her political activity within the network in the 1850s and 1860s, so the sketches became an arena in which she did her utmost to present her ideas about a *past* in which she had participated but from whose *history* she was excluded. As Bonnie Smith has shown, "much historical writing and research was familial," with the wives and children of male historians researching and writing for each new project, turning their home into a sort of "literary workshop."[67] In the end, however, Charlotte Duncker's male political friend (Haym) marginalized her work, much as other network men had in the 1860s.

In later sketches, and especially those dealing with 1863, Charlotte Duncker included forewords and tables of contents and bound the pages of her writing to look more like a book.[68] The form and physical representation of the text shifted from a series of long letters to a manuscript—that is, from a form that expressed feeling and intermingled personal and political matters to one that separated opinion from "objective" analysis. Duncker's foray into Hegelian history for the year 1864—in her reflexive statements on her husband's integration of Hegel's philosophy into political realism—garnered an approving marginal note from Haym.[69] Her development of what Haym would recognize as professional history preempted most of his caustic comments. He ceased sidelining in red pencil and began underlining in blue pencil. This is telling because it was underlining in blue that contemporaries used to mark official reports or other serious sources.

Nevertheless, the manner in which the two discussed Charlotte Duncker's sketches centered on Duncker's place as a female writer to the detriment of her auto/biographical project. Haym adapted an epistolary stratagem of the 1850s and 1860s to signal the inferiority of Duncker's writing. In one instance, Haym sighed appreciatively to Duncker that he could imagine exactly how she wrote, describing her "lovely, diligent hand, which so carefully, faithfully [and] prudently prepares the groundwork for me . . ." and that he would like nothing better than to see her at work.[70] Network members frequently noted the association of handwriting with the physical body and the emotions that handwriting evoked. Yet, in Haym's gender hierarchy, Duncker's writing expressed her physicality, not her mind. At work, Charlotte Duncker was a compelling vision, but was her work compelling? Haym admitted to admiring the emotions and images that Duncker's sketches called forth, but his reading of her distinct authorial voice also gave rise to gender inequality. Even when he was genuinely appreciative, Haym possessed only one vocabulary to praise Duncker.

In effect, Haym wanted to claim control of the character of Max Duncker and to diminish Charlotte Duncker's wider forays into political history. Haym exploited the fact that "female relatives were the ones most familiar with the historian's work; consequently, they were natural editors of his posthumous publications and his knowledgeable biographers."[71] He acknowledged the "freedom" that writing her husband's biography left both of them as writers, but such freedom was premised on the separate spheres of bourgeois gender relations that also tended to code political problems as feminine and political achievements as masculine.[72] Rudolf Haym's writing would be published, whereas Charlotte Duncker's writing was never expected to see the light of day.[73] Duncker died in 1890, shortly before the publication of Haym's biography of her husband.

In the forward to his book, published in 1891, Rudolf Haym thanked Charlotte Duncker for her assistance and noted her recent passing. He acknowledged her diligent "work up" of her spouse's papers and offered the backhanded compliment that, if she had wanted to write the biography herself, she had had the materials and knowledge to do so. Duncker was, however—still according to Haym—worried about "the bias of her love": a "womanly hand" could "be neither fitting nor successful in bringing poise and character to the depictions of the political world in which her husband's history was so manifoldly entangled."[74] Haym conformed to the contemporary assumptions of (male) historians, presupposing Charlotte Duncker's innate inability to comprehend complex political issues and the abstract relationship between the individual and society.[75] As a wife, Duncker could not have been trusted to write objectively or critically of her husband. As a woman, she could not have been trusted to evaluate the past from the cool perspective of the gentleman-citizen—even in the eyes of a gentleman-friend. As was common in joint authorship between a man and a woman, Haym proceeded to write as if he were the sole author.[76]

We can readily conclude that Haym did Charlotte Duncker an injustice. From her sketches, diaries, and correspondence, it is clear that Duncker possessed the intellectual training, political understanding, and social capital to participate fully in German public life and politics. But in the foreword to his book, Haym had to write Charlotte Duncker, and women in general, out of the story of German unification and the network. He excluded a great deal of Charlotte Duncker's politics, as well as her depictions of women in German society and the liberal network. Whereas Charlotte Duncker, for example, had emphasized the role of religion in the political activism of the 1830s and 1840s and highlighted the role of women in the dissenting circles of Halle in the 1840s, these aspects vanished almost entirely from Haym's work.[77]

For her own critiques of Max Duncker's abilities, we have to turn to her sketches. Overall, Charlotte Duncker considered her husband too conciliatory in policy disputes.[78] He always worked for accommodation between Bismarck and his liberal and courtly enemies, which tended to satisfy no one; ultimately, this tendency cost him his place with Prussian Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm in 1866.

The political friends did not mark as questionable the potential "bias" of male biographers' emotional relationship to their subjects. If anything, they supposed that it allowed them to meld feeling and national-political didacticism in potent biographical characters, to practice affective characterization more effectively.[79] Haym wrote at the end of his foreword that, at its core, the book was a biography of a friend, by a friend.[80] His emotional relationship with Duncker was a benefit, the best lens through which the ideal type of Max Duncker as minor though admirable national hero would appear. It is hard to overlook the double standard here. Shortly after Max Duncker's death in 1886, Haym wrote a letter to Charlotte Duncker. He had read hundreds of her husband's letters in preparation for the biography and saw in them "patriotic-political tribulations, as well as his friendship, and his trust in me." He continued: "It was also a melancholic wandering through my own past; my life often seemed to me as if it lay in the shadow of his. Fellow travelers who will then be parted by great distances." These feelings, he told Charlotte Duncker, encouraged him to continue the book.[81] As Sarah Horowitz has suggested, emotional attachment between male biographers and their male subjects validated the former's claims to authority because contemporaries believed that a close friend "knew the man's thoughts better than anyone else did."[82] Charlotte Duncker's emotions, coded feminine, threatened the political and historical goals of biography. Haym's emotions, coded masculine, enhanced the quality of the biography and its political message.

Writing about his deceased political friend and mentor, Rudolf Haym seems to have experienced a moment of self-reflection similar to those Gustav Freytag and Max Duncker felt when writing about Karl Mathy. Haym assured readers from the outset that the idea for the biography was not his own but the prod-

uct of a promise to "the widow," whose pleas he could hardly refuse.[83] He then claimed that he was neither a historian nor a politician, asking the reader whether he was well-placed to offer a "character sketch" and a "piece of contemporary history" in an engaging narrative.[84] Here, Haym was guilty of false modesty. He was a well-respected literary historian, philosopher, and the founder of the eminently historical *Preußische Jahrbücher*.[85] Since the 1860s, he had published works meant, according to Hans Rosenberg, to be both "national-pedagogic and aesthetically pleasing (*bildnerisch*)."[86] Not to create a critical historical depiction of Max Duncker, with all his flaws and complexity, but to create an ideal type: that was Haym's goal with the biography. Much like the fictive Mathy of Freytag's book, or Duncker's essay, the image of Max Duncker in Haym's biography was meant to set an example for a forgetful generation of young Germans.

Unlike Gustav Freytag or Max Duncker, however, whose biographies appeared when the national project lent full coherence to individual lives, Charlotte Duncker and Haym incorporated a turn-of-the-century sense for the fragile, splintered nature of human experience and its representation.[87] The two struggled, nevertheless, to understand and evaluate the individual—no matter how insignificant—through the lens of the nation, however cracked it might have become. The approach represented a smaller version of Freytag's oversized Mathy or a flawed version of Max Duncker's obsessive portrait of Mathy. Haym concluded his book by emphasizing that the new generation of Germans had to understand how much life had changed before and after the 1860s. In that, Max Duncker was a prime example.[88] Haym's mixture of mourning for his subject, nostalgia, and concern for the future fueled his desire to defend and advertise network members' political ideals and personal virtues through biographical characters.

The Content of Network Biography: Political Friends, Political Enemies

In their biographies, Gustav Freytag, Max Duncker, Charlotte Duncker, and Rudolf Haym deployed affective characterization to create settings, thoughts, and feelings for their subjects. They turned their subjects into semi-fictional biographical characters with whom the authors and their readers could engage. In the process, the four biographers also advanced their idiosyncratic assessments of political friendship and historical events. One important element of their strategy is clear: to salvage the legacy of network members' activities between the 1830s and 1866.

The association of natural settings with the nation had been commonplace in nationalist thought since at least the era of Romanticism.[89] The four biographers described geographic settings that permitted their biographical characters

to reflect on their feelings and the political fate of the nation. In doing so, the authors conflated foreign natural landscapes with "German" emotions, social characteristics, and political loyalties. Freytag and Max Duncker adopted a sort of neo-Romanticism that crystallized as their subjects pondered the Swiss landscape, the "ambiguities of German identity," and political culture *before* the advent of the "age of the nation-state."[90] This section explores some of these episodes in detail because they are illustrative of how network biographers tried not only to explain the political education of their subjects but also explain away their political subversion in light of their accommodation with state power in the late 1850s and 1860s.[91]

In the first episode to be considered in this way, which took place in the mid-1830s, Gustav Freytag combined meditations on natural beauty, domestic *Bildung*, and Karl Mathy's politics. Mathy's political and professional discontent, Freytag claimed, began with the harassment of liberals and radicals during the Restoration by the government of Grand Duke Leopold of Baden. Unwarranted official harassment, Freytag wrote, had already turned Mathy into "a troublesome opponent of the government . . . [Mathy] himself had always felt that it was a misfortune: that his honorable liberalism was forced into conflict with the creative powers of the state."[92] This passage exemplifies how the biographer worked to assure readers that Mathy had remained loyal to the state, a stance that liberals saw as the safest means to reform. Mathy was no revolutionary, Freytag contended. Although Mathy was under investigation for his publications advocating expanded legislative and civil rights, Freytag portrayed state repression much like bad weather: it would pass with the inevitable progress of liberalism and nationalism.

Mathy weathered the political storm in Baden, Freytag continued, by retreating to the domestic sphere, where the light of *Bildung* still shone: "Thus, the winter came and went, a light in the house, and outside, a cloudy sky, [and] still the political investigations hung over [Mathy]. As the spring of 1835 neared, Mathy lost his patience."[93] Karl von Rotteck had tipped him off about an imminent police search of his home. For Freytag, the climatic environment—state repression—was unable to penetrate Mathy's house—a domestic haven of liberalism. But now the state threatened to violate the sanctity of the bourgeois domestic sphere. Mathy had endeavored to remain in his *Heimat*, but the government failed to understand that he wished to reform the post-Napoleonic monarchical state, not overthrow it. Mathy resolved to flee to Switzerland. Freytag, thus, skewed his characterization of Mathy—who had sharply criticized the Baden government in numerous publications and participated in an unnamed smuggling ring—to evoke the sympathy of law-abiding readers.

Mirroring the experiences of other liberal nationalists in Europe, exile served to clarify Mathy's politics and his image of the nation.[94] Freytag depicted Mathy in exile as a liberal martyr who remained faithful to the German nation and the idea of constitutional monarchy, despite his persecution. In both biographies of

Mathy, but particularly in Freytag's, Mathy's experiences in Switzerland served to moderate his political views and harden his aversion to democracy. After a compelling emotional reaction to the Swiss Alps, Mathy settled down to a respectable Biedermeier lifestyle of patriotic charity and quiet study. Freytag recounted how Mathy studied Hegel to "sharpen his mind" and how he earned money translating Lucien Bonaparte's memoirs into German and writing a commentary on the work of liberal economist David Ricardo.[95] Mathy also found an emotional refuge from contemporary political troubles in an idealized medieval past.[96] Deploying seasonal imagery of light and dark again, Freytag effused: "While the countryside lay covered in snow, and the storms of spring raged outside the window, while the country's wrath against refugees remained high, there, in the refugees' home, the verses of Walther von der Vogelweide, the Nibelungen, and Gottfried von Straßburg rang softly."[97] Freytag's lyrical language, reminiscent of his plea to Duke Ernst in 1854 for asylum, suggested that nationalism and scholarship went hand in hand—even in exile.

Yet, for both Freytag and Max Duncker, education and high ideals were not enough. The domestic cultivation of *Bildung* had to be expressed in Christian charity and liberal activism in the public realm. Freytag wrote that Mathy shared the last bits of food, money, and space in his home with exiled German liberals, while Max Duncker emphasized the personal risks that Mathy took to help his fellow countrymen.[98] The natural environment of the forbidding Swiss mountains, which both shielded and threatened German refugees, contrasted with the warm hearth that Anna Mathy cultivated.[99] Here, bourgeois domesticity functioned to restore (male) political refugees. It was in exile where both Freytag and Duncker painted Mathy as industrious, charitable, and compassionate. The two biographers reminded their readers that these virtues had paved the way for Mathy to return to fight for a liberal nation-state.

These sorts of descriptions were legion in Gustav Freytag's biography. They served partly as narrative fluff, but they also provided moments for the author to defend his subject's sometimes questionable politics and expound on his devotion to the monarchical state. Both Freytag and Duncker were struggling with the fact that Mathy had fled Baden to dodge an arrest warrant—a detail that Duncker tactfully omitted. A warrant had been issued against Mathy for smuggling contraband literature into Baden from Switzerland. Mathy had participated in the bustling trade in illegal political publications between the border states of the German Confederation and Switzerland.[100] After the Revolutions of 1830, Confederal authorities, and Austrian and Prussian authorities, in particular, were eager to pressure individual German states into suppressing smuggling networks and tightening domestic censorship.[101] The high point of these official efforts came in 1835, the very year Mathy fled Baden.

Freytag's and Duncker's efforts to portray Mathy as a virtuous German citizen in exile reflected a wider network insistence, starting in the mid-1850s, that their

lawbreaking during the *Vormärz* had been well-intentioned and misunderstood. Network members sought, in this version of their history, simply to bolster monarchical Germany through liberal reforms and national unification. Freytag and Duncker endorsed monarchical rule and the rule of law through their biographical characters in order to distance themselves from the democrats and socialists whom they blamed for the failure of the Revolutions of 1848/49.[102] After all, Freytag, Mathy, and Duncker later accepted official positions in the same states that had once hounded them. That fact alone merited the inclusion of scenes in these biographies explaining why some members of the network had broken the law and fled abroad before returning to seek court and government appointments. It was the network's own backstory of liberal accommodation with state power in the 1850s and 1860s.

For the two Mathy biographers, in sum, their subject needed to model Protestant virtues, moderate liberalism, and national *Bildung* in exile. To highlight further Mathy's loyalty to the monarchical state, both Freytag and Duncker focused on his disdain for German democrats and socialists sharing his Swiss exile—even though Mathy exhibited no such disdain before 1847.[103] In their narratives, Mathy shunned radical circles and viewed their leaders ironically. Yet, the biographers approved of Mathy's friendships with Italian radicals such as Giuseppe Mazzini and Giovani Ruffini.[104] The Italians offered Mathy the camaraderie denied him by German radicals and kept him from joining what Freytag and Duncker deemed the empty plans of exiled radicals for democratic revolution in the German Confederation.[105] Ultimately, the two biographers used the spotlight that they shone on liberal politics and German patriotism to relegate democrats to the shadows, or even to suggest that they did not belong on the stage at all.

Freytag and Duncker hammered home the point by discussing their subject's attitude to monarchy. In Switzerland in the 1830s, Mathy learned to appreciate the stabilizing social power of monarchy and, both biographers argued, Germans' supposedly inborn monarchism. Network biographers again portrayed monarchism as an essential component of proper German nationalism and liberalism. As Freytag claimed: "in the foreign country, [Mathy's] feelings for his homeland became more intimate and conscious; in a republic his judgement about the one-sidedness of his home state became fuller."[106] Freytag and Duncker emphasized that Mathy worked to support the moderate liberal effort to save the monarchical governments of Germany from their own misguided policies of repression. This insistence reflected network arguments in the 1850s and 1860s about whether German leaders needed only the counsel of more bourgeois, liberal men to achieve national unification and enact political reforms—about the feasibility of *Bildungsmonarchie*. Between 1840 and 1858, this conciliatory attitude was often opportunist—and at times openly antagonistic—toward state ministers such as Friedrich Eichhorn, Karl von Raumer, and Otto von Manteuffel. Only

by 1858 had most members of the liberal network agreed that cultivating influence over state leaders was the surest path to peaceful unification.

The main point the two biographers attempted to make was that their subject's character remained pure, even though he went into political exile. Mathy remained a blameless model for future generations of free-thinking, virtuous Germans. Network biography, in effect, absolved Karl Mathy of any wrongdoing. Remarkably, although the biographies were published during the North German Confederation and the German Empire, the texts shared the goal of excusing Mathy's crimes in the *Vormärz*—and by proxy the crimes of his political friends.

Karl Mathy's early political friendships received similar treatment from his network biographers. Gustav Freytag and Max Duncker both sought to demonstrate the importance of political friendship for individuals and the nation. Mathy's first major political friendship, his relationship with Berthold Auerbach, was forged while in exile in the late 1830s. Freytag wrote that Mathy was the one who found a publisher for the debut collection of Auerbach's popular *Black Forest Village Stories*.[107] The author of this "favorite book of the Germans," Freytag effused, was a true "literary talent" who rescued German drawing-rooms from French literature.[108] Mathy's friendship with Auerbach and subsequent support of him was a service to the nation because it checked the allegedly corrupting influence of French culture in Germany.[109] Much as he had done in the decades before national unification, Freytag ignored his friend Auerbach's Jewishness.

In Freytag's biography of Mathy, the two men formed a close relationship around a shared conception of the nation, the importance of political liberalism, and the need to defend German culture against France.[110] This insistence elided Mathy's affinity for French-style liberalism, which favored centralized government and was common among southern German liberals before 1848.[111] Freytag's biography thus imputed a certain Francophobia to Mathy that was not characteristic of him, either in the *Vormärz*, or in the 1850s and 1860s. Fear and hatred of Napoleon III, and, by extension, France, was closer to Freytag's own position in the late 1860s.[112] Explicit efforts to portray France as the "hereditary enemy" began in earnest only after Napoleon's defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71.[113]

The point for Freytag remained the German-ness of Mathy and Auerbach's friendship. Auerbach felt "*heimisch*" in the Mathy home, Freytag claimed. Anna Mathy, in one of the rare instances in which she appeared by name in the biography, had created a *gemütlich* domestic atmosphere for the cultivation of important relationships between men.[114] Such an atmosphere was considered essential for protecting and healing the "nerves" of Biedermeier Germans.[115] The Mathys' acquaintance with Auerbach also "opened before [them] a graceful path into the magic land of poetry."[116] This "magic land" comforted the Mathys as they

weathered exile. Switzerland thus provided the backdrop for formative moments in the biographical narratives—a place where political friendship, emotions, and *Bildung* met monarchism and liberal nationalism.

Gustav Freytag illustrated how beneficial—almost whimsical—political friendships could be for individuals, families, and the nation. The fact that Karl Mathy was Christian and Berthold Auerbach was Jewish went without saying to the antisemitic Freytag, at least for the purposes of this particular text: both were German bourgeois liberals following the "reformed" faiths in Protestantism and the Jewish Reform movement, respectively. This argument fit with Enlightenment and Romantic notions of passionate, transcendent friendship common in the network before 1866. Intense emotional relationships helped enlightened individuals cooperate—overcoming private religious identities—to increase the cultural, social, and political power of the nation.[117] From their friendship, Auerbach gained a publisher for his nationalist literature, whereas Mathy gained a window into the world of poetry, a path to further *Bildung*, and a welcome (nationalist) comfort among hostile surroundings. Each of these results would eventually aid Mathy on his quest for the nation, which the reader already anticipated as the ultimate beneficiary of the interfaith Auerbach–Mathy friendship.

The final example is drawn from Gustav Freytag's and Max Duncker's biographies of Karl Mathy. Each biographer focused on one pivotal moment in Mathy's life to rewrite history and boost their protagonist's appeal. They did so by creating a model of patriotic resolve tested by profound personal loss. The event in question was the death of Mathy's last surviving child, Karl Mathy Jr., in 1856. The effects of his death on the Mathys and Dunckers and on the flow of resources within the network were extensive. Freytag's and Duncker's later representations of the event are central to this section.

Karl Jr. had been chronically ill for years—likely with tuberculosis—and costly cures in France and Italy had failed. After attempting to attend university, Karl Jr.'s health deteriorated rapidly in the first months of 1856, as we read in Freytag's account: "Every free moment, [Karl Mathy] sat next to the broken figure [of his son]. . . . So passed the winter. The doctor became quieter. . . . In the final nights, he watched over the bed with his wife; on the final day, he held his son in his arms to ease his death throes."[118] The details of Karl Jr.'s last days were sparing, even in Karl Mathy's diaries and Anna Mathy's correspondence with her closest friend, Charlotte Duncker. There is no surviving document to suggest that Anna Mathy had shared a similar memory with Freytag. Mathy recorded that he sat beside his son's bed, noting Karl Jr.'s last words, but not much more.[119] Freytag invented a compelling scene to solicit an emotional reaction from the reader for the subject of his biography and the ideas that he represented.

The deaths of Mathy's close friends and liberal political allies, Alexander von Soiron and Friedrich Bassermann, occurred within weeks of Karl Jr.'s death.[120]

Despite these losses, Freytag reported that Mathy quickly devoted himself to new works and his "faith in the great future of the Fatherland."[121] Mathy overcame his personal sorrow in order to devote himself to the nation; personal suffering and national salvation were again linked in his biography.[122] However, according to the Dunckers—and as the surviving documents suggest—it took years for Mathy to find fresh motivation in life, let alone for the Fatherland.[123]

Freytag added that Mathy chose to embrace German nationalism over the "money-grubbing people of the stock market," whom Mathy reportedly found repellent.[124] Freytag attempted to characterize Karl Mathy as sharing the author's own thinly veiled antisemitism and his rejection of commercial finance.[125] This stratagem was found elsewhere in Freytag's oeuvre, where he tried to provide what Celia Applegate has called "cultural legitimation" for antisemitism among the Christian reading public.[126] There was no indication that Mathy shared Freytag's antisemitism or his aversion to new financial institutions. Indeed, Mathy embraced joint-stock companies, and much of his work after Karl Jr.'s death focused on establishing credit banks in Gotha and Mannheim.[127] While mourning his friend's passing and the loss of Mathy's only child, Freytag worked his own prejudices into the supposedly model character of Karl Mathy.

Max Duncker's description of the death of Karl Mathy Jr. matched Freytag's mixture of mourning, fictionalization, and didacticism. Duncker examined Mathy's Sisyphean efforts to cure his son by sending him to Hyères and Palermo.[128] Duncker's commentary followed Karl Jr.'s deterioration until, "in March 1856," Duncker wrote, "Mathy and his wife bore their last child to the grave. It was the hardest of the trials that Mathy overcame."[129] Karl Jr.'s death haunted Mathy, Duncker wrote, especially after he amassed the wealth that could have afforded the care that Karl Jr. had required.[130] By making such narrative choices, Max Duncker, in effect, mourned Karl Jr. and his father together through a text that also invited readers to sympathize with Karl Mathy and emulate his devotion to the nation despite crushing personal loss. In this sense, liberal politics took precedence over personal grief in Duncker's portrayal of Mathy.

After the death of Karl Jr., both biographers wrote, the Mathy family moved to Gotha at the invitation of Duke Ernst II of Coburg. The duke received Mathy convivially as a "fellow countryman," Freytag noted.[131] In 1868, when Freytag wrote this passage, Duke Ernst was angry about Freytag's defection to the court of the Prussian crown prince. The duke therefore received sparing treatment in Freytag's biography. Not so the town of Gotha, for it offered the Mathys long-denied "calm" and Karl Mathy much needed "rest," despite its dense telegraph and rail connections to the rest of Germany.[132] What Freytag called Mathy's "calm" was really a cover for his work to establish the Privatbank zu Gotha.[133] This story would not have fit Freytag's Prussophile national history, however, because Freytag personally rejected such financial institutions and the Prussian government of the 1850s was suspicious of credit banks.[134]

Freytag raced into a description of the social world of the small Thuringian town and the quiet *Gemütlichkeit* of the Mathys' new circle: "In this way, Mathy and his wife lived in Gotha in friendly contact with the Becker, Braun, Schwarz, Samwer, von Holtzendorff, [and] Freytag families. In the summer [there were] social outings to the forest or a visit to Siebleben; in the winter, the theater and home concerts with their new friends."[135] The modest charm of Gotha in Freytag's description also reflected network attitudes toward smaller *Residenzstädte*. They offered safe harbor from Confederal repression, but they lacked the vivacity and access to powerful circles of larger capitals. Freytag's focus on daily life in Gotha allowed him to cover this period of Mathy's life—and his own—without stating that Gotha, much like Switzerland, was a place of exile. Mathy might have been tolerated in Berlin or Vienna, but Freytag had fled to Gotha in 1854 to escape a Prussian arrest warrant. Siebleben was his summer home. Thus, the respectable attractions of Freytag's Gotha and the quietude of its denizens obscured the fact that it hosted exiled network members as a base for organizing illegal political activities and publications.[136]

Max Duncker treated Gotha similarly in his essay.[137] He wrote about how the Mathys loved Gotha's greenery after years in large industrial cities and lauded their tight-knit circle of friends. Mathy's time in Gotha became, in Duncker's text, "an idyll after years filled with struggle," though the couple failed to escape the loss of their son.[138] Duncker described the great value that Mathy placed on the Freytags' proximity and the "affectionate terms" on which their two families interacted. In a rare moment of intertextuality, Duncker even noted Freytag's description of Gotha that was just cited.[139] The four biographers, with the partial exception of Charlotte Duncker and Rudolf Haym, hardly mentioned other biographies on their subjects. This lacuna was a way for the writers to monopolize control over portrayals of their subjects' past.[140]

The role of friendship in Mathy's emotional convalescence and the reinvigoration of his political activity were inseparable for the biographers. Although the political overtones of Duncker's description remained more muted than in Freytag's book, Duncker nonetheless illustrated the connection for his readers between political activity and the value of friendship. He revised network history by erasing from the idyll Ernst of Coburg, whom Duncker came to distrust and then despise in the 1860s.[141] Duncker thus removed a core, princely network member from a key stage of Mathy's life, from the cultivation of political friendship, and from his national story. Like the novelist Gustav Freytag, the historian Max Duncker exploited the overlap and interaction among literature, history, and politics in his biography to present a politically affecting image of Karl Mathy.[142]

Charlotte Duncker and Rudolf Haym adopted similar methods and had similar goals in their affective characterizations of Max Duncker. Using examples drawn

from his service to the Prussian state between 1859 and 1866, these two network biographers also created a purposefully revised history of the period. They sought to settle old scores with rival network members and sing Bismarck's praises as *the* German national hero.

Haym underlined in thick, red pencil one section of Charlotte Duncker's sketches: "*Am 22* [sic] *Sept wurde Bismarck Ministerpräsident*."[143] The entrance of Bismarck into Duncker's auto/biography followed her portrayal of her husband's dogged independence in the New Era government.[144] Max Duncker's association with the tottering Prussian cabinet under Karl Anton von Hohenzollern and Rudolf von Auerswald, Bismarck's predecessors, as well as his later embrace of Bismarck while serving as political counselor to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm (in 1888, German Emperor Friedrich III), alienated him from network members based around Ernst of Coburg, particularly Karl Samwer.[145]

Caught in a perilous position, Charlotte Duncker noted, her husband received a letter from a worried Karl Mathy. The letter in question has not survived. In fact, it may never have existed as its alleged arrival would have occurred during a long period of epistolary silence between the two couples.[146] Mathy reportedly wrote that: "I could reassure [Max Duncker], I could write to him . . . that dwelling in Egypt had accustomed him to Egyptian darkness."[147] Charlotte Duncker's Mathy apparently associated the Bismarck cabinet with the Egyptian captivity of the Israelites and prompted Max Duncker to make his exodus back to the ivory tower. Charlotte Duncker feared that Mathy might succeed and coax her husband back to "more secure" scholarly work. Yet, for Duncker, her spouse held a "dual purpose" as a royal advisor and a historian. In this perhaps invented correspondence with Mathy, Duncker defended her husband's calling as an academic courtier: he was obliged as an educated man to participate in government affairs and to counsel monarchs.

Discussing this trying time for her husband, Charlotte Duncker shifted her narrative to incorporate domestic and family issues, which rarely entered the other biographies. In 1862, she was expected to care for her ailing father during the week in Halle, which, she conceded, was "a difficult test for him [Max]."[148] Without her, Max Duncker had no one to oversee the household. Charlotte Duncker's absence also deprived her husband of an amanuensis, as well as the domestic congeniality associated with a proper bourgeois home at a time of professional turmoil.[149] Duncker implied that she prioritized her husband's needs over her own, even as she grew worried about her own health. She felt a "conflict of duties" as a daughter and wife, between caring for an ill father and supporting a husband in crisis.[150]

At this point in the sketch, dealing with late 1862, Charlotte Duncker switched to the third person. She lamented that "on top of work, on top of the ever changing, gray-on-gray situation in Halle, Max suffered unending political woes."[151] Duncker pivoted to the "great friendly service" Anna and Karl Mathy offered

"Max and Lotte" by visiting them in Halle every Sunday.[152] She highlighted the restorative power of friendly gatherings and emotional support—network services—to members during difficult periods. Emotional support and political efficacy as part of the network were intertwined in Charlotte Duncker's sketches, and women played an important role in their administration. The episode, which began with the resistance that Max Duncker faced in cooperating with Bismarck to break the gridlock between Landtag and cabinet, demonstrates how Charlotte Duncker used the letter-sketch form to shuttle between Bismarckian high politics, her spouse's awkward professional position, and her own conflicts, while tying each back to the role of the Mathys and political friendship in general during unstable periods.

Charlotte Duncker, like the other biographers, worked to characterize her subject's past to instrumentalize history. Her criticisms of her husband were often coupled with apologias for his work or attacks on his adversaries. Her depiction of the value of emotional support in uncertain political climates, like those of the other biographers, also served a political purpose. She drew lines, not only between those who supported or opposed Max Duncker's social behavior and political activities, but also between those who supported Bismarck before 1866 and those who had tried to undermine him. Charlotte Duncker clearly had an axe to grind: one side of it was political, the other personal. With unmistakable and historically significant intentionality, she adapted auto/biography to preserve and present her version of the 1860s, to make *her* idea of political friendship the model for future generations, and to advance *her* narrative of German history.

In the next sketch, Charlotte Duncker lamented: "For no other year of our life does the task of reporting seem so difficult as for the year 1863."[153] She now presented her work as political reportage beyond personal opinion. Duncker spent most of the sketch blaming Duke Ernst of Coburg, Gustav Freytag, Ernst von Stockmar, and Karl Samwer for the fallout from the Danzig Affair.[154] The publication of critical letters between Prussian Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm and King Wilhelm I destabilized Max Duncker's position as political advisor to the crown prince and threatened to ignite a succession crisis if the king decided to disinherit his son.

Charlotte Duncker defended her spouse, who, in the summer of 1863, was suspected of leaking the damaging letters and had earned the king's ire for not preventing the crown prince's speech in Danzig.[155] Max Duncker, she explained, "took Bismarck's demand for silence so strictly that even I, who after all lived through everything with him, was not in the know."[156] Charlotte Duncker portrayed her husband's faith in Bismarck as absolute loyalty to the German nation and the Prussian state. Her characterization exonerated Duncker of malfeasance in the Danzig Affair vis-à-vis the king or government. Her subject was above all loyal to Bismarck, and thereby to the nation. He was so devoted that he risked his marriage and suffered his political friends' censure. Max Duncker became,

in Charlotte Duncker's biography, Bismarck's long-suffering and misunderstood servant: a forerunner to the moderate liberals who in 1866/67 made their peace with the "white revolutionary."[157] In Charlotte Duncker's history, Max Duncker was willing to sacrifice domestic harmony and old friendships for Bismarck's plans. Her spouse became an exemplar of modern patriotism and the primacy of politics.

After excusing her husband's mistakes as advisor to the crown prince, Charlotte Duncker moved to discredit his chief rival after 1862, Karl Samwer. Samwer appeared almost villainous in Duncker's sketches as she questioned his faith in the Prussian state and Bismarck's leadership, particularly during the Second Schleswig War.[158] According to her sketch, the coterie around Samwer not only attacked her spouse politically, but they also betrayed him personally. Because Max Duncker's efforts were pro-Bismarckian and thus true to the German nation, the machinations of his anti-Bismarckian opponents became anti-German. By focusing first on Max Duncker's loyalty to Bismarck, then on the person who punished said loyalty, Charlotte Duncker sought to fill in her history of the network while highlighting the potential dangers of political friendship.

During the rolling crises of 1863, she remembered, "friendly intercourse grew very excited" with J.G. Droysen and August von Saucken, both sympathetic to the Dunckers' pro-Bismarck stance. "In contrast," Duncker wrote, "another group of friends, among whom can be counted with special pain Freytag a[nd] and even Samwer a[nd] Stockmar Jr., had not only abandoned their once so highly and warmly held old friend, but [they] had also, through irresponsible dealings with the crown prince, undermined [Duncker's] work, ruining the results of his faithful efforts."[159] Saucken and the Droysens represented the positive aspects of political friendship, whereas Samwer and company represented the damage done when such bonds were broken.[160]

In the network of the 1860s, policy differences, such as over the army bill or Schleswig-Holstein, could lead to accusations of political betrayal, personal betrayal, and betrayal of the nation—not necessarily in that order. In her sketches, Charlotte Duncker alluded to an underlying anxiety in network relationships: political friends could prove unpredictable or unreliable. Violations of social solidarity presaged violations of political commitments; personal antipathy became a national threat. Network members might refuse the emotional, political, or professional support on which counterparts had come to rely. This effort to control others and comfort oneself re-emerged in the biographies as affective characterization. Duncker placed the responsibility for imploding the network squarely at the feet of Samwer, Freytag, and Duke Ernst: all enemies of Max Duncker, Bismarck, and, therefore, Germany.

It is also important to note that when Gustav Freytag completed his biography of Karl Mathy in 1869, Bismarck's achievements in national affairs were

undeniable; but Freytag endeavored to include bourgeois figures who acted independently of Bismarck in his own narrative. In Charlotte Duncker's biography, the political friends who had had enough political acumen to back Bismarck before 1866 played second fiddle, so to speak, to the Prussian minister president. They were not necessarily key figures in their own right in the "spiritual struggle" for the nation-state, as Freytag believed. The point here is that the figure of Bismarck overshadowed the political history that Charlotte Duncker offered, whereas the Prussian leader appeared in a more shadowy role in Freytag's and Max Duncker's earlier pieces.[161] The "Bismarck myth" had not taken hold among members of the former network when Freytag and Max Duncker wrote in the late 1860s and early 1870s.[162] Charlotte Duncker—and then Rudolf Haym—participated in an early stage of the myth-making around Bismarck, long before his resignation in March 1890 and his subsequent idolization.[163]

Rudolf Haym conveyed little of Charlotte Duncker's intensity when he, too, condemned former political friends in his biography of Max Duncker. He did, however, reiterate her depiction of Max Duncker's loyalty to Bismarck, coupled with fears in the 1860s that cracks in network solidarity might shatter the national project. Haym frequently referred to the power of politics in building friendships, professional achievement, and the circulation of favors. From the formation of dissenting circles in Halle in the 1840s, to Duncker's advancement in Prussian state service, to the dissemination of political information and intrigue, political views and emotional relationships reinforced each other in Haym's account.[164]

Haym found a prime example of such reinforcement in the instability of the New Era cabinet and Max Duncker's increasing support for the Crown during the Prussian constitutional crisis. Duncker sided with King Wilhelm I and his demand that the Landtag pass a sweeping new army bill. Most network members considered the proposal illiberal and dangerous, as Haym noted: "With regret, Duncker's friends saw him entangled in the half-measures and faint-heartedness of these policies."[165] In Haym's narrative, Duncker was a victim of circumstance rather than a maker of circumstances themselves. Yet Max Duncker's proclivity for prevarication appeared throughout Charlotte Duncker's sketches, as well. In this way, Haym repurposed Charlotte Duncker's critique and couched it in the language of friendly concern to present Max Duncker as a positive example of "free-thinking."[166] Knowing that Bismarck would lead German national unification, Haym characterized Max Duncker as an open-minded patriot, who rejected the prevailing wrongheadedness of his network rivals.

In the mid-1860s, however, Karl Samwer and most of Max Duncker's other political friends had seen such "free-thinking" as "apostasy."[167] For them, Duncker was not too free-thinking at all; on the contrary, he was too amenable to the government's military demands and its plans to annex Schleswig-Holstein

after the Second Schleswig War (1864). In 1863, Samwer had believed Duncker's behavior threatened their political friendship, the wider network, and the nation. Writing years later, Haym therefore had to stress that Max Duncker could discern greatness in Bismarck early on. Duncker had learned from Bismarck that backing the king against the legislature and endorsing the annexation of the Elbe duchies would lead to liberal, constitutional political life in a united Germany: "this conviction made it possible for him—he, the liberal—to see Herr v. Bismarck's entrance with different eyes than those who saw in him only the reactionary and the Junker."[168] Haym's religious, supersessionist allusion here cannot be overlooked (nor would it have been by his contemporary readers): for Duncker was blind, but now he could see.[169] His network rivals, Haym implied, remained blind to the truth, plotting to foil Bismarck. They suffered a biblical punishment for their national sin. In short, there was no place left in Haym's biography, in his history of German unification, for those who had challenged Bismarck in the 1860s. In 1891, readers knew how things had turned out: the German Empire itself had vindicated Max Duncker and damned his one-time rivals. This outcome, of course, was so much the better for Haym because he had also supported Bismarck. In Haym's account, national unity and state power outpaced friendship and liberty.[170]

Conclusion

In the years after the dissolution of the network of political friends in 1866, Gustav Freytag, Max Duncker, Charlotte Duncker, and Rudolf Haym wrote biographies of recently deceased members. Their auto/biographical texts shared overlapping goals, which they achieved through affective characterization. The four biographers created and presented their particular understandings of the past as history through their semi-fictionalized subjects. The process was imaginative and didactic, turning subjects into characters. Characters were portrayed sympathetically and emotionally as the writers engaged in affective relationships with their subjects through their phantasmic characters. The biographers hoped that their readers would perceive their fictive subjects as individual embodiments of a single, authoritative national history. Such readers would sympathize with these semi-fictional historical subjects and emulate their liberal political virtues in the present.

Although Freytag, the Dunckers, and Haym worked at different times and through different forms, they shared these goals. Freytag's biography of Karl Mathy was more bourgeois epic than critical biography. His depictions were fictionalized when needed, he admitted, because of a lack of available biographical material. Yet, the image of Mathy that he provided was cool, virtuous, and devoted to a national cause that he never saw completed. Freytag's depiction dif-

fered little from the Mathy of Max Duncker's more professional essay. Duncker's shorter text for a Baden reference series portrayed a similar Mathy to young readers for emulation and as an admonition about the political work left undone. Both biographers offered an alternative to Bismarckian unification by presenting Mathy as a model of bourgeois, liberal-nationalist dedication.

In the 1880s, Charlotte Duncker and Rudolf Haym took the late Max Duncker as their subject. Charlotte Duncker's text began as a sort of lengthy epistle to Haym. The letters soon became professionalized auto/biographical sketches from Charlotte Duncker's life and times, told through her characterization of her husband. She worked to salvage his reputation and advanced her own judgments about politics and political friendship. But Duncker's sketches remained unpublished, and in public she played the deferential widow until her death. Nevertheless, Haym replicated—in effect, plagiarized—many of her characterizations of Max Duncker in his published biography. Haym celebrated himself through Duncker's support for Bismarck in the 1860s, depicting Duncker as a farsighted, faithful servant of the German nation and its first chancellor. In the two biographies of Max Duncker, his rivals were either misguided or malevolent: either way, they were destined to fade from Germany's national story.

Overall, these four biographers characterized their deceased friends for both personal and political purposes. They refashioned personal pasts into national history. Their auto/biographical airbrushing of the past and their insistence on the importance of their departed friends—and thereby of themselves—in the pursuit of the nation-state suggests that German liberals understood at some level their failure to steer high politics before 1866. Life-writing offered these moderate liberals and members of the former network a chance both for political rehabilitation and emotional catharsis. Indeed, they seemed ill-disposed to make a clear distinction between the private and political—as they had been in the 1850s and 1860s, too. The elite political friends moved across fluid conceptual boundaries, muddying them at will. What at first might seem like flights of fancy, emotional outbursts, or petty (inter)personal disputes could be—and often were—part and parcel of the political culture of nineteenth-century Germany.

Notes

1. Auerbach, *Tagebuch aus Wien*, iii–iv.
2. "Auto/biography" emphasizes that biographical writing incorporates, at various levels, the biographer's own life and views. For a brief review of terminology from the field of "life-writing," see Saunders, *Self Impression*, 3–7.
3. Heinrich von Treitschke also wrote a biographical article about Max Duncker in the 1880s.

Berthold Auerbach hoped that his correspondence with his cousin, Jakob Auerbach, would be read as a kind of autobiography. See *Briefe an seinen Freund*, ed. J. Auerbach, xiii.

4. Freeden and Fernández-Sebastián, introduction to *In Search of European Liberalisms*, 4.
5. See Smith, *Gender of History*, 18, 20–23, 240. Considered alongside the general interest in nineteenth-century Europe in the "supernatural," network members' desire to interact with the dead may not seem so far-fetched. Theories and movements such as mesmerism, animal magnetism, and spiritualism tried to account for the abnormal in human experience. Ghosts and apparitions thus retained social, cultural, and political power well into the twentieth century—and not just for country folk. For example, see Blackbourn, *Marpingen*; Harris, *Lourdes*; N. Freytag, *Aberglauben im 19. Jahrhundert*; Figal, *Civilization and Monsters*.
6. Tobias Heinrich has demonstrated how empathy was central to auto/biographical writing. See Heinrich, *Leben Lesen*, 16.
7. The term comes from Sheehan, *German Liberalism*, 101. See also Smith, *Gender of History*, 131; Hagemann, *Revisiting Prussia's Wars*, 278; Lees, *Revolution and Reflection*, 40–50. One possible reason for the biographers' didactic purpose may have been the steady erosion of liberal electoral power after 1881. See Eley, "Bismarckian Germany," 17–18.
8. See, for example, Bhabha, ed., *Nation and Narration*; Berger et al., eds., *Narrating the Nation*; Baczko, *Les imaginaires sociaux*; Kaiser, *Social Integration and Narrative Structure*.
9. Fulbrook and Rublack, "Social Self," 267; Hadley, *Living Liberalism*, 33–34.
10. See Giorgi, *Emotions, Language and Identity*, 23; Frevert, "Was haben Gefühle in der Geschichte zu suchen," 194; Fulda, "Telling German History," 198–99. See also White, *Metahistory*, 5, 11, 48. This national story also had eschatological subcurrents inherited from Pietism and the later *Erweckungsbewegung*. See Lehmann, "Pietism and Nationalism"; Hoover, *Gospel of Nationalism*; Kaiser, *Pietismus und Patriotismus*.
11. Tobias Heinrich argues that the "nationalization" of individual's lives, and their life-stories, began with Herder's eulogies. See Heinrich, *Leben Lesen*, 44. On the competition between historical narratives and the role of "literary media of memory," see Hagemann, *Revisiting Prussia's Wars*, 250–51, 280. See also Freeden and Fernández-Sebastián, introduction to *In Search of European Liberalisms*, 13–14.
12. Barthes, *S/Z*, 4.
13. On the effect of genre on historiography, see White, *Content of the Form.* Albert Koschorke writes that "in the world of Enlightenment morality . . . every citizen is a hero." See Koschorke, *Körperströme*, 32.
14. Duncker, "Mathy."
15. Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*. Charlotte Duncker's sketches are held in the GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Nr. 5a.
16. Rudolf Haym to Charlotte Duncker, 1 August 1886, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 56, Bl. 93–95.
17. Gustav Freytag to Ernst of Coburg, 16 June 1868, *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 231.
18. Gustav Freytag to Heinrich von Treitschke, 14 December 1869, *Freytag und Heinrich von Treitschke*, ed. Dove, 144–45.
19. Freytag to Treitschke, 14 December 1869, *Freytag und Heinrich von Treitschke*, ed. Dove, 145.
20. Mathy's papers at the Bundesarchiv Berlin and the Geheimes Staatsarchiv are rather extensive. Freytag apparently did not have—or want to find—many of his subject's letters or any of his diaries or notebooks.
21. My use of the term "readerly" comes from Barthes, *S/Z*, 4–5. For Barthes, a readerly text—as opposed to a "writerly" text—is one in which readers can anticipate the arc of the plot and many of the characters' thoughts and actions because the story conforms to established narrative strategies and stereotypes. Readerly texts thus require less effort from readers, posing questions and eliciting responses that the genre of the text itself has already narrowed. A writerly

text, in contrast, asks readers to participate in making the meaning of the text rather than simply receiving it from the author.

22. Freytag to Treitschke, 14 December 1869, in *Freytag und Heinrich von Treitschke*, ed. Dove, 145.
23. Freytag maintained this approach in both his fiction and his nonfiction. See Fulda, "Telling German History," 200. Karen Hagemann has written that, in the context of the memorialization of the Napoleonic Wars, although memoirs and recollections in general reflect perhaps more of the present than the past, "the narrative must still reflect important pieces of this past if they are to become and remain influential." See Hagemann, *Revisiting Prussia's Wars*, 24–25, 280.
24. Applegate, "Mediated Nation," 44; Fulda, "Telling German History," 199.
25. Freytag to Ernst of Coburg, 16 June 1868, *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 231.
26. Freytag to Ernst of Coburg, 20 December 1869, *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 240. Freytag used the terms "*Waffengang*" and "*Geisteskampf*."
27. See, for example, Carr, *Wars of German Unification*.
28. Freytag argued against what became, after the Franco-Prussian War, the glorification of the Prussian military and the embrace of military service by the German bourgeoisie. See Frevert, *Nation in Barracks*, 149, 157. On Freytag's anti-Polish, anti-Catholic, and antisemitic beliefs, see Mühlen, *Gustav Freytag*; Healy, *Jesuit Specter*, 50.
29. Ping, "Gustav Freytag," 608.
30. Freytag to Ernst of Coburg, 20 December 1869, *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempeltey, 240.
31. Applegate, "Mediated Nation," 34, 44, 46; Fulda, "Telling German History," 199–201. Freytag also maintained a studied silence on Bismarck in the Bilder aus der deutschen Vergangenheit. See Ping, "Gustav Freytag," 609.
32. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 416–17; Nipperdey, *Germany from Napoleon to Bismarck*, 707. See also Gall, *Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 385–88.
33. Treitschke to Freytag, 9 January 1870, in *Freytag und Heinrich von Treitschke*, ed. Dove, 148.
34. Treitschke to Freytag, 9 January 1870, in *Freytag und Heinrich von Treitschke*, ed. Dove, 148. Roland Barthes expanded his notion of the readerly text to discuss "texts of pleasure." A pleasurable text "contents, fills, grants euphoria . . . comes from culture and does not break from it, is linked to a *comfortable* practice of reading." Barthes, *Pleasure of the Text*, 14. Nevertheless, Freytag's book may not have granted Treitschke euphoria. Freytag had "filled" the blank spaces in Mathy's life-story to the point where the book reproduced generic, bourgeois expectations about the development of a "normal" human life, which were ultimately derived from *Bildungsromane*. The joy that Treitschke drew from the biography was central to Freytag's project.
35. Treitschke to Freytag, 9 January 1870, in *Freytag und Heinrich von Treitschke*, ed. Dove, 148.
36. Treitschke to Freytag, 9 January 1870, in *Freytag und Heinrich von Treitschke*, ed. Dove, 148.
37. Biefang, *Politisches Bürgertum*, 47.
38. Freytag took similar novelistic license with historical texts that appeared in his Bilder series. See Applegate, "Mediated Nation," 48.
39. On the construction of regional German identities and state-building, see Applegate, *Nation of Provincials*; and Green, *Fatherlands*. See also Kaschuba, "Zwischen Deutscher Nation und Provinz," 84–85; Dann, *Nation und Nationalismus*, 34.
40. Radkau, *Zeitalter der Nervosität*, 58–59.
41. On the *Kulturkampf* and the longer history of confessional conflict in Germany, see H. Smith, *German Nationalism and Religious Conflict*; Gross, *War Against Catholicism*; Borutta, *Antikatholizismus*. See also Eley, "Bismarckian Germany," 4, 7, 21.
42. Gross, *War Against Catholicism*, 246; Tal, *Christians and Jews in Germany*, 102–103.

43. Nipperdey, *Germany from Napoleon to Bismarck*, 710; Craig, *Germany*, 13.
44. Duncker, "Mathy," 45.
45. Duncker, "Mathy," 45.
46. Smith, *Gender of History*, 53; Heinrich, *Leben Lesen*, 12; Koschorke, *Körperströme*, 151.
47. On Romantics' obsession with reviving lost objects as the basis of history, see Smith, *Gender of History*, 133.
48. Heinrich, *Leben Lesen,* 47. Barthes argued that literature shifted during the nineteenth century from a code based on painting to one based on theater. Max Duncker's auto/biographical writing occupied a place between the two poles. It required a real referent. But, because Duncker wanted to continue an emotional relationship with his deceased friend—through the essay and the portrait—his writing often drifted toward something akin to literary realism. See Barthes, *S/Z*, 55–56.
49. On the role of encyclopedias in shaping emotional norms, see Frevert, "Defining Emotions," 8.
50. Duncker, "Mathy," 68–69.
51. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5a [unfoliated]; Haym to Charlotte Duncker, 1 August 1886, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 56, Bl. 93–95.
52. French, *German Women as Letter Writers*, 20, 49–50; Clarke, *Rise and Fall of the Woman of Letters*, 7. From the emergence of the modern letter, this sanction was matched by women's use of letters to record and share their experiences and expand their social worlds. See Furger, *Briefsteller*, 59–60.
53. See Smith, *Gender of History*, 6–8.
54. Haym to Charlotte Duncker, 29 December 1886, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 56, Bl. 115; GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 1, 15. Katherine R. Goodman argues that around 1800, women in Germany began to prefer writing their autobiographies in the epistolary form of the late eighteenth century rather than accepting the new standard of auto/biographical writing in narrative—book—form. See K. Goodman, "Elisabeth to Meta," 306.
55. Haym to Charlotte Duncker, 28 October 1886, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 56, Bl. 111–112. Collecting one's letters to form a sort of archive or "artifact" for posterity was common throughout Europe. See, for example, Schlientz, "Verdeckte Botschaften," 28.
56. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 15. Duncker might have also used humble statements as a rhetorical device to win over her correspondent.
57. As Bella Brodzki and Celeste Schenck have argued, even though women's auto/biography in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries could be "[s]hot through with qualifications—protestations as to her modesty, insistence upon her dependence on her husband . . ." it still served as a vehicle for self-inscription and subjectivity-formation. See Brodzki and Schenck, introduction to *Life-Lines*, 8.
58. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 16.
59. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 16.
60. Ansel, *Prutz, Hettner und Haym*, 100, 116; Rampton, *Liberal Ideas in Tsarist Russia*, 15–16.
61. For example, see GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 55, 121, 163–64. Members also made marginalia in letters and reports from their political friends. Haym's marginalia were perhaps, in another iteration of network epistolary tactics, an attempt to engage—and argue—with an absent Charlotte Duncker. See Jackson, *Invisible Forms*, 163–64, 168.
62. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 156.
63. For example, see GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 157–58, 325. On sectioning, see GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 227–28.
64. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 221, 227–28, 267, 370–407.
65. Saunders, *Self Impression*, 6.

66. For example, see GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5. Bl. 206, 241–242, 252, 288, 290, 292, 308, 322, 337, 354, 383.
67. Smith, *Gender of History*, 10, 83–84.
68. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 408–501.
69. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 528–29.
70. Haym to Charlotte Duncker, 30 April 1887, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 56, Bl. 123. It was also possible that Haym was flirting with Duncker. As Sarah Horowitz has noted, men were expected to perform a certain level of emotional expression in their correspondence with women. See Horowitz, *Friendship and Politics*, 66, 85.
71. Smith, *Gender of History*, 85.
72. Haym to Charlotte Duncker, 15 September 1886, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 56, Bl. 104–105; Haym to Charlotte Duncker, 28 October 1886, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 56, Bl. 111–12; Haym also reminded Duncker that he had other important things to do. See Haym to Charlotte Duncker, 29 December 1886, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 56, Bl. 115; Haym to Charlotte Duncker, 30 April 1887, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 56, Bl. 123–24. On contemporary men's use of "strategic sexism" to blame women for political failures and to equate political problems in general with femininity, see Kreklau, "Gender Anxiety," 174.
73. Yet it seems Charlotte Duncker did expect, by the end of her project, that the sketches would be shared. See GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 681.
74. Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, iii–iv.
75. Smith, *Gender of History*, 3–4.
76. Smith, *Gender of History*, 85.
77. See GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 109–19. Duncker also discussed household issues and members' economic precarity caused by government harassment. See GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 239–40. The role of women in bourgeois and royal circles was likewise important. See also GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 64, 375.
78. See GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 591.
79. The coding of men's emotions, as positive in some situations and negative in others, was key to letter-writing as well. See Bauer and Hämmerle, introduction to *Liebe Schreiben*, 28; Hoffmann, "Freundschaft als Passion," 90.
80. Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, iv. Haym claimed that he had devoted himself to the biography because he believed he owed it to his old friend, Max Duncker. "Friendship also comes with rights," he wrote. See Rudolf Haym to Eduard Zeller, 1 June 1891, in *Ausgewählter Briefwechsel*, ed. Rosenberg, 350.
81. All quotations are from Rudolf Haym to Charlotte Duncker, 15 September 1886, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 56, Bl. 104.
82. Horowitz, *Friendship and Politics*, 75.
83. Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, iii. Duncker's insistence that Haym write the published biography reflected, perhaps, a desire to preserve her reputation in a society that had long associated women writers with sexual promiscuity. See Clarke, *Rise and Fall of the Woman of Letters*, 7.
84. Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, iii.
85. Ansel, *Prutz, Hettner und Haym*, 250, 265–67; Rosenberg, introduction to *Ausgewählter Briefwechsel*, ed. idem, 8. Haym privately claimed that the biography contained "a bit of scholarly life, scholarly method. . . ." See Haym to Zeller, 1 June 1891, in *Ausgewählter Briefwechsel*, ed. Rosenberg, 350.
86. Rosenberg, introduction to *Ausgewählter Briefwechsel*, ed. idem, 12, 14.
87. Saunders, *Self Impression*, 10–11; Radkau, *Zeitalter der Nervosität*, 23. See also Smith, *Gender of History*, 215.
88. Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 470.

89. See again Applegate, *Nation of Provincials*.
90. Blackbourn and Retallack, introduction to *Localism, Landscape*, ed. idem, 4.
91. On the post-revolutionary "accommodation" between liberals and conservative leaders, see chapters 2 and 3.
92. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 66–67.
93. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 82.
94. See, for example, Isabella, *Risorgimento in Exile*.
95. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 155.
96. On the concept of "emotional refuge," see Reddy, *Navigation of Feeling*, 129.
97. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 156. This winter scene also drew on the legacy of Pietism and its emphasis on patriotic renewal through individual redemption. The Mathys' isolation, both psychically and politically, only served to underscore the hermetic quality of Karl Mathy's political sojourn in Switzerland—Mathy as nationalist hermit. See Lehmann, "Pietism and Nationalism," 42, 44.
98. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 143; Duncker, "Mathy," 48.
99. This dual depiction of the Swiss mountains also represented the hostility of the Swiss governments toward the masses of political refugees from Germany. See Tóth, *Exiled Generation*, 1, 7–8.
100. Both smuggling and legal trade were difficult for Confederal states, such as Austria, to track in the *Vormärz*. See Mulholland, *Bourgeois Liberty and the Politics of Fear*, 50; Nipperdey, *Germany from Napoleon to Bismarck*, 300–301. See also C. Müller, *Schmuggel politischer Schriften*.
101. C. Müller, *Schmuggel politischer Schriften*, 180–81, 186–87.
102. Lees, *Revolution and Reflection*, 68.
103. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 91, 137. See Leonhard, *Liberalismus*, 449, 463–64; Mommsen, "German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century," 416–18.
104. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 139. Mathy was also the German translator for Mazzini's *La Jeune Suisse*. See Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 95.
105. Duncker, "Mathy," 49.
106. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 139, 187.
107. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 217.
108. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 217. Nancy Kaiser writes that both Auerbach's and Freytag's fiction worked to integrate individuals into state institutions and the bourgeoisie. The two authors conveyed "reality paradigms" in which bourgeois characters and social developments met in narratives that readers, as loci of "literary work and external reality," then reproduced. See Kaiser, *Social Integration and Narrative Structure*, 9, 13, 24.
109. Wilhelm Gössmann and Klaus-Hinrich Roth argue that, beginning with the Romantics, German writers developed images of Germany with constant reference to France, as well as from the French perspective, on Germany. From its inception, this process created "competition" with French intellectuals. See Gössmann and Roth, introduction to *Poetisierung—Politisierung*, ed. idem, 13.
110. I follow George Mosse's argument about the interdependence of friendship and nationhood in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The notion of friendship shifted from one that emphasized the conscious cultivation of the individual to one that focused on friendship as a brake on uncontrolled passions and a source of unity that could be used to advance the nation. See Mosse, "Friendship and Nationhood," 355, 360. On anti-French sentiment in early German liberalism, see, for example, Gall, "Liberalismus und 'bürgerliche Gesellschaft,'" 343.
111. Lees, *Revolution and Reflection*, 15–16.
112. Jeismann, *Vaterland der Feinde*, 266–67; Biermann, *Ideologie statt Realpolitik*, 79–80.

113. Jeismann, *Vaterland der Feinde*, 274–75. See also Nolan, *Inverted Mirror*.
114. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 217.
115. Radkau, *Zeitalter der Nervosität*, 324–25; Nipperdey, *Germany from Napoleon to Bismarck*, 104.
116. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 217.
117. Habermas, *Frauen und Männer*, 247–49; Graf, *Politisierung*, 47–48. For an examination of religious variations on the German Enlightenment, see Altgeld, *Katholizismus, Protestantismus, Judentum*.
118. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 366–67.
119. Karl Mathy, diary entry for 30/31 March 1856, BArch, N2184/75, Bl. 316–17.
120. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 368. The three actually died in the year before Karl Mathy Jr.'s death.
121. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 368.
122. On nationalist notions of the German nation as God's chosen people, see Hoover, *Gospel of Nationalism*; and Lehmann, "Pietism and Nationalism."
123. Duncker, "Mathy," 62–63; GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 248, 252.
124. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 368, 371.
125. Freytag was apparently involved in a credit bank based in Leipzig. See BArch N2184/75, Bl. 313; Freytag to Mathy, 11 November 1856, in *Nach der Revolution*, ed. Jansen, 403–404. On Freytag's representation of Jews as avaricious businesspeople, see Stoetzler and Achinger, "German Modernity, Barbarous Slavs and Profit-Seeking Jews," 748.
126. Applegate, "Mediated Nation," 49–50.
127. BArch, N2184/75, Bl. 327; BArch, N2184/76, Bl. 136, 144. For more on Mathy's semi-official banking activities in Coburg and Baden, see chapters 2 and 3.
128. Duncker, "Mathy," 62.
129. Duncker, "Mathy," 62.
130. Duncker, "Mathy," 62.
131. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 379.
132. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 379, 383.
133. BArch, N2184/75, Bl. 327.
134. Brophy, "Political Calculus of Capital," 152–53; Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 222.
135. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 381–82.
136. Karl Samwer and Karl Francke found refuge in the Duchy of Coburg after participating in the Revolution of 1848/49 and the First Schleswig War. See also Biefang, *Politisches Bürgertum*, 36.
137. Duncker, "Mathy," 63.
138. Duncker, "Mathy," 63.
139. Duncker, "Mathy," 63.
140. This stratagem seems to complicate Barthes's claim that realist authors often cite other texts to support their claims of representing reality: Barthes, *S/Z*, 39.
141. See chapter 4 on the conflicts between Duke Ernst and Max Duncker in the mid-1860s.
142. Fulda, "Telling German History," 199; Ping, "Gustav Freytag," 606.
143. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 386.
144. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 633–34. This section appears to have been written later and then inserted into this section of sketches. Charlotte Duncker had apparently been asked for more information about her husband's service to the New Era government.
145. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 386.
146. Mathy noted an argument with Max Duncker in late November 1861, in which he had told Duncker that, although he loved him, he did "regret that our correspondence is dropping because we have no points of connection": BArch N2184/76, Bl. 51. Charlotte Duncker wrote that she later repaired the bonds between the two. However, Max Duncker's papers include

no letters from January 1863 to July 1864: BArch, N2184/11. Contact was not reestablished until 1865, shortly before the Mathys cut the Dunckers off again. See Charlotte Duncker to Karl Mathy and Max Duncker to Karl Mathy, 7 January 1866, BArch N2184/12, Bl. 193–96.

147. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 391.
148. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 393.
149. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 393.
150. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 393.
151. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 397.
152. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 398. Her phrase in German was "*großen Freundschaftsdienst*." This scene is just one example that highlights Charlotte Duncker's shuttling between the first and third person. Katherine R. Goodman has contended that the epistolary form of autobiography allows for multiple voices to narrate events rather than the one voice common to retrospective narration in other forms of auto/biographical writing. See K. Goodman, "Elisabeth to Meta," 311.
153. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 409.
154. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 436–42.
155. Franz von Roggenbach to Friedrich of Baden, 14 July 1863, GAK, FA Korr. 13, Bd. 30, Doc. 67.
156. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 438.
157. Gall, *Bismarck*; Pflanze, *Bismarck*, 1: 328–30; Blackbourn, *History of Germany*, 194–95. See also Leonhard, *Bellizismus und Nation*, 603.
158. Charlotte Duncker accused Samwer of being unreliable, putting Augustenburg's sovereign pretensions before national unification, and slandering Max Duncker through Augustenburg's press office in Kiel, among other failures. See GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 492, 515–16, 548.
159. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 488.
160. On the Droysens, see also GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 496–97.
161. Freytag to Ernst of Coburg, 20 December 1869, in *Freytag und Herzog Ernst*, ed. Tempeltey, 240.
162. See Gerwarth, *Bismarck Myth*, 11–12, 18.
163. Gerwarth, *Bismarck Myth*, 12–13; Pflanze, *Bismarck*, 3: 395–98.
164. Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 171, 177, 211–12.
165. Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 231.
166. Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 232.
167. Karl Samwer to Karl Mathy, 10 August 1863, BArch N2184/22, Bl. 45–46.
168. Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 262.
169. Christian liberals in Europe often saw the exercise of individual rationality and enactment of liberal policies as a means to achieve closer communion with God. See Parry, *Politics of Patriotism*, 89.
170. See Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*.

Conclusion

Until the 1990s, the period between 1848 and the early 1860s remained relatively neglected in the historiography of nineteenth-century Germany. Most historical narratives tended to focus on the Revolutions of 1848/49, dismissing much of the 1850s as a "period of reaction" before rushing on to the New Era and the Prussian constitutional crisis. Even the latter were generally portrayed as preludes to the ascendancy of Otto von Bismarck and his wars of German unification. More recently, Andreas Biefang, Christian Jansen, Anna Ross, and a small number of other scholars have challenged this view of the 1850s and 1860s: they portray the years between revolution and unification as a vitally important transitional phase of political accommodation between moderate democrats, liberals, and conservative officials—albeit still with a marked emphasis on Prussia.[1]

Conservatives such as Minister President Otto von Manteuffel resisted reactionaries' calls after 1851 to reverse all the gains of the revolutions. Manteuffel, representing reformist conservatives in Central Europe, understood that limited economic and political concessions to moderates would win support and legitimacy for the post-revolutionary monarchical state. Moderate liberals, for their part, wanted to preserve the new constitution, influence government policymaking, and, ultimately, establish a *kleindeutsch* nation-state under the Prussian monarchy. Within the network of political friends that I have focused on, liberals of varying political hues hoped that their proposals, reflecting myriad strategies and tactics, would achieve both liberal reform at home and national unification without summoning the specter of republican revolution. They were not unusual among European liberals of the time in their dependence on monarchical power to realize domestic reform and maintain social order. Nor was their insistence on constitutionalism, national unity, and basic civil rights exceptional. Like most European liberals, these political friends rejected democracy in favor of royal government guided by the counsel of propertied and educated men—by *their* counsel.

Analyzing the debates and actions of this network of otherwise neglected or forgotten historical figures through a series of granular episodes has allowed me to modify the findings of scholars such as Andreas Biefang and Christian Jansen on liberals' turn to realpolitik and political accommodation in the 1850s.[2]

German liberals "thought with their friends."[3] Why? To reconcile liberalism's ideals with everyday personal, professional, and political realities over decades of government repression, war, and political crisis. We must, therefore, not only consider the churn of political activity and decision-making in the 1850s but also look back to the 1840s and forward into the 1860s. In each of these three decades, we must consider the changing role of political friendship.

The individual political friends were initially bound together by the still vague concepts of liberalism and nationalism of the 1840s.[4] They achieved greater degrees of cohesion and consensus during the Revolutions of 1848/49 and the First Schleswig War (1848–51), in a network that remained relatively diverse and informal. In the 1850s, they weathered post-revolutionary state repression by drawing on the shared professional and emotional resources of their network while trying to reach consensus on questions of political tactics. In this spirit, they made their earliest accommodations with state power by incorporating into the network minor monarchs from Coburg and Baden. They then courted the *Wochenblatt* party of moderate liberal officials around Prince Wilhelm of Prussia while he resided in Koblenz, and they sought limited concessions from an often recalcitrant and combative government in Berlin.

Some members of the network used these connections to enter Prussian government service at the dawn of the New Era in 1858. Having "passed into the structures of authority,"[5] members such as Max Duncker were then forced to balance the common political outlooks that he and his friends had fostered in the 1850s with the legislative demands of an increasingly conservative Prussian monarch. In the meantime, other members produced detailed plans for achieving a liberal, *kleindeutsch* unification of Germany based on a collective national monarchy. Such plans included Franz von Roggenbach's comprehensive reforms drafted for Grand Duke Friedrich I of Baden, the Coburg military convention initiated by Duke Ernst, and the arguments of network princes at the Frankfurt Fürstentag of 1863. These proposals found little reception outside liberal circles. Members of the network began implicitly to ask whether core tenants of liberalism, such as constitutionalism and the rule of law, should be sacrificed for national unification under Prussian hegemony. After these challenges were exacerbated by the Prussian constitutional crisis and the 1864 war against Denmark over Schleswig-Holstein, the network dissolved in 1866.

Vanessa Rampton has argued in the context of Russian liberalism that studying a failed movement showcases the "inherent complexity and multifaceted quality" of political ideals and their practitioners.[6] In the context of the German Confederation, we have seen that the members of this network of political friends tried and largely failed to steer high politics. Simply because the political friends failed to make an *indelible* impact on high politics does not mean that political friendship was irrelevant to German political culture. Having examined an influential network of political friends through multiple lenses, we have

discovered how individuals approached political accommodations at midcentury within complex and dynamic social and political environments. We have also learned how and why many German liberals were willing by 1866 to abandon political principles and old friends in pursuit of the nation-state.

The German Confederation (1815–66) lacked many of the overarching institutions associated with nation-states, such as a single military authority or a national school system. Friendship was thus a crucial means of self-organization among liberal nationalists in Germany. It simultaneously addressed their need for emotional support, professional favors, and political discussion. Letters served as the main means of communication between individuals scattered across the Confederation's thirty-odd states. Letters had become a multivalent genre since the eighteenth century: correspondents rarely separated detailed political thought, gossip, professional issues, and emotional declarations. The relationships that constituted the network rested on a cult of epistolary friendship, a form of written sociability and intellectual exchange inherited from the eighteenth-century "republic of letters" that had supported the development of Sentimentalism and the Enlightenment.[7]

This heritage facilitated the formation of the liberal network in the 1840s and early 1850s as future members met at university and in their early careers as writers, academics, and administrators. Their family and educational backgrounds provided them with a shared vocabulary for political discussion and emotional intimacy. They became political friends, sharing lasting personal affinities, professional resources, and political beliefs. These moderate liberals wove the disparate bonds between them to fashion an informal network of political friendship. Under the threat of print confiscations, professional harassment, arrest, and exile, these liberals favored vague political agreement to avoid jeopardizing their access to the emotional and professional resources that the network provided. Emotional bonds helped these liberals solidify and expand their network, weathering state repression and advancing their careers in academia, the arts, business, and government. Political friendship was thus essential to moderate liberals and liberalism in the 1840s and 1850s. Nevertheless, network members also perpetuated an exclusive liberalism in their dismissive attitude toward women, including Charlotte Duncker, their incomprehension of Berthold Auerbach as a Jew, and their derision of democrats.

Network members' re-entry into post-revolutionary political activity began in earnest with the Crimean War (1853–56). Liberals sought to achieve national unification through the existing monarchies of the Confederation to avoid the violent revolution they had glimpsed in 1848–49. But this accommodation was difficult. The Prussian government had determined to harass these liberal academics, artists, and administrators, suggesting a discrepancy between the state's treatment of *Besitzbürger* and *Bildungsbürger*—between those who could grow

the post-revolutionary economy and those who could not.[8] The Prussian state used professional and police harassment, developed in the *Vormärz*, to batter liberals into accepting economic and political accommodation on the state's terms. Our close examination of the ways such acceptance was generated suggests that we should accept with a grain of salt the argument that the 1850s in the German Confederation represented a total "revolution in government" or the implication that Prussian conservatives acted like progressives in their expansion of state power.[9] For every Manteuffel open to reform, there was also a Hinckeldey bent on repression.

We have also seen that *kleindeutsch* liberals struck their first bargains with state power not in Berlin, but in Coburg and Karlsruhe. It was from among the network of political friends that liberals made their initial post-revolutionary accommodations with the embodiments of power in Germany—monarchs. Importantly, these accommodations began earlier than Christian Jansen has argued.[10] To develop the theory of post-revolutionary accommodation, we must therefore expand our scope to include more of the smaller German states. After 1851, core members of the network befriended monarchs, served in government, and intrigued at court—political arenas in which conservative opponents had long excelled.[11] Non-princely members of the network entered the service of self-styled liberal princes, most notably Duke Ernst II of Coburg and Grand Duke Friedrich I of Baden. Princely and non-princely liberals collaborated as political friends in supporting, for example, the Literary Association and its publications, which advocated liberal reform and national unification.

Yet, the interactions between princely and non-princely members remained a frequent source of tension in the network. The German monarchs involved sought meaningful emotional relationships based on Enlightenment notions of the equalizing, morally transformative power of friendship. At the same time, they demanded political deference from non-princely friends, as the relationship between Duke Ernst of Coburg and Gustav Freytag revealed. The place of princes among the political friends confirms that even the most liberal German princes cherished a far more authoritarian interpretation of liberalism than their bourgeois counterparts appreciated.[12] Cross-status political friendship was possible, but the bonds of friendship were fragile: personal affinities often obscured fundamental differences of political opinion. In this case, those differences concerned the role of monarchy in the future German nation-state.

The opening of German political society around 1860, with the Prussian New Era and the appointment of a moderate Austrian cabinet, offered political friends the opportunity to negotiate—or reject—individual accommodations with conservative power. The friends gained welcome but ultimately insecure political space to air their specific views and advance their goals outside the network: through civic organizations, state legislatures, and government office. Although they never questioned the merits of forming a unified *Kleindeutschland*, members

of the network did differ on *how* to reach this aim, and at what cost. Because the type of political friendship that they had cultivated in the 1840s and 1850s led them to equate political conformity with emotional well-being and professional advancement, their debates became increasingly adversarial. Put simply: the form of political friendship they had adopted could no longer sustain a network during the years of political crisis in the 1860s. This finding extends Sarah Horowitz's thesis about France—that friendship acted as a stabilizing organizational force in post-Napoleonic French politics only so long as civil society and party politics remained limited—to Germany.[13]

The central points of disagreement within the network in the 1860s were the Prussian constitutional crisis and the question of Schleswig-Holstein. The dispute over whether the Prussian Landtag or the king held the right to determine line items in the military budget grew by 1861 into a major constitutional crisis. The conflict was the first test of the network's liberal solidarity. Max Duncker ultimately made one of the earliest accommodations with conservative state power in his support for the Prussian king and Bismarck, against his political friend Heinrich von Sybel, who, after all, led the opposition in the Landtag as head of the Progressive Party. Duncker and his supporters in the network argued that an expanded Prussian military under the firm command of the king was the best means to achieve domestic liberal reform and German unification—by force, if necessary. Many other core members, by contrast, refused to sacrifice the constitutional rights of the Landtag or risk a fratricidal war for an undefined nation-state in the future. Conflict among network members reached its peak in the summer of 1863 with the "Danzig Affair." Here, the network used its connections to the international press and at monarchical courts in a campaign to punish Max Duncker for his political "apostasy." In the process, however, they unwittingly ignited a crisis within the Hohenzollern dynasty that raised fundamental questions about the role of the Prussian royal family in a future German nation-state.

It was in this complex and highly charged political environment that network liberals sought to reconcile their principles of liberalism and constitutional monarchy with the realities of Prussian-led unification. Paradoxically, Schleswig-Holstein served as both a rallying cry and a point of contention between network members. We therefore need to extend forward in time—into the 1860s—Brian Vick's argument that Schleswig-Holstein in 1848–49 played an essential role in liberals' understanding of the future of the German nation-state.[14] Most core members of the network had fought in, worked for, or reported from the Elbe duchies during the first conflict. From the winter of 1863 until the Gastein Convention of 1865, network members failed to reach consensus on the path forward, disagreeing over whether to support Augustenburg and his promises of parliamentary monarchy in Kiel or to advance the annexation of the duchies under an anti-constitutional Prussian Crown. As early as 1864, then, many

members of the network were willing to sacrifice liberal principles if doing so led to *kleindeutsch* unification.

As the shared idea of a collective national monarchy behind their reform proposals became more problematic during the Schleswig-Holstein crisis, the network members close to Duke Ernst of Coburg and Karl Samwer—like Progressives in the Landtag—insisted on the rights of the Augustenburg claimant and on the illegality of the Prussian government's actions. Other members, including the Dunckers, Rudolf Haym, and Karl Mathy, turned to Bismarck and his realpolitik. To use Christian Jansen's terms, they chose monarchical "*Macht*" at the expense of political "*Freiheit*" as they pursued what had become their overriding goal: national "*Einheit*."[15] The network of liberal political friends had been negotiating this very accommodation among themselves since the 1840s—first as persecuted political dissidents, then as government officials and courtiers. However slow, painful, and halting this process was, by the end of 1866, both sides of the crumbling network had endorsed Bismarck's North German Confederation and accepted the Indemnity Act. They had bought into the system of power, largely on terms favored by conservative monarchs and state ministers. Accommodation favored the powerful.

This period of German history proved so pivotal to their political experience that members of the former network continued for decades to (re)assess its meaning through their auto/biographical writings. The emotional bonds they had forged in a bygone era provided the voice with which they narrated the journey toward unification taken by their political friends—and themselves. Through the process of "affective characterization," members of the former network emphasized their faith in Prussia and a commitment to loyal opposition during the pre-unification era. They also used their biographical texts to settle old scores with network rivals and to explain the benefits and the dangers that political friendship presented along the road to the nation-state. Their resulting works reflected not historical reality but rather the tension between memory and narration: they were, after all, rewriting the past to serve contemporary political goals and personal desires.

Overall, this study of the network of political friends in the middle years of the nineteenth century suggests that German liberals maintained a limited capacity for personal connection, professional cooperation, and political organization across gender, religious, and status lines. Considering these individuals as a network—and vice versa—has allowed us to account for changes in the actual practice of German liberalism: neither personal motivations nor group solidarities can be understood without considering the points at which liberals' social, professional, and political lives met. Political friendship was key not only for these network members but also for thousands of other politically active Germans because it was dynamic and mutable, its boundaries unclear and accommodating.

Members of the network insisted on this convenient ambiguity into the 1860s—for too long. The initial forms of political friendship forged in the *Vormärz* could no longer bear the weight of incipient mass politics and a rapidly expanding public sphere. Network liberals doggedly pursued national unification through extra-parliamentary avenues, believing that minor monarchs would seek and implement their counsel. In the end, the national future that the friends had envisioned together for decades was realized in another form by Bismarck. Nevertheless, in their many failures and spare successes, this liberal network demonstrated the importance of political friendship to German political culture in an era marked by rapid change and rolling crises.

Notes

1. See Biefang, *Politisches Bürgertum*; Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*; Ross, *Beyond the Barricades*. See also Brophy, "Political Calculus of Capital," 149–76; Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 221; Berdahl, *Politics of the Prussian Nobility*, 5–6, 11; Levinger, *Enlightened Nationalism*, 164–65.
2. See also Biermann, *Ideologie statt Realpolitik*; Lees, *Revolution and Reflection*. Lothar Gall has argued that liberals' turn to Bismarckian realpolitik was simply cover for their "helplessness" in the face of rapid societal and economic change. See Gall, "Liberalismus und 'bürgerliche Gesellschaft,'" 354–55.
3. See Arendt, *Life of the Mind*; Leonhard, *Liberalismus*, 30.
4. Sheehan, *German Liberalism* 5; Langewiesche, *Liberalismus in Deutschland*, 13–15.
5. The phrase comes from Clark, "After 1848," 194.
6. Rampton, *Liberal Ideas in Tsarist Russia*, 187.
7. Hoffmann, "Freundschaft als Passion," 84–85; Garrioch, "From Christian Friendship to Secular Sentimentality," 16; Koschorke, *Körperströme,* 100; Mosse, "Friendship and Nationhood," 355, 360; Habermas, *Frauen und Männner*, 247–49.
8. Brophy, "Political Calculus of Capital," 152–53. See also Clark, "After 1848," 174; Ross, *Beyond the Barricades*, 13–14; Mulholland, *Bourgeois Liberty and the Politics of Fear*, 3–5; Kocka, *Industrial Culture and Bourgeois Society*, 192–93.
9. See Clark, "After 1848," 173; Ross, *Beyond the Barricades*, 198.
10. Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 261, 265, 616.
11. Ross, *Beyond the Barricades*, 10.
12. Frank Lorenz Müller has argued this in the case of Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm (later Emperor Friedrich III); see Müller, *Our Fritz*, 10, 63–64.
13. See Horowitz, *Friendship and Politics*, 156, 158–59.
14. Vick, *Defining Germany*, 142–43, 177.
15. Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 261.

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Index